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The discussion centered on NATO summit claims about the US returning to a more direct war posture against Iran while also deepening involvement in the Russia-Ukraine war, and how abrupt escalation could unfold. On Iran, Lieutenant Colonel Daniel Davis said President Trump is “trapped” in a position he “can’t get out of,” and that during an Air Force One interview he was asked whether the US was going back to full-scale war and answered “I don’t know,” then said that if it happened it would be “easy” and “blooder.” Davis argued that prior coercive and military approaches are “fizzling out” and that Trump lacks a clear idea of what military power is supposed to accomplish when it does not produce the expected compliance. Davis compared this to earlier performative or expectation-driven strikes, but said the current situation is not “following the script.” Davis then described how the US-Iran memorandum of understanding and ceasefire ended, focusing on Point 5 regarding administration of the Strait of Hormuz. He said the wording left room for interpretation: it stated the Iranian side would determine “safe passage” and “not charge a fee” for 60 days, with a shift afterward in which “Iran and Oman would determine the future course,” while Iran maintained that on day 61 it would resume fees and govern administrative rules. Davis said the Iranian side interpreted the paragraph as granting Iran authority to set rules, including enforcement if ships did not comply with Iran’s prescribed course and paperwork procedures. He said the US, lacking authority in the MOU to determine how things happened in the strait, nevertheless attempted to set a southern corridor path “nearly in Omani waters,” after which Iran warned ships for about two days, then hit ships on the third day. Davis said CENTCOM’s ex post assessment on July 7 characterized the action as response to Iran violating the ceasefire and MOU, and that US strikes continued under that interpretation. Davis argued the ambiguity and differing readings of the same paragraph created a friction point, and questioned the “20 to 1” rationale as large-scale strikes that did not change Iranian behavior and risked driving escalation. He said Iran responded by indicating possible withdrawal from the non-proliferation treaty and changing nuclear doctrine, and by continuing to fire back. Davis also referenced Iran’s stated claim that it shot 10 missiles at an air base in Jordan, with Jordan claiming it shot everything down. He said Trump has suggested further measures such as seizing Karg Island and targeting desalination plants and oil, and warned this could push the conflict toward action against Gulf states. Davis argued the Iranian approach is not likely to be submissive and that Iranian leadership has previously specified responses if the US targets certain sites. He also said US statements described potential strikes that might expand from military targets to Iranian cities, calling this a punitive raid against civilian populations and describing it as a war crime. He linked such escalation risks to a collapse of “guardrails,” including separation of powers and the War Powers Act, and said he expects retaliation against Israel, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the UAE, and further refusal to yield on nuclear proliferation constraints. The conversation expanded to wider NATO dynamics. Davis argued that Western leaders have abandoned moral or rule-of-law “guardrails” and replaced them with “pure power politics,” using language to steer public perception and keep populations controlled. He specifically cited Mark Rutte’s comments portraying US actions against Iran as understandable because Iran was not following the ceasefire, while condemning Russian actions as “evil,” describing the contradiction as part of a power-based narrative. On the Russia-Ukraine war, Davis said Trump’s position is unclear and that Trump, like with Iran, “doesn’t know” what to do because he faces no “rational way out” without political or strategic loss. Davis described a “least destructive” option as winding down support for Ukraine over time, giving time for a negotiated deal with Moscow to end the war and stop the killing, potentially requiring changes including acceptance of that outcome not including Volodymyr Zelensky. He argued Trump is unlikely to do this and instead may “kick the can down the road.” Finally, Davis addressed Dmitry Peskov’s assertion that the “special military operation” has become a war because of NATO involvement. Davis said this language opens the door to a broader framework where Russia’s public and leadership begin preparing for wider consequences, including gradual escalation, since war changes what Russia can mobilize. The discussion concluded that public admissions about NATO involvement could pressure governments to respond and that the speakers feared the world is “sleepwalking” toward wider conflict.

The speaker asks why a certain measure had to be taken, and says it is worth reminding people who supports the treaty or deal and who opposes it. Supporters include all of the speaker’s allies: the US, NATO, Five Eyes, and India. Opponents include Russia, China, and Iran. The speaker also says that surprisingly, Nigel Farage is in the opposition column, aligning him with Russia, China, and Iran rather than with the column of the UK and its allies.

Chas Freeman and the host Glenn discuss how sea power has shaped global politics and why the current era may be signaling a shift toward land power and new kinds of strategic leverage. - Historical context of maritime dominance: Freeman traces a long arc from British naval hegemony after the Seven Years’ War to American preeminence after World War II, noting that naval power helped sustain a rules-based order and open sea lanes. He argues that dominance of the seas is no longer guaranteed, highlighting evolving ranges of weapons and the emergence of land-based controls that can threaten naval movements. - The evolving limits of naval power: He notes that artillery ranges kept territorial seas limited to about three miles in the eighteenth century, but advances in missiles and shore-based defenses have eroded that traditional maritime advantage. The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea’s 12-mile territorial limit is described as a political compromise rather than a fixed physical law. Modern missiles with ranges of up to 2,000 kilometers enable coastal forces to threaten carriers far from home waters, while shore installations can enforce blockades from land, as seen with Yemen’s Houthis in Bab El Mandeb and Iran in Hormuz. - The Strait of Hormuz as a strategic focal point: Freeman describes the current blockade as a sea-change that challenges the historic assumption that ships can freely operate in open waters. Aircraft carriers must stay well back from Iranian batteries, and surface ships at risk from Iran’s cruise missiles and drones. He emphasizes that control of Hormuz now rests more on land-based capabilities than on naval forces, making open-sea dominance increasingly untenable. - Implications for the traditional order: The discussion suggests that Anglo-American naval dominance, which helped sustain a liberal international order, is becoming less viable. Freedom of navigation operations and the appearant stability they created are no longer sufficient or sustainable in the new environment, where land-power and non-military instruments (energy, finance, and partnerships) matter more. - Energy, finance, and the petrodollar: The energy-trade dimension is central. Freeman and Glenn consider how the Strait of Hormuz underpins the petrodollar system, and discuss recent currency-swaps and dollar-reliance questions. They propose that if Gulf states shift toward the yuan or other currencies, U.S. financial hegemony could be challenged, catalyzing broader strategic realignments. China’s willingness to tolerate sanctions resistance and issue directives to its banks suggests a pushback against U.S. financial dominance. - China, Iran, and strategic realignments: Freeman notes China’s rise as a major sea power but argues China will not inherit Western maritime hegemony. He highlights China’s land-based connectivity initiatives (rail, roads, free-trade zones) that have maritime dimensions but are primarily land-centric, including Iran’s overland oil transport to China. He underscores a broader multipolar shift and the potential for Chinese and Iranian strategies to erode the effectiveness of U.S. sanctions. - Negotiations and potential outcomes: The conversation concludes that there is no viable military path to open Hormuz or a negotiated settlement in sight. Freeman describes the situation as a high-stakes stalemate with no clear diplomatic avenue. He suggests that the war could subside into a lower-intensity conflict reminiscent of Israel-Iran dynamics in the region, with ongoing tensions and episodic explosions rather than a decisive end. - NATO, Europe, and Israel: The hosts discuss the potential decline or reform of NATO, the pivot of U.S. strategy away from Europe toward Asia and the Western Hemisphere, and how these shifts could affect European security. Freeman questions the future viability of Israel given shifting U.S. stance and waning Western consensus, noting domestic and international criticisms of Israeli actions and leadership. He observes growing Western skepticism toward Netanyahu’s approach, and the broader political costs for Israel on the world stage. - Final reflections: Both speakers anticipate profound, systemic changes in international relations—multipolarity, weakened sea-power advantages, a possible redefined European security architecture, and a reevaluation of essential alliances. They caution against overreliance on any single power’s hegemonic framework and emphasize gradual, incremental reforms over abrupt, destabilizing shocks.

As European economies decline, young people can't afford homes, and energy costs are much higher, leading to a declining standard of living and low birth rates, which is a sign of civilizational collapse. There's a lot of rage in Europe, and the Russia-Ukraine war serves as a relief valve for European leaders to blame Putin. The UK's response to fighting a new war against Russia is sad because Russia could easily defeat the UK. Turning the population's rage towards Russia distracts from domestic issues. Intelligence sources believe Ukrainians were behind the Nord Stream pipeline attack.

Glenn: Welcome back. Stanislav Krappivnik, a former US military officer, born in Dolbaz and recently returned, joins us again. Stanislav: Always a pleasure, Glenn. Glenn: In the last two days, Russians entered the strategic city of Orekhov in the Saporiyansko region, which may indicate that if this falls, the whole region might begin to collapse. In Slaviansk, the last Donetsk conglomeration, there are real advances that, if successful in circling the region, could mean the entirety of Donbas falls. Is the Russian spring offensive already begun? Stanislav: It’s hard to say, partly because mud season is ongoing in those areas. The South is still mud-prone; the terrain there is different from Haryakov and Sudirmy, where ground is firmer, forested. In the South, there’s black earth with fewer trees, causing severe mud this time of year. If the melt is fast, flooding can occur; if slow, the ground acts like a sponge and mud persists as water seeps down. Nightly freezes persist while daytime temperatures rise above zero. Weather affects movement and logistics. He notes that the briefings from the Russian command vary from independent mappers, suggesting either undisclosed advances or battlefield confusion. The Russian high command’s reports and geolocations may not always align with independent assessments. If credible, Russia’s forces from the South may have entered Ariakhov, with two parallel rows advancing toward Ariyakara and a long urban sprawl to the south. There is a gray zone because Ukrainian claims differ from Russian assertions. Ukrainians often withhold confirmations for long periods; e.g., Gudaiipoya/Gulyaporiya discrepancies show how contested reports can be. Stanislav says it’s not clear that this is a bold, continuous offensive up and down the lines. A big push would require enough armored vehicles, artillery, and aviation, which he has not seen yet, though it could be developing. Ukrainians have conducted desperate counteractions not just to retake territory but to disrupt Russian preparation for a potential spring offensive. If he were in command, he would launch a big spring offensive, at least partially toward Sumy, which is about 14 kilometers from Kharkiv. Sumy would be a key logistics hub and could cut off Kharkiv from the west, accelerating the fall of the region. He explains that Kharkiv could be surrounded by blowing bridges from the south and encircling through Sumy to the west and the east along the Russian line toward Bianka and the Big Water Reserve. He mentions continuing Russian movement in the north and the city of Kasatirivka, which has been split by a river; all bridges were blown about a month ago, complicating approaches. North of Slaviansk, the gates of Krasnyomar require closing first. There are contested claims about Yaman, with Russians saying around 50% controlled vs. Ukrainians claiming 10–15%. The central concern is the Russian push in the south, where Yemen sits in a triangle formed by the Oka and the Sri Bianca rivers, and Russian forces are closing in from the north as well. Crossing Yamana is expected to fall; it’s a matter of time, though how long remains uncertain. Glenn: Ukraine does not withdraw after encirclement. There’s a rational explanation tied to PR wars: if the US and Europeans lose interest in Ukraine, weapons and money dry up, and Zelensky appears addicted to PR victories to keep support. Do you think the war in the headlines affects Western support? How does the Iran conflict influence Ukraine, given weapon and money dynamics? Stanislav: There’s additional pressure on Western governments from the military and certain military societies not to rush into direct NATO engagement or a large-scale conflict with Iran. He notes Iran’s demonstrated ability to strike American bases and key targets, and that Iran’s actions have shown the US and its allies that American power isn’t unlimited. He argues Iran’s strikes and the broader Middle East conflict complicate Western calculations, as American bases and interests face increased threats. He asserts that Iran has shown it can strike at American bases and that American casualties would be far higher than reported. He claims Iran’s actions press Western governments to reconsider involvement in the region and to reassess commitments to allies such as the Saudis, who reportedly told American bases to stand down. He also discusses how Russia’s deterrence posture could shift in response to ongoing Iran–US tensions, and suggests that if Russia sees an opportunity to restore deterrence, it might be tempted to push back more forcefully. Glenn: Russia’s approach to diplomacy with Europe and the US is complex. Macron’s bid to join a Russia–US–Ukraine format could spoil negotiations. Belgium’s stance on Russian assets and broader EU politics complicate any settlement. Stanislav: He explains distrust in European leadership, questioning whom to trust in Europe. He suggests that a broader reform in European leadership and doctrine is unlikely soon. He notes that among European politicians, there’s disagreement and strategic posturing, with some populist voices but institutional leadership often failing to present a coherent strategy. Glenn: What about China and Russia’s support for Iran? How might that evolve? Stanislav: Russia previously explored a mutual defense pact with Iran; the document lacks substance, and real support has been practical, including MiG-29s, Su-30s, and S-400s, along with jamming systems enabling Iran to counter US satellites and missiles. He describes Iran’s military buildup and how Russia’s support has extended to drone technology and air defenses. He predicts Syria could reemerge as a battleground, especially if Iran’s militancy expands and if the US and Israel are drawn into broader conflict. He suggests China may reassess its stance and consider leveraging its position as US capabilities wane, potentially viewing Taiwan’s reunification as a strategic opportunity. Glenn: Any final thoughts? Stanislav: He emphasizes the high level of risk and unpredictability in the current international security environment, with multiple actors pursuing aggressive strategies and the potential for rapid shifts in alliances and deterrence calculations. He notes Iran’s broader influence and the risks to regional stability, hinting at a world where war remains a possible, though increasingly costly, option for major powers.

The discussion frames the current global confrontation as driven less by ideology or democracy and more by an economic battle centered on financial control. The speakers argue that the British establishment is panicking not about territory or missiles, but because a Quietly released Washington document signals the end of London’s ability to siphon money from the American economy. This document, the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) 2025 annual report, is said to prioritize economic stability and household income over protecting the financial system that underpins “the casino,” and it is described as revolutionary in shifting policy away from saving “financial parasites” toward supporting the real economy. Key points include: - The premise that London fears a shift in U.S. policy that places people and economic growth first, not globalist or imperial financial interests. The two documents released within a week—the FSOC 2025 report and the administration’s national security strategy—are said to reassert that American principles will govern, not imperial ones. - Susan Kokinda argues that this shift exposes a strategic clash: London’s fear is the end of its economic model’s dominance, not a conventional military threat. - The war in Ukraine is recast as a theater where Trump’s administration is pushing a new economic and geopolitical strategy. Trump’s team is said to be telling Zelensky to negotiate on territory or risk losing security guarantees, signaling a move away from a rigid transatlantic alliance toward recognizing Russia’s interests and seeking peace. - Britain, according to the analysis, is openly pushing for continued conflict. A Sky News interview with a British general is cited as evidence that the UK is preparing its population for war rather than advocating peace. - Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service is presented as corroborating that the UK is undermining Trump’s peace efforts and pressuring the EU to seize Russian assets to fund Ukraine and derail a U.S.-led settlement. - The FSOC reform is tied to a broader reshaping of the U.S. economy, with the participation of influential figures such as Lord Peter Mandelson and Larry Summers in shaping post-2008 financial policy (Dodd-Frank) and its alleged pivot toward protecting American households rather than financial centers. - The administration’s domestic focus targets four alleged cartels that are viewed as pillars of the imperial financialized system: beef cartels, big pharma and insurance, housing, and narco trafficking. The claim is that these sectors drain resources from the public and fuel the financial system’s dominance. - Beef, pharma, housing, and drugs are presented as extraction and control mechanisms of the British system, with reforms aimed at breaking these up described as both economic and strategic blows to the empire. - The narrator contends that stopping these economic mechanisms can prevent wars sustained by financial interests, and that Trump’s policies are reviving American manufacturing, builders, and producers. Supporting details highlight instances where political figures frame policy as protecting working Americans—food security, healthcare affordability, and housing stability—while linking these goals to a broader strategy against international financial power structures. The overarching claim is that the real war behind the shooting war is economic, and the British system cannot survive a successful American pivot toward prioritizing people and real economy over financial elites. The update closes by urging readers to understand the economic war behind geopolitical conflict and to engage with Promethean Action for more analysis.

Speaker 0: "Papa Gallo, parrot, stop repeating what everybody else is saying and think for yourself." "People have little minds. The masses follow." "My greatest concern is there's gonna be a false flag event that's gonna escalate this war." Speaker 1: "NATO can't keep going at this rate; not enough weapons to sustain Ukraine." "In a multipolar world, Russia, China, and India realize they need to cooperate because The US cannot be trusted." "They're gonna unite more." "When Biden put the sanctions on Russia, he said, quote, Putin's gonna pay the price." "We wrote in the Trends journal, no, they're not, that the people Russia has all of the technological, industrial, high-tech. They have they have all they need to be self sufficient." "All these companies pulling out of Russia, the Russian people are gonna take it over." "If we do, life on earth will be destroyed in twenty four hours."

Ashton Rutanski hosts Going Underground from a region tensioned by ongoing missiles and drone attacks and the wider aftermath of what he describes as the Trump-era wars in the Middle East. He notes that Xi Jinping canceled and rescheduled a meeting with Trump in Beijing, shortly after Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi met Wang Yi, with China and Russia blocking UN Security Council efforts to condemn Iran's actions in the Strait of Hormuz and China directing its companies to ignore Washington’s oil sanctions on Tehran. Rutanski frames the current sanctions as part of a long tradition of U.S. sanctions and cites figures from The Lancet Health Journal on deaths linked to those sanctions. He then introduces Paul Craig Roberts, former US assistant secretary of the treasury for economic policy under Reagan and former associate editor of the Wall Street Journal. Roberts argues that if Iran had prevailed in the Gaza conflict, the outcome could have reshaped world events, claiming Iran could have “pummeled the American bases and Israel into a surrender” if not for a ceasefire. He says the ceasefire was a mistake that prevented solidifying a victory and criticizes negotiations as ineffective against hegemonic powers like the United States and Israel, which he characterizes as pursuing greater Israel and broader regional hegemony. He suggests that negotiating with such powers is pointless when their aim is existential, and he contends that Iranian taktics were good but the strategic plan was flawed. Rutanski asks about media and political rhetoric, including allegations that Japan’s Financial Times (as a stand-in for Western media) reports Iran warning the U.S. not to enter the Hormuz Strait and to launch drones at the UAE. Roberts reiterates his view that negotiations with hegemonic powers are futile when those powers deny others’ right to exist, and stresses that the broader issue is the Zionist agenda of Greater Israel. He asserts that Arab and Muslim states have never confronted this agenda and argues that Iran should use its position to raise the Greater Israel issue as a matter of diplomacy and regional sovereignty, rather than focusing solely on uranium enrichment or coastal control. The discussion turns to Neoconservatism and American policy history. Roberts recalls the Iran-Contra affair as an early neoconservative moment, and cites Norman Podhoretz’s call for “the elimination of seven countries in five years” (Iraq, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Lebanon). He contends that U.S. policy has long aimed to reshape the Middle East in support of Greater Israel, with ongoing Israeli attacks on Lebanon and Western support for Israel. Regarding Trump, Roberts dismisses Trump’s statements as nonsensical and references an official U.S. State Department document claiming that the United States attacked Iran “at the request of Israel.” He criticizes mainstream journalism and suggests much reporting has become aligned with official narratives, while noting that Iran’s strategic posture should be to confront the Zionist agenda rather than to engage in other points of negotiation. The conversation touches on Vladimir Putin and Ukraine, arguing that Putin’s long-running war has widened and become increasingly dangerous; Roberts criticizes Putin for not seizing opportunities and notes that the broader regional conflict is expanding into NATO airspace, which could destabilize regimes in the region. The program closes with Roberts emphasizing the need for the Muslim world to frame its negotiations around the Greater Israel issue and for internal Israeli politics to reflect on the Zionist agenda, then signs off with condolences for those affected by NATO-era wars and invites viewers to continue watching on Going Underground.

The conversation centers on a view that the United States has failed in its proxy conflicts with Russia and Iran and that power is shifting to a multipolar world led by non-Western states. Stanislav Krapivnik argues that Russia’s pivot away from the West undercuts Western unity and that Europe is increasingly exposed as the West’s policies erode, with Russia becoming a leading anti-Western force for years to come. He frames the shift as not just multipolar but anti-Western in direction, noting that Russia’s stance has turned against the West and that the West’s “genocidal” actions and moral claims have damaged its legitimacy. He also asserts that the West’s actions have helped bring to power leadership in both Russia and Iran who are less amenable to Western influence. He highlights Trump’s regime-change actions as reflecting realignments away from West-facing regimes and notes the long-running Iranian threat as a consequence of Western policy. Key points covered include: - The shift from a Western-centered world order to a multipolar order led by non-Western powers, with Russia and Iran resisting U.S. and European influence. - Russia’s movement away from Western integration toward an anti-Western bloc, and the idea that the West’s moral posture has deteriorated, with calls that Europe’s rulers have failed to uphold moral standards while supporting aggressive actions. - Iran’s history of being pro-Western but ultimately rejecting Western dominance after regime-change attempts and pro-West leadership were removed; the discussion notes that Iran has demonstrated resilience by countering Western pressure and has weakened American influence in the region by striking American targets and allied interests. - Ukraine as a proxy conflict, with NATO involvement, and the view that Western leaders are pushing Ukraine into escalating confrontations with Russia. The speaker cites evidence that NATO and U.S. forces are deeply involved, including drone and missile strikes attributed to American planning or directive, and suggests that Europe’s leadership is moving toward broader war, despite public appeals for limited engagement. - The role of Turkey and the Baltic states: Turkey’s shifting position and its anger over Ukrainian actions; the Baltic states’ treatment of Russian minorities and the geopolitical risk of escalation if Estonia’s airspace is used for drone strikes against Russia, seen as potentially triggering a larger European conflict. - The argument that Europe’s security architecture is collapsing under its own hubris and dependence on the United States, with accusations that European populations are being molded toward war, militarization, and possibly even mobilization and conscription in several states (Germany, Poland, etc.). - The claim that deterrence must be reasserted; the speaker argues for making an example of Estonia as a warning to deter further cross-border aggression and to prevent a larger war, asserting that Europe’s leaders are too eager to escalate, risking a broader confrontation with Russia. - The broader cultural and historical analysis of Europe’s relation to Russia, including Peter the Great’s attempts to connect with Western Europe and Russia’s long-standing pendulum between East and West, with the speaker asserting that today Russia views itself as separate from Europe, forming a distinct civilization and political orientation. - The potential for a larger war in the near term if European leadership does not adopt a more prudent approach; the speaker warns that Orban’s political fate could accelerate conflict, and emphasizes that Europe must acknowledge deterrence realities or face nuclear risks. - The closing remarks echo Easter greetings, with the speaker returning to the grim prognosis of European demographic and political trajectories, highlighting a view that Western policy has empowered elites while threatening mass casualties and societal upheaval in Europe.

Larry Johnson and the host discuss the current trajectory of U.S. policy under Donald Trump and its implications for international law, NATO, and the global balance of power, with frequent emphasis on Greenland as a flashpoint. - They suggest Trump is making a case for peace through overwhelming strength and unpredictability, implying that international law is seen by him as a restraint US power. Johnson argues that Trump’s stance includes threats and pressure aimed at annexing Greenland, and he questions whether this represents a genuine peace strategy or a coercive strategy that disregards international norms. - Johnson catalogs a sequence of Trump-era actions and rhetoric: Donald Trump “launched the coup against the Iranian government,” was involved in discussions with Zelensky, helped Ukraine, and then “kidnapped Nicolas Maduro,” followed by an escalation that included the suggestion of a military attack on Iran. He says Trump has “declared openly” that he does not recognize or respect international law, describing it as “useless. It’s whatever he thinks is right and what needs to be done.” - The conversation notes that Trump’s position has been reflected by close aides and allies, including Steven Miller, Marco Rubio, and Scott Bessette. Johnson claims this broad endorsement signals a shift in how major powers might view the U.S. and its approach to international law, with Putin, Xi, Macron, and others watching closely. - They argue this marks a breakdown of the international system: “a complete breakdown of the international system,” with NATO potentially coming apart as the U.S. claims a threat to Greenland from China or Russia and insists that NATO is unnecessary to protect it. The debate frames Europe as being in a toxic relationship with the United States, dependent on U.S. security guarantees, while the U.S. acts with unilateralism. - The European response is discussed in detail. The host describes European leaders as having “ Stockholm syndrome” and being overly dependent on Washington. The letter to Norway’s prime minister by Trump is cited as an astonishing admission that peace is subordinate to U.S. self-interest. The question is raised whether NATO is dying as a result. - They compare the evolution of international law to historical developments: Magna Carta is invoked as a symbol of limiting rulers, and Westphalia is discussed as a starting point for the balance-of-power system. The hosts consider whether modern international law is viable in a multipolar world, where power is distributed and no single hegemon can enforce norms as unilaterally as in the past. - They discuss the economic dimension of the shift away from U.S. hegemony. The U.S. dollar’s status as the global reserve currency is challenged as BRICS-plus and other nations move toward alternative payment systems, gold, and silver reserves. Johnson notes that the lifting of sanctions on Russia and the broader shift away from dollar-dominated finance are undermining U.S. financial hegemony. He highlights that Russia and China are increasing gold and silver holdings, with a particular emphasis on silver moving to new highs, suggesting a widening gap in global finance. - The Trump administration’s tariff strategy is discussed as another instrument that could provoke a financial crisis: Johnson cites reports of European threats to retaliate with massive tariffs against the U.S. and references the potential for a broader financial shock as gold and silver prices rise and as countries reduce their purchases of U.S. Treasuries. - The discussion examines Greenland specifically: the claim that the U.S. wants Greenland for access to rare earth minerals, Arctic access, and strategic bases. Johnson disputes the rare-earth rationale, pointing out U.S. processing limits and comparing Arctic capabilities—Russia has multiple nuclear-powered icebreakers. He characterizes Trump’s Greenland gambit as a personal vanity project that could set off broader strategic consequences. - They touch on the role of European defense commitments, with German and other European responses to defend Greenland described as inconsequential or symbolic, and a suggestion that Europe might respond more seriously by hedging against U.S. influence, though current incentives make a real break difficult. - A broader warning emerges: the possibility of a new world order emerging from multipolarity, with the United States weakened economically and politically. They foresee a period of adjustment in which European countries may reorient toward Russia or China, while the United States pursues a more fragmented and confrontational stance. - The conversation ends with mutual concerns about the trajectory toward potential geopolitical conflict and a call to watch the evolving relationship between the major powers, the role of international law, and the coming economic shifts as the global system transitions from unipolar to multipolar.

Real evil forces are manipulating the world, and I suspect figures like Putin and Trump play roles in this scheme. Putin, a World Economic Forum Young Global Leader, may be involved in a plan linked to Ukraine, which seems to serve as a backdrop for money laundering and geopolitical maneuvering. The situation in Gaza appears to be a tactic to justify global action against Israel, potentially allowing certain groups to reclaim their historical homeland in Ukraine. The West's diminishing support for Ukraine, including a significant cut in artillery supplies, suggests a coordinated effort rather than a genuine conflict. Announcing such reductions during wartime contradicts strategic principles, indicating that this is all part of a larger, orchestrated operation to maintain control over humanity.

The speaker says it’s worth reminding people who supports and who opposes the treaty or deal. Supporters are described as all of the speaker’s allies: the US, NATO, Five Eyes, and India. Opponents are described as Russia, China, and Iran. The speaker also says that Nigel Farage—the leader of the opposition—is surprisingly in the “against” column, alongside Russia, China, and Iran, rather than in the column with the UK and its allies.

Speaker 0 says Western European populations support what he calls a “suicidal war on Russia through Ukraine” because elites in Zelensky’s Ukraine use corruption to maintain control over their population, rather than protecting countries from Russia or the Soviet Union. He adds that the elites aim to protect societies from becoming democratic. Speaker 1 agrees and frames the pattern as one where leaders who prioritize national interest are eliminated. He cites Libya as an example, saying Muammar Gaddafi cared about Libyans and Africans, but was assassinated for defying the central banking system and relying on gold with his own oil. He then says Venezuela today follows a similar pattern, where becoming nationalist and enriching one’s people leads to being killed or overthrown. Speaker 1 describes the mechanism as “Gladio networks” and intelligence agencies deploying operations against leaders. He recounts the Congo in the early 1960s after independence from Belgium, when Patrice Lumumba was elected prime minister. He says Lumumba approached the United States with a proposal to give the uranium that had been allocated to Belgium, but to use the portion going to Belgium to enrich Congolese people. He states that President Dwight D. Eisenhower would not meet with Lumumba and that Vice President Richard Nixon would not meet with him; Lumumba instead met with the secretary of state, who told him that he could not cut out Belgium and that Congo would receive the same arrangement as before, providing essentially nothing for building schools and hospitals. Speaker 1 says Lumumba then refused the deal, and that the Soviet Union would have been interested in uranium. Speaker 1 concludes that Lumumba was murdered by Operation Gladio elements controlled by Otto Skorzeny, described as Nazi, under Reinhard Gehlen’s German intelligence, the BND. He ends by saying that any prime minister or president who “stands up for their country” is targeted by an “international syndicate” seeking to control the world’s resources.

The speaker believes European globalist elites are in a panic because they realize the U.S. is no longer following the same path, and there is no future in Ukraine. Ukraine will never be a NATO member, and no one will go to war with Russia. European armies are "boutique forces" not designed for serious war. The leaked German military discussion is tragic and suggests a decline in professionalism. The conversation was amateurish, with no appreciation for the gravity of providing Taurus missiles to Ukraine, which risks a serious war by attacking Russian territory with Western assistance. Putin has made it clear that Berlin could face similar attacks if such actions occur.

Ashwin Rutansi introduces New Order, a global show tracing how India and its allies sit at the center of a transformation in world history. The program aims to explore partnerships, shifting alliances, and how structural changes ripple from global powers to streets, villages, markets, and boardrooms. The show promises to examine diplomatic architecture, networks of power, money flows, and levers of influence, presenting a fundamental reordering rather than mere turbulence. Zara Khan will join later to field viewer questions. Guest: John Mearsheimer, University of Chicago professor and coauthor of The Israel Lobby and US Foreign Policy. The discussion opens with the recent incident of Iran firing missiles at an F-35 and what it implies given anticipated US and allied arms purchases. Mearsheimer notes that aircraft over adversary territory face real risks from surface-to-air missiles and air defenses, even if the US and Israel have degraded Iran’s defenses. He suggests this is a factor behind why the US and Israel refrain from flying over Iran. Geopolitical framing: Who benefits from the ongoing war (in Iran) at the time of the interview? Mearsheimer identifies two clear winners: Russia and China. Russia benefits from sanctions relief on oil and gas pushed by Trump-era policies, and the war diverts munitions away from Ukraine, aiding Russia in its position. China gains as US credibility in foreign policy deteriorates, increasing its influence in the Middle East and globally as nations worry about an unreliable US, with Europe showing signs of leaning toward China. India’s position is discussed as a potential loser in this new order. The discussion asserts that India’s relations with Israel and Iran, and its ties to both the US and the Gulf, place it in a precarious position. The possibility of a summit or peace conference is deemed unlikely to solve inflation, gas prices, fertilizer costs, or Indian food production challenges; the war is characterized as bad news for India, as reflected in Indian media. On US policy and the Israel lobby: Mearsheimer contends that the Israel lobby has significant influence over US foreign policy and that its role in dragging the United States into wars, including Iraq in 2003, was central. He notes with some irony that the lobby’s power is increasingly in the open, referencing Joe Kent’s statements and public figures like Tucker Carlson and Bernie Sanders endorsing similar criticisms. He points to Francesca Albanese, UN official on Palestinian territories, describing the Israeli actions in Gaza as genocidal, and notes the lobby’s efforts to undermine her career. Policy advice for the Global South, focusing on India: Mearsheimer argues that India should maintain distance from excessive US alignment to avoid heavy leverage over Indian policy. He suggests speaking up against US policy when it harms national interests but avoiding becoming overly dependent on the United States. He cites examples such as Indonesia where maintaining friendly ties with China while balancing US relations would be prudent. He warns that excessive closeness to the US invites sanctions and pain, whereas diversifying partnerships could reduce vulnerability. BRICS and multipolarity: The war could benefit BRICS and the Global South, with Russia and China gaining, while some BRICS members like India and possibly Indonesia could suffer. The conflict may prompt a strategic rethinking of US ties, encouraging greater independence from Washington. The discussion also touches on Europe’s economic strain and NATO’s perceived setback if Russia prevails in Ukraine, describing a “double whammy” for European leadership from the Gulf conflict alongside Ukraine. End of interview: The program teases future exploration of the Israel lobby’s influence and the potential for a broader discussion on the end of the Israel lobby era, followed by viewer questions. Zara Khan presents questions from the audience, including whether the broader humanity will gain a say on the world stage and how the Iran war might differ from Vietnam and Afghanistan, emphasizing asymmetrical warfare and the risk of ground involvement. The show signs off, inviting viewers to follow and watch future episodes.

The UK is seen as irresponsible, echoing the attitudes of the 19th-century British Empire and causing global tensions. Recent comments by President Macron are also viewed as reckless. Zelensky is perceived as a threat because he seems to be pushing for a full-scale war between NATO and Russia. The belief is that if the conflict remains between Ukraine and Russia, Ukraine will ultimately lose. Zelensky's actions appear aimed at drawing NATO into a broader conflict.

Mario: Let's start with Venezuela. Do you think this is a strategy by Trump? Larry: I saw something similar back in 1988. The CIA was involved with trying to provoke Manuel Noriega into taking some action, so we could say we had to respond to set the stage for a military invasion, which I believe that in 2018, Donald Trump signed a finding authorizing a covert CIA action to get rid of Maduro. That attempt failed. And now the objective is to get control of the oil. That's the number one priority, with an eye toward the risk of a renewed Iran conflict and the prospect of shutdown of the Persian Gulf, and the need to have an alternative supplier. Ukraine defeating Russia was the plan, and Russia’s military is now around 1,500,000. Mario: What’s your initial reaction to Venezuela? I talked to John Kuriaki who said to read naval movements to gauge what the military plans. The buildup on the coast of Venezuela is significant. They’ve got 14, 12 warships, including the Gerald Ford. Do you think they are bluffing or this is a Trump strategy? Larry: It could be a bluff. I saw something similar in 1988. I was in the Central America branch, and the CIA’s analytical thrust was to provoke Noriega into taking action to justify a response and invasion. That happened in 1988. But that time there were US bases in Panama; Quarry Heights was full. Southern Command was there. Now Southern Command has moved to Miami, just near Southcom. Another issue: within the military, the concept of supported and supporting commands means the special operations command (SOCOM) would normally be the supporting commander, but here Southern Command would be subordinate to SOCOM, which is problematic because SOCOM cannot fight a conventional war. Delta Force, SEAL Team Six, and others are light infantry for raids, not mass warfare. So launching shells or sending ground forces won’t solve Venezuela; terrain is rugged and favors ambushes. If US troops ashore, body bags would likely exceed those from Iraq and Afghanistan. Venezuelans will fight, and insurgents from Brazil and Colombia could join. Decapitation strikes against Maduro could provoke an insurgency that the US would struggle to pacify. Mario: Could we see a decapitation strike like Israel against Hezbollah and Iran? Larry: Decapitating Maduro would still leave loyalists and other actors with weapons; an insurgency could erupt, and the US would be unable to pacify it. The real objective here is unclear. The State Department’s INL/INSCR programs have long documented Venezuela as a transit point for drugs; Trump claimed fentanyl is the issue, but most cocaine also goes to Europe. The 2018 Trump era mentioned the Trendy Aragua as a pretext to justify covert actions; I believe Trump signed a finding authorizing a CIA operation to remove Maduro, leading to Guaidó, but that failed. The broader agenda appears to be regaining oil influence and countering Russia, China, and Iran’s influence in Venezuela. Mario: Elaborate the agenda and strategy behind these strikes on boats out of Venezuela and Trump’s public acknowledgement of a CIA covert operation. What’s the strategy and intention? Larry: The objective is to restore oil control in Venezuela and reduce adversary influence. Maduro once aligned with the CIA, and Chavez/Maduro have maintained cordial relations with Moscow and Beijing. The US aims to curtail BRICS and reduce Venezuelan ties to Russia, China, and Iran, potentially moving Venezuela away from the dollar-based system. The theory that this is a message to Putin circulates, but if that were the aim, it’s a poor strategy given the broader geopolitical dynamics in Syria, Iran, and the Palestinian-Israeli arena. The US previously overpromised in the Red Sea and failed to secure freedom of navigation, signaling limited military capacity for large-scale campaigns. The objective of any Venezuela action must be concrete, otherwise it risks entanglement in an insurgency. Mario: Turning to general foreign policy under Trump. What about the national security strategy? Europe’s criticisms, and Trump’s approach to Ukraine—Witkoff and Kushner meeting Putin? Larry: The 2025 national security strategy signals change, but these documents are not blueprints; they’re guidelines. Europe is being asked to step up, while the US distances itself, arguing Europe’s resources and industrial capacity have diminished while Russia and China shift. Europe’s censorship and defense spending are under scrutiny. The US–UK intelligence relationship still lingers, but overall the West’s ability to project force is questioned. Russia and China’s relationship is deep and mutually reinforcing; the Rand Corporation’s earlier ideas that Ukraine would defeat Russia to force Moscow to join the West have not materialized. Ukraine’s fight has forced Russia to mobilize and shift front lines; casualty counts are contested, but Russia’s front has expanded with a larger force and higher attrition. Mario: What about Ukraine negotiations and Putin’s terms? Larry: Putin’s terms (as stated on 06/14/2024) are: Crimea, Zaporizhzhia, Kherson, Donetsk, and Luhansk permanently part of Russia; Ukraine must withdraw forces from those territories before negotiations begin. An election must be held in Ukraine with a legitimately elected president, potentially replacing Zelenskyy, and Russia would then talk to Ukraine. Russia’s stance treats these territories as non-negotiable; freezing lines is not acceptable to Russia. If negotiations fail, Russia is likely to maintain control over large parts of Donbas and southern Ukraine, potentially extending into Kharkiv and Odessa. Western military support is insufficient in scale to match Russia’s production; Russia’s oil revenue remains a significant portion of GDP, and the global south is pivoting toward BRICS, with Modi’s meeting signaling stronger ties with Russia and China. The strategic trend is a shift away from Western dominance toward a multipolar order. Mario: Larry, appreciate your time. Larry: Pleasure as always, Mario.

Alexander McCurryst interviews Alexander McCurryst podcast host Alexander McCurryst (“the Duran” host Glenn) about European and British political crises. Alexander McCurryst argues that across Europe there is a “denationalized political elite” that concentrates on foreign policy—especially Russia and the conflict in Ukraine—while losing attention to accumulating domestic problems. He connects this disengagement to declining approval ratings, weakening of opposition, and rising political volatility. On Britain specifically, he says the crisis stems from Prime Minister Kirst Palmer and the broader leadership being narrowly focused on “foreign policy” framed euphemistically, largely centered on Russia, Ukraine, and wider European integration rather than basic British concerns. He characterizes Palmer as constantly traveling abroad and “never hear kir,” implying disengagement from British problems. He argues that the established political elite is unlikely to change course even if Palmer’s time as prime minister ends, because successors would be expected to continue the same approach while only trying to become more popular. Regarding Nigel Farage and Reform, Alexander McCurryst says Farage comes from outside the elite and has previously suggested changes to British foreign policy, including writing that the Ukraine war was provoked by actions taken by the West. However, he argues that as Farage gets closer to power he talks more like the elite does—especially on relations with Russia and Europe—and he does not believe Farage would have the political authority or skills to carry out the major sea change required. He adds that Farage’s priorities include attracting defections from Conservative Party elites and that the link between foreign policy and the domestic policy crisis is not understood. Alexander McCurryst then describes Britain’s economic stagnation as particularly severe. He points to over-investment in the financial system in the 1980s, deindustrialization, reliance on North Sea oil, and exposure after the 2008 period as a “one-dimensional economy” lacking strategic depth. He lists long-running outcomes since 2008: flat or falling living standards, flat output, rising debt as government costs increase, rising taxes, and widening budget and trade deficits. He also claims Britain is more boxed in to the foreign-policy consensus than other European countries, lacking examples of strong domestic challengers akin to parties like National Rally, left-wing forces such as Melenchon, or Italy’s Salvini. He argues that this combination creates rising public anger and exasperation and could lead to sudden, sharper political shifts that are not moderated by consensus, likening Britain to a pressure cooker approaching an “almost pre revolutionary situation.” He suggests legitimacy crises are expanding across Europe and sees administrative and repressive measures as signs of insecurity and inability to adapt. The discussion turns to Germany as a comparative case. Glenn highlights the Alternative for Germany (AfD) as Germany’s most popular party, described as relatively new, and claims Chancellor Blackrock Mertz is less popular than Palmer. Glenn argues Germany is changing in ways that contradict post–World War II lessons and mentions targeting the opposition, including describing AfD as an extremist organization by intelligence services. Alexander McCurryst responds that in both Britain and Germany these legitimacy crises show the political system cannot adapt and tries to manage instability through repressive tools. He contrasts Germany and Britain’s historical orientation toward Russia: Germany is described as moving against the grain of policies aiming for stability with Russia, including “Ostpolitik” approaches associated with earlier decades, while Britain is described as having an “almost surfeit of policy” anchored in founding myths. Glenn then asks about France and other smaller states, mentioning attempts to cancel election results in Romania, a new election in Bulgaria, celebration of a possible end to Orban in Hungary that did not produce profound change, and Slovakia “holding the line.” Alexander McCurryst says smaller countries show more political agency and vitality partly because they have fewer security-state constraints and are easier for people to organize, but argues big countries still determine European direction. He lists Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Britain as decisive, while smaller states influence dialogue but cannot change overall direction alone. On diplomacy with Russia, Glenn notes a shift in rhetoric after years of arguing “weapons are the path to peace” and boycotting diplomacy, and asks whether it will go anywhere. Alexander McCurryst says events are pressing the elites but that they are not acting with conviction. He claims that by May they are still not agreed on who will lead negotiations with Russians and have not defined realistic objectives. He cites an episode where Macron sent two people to Moscow and says the Russians responded that it was not negotiation but a one-way dialogue. He argues that without deciding what to talk about and who represents Europe, talks cannot advance. Glenn adds that Europeans want a “seat at the table” but refuse to talk to Russia, citing Kaya Kallas’s statements about not talking to Putin and Russia being broken up into smaller countries. Alexander McCurryst agrees that the mindset driving domestic crisis also affects foreign-policy decision-making: elites insist their values must prevail and retreat into values language that blocks real solutions. He claims Western media narratives increasingly depict Ukraine as winning and portrays recurring stories about Putin being sick or dying and corruption in Ukraine as proof democracy is working, describing this as a “hope strategy.” Finally, Alexander McCurryst connects the crisis to Europe losing its place in the world and becoming less coherent with the United States. He argues Britain’s belief it remains a great power despite decline amplifies the struggle with Russia. He warns that without understanding with Russia Europe risks becoming a “backwater.” He says Europe still has time to change but that goodwill in Russia has been lost and that Russia controls the “gateway” to Eurasia. He concludes that despair should be avoided, claiming Europe is near a “tipping point,” with Britain and Germany already in crises and elections in France potentially bringing faster change, but that Europe must adapt to a post-American world; otherwise it risks remaining a small region left behind.

Ray McGovern emphasizes the erosion of the post-World War II security architecture, especially the U.S.-led system that emerged after the Cold War and aimed to globalize the Transatlantic Partnership. He argues that this expansion has strained the United States economically, militarily, and institutionally, and that security has become more volatile as empires exhaust both capabilities and moral legitimacy. He uses NATO’s history to illustrate how shifting perceptions of threat—historically the Soviet menace versus modern Russian and German sensitivities—shape alliance dynamics. He notes that many Americans were taught a one-sided narrative: NATO was created to contain the Warsaw Pact, while the Soviets also felt threatened by Western actions. He recalls his own indoctrination, the evolution of NATO, and the Warsaw Pact’s creation in response to West German NATO entry in 1955, explaining that “security is indivisible” and that each side’s fears drive the other’s behavior. He observes that polls show the U.S. losing its status as Russia’s main adversary, with Germany becoming the more prominent concern, which complicates the security calculus. Speaker 0 adds historical context, referencing John Lewis Gaddis and the Cold War’s security competition, where blocs prompted mutual insecurity. He discusses the Helsinki Accords and the attempt to reduce security competition, contrasting that with post-Cold War optimism that NATO expansion would stabilize Europe. He notes opposition among some American leaders to expanding NATO and argues that the Ukraine conflict reveals a problematic belief in “force for good” through military blocs, suggesting that expanded NATO has contributed to the current crisis rather than preventing it. He highlights the potential consequences of continued reliance on NATO and U.S. guarantees, questioning the credibility of Article 5 guarantees in an era of waning U.S. commitment. Speaker 1 recounts his experiences in Munich (1968) with Radio Free Europe and his opposition to encouraging Czech resistance to Soviet tanks, arguing that the Brezhnev Doctrine has a modern analogue in Ukraine. He describes the sequence leading to Crimea’s annexation, including the 2014 Maidan events, Western negotiations (Minsk Accords), and the dynamic between Western leaders and Putin. He argues that Putin’s decision to invade Ukraine arose from a perception of NATO encroachment and Western deceit, asserting that Moscow’s actions were a response to attempts to place Ukraine in NATO orbit and to secure a vital Black Sea port. He states that Russia halted further invasions in 2022 after Ukrainian negotiations to avoid NATO membership and a ceasefire, and he contends that Western actors, including Boris Johnson, pressured Ukraine to continue fighting. Speaker 0 contends that the war’s conduct was shaped by Western promises and the perception that NATO’s expansion would secure democracy. He criticizes European leaders like Kaya Kaltois (Kallas) and Zakharova’s exchange to illustrate the political theater around NATO and European security. He stresses that European leaders’ rhetoric—such as calls for “no Russian red lines”—and the reliance on U.S. military power created incentives for continued conflict. He also critiques the influence of the military-industrial complex, warning that profiteering from defense production drives war. Speaker 1 emphasizes the CIA’s dual role: one branch “for lying to the public” and overthrowing governments, and another “analysis division” that historically aimed to tell the truth. He cites the 2007 unanimous intelligence assessment that Iran had stopped working on a nuclear weapon at the end of 2003 and had not resumed, noting that later officials removed or reframed statements about immediate threats. He references George W. Bush’s admission that the 2007 estimate deprived him of a military option, and he points to Tulsi Gabbard’s 2019-2024 reluctance to label Iran as an imminent threat. He argues Iran is not a direct threat to the United States but is linked to Israel and regional dynamics, including Netanyahu’s role and the 2003-2007 Iran/Iraq/Israel calculus. He mentions Joe Kent’s resignation as a dissenting voice against continued war in Iran, suggesting that some military leaders and officials pushed back against aggressive policy. Speaker 0 wraps by noting the evolving U.S.-Israel relationship and the need for responsible diplomacy. He highlights the broader international realignment: NATO’s credibility waning, Europe reassessing security guarantees, and potential shifts in alliances with the Gulf States and Asia. He closes with a cautious note that genuine diplomatic leadership and intelligent intelligence analysis could help establish a more stable order, rather than perpetuating disruptive escalation.

Afshin Ratanzi and the guest discuss the Epstein files and how they are being linked to Russia and Western power structures. The guest says 3,000,000 Epstein files have not been released by the Department of Justice, with Trump administration’s attempts to block them and congressional efforts by Thomas Massie and Ro Conner to release them. He notes the files describe how a former Russian deputy, Ponomarev, allegedly wanted to incite a coup in Russia and the assassination of President Putin, and mentions interest in interviewing Ponomarev, who reportedly lives in Kiev. The guest adds that Going Underground has interviewed some people from the Epstein files, including Noam Chomsky, who he says criticized how NATO media prevent understanding of world events and support Russiagate. He mentions Ehud Barak walked out of the show, and notes FBI sworn statements containing disturbing allegations such as child cannibalism, and says these are “allegations, of course.” He asserts Western media will blame Putin and Russia to avoid confronting the broader “dump of redacted 3,000,000 files,” portraying Washington, London, and Brussels as oligarch-dominated and condemning Western democracy while accusing elites of trafficking children and influencing tax legislation to enrich the rich. The host asks what fears the Epstein links raise. The guest explains that Epstein, described as a Mossad asset, purportedly sought to destroy the Russian Federation because a multipolar world involving China, Russia, Venezuela, and Iran challenges Zionist expansion. He argues leaders from those countries aren’t in the Epstein files, contrasting them with Western elites. He discusses why media might link Epstein to Russia, noting that Trump’s handling of the files has caused concern in West Asia; the guest suggests Trump could launch wars (e.g., Iran) to distract from links to Epstein and to avoid scrutiny of his own associations, which could have global economic consequences if Straits of Hormuz were affected. Addressing why the “Russia hoax” persists, the guest emphasizes the existence of a captive population in NATO countries through propaganda and restricted access to alternative outlets (citing bans on Rumble in France and RT in Britain), arguing Western oligarchs control cultural and media sectors. He contends that Western systems have historically supported wars in Iraq, Libya, Afghanistan, and Syria, and claims public belief about events like Bucha could be shaped by NATO media. Regarding Britain’s role, the guest claims MI6 is heavily involved in wars including Syria, with Epstein-linked interests tied to overthrowing Assad; he notes Peter Mandelson’s resignation from the House of Lords and his appointment as British ambassador to the United States, highlighting Britain’s investment in destroying Russia since the Crimean War. He cautions that Britain’s diplomacy may be a lie and urges BRICS and Shanghai Cooperation Organization members to reassess Western leaders, suggesting distrust toward Western diplomacy and warning that leaders in global South should recognize a pattern of destruction propagated by Western powers. The interview ends with thanks to Afshin Ratanzi.

Ray McGovern, a former CIA officer who chaired the National Intelligence Estimate and prepared daily briefs for the president, discusses the newly released US national security strategy and its implications for the war in Ukraine, as well as broader US-Russia and US-Europe dynamics. - McGovern notes a dramatic shift in the national security strategy’s emphasis. He observes it prioritizes the Western Hemisphere, Asia, Europe, and the Middle East, with Russia treated as part of Europe. He contrasts this with past eras, recalling Paul Wolfowitz’s post–Gulf War doctrine, which asserted US primacy and the ability to act that Russia could not stop, and he emphasizes the stark difference between that era and the current document. - He recounts a historical anecdote from 1991–1992: Wolfowitz’s belief that the US could win where others could not, followed by a warning to General Wesley Clark that Russia would challenge US primacy as times changed. He points to subsequent US actions in Iraq (2003) and Syria (2015) as evidence of a shift in capability to project power, and he argues that in 2022 Russia halted US plans by preventing NATO expansion into Ukraine. - McGovern interprets the current strategy as signaling a recalibration: the US may be acknowledging a changing balance of power, with a focus on deterring Russia and stabilizing relations with Moscow, while recognizing that Europe is central to strategic calculations. He stresses that Russia’s core principle, in its view, is to prevent Ukraine from joining NATO, and he underscores that the strategy doc frames core interests as seeking strategic stability with Russia and a negotiated modus vivendi, though he notes these appear as a “castaway” in the Europe section. - He discusses ongoing high-level discussions in Berlin involving Witkoff (Wittkop) and Jared Kushner, and Zelenskyy’s positions on NATO membership and security assurances. He recalls past European reactions, including Rubio’s role in watering down European talking points and US–Russian negotiations, suggesting a pattern of European concessions followed by US–Russian engagement that sidelines European voices. - McGovern argues that Russia has “won the war” on the battlefield and that Moscow’s tactic is gradual, minimizing Ukrainian casualties while consolidating control over parts of Donetsk and other territorial objectives. He asserts Putin’s priority is to maintain a workable relationship with the United States, with Ukraine as a secondary concern. He also notes Trump’s stated interest in improving US-Russia relations, including a willingness to consider extending New START, and he highlights that Moscow would react to whether Trump commits to the treaty’s limits for another year, which would influence Moscow’s strategic calculations. - The discussion covers the internal US debate over how to handle Ukraine and whether to pursue negotiations with Russia. McGovern argues that the reality of Russia’s position and Ukraine’s losses complicate any simple “win” scenario for Ukraine, and he suggests that a negotiated settlement might eventually emerge if a durable US–Russia relationship can be pursued, given Russia’s advances on the battlefield and its leverage in European security. - They discuss John Mearsheimer’s realist perspective, arguing that Western expansion toward Ukraine contributed to the conflict, and that voices emphasizing NATO enlargement as the sole cause are contested. McGovern mentions Obama’s warnings not to give Ukraine illusions of prevailing against Russia and to avoid escalation, and he contrasts this with Stoltenberg’s statements about Russia’s preconditions for peace. - They also critique EU moves to seize Russian assets to fund Ukraine, suggesting that European leaders may be acting to preserve political power rather than align with the public’s long-term interests, and question whether such measures will endure or provoke wider political backlash. - In closing, McGovern reiterates that Russia has the upper hand for now, with the war’s outcome dependent on political decisions in Washington and Moscow, particularly whether Trump can extend New START, and whether European and US policymakers can sustain a realistic approach to security guarantees and the balance of power in Europe. The conversation ends with a cautious note about the potential for a settlement but ongoing uncertainties about the strategic environment and transatlantic politics.

Alex Kraner and Glenn discuss the evolving Iran crisis, U.S. strategy, and broader implications for Europe and the global order. - The Trump administration’s approach to the Iran confrontation is characterized as reactive and ad hoc. Alex suggests the administration has a “thoroughly thought through strategy of making it up as they go along,” operating in a reactive mode as ground conditions change and new opportunities arise. He asserts the conflict is one the U.S. went into that “created the problems that they're trying to solve now,” leaving the U.S. in a weak position. - On domestic optics and objectives, Trump appears to seek tangible, visible proof of success, needing to “humiliate Iran” or demonstrate a victory, but the complexity of the conflict makes a clean win difficult. Alex questions why the administration would proceed with such a path, given that Trump is due to visit China next week and may want to present stronger leverage at that meeting. - The strategic implications of controlling the Strait of Hormuz are highlighted. If Iran maintains control, it could pressure neighboring countries to decouple from the U.S., reduce American influence, and even threaten U.S. bases and the dollar’s dominance in the region. Conversely, the U.S. cannot easily “go home” without relinquishing strategic positioning, which would undermine Western dominance in the region. - The likely trajectory is escalation. The discussion notes a shift toward renewed or intensified violence, with potential further bombings and Iranian retaliation. There is a view that the U.S. is boxed into choosing between victory and defeat, with no middle ground if sanctions and regional pressure fail to resolve the crisis. - The broader political calculus: the conflict is seen as intersecting with Israel’s regional posture and broader Middle East dynamics. There is concern that Israel’s actions and the broader alliance structure complicate any possible ceasefire, and that the ceasefire may already be off the table due to continued hostilities in Gaza and Lebanon. - The economic and military balance is emphasized: the U.S. military is spread thin across multiple theaters, and analysts note that achievements on paper do not translate into decisive victory in the field against Iran, which is large, populous, and capable of sustained resistance. - There is widespread skepticism about the likelihood of a favorable outcome for U.S. or Western objectives. Alex argues that conventional military instruments are unlikely to compel regime change in Iran, and he contends the U.S. has already “painted itself into a corner” with no credible face-saving exit. - The discussion on Europe and NATO: Glenn and Alex discuss Europe’s response to the Iran conflict and its impact on Ukraine and Russia. They describe a new Joint Expeditionary Force (ten Northern European nations under British command) as a mechanism to confront Russia, signaling a potential shift toward a new European naval alliance aimed at harassing Russia’s northern maritime routes. This raises questions about why European NATO members would cledge their navies to a London-led command in a bloc that could escalate toward war with a nuclear power. - London’s role in shaping Western policy is repeatedly highlighted. The speakers suggest that “all roads always end up leading to London,” pointing to the British establishment’s influence on Middle East policy, Israel, and Europe’s strategic posture. They argue that powerful financial or banking interests (the “cabal” or “banking cartel”) may exert outsized influence over political leaders, including Trump, Netanyahu, and British officials, sustaining a long-standing push for Middle East hegemony. - The multipolar shift: both speakers emphasize that the world is moving away from unipolar American dominance toward a multipolar system with multiple power centers. They suggest that a sustainable peace would require acknowledging this distribution of power and adjusting strategies accordingly, rather than pursuing unilateral or hegemonic approaches. - Final reflection: if the West pursues a multipolar settlement, it could avert the calamity of a broader, potentially nuclear confrontation. However, the speakers warn that the global struggle over power—between unipolar and multipolar orders—may still unfold in blood, fire, and broader geopolitical clashes.