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If Russia and China form a military alliance and the US enters World War 3, there is a high likelihood that the United States could cease to exist. The foreign policy establishment that led us to Iraq and Afghanistan has failed to protect our borders and cyber defenses. A super EMP attack from a country like Iran could take out our electric grid, causing millions of Americans to become impoverished. Russia and China have advanced space-based offensive capabilities, while the US lacks both offensive and defensive capabilities. Russia is accumulating nuclear weapons at a faster pace than the US. Going to war would be a huge risk, especially when our own homeland is vulnerable and our industrial capacity is lacking. Both parties in the US support a pro-war agenda, increasing the risk of World War 3. The American people are not being informed about the potential consequences of such a war.

Gilbert Doktorov is asked how the Iran war is reshaping dynamics in the East, especially for Russia and China, and what the broader implications are for global order. - On Russia’s stance and reaction: Doktorov notes a gap between the Kremlin’s official positions and what “chattering classes” discuss. He observes astonishingly limited reaction from President Putin and his close foreign-policy circle to dramatic developments that could redefine regional and global orders. He contrasts Putin’s cautious, “slow-war” approach with sharper criticisms from other Russian voices (e.g., Salaviyev and Alexander Dugin) who urge moving beyond a gradual strategy. There is a sense within some Russian circles that a more assertive stance may be required, yet official channels show restraint. - On Iran’s strategic position and alliances: He points out that Iran has withstood intense pressure and maintained the ability to threaten Gulf energy infrastructure and the Strait of Hormuz, thereby sustaining global leverage despite severe attacks. Iran has managed to survive and press the global energy market, calling into question how meaningful Iran’s inclusion in BRICS or the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) is in practice. He notes scant evidence of meaningful Russian or Chinese military or intelligence support to Iran in public accounts, and cites Israeli claims of Russian arms shipments being denied by Moscow. - On the West’s behavior and international law: The discussion highlights what is described as the United States’ “might makes right” posture and the dismissiveness toward traditional international-law norms, including UN Charter commitments. The panelists contrast American rhetoric about legality with its real-world actions, and discuss how Russia’s and China’s responses have been cautious or critical rather than conciliatory or confrontational. - On potential military cooperation and bloc dynamics: The conversation explores whether a deeper Russia-China-North Korea alignment could emerge in reaction to US and Israeli actions against Iran. Doktorov mentions that North Korea is viewed as a, “will and determination to act,” supplying munitions such as underwater drones and missiles to Iran, whereas Russia and China are characterized as more talk than action. He argues Moscow benefits from maintaining broad, non-aligned diplomacy, but acknowledges a shift in Russian thinking after recent events toward more decisive posture. - On Europe and the US-European split: The panel discusses the European Union’s fragility and its leaders’ inconsistent responses to the Iran crisis and to US pressure. They consider European solidarity rhetoric as a cover for avoiding hard choices, with examples including Belgian leadership suggesting normalization with Russia post-conflict. The discussion reflects concern that EU leaders may be forced to confront realignments as Gulf energy supplies and US LNG leverage reshape Europe’s energy security and political calculus. - On diplomacy and pathways forward: The speakers debate the prospects for diplomacy, including possible three-way or broader security arrangements, and whether Alaska or other meeting points could offer reprieve. They note a public split within Moscow’s foreign-policy establishment about how to proceed, with internal figures pushing for diplomacy and others advocating a stronger balance of power. There is explicit skepticism about the utility of negotiations with Donald Trump and the idea that the war could end on the battlefield rather than through diplomacy. - On the Ukraine war’s interconnection: The discussion emphasizes that the Iran crisis has global ramifications that feed back into Ukraine, noting that Russia’s current posture and Western responses influence the Ukraine conflict. Doktorov highlights that the depletion of US air defenses observed in the Israel-Iran context affects Ukraine, underscoring the interrelatedness of the two wars and their combined impact on global power dynamics. - Final takeaway: The dialogue reiterates that the Iran war has a global dimension with the two wars being intimately connected; the Iran conflict reshapes alliances, energy security, and strategic calculations across Europe, the Middle East, and East Asia, while signaling a potential reconfiguration of Western alliances and multipolar governance.

We need courageous leaders who prioritize principles and patriotism in senior ranks. A president must shake things up to remove dangerous individuals. Americans must realize the importance of establishing a just world through dialogue with other nations. Unfortunately, significant turmoil may be necessary to drive this change. The media's bias has hindered public perception. Major countries like China, Brazil, South Africa, Saudi Arabia, and India support Russia in the ongoing conflict.

China uses other countries like Russia, Iran, and Hamas for its own benefit, without any real loyalty or friendship. Similarly, these countries rely on China for economic aid and military defense when they face isolation and sanctions from the US and its allies. This transactional relationship presents an opportunity for the US to intervene and disrupt these alliances. There is no honor among thieves, and when China, Iran, Russia, North Korea, Hamas, and Hezbollah are all considered, they can be described as thieves or even violent extremists.

The speaker suggests they rely on Putin's worldview due to their knowledge of the United States' actions, citing the US bombing of Belgrade to create Kosovo and install a NATO base. They claim the US has repeatedly engaged in illegal wars, including in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and Libya, and that the US overthrew Yanukovych in Kiev in 2014, despite an EU agreement for early elections. The speaker says that in 2015, Russia advocated for peace through negotiations, leading to the Minsk 2 agreement, which was unanimously approved by the UN Security Council. However, the speaker claims the US government laughed at it, and Angela Merkel admitted it was a holding pattern to allow Ukraine to build strength. The speaker distrusts the US government and wants both sides to agree on terms publicly. They propose that the US and Russia commit to not overthrowing governments or expanding beyond agreed boundaries, and that NATO halt its enlargement.

- Democrats' spending caused inflation, and Biden's administration ignited global unrest after a peaceful period under Trump. Biden's Afghanistan withdrawal was botched, and NATO expansion talks provoked Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Opportunities for peace were rejected, leading to a prolonged war with mass casualties and depleted US stockpiles. - The US has a history of military interventions, including the bombing of Belgrade, and illegal wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria, as well as involvement in the 2014 coup in Kyiv. The US government cannot be trusted. - NATO expansion was promised not to move "one inch eastward" but Clinton signed off on plans to expand NATO to Ukraine. The US unilaterally withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 2002, leading to missile systems in Eastern Europe that Russia views as a threat. - Putin sought to force Ukraine to negotiate neutrality, aiming to keep NATO off Russia's border. The US rejected negotiations, and a draft Russia-US security agreement proposing no NATO enlargement. - Germany has aligned with the US, supporting NATO expansion, but previously had an independent foreign policy. Merkel knew NATO expansion was a bad idea but gave in to US pressure. - The US is in a hot war with Russia, with US personnel on the ground in Ukraine. Russia could disable critical American infrastructure. - The war in Ukraine is a US-Russia conflict provoked by the US with the aim of NATO enlargement. The American people have been told the opposite. - The war started in 2014 with US involvement in the overthrow of Ukraine's government. The US rejected off-ramps and continues to fund the war, resulting in Ukrainian deaths and territorial losses. - The US should negotiate with Russia, acknowledging mutual security concerns and halting NATO enlargement. - The US is trying to destroy Russia through CIA operations in Ukraine. Russia is defending its right to survive. - Globalists aim to exploit Ukraine's resources and destroy Russia. The BRICS nations are moving towards a gold-backed currency. - The US has invested billions in Ukraine since 1991 to support a democratic government. Zelenskyy's team is adding fuel to the fire. - The US blew up the Nord Stream pipeline, as promised by Biden. - The US is turning Ukraine into a de facto member of NATO.

The ongoing conflict between Russia and Ukraine is not just a battle between two countries, but a larger struggle between democracy and dictatorship, specifically involving the Chinese Communist Party and the United States. The CCP's strategy includes creating chaos in multiple regions to overwhelm the US, with conflicts in the Middle East, Russia's aggression towards Ukraine, and CCP's intimidation of Taiwan. These actions highlight the global impact of the Chinese Communist Party's influence.

The speaker suggests the US has a history of interventionism, citing the bombing of Belgrade to create Kosovo and establish a NATO base. They claim the US illegally engaged in wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria, with the Obama administration tasking the CIA to overthrow Bashar al Assad. They also allege the US, along with right-wing Ukrainian military forces, overthrew Yanukovych in Kyiv in 2014, despite an EU agreement for early elections. The speaker states that in 2015, Russia wanted peace through negotiations, leading to the Minsk II agreement, which was unanimously voted on by the UN Security Council and signed by Ukraine. However, the speaker claims the US government laughed at it, and Angela Merkel admitted it was a holding pattern to allow Ukraine to build strength. The speaker distrusts the US government and wants both sides to agree to terms publicly, with the US agreeing to stop overthrowing governments, Russia agreeing to not advance further, and NATO agreeing to not enlarge.

China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea are working together to disrupt the world. China funds Russia's war against Ukraine, while Russia obtains weapons from China, North Korea, and Iran. Iran sponsors terrorism globally, including Hamas and Hezbollah. The speaker supports helping Ukraine for two reasons. Firstly, the US promised to defend Ukraine when they returned Soviet nuclear weapons to Russia. Keeping this promise is crucial for maintaining credibility. Secondly, the speaker believes that Russia's aggression will not stop at Ukraine. By providing Ukraine with a small portion of the Pentagon budget, they have significantly degraded Russian military hardware, making it a worthwhile investment.

Putin's worldview contrasts sharply with the reality of his war's brutality. The U.S. has a history of military interventions, starting with the bombing of Belgrade under Clinton, which aimed to alter European borders without UN authority. The U.S. also engaged in illegal wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and Libya. In 2014, the U.S. supported the overthrow of Yanukovych in Ukraine, disregarding a prior agreement with the EU for early elections. The Minsk II agreement, intended to bring peace, was ignored by the U.S. government, which viewed it as a mere delay tactic. Trust in the U.S. is lacking, and a clear, public agreement between the conflicting sides is necessary to prevent further interventions and ensure stability. Treaties can hold if respected by all parties involved.

Glenn opens by noting a year has passed since Jeffrey Sachs urged Europe to adopt a realistic foreign policy that understands Russia, Europe, and the United States, and to avoid being invaded by the U.S.—even suggesting Trump could land troops in Greenland. Glenn asks how to read the current situation, including Davos and Europe’s anger at U.S. hostility, and the revived emphasis on international law. Jeffrey Sachs responds with a version of the “ride on the back of a tiger” metaphor from Kennedy, arguing Europeans forgot that the United States is an imperial power that has acted brazenly and brutally for about twenty years. He lists U.S. actions: invasions, regime changes, and reckless interference in Ukraine, and U.S. complicity in Israel’s wars across Africa and the Middle East, along with involvement in overthrowing Ukraine’s Yanukovych and other interventions. He claims Europeans were silent or complicit as the United States bombed Iran, kidnapped its president, and pursued Greenland, calling the Greenland push a grotesque power grab by Trump. He asserts New York Times recognition of U.S. imperial tendencies and says Europe’s naivete and hypocrisy are evident. He states: “The United States is thuggish, imperialistic, reckless, and that The U. S. Has left a large swath of the world in misery. Europe has been mostly compliant or complicit.” He urges Europeans to understand what the United States is about, to stop Russophobia, and to keep lines of communication with Russia open; he argues Europe’s Russophobia made it boxed in with little diplomacy with Russia or the U.S. Glenn adds that Europe’s stance mirrors a Cold War-like unity against Russia, but that the current reality differs: the U.S. does not view Russia as its main adversary, and Russophobia deepens Europe’s dependence on the U.S. Glenn notes mixed reactions at Davos, including Canada’s Prime Minister Mark Carney signaling a shift away from a rules-based order that privileges the West, and Macron’s private message to Trump seeking a cooperative stance on Syria, Iran, and Greenland. He remarks that NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg praised NATO while Trump hinted that the real enemy is within NATO, highlighting the chaos. He asks if this signals a decline of the U.S. empire or NATO. Sachs discusses Carney's stance as significant: Carney’s trip to China and a dialogue with Beijing indicating diversification with China, including a Canadian-Chinese investment plan. He credits Carney with being a rare straightforward statesman and notes instability ahead. Trump’s Davos retreat from threats (notably Greenland) may have been influenced by stock-market declines, according to Sachs’ theory. He mentions a possible European concession about U.S. sovereignty over parts of Greenland, though he doubts any negotiation has been meaningful. He cites Scott Bessent’s Fox Business interview as revealing: sanctions on Iran are a form of economic statecraft designed to crush the Iranian economy, with Iran’s currency collapse and bank failures cited as evidence; Sachs condemns this as a violation of international law and UN Charter, and calls Bessent’s pride in wielding currency-destabilization as alarming. He points to sanctions against Cuba and a broader pattern of “thuggish gangster behavior” by the U.S., noting Europeans’ silence on Iran and other regimes until it backfires on them. Sachs argues Europe’s Russophobia is self-destructive, and he emphasizes that diplomacy remains possible if Germany, France, and Italy adopt a rational approach. He criticizes Germany for duplicity in NATO enlargement and Minsk II, blaming Merkel for dropped commitments, and notes that Italy shows less Russophobia and could shift toward diplomacy. He believes Central Europe and some leaders (e.g., Orban, Czech and Slovak figures) favor diplomacy, but German leadership has been weak. He stresses that Europe must avoid dismemberment and choose diplomacy with Russia, warning that continued war policy will leave Europe isolated. He closes with optimism that there remains a path forward if key European powers act differently. Glenn thanks Sachs for the discussion and ends.

The speaker suggests they rely on Putin's worldview due to their knowledge of the United States' actions, citing the US bombing of Belgrade to create Kosovo and install a NATO base. They claim the US has repeatedly engaged in illegal wars, including in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and Libya, and that the US, along with right-wing Ukrainian forces, overthrew Yanukovych in Kiev in 2014, despite an EU-brokered agreement for early elections. The speaker says that in 2015, Russia advocated for peace through negotiations, leading to the Minsk 2 agreement, which was unanimously approved by the UN Security Council. However, the speaker claims the US government laughed at Minsk 2, and Angela Merkel admitted it was a holding pattern to allow Ukraine to build strength. The speaker distrusts the US government and wants both sides to agree to terms publicly, with the US agreeing not to overthrow governments and Russia agreeing not to advance further, with NATO not enlarging.

My skepticism towards Putin's narrative stems from my extensive knowledge of US foreign policy. The US has a history of illegal interventions: bombing Belgrade to alter borders, wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya, and the overthrow of the Ukrainian government in 2014, despite a prior EU agreement. The Minsk II agreement, unanimously adopted by the UN Security Council, was essentially disregarded by the US and Ukraine, delaying a peaceful resolution. This history makes it difficult for me to trust the US government. A lasting peace requires transparency and accountability. Both the US and Russia need to publicly commit to ending regime change operations, respecting existing borders, and halting NATO expansion. Then, the world can judge the terms of any agreement.

China, Russia, and Iran are seen as the new axis of evil and pose a significant threat. China, in particular, aims to rebuild its empire and challenge the US as a global superpower. They are establishing outposts, buying farmland and land near military installations in the US. Meanwhile, the US is the only nation with the ability to project power globally. The concern is that China is encroaching on this power. Additionally, there have been questionable decisions made by the Biden administration, such as allowing a Chinese spy balloon to float across the country for 8 days.

John Mearsheimer and Glenn (Speaker 0) discuss the current state of the international system, its shifts since World War II, and the implications for U.S. foreign policy, Europe, the Middle East, and East Asia. - Structural changes since the Cold War: Mearsheimer argues fundamental changes are underway in the international system due to two forces: evolving structural dynamics and the rise and actions of Donald Trump. The Cold War produced a bipolar order with the United States shaping a Western security architecture (NATO, European Community) designed to wage the Cold War. After 1989–1991, the Western order expanded globally during the unipolar moment, with NATO enlargement, EU expansion, and globalization (including China joining the WTO). From 2017, the world has entered a multipolar era with three great powers, and East Asia becomes the United States’ most important region outside the Western Hemisphere, overtaking Europe and the Persian Gulf. - East Asia as a priority: The U.S. pivot to East Asia (explicitly discussed by Clinton and then pursued under Trump) reorients strategic priorities away from Europe in a multipolar world where China is a peer competitor. This shift redefines where the U.S. focuses its resources and attention. - Trump as a destabilizing factor: Trump’s presidency is described as sui generis—a one-man wrecking ball that amplified unilateralism and contempt for international law, institutions, and allies. After initial containment of China in his first term, Trump’s policies intensified a unilateral approach. The Iran war decision (February 28) is presented as a catastrophic misstep that worsened U.S. positions globally and risked destabilizing the region further. - Three major strands of American policy causing trouble: NATO expansion, the global war on terror, and the Iran war. NATO expanded eastward in the 1990s and 2000s, culminating in Ukraine’s entry in 2022, aggravating Russia and complicating U.S.–Russia relations and European security. The global war on terror led to Afghanistan and Iraq conflicts and other interventions (Libya), generating domestic fatigue and a populist backlash that helped propel Trump. The February 28 Iran invasion created a broader, more consequential set of regional and global ramifications, with China, Russia, and Europe pressuring limits on U.S. actions. - The Iran war: Mearsheimer stresses that Iran presents a more dangerous theater than Iraq because the stakes are higher globally, with potential for a worldwide depression and cascading economic impacts, particularly in Asia. He outlines three options for ending or de-escalating the Iran conflict: (1) maintain the status quo with ongoing blockades; (2) blockade plus bombing, which risks catastrophic economic damage and Iranian retaliation; (3) cut a deal with Iran, which would be politically difficult in Washington given Israeli influence and the desire to avoid conceding that Iran “wins.” He asserts that the blockade alone won’t force surrender, bombing would escalate risk and deplete U.S. military capacity, and the only viable path is a negotiated settlement, though domestic and allied opposition makes this hard. - Israel–Iran–U.S. dynamics: The relationship between the United States and Israel creates a “tag team” dynamic, with Israel viewing Iran as an existential threat. If Iran preserves its nuclear enrichment capability, it could push Israel toward considering nuclear options, which raises the possibility of catastrophic outcomes. Trump’s rhetoric has even hinted at extreme objectives against Iran, complicating efforts to reach a deal. Mearsheimer emphasizes the influential role of the Israeli lobby in U.S. policy and notes the broader risk of nuclear escalation in the region. - Ukraine and nuclear deterrence: The Ukraine war has surprised many by showing Ukraine’s ability to threaten Russian strategic forces with Western support, which underscores Karaganov’s point about Europeans underestimating the nuclear dimension of security and deterrence. Mearsheimer highlights that the current era features a complex web of regional and great-power interdependencies—Russia, China, Iran, and European security architectures are all interlinked, affecting and being affected by one another. - Conclusion and outlook: The discussion emphasizes that managing security competition, rather than relying solely on military solutions, is essential. The speakers warn that the contemporary shift toward multipolarity and the interwoven regional dynamics heighten the risk of escalation and miscalculation, making prudent diplomacy and restraint crucial to avoiding a broader catastrophe. They acknowledge the difficulty of achieving lasting peace in the Middle East given domestic political constraints and the powerful influence of regional actors, but stress the necessity of recognizing the geopolitical realities of a world in which power is distributed more unevenly than in the Cold War.

Russia is consistently portrayed as acting against American interests, particularly with its alliance with China and its invasion of Ukraine. This action, while wrong, was driven by Russia's concern over Ukraine potentially joining NATO and becoming a satellite of the United States with American weapons. The speaker argues that Ukraine's government isn't fully sovereign, alleging it was installed by a CIA coup. They highlight that during peace talks in Istanbul, a potential agreement was disrupted by the US, leading to further devastation and loss of life in Ukraine. The speaker questions why the U.S. is at war with Russia.

The war in Ukraine and potential conflict over Taiwan are driven by misguided policies in Washington. There's a belief that the U.S. must prevent China from becoming the dominant power in East Asia, which could lead to nuclear war. Game theory suggests cooperation is often overlooked; real people tend to cooperate more than expected when they communicate. Historical examples, like Kennedy's approach during the Cuban Missile Crisis, show that dialogue can lead to peace. Current leaders, however, focus on military solutions and insults rather than diplomacy. The notion that China poses an intrinsic threat is misguided; it has not invaded other countries in its long history. Instead, the U.S. has been continuously engaged in wars, reflecting a militarized mindset that hinders the possibility of peaceful resolutions.

America would want China's help to avoid fighting too many wars, ensuring China continues buying US dollars to sustain American debt. Also, historically, Russia has been more of a threat to China, so US friendship with China would force Putin to focus on defense. China is now transferring its US dollars into gold, encouraging others to do the same because America's debt is a huge problem. It makes sense for China and the US to be friends because the US is a huge market for Chinese exports and provides technology. China wants to be friends with Russia because it feels threatened by the US, which has military bases surrounding China. China needs oil and food imports to sustain its economy, and if the US launches an embargo, China collapses. China needs new trade routes, and Russia is the best partner for energy and oil access. Chinese policymakers know China's economy and demographics have collapsed, making it vulnerable and dependent on the world.

One speaker considers the possibility that China, India, or Pakistan might escort a ship through the Strait of Hormuz and worries about a potential direct confrontation between the United States and those countries. He notes there is no expected confrontation between Pakistan and India, highlighting an open line of communication, a good relationship, and that one of them is a mediator in negotiations. China, however, is described as a different case, with increasing parallels to what was seen between the United States and Russia in the early Cold War era. The other speaker expresses hope that the Chinese will not decide to confront the Americans over the Strait. He bluntly states that the Chinese are not friends with the United States anymore; while they have long-term economic partnership and linked economies, the current administration has been placing tariffs on China and threatening more tariffs. News reports are cited indicating that China will provide the HQ-9 air defense system, which is described as far superior to the Russian S-300, to Iran. He emphasizes these are defensive weapons, not offensive capabilities, and notes that the administration is likely to be distressed by this development. Despite the administration’s stance, the speaker asserts that providing defensive weapons to another country is something done routinely and acknowledges that this move could enhance Iran’s defensive posture. He mentions the possibility that the Chinese supply could even enable Iran to detect F-35 aircraft, though he notes uncertainty about this point. The situation is characterized as a game changer and described as a behind-the-scenes nuance that the average American might not fully understand, as well as perhaps the administration not fully grasping it. The speaker reiterates that the Chinese plan is to provide these defensive weapons to Iran, describing it as a soon-to-occur development.

The China-Russia relationship is based on non-alignment, non-confrontation, and non-targeting of third parties, contributing to world peace and stability. The U.S. is the primary cause for concern due to its destructive role. The U.S. is allegedly the number one warmonger, having been at war for over 224 years of its history and accounting for about 80% of post-World War II armed conflicts. It is also the number one violator of sovereignty, interfering in the internal affairs of other countries. Since World War II, the U.S. has reportedly supported over 50 foreign governments, interfered in elections in at least 30 countries, and attempted assassinations on over 50 foreign leaders. The U.S. is also the primary source of antagonism. NATO, led by the U.S., is responsible for wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria, which caused over 900,000 deaths and 37,000,000 refugees. U.S. actions focused on Asia Pacific security also require vigilance. The world will allegedly not have peace as long as U.S. hegemony and belligerence exist.

Scott Ritter and the interviewer discuss the looming end of the New START treaty and the broader implications for global arms control, stability, and security. - The New START treaty, described by Ritter as the remaining nuclear arms control framework, expires, and without a moratorium on deployed caps or a new treaty, the risk of nuclear war between the United States and Russia, and also with China, could rise significantly. Ritter calls this “earth ending significant” and says the six-decade arms-control legacy would be at risk if no replacement is negotiated. - Ritter emphasizes that New START has provided a framework of stability through on-site inspections, data exchange, and verifiable limits. He notes that the treaty’s value rests on confidence that numbers are correct, which requires robust verification, something he argues was compromised by the lack of inspections in the last two years and by political gamesmanship during negotiations. Rose Gutermiller’s warning about needing a confidence baseline for a potential one-year moratorium is highlighted. - The historical arc of arms control is traced from the Cuban Missile Crisis to the ABM treaty, which Ritter says was foundational because it established the concept of mutually assured destruction. He argues that many subsequent arms-control efforts, including START and particularly INF, were intertwined with the ABM framework and mutual deterrence. The INF treaty is highlighted as the occasion where Ritter was the first ground-based weapons inspector in the Soviet Union, underscoring the value of on-site verification. - Ritter recounts how START was negotiated amid a collapsing Soviet Union, and how post-Soviet realities (nuclear weapons in former Soviet states under Russian control) affected negotiations. He contends that Soviet/Russian leaders perceived START as potentially “bullying” and that Western confidence in Russian strategic deterrence diminished after the end of the Cold War, which contributed to tensions over missile defenses and strategic postures. - The dialogue reviews the evolution of U.S.-Russian relations and how perceptions of threat or weakness influenced policy. Ritter recalls that Russian leadership warned of consequences when the ABM treaty was abandoned and that fear and respect shaped early arms-control cooperation. He asserts that American arrogance toward Russia, including dismissive attitudes toward Russian concerns about missile defenses, harmed trust and contributed to instability. - The involvement of China is treated as a separate but connected issue. China’s position, as outlined in its white paper, is not seeking an arms race and endorses a “no first use” policy, but argues that the United States and Russia must first resolve their bilateral arms-control arrangements before China would join in a broader framework. China argues for all parties to reduce numbers, while insisting China should not be treated as a mere subset of a U.S.-Russia framework. - Ritter asserts that the current U.S. approach to modernization and expansion of strategic forces could precipitate a three-way arms race (U.S., Russia, China) and notes a planned shift in U.S. posture, including potential reactivation of underground testing and revamping warhead delivery systems. He argues that if the process proceeds, other nations might follow with their own nuclear programs, eroding the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) framework and undermining decades of nonproliferation efforts. - He contrasts the current situation with past arms-control muscle memory. He laments the loss of experienced negotiators and Russian area expertise, arguing that today’s policymakers and some academics treat arms control as transactional or overly adversarial rather than as a reciprocal, trust-based process. He claims there is a shortage of genuine arms-control specialists and describes a culture in which the media and academia have overlooked or mischaracterized Russia’s behavior, often blaming Moscow for cheating when, in his view, the problem lies with Western overreach and a lack of mutual understanding. - The conversation ends on a bleak note: without renewed treaties, verification, and mutual recognition of security concerns, the world could regress to a “Wild West” dynamic of proliferation and competition, with Europe’s security umbrella eroded and a broader risk of renewed testing, modernization, and potential conflict. Overall, the discussion frames the expiry of New START as a pivotal moment with potentially catastrophic consequences for strategic stability, arguing for renewed arms-control engagement, better verification, and a recognition of the intertwined histories and motivations of the United States, Russia, and China.

Glenn: Welcome back. We are joined today by Professor John Mersheimer to understand what is happening in the world with this new great power rivalry and how the outcome of the Ukraine war will impact this new Cold War. Have we entered a new Cold War? Who are the players, competing interests, and the rules? Mersheimer: I think we have entered a new Cold War. We're in a multipolar system, and the United States, China, and Russia are the three great powers. The United States is certainly in a cold war with China. China is powerful and threatens to dominate East Asia, and the United States will almost certainly go to great lengths to prevent that from happening, which axiomatically creates an intense security competition in China. An intense security competition is a cold war, and the name of the game is to make sure that security competition does not turn into a hot war. We are in a cold war with the Chinese, or the Chinese are in a cold war with us. The hot war is avoided. Regarding Russia, since we moved into multipolarity, the Russians and the Chinese have been close allies against the United States. This is largely a result of the Ukraine war, which has pushed the Russians into the arms of the Chinese and caused closer Sino-Russian cooperation. The United States, through the Biden administration, was involved in a cold war with both Russia and China. Trump tried to change that, seeking good relations with Russia to form a Russia-plus-US alliance against China, but he has been unable to make that happen. The result is that the United States is basically still in a cold war with both Russia and China. The war in Ukraine has made me worry greatly that the Cold War in Europe could turn into a hot war, even as the U.S.-China relationship remains cooler so far. Glenn: European leaders hoped the United States and Europe would unite in this new Cold War, with liberal hegemony fading and a return to unity against Russia. But Ukraine has instead divided Europe. How do you explain this? Is it the US not seeing Russia as the same threat as Europeans, or a concern about pushing Russia toward China, or Europe’s costs of the partnership? Is this uniquely a Trump-era approach? Mersheimer: From an American point of view, good relations with Russia make sense. China is the peer competitor, and the United States wants to pivot to East Asia to prevent China’s dominance. Russia is the weakest of the three great powers and not a major threat to Europe. The Americans believe Europe can deal with Russia, freeing them to focus on China. Europe, by contrast, is threatened by Russia’s proximity and thus prioritizes Russia. NATO expansion into Ukraine is seen by many Europeans as a disaster, poisoning Russia–Europe relations, making Europe deeply committed to using Ukraine to weaken Russia. The transatlantic alliance becomes strained, especially with Trump raising the possibility of leaving NATO. Europeans fear losing the American pacifier that keeps centrifugal forces in check, which would complicate European coordination with Russia. Glenn: If the United States signals a departure, won’t Europe face greater challenges in managing Russia? And is Russia truly an empire-building threat, or is this a post-2014 narrative that intensified after February 2022? Mersheimer: Bringing Ukraine into NATO was destined to cause trouble. The crisis began in 2014, and the 2022 war is ongoing. The Ukrainians and Europeans want a security guarantee for Ukraine, essentially NATO membership, while Russia demands territory and rejects a security guarantee that would enshrine NATO’s presence near its borders. The Europeans see NATO expansion as threatening, while the Americans view Russia as the weaker power and the need to pivot to China. The controversy over responsibility for this disaster arises from competing interpretations of NATO expansion and Russian aggression. Glenn: Do you see Russia changing course soon? There has been escalation—Odessa blockades, port attacks, and targeting infrastructure. Could this signal a new stage of the war? Mersheimer: The Russians believe Ukraine is on the ropes and expect to win on the battlefield in 2026, possibly expanding fronts in Kharkiv and Sumy. They may consider increasing conventional force and possibly using nuclear weapons if the war drags on. They view the conflict as existential and fear losing, which could push them toward drastic measures to end the war. The Russians could escalate if they think they cannot win conventionally. Glenn: What are the non-nuclear options to win quickly? Could the Russians deliver a decisive conventional victory? Mersheimer: It’s a war of attrition. If Ukraine’s army is weakened, Russia could surround large Ukrainian formations, disrupt logistics, and open larger fronts. They may build up forces in the rear, potentially for a breakthrough or to deter Western escalation. The battlefield outcome may determine the next steps, including whether nuclear options are considered. Glenn: How will Ukraine end? Is it a military defeat, economic collapse, or political fragmentation? Mersheimer: Ukraine is likely to be defeated on the battlefield. Its economy is in desperate shape, and losing Odessa or more territory would worsen it. Politically, Ukraine will face internal divisions once the war ends. Europe will face a broken Russia–Ukraine relationship, with some European states viewing the conflict differently. Ukraine’s demographic decline compounds its bleak outlook, and the country may become a problematic rump state. The war should have been settled earlier; the negotiators in Istanbul in 2022 could have sought a different path. Zelensky’s choice to align with Western powers and walk away from Istanbul negotiations deepened Ukraine’s predicament. Glenn: Any final reflections? Mersheimer: The war’s outcome will reshape Western unity and European security. Historians may view this as a major mistake in weakening the West. The blame for the disaster will likely be attributed in the West to Russia’s imperialism, but the expansion of NATO is also central. Europe’s economic and political landscape will be altered, and Ukraine’s future will be deeply challenging.

Brian Berletic discusses connections between the US “economic war against China” and wars/proxy conflicts involving Russia and Iran, arguing that the US seeks primacy rather than balance of power and uses diplomacy to build pretexts for additional war and to shape geopolitics. He says US policymakers do not expect China to pressure Iran or to pressure Russia, because China has reasons to avoid helping isolate itself, and he frames US actions as deliberate attempts to keep adversaries from becoming independent centers of power. He argues the US aims to weaken Russia, Iran, and China by creating wedges and subordination through client regimes and proxies. He claims Europe, Israel, Persian Gulf states, Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines are treated as extensions of US foreign policy rather than independent balancing powers. He also contrasts what he describes as US strategic framing—portraying America as reasonable while treating opponents as “evil”—with the claimed reality of proxy war, including in Europe and Iran. When asked about the goal of restoring primacy, Berletic says the US tries to pursue multiple forms of dominance—military, financial, trade-route control, and technological dominance—while acknowledging it is becoming less realistic as China surpasses the US plus its proxies. He says US strategy, as he describes it, shifts to wrecking multiple theaters and trade systems rather than direct head-to-head conflict, including efforts to disrupt energy exports and contested waterways. He cites US-created crises in the Middle East and describes US pressure on Indonesia near the Strait of Malacca, attempts to gain military access to that chokepoint, and blockading tactics affecting Russian energy exports and other routes. He claims the US has reorganized the Marine Corps into an anti-shipping force “specifically” for interdicting shipping, with preparation starting before the Trump administration. He argues that these actions aim to increase leverage over Asian states through energy dependence on US LNG exports, and to coerce regional countries away from balancing China. He compares this to how he says the US subordinated Europe via energy dependence, including by disrupting Russia–Europe energy flows over years. Addressing the US strategy’s “double blockade” concept and chokepoints, Berletic argues it is not about shutting everything down instantly. He claims the US does not need to seize every ship; he says ships often turn back and/or are disabled or seized, and he points to examples of US warplanes disabling ships. He argues this creates deterrence and manages economic damage rather than causing total collapse at once, with the goal of controlled destabilization and increased dependency that can be used to disrupt what China is doing in the region. On the Russia–China dynamic, he says Russia is a large energy producer and shares a direct border with China, leaving fewer “middle countries” through which disruption can be mediated compared with routes like Russia–Europe gas via Ukraine. He argues that because Russia and China together can attract other states into a broader gravitational pull, the US strategy carries risks but fits a longstanding pattern of maritime corridor control and chokepoint strategies. Berletic expands on what he describes as long-running pressure against Belt and Road corridors: he claims US-backed militants attack Belt and Road infrastructure in Myanmar and that the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor is attacked by US-backed terrorists. He also describes attacks in Afghanistan against the Afghan government and Chinese investments, framing this as a long-term “global dirty war” against China and its partners. When discussing Iran and Russia, he says Iran and Russia could strike deals with the US but are instead aiming to prevent a return to the prior status quo of sanctions/perpetual threats and NATO’s incremental expansion. He frames their posture as insisting adversaries must be included in the security architecture. He then compares the current era to a “new great game,” arguing it extends beyond Eurasia and now involves technology and rapid integration of advanced capabilities into deterrence for states such as Iran. He characterizes US behavior as either dividing adversaries or weakening them to prevent coordination. He says the US does not want friends among Iran or Russia because it wants them to be subordinated or weakened; otherwise, he claims they would work together with China. Finally, regarding Taiwan, he says the US “keeps” the one-China policy rhetorically but undermines it in practice through laws, troop presence, and military cooperation with Taiwan alongside regional partners, framing US support as preventing any meaningful back-off. He says US diplomacy functions as cover, including in relation to Russia/Ukraine and Iran, and describes US strategy as a multi-domain approach that already functions as economic and proxy war against China while escalating across Russia, Iran, the Middle East, and Asia-Pacific military integration. He concludes by warning that US policy will likely continue escalating and that China’s ability to build faster than the US can disrupt and destroy is central to whether open conflict can be deterred.

The current situation marks the end of the post cold war order. The reasons behind this will be analyzed for years to come. It is now widely acknowledged that some fundamental beliefs that guided us during this era are no longer valid. Beijing and Moscow are collaborating to promote autocracy worldwide through their partnership. As this rivalry intensifies, many countries are adopting cautious strategies.

Pepe and Mario discuss a broad set of geopolitical developments, focusing on Venezuela, Iran, and broader U.S.-led actions, with insights on Russia, China, and other regional players. - Venezuela developments and U.S. involvement - Venezuela is described as a “desperate move related to the demise of the petrodollar,” with multiple overlapping headlines about backers maneuvering for profit and power in Latin America, and about the U.S. declaring “this is my backyard.” Delcy Rodríguez, the daughter of a slain revolutionary killed by the CIA, leads a new government, described as old-school Chavista with strong negotiation skills, who prioritizes Venezuela’s interests over U.S. interests. - The operation is criticized as having no clear strategy or forward planning for reorganizing the Venezuelan oil industry to serve U.S. interests. Estimates from Chinese experts suggest it would take five years to recondition Venezuela’s energy ecosystem for American needs and sixteen years to reach around 3 million barrels per day, requiring approximately $183 billion in investment—investment that U.S. CEOs are reportedly unwilling to provide without total guarantees. - There is debate about the extent of U.S. influence within Maduro’s circle. Some Venezuelan sources note that the head of security for the president, previously aligned with the regime, was demoted (not arrested), and there is discussion of possible U.S. ties with individuals around Maduro’s inner circle, though the regime remains headed by Maduro with key loyalists like the defense minister (Padrino) and the interior minister (Cabello) still in place. - The narrative around regime change is viewed as a two-edged story: the U.S. sought to replace Maduro with a pliant leadership, yet the regime remains and regional power structures (including BRICS dynamics) persist. Delcy Rodríguez is portrayed as capable of negotiating with the U.S., including conversations with Marco Rubio before the coup and ongoing discussions with U.S. actors, while maintaining Venezuela’s sovereignty and memory of the revolution. - The broader regional reaction to U.S. actions in Venezuela has included criticism from neighboring countries like Colombia and Mexico, with a sense in Latin America that the U.S. should not intrude in sovereign affairs. Brazil (a major BRICS member) is highlighted as a key actor whose stance can influence Venezuela’s BRICS prospects; Lula’s position is described as cautious, with Brazil’s foreign ministry reportedly vetoing Venezuela’s BRICS membership despite Lula’s personal views. - The sanctions regime is cited as a principal reason for Venezuela’s economic stagnation, with the suggestion that lifting sanctions would be a prerequisite for meaningful economic recovery. Delcy Rodríguez is characterized as a skilled negotiator who could potentially improve Venezuela’s standing if sanctions are removed. - Public opinion in Venezuela is described as broadly supportive of the regime, with the U.S. action provoking anti-American sentiment across the hemisphere. The discussion notes that a large majority of Venezuelans (over 90%) reportedly view Delcy Rodríguez favorably, and that the perception of U.S. intervention as a violation of sovereignty influences regional attitudes. - Iran: protests, economy, and foreign influence - Iran is facing significant protests that are described as the most severe since 2022, driven largely by economic issues, inflation, and the cost of living under four decades of sanctions. Real inflation is suggested to be 35–40%, with currency and purchasing power severely eroded. - Foreign influence is discussed as a factor hijacking domestic protests in Iran, described as a “color revolution” playbook echoed by past experiences in Hong Kong and other theaters. Iranian authorities reportedly remain skeptical of Western actors, while acknowledging the regime’s vulnerability to sanctions and mismanagement. - Iranians emphasize the long-term, multi-faceted nature of their political system, including the Shiite theology underpinning governance, and the resilience of movements like Hezbollah and Yemeni factions. Iran’s leadership stresses long-term strategic ties with Russia and China, as well as BRICS engagement, with practical cooperation including repair of the Iranian electrical grid in the wake of Israeli attacks during the twelve-day war and port infrastructure developments linked to an international transportation corridor, including Indian and Chinese involvement. - The discussion notes that while sanctions have damaged Iran economically, Iranians maintain a strong domestic intellectual and grassroots culture, including debates in universities and cafes, and are not easily toppled. The regime’s ability to survive is framed in terms of internal legitimacy, external alliances (Russia, China), and the capacity to negotiate under external pressure. - Russia, China, and the U.S. strategic landscape - The conversation contrasts the apparent U.S. “bordello circus” with the more sophisticated military-diplomatic practices of Iran, Russia, and China. Russia emphasizes actions over rhetoric, citing NATO attacks on its nuclear triad and the Novgorod residence attack as evidence of deterrence concerns. China pursues long-term plans (five-year plans through 2035) and aims to elevate trade with a yuan-centric global south, seeking to reduce dollar reliance without emitting a formal de-dollarization policy. - The discussion frames U.S. policy as volatile and unpredictable (the Nixon “madman theory” analog), while Russia, China, and Iran respond with measured, long-term strategies. The potential for a prolonged Ukraine conflict is acknowledged if European leaders pursue extended confrontation, with economic strains anticipated across Europe. - In Venezuela, Iran, and broader geopolitics, the panel emphasizes the complexity of regime stability, the role of sanctions, BRICS dynamics, and the long game of global power shifts that may redefine alliances and economic arrangements over the coming years.