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Ehud Olmert discusses the October 7, 2023 Hamas attack and its domestic implications for Israel, arguing the attack was a brutal, civilian-targeted assault in homes, not against soldiers or military sites, with over 1,200 civilians killed. He emphasizes that the immediate Israeli impulse was to pursue all killers, and he distinguishes between the real security threat in the south and the actual events of that day. He contends that the danger to Israel’s security in the south was not realistic if Israel had fully deployed defense systems and manpower; the catastrophe resulted from arrogance, complacency, and overconfidence, leading to a total absence of defense when Hamas crossed the border.
On Prime Minister Netanyahu’s leadership, Olmert says the counteroffensive was inevitable but criticizes the government for years of mishandling engagement with the Palestinian Authority and for tacitly enabling Hamas by channeling funds to Hamas via Qatar. He argues that Netanyahu became “the greatest ally of Hamas” by providing military and financial support that allowed Hamas to build tunnels and rockets. The major mistake, according to Olmert, was not pursuing meaningful negotiations with the Palestinian Authority, which would have served Israel’s strategic interests more than tacit arrangements with Hamas. He questions the strategy of the military response, noting that the day-after plan was absent and that international patience frayed as a result of continued Israeli attacks without a clear horizon for Gaza’s future.
Olmert notes that the war’s continuation raised concerns about its legitimacy, citing a 2025 moment when senior former military leaders, including the former commander in chief and heads of intelligence services, signed a petition opposing further expansion of the war. He says this contributed to widespread international opposition, with riots and protests harming Israel’s global reputation. Domestically, he highlights a polarized society and a battle over democracy, citing protests that predated October 7 due to Netanyahu’s attempts to reform the judiciary and other democratic institutions. He claims more than 60% of Israelis do not trust the prime minister and doubt that his government serves Israel’s true national interests.
Olmert weighs Israel’s international position, arguing that U.S. influence in the region has actually grown, while Israel’s military superiority has increased. He points to Hezbollah’s decline and Syria’s realignment as indicators, and argues that Israel is in a better place to tolerate risk for a meaningful peace process leading toward a two-state solution. He contends the rhetoric from Netanyahu’s government is out of step with real needs.
Regarding diplomacy with Iran, Olmert says he would have tried to engage Iran directly, suggesting that Iran might respond to candid dialogue about mutual destruction and proxies. He recounts his own attempts to reach out to Iran during his tenure and contends it could be worth trying again.
On Russia and shifting alliances, Olmert recalls his 2018 view that Russia-Israel ties were important, noting recent tensions due to Ukraine and Iran. He says Kazakhstan’s President’s interest in joining the Abraham Accords is ironic given long-standing Israeli relations, and asserts Israel has opportunities to pursue different policies from the current government. He argues that replacing the government could allow renewed strategic talks with the United States, Saudi Arabia, the Emirates, and a reestablishment of trust with Russia and China.
Olmert concludes by reiterating that the path to better security and a sustainable future lies in changing the Israeli government to enable renewed diplomacy, peace talks with the Palestinian Authority, and a comprehensive two-state framework.