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The discussion centers on the Ukraine peace process, with Trump reportedly optimistic after his envoy discussed ceasefire conditions in Moscow. A key point is whether Ukraine has privately agreed to any fundamental conditions for peace, such as neutrality, territorial settlements, and security arrangements. Publicly, Ukraine continues to demand NATO membership and full territorial recovery, which Russia rejects. The US may have shifted, suggesting NATO will not enlarge, territorial concessions are needed, and US involvement in security arrangements will be limited. However, European leaders remain bellicose, possibly indicating two levels of diplomacy: closed-door negotiations versus public statements. NATO expansion is viewed as a fundamental cause of the conflict. Crimea is unlikely to return to Ukraine, and Russia's battlefield gains complicate territorial negotiations. Security arrangements should involve the UN Security Council, including Russia and China. The 2022 Istanbul agreement is seen as a potential basis for peace, which was allegedly undermined by the US. Some European leaders are accused of lying, stating privately that NATO won't expand while publicly asserting the opposite. The purpose of NATO is questioned, with some suggesting it lost its purpose after the Cold War and has become an instrument of American hegemony.

Checklist for summary approach: - Identify core positions: whether Russia views current tensions as war, and its stated objectives. - Track key diplomatic milestones and proposals: Minsk, Istanbul, security guarantees, doctrine on NATO. - Capture stated justifications for actions: language rights, minority protections, UN Charter references, self-determination. - Note referenced U.S./NATO actions and perceived aims, plus Russia’s response signals (including hypersonic test). - Highlight backchannel diplomacy and statements about negotiations, including who may negotiate and under what terms. - Preserve notable claims about casualties, rhetoric around “massacres,” and contentious episodes (Bucha, Navalny). - Exclude evaluation or commentary; reproduce claims as presented. - Maintain chronological and thematic flow to reflect interview emphasis. - Keep to 556–695 words; translate if needed (English here). Summary: Lavrov states that Russia would not describe the relationship with the United States as a war, expressing a desire for normal relations with all countries, especially the United States, and noting that President Putin respects the American people, history, and achievements, while hoping for cooperation “for the sake of the universe.” He argues that Washington’s support for Ukraine amounts to active participation in a conflict with Russia and characterizes the fighting in Ukraine as a “hybrid war,” asserting Ukrainians could not use long-range, modern weapons without direct American servicemen. He contends that Western officials have suggested that “the attack is the best defense” and warns that statements by Pentagon/NATO figures about limited or even nuclear-echo threats are dangerous, insisting that red lines are being moved and that Russia did not start the war, only a “special military operation” designed to end Kyiv’s actions against Donbas. He emphasizes Russia’s readiness for peaceful solutions based on Russia’s security interests, and the protection of Russian-speaking people in Ukraine—specifically their language, religious rights, and education—rights which he says have been eroded by Ukrainian legislation since 2017 (including bans on Russian education, Russian media, Russian language, and later restrictions on the Ukrainian Orthodox Church). He invokes the UN Charter and international law, arguing that true respect for the Charter requires consideration of the right to self-determination and equal state sovereignty. He contends that referenda in Crimea led to reunification with Russia after Crimeans rejected Kyiv’s coup in 2014; Donbas, initially labeled terrorists by Kyiv, was fought over until Minsk agreements were signed in 2015, which he says were sabotaged by the post-coup Ukrainian government. He asserts that Minsk envisaged territorial integrity for Ukraine minus Crimea, with Russian language rights and local self-governance in certain Donbas areas, plus economic ties with Russia, and emphasizes that Russia offered security guarantees to Ukraine—ultimately rejected when negotiations shifted to Istanbul in April 2022. In Istanbul, Lavrov says the Ukrainian delegation proposed “principles” for peace, which Russia accepted, including non-bloc status for Ukraine and collective security guarantees that would exclude NATO. He notes Boris Johnson’s alleged encouragement to continue fighting and claims the West has pursued a line of conduct that excludes meaningful negotiation, with Zelenskyy later banning negotiations by decree and advancing a “peace formula” and a “Victory Plan.” Russia’s position remains that no NATO bases or foreign troops on Ukrainian soil are acceptable, and that any settlement must reflect the realities on the ground, including updated constitutional changes in Donetsk, Lugansk, Kherson, and Zaporozhye after their incorporation into the Russian Federation. Lavrov characterizes Western sanctions as unprecedented and says Russia must become more self-reliant, seeking cooperation with non-hostile states to counter sanctions. He argues that Western leaders aim to preserve a “rules-based” order that ensures U.S. dominance, pointing to NATO’s Indo-Pacific ambitions and ongoing security strategies that extend beyond Europe. He insists Russia seeks no war with anybody but warns against a presumed willingness in the United States to risk nuclear escalation, stressing that a limited or even threatened nuclear exchange would be catastrophic. He notes that backchannel communications exist but that there has been little meaningful dialogue with the Biden administration, and he observes Western fatigue with the Ukraine issue, while maintaining that Russia seeks a negotiated settlement grounded in Istanbul’s principles and in recognition of Russia’s security concerns, the rights of Russian-speaking populations, and an end to NATO expansion on Russia’s borders.

Трамп не понимает природу украинского кризиса и не знает русской истории. Его взгляд на события после развала Советского Союза слишком упрощённый. Он считает, что может быстро закончить войну, но это невозможно. Первые переговоры между Путиным и Трампом будут критически важны, чтобы донести, что мы не прекратим военные действия без освобождения Украины от нацистского режима и полной демилитаризации. Это не просто лозунги, а наши жизненные интересы. Некоторые сторонники Трампа понимают нашу позицию и склонны поддерживать её, но есть и те, кто заинтересован в продолжении войны. Ситуация сложная, и не стоит надеяться на быстрое разрешение конфликта. --- Trump does not understand the nature of the Ukrainian crisis and lacks knowledge of Russian history. His view of events after the Soviet Union's collapse is overly simplistic. He believes he can quickly end the war, but this is impossible. Initial negotiations between Putin and Trump will be crucial to convey that we will not cease military actions without liberating Ukraine from the Nazi regime and complete demilitarization. These are not just slogans, but our vital interests. Some of Trump's supporters understand our position and are inclined to support it, but others benefit from the continuation of the war. The situation is complex, and one should not expect a quick resolution to the conflict.

Vladimir Putin has theoretically and practically put forward a concept, stating readiness to engage in direct negotiations with Ukraine on May 15 in Istanbul, with Turkey as mediator, and without preconditions. This is presented as a successful negotiation model. Undermining it would only reinforce the idea that Ukraine, its western sponsors, and the United States are not serious about peace.

Украина рассматривает вступление в НАТО, но это может вызвать крупные военные операции России. Россия может атаковать Украину, чтобы предотвратить вступление в НАТО. Выбор стоит между войной с Россией и вступлением в НАТО после победы. Крупная война включает воздушные операции, вторжения армий, осаду Киева, диверсии и другие действия. Вероятность войны 99%, особенно после 2021-2022. Translation: Ukraine considers joining NATO, but it may lead to major Russian military operations. Russia could attack Ukraine to prevent NATO membership. The choice is between war with Russia and joining NATO after victory. A major war involves air operations, army invasions, siege of Kyiv, sabotage, and other actions. The likelihood of war is 99%, especially after 2021-2022.

I was part of the Ukrainian negotiators trying to reach a peaceful settlement with Russia. We were close to finalizing an agreement in April, but it was postponed. In my opinion, Putin realized his mistake and quickly tried to make a deal with Ukraine. He personally accepted the Istanbul communique, which was a compromise compared to Russia's initial ultimatum proposal. It's important to remember that Putin genuinely wanted a peaceful resolution with Ukraine.

I don't think Putin can be trusted in negotiations. I believe he is a war criminal who should be imprisoned for life, or face execution. Regarding the exclusion of Ukraine and Europe from Russia-US negotiations, I'm unsure of the exact plan, but there might be a strategic reason. However, any significant peace talks that aim for a fair resolution must include Ukrainian participation and careful consideration of European interests. Again, Putin is a war criminal and should be in jail for the rest of his life, if not executed.

Negotiations with Russia in Istanbul were successful, even to the point of opening a champagne bottle in celebration. The agreement was 90% ready for a direct meeting between Putin and Zelensky, with only the size of Ukrainian armed forces in peacetime remaining. However, after the discovery of Bucha, Zelensky was shocked and the negotiations were halted. A meeting scheduled for April 9th was canceled. The speaker doesn't know if Boris Johnson's visit to Kyiv influenced this decision. Although Russia showed readiness to continue negotiations, Ukraine declined. The speaker now believes an agreement at that time was impossible, as Putin could reframe the conflict as a war against the West, opening a "Pandora's box" of global issues. The speaker views the current situation as a new "Thirty Years' War," signaling the end of the modern era.

## Russian Summary: Переговоры с Украиной рассматривались как продолжение стамбульского процесса, начатого еще в Гомеле. Вмешательство Запада сорвало договоренности, как это уже бывало в истории, например, после русско-турецкой войны, когда Берлинский конгресс "улучшил" Сан-Стефанский мир, что привело к Балканским войнам и Первой мировой. Война и переговоры должны идти одновременно, как во Вьетнаме, Корее и советско-финской войне. Петр I предлагал Швеции мир после начала Северной войны, но Швеция, поддержанная Англией и Францией, отказалась, что привело к потере статуса великой державы и территорий. История повторяется, и Бисмарк говорил, что русские всегда возвращаются за своим. ## English Translation: Negotiations with Ukraine were seen as a continuation of the Istanbul process, which began in Gomel. Western interference disrupted the agreements, as had happened in history, for example, after the Russo-Turkish war, when the Berlin Congress "improved" the San Stefano peace, leading to the Balkan Wars and World War I. War and negotiations should proceed simultaneously, as in Vietnam, Korea, and the Soviet-Finnish War. Peter I offered Sweden peace after the start of the Great Northern War, but Sweden, supported by England and France, refused, leading to the loss of its status as a great power and territories. History repeats itself, and Bismarck said that the Russians always come back for what is theirs.

Trump was elected partly on the promise to end costly wars like the one in Ukraine. Ending the war has been a topic since before it began. The Minsk agreements aimed to resolve the conflict in Eastern Ukraine, but Ukraine didn't implement key provisions, like constitutional changes for Russian-speaking people. In 2021, Zelensky signed a law to reclaim temporarily occupied areas, including Crimea, a red line for Russia. Crimea has historically been Russian, with a majority Russian population. A plebiscite showed Crimeans favored joining Russia. We could have avoided war by saying NATO would never accept Ukraine. Johnson shut down negotiations in Istanbul. This has been a failure on our military leadership.

**Original Language Summary:** Вступление Украины в НАТО с вероятностью 999% приведет к крупной войне с Россией, но отказ от вступления обернется поглощением Россией в течение 10-12 лет. Крупная война включает наступление, осаду Киева, прорыв через Крым и наступление с территории Беларуси. Возможные сроки обострения – 2021-2022, 2024-2026 и 2028-2030 годы. Избежать войны при вступлении в НАТО можно, если Запад даст России понять, что это неприемлемо, например, санкциями, размещением авиации США или вводом контингента НАТО. Смена власти в России возможна при внутриэлитном конфликте. Мирное урегулирование на Донбассе невозможно, пока Россия не изменит свою позицию. Главная задача Украины – вступление в НАТО, даже ценой социально-экономических жертв. Нейтралитет невозможен, и страна должна дрейфовать в военный союз, предпочтительно в НАТО. В случае войны Украина получит поддержку Запада. **English Translation:** Ukraine's accession to NATO has a 999% probability of leading to a major war with Russia, but refusing to join will result in absorption by Russia within 10-12 years. A major war includes an offensive, the siege of Kyiv, a breakthrough through Crimea, and an offensive from Belarus. Possible escalation periods are 2021-2022, 2024-2026, and 2028-2030. Avoiding war when joining NATO is possible if the West makes it clear to Russia that this is unacceptable, for example, through sanctions, the deployment of US aviation, or the introduction of a NATO contingent. A change of power in Russia is possible in the event of an intra-elite conflict. A peaceful settlement in the Donbass is impossible until Russia changes its position. Ukraine's main task is to join NATO, even at the cost of socio-economic sacrifices. Neutrality is impossible, and the country must drift into a military alliance, preferably NATO. In the event of war, Ukraine will receive support from the West.

Larry: Lavrov claimed Ukraine attempted to attack Putin’s official residence in Novgorod with around 91 long-range drones in December; allegedly all intercepted, no proof provided, no reported injuries or damage. Lavrov said retaliation is coming, targets for retaliatory strikes and timing had been set. Putin supposedly mentioned this on a call to Trump two days before the Zelensky meeting in Florida; Yuri, a Kremlin aide, said Putin was shocked and outraged, and that it would influence Washington’s approach to working with Zelensky. Russians claim Trump was relieved that no Tomahawk missiles were provided to Ukraine. No US confirmation; Trump described the meeting with Putin as very productive, and discussions included the temporary ceasefire not being an option. Budanov had suggested it wouldn’t be the first assassination attempt on Putin, but the most consequential due to timing. The question posed: who is the target—Ukraine, Zelensky, Budanov—or a Russian false flag to justify attacks and derail negotiations. Speaker 1: Timelines. The attack allegedly began the night of the 28th and continued into the 29th. The Russians say it was an attack on one of Putin’s residences, described as terrorism. Putin hasn’t lived at his residences for three years, using the Kremlin instead, but this is not the first Ukrainian attempt to target Putin; there was a proposed attack when he flew into Kursk by helicopter. Russians are upset that this attack had no military objective, only potential assassination, and they know Putin wasn’t there. The Russians view it as real and plan to respond; Lavrov indicated that negotiations would be reexamined. Budanov claims Ukrainian intelligence has targeted Putin multiple times; the attack timing coincides with Zelensky in Florida, suggesting possible rifts or risk of undermining negotiations. The possibility of Western (American or British) intelligence involvement is raised, with speculation about CIA influence or European intelligence, particularly Britain’s MI6, given its Ukrainian roots. The question remains whether the attack was staged to derail negotiations or a genuine strike. Larry: If Ukraine did this, why would they? Ukraine might want to eliminate an obstacle to peace, though that could backfire; some argue Putin is more restrained than any immediate successor. If 91 drones were launched, Western intelligence would likely be involved, possibly undermining Trump’s approach. There is a sense of mixed messages from U.S. intelligence, with individuals like Susan Miller pushing claims of Russian interference that contradict other narratives. Zelensky stated no territory would be ceded as part of negotiations; Russia’s position is that Crimea, Zaporizhzhia, Kherson, Donetsk, and Luhansk must be permanently part of the Russian Federation, elections must occur in Ukraine before negotiations, NATO must be out of Ukraine, and demilitarization is non-negotiable. Russia suggests there will be no 800,000-man army; these conditions are not open for negotiation. Russia may be willing to discuss numbers of troops for Ukraine, but not to concede core territorial goals. Speaker 0: If CIA or other elements were behind this, could it be to undermine Trump or push for a peace deal by pressuring Putin? Putin showed up in uniform with the military leadership, signaling a hard stance on land/territory, stating that negotiations should proceed without ceasing. Some argue this would trigger a stronger Russian push, while others see this as undermining Trump’s efforts. Trump and Zelensky had discussed a peace plan with 90-95% agreement, with a few thorny issues, possibly territorial. Trump characterized their call as productive; Russia reportedly agreed to support Ukraine postwar with discounted energy and resources. Lavrov’s rapid response to the attack and the potential retaliation would affect ongoing negotiations, which some view as already derailed due to Ukraine’s intransigence on concessions. Speaker 1: Could European intelligence be involved? Britain’s MI6 is seen as critical; there is a suggestion that British intelligence could have acted without American consultation. This would strain relations with Trump, especially after new security strategy. The transcript also notes a broader shift in Western posture: some European leaders are pushing for stronger defense and a more independent European stance, which might influence the dynamic around negotiations and intelligence actions. Speaker 0: Zelensky’s Christmas remark, “may he perish,” followed by an attack on Putin’s residence, prompts questions about who’s pulling Zelensky’s strings. Zelensky is described as the “highest paid actor in the world” with large sums allegedly pilfered from Ukraine’s aid; Zelensky could be expendable to those steering Ukraine’s direction. The meeting in Mar-a-Lago between Zelensky, Trump, and others occurred while the Putin residence attack was underway, suggesting an attempt to undermine negotiations. Budanov’s connection to the CIA and potential independent actions by Ukrainian intelligence raise further concerns about internal Ukrainian divisions. Speaker 1: Russia’s potential retaliation could target Ukrainian intelligence assets like the SBU headquarters in Kyiv, or European assets inside Ukraine if evidence points to Western involvement. Russia’s current military actions include continuing strikes on power infrastructure, with movements in Zaporizhzhia and around Kherson, indicating an axis of attack. Independently, Russia claims significant ground progress; Ukraine counters with claims of selective advances by Russia and a favorable propaganda edge for Ukraine. The battlefield metrics show Russia increasing manpower and maintaining multiple axes of attack, with eight or more fronts, while Ukrainian recoveries of bodies show a ratio suggesting heavy Ukrainian losses. Speaker 0: The conversation ends with expectations for retaliation, possible new European involvement, and the enduring fear that negotiations remain unsettled. The next days could reveal more about who is behind the attack, how Russia responds, and whether a path to peace remains possible, given the conflicting narratives and competing strategic interests.

Dear friends, I want to draw your attention to the fact that there were negotiations between Russia and Ukraine, led by the same president, in Turkey. These negotiations aimed to establish trust and peace. However, we did not agree with Ukraine on the nature of the treaty, which was called the Treaty on Permanent Security Guarantees for Ukraine. It consisted of 18 articles and included details about armed forces and weaponry. The Kiev delegation signed this document, but the Kiev authorities discarded it after we withdrew our troops. They treated it as history and disregarded its importance.

"Peace in Ukraine is possible now." "The war started eleven years ago when The United States backed a violent coup to overthrow the Ukrainian government of president Viktor Yanukovych." "Why did The United States want NATO enlargement? Because The United States wanted to dominate Russia." "It was based on autonomy for Eastern Ukraine, the ethnically Russian part of Ukraine." "The United States and Germany ignored the treaty." "Do not accept neutrality. Fight on." "The Ukraine war can end now based on neutrality of Ukraine. Just say it. Neutrality." "Diplomacy where Europe and Russia sit down and undertake collective security, recognizing that Russia does not want NATO or NATO troops on its border, and Russia recognizing that Europe does not want Russian troops in Ukraine."

The discussion centers on why achieving a durable peace in Ukraine remains elusive, with participants insisting that every side seeks terms favorable to itself and that genuine compromise is seldom forthcoming. Putin’s true aims are debated. Jonathan argues that Putin’s primary concern is internal regime security rather than territory. He suggests that Ukraine’s shift toward Western political and democratic norms threatens Putin’s rule and his business model, making Ukraine a strategic buffer that could inspire similar Western reforms within Russia. He contends that the issue is not NATO expansion per se, but the regime’s fear of democratic influence emanating from Ukraine. Mark, by contrast, views the conflict as driven by a broader geopolitical contest, with Russia aiming to erase Kyiv’s Western alignment and to neutralize Ukraine as a political threat, a stance he says is explicitly stated by Russian representatives. He also emphasizes that for Russia, security guarantees and territorial concessions would be unacceptable if they leave anti‑Russian regimes in control of eastern Ukraine. The panelists repeatedly acknowledge that, in practice, peace negotiations are framed as a contest of terms. Rubio’s remark is cited to illustrate the perception that all parties want peace “on their terms,” and that Russia has repeatedly rejected deals that require concessions on its core objectives. A recurring theme is that Russia would prefer a permanent settlement that keeps Ukraine out of NATO and restores a neutral status for Ukraine, effectively precluding Kyiv’s future alignment with Western security structures. There is broad agreement that, on the battlefield, Russia has not achieved a straightforward, decisive victory and that the conflict is complex and protracted. Yet there is disagreement about whether Russia is “winning” or whether the front lines indicate a longer stalemate, with some arguing that Russia remains capable of imposing strategic costs and that the West has faced limits in providing advanced weapons or decisive deterrence. The discussion also touches on escalation risk, with some participants highlighting the risk of nuclear confrontation and the perception that Western powers, especially the United States, have been cautious in delivering the most potent capabilities to Kyiv. US and Western roles are examined in depth. Jonathan contends that the conflict has evolved into a US/NATO proxy dynamic, with the West providing support while avoiding a direct confrontation that could trigger a broader war. He argues that the Biden administration has pursued a cautious, incremental approach to armament and economic pressure to avoid escalation, while still trying to prevent a Ukrainian defeat. Mark challenges this, suggesting that Western policy has often been framed as preventing Ukraine’s collapse rather than decisively countering Russian goals, and he asserts that the U.S. has pursued objectives that do not aim for Moscow’s overthrow but instead for preserving a client state in Kyiv. The conversation also covers the Budapest Memorandum, the history of Western guarantees, and questions about whether Western promises would be reliable in a crisis. The role of NGOs, civil society, and media is debated. Jonathan explains that, prior to the full-scale invasion, Ukrainian media was a mosaic with significant oligarchic influence, but that independent voices gained strength after 2014 and became more robust under pressure from government and oligarchs. He argues that Western funding for NGOs has aimed to promote democratic values and press freedom, though he concedes that some Western projects lacked a clear strategic objective. Mark counters by arguing that Russia also used civil society and NGOs as tools, though he asserts that Western leverage and funding were far more extensive and impactful. The debate includes a critique of US funding patterns and the potential for foreign influence shaping political outcomes. The participants discuss the possibility of freezing lines as a path to peace. They deem it unlikely: Mark says NATO presence near Russia’s borders remains unacceptable, and Jonathan notes that such a freeze would leave large Russian-leaning regions in Ukraine under a regime Moscow views as hostile. They acknowledge the political and military infeasibility of a durable ceasefire under the current conditions, given the entrenched positions and fortifications in Donbas, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhia. Looking ahead, the panelists foresee a long, possibly generational conflict unless there is a dramatic shift. Mark argues that the ultimate settlement would require regime change in Kyiv, while Jonathan suggests that both sides see no real path to a negotiated end under current terms, forecasting endurance of hostilities with periodic escalation and continued diplomacy as a façade that fails to yield a decisive peace. They anticipate Europe’s ongoing rearmament and potential domestic political shifts that could influence the trajectory of the conflict, with the broader global balance affected as countries reassess alliances and deterrence strategies.

They were ready to end the war if we take on the neutrality of Finland and promise not to join NATO. Boris Johnson came to Kyiv and said we won't sign anything with them, let's just fight. But as soon as we called on them to sit down, the next day they were already waiting with a delegation.

Мы против расширения НАТО и размещения ударных систем у наших границ. Если все хотят мира, почему не отказаться от этого? Мы готовы создать условия для повышения доверия и безопасности.

Putin initially tried to prevent the war and sought a diplomatic solution. He negotiated with Ukraine, focusing on Crimea. However, his main concern was NATO expansion into Ukraine. If Ukraine had remained neutral, the war might have been avoided. But the US and UK intervened, pressuring Ukraine to abandon negotiations. In 2022, it seemed possible for Ukraine and the West to win, but 2023 has been disastrous for Ukraine, and now it appears Russia will emerge victorious.

Putin claimed to have a document outlining a peace agreement with Ukraine, which he showed during negotiations in Istanbul. The agreement was called the Permanent Agreement on Ukraine and Security Guarantees, consisting of 18 articles covering everything from military equipment to personnel. However, Putin did not make the document public. The Ukrainian delegation aimed to prolong the process, while the Russian delegation wanted to pressure Ukraine into signing the agreement, particularly by ensuring Ukraine's non-membership in NATO. Ukraine refused this point due to the need for constitutional changes and lack of trust in Russia's commitment. The lack of preparation and uncertainty led Ukraine to only work towards an agreement with 100% assurance that history would not repeat itself. Boris Johnson's visit to Kyiv further complicated matters, as he stated that no agreements would be signed, suggesting a preference for continued conflict.

Checklist for summary approach: - Identify and order the core claims and chronology of events. - Preserve the speaker’s key assertions and specific examples, including quoted phrases where appears in the transcript. - Highlight unique or surprising points (e.g., alleged coups, Minsk II interpretation). - Exclude repetition, filler, and off-topic content. - Avoid commentary on truthfulness; present claims as stated. - Translate only if needed (not needed here); keep the summary within 380–476 words. The speaker argues that the United States has repeatedly acted to redraw borders and topple governments without UN authorization, and that Western powers have treated international agreements as tools to serve their interests. He cites the Belgrade bombing for seventy-eight days as the first post-World War II European war that aimed to break Serbia, create Kosovo as an enclave, and install a NATO base in the Balkans, describing it as a NATO mission without UN authority. He lists additional interventions: Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria, with the assertion that the Obama and Hillary Clinton era tasked the CIA to overthrow Bashar al-Assad, and that NATO illegally bombed Libya to topple Muammar Gaddafi. He also recounts Kyiv in February 2014, stating that the United States overthrew Yanukovych together with right-wing Ukrainian forces, noting that this occurred after the EU had reached an agreement for early elections, a government of national unity, and a stand-down by both sides. He emphasizes that the next day the opposition asserted disagreement, and the United States immediately backed the new government, ignoring the prior constitutional agreement. In 2015, he contends the Russians did not seek Donbas restoration but peace through negotiations. Minsk II, a UN Security Council unanimously adopted treaty, was signed by the Ukrainian government and guaranteed explicitly by Germany and France. He states that it was laughed at inside the US government, despite the UN endorsement. He cites Angela Merkel’s later remark in a desight-era interview after the 2022 escalation, claiming she said Minsk II was “a holding pattern to give Ukraine time to build its strength.” He counters that Minsk II was a UN Security Council unanimously adopted treaty meant to end the war. He asserts familiarity with the United States government and urges distrust, arguing that both sides should sit down publicly and present their terms “in front of the whole world” for judgment. He calls for clear terms: “We’re not going to overthrow governments anymore,” and asks the United States to say “We accept this agreement,” and Russia to say “We’re not stepping one foot farther than whatever the boundary is actually reached,” with NATO not enlarging. He envisions putting the terms on paper for the world to see, asserting that “once in a while, treaties actually hold.”

Speaker 0: He asks about comparisons to World War II and what Hitler did in Czechoslovakia. Initially, he takes some territory. He appeased Putin the same way they appeased Hitler. But then, especially if he takes the defensive line in Donbas, which Ukraine still holds at the moment, it puts Putin in a better position to continue invading more and more territory out of Ukraine over the next ten, fifteen years rather than trying to achieve it all in the next few months or next couple of years? Speaker 1: It’s wildly insulting to compare Putin to Hitler for obvious reasons. But regarding territory, for seven years before Russia invaded, Russia was on board with the Minsk Accords, brokered in February 2015. The Minsk Accords would have left all of Ukraine intact; Ukraine would have kept the Donbas. All Ukraine had to do was pass some laws in its parliament enshrining autonomous rights for the ethnic Russian regions of the Donbas, letting them speak the Russian language, letting them select their own judges, letting them have trade with Russia if they wanted to. And yes, that Minsk accord, if it had been implemented, would have kept Ukraine out of NATO. So this idea that Russia’s bent on conquest not only in Ukraine but everywhere is totally undermined by the available evidence. Russia was fine with even the Donbas staying in Ukraine as long as the cultural rights of Ukrainians of ethnic Russians in the Donbas were respected and if Ukraine stayed out of NATO. And if you want to say that that’s imperialist for Russia to demand the Ukraine side of NATO, would we ever accept Canada or Mexico being in a hostile military alliance led by Russia and China? Of course not. And by the way, Ukraine not being in NATO was, for a long time, the majority public position inside of Ukraine, if you look at polls, and it was enshrined in Ukraine’s declaration of state sovereignty, which said that Ukraine will be a permanently neutral state. So these were not radical demands by Putin at all. It was just ultraradicals in Ukraine—the ultranationalists, like groups like the Azov battalion, Right Sector, Vubota—which refused to accept the compromise of Minsk. You read the memoir of Angela Merkel; they all say the same thing. It was a hostility inside of Ukraine that prevented Minsk from being implemented. And had Minsk been implemented, I think you would have avoided this war. So in short, the idea that Putin has territorial designs in Ukraine is undermined by the available evidence, which then shows how completely idiotic it is to believe he has territorial designs beyond Ukraine as well.

The war in Ukraine was a terrible debacle caused by The United States expanding NATO despite Russia's objections. Ukraine and Russia were about to sign a peace agreement based on neutrality, but "The United States said, no." We want "military bases. We want NATO there. Don't sign the agreement." The speaker argues the conflict could end if Trump publicly declared that NATO will not enlarge to Ukraine: "NATO will not move one inch eastward, not one inch." They note "They promised." The piece cites Clinton in 1994 beginning NATO enlargement and calls this "the most basic point" that we do not need conflict. It says we end Ukraine's war with Ukrainian neutrality and halting NATO enlargement; Russia won't accept it, "just like The United States didn't accept bases in Cuba of the Russian military." It closes with AI as a better mediator: "it'll give you both sides of the argument."

The discussion centers on the Ukraine peace process, with Trump reportedly optimistic after his envoy discussed ceasefire conditions in Moscow and a call with Putin expected. A key point is that Russia seeks recognition of the war's fundamental causes, including Ukraine's neutrality, territorial settlements, and security arrangements. Publicly, Ukraine continues to demand NATO membership and full territorial recovery, which are not conducive to peace. The US may be shifting, suggesting NATO will not enlarge, territorial concessions are needed, and security arrangements won't involve the US. However, Ukraine's agreement on these points is uncertain. European leaders' bellicosity is contrasted with potential behind-the-scenes diplomacy. NATO expansion is viewed as a core issue, with Crimea unlikely to return to Ukraine. The failure of the Istanbul process in April 2022, allegedly blocked by the West, worsened Ukraine's territorial situation. Security arrangements should involve the UN Security Council, including Russia and China. Some European leaders privately acknowledge NATO enlargement to Ukraine is unlikely, despite public statements, which is seen as dangerous lying. The purpose and future of NATO are also questioned, given its original purpose has expired.

The Ukrainian side needs to take real action if they want progress. They should start by revoking the red card given to the Ukrainian president for negotiating. We hear that they are ready for some kind of peace talks, but it's interesting how the responsible individuals who were recently talking about defeating Russia on the battlefield are now changing their tune. They are now saying that these problems should be resolved through peaceful negotiations, which is a positive transformation. However, just talking about it won't be enough. Concrete steps need to be taken if there is a genuine desire to make a deal.

They were ready to end the war if we took a neutral stance like Finland and promised not to join NATO. When we returned to Istanbul, Boris Johnson came to Kyiv and said we wouldn't sign anything with them and let's just fight. But as soon as we called on them to sit down, the next day they would already be sitting, waiting with a delegation.