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Michael Hudson discusses how the Iran war is accelerating a global economic crisis and signaling a struggle over what the world economic order will look like after the current system breaks down. He emphasizes that energy markets are central to the ripple effects, since disruptions affect fertilizer and agricultural inputs, pharmaceuticals, helium for hospital and tech uses, and highly refined fuels for transportation. In India, fertilizer prices are rising; in the U.S., farmers face constraints from higher input costs and the need to borrow to plant, risking profits as crop prices may not compensate the costs. He notes that crop traders may profit more than farmers, and that the wider impact cascades into electronics and manufacturing through electricity-intensive processes like aluminum refining. The broader point is that energy is the linchpin of the economy; a disruption in energy flows threatens production across sectors, raising unemployment and undermining manufacturing. Hudson argues that the Iran threat, and the possibility that the United States and Israel would destroy Iran’s refining capacity and electricity, would provoke a depression larger than the 1930s because the physical flow of goods would be constrained beyond what debt relief or wartime Keynesianism can fix. To avoid this, he says, the world must restructure how trade, payments, and international reserves work, which would require reform—or replacement—of the United Nations, since U.S. veto power and international-law violations hinder cooperation and the transition away from fossil fuels toward atomic, solar, or wind energy. He characterizes the current dynamic as an economic mutually assured destruction: Iran resists being crushed by U.S. and Israeli aggression, while the U.S. seeks to maintain dominance by weaponizing energy and finance. He attributes extreme risk to the U.S. political leadership, describing the internal White House tensions and the possibility of a nuclear impulse as driven by political personalities who would gamble with civilization rather than accept a loss of dominance. Hudson then contrasts Iran’s position with the U.S. and its allies, noting that U.S. military capability is constrained: the United States has burned through missiles and bombers and cannot easily invade Iran on land. Iran, despite punitive actions against its navy and air force, retains a resilient defense and decoupled administrative networks, and it wields moral authority by opposing what it sees as American-dominated, one-sided control of oil, food, and the dollar. He argues that other countries confront a choice: align with a more independent, multipolar order or accept continued pressure from the United States to surrender sovereignty or face economic isolation. He critiques the Western use of the term liberalism as misapplied, arguing that the term in contemporary discourse often denotes neoliberals who favor deregulation and reduced government, whereas, historically, public control of essential services and strategic sectors—transportation, banking, health care, education—guided growth. He compares China favorably for keeping banking under public direction and maintaining state-led credit for productive investment, arguing that Western economies have shifted toward financialization and rent-seeking, fueling inequality and instability. He posits that open, liberal trade and investment are not genuinely open under U.S. dominance, since the dollar’s supremacy and centralized control enable coercive extraction. In closing, Hudson emphasizes that the real question is what economy and political system will replace the current liberal order, with attention to why China’s model—combining public banking, subsidized infrastructure, and state-led development—has produced higher productivity and living standards. He calls for a realistic redefinition of democracy and economic policy to prevent further polarization and decline, and for an international framework that supports productive investment and equitable growth rather than financial extractivism.

Jiang Shuichin argues that rapid shifts in international power generally become highly disruptive and destabilizing, often coinciding with major world-order changes after major wars or state collapses. He says the Iran war could have wider ramifications beyond the Strait of Hormuz and the region, potentially dragging the broader world into escalating conflict. He explains that the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) has long been a major driver of the global economy by selling oil cheaply in US dollars and recycling revenue into the US economy. If GCC states were removed from the global economy, he says it would have “tremendous consequences.” He claims that within “a month or two” the world could run out of strategic fuel reserves, grounding airplanes. He also links the conflict to global food supply, stating that the Tigray War provides one third of the world’s fertilizer, and that during the global growing season widespread famine could occur within “five months” or “six months,” especially in Africa. On the Middle East’s reorientation, he argues that Iran can control the Strait of Hormuz de facto, collect tolls, and de facto use it to reconstruct its economy, industrialize, and build stronger trade relations with China and Russia. He says the US imposed a naval blockade to embargo Iranian oil exports to China, but that enforcement is difficult due to the Indian Ocean’s scale and US resource limitations. He asserts that the UAE is “most desperate for war” after losing control of trade through the region’s shipping and finance hub. He adds that Saudi Arabia faces long-term threat dynamics because Iranian influence and proxies affect both Hormuz/Straight security and the Red Sea. He claims Israel wants the war to continue to advance the “Greater Israel” project and warns it has discussed attacking Turkey and Egypt next. He frames the region as a “powder keg,” arguing it is hard for the status quo to persist and predicting possible future breakout regional hostilities, including possible US airstrikes against Tehran and possible Israeli false-flag escalation modeled on the Gulf of Tonkin incident. He suggests the status quo could last “the next three to five months,” arguing Trump would avoid being seen as a loser and might pursue a tentative agreement before shifting attention elsewhere. He presents Cuba as a potential “next global flash point,” arguing the US embargo blocks Cuba from accessing fuel, food, and water, and that Raúl Castro could be indicted, recalling a prior pattern involving Maduro and special forces. He says Russia is heavily invested in Cuba and that both Russia and China are trying to support it. He predicts the Middle East conflict could expand to other flashpoints worldwide, including the possibility of tensions involving North Korea and South Korea, and he claims the war in Europe will also escalate. In discussing Russia’s Ukraine war trajectory, he references an attack on a student dormitory in Luhansk that reportedly killed at least six students and says Putin promised swift retaliation, framing this as potential movement from a “special military operation” toward declaring war and switching to “total war.” He then argues that European elites are trapped in a self-reinforcing fantasy that Ukraine is winning, describing domestic and institutional dynamics that prevent acknowledgment of losses and sustain continued war support. Regarding China’s and Russia’s roles, he says Iranian Foreign Minister Araki visited both Russia and China and claims Putin told him Russia is supportive of the Iranian people and views the US and Israel as aggressors. He says if Iran faces difficulties, Russia would reinforce Iran through the Caspian Sea and describes Russia’s response to GCC complaints about Iran. He contrasts China’s approach as neutral and mediation-focused, arguing China seeks peace and ceasefire so the world can return to global trade and that China refuses a clear stance. He also claims China might sign an agreement with the US to buy more LNG to compensate for lost Middle East LNG, especially Qatar. He describes negotiations between the US and Iran as having “three sticking points.” The uranium issue, he says, could allow compromise through allowing international inspectors while keeping uranium. The Strait of Hormuz control, he says, is core to Iranian security and not something Iran would give up. The third sticking point is Lebanon and the requirement that any peace treaty with the US also applies to Lebanon, including Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon. He argues that Israel’s offensive in Lebanon makes lasting peace unlikely and suggests any settlement with Iran would be tentative and could resume within “at most six months.” He argues the US cannot retreat from the Iran war because US financing needs depend on the world continuing to buy US Treasuries and because continuous bombardment is limited by depleted munitions stocks after earlier sustained airstrikes. He states that to “fight this war effectively” the US would need ground troops, which he says would require a national draft and also a chain of events to justify the invasion, including a need for “justification” to rally Americans and create broader economic chaos that would make the invasion acceptable. On Israel’s “Greater Israel” project, he argues that Lebanon is part of the project and that even if the US and Iran reach tentative terms, Israel’s long-term objective would continue, preventing permanent peace. He also claims the Zionist lobby has significant political sway in the US and cites campaign spending aimed at defeating a Republican congressman to warn others. He further argues that conflict models in Europe and Asia are tied to a broader US grand strategy: shifting global conflict to sustain debt and delay economic constraints. He says the US would aim to retreat geographically while still financing and arming partners to prolong wars. For East Asia, he claims the US might allow Japan and South Korea to handle more while American forces and allied structures support containment dynamics. Finally, he argues that Taiwan’s status quo is not sustainable and points to a “grand bargain” after Trump’s China visit. He says Western reporting frames the visit as unproductive, while Chinese media and experts view it as a breakthrough that could end the trade war. He claims the bargain could involve US access to China’s financial market and China opposing Taiwan independence, with the US pausing or blocking a weapons shipment to Taiwan and considering onshoring semiconductors. He states he expects Taiwan to be a future flashpoint only near-term at minimum and argues the next major flashpoint could be North Korea rather than Taiwan. He closes by describing a Western “legitimacy crisis,” attributing it to demographic crisis, financialization, and moral decay, and arguing it will lead to a decline of Western society. He also argues immigration debates are framed as purely pro-immigrant versus racist, while culture and cultural cohesion are not addressed.

In this discussion, Zhang Shuay Shin and Speaker 1 analyze the evolving U.S.-Iran confrontation through the lens of global power dynamics, the petrodollar, and the shifting balance among major powers. - The war is framed as primarily about preserving the petrodollar. Speaker 1 argues the United States, burdened by enormous debt, seeks to maintain the dollar’s dominance by controlling energy trade through naval power and strategic choke points. The belief is that the U.S. can weaponize the dollar against rivals, as seen when it froze Russian assets and then moved to stabilize oil markets. BRICS and others are moving toward alternatives, including a gold corridor, challenging the petrodollar’s centrality. The aim is to keep Europe and East Asia dependent on U.S. energy, reinforcing American hegemony, even as historical hubris risks a global backlash turning growing powers against Washington. - The sequence of escalation over six weeks is outlined: after the American attack on Tehran and the Iranian move to close the Strait of Hormuz, the U.S. eased sanctions on Russian and Iranian oil to maintain global stability, according to Treasury statements. Escalations targeted civilian infrastructure and strategic chokepoints, with discussions of striking GCC energy infrastructure and desalination plants. A U.S. threat to “bomb Iran back to the stone age” was countered by Iran proposing a ten-point framework—encompassing uranium enrichment rights, lifting sanctions, and security guarantees for Iran and its proxies. The Americans reportedly suggested the framework was workable, but negotiations in Islamabad stalled when U.S. officials did not engage seriously. - The broader objective is posited as not simply a tactical war but a strategic move to ensure U.S. imperial supremacy by shaping energy flows. Speaker 1 speculates Trump’s motive centers on keeping the petrodollar intact, potentially forcing China and other partners to buy energy with dollars. Iran’s willingness to negotiate in Islamabad is linked to pressure from China amid China’s economic strains, particularly as energy needs and Belt and Road investments create vulnerabilities for China if Middle East energy becomes unreliable. - The proposed naval blockade is discussed as difficult to implement directly against Iran due to ballistic missiles; instead, the plan may aim to choke off alternative routes like the Strait of Malacca, leveraging trusted regional partners and allies. Iran could respond via the Red Sea (Bab al-Mandab) or other leverage, including the Houthis, challenging Western control of energy corridors. The overarching aim would be to force a global energy reorientation toward North America, though it risks long-term hostility toward the United States. - The roles of great powers are analyzed: the U.S. strategy is described as exploiting Middle East disruption to preserve the petrodollar, with short-term gains but long-term risks of a broader alliance against U.S. hegemony. Europe and Asia are pressured to adapt, with China’s energy needs especially salient as sanctions tighten Middle East supply. Russia is identified as the principal challenger to U.S. maritime hegemony, while China remains economically entangled, facing strategic incentives to cooperate with the United States if required by economic pressures. - The dialogue considers NATO and Europe, arguing that the real contest is between globalists and nationalists in the United States, with Trump viewed as an agent of empire who may threaten the existing globalist framework. The speakers discuss whether this competition will redefine alliances, the future of NATO, and the possibility that a more Eurasian-led order could emerge if Western powers fail to maintain their maritime advantages. - Finally, Russia’s role is emphasized: Moscow is seen as the key counterweight capable of challenging American maritime dominance, with the war in Iran serving, in part, to counter Russian actions in Ukraine and to incentivize alignment with Russia, China, and Iran against U.S. leadership over the next two decades.

Col. Lawrence Wilkerson and the host discuss escalating geopolitical tensions centered on Iran, Russia, China, and the United States, with examination of diplomacy, strategy, and international law. - Wilkerson notes Iran’s foreign minister Hossein Amirabdollahian’s meeting with Vladimir Putin and suggests Beijing should be part of any further diplomacy, saying the significance lies in Putin’s assertion that the US faces allies and cannot make headway unilaterally. He praises Wang Yi, Sergei Lavrov, and Abbas Kamel (Abbas Rishi) as true diplomats who execute their leadership’s will with finesse, contrasting them with what he sees as other actors. - The host reflects on Russia’s wartime aims in Ukraine and Iran’s security concerns under sanctions, arguing that both Moscow and Tehran had reasonable demands (Ukraine’s neutrality/NATO expansion, ending US threats near Iran). He asks whether a durable common ground is possible or if the conflict will become protracted, with one side capitulating. - Wilkerson outlines a broader, global contest he calls a renewed great game, with theaters in the Arctic (Russia inviting China to share its Arctic coast and potential new shipping routes), the Baltic states, Ukraine, the Caucasus, Central Asia, and the bottom theater of Iran. He asserts the conflict is being waged against China through proxies and warns that a lack of leadership in the US, including figures like Rubio, Hegseth, and Trump, jeopardizes strategic interests. - He discusses BRICS (including Russia, China, and India) and the potential for a 30,000-kilometer-per-hour Agni missile with a 5,000–7,000 mile range, highlighting its significance for multipolar alignment. He suggests this bloc could alter the global balance and accelerate moves away from US-dominated frameworks. - The host asks about US misjudgment of Iran’s resilience. Wilkerson says the US assumed air power would compel compliance, a belief he says is flawed. He critiques the emphasis on JCPOA-like outcomes that appear to offer aTrumpian victory, rather than addressing ballistic missiles and other issues. - The discussion touches international law, UNCLOS, and the Law of the Sea Treaty. Wilkerson argues the US should revisit and potentially revive international law, including UNCLOS, to manage straits like Hormuz and to reduce conflicts, noting that neither the US nor Iran has ratified UNCLOS. He criticizes the current administration for disregarding international law to serve strategic aims but stresses the need to reengage with treaties and norms. - They address Iran’s nuclear issue. Wilkerson expects attempts to frame any deal as better than Obama’s JCPOA, potentially including transfer of uranium to Russia, while the Iranians may accept a negotiated arrangement if it halts bombing. They discuss possible Turkish mediation via law-of-the-sea frameworks and international law as a stabilizing mechanism, lamenting the fecklessness of the UN and the current UN Secretary General. - The host notes Netanyahu’s difficulties in Lebanon and questions Israel’s future status as a Jewish state, predicting demographic and political challenges ahead. - On Iran’s peace proposal, Wilkerson says Trump would likely reject it to preserve leverage and position for a JCPOA-like framework, arguing that the administration’s endgame is to claim a victory and move on, regardless of regional consequences. - Finally, they anticipate a likely imminent phone call between Putin and Trump, predicting a tense exchange about Ukraine and US policy, with potential but uncertain outcomes. Wilkerson reiterates concerns about the broader multipolar shift, domestic political pressures in the US, and the risk of escalating conflicts without coherent strategy.

Glenn discusses growing fears that the Russia-Ukraine conflict is approaching a “third world war,” citing weekend attacks on Moscow, claims of Western assistance to Ukraine, and attacks “coming from NATO territory” without permission from Baltic states and Finland. He notes Europe mass-producing or intending to mass-produce long-range strike weapons to strike deep inside Russia, and asks Professor John Mearsheimer how events may develop, what options Russia has, and what futures lie ahead. Mearsheimer says Ukrainians are escalating against the Russian homeland. Earlier in the war they relied mainly on missiles under limits from Europeans and Americans; now they have turned to drones and developed a significant drone force capable of striking into Russia. He argues drone damage is not enough to affect the war’s outcome meaningfully, but warns the danger is continued escalation: drone attacks rising over time, and later missiles being added, resulting in combined missile-and-drone attacks on Russia. He says the key question is what Russia will do in response. He reports that Sergei Karaganov argues Russia should strike European targets to send a signal that actions are unacceptable, starting with conventional weapons and then—if necessary—nuclear weapons. Mearsheimer says Karaganov claims that while the idea was previously a minority view, now most Russians Mearsheimer speaks to agree, arguing Russia is “fed up” and that escalating attacks on the Russian homeland are unacceptable. Glenn suggests further escalation may occur beyond retaliation, including more brutal attacks on Ukraine and conventional attacks against countries such as Germany or Estonia, and raises discussions about Ukraine possibly “liberating Moldova” from Transnistria, where thousands of Russian troops are present, as another escalation pathway. Mearsheimer frames the conflicts as lacking bargaining space—comparing them to the Iran conflict between Iran and the United States/Israel. He says both sides see the other as an existential threat, leaving no room for negotiation, and that desperation drives risky behavior. Regarding diplomacy, Glenn questions how diplomacy can fail repeatedly. Mearsheimer says there is “zero bargaining space” because Russia sees Ukraine and European positions as existential threats, while Europe and Ukraine increasingly view Russia’s success in Ukraine as an existential threat. He adds that the United States does not view Russia as an existential threat, implying Trump is willing to bargain, but Europeans and Ukrainians do not want to negotiate the deal Trump proposes. He says Trump may have “washed his hands” of a diplomatic settlement and believes the war must be settled on the battlefield. Glenn then asks whether the United States would join if Russia struck Estonia. Mearsheimer says Karaganov’s framework involves attacking NATO countries with conventional weapons, which in the past would almost guarantee U.S. involvement. He says it is unclear what Trump would do, but emphasizes that once escalation begins, nuclear weapons are in the background. He describes the escalation ladder as being “felt in the dark,” where nuclear use is a rung that everyone wants to avoid, giving nuclear threats “huge deterrent value.” Glenn returns to deterrence and escalation dynamics, suggesting NATO is overly confident Russia is deterred, while Russia waits and then takes bigger steps. Mearsheimer says even limited conventional missile strikes into NATO countries—killing hardly anyone—would be a huge step because they would strike NATO members. He also argues Russia is winning the war and that drones have slowed Russian territory gains, making progress incremental. He concludes that slow battlefield progress, no bargaining space, and rising homeland attacks make serious escalation likely, and that Russia may only need a major conventional step to trigger a “gigantic leap forward.” He further argues narrative incentives increase the risk: if the West believes Russians are losing momentum, Europeans and Ukrainians may increase attacks on Russian homeland. He says rebranding in the West could also shape decisions, including how people describe the Iran war’s objectives. Glenn pivots to Iran, saying it may be “hours away” or within 20–48 hours, and asks how it may develop. Mearsheimer says Iranian and American settlement proposals are “light years apart,” with no public evidence of behind-closed-doors concessions. He describes the sequence as a 40-day bombing campaign failing, followed by a ceasefire and a blockade strategy that also is not working; he says time is something Trump does not have because of economic consequences. He argues Trump’s choices appear to be restart bombing or cut a deal on Iran’s terms, and that returning to bombing would not cause Iranian surrender, while increasing incentives for Iran to escalate attacks across the Gulf, including threats to shut down the Red Sea and damage key infrastructure. When Glenn asks about strengthening the blockade by moving it (e.g., toward the Strait of Malacca), Mearsheimer says the location does not matter much; the blockade is not inflicting sufficient punishment to get Iran to surrender, and if the Strait of Hormuz is closed, economic damage worsens over time. He says Iran and Gulf countries are working on ways to beat the blockade, complicating any attempt to inflict punishment strong enough to force surrender. Glenn asks about the broader U.S. strategy amid multipolarity claims and the sense that diplomacy is failing. Mearsheimer says the U.S. is shifting the burden of Ukraine onto Europeans, is working to prevent crises or war in East Asia involving the U.S., and is deeply involved in fighting in the Middle East—specifically the Iran war. He concludes that the U.S. is unlikely to accept defeat in a war once involved, tying it to lessons from Vietnam: entering wars is easier than getting out, and the U.S. searches for ways to win even when defeat is recognized. He says there is reason to believe Trump may return to a massive bombing campaign driven by desperation, but that it still would not work. He adds that a “meltdown” may be overstated, drawing on historical comparison between Johnson in Vietnam and Trump’s potential political fate, while arguing Trump has “no good option.” Glenn asks about additional “cards” the U.S. could play through regional actors or proxies. Mearsheimer says no comparable proxy force exists to match what Ukraine represented, and argues that if the U.S. and Israel together could not defeat Iran, then other actors like the UAE by themselves are not positioned to take on Iran. In closing, Glenn notes fears of more escalation in both Ukraine and Iran and says the situation ahead may be “very troubling.” Mearsheimer agrees and calls the escalation ladder framing “very depressing,” ending with the theme that once conflicts begin, escalation and difficulty exiting are persistent.

In this conversation, Brian Berletic discusses the current collision between the United States’ global strategy and a rising multipolar world, arguing that U.S. policy is driven by corporate-financier interests and a desire to preserve unipolar primacy, regardless of the costs to others. - Structural dynamics and multipolar resistance - The host notes a shift from optimism about Trump’s “America First” rhetoric toward an assessment that U.S. strategy aims to restore hegemony and broad, repeated wars, even as a multipolar world emerges. - Berletic agrees that the crisis is structural: the U.S. system is driven by large corporate-financier interests prioritizing expansion of profit and power. He cites Brookings Institution’s 2009 policy papers, particularly The Path to Persia, as documenting a long-running plan to manage Iran via a sequence of options designed to be used in synergy to topple Iran, with Syria serving as a staging ground for broader conflict. - He argues the policy framework has guided decisions across administrations, turning policy papers into bills and war plans, with corporate media selling these as American interests. This, he says, leaves little room for genuine opposition because political power is financed by corporate interests. - Iran, Syria, and the Middle East as a springboard to a global confrontation - Berletic traces the current Iran crisis to the 2009 Brookings paper’s emphasis on air corridors and using Israel to provoke a war, placing blame on Israel as a proxy mechanism while the U.S. cleanses the region of access points for striking Iran directly. - He asserts the Arab Spring (2011) was designed to encircle Iran and move toward Moscow and Beijing, with Iran as the final target. The U.S. and its allies allegedly used policy papers to push tactical steps—weakening Russia via Ukraine, exploiting Syria, and leveraging Iran as a fulcrum for broader restraint against Eurasian powers. - The aim, he argues, is to prevent a rising China by destabilizing Iran and, simultaneously, strangling energy exports that feed China’s growth. He claims the United States has imposed a global maritime oil blockade on China through coordinated strikes and pressure on oil-rich states, while China pursues energy independence via Belt and Road, coal-to-liquids, and growing imports from Russia. - The role of diplomacy, escalation, and Netanyahu’s proxy - On diplomacy, Berletic says the U.S. has no genuine interest in peace; diplomacy is used to pretext war, creating appearances of reasonable engagement while advancing the continuity of a warlike agenda. He references the Witch Path to Persia as describing diplomacy as a pretext for regime change. - He emphasizes that Russia and China are not credibly negotiating with the U.S., viewing Western diplomacy as theater designed to degrade multipolar powers. Iran, he adds, may be buying time but also reacting to U.S. pressure, while Arab states and Israel are portrayed as proxies with limited autonomy. - The discussion also covers how Israel serves as a disposable proxy to advance U.S. goals, including potential use of nuclear weapons, with Trump allegedly signaling a post-facto defense of Israel in any such scenario. - The Iran conflict, its dynamics, and potential trajectory - The war in Iran is described as a phased aggression, beginning with the consulate attack and escalating into economic and missile-strike campaigns. Berletic notes Iran’s resilient command-and-control and ongoing missile launches, suggesting the U.S. and its allies are attempting to bankrupt Iran while degrading its military capabilities. - He highlights the strain on U.S. munitions inventories, particularly anti-missile interceptors and long-range weapons, due to simultaneous operations in Ukraine, the Middle East, and potential confrontations with China. He warns that the war’s logistics are being stretched to the breaking point, risking a broader blowback. - The discussion points to potential escalation vectors: shutting Hormuz, targeting civilian infrastructure, and possibly using proxies (including within the Gulf states and Yemen) to choke off energy flows. Berletic cautions that the U.S. could resort to more drastic steps, including leveraging Israel for off-world actions, while maintaining that multipolar actors (Russia, China, Iran) would resist. - Capabilities, resources, and the potential duration - The host notes China’s energy-mobility strategies and the Western dependency on rare earth minerals (e.g., gallium) mostly produced in China, emphasizing how U.S. war aims rely on leveraging allies and global supply chains that are not easily sustained. - Berletic argues the U.S. does not plan for permanent victory but for control, and that multipolar powers are growing faster than the United States can destroy them. He suggests an inflection point will come when multipolarism outruns U.S. capacity, though the outcome remains precarious due to nuclear risk and global economic shocks. - Outlook and final reflections - The interlocutors reiterate that the war is part of a broader structural battle between unipolar U.S. dominance and a rising multipolar order anchored by Eurasian powers. They stress the need to awaken broader publics to the reality of multipolarism and to pursue a more balanced world order, warning that the current trajectory risks global economic harm and dangerous escalation.

China uses other countries like Russia, Iran, and Hamas for its own benefit, without any real loyalty or friendship. Similarly, these countries rely on China for economic aid and military defense when they face isolation and sanctions from the US and its allies. This transactional relationship presents an opportunity for the US to intervene and disrupt these alliances. There is no honor among thieves, and when China, Iran, Russia, North Korea, Hamas, and Hezbollah are all considered, they can be described as thieves or even violent extremists.

Brandon and Kieran Andrew discuss the mounting regional dynamics as the Iran war drags into its fourth week. They agree on the possibility of serious unrest in at least one or two Arab countries in the coming years, though they caution not to overstate things. They note that the Gulf states lack a strong social contract, so economic volatility and external shocks could push instability, even if regimes recalibrate and survive. Kieran argues the perception in the region is that Iran has punched above its weight, pursuing a strategy of absorbing losses while raising costs for opponents, especially the US and Israel. Across the region, people are furious with the disruption and violence, privately blaming Israel and the United States for attacking Iran, even if publicly they maintain official narratives. Sovereignty violations against Iran are seen as justification for Iranian retaliation, with regimes prioritizing survival and counterattack. They touch on Bahrain as a case study: civil and political fragility, with Shiite civilians allegedly assisting Iranian targeting, and the Bahrain monarch’s status complicating regional dynamics. This feeds into the broader idea that a new Arab Spring is plausible in the Gulf as governments face popular pressures and a deteriorating social contract. Brandon reflects on the American role, noting the US prioritized defending Israeli targets over its own bases in the region, which erodes trust among Arab states. This feeds a fear that American retreat could materialize, altering long-standing regional alignments and making it harder to maintain bases or security commitments. The conversation shifts to the US-Israel relationship. They discuss the “wolf’s milk of nationalism” and how many Israelis are conditioned to view themselves as besieged and exceptional, which shapes policy and public opinion. They critique a top Israeli official’s stance that the Strait of Hormuz is not Israel’s concern, calling it insane and arguing that open sea lanes affect everyone. They contrast Israel’s unified national narrative with the region’s broader interests, suggesting that the Israeli leadership often acts in ways that may be unsustainable in the long run. They discuss the economics of the conflict. The IEA highlighted that oil shocks in 1973 and 1979 produced a combined loss of about 10 million barrels per day; in this war, about 11 million barrels per day have been lost on average. Gas losses are also significant, with 2022 spikes reversing and accelerating inflation. They warn about broader macro effects: rising inflation (Goldman Sachs predicting 4.5% in the US), higher interest rates, stock market risks, and potential AI-related energy and helium shortages that could undermine tech-driven growth. They emphasize that this energy shock could feed a broader recession in the West. They debate possible endgames. Scenario one: Trump constructs a narrative that the US won, reaching a face-saving deal with Iran to “cover up” a catastrophic outcome; Iran then consolidates a more entrenched, economically weakened regime, and the US must manage the fallout with bases and allies. Scenario two: deployment of US troops leads to a quagmire, with escalating casualties and a draw-out conflict that could push toward nuclear risk. Scenario three: arguably not distinct, but a continued escalation toward wider conflict, potentially drawing in adversaries or increasing regional volatility. They see scenario two as more likely, driven by Israeli pressure and ongoing US engagement, possibly culminating in escalation to nuclear threats. They consider Russia and China’s roles. Russia is viewed as aligned with China; China is playing a cautious, calculating game, avoiding direct involvement while expanding its influence through trade and joint exercises with client states. They argue China’s approach could accelerate American decline and shift influence toward Beijing’s orbit over the next 15–30 years, with Pacific allies and others gravitating toward China for stability and economic ties, even if not openly allied. Iran remains central. They discuss Iran’s resilience: even if economic conditions deteriorate, the regime could deepen its internal consolidation and broaden its persistence through institutions and praetorian guard support. If nukes were used or if retaliation escalates, the regime’s survivability would hinge on its decentralized structure and potential for hardline consolidation. Brandon asks about the possible brain drain and long-term sustainability of Israel if the conflict endures. Kieran warns that even if Israel survives militarily, it faces a Pyrrhic victory with existential threats from within, including demographic shifts, brain drain, and an economy sustained by a war footing and American aid, which may not be sustainable in the long run. Brain drain and domestic social fractures could undermine Israel’s stability and economic vitality, especially once the immediate military crisis subsides. Towards the end, they acknowledge that the war’s trajectory will likely redefine US influence, the Gulf’s political landscape, and Israel’s future. They conclude with mutual acknowledgment of the complexities, agreeing that the situation is poised to reshape regional and global power dynamics for years to come, and that the path forward remains uncertain and dangerous. They sign off with plans to reconnect, noting Kieran’s Navarra Live and other media appearances.

Glenn and Professor Zhang discuss the trajectory of global conflict and the transformation of the world order. Zhang presents several lines of evidence and reasoning for a destabilizing, multi-polar era that could culminate in a broader conflict akin to World War III, with 2026 identified as a period of potential flare-ups. Evidence and triggers pointing toward greater conflict: - The American National Security Strategy recently published argues that “the order has dissipated. It’s gone,” and that America must protect its own national self-interest, primarily in the Western Hemisphere, through a “mineral doctrine” and a Trump corollary to enforce it. China’s and Russia’s encroachment in South America, notably via China’s investments, is cited as a trigger for U.S. assertiveness, including the Caribbean concentration of naval assets and actions affecting Venezuela’s oil. - The Russia-Ukraine war is described as effectively over, with morale in Ukraine collapsed and large-scale desertions; Europe contemplates using seized Russian assets to fund Ukraine and avoid a peace that could allow Russia to consolidate gains. Europe’s intended loans to Ukraine and the fear that Russia could challenge European supremacy are highlighted. - In the Middle East, the Israel–Iran dynamic is seen as increasingly unstable, with predictions of Israel attacking Hezbollah and Lebanon within weeks, and ongoing friction around the Hamas peace deal. Iran is portrayed as a pivot in a broader Eurasian alliance that could threaten Western interests if Iran’s lines of trade and energy routes are integrated with Russia and China. - The overall global contest is framed as a struggle over the new world order: the shift from a liberal, rules-based order to multipolar competition where the U.S. seeks to maintain dominance through deterrence, sanctions, and allied proxies. Historical patterns and structural analysis: - Zhang invokes historical analogies, noting the rise and fall pattern of empires, the McKinder Heartland Thesis, and the dynamics of Britain’s naval supremacy that aimed to keep Eurasia fragmented to prevent a continental power from unifying the region. He argues that today China’s rise, paired with U.S. efforts to sustain dominance, pushes toward a similar pendulum where a Eurasian continental system could emerge if Russia, China, Iran, and possibly India align economically and politically. - The BRICS alliance and Iran as a pivot are emphasized: America’s debt-dominated reserve currency system pushes BRICS and Iran closer together, forming a potential continental trade network that could bypass Western-dominated channels. America’s strategy, in this view, is to “economically strangle China,” deny China access to South American minerals, and use allies to counter Beijing while promoting divide-and-rule tactics in Asia. - The discussion suggests that a war could be expanded by a domino effect: a Venezuela operation could draw Cuba, Nicaragua, Brazil, and other regional players into conflict; a wider confrontation could involve the Hormuz Strait, Odessa, and European troop commitments, creating a global escalation. Domestic dimension and leadership implications: - Zhang cites Arthur Spengler’s decline indicators for Western societies: over-urbanization, declining birthrates, extreme inequality, proxy warfare, and cultural decadence, coupled with immigration and fear-based policies that suppress open discourse (examples include social-media surveillance and visa requirements tied to political speech). - He asserts that Western leadership has become addicted to projection and proxy wars, shedding the liberal pretenses that once underpinned its strategy, and that a collapse of confidence and cohesion could accompany, or even drive, a broader conflict. Conclusion and prognosis: - The conversation converges on a bleak frame: the end of U.S. hegemony and a transition to a multipolar order with rising powers, where the possibility of a large-scale war remains real and not easily contained. Zhang argues that the current trajectory does not easily revert to a peaceful status quo and that the 2020s could be a period of sustained tensions and escalations, potentially lasting a decade or more. He acknowledges that he hopes to be proven wrong and would personally prefer a peaceful resolution, but maintains that the next period may be defined by a significant, multipolar contest in which proxies and great-power competition are central.

In this conversation, the speakers discuss a high-profile operation centered on Maduro’s kidnapping, its implications, and broader geopolitical consequences. - The operation to capture Maduro is described as not a regime change but an action intended to “hold off Maduro, get US control of the oil, and get China and Russia and Iran out.” A senior Venezuelan security official is identified as a full cooperator with the United States, allowing US forces to enter “the front door” with minimal resistance and no return fire. The plan reportedly involved a coordinated assault with Venezuelan forces, and while several air defenses were destroyed or not activated, most were not deployed due to a stand-down order. The operation did not replace the Venezuelan government; Maduro remained in power, at least for the moment. - For context on the execution, Speaker 1, who has experience scripting Delta Force and SEAL Team Six exercises, notes the mission took place in full moonlight (unusual for planned clandestine night operations). He claims the Venezuelan air defenses were substantial but largely avoided activation because of the stand-down order, enabling a seamless entry for US forces. He compares this to a counterterrorism exercise in the US years earlier—staged surveillance and pre-positioned access that eliminated obstacles in advance. - Casualties and aftermath are uncertain. There are conflicting reports on casualties among Cubans and Venezuelans, with no clear names or numbers yet confirmed. The operation involved collaboration with Venezuelan forces and did not topple the Maduro regime. - On the motive and internal dynamics, Speaker 1 suggests multiple potential actors within Maduro’s circle could have incentives to cooperate with the US, possibly including financial or visa-based incentives. The possibility of infiltrators within intelligence, military, or police is raised. The role of a specific senior official who allegedly ordered a stand-down is mentioned, though not named. - Questions about the rocket attack on a US chopper are raised, with speculation that it might have been a lone actor or a malfunction rather than a deliberate act by a large organized force. - The discussion turns to the interim president Delcy Rodríguez. While theories exist that she cooperated with the US, Speaker 1 says that the theory of her involvement is likely a cover story designed to divert attention from those actually involved. - The broader geopolitical frame emphasizes that this is not about regime change in Venezuela, but about oil access and limiting adversaries. The conversation suggests a recurring US strategy: remove Maduro, gain oil leverage, and push rivals like China, Russia, and Iran out of influence. The hypothesis includes using economic and political pressure and, if necessary, military options, while acknowledging the risk of drawing wider regional opposition and potential escalation. - The discussion then broadens to the US role in the multipolar order. The speakers debate whether the world is tilting toward a multipolar system or a reinforced US unipolar order. They agree that the reality is mixed: Russia and China are building a new international order with India and Brazil, while US actions—such as threats against Venezuela, arms packages to Taiwan, and support for Ukraine—signal both erosion of hegemony and attempts to sustain influence. - The Monroe Doctrine is critiqued. The speakers contend that the so-called Dunro Doctrine (a term they use to describe perceived US interference) misreads the historical framework. They argue that the Monroe Doctrine was never a proclamation of exclusive US dominance in the Western Hemisphere; instead, the US has historically faced resistance as other powers gain influence. - Iran and the Middle East are discussed at length. The twelve-day war (in reference to Iran’s confrontation with Israel) is described as not severely weakening Iran militarily, though it has economic and political strains. Iran’s allies (Russia, China) have become more engaged since sanctions relief began in September, and Iran has pursued stronger economic ties with both Russia and China, including a potential North–South Corridor. Iran reportedly rejected a mutual defense treaty with Russia initially but later pursued stronger cooperation after the conflict. Iran’s leadership is described as consolidating power and preparing for potential future conflicts, while the protests inside Iran are depicted as largely manufactured or at least amplified by Western intelligence networks, though there is genuine internal discontent over currency and economic conditions. - The panelists debate whether the US could or would attempt another targeted strike on Iranian leadership. They argue that the US would face greater risk and likely casualties if attempting a similar operation without a compatible insider network, making a repeat Maduro-like capture unlikely. - Final reflections acknowledge that the US’s global influence is eroding, but the US remains deeply involved in global affairs. The discussion ends with a cautionary stance toward US hegemonic assumptions and recognition of a rising multipolar framework in which China, Russia, and allied states exert greater influence in Latin America, the Middle East, and beyond.

The conversation centers on a view that the United States has failed in its proxy conflicts with Russia and Iran and that power is shifting to a multipolar world led by non-Western states. Stanislav Krapivnik argues that Russia’s pivot away from the West undercuts Western unity and that Europe is increasingly exposed as the West’s policies erode, with Russia becoming a leading anti-Western force for years to come. He frames the shift as not just multipolar but anti-Western in direction, noting that Russia’s stance has turned against the West and that the West’s “genocidal” actions and moral claims have damaged its legitimacy. He also asserts that the West’s actions have helped bring to power leadership in both Russia and Iran who are less amenable to Western influence. He highlights Trump’s regime-change actions as reflecting realignments away from West-facing regimes and notes the long-running Iranian threat as a consequence of Western policy. Key points covered include: - The shift from a Western-centered world order to a multipolar order led by non-Western powers, with Russia and Iran resisting U.S. and European influence. - Russia’s movement away from Western integration toward an anti-Western bloc, and the idea that the West’s moral posture has deteriorated, with calls that Europe’s rulers have failed to uphold moral standards while supporting aggressive actions. - Iran’s history of being pro-Western but ultimately rejecting Western dominance after regime-change attempts and pro-West leadership were removed; the discussion notes that Iran has demonstrated resilience by countering Western pressure and has weakened American influence in the region by striking American targets and allied interests. - Ukraine as a proxy conflict, with NATO involvement, and the view that Western leaders are pushing Ukraine into escalating confrontations with Russia. The speaker cites evidence that NATO and U.S. forces are deeply involved, including drone and missile strikes attributed to American planning or directive, and suggests that Europe’s leadership is moving toward broader war, despite public appeals for limited engagement. - The role of Turkey and the Baltic states: Turkey’s shifting position and its anger over Ukrainian actions; the Baltic states’ treatment of Russian minorities and the geopolitical risk of escalation if Estonia’s airspace is used for drone strikes against Russia, seen as potentially triggering a larger European conflict. - The argument that Europe’s security architecture is collapsing under its own hubris and dependence on the United States, with accusations that European populations are being molded toward war, militarization, and possibly even mobilization and conscription in several states (Germany, Poland, etc.). - The claim that deterrence must be reasserted; the speaker argues for making an example of Estonia as a warning to deter further cross-border aggression and to prevent a larger war, asserting that Europe’s leaders are too eager to escalate, risking a broader confrontation with Russia. - The broader cultural and historical analysis of Europe’s relation to Russia, including Peter the Great’s attempts to connect with Western Europe and Russia’s long-standing pendulum between East and West, with the speaker asserting that today Russia views itself as separate from Europe, forming a distinct civilization and political orientation. - The potential for a larger war in the near term if European leadership does not adopt a more prudent approach; the speaker warns that Orban’s political fate could accelerate conflict, and emphasizes that Europe must acknowledge deterrence realities or face nuclear risks. - The closing remarks echo Easter greetings, with the speaker returning to the grim prognosis of European demographic and political trajectories, highlighting a view that Western policy has empowered elites while threatening mass casualties and societal upheaval in Europe.

- The speaker asserts that the United States is not just containing China but is attempting a rollback of Chinese economic growth, arguing that military power is largely a function of economic power. - They claim, “The United States… is a ruthless great power,” and that Americans are tough despite liberal rhetoric used to cover up ruthless behavior. - The speaker recounts a late-1980s/early-1990s warning to China: if China continues to grow economically, there will be a fierce security competition, and China would be shocked by how ruthless the United States is. - They state that China did not believe the warning at the time because the United States was treating China very well. - The speaker explains the underlying mechanism: “the structure’s gonna change, and when we go from unipolarity to multipolarity, and you’re a peer competitor, we’re gonna think about you very differently than we think about you now.” - They claim that this structural shift is exactly what is happening, with China moving toward being a peer competitor and the United States now treating China differently as a result.

Apparently, the strategy is to weaken Russia, which is essentially a state of war. The aim is to remove Putin, replace his administration, and potentially divide Russia. This stems from the neoconservative movement, which has always been anti-Soviet and anti-Russian, pushing for a strong, challenging America. However, America can't challenge Russia, especially since the U.S. military isn't ready for war. The U.S. is using the Ukrainian military as cannon fodder, fighting over pride and fear of a Russian/Chinese economic takeover. America shouldn't go to war for trade, even if it means becoming number two or three economically. The world is multipolar, but the U.S. hasn't accepted this. People don't realize how destructive even a limited war would be. The situation is much more dangerous than people realize because America is too prideful and arrogant and will be nasty when it doesn't get its way in Ukraine.

Lawrence Wilkerson and Glenn discuss a fragile ceasefire in Southwest Asia and what it signals about broader geopolitics and U.S. strategy. - Ceasefire prospects and Lebanon: Wilkerson says, as a military professional, ceasefires need the first week or two to establish, and with Iran-related communications, longer to restore contact with dispersed forces. He notes Netanyahu’s continued bombing in Lebanon and Beirut, arguing this is a major impediment to a durable ceasefire, with Iran having made clear that if Lebanon is not part of the ceasefire the deal may fail. - NATO and U.S. commitments: Wilkerson declares NATO effectively dead, though not formally, predicting the U.S. will disengage from NATO in practice as Ukraine’s conflict accelerates the decline. He links this to a broader reevaluation of U.S. alliances, suggesting a shift away from formal alliances toward other strategic arrangements, especially given changes in Europe, East Asia, and the Middle East. - U.S. role in Southwest Asia: He argues the United States is moving toward “offshore balancing” or withdrawal from the region, citing aging maritime assets, vulnerable aircraft carriers, and a changing energy/security architecture that lessens the need for a permanent U.S. ground presence. He predicts a transformation where pipelines and land routes become more important than sea routes, with Central Asia (Caspian energy) and the broader Eurasian land corridor strengthening, while Gulf oil dynamics and the Arab-Israeli tie weaken. - Russia and China in a multipolar world: Wilkerson contends power is shifting toward a multipolar order. He suggests Russia will become a major land and maritime power, leveraging Arctic routes and expanding naval reach, while China leverages both the Belt and Road and maritime interests (including deep-sea fishing and ports). He emphasizes the need to accept this shift rather than fight it, warning against a Thucydides trap scenario if the U.S. doubles down on containment. - The Middle East and regional realignments: He describes potential strategic shifts, such as Saudi Arabia redirecting Gulf investment toward Syria and away from Israel, and Israel’s future as a “tool” rather than the driver of U.S. policy. He fears Israel’s days could be numbered if the wider regional energy and political alignments move against it and if U.S. support falters. He calls for a genuine two-state framework and democracy in Israel for long-term viability, but doubts such changes will occur given current leadership. - U.S. domestic politics and leadership: The discussion touches on the perceived degradation of U.S. institutions (Congress, Supreme Court) and political finance concerns (Citizens United). Wilkerson criticizes the leadership around Donald Trump and Pete Hegseth, accusing them of pursuing religious-nationalist agendas and purging military leadership to build a partisan base. He cites the potential for internal conflict, including a possible civil dimension in the United States, exacerbated by polarization and militarized factions. - Iran and diplomacy: Wilkerson presents two opposing paths for the Iran question: a subterfuge scenario where negotiations are used to lull Iran into a false sense of security, followed by renewed pressure, or a serious diplomatic track led by a serious U.S. president to end the war and negotiate a settlement that satisfies Iran’s terms (reparations, sanctions removal, regional security guarantees). He doubts the current leadership will pursue genuine diplomacy, anticipating muddled outcomes or renewed strikes. - The ceasefire’s optics and escalation: He suggests the ceasefire could be a tactical pause while threats of escalation persist, with the Iranians possibly misreading U.S. diplomacy. He notes the risk of renewed Israeli actions against Iranian targets or proxies, and the potential for further bombardment or military missteps (citing past U.S. missteps as cautionary examples). - Cultural and geopolitical macro-trends: Wilkerson emphasizes the erosion of Western-led order, the rising importance of land-based energy and trade corridors, and the need to recalibrate how the United States engages a rising, multipolar world. He uses historical analogies (Halford Mackinder, Monroe Doctrine) to describe the strategic pivot toward inland power centers and away from exclusive maritime dominance. - Concluding outlook: The conversation ends on a bleak note about continued instability, the potential for regional and domestic turmoil, and the sense that without new leadership and a fundamental rethinking of strategy, the current trajectory risks further deterioration of global stability and U.S. influence.

Richard Wolff and Glenn discuss the implications of the Trump–Xi meeting in Beijing for the US economy, the global economy, and the political economy underlying the encounter. Wolff frames it as part of a broader transition in human history: the decline of American “empire” dominance that has existed since at least World War II, and the rise of China. He argues the US is pulled downward by the end of its dominance and that China has outperformed the West in economic growth over the past thirty to forty years, citing China’s GDP growth about three times the US average (about two to two and a half percent annually for the US). Wolff claims Trump and Xi’s meeting reveals asymmetrical timing. He says one side wants free trade, multilateralism, and open cooperation, while the other side tries to “smash the Chinese down every chance they get,” without success. He also argues China’s approach is distinct: a developmental hybrid combining roughly half of the economy as private capitalist enterprises and the other half as state-owned and state-operated enterprises, all managed by a powerful government supervised by the Communist Party of China. Wolff presents this as “sui generis,” neither the US/Western model nor the Soviet model. He describes a decades-long contest among “private capitalism,” “state capitalism” (including the Soviet system), and China’s hybrid system, saying the Soviet socialism collapsed, leaving Scandinavian/Western European socialism and a Chinese form of socialism. Wolff asserts China “won” at least at this point because China achieved rapid development from extreme poverty to a highly developed standard of living and strong economic dynamism, in spite of receiving little direct external development help compared with other countries. He says China supervised and regulated the process even as private capitalists played an important role in later decades. Wolff then argues the strategic logic of the meeting centers on avoiding war. He says China benefits from time on its side and wants to avoid “rocking the boat,” while the US leadership seeks freedom to resuscitate an imperial order and expects Chinese cooperation. He presents Iran as a “microcosm” of this clash: US aims include removing the Iranian regime, replacing it with a US client, and subdividing Iran, while Wolff says China wants Iran left in place so it can manage the Strait of Hormuz as before and remain aligned with Russia and China. He states China is not driven by oil urgency, citing large Chinese oil reserves, and says the US project fails and has cascading consequences. Wolff extends the argument to propose that the US attempts to revive dominance through energy control (he mentions attacks related to Russia’s energy, Venezuela, Iran, and other oil-related efforts) reflect “empire fantasy.” He argues these actions reveal a broader phenomenon: a decline in US control rather than an ability to impose outcomes. He adds that American public opinion is largely opposed to war, noting that unlike earlier conflicts where patriotic support faded over time with costs and casualties, he says there is already no appetite now, and that domestic economic concerns matter more than grandiose foreign projects. He also references the controversy around a White House “ballroom” as an example of political symbolism amid economic priorities. In response, Glenn asks about how shifting power should change ideological assumptions about development and about what each side wants from the other. Wolff says China’s position is to resolve problems and prevent explosive issues, potentially including disputes such as Taiwan, while the US cannot hear or accept China’s appeal to avoid warfare and instead wants room to restore the empire. He concludes that major issues are at stake even if reported discussion points seem limited, and he expects further efforts by a “declining empire” to preserve its sense of remaining time.

Ashwin Rutansi introduces New Order, a global show tracing how India and its allies sit at the center of a transformation in world history. The program aims to explore partnerships, shifting alliances, and how structural changes ripple from global powers to streets, villages, markets, and boardrooms. The show promises to examine diplomatic architecture, networks of power, money flows, and levers of influence, presenting a fundamental reordering rather than mere turbulence. Zara Khan will join later to field viewer questions. Guest: John Mearsheimer, University of Chicago professor and coauthor of The Israel Lobby and US Foreign Policy. The discussion opens with the recent incident of Iran firing missiles at an F-35 and what it implies given anticipated US and allied arms purchases. Mearsheimer notes that aircraft over adversary territory face real risks from surface-to-air missiles and air defenses, even if the US and Israel have degraded Iran’s defenses. He suggests this is a factor behind why the US and Israel refrain from flying over Iran. Geopolitical framing: Who benefits from the ongoing war (in Iran) at the time of the interview? Mearsheimer identifies two clear winners: Russia and China. Russia benefits from sanctions relief on oil and gas pushed by Trump-era policies, and the war diverts munitions away from Ukraine, aiding Russia in its position. China gains as US credibility in foreign policy deteriorates, increasing its influence in the Middle East and globally as nations worry about an unreliable US, with Europe showing signs of leaning toward China. India’s position is discussed as a potential loser in this new order. The discussion asserts that India’s relations with Israel and Iran, and its ties to both the US and the Gulf, place it in a precarious position. The possibility of a summit or peace conference is deemed unlikely to solve inflation, gas prices, fertilizer costs, or Indian food production challenges; the war is characterized as bad news for India, as reflected in Indian media. On US policy and the Israel lobby: Mearsheimer contends that the Israel lobby has significant influence over US foreign policy and that its role in dragging the United States into wars, including Iraq in 2003, was central. He notes with some irony that the lobby’s power is increasingly in the open, referencing Joe Kent’s statements and public figures like Tucker Carlson and Bernie Sanders endorsing similar criticisms. He points to Francesca Albanese, UN official on Palestinian territories, describing the Israeli actions in Gaza as genocidal, and notes the lobby’s efforts to undermine her career. Policy advice for the Global South, focusing on India: Mearsheimer argues that India should maintain distance from excessive US alignment to avoid heavy leverage over Indian policy. He suggests speaking up against US policy when it harms national interests but avoiding becoming overly dependent on the United States. He cites examples such as Indonesia where maintaining friendly ties with China while balancing US relations would be prudent. He warns that excessive closeness to the US invites sanctions and pain, whereas diversifying partnerships could reduce vulnerability. BRICS and multipolarity: The war could benefit BRICS and the Global South, with Russia and China gaining, while some BRICS members like India and possibly Indonesia could suffer. The conflict may prompt a strategic rethinking of US ties, encouraging greater independence from Washington. The discussion also touches on Europe’s economic strain and NATO’s perceived setback if Russia prevails in Ukraine, describing a “double whammy” for European leadership from the Gulf conflict alongside Ukraine. End of interview: The program teases future exploration of the Israel lobby’s influence and the potential for a broader discussion on the end of the Israel lobby era, followed by viewer questions. Zara Khan presents questions from the audience, including whether the broader humanity will gain a say on the world stage and how the Iran war might differ from Vietnam and Afghanistan, emphasizing asymmetrical warfare and the risk of ground involvement. The show signs off, inviting viewers to follow and watch future episodes.

Zhang Shueqin is discussed as a predictor known for predicting Trump’s reelection, Vance as VP pick, and a US–Iran war. The conversation centers on why he predicted a US attack on Iran and how it might unfold. Key reasoning about Iran war - The strongest evidence, according to Zhang, is the January 2020 US assassination of Qasem Soleimani, who led Iranian proxies. He argues that killing an Iranian envoy to the region amounted to a declaration of war, and that if Trump had won reelection in 2020, he would have most certainly declared war on Iran. - In the war’s first month, the US focus was decapitation of Iranian leadership, aiming to force surrender and regime change. Iran proved resilient and creative, leading the US to shift to a phase of attrition, attempting to cripple Iran’s war-financing capacity and oil exports to China, and to control Hormuz. This included a naval blockade of the Strait of Hormuz. - The war is expected to be slow and world-news-muted, with efforts to pressure Iran economically and diplomatically to force a settlement. There is no off-ramp seen for the US because consequences are vast for regional players. Actors and interests in the region - Regional players: UAE, Saudi Arabia, and possibly Kuwait, viewed as wanting Iran defeated and the war prolonged. Iran’s leadership wants relief from sanctions and to retain Hormuz as leverage. - The United States: aims to sustain the petrodollar system; fears that if Gulf states decouple from the dollar or shift currencies, the American economy could suffer. The US would prefer to press sanctions and blockade to compel cooperation and debt-financing from global actors. - Israel: sees the conflict as an opportunity for its Greater Israel project, hoping regional chaos would redraw borders after the conflict. - China: wants an end to the conflict to protect global trade and its energy interests, and to preserve balance in its relations with Iran, the GCC, and other players. China’s leverage includes pressure on Iran and economic guarantees that encourage a ceasefire, while seeking to minimize direct conflict with GCC states. - Russia and others: Russia is discussed as arming and supporting Iran in a broader economic/military contest with the US; geopolitics involve maritime skirmishes and energy strikes in a wider economic war. World War III framework and economic warfare - Zhang argues we are already in World War III, but the war is economic and strategic rather than traditional kinetic warfare. The main combatants are the US and Russia in the maritime and energy sphere, with China central to US debt-financing and global trade stability. - Economic warfare includes targeting oil refineries, shipping lanes, and export capabilities; the purpose is to force political settlements and shift global economic order. - The US strategy is described as creating global chaos while maintaining North American focus, exporting conflict to Europe and East Asia to defend empire interests, and using debt and weapons sales to manage global markets. China, the US, and future diplomacy - A Trump visit to Beijing is framed as potentially signaling a rapprochement, followed by cooperation in three areas: trade (China buying more Western Hemisphere LNG and resources), Taiwan status (reaffirming one China policy), and AI collaboration. The larger aim is described as turning China into an economic vassal to the US empire. - Europe is described as already largely vassalized by US policy, with the war in Ukraine illustrating this subordination; popular discontent is rising (e.g., in Germany with the AfD), but European leadership remains aligned with Washington’s agenda. Iranian and European responses - Iran, facing economic pressures and geopolitical isolation, initially led the war, but China’s mediation and pressure contributed to a ceasefire. There is a rift between Iran’s political leadership and its military leadership over how to proceed with the war. - Europeans could escalate involvement in a broader conflict, but the US strategy appears to rely on Europe fighting longer against Russia while the US profits through arms sales and financial mechanisms. European leadership, according to the discussion, remains cautious and influenced by external powers. Israel’s position and the broader arc - Israel is depicted as pursuing a death-cult, eschatological strategy that could unify Jews globally but increase regional instability. The greater aim is for Israel to benefit from regional chaos, while risking broader conflict. Future trajectories and civilizational decline - The discussion suggests that, in the short term, the US may appear to win economically, especially through debt-financed global demand for US energy and weapons, but in the mid- to long-term, imperial decline could lead to civil conflict within the US, driven by factional struggles between Wall Street financiers and tech oligarchs backing AI surveillance/state power. - The potential for a third Trump term is linked to deeper internal conflicts and the acceleration of violence or civil unrest, with religion offered by some as a potential stabilizing force in American society. - Three symptoms of imperial decline are privatization, financialization, and individualization; yet the speaker believes a Christian-nationalist revival could renew the republic. Closing stance - Across the discussion, the US empire is portrayed as pursuing an expansive, conflict-driven strategy to sustain power, while global players seek various economic and strategic outcomes. The overall forecast emphasizes ongoing, multi-front tensions with no easy peace, and a complex interplay among US, European, Middle Eastern, Russian, and Chinese interests.

Richard Wolff and Glenn discuss the future of the West, NATO, Europe, and the international economic system. - The central dynamic, according to Wolff, is the rise of China and the West’s unpreparedness. He argues that the West, after a long era of Cold War dominance, is encountering a China that grows two to three times faster than the United States, with no sign of slowing. China’s ascent has transformed global power relations and exposed that prior strategies to stop or slow China have failed. - The United States, having defeated various historical rivals, pursued a unipolar, neoliberal globalization project after the Cold War. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of that era left the U.S. with a sense of “manifest destiny” to shape the world order. But now time is on China’s side, and the short-term fix for the U.S. is to extract value from its allies rather than invest in long-run geopolitics. Wolff contends the U.S. is engaging in a transactional, extractive approach toward Europe and other partners, pressuring them to concede significant economic and strategic concessions. - Europe is seen by Wolff as increasingly subordinated to U.S. interests, with its leadership willing to accept terrible trade terms and militarization demands to maintain alignment with Washington. He cites the possibility of Europe accepting LNG imports and investments to the U.S. economy at the expense of its own social welfare, suggesting that Europe’s social protections could be jeopardized by this “divorce settlement” with the United States. - Russia’s role is reinterpreted: while U.S. and European actors have pursued expanding NATO and a Western-led security architecture, Russia’s move toward Greater Eurasia and its pivot to the East, particularly under Putin, complicates Western plans. Wolff argues that the West’s emphasis on demonizing Russia as the unifying threat ignores the broader strategic competition with China and risks pushing Europe toward greater autonomy or alignment with Russia and China. - The rise of BRICS and China’s Belt and Road Initiative are framed as major competitive challenges to Western economic primacy. The West’s failure to integrate and adapt to these shifts is seen as a strategic misstep, especially given Russia’s earlier openness to a pan-European security framework that was rejected in favor of a U.S.-led order. - Within the United States, there is a debate about the proper response to these shifts. One faction desires aggressive actions, including potential wars (e.g., Iran) to deter adversaries, while another emphasizes the dangers of escalation in a nuclear age. Wolff notes that Vietnam and Afghanistan illustrate the limits of muscular interventions, and he points to domestic economic discontent—rising inequality, labor unrest, and a growing desire for systemic change—as factors that could press the United States to rethink its approach to global leadership. - Economically, Wolff challenges the dichotomy of public versus private dominance. He highlights China’s pragmatic hybrid model—roughly 50/50 private and state enterprise, with openness to foreign participation yet strong state direction. He argues that the fixation on choosing between private-market and public-control models is misguided and that outcomes matter more than orthodox ideological labels. - Looking ahead, Wolff is optimistic that Western economies could reframe development by learning from China’s approach, embracing a more integrated strategy that blends public and private efforts, and reducing ideological rigidity. He suggests Europe could reposition itself by deepening ties with China and leveraging its own market size to negotiate from a position of strength, potentially even joining or aligning with BRICS in some form. - For Europe, a potential path to resilience would involve shifting away from a mindset of subordination to the United States, pursuing energy diversification (including engaging with Russia for cheaper energy), and forming broader partnerships with China to balance relations with the United States and Russia. This would require political renewal in Europe and a willingness to depart from a “World War II–reboot” mentality toward a more pragmatic, multipolar strategy. - In closing, Wolff stresses that the West’s current trajectory is not inevitable. He envisions a Europe capable of redefining its alliances, reconsidering economic models, and seeking a more autonomous, multipolar future that reduces dependency on U.S. leadership. He ends with a provocative suggestion: Europe might consider a realignment toward Russia and China as a way to reshape global power balances, rather than defaulting to a perpetual U.S.-led order.

The speakers portray the United States as having shifted from an empire to a pirate state, with a transformation into what they call the petro gas dollar or LNG dollar. They claim the US has quietly carried out an armed robbery of the world’s oil and gas supply, hitting Russian tankers and refineries, crippling China’s oil supply, capturing major oil fields, and kidnapping or assassinating leaders, all while expanding its domination over global energy and finance. The analysis emphasizes that the US, now the world’s top producer and exporter of oil, gas, and LNG, operates with self-sufficiency but seeks to kill competition to maintain a monopoly. The claim is that the US used the Ukraine war as cover to eliminate rivals and then used the Iran war to finish off Qatar’s LNG position, forcing Europe to buy American LNG at ten times the price and turning Europe into a US energy client. As a result, European energy prices rise, euros lose value relative to the dollar, and BRICS and dedollarization efforts falter. A central strategic thread is the destruction of competing energy suppliers to create captive markets. The speakers allege that the US destroyed Nord Stream II and blew up pipelines, which not only hurt Russia but forced Europe to rely on American LNG. They argue that the US then redirected gas flows to the Gulf and Levant, sealing a role for Chevron and other US energy giants in these transactions. The Board of Peace is described as a front for a legal cover of Washington’s colonial plan, enabling energy seizures in Gaza, the Levantine Basin, and elsewhere, with Chevron’s activities framed as orchestrated groundwork for energy deals in the Levantine Basin, as well as in Venezuela and Lebanon. The narrative then claims the US intends to dominate China by cutting off its vital fuel sources, forcing China to buy American oil and gas, thereby preserving the dollar and hobbling BRICS and multipolarity. It details how the US targeted Venezuela’s oil, kidnapping Maduro and seizing oil, which previously supplied 80% of Venezuela’s oil exports to China, and how the US expanded its reach by threatening Cuba’s energy grid after Maduro’s removal. It asserts the US orchestrated a global oil blockade, with attacks on Russian energy hubs, ships, and refineries, to cripple Russia and China’s energy security, including attacks in the Caribbean, North Atlantic, Mediterranean, Black Sea, and Baltic Sea. The speakers describe Iran as being cut off from Hormuz and subjected to an escalating cycle of strikes that disrupt its toll system and port infrastructure, while Russia’s exports are disrupted by attacks on export hubs and ships, creating a 40% reduction in Russia’s seaborne oil export capacity. They claim the US is using this chaos to drive up LNG and oil prices, forcing Europe and Asia to bid on US gas while shipping dominance remains with Washington. The financial logic is that dedollarization efforts fail because the US can force energy trade to be settled in dollars, while the US economy benefits from wartime pricing and export profits. The “maritime extortion network” is described as a system where the US can move LNG on ships, changing routes as needed, and a “protection racket” via the US Navy is proposed as a price for safe passage. The monroe doctrine is reframed as moving the planet’s energy corridor into the Western Hemisphere, with the Gulf of Mexico and Washington as the key nodes, rather than the Middle East. Finally, the speakers assert that Iran’s drones, missiles, and air defenses have degraded the US air force’s bases and radar arrays, while the USS Gerald R. Ford was compelled to relocate, reinforcing the claim that Iran’s actions are challenging US military dominance and undermining the myth of invincibility. The overarching claim is that the US empire is consolidating global energy control through piracy, sanctions, and strategic energy realignments, with Chevron playing a pivotal role in every facet of this strategy.

The discussion centers on the rapidly evolving geopolitical landscape, with a focus on Venezuela, Iran, and the broader US-led strategic environment, as seen through the perspectives of Mario and Pepe Escobar. Venezuela and the Venezuelan crisis - Escobar frames Venezuela as a desperate move tied to the demise of the petrodollar, with a broader matrix of actors maneuvering in the back to profit from a potential annexation and to test regional security strategies. He notes that the United States has stated “this is my backyard, and I own it,” and questions whether Washington is ready to back that stance against the will of the Venezuelan people, including Chavistas and the new government led by Delcy Rodríguez, who he describes as “an old school Chavista” with a strong legal and negotiation background. - He argues that the operation against Maduro lacked a coherent strategy, including planning for reorganizing the Venezuelan oil sector to serve American interests. He cites expert opinion suggesting it would take five years to recondition Venezuela’s energy ecosystem to produce around 3,000,000 barrels per day, requiring about $183 billion in investment, which CEOs would require guarantees for before engaging. - The regime-change objective as pursued by Trump-era policy did not materialize; the core regime persists with figures like Padrino and Cabello still in place. The “mini Netflix special” of the operation did not translate into a durable political outcome, and the regime’s leadership remains, even as some key security figures were demoted or accused in the operation. - Dulce Rodríguez (Delcy), the vice president, is portrayed as a capable negotiator who must persuade the Venezuelan public that the security betrayal by the head of Maduro’s security apparatus was real. Escobar emphasizes that the domestic narrative faces a hard sell because the core regime remains and the security apparatus has not been fully neutralized. - Escobar stresses that sanctions are the most critical barrier to Venezuela’s economic recovery and argues that without sanctions relief, meaningful economic reconstitution is unlikely. He notes that Delcy Rodríguez enjoys broad popular support, and he argues that Latin American sentiment toward U.S. intervention complicates Washington’s position. - He warns Brazil’s Lula, a BRICS member, plays a crucial role; Brazilian foreign policy, influenced by Atlanticists, could veto Venezuela’s BRICS membership, complicating Venezuela’s regional integration. He contends that Maduro’s removal is not assured, and a more open Venezuelan regime under Delcy could potentially collaborate with the West, but sanctions and governance challenges remain central obstacles. Iran, protests, and sanctions - The Iranian protests are framed as economically driven, with inflation and cost-of-living pressures fueling dissent. Iran’s currency and real inflation are cited as severe stressors, and the regime’s subsidy policies are criticized as inadequate. Escobar emphasizes that the protests are hijacked by foreign actors to turn into a regime-change playbook, echoing familiar color-revolution patterns observed in other contexts. - He describes Iran’s resilience under extensive sanctions, highlighting infrastructure deficits and the broader economic stagnation as long-running issues. He stresses that Iranian society contains grassroots debate and a robust intellectual culture, including Shiite theology studies, universities, and a tradition of long-term strategic thinking with sustained cross-border alliances (Russia and China) as part of a broader BRICS alignment. - On foreign involvement, Escobar notes differing perspectives: some Iranians blame foreign meddling, while others point to domestic mismanagement and sanctions as primary drivers of discontent. He emphasizes that Iran’s leadership remains wary of external coercion and seeks to strengthen ties within BRICS and other partners, while being cautious about provoking Western escalation. Russia, China, and the evolving great-power dynamic - Escobar argues that Moscow, Beijing, and Tehran view US actions as part of a broader long-term strategy rather than short-term wins. He describes a sophisticated, long-horizon approach: China pursuing a multi-decade plan with five-year cycles, Russia testing BRICS-centered financial and payment systems to reduce dependence on SWIFT, and Iran leveraging BRICS relationships to counterbalance Western pressure. - He contrasts this with what he calls the “bordello circus” of American political-military maneuvering, suggesting that the US’s episodic threats and unpredictable diplomacy undermine any similar credibility or effectiveness. He emphasizes that Russia and China prioritize acts and long-term power balancing over American-style unpredictability. - The 12-day war and the Orishnik missile attack on Lviv are framed as signaling a more volatile phase in the Russia-Ukraine conflict, with Putin signaling that the war could extend beyond the previously imagined timelines if Western escalation continues. The missile strike is presented as a clear warning to NATO and the Polish border region, underscoring heightened geopolitical risk. The broader outlook and conclusions - Escobar remains deeply pessimistic about a swift resolution to the Russia-Ukraine war, citing the potential for a prolonged European conflict that could strain European economies. He views regime stability in Iran as fragile but enduring, while Venezuela’s path remains contingent on sanctions relief, domestic governance, and the strategic posture of Latin American neighbors and BRICS members. - The conversation closes with a reminder of the complexity of modern geopolitics, where sanctions, domestic economics, regional alignments, and long-term strategic planning interact in ways that defy simple “winner-loser” narratives.

In this conversation, Brian Berletic, a former US Marine and political analyst, discusses how the United States pursues a pattern of strategic sequencing that targets rivals one by one, often using negotiation or peace as delaying tactics or outsourcing parts of conflict to allies. He connects this to a broader framework outlined in a 2019 Rand Corporation paper and to a speech by Elbridge Colby, the US undersecretary of war for policy, arguing that the US aims to keep Ukraine’s war ongoing by shifting more responsibility and escalation to Europe, thereby pressuring Russia while also targeting Iran and, ultimately, China. Berletic frames Pete Hegseth’s early-2025 pivot as Europe taking over a proxy war against Russia and Ukraine, with Europe increasing defense spending and doubling down on Ukraine support. He says this demonstrates a natural progression where Europe becomes the frontline in the proxy conflict, while the US maintains involvement through its command in Germany and intelligence and reconnaissance capabilities. He asserts that the US is fighting Russia through Ukraine and Europe, and that there was never an intention to defeat Russia outright in this phase; instead, the aim was to create multiple dilemmas for Russia, Iran, and China as described in the Rand paper. He notes that the US sought to destroy Russia’s energy exports to Europe and replace them with LNG from the US, turning peacetime relationships into wartime dependencies. The host pushes back on the idea that evidence is ignored, highlighting how public discourse often promotes the Ukraine war as beneficial for the US, while the real dynamic is a shift toward European engagement and energy decoupling from Russia. Berletic reiterates that Europe’s energy dependence on the US mirrors how Europe was cut off from Russia through war, paralleling Asia’s potential energy realignment. He points to the Nord Stream destruction as part of a long-running strategy to subordinate Europe to US interests and to enable a broader energy strategy that pressures Asia similarly. He claims that US corporate and political influence in Europe, including the EU’s governance and non-democratic manipulation of information spaces, results in a system where national sovereignty is eroded in favor of a US-led foreign policy. They discuss elite capture, where a handful of individuals in European Union leadership and other allied governments operate for US interests, often through think tanks and institutions like the New York Times’ reporting on CIA involvement in Ukraine’s internal security apparatus. Berletic argues this results in client regimes and a lack of true national sovereignty, making European and East Asian leadership more pliant to US strategic aims. He notes that the EU’s approach—treating opposition as a temporary obstacle to be overcome—has facilitated centralized power and an ever-tightening foreign policy framework that undermines independent decision-making. On China, Berletic argues that US actions against Iran are also aimed at Asia, cutting energy flows and pressuring regional states to depend on US energy. He points to LNG projects prepared in advance of conflict with Russia, designed to be economically viable only if energy flows can be constrained, and he describes a broader energy-dominance framework aimed at surrounding China with US-backed energy dependencies. He asserts there is a coordinated plan to surround China with hostile proxies and to leverage energy as strategic leverage, transforming countries like Vietnam, Japan, and South Korea into instruments of US policy. The discussion then touches on what happens if allies resist this burden-sharing, suggesting that truly independent leadership in Europe or East Asia would reject the arrangement as unsustainable. Berletic argues that diplomacy is not dead, but multipolarism—led by Russia, China, and Iran—offers a path away from US-led hegemony, albeit with ongoing conflict and upheaval. He closes by emphasizing the importance of alternatives to Western media narratives and the need for multipolarism to reduce war and promote a more equitable global order.

Alastair Crook outlines a two-component Iranian retaliation that is unfolding in three stages. The first component, driven by Iran’s missile and drone capabilities, was expected to target American bases in the Persian Gulf and Gulf area rather than Gulf States themselves. Ali Larragyani has stressed that the attack is not on Gulf States but on American bases and CIA facilities that use Gulf States to pursue Iran’s conflict. The second element, aimed at Israel, focuses on degrading Israel’s early warning radar systems and AIGs that allow United States and Israel to monitor Iran. This involves striking major radar sites in Gulf States such as Qatar and other locations to hinder Israel’s ability to attack Iran. The second phase then employs older missiles and drones to exhaust Israeli air defenses, wearing them down so they can no longer intercept subsequent strikes. Observations of Israeli intercepts against incoming missiles, with many intercept attempts yet frequent misses, are cited as evidence of this wear-down strategy. In the Gulf, Iranian drones have begun to operate more freely over Dubai and other sites, indicating that Gulf air defenses are strained or exhausted. Iran may continue destroying American bases and evacuating certain installations, notably in Bahrain, where the Fifth Fleet facilities have suffered significant damage. In the Israel domain, after degrading radar and defense networks, Iran may transition to more modern, faster missiles. There is speculation about hypersonic missiles with higher speeds (potentially Mach 8–10) and multi-warhead configurations arriving in Iranian inventories, though Crook hedges that he is not a military expert. A longer-term objective of Iran, according to Crook, is to drive the United States out of the Middle East, with the broader aim of reconfiguring regional power dynamics and energy infrastructure—potentially shifting influence toward BRICS and reducing Western dominance over seaborne oil and gas routes. He notes signs that the United States is attempting to control chokepoints and detain or seize tankers linked to Russia, China, or sanctioned states, albeit with questionable legal justification. The economic and geopolitical costs are significant: gas prices for Europe have surged, oil prices are up, and markets are crashing. He suggests the Gulf States may never be the same, with security concerns driving some Western residents to relocate. The conflict is also prompting discussions among Gulf States about changing their relationships with Iran and potentially limiting future American or British military presence on Gulf bases, as illustrated by warnings to the British about the Cyprus and broader Gulf basing roles. On the American side, Crook argues that the U.S. strategy is not going as planned. He asserts the killing of the Iranian supreme leader (Khamenei) was a grave miscalculation that failed to trigger regime change and instead sparked widespread protests in Baghdad, Bahrain, and Iraq, potentially destabilizing Bahrain’s ruling Emir and provoking regional unrest. He emphasizes that the attack undermined U.S. credibility and highlighted the vulnerability of American interests, with protests and regional backlash challenging the U.S. narrative and complicating domestic political considerations, including potential ramifications for Trump’s political standing. Regarding the Israeli-American relationship, Crook suggests the clash and miscalculations are likely to affect U.S.–Israel ties. He argues that attempts at decapitation strikes and hopes for a Western-aligned Iran have not only failed but also intensified anti-American and anti-Israeli sentiment in parts of the region, challenging the traditional “Israel-first” posture and implying significant implications for how the United States will engage with Israel in future policy, diplomacy, and security commitments. He also notes that even within the Democratic Party, there may be demand for a thorough rethink of U.S.–Israel relations. Crook concludes that Iran’s hard-to-predict responses, combined with U.S. miscalculations and regional blowback, signal broad and potentially lasting geopolitical shifts in West Asia, with the possibility of broader implications for Russia–Ukraine dynamics and global energy security. The discussion ends with an acknowledgment that an immediate diplomatic de-escalation seems unlikely unless substantial concessions—such as lifting sanctions, returning frozen Iranian assets, and a broader shift in U.S. policy—are offered.

Glenn: Welcome back. We are joined today by Professor John Mersheimer to understand what is happening in the world with this new great power rivalry and how the outcome of the Ukraine war will impact this new Cold War. Have we entered a new Cold War? Who are the players, competing interests, and the rules? Mersheimer: I think we have entered a new Cold War. We're in a multipolar system, and the United States, China, and Russia are the three great powers. The United States is certainly in a cold war with China. China is powerful and threatens to dominate East Asia, and the United States will almost certainly go to great lengths to prevent that from happening, which axiomatically creates an intense security competition in China. An intense security competition is a cold war, and the name of the game is to make sure that security competition does not turn into a hot war. We are in a cold war with the Chinese, or the Chinese are in a cold war with us. The hot war is avoided. Regarding Russia, since we moved into multipolarity, the Russians and the Chinese have been close allies against the United States. This is largely a result of the Ukraine war, which has pushed the Russians into the arms of the Chinese and caused closer Sino-Russian cooperation. The United States, through the Biden administration, was involved in a cold war with both Russia and China. Trump tried to change that, seeking good relations with Russia to form a Russia-plus-US alliance against China, but he has been unable to make that happen. The result is that the United States is basically still in a cold war with both Russia and China. The war in Ukraine has made me worry greatly that the Cold War in Europe could turn into a hot war, even as the U.S.-China relationship remains cooler so far. Glenn: European leaders hoped the United States and Europe would unite in this new Cold War, with liberal hegemony fading and a return to unity against Russia. But Ukraine has instead divided Europe. How do you explain this? Is it the US not seeing Russia as the same threat as Europeans, or a concern about pushing Russia toward China, or Europe’s costs of the partnership? Is this uniquely a Trump-era approach? Mersheimer: From an American point of view, good relations with Russia make sense. China is the peer competitor, and the United States wants to pivot to East Asia to prevent China’s dominance. Russia is the weakest of the three great powers and not a major threat to Europe. The Americans believe Europe can deal with Russia, freeing them to focus on China. Europe, by contrast, is threatened by Russia’s proximity and thus prioritizes Russia. NATO expansion into Ukraine is seen by many Europeans as a disaster, poisoning Russia–Europe relations, making Europe deeply committed to using Ukraine to weaken Russia. The transatlantic alliance becomes strained, especially with Trump raising the possibility of leaving NATO. Europeans fear losing the American pacifier that keeps centrifugal forces in check, which would complicate European coordination with Russia. Glenn: If the United States signals a departure, won’t Europe face greater challenges in managing Russia? And is Russia truly an empire-building threat, or is this a post-2014 narrative that intensified after February 2022? Mersheimer: Bringing Ukraine into NATO was destined to cause trouble. The crisis began in 2014, and the 2022 war is ongoing. The Ukrainians and Europeans want a security guarantee for Ukraine, essentially NATO membership, while Russia demands territory and rejects a security guarantee that would enshrine NATO’s presence near its borders. The Europeans see NATO expansion as threatening, while the Americans view Russia as the weaker power and the need to pivot to China. The controversy over responsibility for this disaster arises from competing interpretations of NATO expansion and Russian aggression. Glenn: Do you see Russia changing course soon? There has been escalation—Odessa blockades, port attacks, and targeting infrastructure. Could this signal a new stage of the war? Mersheimer: The Russians believe Ukraine is on the ropes and expect to win on the battlefield in 2026, possibly expanding fronts in Kharkiv and Sumy. They may consider increasing conventional force and possibly using nuclear weapons if the war drags on. They view the conflict as existential and fear losing, which could push them toward drastic measures to end the war. The Russians could escalate if they think they cannot win conventionally. Glenn: What are the non-nuclear options to win quickly? Could the Russians deliver a decisive conventional victory? Mersheimer: It’s a war of attrition. If Ukraine’s army is weakened, Russia could surround large Ukrainian formations, disrupt logistics, and open larger fronts. They may build up forces in the rear, potentially for a breakthrough or to deter Western escalation. The battlefield outcome may determine the next steps, including whether nuclear options are considered. Glenn: How will Ukraine end? Is it a military defeat, economic collapse, or political fragmentation? Mersheimer: Ukraine is likely to be defeated on the battlefield. Its economy is in desperate shape, and losing Odessa or more territory would worsen it. Politically, Ukraine will face internal divisions once the war ends. Europe will face a broken Russia–Ukraine relationship, with some European states viewing the conflict differently. Ukraine’s demographic decline compounds its bleak outlook, and the country may become a problematic rump state. The war should have been settled earlier; the negotiators in Istanbul in 2022 could have sought a different path. Zelensky’s choice to align with Western powers and walk away from Istanbul negotiations deepened Ukraine’s predicament. Glenn: Any final reflections? Mersheimer: The war’s outcome will reshape Western unity and European security. Historians may view this as a major mistake in weakening the West. The blame for the disaster will likely be attributed in the West to Russia’s imperialism, but the expansion of NATO is also central. Europe’s economic and political landscape will be altered, and Ukraine’s future will be deeply challenging.

Alex Kraner and Glenn discuss the Iran ceasefire and the market's reaction, along with broader geopolitical dynamics and historical patterns around war and finance. - On the ceasefire and markets: Alex argues that reading optimism from markets is unreliable, noting that markets can remain irrational for longer than a person can stay solvent. He was surprised by the ceasefire and authored a newsletter piece suggesting the peace was unlikely to hold and that the probability of lasting peace was near zero. He observed the ceasefire narrative already fraying as he finished his article. He emphasizes that the ultimate incentive for war is the conquest of collateral: Iran’s vast natural-resource wealth (estimated at about $35 trillion) could become collateral for Western banking interests. He contends that war is driven by a desire to secure new money-like collateral to prevent systemic collapse caused by fiat money expansion and liquidity injections. - Narrative and hypocrisy in war discourse: Glenn notes how narratives about values, feminism, or democracy are used to sell wars. Alex adds that wars are often sold by demonizing the other side, citing examples from past interventions (Syria, Gaddafi, Saddam Hussein, Milosevic, Allende, Ortega, Chavez, Maduro, Castro) to illustrate a recurring pattern of manufactured villains and “slaying dragons” to justify action. He also cites Afghanistan as an example where Western intervention harmed women’s rights and long-term outcomes (mass malnutrition and stunting among children) despite rhetoric about protecting women. - Lebanon and the ceasefire framework: They discuss whether Lebanon was included in the ceasefire framework as communicated by the Pakistani prime minister and why Israel then attacked Lebanon. Alex argues the U.S. may be posturing to present the ceasefire as a U.S.-led result, while Iran shaped the negotiation terms. He also suggests the U.S. was already preparing for broader action, including ground invasion plans and troop movements. - U.S. strategic posture and global ambitions: They consider whether Trump’s administration genuinely sought to retreat from global policing or if transition plans were undermined by the Iran decision. Alex recalls a shift in 2019 where Trump reportedly resisted war against Iran, then changed course on 28 February, risking severe consequences. He argues Europe may bear more hardship from the conflict, with the U.S. potentially cushioning its own impact, while Europe could face stagflation, currency pressures, and social unrest. - European exposure and dollar dynamics: Glenn notes hedge funds betting against European stocks and asks how Europe will fare if the ceasefire holds but the damage persists. Alex describes Europe as cornered: cutting off Russian energy while maintaining vulnerability due to limited alternative supplies (Qatar/US), and the potential fragility of dollar liquidity for European banks. He warns that swap lines could be withdrawn, threatening the euro and triggering inflationary crises. He cites Eurostat data showing high living-cost pressures and suggests social revolts or civil unrest could emerge across Europe. He forecasts a possible major war against Russia as a political stabilization tactic. - Global realignment and multipolarity: They foresee massive fracturing in the Middle East and Europe, leading to a multipolar global order. The United States could retreat to its own hemisphere and rethink its monetary system, with the banking oligarchy remaining a central lever of power. They discuss Gulf states’ vulnerability to Western policy and consider whether Saudi Arabia, among others, will fare better or worse depending on access to U.S. dollars and geopolitical alignments. Alex argues that the broader strategy aims to reconfigure Eurasia by weakening or fragmenting Iran, Russia, and China in sequence, using proxy wars, regime-change efforts, and economic coercion. - Long-run structural shift: The conversation concludes with the assertion that the current dynamics reflect a persistent pattern: Western powers leveraging financial and military instruments to secure strategic advantages, while portraying their actions as defending democracy and rights. They reiterate that the overarching driver remains financial hegemony and control of collateral, with the war system persistently extending into Eurasia through interconnected corridors, ports, and infrastructure projects. The dialogue ends with the claim that wars are driven by banking and financial interests rather than purely ideological aims.

Pepe and Mario discuss a broad set of geopolitical developments, focusing on Venezuela, Iran, and broader U.S.-led actions, with insights on Russia, China, and other regional players. - Venezuela developments and U.S. involvement - Venezuela is described as a “desperate move related to the demise of the petrodollar,” with multiple overlapping headlines about backers maneuvering for profit and power in Latin America, and about the U.S. declaring “this is my backyard.” Delcy Rodríguez, the daughter of a slain revolutionary killed by the CIA, leads a new government, described as old-school Chavista with strong negotiation skills, who prioritizes Venezuela’s interests over U.S. interests. - The operation is criticized as having no clear strategy or forward planning for reorganizing the Venezuelan oil industry to serve U.S. interests. Estimates from Chinese experts suggest it would take five years to recondition Venezuela’s energy ecosystem for American needs and sixteen years to reach around 3 million barrels per day, requiring approximately $183 billion in investment—investment that U.S. CEOs are reportedly unwilling to provide without total guarantees. - There is debate about the extent of U.S. influence within Maduro’s circle. Some Venezuelan sources note that the head of security for the president, previously aligned with the regime, was demoted (not arrested), and there is discussion of possible U.S. ties with individuals around Maduro’s inner circle, though the regime remains headed by Maduro with key loyalists like the defense minister (Padrino) and the interior minister (Cabello) still in place. - The narrative around regime change is viewed as a two-edged story: the U.S. sought to replace Maduro with a pliant leadership, yet the regime remains and regional power structures (including BRICS dynamics) persist. Delcy Rodríguez is portrayed as capable of negotiating with the U.S., including conversations with Marco Rubio before the coup and ongoing discussions with U.S. actors, while maintaining Venezuela’s sovereignty and memory of the revolution. - The broader regional reaction to U.S. actions in Venezuela has included criticism from neighboring countries like Colombia and Mexico, with a sense in Latin America that the U.S. should not intrude in sovereign affairs. Brazil (a major BRICS member) is highlighted as a key actor whose stance can influence Venezuela’s BRICS prospects; Lula’s position is described as cautious, with Brazil’s foreign ministry reportedly vetoing Venezuela’s BRICS membership despite Lula’s personal views. - The sanctions regime is cited as a principal reason for Venezuela’s economic stagnation, with the suggestion that lifting sanctions would be a prerequisite for meaningful economic recovery. Delcy Rodríguez is characterized as a skilled negotiator who could potentially improve Venezuela’s standing if sanctions are removed. - Public opinion in Venezuela is described as broadly supportive of the regime, with the U.S. action provoking anti-American sentiment across the hemisphere. The discussion notes that a large majority of Venezuelans (over 90%) reportedly view Delcy Rodríguez favorably, and that the perception of U.S. intervention as a violation of sovereignty influences regional attitudes. - Iran: protests, economy, and foreign influence - Iran is facing significant protests that are described as the most severe since 2022, driven largely by economic issues, inflation, and the cost of living under four decades of sanctions. Real inflation is suggested to be 35–40%, with currency and purchasing power severely eroded. - Foreign influence is discussed as a factor hijacking domestic protests in Iran, described as a “color revolution” playbook echoed by past experiences in Hong Kong and other theaters. Iranian authorities reportedly remain skeptical of Western actors, while acknowledging the regime’s vulnerability to sanctions and mismanagement. - Iranians emphasize the long-term, multi-faceted nature of their political system, including the Shiite theology underpinning governance, and the resilience of movements like Hezbollah and Yemeni factions. Iran’s leadership stresses long-term strategic ties with Russia and China, as well as BRICS engagement, with practical cooperation including repair of the Iranian electrical grid in the wake of Israeli attacks during the twelve-day war and port infrastructure developments linked to an international transportation corridor, including Indian and Chinese involvement. - The discussion notes that while sanctions have damaged Iran economically, Iranians maintain a strong domestic intellectual and grassroots culture, including debates in universities and cafes, and are not easily toppled. The regime’s ability to survive is framed in terms of internal legitimacy, external alliances (Russia, China), and the capacity to negotiate under external pressure. - Russia, China, and the U.S. strategic landscape - The conversation contrasts the apparent U.S. “bordello circus” with the more sophisticated military-diplomatic practices of Iran, Russia, and China. Russia emphasizes actions over rhetoric, citing NATO attacks on its nuclear triad and the Novgorod residence attack as evidence of deterrence concerns. China pursues long-term plans (five-year plans through 2035) and aims to elevate trade with a yuan-centric global south, seeking to reduce dollar reliance without emitting a formal de-dollarization policy. - The discussion frames U.S. policy as volatile and unpredictable (the Nixon “madman theory” analog), while Russia, China, and Iran respond with measured, long-term strategies. The potential for a prolonged Ukraine conflict is acknowledged if European leaders pursue extended confrontation, with economic strains anticipated across Europe. - In Venezuela, Iran, and broader geopolitics, the panel emphasizes the complexity of regime stability, the role of sanctions, BRICS dynamics, and the long game of global power shifts that may redefine alliances and economic arrangements over the coming years.