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Two Republican US senators have suggested using nuclear weapons against Russia, which raises serious concerns about the implications of thermonuclear war. It's crucial to recognize that Russia possesses a comparable nuclear arsenal, including hypersonic missiles that can evade detection and reach major US cities like San Francisco, Los Angeles, and New York. In Virginia, for instance, a nuclear conflict would devastate Northern Virginia, annihilating areas such as Loudoun, Prince William, and Fairfax counties, with the Pentagon in Arlington becoming a lifeless wasteland. The potential loss of life in the nation's capital would be catastrophic.

A resolution is being introduced to consider an attack on NATO if Russia or its proxy, Belarus, detonates a nuclear device in Ukraine. The belief is that such an attack would irradiate Europe and harm NATO allies. The urgency stems from President Biden's acknowledgment of the threat of Putin using tactical nuclear weapons. The counter offensive in Ukraine is progressing slowly, but thousands of well-trained forces are ready to join the battle. The focus is on the potential use of nuclear weapons by Putin, and the message is clear: NATO will respond massively, and a war with NATO will ensue. The resolution aims to deter Russia and provide clarity on the consequences of such actions.

Under Joe Biden, the world has become more dangerous due to the threat of nuclear weapons and hypersonic missiles. These missiles move at incredible speeds and can cause widespread destruction. To prevent a catastrophic conflict, we need to be prepared with advanced technology and strength. As commander in chief, I will work with Congress and military leaders to build a state-of-the-art missile defense shield, similar to Israel's Iron Dome. We have the technology and capability to protect our homeland, allies, and military assets from hypersonic missile threats. Our adversaries must know that launching missiles against us will result in their total destruction. The Space Force will also play a vital role in this defense. By rebuilding our military and nuclear capabilities, we can ensure peace through strength, as demonstrated during the Trump administration. Thank you.

Ray McGovern recounts a long, inside view of U.S.–Soviet/Russian arms control and how it shaped or hindered security over decades, tying personal experience to broader strategic lessons. - Continuity and historical perspective. McGovern notes that, after decades in the CIA, he has witnessed both continuity and change in U.S. strategy across eras and administrations. He emphasizes that serious arms control and verification work has often depended on skilled, principled diplomacy even amid bureaucratic friction and political constraints. - Early arms-control work and verification. As chief of the Soviet Foreign Policy Branch in the CIA during the SALT era, he helped support Kissinger and Nixon while recognizing that the Russians faced pressure from both arms racing and concerns about China’s progress. He recalls briefing the Moscow delegation and the importance of verification: “Trust but verify.” He describes witnessing the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty negotiations and the process of uncovering Russian cheating (a radar at Krasnoyarsk later identified as ABM-related). The experience reinforced the value of independent verification mechanisms. - Personal anecdotes about diplomacy and decision-making. McGovern shares instances illustrating how diplomacy operated in practice: Kissinger touring Moscow covertly to broker deals; ambassador Beam's reaction in Helsinki; the sense that a president’s trusted aides could push forward arms-control progress even amid Senate resistance. He stresses the role of credible, informed analysis about the Soviet Union and Gorbachev, and the way that genuine engagement with Moscow helped reduce tensions at key moments (e.g., the late-1970s/early-1980s path toward detente and arms control). - Key treaties and turning points. He highlights several milestones: - ABM Treaty (1972): limiting ABM sites to two, then one, to preserve deterrence stability; verification challenges and the Russians’ willingness to negotiate under pressure. - Reykjavik and the late-1980s era: Reagan’s willingness to pursue arms-control breakthroughs; the shift that helped lead to meaningful reductions. - INF Treaty (1991/1992 onward) and its later withdrawal under Trump: the collapse of a pillar of strategic stability and its consequences for future arms control. - New START (2011): described as “really good” in limiting offensive missiles; its expiry topic is central to the current security calculation. Putin’s public suggestion to extend the treaty for another year, conditional on U.S. reciprocity, is noted; Trump’s stance is portrayed as uncertain or inconsistent. - The broader security architecture and indivisible security. McGovern stresses that “there is no security without mutual security” and points to the OSCE concept of indivisible security—no country should increase its security at the expense of others. He argues that NATO expansion and security dynamics in Europe have undermined mutual security and contributed to the current fragility in the security architecture. - Ukraine, NATO, and the stakes of perception. He contends that Moscow viewed NATO expansion and Ukraine’s trajectory as threats to its core security interests, contributing to Russia’s actions in Ukraine. He argues that Americans are often not educated about mutual security principles, which fuels misperceptions and escalatory dynamics. - Putin as a cautious actor and the risk of leadership reliability. McGovern describes Putin as a cautious statesman who aims to protect Russia’s core interests and avoid existential risk. He suggests Putin is calculating the reliability of U.S. leadership, especially under Trump, whose unpredictability complicates trust and predictability in negotiations. He notes Trump’s perceived narcissism and the possibility that Trump’s motivations in pursuing a peace process could be mixed with personal prestige or political gain. - Current and near-term outlook. The discussion touches on the likelihood of renewed arms-control leverage if U.S. and Russian leaders can agree on Ukraine-related constraints and verify compliance. It also notes that the broader trend—toward weaker, inconsistent adherence to treaties and a perceived decline in diplomacy—risks fueling a renewed arms race and greater instability. - Closing sentiment. McGovern underscores that genuine arms-control diplomacy, mutual restraint, and credible verification are essential for reducing the security dilemma that drives dangerous competition. He frames Putin as a potential hinge for stabilizing relations if U.S. leadership can articulate and sustain a credible, reciprocal security posture. Overall, the dialogue weaves historical memory with current geopolitics, stressing that lasting security rests on mutual restraint, verifiable agreements, and a shared understanding of indivisible security—even as political winds shift and alliances realign.

Speaker 0: The discussion reports that Russia has covertly tested three new weapon systems over the past twenty-eight days, with two of them described as complete game changers. These tests are said to be causing nerves inside NATO, and none of these three have been made public by President Putin, who typically announces such developments. One system, however, is not being kept secret. Speaker 0: According to the report, Russian President Putin just rolled out their most advanced hypersonic missiles to date. These missiles are described as "no one can shoot down"—at least in the view of the speaker—unless future assessments prove otherwise. The specific system named is the Orenshik Oreshnik hypersonic missiles. They are set for combat duty by the end of the year, and they are characterized as capable of extremely high speeds and long-range strikes. The deployment of these missiles is framed as something NATO will be watching very closely. The report suggests that European leaders are exhibiting a willingness to engage in war-related actions, with two particularly troubling points highlighted: the idea that they want to be part of the conflict and the accompanying casualties. It is claimed that they want to participate in the death and destruction in the European Union and in The UK. Speaker 0: The report specifically notes German Chancellor Mertz saying that they are ready to draft young men to war if they cannot reach their volunteer numbers, effectively suggesting compulsory service to fight Russia. Speaker 0: It is also stated that the UK is telling its populace to prepare to sacrifice their sons and daughters, and the speaker emphasizes that "Sons and daughters, colleagues, veterans will all have a part to play, to build, to serve, and if necessary, to fight." The speaker adds that more families will know what sacrifice for our nation means. Speaker 1: The accompanying commentary underscores the need to explain the changing threat and the necessity of staying ahead of it, reinforcing the idea that sacrifice and readiness are central to national defense in the current context.

In a wide-ranging discussion about the Ukraine war and related strategic developments, Colonel and the host cover several key topics, facts, and analyses. Skyfall/Burevznik nuclear-powered cruise missile - The Skyfall (Burevznik) is a nuclear-powered, nuclear-capable cruise missile. A test five years ago ended with five deaths and an explosion; a newer test reportedly flew 14 hours and 15,000 miles. Its characteristics include very long range, low-altitude flight to hug terrain, and high maneuverability, making detection and interception challenging. - The U.S. perspective is that it is not a silver bullet, but it represents an advanced capability: maneuvering over great distances, flying subsonically at very low altitude (within about 20 meters of the ground), and potentially approaching from unexpected directions. - Russia claims it cannot be shot down; the guest cautions that nothing is invulnerable until proven operational, but the missile adds a troubling dimension to deterrence and arms competition. - The broader significance is that it accentuates concern about nuclear weapons and underscores the desirability of nuclear arms reduction talks before START’s expiration. Nuclear arms talks and China’s potential role - The guest indicates Russia is pushing for nuclear arms reduction talks before START expires (February). China is conceptually willing to join, according to some Russian sources, but no authoritative statements from China are cited. Any willingness would depend on Western engagement to explore meaningful participation. Poseidon and other advanced weapons - Poseidon is described as a Russian nuclear-powered autonomous underwater vehicle (a "massive unmanned torpedo drone") intended as a strategic deterrent. Its exact status is uncertain; reports and videos circulate, but it remains largely experimental. - The discussion notes general concerns about U.S. safety from advanced weapons such as Poseidon and other long-range strike capabilities. Encirclement near Donbas: Pokrovsk and Kupiansk - Grasimov claimed 49 Ukrainian battalions are involved in Donbas, with about 31 allegedly encircled near Pokrovsk (for roughly 5,000 troops). Ukraine says supply lines are not cut and that encirclement is not complete. - The analysts explain that Russia has achieved notable progress in Kupiansk and Pokrovsk areas. Ukraine has mounted limited counterattacks in the north near Pokrovsk to disrupt a potential northern encirclement pivot at Rodinsky, but sustained pressure is difficult due to Ukraine’s manpower and logistics constraints. - The northern shoulder near Rodinsky is a focal point: if Russians move beyond Rodinsky, encirclement risk increases. Ukraine’s ability to keep tens of thousands of troops supplied and to hold the city is limited; Russia’s reserves enable more methodical advances. - The overarching view: Ukraine can slow Russian advances but cannot realistically stop or reverse the broader trajectory due to manpower, equipment, and ammunition imbalances. Russia’s advantage in resources makes a prolonged war of attrition unfavorable to Ukraine. Ukraine’s manpower, equipment, and ammunition - The central constraint for Ukraine is manpower. Even with missiles, drones, and air defense, without sufficient infantry to hold and seize territory and to provide reserves, Ukraine cannot win. - Russia’s industrial capacity and reserves enable it to sustain campaigns, whereas Ukraine’s supply and manpower constraints limit sustained operations. - The discussion notes Western missiles (Storm Shadow, Flamingo) and the pace of Tomahawk deliveries, with the implication that gaps in long-range standoff capability affect Ukraine’s offensive and defensive options. Mercenaries and potential foreign troop contributions - Reports of North Korean troops aiding Pokrovsk are discussed. The guest sees little likelihood of other countries sending troops, given the risk of provoking Russia. Mercenary recruitment by other countries is mentioned as a potential but unverified factor. Western sanctions and energy dynamics - The significant development of American sanctions on Rosneft and Lukoil (two-thirds of Russia’s oil exports, roughly 4.4 million barrels per day) is analyzed. China’s state-owned majors and India are reducing seaborne imports but still engaging via pipelines or other mechanisms; the long-term impact on Russia’s revenue is likely substantial but may be offset through workarounds. - The guest emphasizes that history shows Russia tends to absorb economic pain and adapt, making it unlikely that sanctions alone will force strategic changes in Russia’s posture. Global Thunder and other security signals - The Global Thunder nuclear command exercise is mentioned, but the guest signals incomplete knowledge of this particular exercise’s details. Other security signals include drone activity near the Kremlin and assertions about Russia’s broader strategic planning, including potential NATO-related concerns and the Arctic buildup. NATO, European militaries, and relative capabilities - The discussion contrasts Europe’s growing modernization and ambition with actual combat experience. Europe’s strategic parity with Russia is viewed as plausible at a high level, but conventional capabilities lag Russia’s real-time battlefield experience and industrial scale. - The guest warns that perception of inevitable war between NATO and Russia could create self-fulfilling dynamics, urging cautious interpretation of escalatory signaling on both sides. Trump’s negotiation tactics and Ukraine peace prospects - The host questions Trump’s peace negotiation tactics: threats of Tomahawk missiles, meetings with Putin, and attempts to tailor a peace deal offering to freeze lines or concede Donbas. The guest describes Trump’s approach as transactional and inconsistent, with fluctuating positions that depend on the perceived personal and political gains. - The guest argues that Russia’s position has remained consistent since 2014-2022, centering on existential-security demands and denazification logic, including ensuring rights and language protections for ethnic Russians within the contested territories. A lasting peace would require a win-win vision that both sides can accept; transactional bargaining alone is unlikely to lead to a durable settlement. Venezuela and broader geopolitics - The discussion notes a Wagda-linked cargo flight to Venezuela amid sanctions evasion talk, with implications of mercenaries or military parts and a broader strategic alignment with Russia. The host and guest agree that U.S. regime-change impulses in Venezuela complicate international norms, risk escalation, and could inadvertently shift attention away from Ukraine. Overall, the conversation traces the evolving military balance in Ukraine, the emergence of new weapons systems and strategic deterrence concerns, the limits of Western capabilities and sanctions, and the complex interplay of diplomacy, negotiation tactics, and geopolitical aims shaping the conflict and potential resolutions.

Speaker 0: The transcript portrays Putin issuing a chilling World War III threat with a flying Chernobyl-style nuclear weapon. The classified missile is rumored to reach Mach 15, change direction midair, and the Russians believe no one can shoot it down. They’ve already tested earlier versions on Ukraine. Even with high-tech missile defense systems, it cannot be stopped. Russia reportedly has hypersonic missiles that fly hundreds of feet above the ground, alongside ballistic missiles. The speaker asserts the Russians have it all, and that the US says Russia is ahead of us in hypersonic missiles. The Pentagon is described as keeping most powerful capabilities secret, with about two generations of weapons tucked away. The speaker claims Russia has almost a two-to-one nuclear superiority over the US, and that once war starts, nobody wins: even if 95% of missiles are shot down, they would still flatten every city and military base. A classified unnamed ballistic missile is shown dropping many dummy warheads as a demonstration. The narrative references alleged testing in Ukraine and notes a claim that a demonstration MIRV (multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle) was presented: a demonstration that Russia can penetrate defenses and deliver nuclear payloads, though no warheads were involved in that particular display. The speaker recalls Biden announcing long-range cruise missiles, and Putin responding by attacking a missile factory, with subsequent release of photos showing holes in the centers of buildings within the factory. Western media allegedly dismissed these as not powerful missiles, but the speaker counters that it was a MIRV demonstration, and Russia later confirmed the demonstration of capability to field nuclear payloads. The speaker also claims Trump is frustrated with NATO and the EU, accusing them of starting the war with Russia and not wanting it to end. It is stated that Trump decided, over a week prior, not to provide Tomahawks to Zelenskyy. In response, EU and NATO are said to be supplying comparable or more advanced weapons to Ukraine, which would escalate the conflict on the escalatory ladder. Putin is said to be amassing nuclear weapons and attack submarines, with references to maps in the Daily Mail illustrating Russia’s buildup in the Arctic Circle as preparations for war with NATO are described. A segment mentions footage of the Skyfall ballistic missile factory. Speaker 1: Closing outro promoting Infowars, urging followers to connect on X (Twitter) at real Alex Jones and at AJN Live, and to download the Alex Jones app, urging support against the “democrat deep state party” and declaring that they will never be silenced.

Following unprecedented strikes against Iran's nuclear enrichment sites in Isfahan, Fordo, and Natanz, three B-2 bombers were involved, each carrying two 15-ton bunker-busting bombs. A flight of B-2s flew east, likely three of them, and annihilated Fordow's, likely destroying Iran's nuclear enrichment program. A separate flight of six B-2 bombers flew west over the Pacific, refueling over Hawaii, but these were decoys. Thirty Tomahawks were fired from a sub. President Trump has made clear for eleven years that Iran will not have a nuclear weapon, and tonight, he enforced it.

Two Republican senators suggest using nuclear weapons against Russia, sparking concerns about the devastating impact of a thermonuclear war. Russia's hypersonic missiles can bypass US defenses and target major cities like San Francisco, Los Angeles, Chicago, Detroit, Baltimore, Washington DC, and New York City. With a powerful fleet of nuclear submarines, Virginia, including Northern Virginia and the Pentagon in Arlington County, would face total annihilation. The nation's capital would be devoid of human life in the aftermath.

A single Trident II missile launched at Moscow, with all 8 warheads targeting the same area, would yield approximately 3.8 megatons of TNT. The explosion would create a fireball covering over 10 square kilometers, vaporizing everything nearby, while buildings would be destroyed within an 11-kilometer radius. Thermal radiation could cause severe burns up to 22 kilometers away, affecting over 1500 square kilometers. The estimated immediate casualties would exceed 2.8 million fatalities and 4.6 million injuries. The U.S. has 14 Ohio-class submarines, each capable of carrying 20 Trident II missiles, totaling 280 missiles and 2,240 warheads. The combined explosive power is about 1,064 megatons of TNT, equivalent to over 70,000 Hiroshima bombs, always ready for deployment.

According to the Pentagon, providing weapons to Ukraine that could strike targets within Russia carried a 50% chance of nuclear exchange. Despite this assessment, the US proceeded. Russia warned that a large aerospace attack would be considered a first strike, triggering a nuclear response. The speakers discuss the implications of attacks on the Kremlin and the potential consequences of nuclear war, including the vulnerability of nuclear power plants. They claim that a nuclear meltdown would render the Earth uninhabitable for millions of years. They also discuss European leaders' willingness to continue the war against Russia, despite the risk of escalation. They assert that globalists are willing to risk nuclear war for a "reset" and believe it is survivable. They criticize the current approach as "insanity" and "rolling the dice" with nuclear war.

Iran's nuclear ambitions are officially dead after the United States obliterated Iran's top secret Fordo nuclear facility with five to six bunker buster bombs dropped from America's stealth B2 bombers. Two other major Iranian nuclear sites, Natanz and Estevan, were wiped out with 30 Tomahawk missiles launched by American submarines some 400 miles away. Everyone is out of harm's way for now, but American assets in the region are still at risk, and the Iranian response is being monitored.

Colonel Douglas McGregor, president and CEO of the National Conversation, argues that the world stands at a strategic inflection point where careless leadership could lead to catastrophe. He says the global nuclear order is unraveling as conflicts intensify: Ukraine has become a grinding war of attrition with NATO weapons entering Russian territory and Russia signaling potential nuclear responses; in the Middle East, Israel and Iran engage in escalating exchanges; in South Asia, India and Pakistan watch these dynamics and draw conclusions. He insists the problem is not paranoia but pattern recognition, and that those responsible for maintaining nuclear stability appear least capable of acknowledging the danger. McGregor introduces the concept of “nuclear gain of function,” drawing a parallel to biological gain of function debates around the Wuhan lab. He claims that every time a warhead is designed to be more usable, missiles are deployed to shorten warning times, or war games assume limited nuclear exchanges, nuclear war becomes more transmissible and more likely to escape deterrence. He argues that nuclear strategists lack containment, unlike the caution exercised by electrical contractors and building trades, which embed safeguards and redundancy due to experience with catastrophic risk. He states that the nuclear theorists have never seen a city burn and move arrows on maps rather than facing real consequences. He notes that the new START treaty negotiations expire in February 2026 and that Moscow has signaled a willingness to extend. He urges President Trump to seize this opportunity not as concession but as assertion of American leadership, to extend the treaty and pursue more ambitious goals. His central proposal is for the United States to champion a global no first use (NFU) of nuclear weapons among all nine nuclear-armed states: United States, Russia, China, United Kingdom, France, India, Pakistan, North Korea, and Israel. He argues NFU would lower temperature and create space for compromise, reducing the pressure to launch on warning in India-Pakistan tensions and signaling that nuclear weapons are instruments of last resort in the Middle East. McGregor emphasizes that critics may claim NFU weakens deterrence, but he dismisses this as reckless, noting that former Joint Chiefs Chairman General Colin Powell doubted limited nuclear options and that controlled escalation is a fantasy. He quotes Oppenheimer on facing the danger of nuclear war and asserts that naming and confronting the issue is essential. He concludes that adopting NFU is not weakness but a cold recognition that some weapons are too terrible to use and that survival depends on such choices. He asserts that deterrence will fail eventually, and calls for a generation to choose life over annihilation.

According to a FAS and NRDC survey, there are approximately 23,300 nuclear weapons stored at 111 sites in 14 countries. A nuclear war could begin with an exchange of strikes, escalating into a tactical nuclear war in Europe. Russia could send 300 nuclear warheads to hit NATO bases, and NATO would respond with about 180. Casualties at this stage: 2.6 million. NATO might then launch a strategic nuclear strike of 600 warheads at Russian nuclear forces, prompting Russia to respond with missiles. Priority targets include missile silos, military installations, cities, and industrial plants. Russia and NATO would strike 30 of each other's most populated cities, resulting in 34.1 million deaths and 57.4 million injuries. Radioactive fallout would spread radiation, causing acute radiation sickness and potentially 27 million more deaths. A nuclear winter and famine could follow, devastating the biosphere, especially the Equatorial Zone. Scientists estimate that about five billion people could die within two years, underscoring the need for global cooperation to prevent nuclear war.

The discussion covers Iran, its regional threats, and potential US actions, along with broader geopolitical implications. - Iranian capabilities and external support: The on-hand capabilities are said to be far more lethal and the Iranian position stronger, with enormous recent investment by Iran, notably with Chinese and Russian involvement over the last six months. Russia is aiding integrated air defenses and China has reportedly provided missiles; the exact mix and ranges are not fully disclosed. The panelists expect Iranian air and missile defenses to work much better with Russian and Chinese assistance this time. - Protests in Iran and US strike calculations: The protests were described as legitimate initially, driven by economic distress, with two groups present: reform-minded and more conservative elements. The Mossad, with CIA and MI6, allegedly joined to provoke brutality by the regime, aiming to push it toward a brutal crackdown and to exploit the protests as a regime-change opportunity. It was claimed that 40,000 starlight terminals were smuggled in to orchestrate protests but were discovered and eliminated, marking the operation as a failure. Consequently, strikes were deemed impractical unless more firepower and longer duration were available, leading to a predicted extended air campaign rather than a quick strike. - Maduro kidnapping and Venezuela: The operation involved paying off those in the way and exploiting air defenses; one air-defense battery fired, hitting a helicopter but not bringing it down. The new president in Venezuela reportedly refuses to take instructions from Washington, raising questions about regime-change outcomes. There is speculation about continued income from oil captured and sold illegally, and about who will protect Venezuelan oil interests as drilling resumes, including potential mercenaries and maverick oil groups. The oil leadership reportedly lacks interest in going down there unless it is highly profitable. - Secret weapon discussions: The “discombobulator” and other secret weapons mentioned by Trump are described as exaggerated; the speaker notes there are weapons kept secret for dire circumstances but declines to elaborate beyond public knowledge, given high-level clearance. - Iran-focused air campaign planning: The US would rely on a prolonged air campaign, potentially comparable to the Kosovo campaign in 1999, avoiding nuclear weapons and using extensive air power with support from bases in Europe and the region. The Navy would be complemented by the Air Force with a long campaign, while the Navy would need replenishment and time to rearm. - Missile and weapon capabilities: Iran’s capabilities have evolved, aided by Chinese missiles (allegedly hundreds) and Russian support. The range of missiles questions whether they can reach Diego Garcia, with concerns about more capable missiles hitting US bases in the region. Russia’s supply of Reshnik missiles (hypersonic, multiple warheads) is viewed as unlikely; the focus is on Iranian missiles that can threaten ships and bases in the Middle East. - US force posture and diplomacy: The force buildup (aircraft, submarines, drones, THAAD, Patriot) signals a “play for time” strategy while pursuing negotiations, including enriched uranium discussions. There is debate about what agreement might be possible on enriched uranium and JCPOA-related issues; Iran reportedly rejects several Netanyahu/Trump demand points, including missile constraints as a non-starter. - Russia, China, and Turkey as wild cards: Russia would likely intervene militarily only if Iran’s regime faces collapse; China would likely use economic means and some political leverage. Turkey is seen as a wild card; it could join a regional confrontation and potentially align against Israel or the US, with NATO’s response viewed as uncertain and largely lacking a unified, decisive stance. - Nuclear arms and START: The May suspension of START is mentioned; Russia claims willingness to extend, while the US has not responded, raising concerns about unconstrained Russian nuclear activity if treaties lapse. - Ukraine and Taiwan implications: European nerves and NATO dynamics are evolving; the Europeans are portrayed as vacillating between opposing and challenging Trump-era policies, with NATO potentially facing existential questions. A strike on Iran could shift focus away from Ukraine and Taiwan, empowering adversaries, or strengthen deterrence depending on actions and diplomacy. The speaker suggests that, pragmatically, Taiwan poses a far more difficult strategic challenge and that escalation there would be highly unrewarding, potentially increasing China’s incentives to avoid direct conflict.

Following unprecedented strikes against Iran's nuclear enrichment sites in Isfahan, Fordo, and Natanz, it's reported that three B-2 bombers were involved, each carrying two 15-ton bunker-busting bombs. A flight of B-2s flying west over the Pacific and refueling over Hawaii at 11 PM were likely decoys. Another flight of three B-2s flew east, annihilated Fordow, and likely destroyed Iran's nuclear enrichment program. Thirty Tomahawks were fired from a submarine. President Trump has made clear for eleven years that Iran will not have a nuclear weapon, and tonight, he enforced it.

The transcript reports that Russia has completed tests of the Burovesnik missile, with launches slated for 2027. It is described as a doomsday weapon that is rewriting global security, and the speaker asks why Russia built it and what makes it a game changer. The Burovesnik is propelled by a solid-fuel booster and a nuclear air-breathing jet, and during tests it covered a distance of 14,000 kilometers in fifteen hours. It is described as subsonic and capable of operating at high or low altitudes. The weapon is said to have the ability to loiter for months with unlimited range, and it carries a one megaton warhead, which the speaker equates to 70 Hiroshima bombs, ensuring devastating retaliation. Development of the missile reportedly began in 2001 after the United States abandoned the ABM treaty. The missile is described as being sized like the KH-one 101 cruise missile, and it is characterized as a vengeance weapon targeting critical infrastructure. According to the speaker, its endless flight time disrupts the strategic balance and is an alarm to the West. The Burovesnik is described as ground-launched with no carrier needed, delivering precision strikes with a payload range of 50 kilotons to one megaton, stated as the equivalent of 70 Hiroshima bombs. It is presented as a response to US Tomahawks in Europe or Ukraine, and as a key lever in new START talks. The transcript notes that Russia could ramp up production if the treaty ends. The speaker ends with a promo-style call to action, saying not to miss the next big reveal and to follow new rules, geopolitics on X, or cutting edge geopolitical updates, implying ongoing updates about this missile and related strategic developments.

Russia has 6,000 nuclear warheads, 1,600 that are deployed. Russia is under attack by The US and UK. I say that because while Ukraine nominally presses the button or, makes the attack, it's US weaponry, US satellites, US intelligence, US tracking, US logistics. And so we have an active hot war going on right now. It's insane. So far, no American president, has had, either the bravery or the decency to tell the truth, which is that from the time of the end of the Soviet Union in December 1991 until now, The US has been on a campaign to weaken Russia, to divide Russia, to surround Russia, to put US military all around Russia, to break apart Russia if possible, to sanction Russia to its knees, whatever it is. That's been The US campaign. So if this war is gonna stop, The US has to stop its campaign against Russia. That's the story.

Mario and the Colonel discuss the latest developments in the Ukraine-Russia conflict and their implications for peace negotiations and the battlefield. - The hosts walk through conflicting claims about an alleged Ukrainian drone attack on Putin’s residence, timed with Zelenskyy’s meeting with Trump. Ukraine denied the claims; Russia asserted the opposite; a CIA report then said the drones targeted a Russian military base in the region and that this wasn’t the first time such a base had been targeted. The Colonel notes that all sides may be using disinformation, and no one can say with authority what happened. He emphasizes that what matters is how each side uses the information to bolster its position and public support, including Lavrov’s stated threat of retaliation. He argues the military reality on the ground continues to be unfavorable for Ukraine, and that Russia will use any incident to justify gains or concessions on its terms. - On negotiations, the 90–95% of an agreement reportedly already accepted is contrasted with two sticking points: security guarantees and territory. Zelenskyy is said to be nearing some form of security guarantee solution, but Donbas territorial concessions remain unresolved. The Colonel suggests evaluating who benefits from the alleged incident; if true, it could be used to sabotage peace talks. He notes competing narratives: Ukraine seeks to portray Russia as untrustworthy, while Russia portrays Ukraine as the aggressor and untrustworthy, both using the incident to justify their positions. He questions whether any side actually benefits, proposing that Russia might use the event domestically to rally support and push negotiations toward its terms. - The discussion moves to strategic weapons and timing. They note the Arashnik missiles in Belarus, described as nuclear-capable, with high speed and multiple warheads. The Colonel says Russia has signaled willingness to escalate but would likely reserve Arashniks for decisive moments or major escalations, possibly a clash with NATO, rather than using them routinely. He cites Putin’s statements about negotiating or taking actions by force and explains that Russia’s leadership appears to have reached a point where battlefield gains could be prioritized if diplomacy stalls. - On Ukraine’s ability to advance, the Colonel argues that Russia prioritizes territorial gains but is not constrained by time, with large manpower advantages and sustained firepower. He asserts Russia’s advance has accelerated over 2024–2025 and could continue, potentially enabling breakthroughs even if the Donbas remains a long-term objective. He contrasts this with potential Ukrainian vulnerabilities, including troop losses, desertions, and mobilization limits, suggesting Ukraine could face a collapse in the front line by spring or summer, though there is uncertainty about exact outcomes. - Regarding Ukraine’s effort to disrupt Russia’s economy by targeting the Black Sea fleet and shipping, the Colonel is skeptical that such actions would decisively affect Russia, given Russia’s diversification away from sea-based revenues and Ukraine’s parallel economic strains, including power shortages and refineries. He emphasizes that neither side’s economic measures have produced a decisive effect, and that Russia has prepared countermeasures. - Trump’s post claiming that “Putin’s attack bluster” shows Russia stands in the way of peace is discussed. The Colonel says Trump is echoing Western lines and that such rhetoric will not by itself alter the course of negotiations; an eventual settlement requires both sides to agree on terms, not slogans. - On possible Russian retaliation, the Colonel suggests targeted responses within Kyiv’s power sector or leadership and possibly infrastructure, but he cautions against predicting escalation, noting Russia’s risk-averse tendencies and potential to strike second- and third-tier Ukrainian leaders or critical infrastructure if deemed necessary for domestic purposes. - Looking ahead twelve months, the Colonel predicts continued war, potential major battlefield moves with accelerating territorial changes, and the possibility of a breakthrough or a sharp escalation. He warns that a purely defensive posture will not win and that the pace of Russian advances could lead to significant shifts by late 2026, with Donbas negotiations remaining unsettled. He concludes that the conflict is likely to continue, with hybrid warfare and broader Western responses shaping developments.

Scott Ritter and the interviewer discuss the looming end of the New START treaty and the broader implications for global arms control, stability, and security. - The New START treaty, described by Ritter as the remaining nuclear arms control framework, expires, and without a moratorium on deployed caps or a new treaty, the risk of nuclear war between the United States and Russia, and also with China, could rise significantly. Ritter calls this “earth ending significant” and says the six-decade arms-control legacy would be at risk if no replacement is negotiated. - Ritter emphasizes that New START has provided a framework of stability through on-site inspections, data exchange, and verifiable limits. He notes that the treaty’s value rests on confidence that numbers are correct, which requires robust verification, something he argues was compromised by the lack of inspections in the last two years and by political gamesmanship during negotiations. Rose Gutermiller’s warning about needing a confidence baseline for a potential one-year moratorium is highlighted. - The historical arc of arms control is traced from the Cuban Missile Crisis to the ABM treaty, which Ritter says was foundational because it established the concept of mutually assured destruction. He argues that many subsequent arms-control efforts, including START and particularly INF, were intertwined with the ABM framework and mutual deterrence. The INF treaty is highlighted as the occasion where Ritter was the first ground-based weapons inspector in the Soviet Union, underscoring the value of on-site verification. - Ritter recounts how START was negotiated amid a collapsing Soviet Union, and how post-Soviet realities (nuclear weapons in former Soviet states under Russian control) affected negotiations. He contends that Soviet/Russian leaders perceived START as potentially “bullying” and that Western confidence in Russian strategic deterrence diminished after the end of the Cold War, which contributed to tensions over missile defenses and strategic postures. - The dialogue reviews the evolution of U.S.-Russian relations and how perceptions of threat or weakness influenced policy. Ritter recalls that Russian leadership warned of consequences when the ABM treaty was abandoned and that fear and respect shaped early arms-control cooperation. He asserts that American arrogance toward Russia, including dismissive attitudes toward Russian concerns about missile defenses, harmed trust and contributed to instability. - The involvement of China is treated as a separate but connected issue. China’s position, as outlined in its white paper, is not seeking an arms race and endorses a “no first use” policy, but argues that the United States and Russia must first resolve their bilateral arms-control arrangements before China would join in a broader framework. China argues for all parties to reduce numbers, while insisting China should not be treated as a mere subset of a U.S.-Russia framework. - Ritter asserts that the current U.S. approach to modernization and expansion of strategic forces could precipitate a three-way arms race (U.S., Russia, China) and notes a planned shift in U.S. posture, including potential reactivation of underground testing and revamping warhead delivery systems. He argues that if the process proceeds, other nations might follow with their own nuclear programs, eroding the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) framework and undermining decades of nonproliferation efforts. - He contrasts the current situation with past arms-control muscle memory. He laments the loss of experienced negotiators and Russian area expertise, arguing that today’s policymakers and some academics treat arms control as transactional or overly adversarial rather than as a reciprocal, trust-based process. He claims there is a shortage of genuine arms-control specialists and describes a culture in which the media and academia have overlooked or mischaracterized Russia’s behavior, often blaming Moscow for cheating when, in his view, the problem lies with Western overreach and a lack of mutual understanding. - The conversation ends on a bleak note: without renewed treaties, verification, and mutual recognition of security concerns, the world could regress to a “Wild West” dynamic of proliferation and competition, with Europe’s security umbrella eroded and a broader risk of renewed testing, modernization, and potential conflict. Overall, the discussion frames the expiry of New START as a pivotal moment with potentially catastrophic consequences for strategic stability, arguing for renewed arms-control engagement, better verification, and a recognition of the intertwined histories and motivations of the United States, Russia, and China.

The CIA last November briefed Congress that there's a greater than 50% chance of a nuclear war between Russia and The United States, based on releasing ATAKEMS missiles to Ukraine for long-range strikes into Russia. Those strikes would have violated Russia's new nuclear doctrine and red lines. STRATCOM's director of plans briefed a Washington DC think tank that The United States is prepared for nuclear exchange with Russia, meaning nuclear war, and that The United States thought they would win. A senior Democrat asked if the CIA said the Russians were bluffing; the answer was no—the CIA said the exact opposite. The scary part is Biden administration officials were in the room and said, "Oh, we're ready for that. If the Russians wanna play, we're ready." "We're ready to go to nuclear war with them. This is the insanity that existed in November."