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Seyyed Mohammed Marandi, a professor at Tehran University and former adviser to Iran’s nuclear negotiators, joins the discussion amid rising tensions around Iran. He notes that the Strait of Hormuz has been temporarily closed for Iran’s military exercises, describing it as unprecedented and potentially a warning, while the United States continues to accumulate assets in the region, including the USS Gerald Ford entering the Mediterranean. He observes that given the scale of U.S. assets, it will be hard to reverse the momentum, and wonders how Iran views the severity of the situation and what an off-ramp might look like. From the outset, Marandi says a major confrontation seems likely, though it’s unclear whether it would involve actual military aggression. He asserts that the Zionist regime, the Zionist lobby, and the so-called Epstein class in the West would do anything to aid the Israeli regime, citing the U.S. ambassador to Israel who said that if the regime takes the whole region, that would be acceptable. He argues that Iran, Hezbollah, and the resistance in Iraq are the principal forces resisting the “greater Israel project,” while other regional governments—Erdogan, the Emirates, Egypt, Qatar, Jordan—are part of the American empire and unlikely to prevent Israeli gains until it is too late. He states that Iran will not back down and that there is no scenario in which the Americans win a potential war. Marandi emphasizes that Iran has said it would shut down the Hormuz if attacked, and that this would not be a last-resort measure. He recalls that in the twelve-day war (presumably 2021-2022), the conflict mainly involved Iran and the Israeli regime, with the Americans carrying out a token strike and not destroying the global economy; Iran does not desire to cause global economic suffering. He argues that Iran has friends worldwide, and ordinary people in many countries desire peace and the ability to earn a living. He contends that Gulf monarchies hosting U.S. bases have contributed to planning against Iran, and that Iran and its allies would respond with strong measures. If attacked, Iran would do everything to protect itself and would hit hard to bring down the global economy; the war would be costly and devastating for the United States and its Western allies. Regarding U.S. strategy, Marandi says the American plan for surprise is central, and he doubts Washington can win without a full-scale ground invasion, which would be economically unfeasible for the United States. He argues that the on-the-ground resistance in Iraq and Yemen, and the potential instability of Gulf regimes, would tempt political upheaval in those states. He asserts that the longer the conflict lasts, the more irreversible the damage, with Iran’s drones and missiles capable of striking oil facilities, ports, and ships across the region, threatening Gulf and Caucasus oil flows. Marandi critiques Western media coverage, accusing it of fabricating or inflating numbers about Iranian casualties and portraying Iran as the aggressor. He points to demonstrations in Iran—millions in Tehran and across the country on February 11—versus Western reports that try to depict the opposite, and he argues that independent Western journalists who witnessed Iranian demonstrations were attacked and smeared for challenging the narrative. He says the media’s role is to lay groundwork for war, and that in his view the “Epstein class” in the West has exposed itself. On negotiations, Marandi says the United States publicly focuses on Iran’s regional allies and military capabilities, not on the nuclear deal, and that Iran will not discuss its regional policy. He notes Iran’s insistence on negotiating with the Americans directly (not in a multilateral format) and in Oman, while observing that the talks are often used as deception. He asserts that Iran restarted indirect talks to show that it is not the aggressor, and that Tehran remains prepared for war but not initiating it. He argues that Iran’s preparations have strengthened its capabilities since the twelve-day war, with more drones and missiles directed at the United States and its proxies, and that Iran’s underground bases and air defenses have advanced. Concluding, Marandi says the window for a U.S. decision is limited by the regime’s costs, and that Iran’s home-field advantage, the widespread unpopularity of Gulf monarchies, and the broader resistance in the region would shape the outcome. He believes a U.S. victory is impossible, describing a scenario where, after heavy destruction and economic collapse, Trump would be forced to retreat under the guise of victory, with the West blamed for the catastrophe. He asserts that Iran will defend itself and that the global economy would suffer far greater damage than Iran’s own infrastructure, with mass movements of people worldwide as a consequence. He closes by affirming his commitment to continue communicating despite the risks.

Glenn (Speaker 0) and Seyed Mohamed Marandi discuss the posturing and developments in the Iran–US confrontation around May 2026, focusing on the Strait of Hormuz, regional dynamics, and potential war trajectories. - Glenn notes that the United States had announced it would break open the Strait of Hormuz and that conflicting reports followed, seeking clarity on whether the conflict was moving toward all-out war. - Seyed Marandi says the situation is moving toward all-out war. He explains that the Americans initiated a new stage by attempting to carry out an operation to take ships out of the Strait of Hormuz, which did not succeed; instead, civilian boats were destroyed, and there were no military boats involved according to Iran. Iran is not using its military boats in these circumstances; it is using missiles as warnings, to avoid initiating a full war. - He states the Americans bombed boats carrying goods, resulting in five civilian deaths, citing news reports but noting Western media often follows the official narrative. Iran issued a statement blaming the Americans regarding Emirati targets being struck, though he acknowledges it could be read as either an American action or as American fault for the Emirati strikes. - Marandi asserts the operation was a failure for the United States: the Strait of Hormuz was not opened, and the Emiratis suffered damage. He describes the Emirates as an ally of the Israeli regime, noting its distancing from other Arab states, leaving OPEC, and paying for social media campaigns to shape public perception. He observes worldwide street sentiment toward Iran is largely supportive, except among Wahhabi/Salafi groups aligned with intelligence agencies and those who historically opposed Iran. - He contends that the global economy is entering a crisis phase: high oil and energy prices and rising food costs are the “fever,” with supply chains at risk of collapse and the global economy vulnerable to interruptions in any single link. He argues Iran’s economy is a “resistance economy” under siege for decades, while other global economies are more interlinked and fragile. - On troop movements and targets, Marandi says large US troop numbers and equipment have been deployed in the region, with many ground troops potentially based in Kuwait, Bahrain, and the Emirates; air refueling and other assets involve Saudi Arabia, the Israeli regime, and Qatar. - Glenn asks why the UAE is disproportionately aggressive toward Iran compared with Saudi Arabia or Qatar. Marandi explains the UAE’s alignment with Israel, its departure from OPEC, and the perception that striking Emirati targets amounts to striking Israeli targets. - They discuss predictability of Iran’s strategy: Marandi has long warned Iran would disrupt oil and gas production; he notes Iranian officials have historically warned about the Strait of Hormuz. He criticizes Western analyses of Iran’s capabilities as underestimating Tehran’s military and strategic sophistication, while Western narratives have repeatedly expected Iran to collapse in various wars, which Iran has repeatedly resisted. - On the potential course of a renewed war, Marandi outlines two broad scenarios: a short, intense clash with limited strikes on non-critical infrastructure could provoke a strong Iranian response, including missiles at Israel and allied targets; a more extensive war targeting Iran’s critical infrastructure, such as power plants and bridges, could devastate Persian Gulf countries and precipitate a global economic downturn. He emphasizes that Iran has historically avoided targeting civilians, but warns that destruction of critical infrastructure could force populations to flee. - Regarding escalation and timing, Marandi argues the Americans misjudged Iran’s resolve and that Tehran has rebuilt assets and developed new capabilities since ceasefire discussions. He suggests Trump’s aim may have been to probe whether Iran would capitulate or escalate, a calculation he believes underestimated Iran’s preparedness. - He predicts that the scale and duration of escalation will hinge on American choices: the Red Sea’s closure and Gulf actions depend on how far the United States escalates, what targets are attacked, and how long the strikes last. In general, he contends that the world economy’s vulnerability will intensify with any extended or severe conflict, particularly if critical infrastructure is targeted. - In closing, Glenn and Marandi acknowledge the peril of the situation, with Marandi urging awareness of the broader implications, including regional stability and global economic impacts, and both hoping for a path away from further escalation.

Saeed Mohammed Marandi, a professor at Tehran University and former advisor to Iran's nuclear negotiation team, discusses the status and prospects of a potential Iran–United States memorandum of understanding (MOU) and broader regional implications. Marandi says optimism is warranted but argues the Israeli regime’s attack on Beirut will change calculations. He asserts the attack aimed “to prevent a deal from happening” and to ensure that Iran and the United States do not agree on an MOU. He characterizes Iranian reasoning as: if the United States is not serious, or cannot control events, or is “playing good cop, bad cop,” then Iran has no reason to negotiate. He claims there was “close to an agreement” previously, but that a final text had not been achieved, despite statements by Trump and mediators that it was finalized. He describes a sequence of events: negotiations were close to a deal two or three weeks earlier, then Americans attempted to impose new conditions that stopped talks. He says Israelis attacked Beirut after that, Iran retaliated, and the United States began attacking Iran. He states that on Wednesday a Qatari delegation was sent to Iran to indicate the United States withdrew those conditions, leading negotiations to return to normal. Marandi then says a United States attack that Wednesday night is believed to have been intended to “hide the fact” that the conditions were withdrawn, so that any later agreement would appear to come from strength. Marandi outlines terms he says are already “what you already know” from weeks of discussion: lifting/waiving sanctions on Iran’s energy exports; releasing Iranian assets through a particular mechanism; ending the Gaza conflict and forcing the Israeli regime to retreat; ending a siege; Iran promising not to develop nuclear weapons; and normalizing civilian trade through the Strait of Hormuz. He adds that Iran says it will continue to control the Strait, receive fees from shipping, and not allow ships belonging to Iran’s enemies to pass. He emphasizes an internal Iranian debate on implementation assurances. Critics argue the United States cheated Iran under Obama in the JCPOA by failing to honor obligations after Iran implemented its side, creating concern that the same one-sided outcome could recur. He notes questions being raised: whether the United States will actually release Iranian assets; whether the Israeli regime will stop killing in Lebanon or continue occupying Lebanon; and whether assurances are adequate. Marandi says the attack on Beirut has pushed that intense debate aside for now because Iranians are focusing on Lebanon. He argues Israeli actions increase unity within Iran by reinforcing sensitivity to Lebanon-related red lines. He also argues Netanyahu’s actions undermine Trump politically, making it appear the U.S. is subordinate to Israelis and angering ordinary Americans, while also worsening the economic and energy crisis. On the Strait of Hormuz, Marandi says there is no final text and agreement is not imminent because of the Beirut attack and unresolved issues, especially assurances about stolen assets and whether U.S. forces will pull back. He describes competing positions: negotiators say Iran will control the Strait and impose fees while allowing ordinary shipping to pass normally; critics say the deal does not include adequate guarantees and that reopening the Strait would make it difficult to close later if one side violates commitments. Asked about regional change, Marandi says implementation of a deal would be a turning point, including symbolically forcing the United States to accept defeat in cases where it is not Iranian “capitulation.” He adds that even without a deal, he believes the region is moving toward countries recognizing that the United States is not protecting them, and toward models like Iran–Oman and Iran–Iraq. Marandi also links Western rhetoric and escalation to Iranian attitudes, citing Trump’s tweeted language about an “ultimate alternative” if Iran does not sign, which he reads as a nuclear threat. He expects a likely limited war, at least because Iran would probably respond to the Israeli regime regarding Beirut and because the “genocide” in Lebanon is too severe for Iran to ignore. He says he does not know the decisions “from the inside,” but argues the key question is who calls the shots—Trump or Netanyahu—and that each scenario delays negotiations and worsens prospects for an agreement. He concludes that the Beirut attack will have set back the U.S.–Iranian deal and could further derail it, at least for a while, as the economic crisis worsens.

Seyyed Mohammed Marandi, speaking from Islamabad where US-Iranian negotiations are taking place, says the talks have collapsed. He asserts that the United States behaved with arrogance, sought to dictate terms, and did not respect Iranian sovereignty or independence. He characterizes the Trump regime as having attempted to force Iran to lose and claims the United States is becoming an openly extremist regime, with media and think tanks reportedly naming negotiators as targets. He states that Iran is returning to its position after the collapse and that the situation remains open to future developments. The interviewer notes that Washington Post coverage and Western rhetoric have included calls to murder negotiators, and asks where the most difficult point in the negotiations was. Marandi responds that the United States does not accept Iranian sovereignty and wants control over the Strait of Hormuz; he says Iran views its nuclear program as legitimate and legal within international law, while the United States demands capitulation. He argues the US was not serious from the outset and suggests the talks may have been a ploy to gather more information about individuals, though Iran sought to engage publicly to demonstrate a search for solutions. He mentions that doctors Vandebaut and the speaker of parliament made the right move in engaging publicly but had long been skeptical about any meaningful outcome. Marandi notes significant regional context: the Israeli regime is reported to be slaughtering civilians in Lebanon and Gaza, while Western media and governments are said to overlook these actions. He predicts a high likelihood of renewed aggression against Iran and asserts that Iran has spent the 40-day war reorganizing and strengthening its defensive and offensive capabilities, having learned from prior conflicts. He emphasizes that Iran has not initiated wars since the revolution and that responses have followed Western escalations. He argues that there are no factions within the Trump regime that are distant from the Zionist lobby and asserts that the negotiations showed that Vance and his aides intended to push for capitulation, not a negotiation. The discussion then turns to possible mechanisms for peace, including US opposition to Iran’s control of the Strait of Hormuz and potential toll arrangements involving Iran and Oman. Marandi says he has not been briefed on the latest details but that the issue was discussed; he reiterates that Iran’s control of the Strait is in accordance with international law, even as he notes the law of the jungle prevailing in practice. He asserts that Iran did not carry out aggression and that US demands are unacceptable at multiple levels. Marandi expresses optimism about regional dynamics, arguing that Western narratives are unreliable and praising Iran’s stance and sacrifices by groups like Hezbollah in Syria and Palestine. He contends that the empire will be defeated and that the Islamic Republic will emerge as a power in Western Asia, opposing ethnosupremacism and genocide. Regarding potential US actions if negotiations end, Marandi warns that the US could attack, but Iran would retaliate by destroying oil and gas infrastructure in the Persian Gulf, potentially leading to a broader energy crisis. He contends that any blockade would further harm the global economy and asserts that Trump’s course could push the world toward a global economic depression. He attributes US incentives to the Israeli regime rather than American public interest, suggesting that certain US allies’ priorities align with Israel over global stability. He says he will seek to obtain a fuller picture on the ground upon returning from Islamabad and notes that Vance’s tone appeared more positive than Kushner or Wittkopf at times, though the situation remained fluid.

Speaker 0 and Speaker 1 discuss the unfolding conflict with Iran, focusing on miscalculations, strategy, and potential trajectories. - Speaker 1 says the war is a major miscalculation, identifiable before it began. Signs were evident: movement of military equipment, force postures, and statements suggested that absent an eleventh-hour change by Trump, the plan was to use prepositioned forces and enablers for sustained combat. He notes this pattern matches previous experiences in which the U.S. saw a buildup as a precursor to war, citing Russia’s 2022 invasion and his own observations of earlier prepositioning, logistics, air support, refueling, and large-scale aviation assets (C-17s, C-5s, fighter jets, aircraft carriers). - He argues Iran’s leadership intended to pursue war rather than negotiation, pointing to what he calls a central missed opportunity: the Oman foreign minister’s Friday-night submissions to the Iranian negotiator offering zero reprocessing, stockpile reductions, and at least preliminary talks on long-range missiles and proxies. He asserts that if the Trump administration had accepted those terms, a ceasefire or settlement might have been possible; instead, he claims the next morning’s attack signaled that negotiations were never the aim. - Regarding U.S. objectives, Speaker 1 says the stated aims from Trump were unattainable given Iran’s resolve and the regime’s calculations that fighting a war with the U.S. is less risky than submitting to U.S. demands. He cites a New York Times report indicating Iran believed war with the U.S. was a viable risk, yet he notes Iran’s leadership now appears to be consolidating support at home and regionally after the Ayatollah’s assassination and the subsequent martyrdom of Qasem Soleimani’s successor in Iran’s internal narrative. - On battlefield dynamics, he emphasizes that Iran’s force deployment is not merely pressure but designed for use, with extensive underground facilities capable of withstanding sustained pressure. He forecasts continued high-intensity operations for a period, but warns the U.S. faces a tightening window: if the Iranian side holds firm and the U.S. cannot sustain supplies and missiles, the U.S. could reach a crisis point. - He discusses possible ceasefire dynamics and political reaction: Trump’s suggestion of a ceasefire could be “complete BS” if the Ayatollah’s position remains solid; the martyrdom and regional protests strengthen Iran’s stance. He expects continued escalation and a hardening of Iran’s demands, including sanctions relief or designation changes, should the conflict drag on. - On regional response, Speaker 1 notes that Iran has drawn regional actors into the conflict, with protests supporting Iran across Iraq, Pakistan, Bahrain, Oman, Kuwait, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Israel. He says many Iranians—though opposed to the regime—are unlikely to embrace Israel or the United States as a path out of the crisis, given decades of antagonism and past betrayals by Western powers. - Regarding U.S. vulnerabilities, he says there are reports of U.S. casualties (three killed, five seriously wounded, others lightly wounded) though some figures are disputed; the public reporting may lag behind direct sources. He mentions possible gaps in air defense and the risk of shortages in interceptors as drones and missiles proliferate, warning that Iran could escalate if U.S. stocks are depleted. - Looking ahead, Speaker 1 argues the conflict is a battle of wills and a war of attrition. The U.S. attempted a “cheap” approach with naval and air power but no ground forces; Iran appears ready to continue long enough to force concessions. He warns the Iranian threat could extend to oil infrastructure and the broader economy if the United States or its regional partners target Iran’s energy sector, potentially broadening the conflict. - In sum, he characterizes Iran’s strategy as all-in, aiming to impose pain to compel a negotiated settlement unfavorable to the U.S., while the U.S. faces a narrowing margin to sustain supply chains, missiles, and air defenses as the conflict potentially drags on for weeks to months. He cautions that the escalation ladder remains with higher rungs available, including strikes on energy infrastructure, if the conflict widens.

In a discussion with Glenn about rising US-Iran tensions and the prospect of war, Syed Mohamed Marandi, a professor at Tehran University and former adviser to Iran’s nuclear negotiation team, outlines several key points and scenarios. - He asserts that Iranians are preparing for war, with the armed forces building new capabilities and underground bases, while ordinary Iranians remain calm and continue daily life. He notes large demonstrations on February 11, with up to 4,000,000 in Tehran and 26–34,000,000 nationwide, seen as a show of solidarity against what he calls Western “rioters or terrorists” and against aggressive posturing by Israel. He stresses that Iran government negotiations will be framed around Iranian sovereignty: Iran will not negotiate who its friends are, who its allies are, or give up its rights to a peaceful nuclear program or enrichment, but could consider a nuclear deal. He argues any new deal would not revert to JCPOA terms given Iran’s technological advances and sanctions. He says a deal is unlikely under current conditions, though not impossible, and that even with a deal, it wouldn’t necessarily endure long. Ultimately, Iran is portrayed as preparing for war to deter aggression and preserve sovereignty. - The conversation discusses broader regional security, linking Israeli-Palestinian issues to potential peace. Marandi argues that Zionism has ethnosupremacism and that Western media often whitewashes Israeli actions in Gaza, the West Bank, and Lebanon. He emphasizes that a genuine peace would require recognizing Palestinian humanity and restoring fair treatment, arguing that a one-state solution could be the only viable path given the West’s failure to secure a lasting two-state arrangement. He contends the West has allowed colonization of the West Bank and that only a one-state outcome will resolve the situation, while portraying growing international hostility toward the Netanyahu regime and Zionism, including among young Jews. - On possible US strategies, Marandi rejects the notion of token strikes, arguing that even limited actions would invite broader conflict and potentially false-flag provocations that could be used to escalate toward war. He warns that Iran would respond with full force and could target US bases, naval assets, and regional interests, potentially shutting the Strait of Hormuz or sinking ships, with widespread economic ramifications. He predicts a regional war involving Iran’s allies in Iraq (where PMF played a key role against ISIS) and Yemen, and Hezbollah, suggesting that Arab Gulf regimes hosting US bases would likely collapse quickly in such a conflict. He stresses that Iran’s missile and drone capabilities are heavily focused on the Persian Gulf area and that war would be existential for Iran and its allies, but a dangerous, protracted challenge for the United States. - The potential consequences of US oil and petrochemical disruption are discussed. Marandi notes that Iran could retaliate against Iranian tankers or, conversely, seize Western tankers in response to piracy. He emphasizes Iran’s comparatively lower dependence on oil exports due to sanctions and sanctions-driven diversification, arguing that attacking Iran would backfire economically for the US and its allies. He also highlights that such a war would be regional, not just Iran versus the US, given Iran’s relationships with Iraq, Yemen, and other actors, and that Gulf regimes would be under immediate pressure. - Regarding current US leadership and narrative control, Marandi critiques the inconsistency of Western narratives around regime change, human rights, and democracy, pointing to the Epstein files as revealing a distrustful climate in Western politics. He argues Western media often uniformly pushes a narrative of Iranian repression while ignoring or whitewashing similar or worse actions by Western allies. He suggests that the lack of a cohesive, credible Western narrative signals a shift in geopolitical dynamics and could limit the ability to mobilize public support for aggressive actions against Iran. - They also touch on US-Israeli diplomacy, noting Trump and Netanyahu’s posturing and the Epstein documents’ potential implications. Marandi contends time is not on the side of aggressive policy, given midterm political pressures in the US and growing public skepticism about war, which could undermine leadership like Trump and Netanyahu if conflict escalates. The discussion ends with acknowledgment of the complexity and volatility of the situation, and gratitude for the opportunity to discuss it.

Pepe Escobar and Glenn discuss the secrecy and content of a U.S.-Iran Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) allegedly meant to be signed Friday. Escobar says Iran has provided some information while the U.S. “seems to be not showing their cards.” He claims that he and Larry Johnson have direct access to the negotiating table via Pakistani mediators for the past few weeks. According to Escobar, three weeks earlier they reported a crucial phone call by Pezeshkin to Prime Minister of Pakistan Shabazz Sharif as an ultimatum to the U.S. to “behave” and stop “overstepping” thresholds, warning of “no more nuclear ambiguity.” Three days later, they said an Islamabad Accord was about to be signed and that a similar Trump deal had been ready to be signed six times previously, with Trump backing off. Escobar says their channel was erased from YouTube by direct order of the U.S. government after reporting this. Escobar says the MOU’s key development involved Abbas Arakchi being in Islamabad over the weekend to finalize points with Pakistanis and that the discussions occurred alongside events including an Israeli attack on Dahyeh (south of Beirut). He claims Arakchi told the Pakistanis to warn the Americans that if Israel continued, Iran’s “fingers on the trigger” would be against Israel. Escobar says the White House responded by effectively committing to sign the MOU and to urge Israelis to stop, with the announcement tied to June 14. He further claims that details were withheld even as U.S. officials suggested Trump and Vance had electronically signed the MOU, while no evidence had been shown. On Iran’s side, Escobar describes a delegated decision process: Ayatollah Khamenei’s “green light” is delegated to a Supreme National Security Council with 13 members, requiring a solid majority; he says only two are “reformists,” including President Pesachkin. Escobar says this is why Tehran has not provided official confirmation that it has already signed and expects signing in Geneva Friday, possibly involving Galibaf. He characterizes the MOU as starting a process rather than delivering immediate peace: an initial stage of about 30 days, followed by negotiations in a 60-day period that would extend into late July/early August and across August and September, with acrimonious discussions. Escobar argues Trump’s domestic narrative is built around “twisting narratives” and playing for time, claiming Trump is selling the return of oil flow through the Strait of Hormuz to a “victory,” emphasizing stabilizing oil and bond markets. Escobar says Trump’s stated “victory plan” is effectively about time before rearming the U.S. and resuming war after midterms. Escobar claims Iran’s position on Lebanon is integral to the MOU: “Lebanon is Hezbollah, everything is part of the MOU.” He says Iran told the U.S. that if Israel breaks this, Iran will deal with Israel directly and that if the U.S. intervenes, it would be seen as breaking the MOU, prompting bilateral escalation. He says the Iranian warning includes that continued bombardment of Dahyeh and an Israeli plan aiming at “Gaza 2.0” (permanent occupation of southern Lebanon and turning Dahyeh into a new Gaza) would be met with Iranian retaliation. Glenn asks how Trump will control Israel given Israeli media dissatisfaction about walking back from Lebanon. Escobar replies that the Iranian message already defines the response: Iran says it will bomb Israel “really, really hard” if Dahyeh attacks continue, and that the mediators understand Israel “can break this thing anytime.” The discussion then turns to Pakistan’s diplomatic role. Escobar says Pakistan “played it very well,” involving top-level government figures in mediation. He credits Pakistan’s relationships with Iran and China and says China and Russia supported Pakistan’s mediation, including directing Pakistan to work harder. He argues India could not mediate because India aligned with Israel, referencing close India-Netanyahu ties before February 28. Escobar links Pakistan’s leverage to geoeconomics and infrastructure: Pakistan’s position in the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, Iran’s role in the International North-South Transportation Corridor via Chabahar, and increasing interconnection such as sister-port links between Chabahar and Gwadar. He claims six border crossings between Iran and Pakistan were opened for trade 24/7, and points to a rail link across Central Asia funded by China. Escobar says Pakistan’s mediation is also supported by Gulf communications and defense ties, describing possible Pakistani military presence at Prince Sultan Air Base in Saudi Arabia. He claims Pakistan is working to provide GCC states with a new “protective umbrella” backed by China, after GCC doubts about U.S. guarantees. He suggests UAE stances may shift as “the wind” changes, and that Iran sees negotiating with GCC through Pakistan as a workable structure, with deterrence implied by Iran’s ability to strike. In closing, Glenn and Escobar argue about U.S. adjustment and future war risk, with Escobar stating the situation reflects a strategic defeat and that the U.S. is being expelled from Eurasia. They conclude that the next step is whether there will be actual “solid negotiations” during the first 30-day phase, and whether the U.S. is serious about discussing the “14 points” or using the MOU as “a crude play for time.”

Mario and Professor discuss the current MOU tied to Iran, the Strait of Hormuz, and related negotiations. Professor says Iran is “in the driver’s seat,” that the deal starts “terrifically” for Iran, and that it will “get better over time.” He argues the most important information comes from shippers who want Iran to clearly guarantee their security “by Iran,” not by the United States, UAE, or other Gulf states. He says Iran’s stated demands include $12 billion up front, another $12 billion at the end of the 60 days, and ongoing weekly oil-sale revenue of about a “billion dollars a week,” which he frames as leverage used to “squeeze” Donald Trump during the 60-day window. Professor’s central claim is that oil inventory drawdowns create a timeline advantage for Iran. He says oil shipments to refineries take roughly 30 to 60 days, so during the 60-day window consumers must keep drawing down inventories because “there will be no new oil coming” to them. He predicts Iran’s leverage will grow by the end of 60 days because the world’s buffers will be gone, and oil inventory experts indicate inventories cannot be refilled until next year. He adds that this produces a repeating cycle: if Iran cuts off again, it would be “much worse” for the market, giving Iran additional leverage to demand more, including linked pressure regarding Lebanon and Hezbollah. He also argues that Iran is using the negotiation as a power-maximization tool to reach regional dominance, noting that since March/April Iran has allegedly “taken Hormuz” and then worked to shift Gulf-state alignment through negotiations with Russia, China, Pakistan, Qatar, Oman, and apparently the UAE. He says the Abraham Accords have “gone poof” and frames the shift as “power” and “relative power,” building a sphere of influence while reducing the strategic value of American presence. He expects more regional arrangements “without the U.S.” over the next six months, potentially including Turkey and Saudi Arabia. Regarding U.S. and Israeli reactions, Professor says Israel is the “biggest loser” in a flipped power landscape where Iran becomes the rising power. He argues Israel opened a “second front into Lebanon,” making Israel and the United States more overstretched as Iran’s leverage increases. He says the key question is which Iranian demands matter most: cutting off U.S. military aid to Israel, withdrawing U.S. combat forces from the Persian Gulf, or both. He suggests Israel could respond by “lashing out” if it feels cornered, including possible targeting of Iranian leaders involved in negotiations. Mario asks whether Trump making clear the U.S. would not support Israel in a war would still allow Israel to start one. Professor says “words won’t be enough,” citing internal political pressures on Netanyahu ahead of reelection and the need to appear successful at defending Israel against Iran and Hezbollah. He argues Iran’s leverage trajectory could continue growing and that he expects a period of increased pressure through at least January. On U.S. intelligence, Professor references reporting that CIA Director John Ratcliffe told Trump that U.S. intelligence raised serious doubts about Iran’s willingness to make nuclear concessions, including that Iranian officials discussed the deal inconsistently with what they told American negotiators. He also references Israeli media reporting about Trump potentially allowing opposition figures to be sidelined. In discussing the MOU’s clauses, Professor says ambiguities in the MOU and supposed Israel withdrawal plan (described as non-direct and vague) would tend to advantage Iran across the 60-day window. He frames Iran’s leverage as rising if agreed withdrawal plans do not materialize, with Iran using the resulting circumstances as justification to close the Strait again. He also emphasizes Iran’s strategy of shifting blame—“passing the buck”—so that increased pressure is attributed to America or Israel rather than Iran. Mario and Professor end by noting they will wait for the MOU to be released and then review clauses for political ramifications, while Professor bases his outlook on Iran statements plus the oil inventory drawdown mechanics structured into the 60-day timeframe.

Colonel Lawrence Wilkerson discusses the escalation involving Israel, Iran, and the United States, describing it as getting worse “with every minute.” He says Iran has “essentially extended its deterrence to Lebanon,” attacking Israel because it attacked Lebanon, and he argues Israel “appears to refuse to accept this extended deterrence,” even though it cannot stop the course of events. He cites former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak: “Neither military pressure nor flattening southern Lebanon can topple Hezbollah,” and says Barak is “caught” in a political bind for Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu: opposition accuses Netanyahu of not being tough enough on Israel’s national security and of yielding to President Trump, while Trump’s stance is portrayed as pressuring Netanyahu to slow down or refrain from some actions, including bombing in Dariya and southern Beirut. Wilkerson frames the situation as both a domestic and personal political issue for Netanyahu as well as a security issue for US and Iran. Wilkerson says much discussion misses “the real point in this entire struggle”: “The struggle is about a Palestinian state,” arguing that Israel’s occupation and regulations governing Palestinians have long been ignored, not only since October 7/8. He describes Palestinians dying “at the rate of about thirty to thirty-five a day,” with deaths attributed to bullets, bombs, and “brutality,” but also to a humanitarian situation he says Israel supports. He gives examples such as eggs costing “two hundred and fifty dollars” per dozen and states black-market conditions make many Egyptians rich, while he also claims a large segment of Egypt supports the system. He argues attention is being diverted to Hezbollah, Daraa, and Beirut while the core issue—Palestinian statehood—is neglected. He links this framing to Iran’s approach, quoting a Haaretz headline he used: “All Iran has to do to win is not lose. All the United States and Israel have to do, and this includes… Who’s Bibi Netanyahu’s future… wins spectacularly.” Wilkerson then emphasizes the idea of multiple “nuclear weapon” components described in a separate account: the Strait of Hormuz, Iran’s relationships with Russia and China, and a third nuclear weapon being built or already made (with possible Pakistani involvement depending on the rumor version). He also references President Trump’s claim that he was the president who “wouldn’t start a war,” and portrays the US situation as further pressured by domestic political conditions ahead of midterms. Wilkerson claims that US domestic politics and legislative moves are “gluing us to Israel” in a way that will give Israel most of the advantage, referencing Tom Cotton in the Senate and Speaker Johnson in the House and “Section two two four” in the “twenty twenty seven NDAA.” He says this would embed Israel legally within the US security apparatus by codifying long-term arrangements without the prior oversight structure, eliminating congressionally visible oversight and restricting the ability to ensure compliance such as prohibitions on using equipment to kill civilians. He argues that intelligence, technology, and other security sharing would be locked in, benefiting Israel “on a twenty-four seven basis,” and he says US defense contractors would also be locked at the hip with Israel, including Lockheed Martin, RTX, Boeing, and other contractors. He claims Israeli systems often rely on US-made equipment or US-funded contracts, so the arrangement “changes everything,” and he adds that a US congressman helped introduce the section at Bibi Netanyahu’s direction, based on a taped telephone call. He concludes that without oversight, the American public cannot know what is occurring in real time. On Ukraine, Wilkerson and the other participant agree that Ukraine is being under-covered compared to the Levant. Wilkerson says Ukraine is “getting increasingly dangerous” and argues that Europe’s actions could eventually lead to consequences involving NATO responses, warning of “sleepwalking into a massive disaster.” He describes Putin as holding restraint “in the dam” and argues that the West is misreading restraint as opposition, while also predicting eventual dangerous outcomes. Wilkerson returns to the Iran-Israel conflict, saying the escalation ladder is being set and that Yemen has reportedly announced Israel will also be banning access to the Red Sea. He argues the US faces limited options because contesting militarily could lead to those restrictions applying to the US as well. He says Iran’s allies are not merely proxies but “allies,” and he reiterates that the conflict cannot be properly handled without correctly characterizing the struggle around Palestinian statehood. In response to a question about whether Iran may attack US ships directly, Wilkerson says he thinks it would be “smart,” and he points to Iran’s capability to hit US vessels using various means, describing videos of hits that strike combat-critical areas without necessarily sinking ships. He says Iran might choose a lower-damage approach to avoid triggering a wider US response. On Israel’s next moves, Wilkerson says Israel is in a difficult spot internally and internationally, and he cites a poll implication: “sixty-seven percent” of people across “thirty-six countries” believe Israel is wrong “for the first time,” reflecting a major change in global sentiment. He also expresses concern that US domestic politics could affect US policy, particularly if midterms turn against Trump and Republicans, while describing legislative leadership as likely to acquiesce to Trump’s approach. He concludes that the overall future direction is uncertain amid rapid global shifts, describing transportation and strategic corridors as changing and warning about multipolar dynamics.

Professor Seyyed Muhammad Marandi and Glenn discussed the widening of the war and what Yemen’s entry means for the escalation, as well as how Iran interprets attacks on it and its own targeting. - Yemen’s entry into the war is described as very important. Marandi notes the United States previously waged war on Yemen last year and withdrew, which he says demonstrates Yemen’s significance. With the US engaged against Iran, its ability to focus on Yemen is reduced, giving Yemen more room to maneuver. Iraq’s resistance has been striking US targets and could go further; Yemen’s capabilities have likely grown, and its current targets are limited but could expand to striking Saudi oil facilities or entering the Arabian Peninsula, including potentially closing the Red Sea or striking Israeli and US assets. - He recalls past dynamics of the Yemen conflict, including the seven-yearSaudi-led campaign backed by much of the world, the blockade on Yemen that blocked medicine and food, and Yemen’s eventual leverage via strikes on Saudi oil and gas installations that contributed to a ceasefire. Today, Yemen could “easily take out Saudi oil installations and cut Saudi imports from the Red Sea completely,” and could blockade the Red Sea or strike Israelis or US assets in the Indian Ocean. He asserts Yemen has been developing capabilities swiftly, similar to Iran and Hezbollah, and argues the West consistently underestimates such actors. - The escalation ladder remains high, and if the US or Israel escalates, Iran’s side will escalate too. Global energy, fertilizer, and petrochemical shortages are increasing, intensifying international pressure on Trump and anger toward Israel and Netanyahu. Marandi believes Iran’s escalation dominance is present, although they have not yet demonstrated their maximum capabilities. - He references a book, Going to Tehran, as a contrast to US policy: if the US had chosen a different route a decade ago, the current critical situation might be different. Instead, he says policymakers listened to Zionist influence and a small oligarchy, leading to the current climate of possible catastrophe from the Mediterranean to the Red Sea, Iraq, and Iran. - On the US-Israel coordination, Marandi suggests joint operation is likely, pointing to an Israeli strike on the South Pars gas installation as a test that led to Iranian retaliation, and argues President Trump’s stated deadlines to strike Iranian infrastructure were used to manage markets, notably oil prices. He asserts the pattern shows the US delaying or intensifying threats for market control, while Iran retaliates when threatened. - Ground forces and potential deployments: UAE signals strongest engagement among Gulf states, with islands claimed by the UAE that Iran took in 1971. Marandi argues that no Persian Gulf Arab regime is capable of fighting effectively; their role is to provide bases, airspace, and territorial access for the US. Iran, however, has prepared for potential ground operations for decades and believes it could counter any invasion with underground bases and a wide range of weapon systems that go beyond missiles and drones. He posits scenarios where Iraqi forces and Yemen could strike into Kuwait or Northern Saudi Arabia, complicating US options. - Regarding resilience, Marandi emphasizes Yemen’s and Iran’s enduring capacity to resist: Yemen “won the seven-year genocidal war” against the US-backed coalition and is now more prepared; Iran’s resilience is linked to its Islamic and Shia identity, symbols like martyrdom, and a population that remains mobilized despite leadership assassinations and external pressure. He cites public demonstrations in Tehran and widespread civilian backing, as well as ongoing strikes and bombings against Iranian targets, which he says continue to provoke Iranian retaliation rather than deter it. - In terms of outcomes and negotiations, Marandi says Iranian demands will have to be met, though the method is negotiable: reparations could be pursued from regional actors like the Emirates and Saudis rather than the US. Iran would require benefits for its regional allies (Hezbollah, Yemen, Palestinians, Iraqis). He warns that without concessions, further invasion remains a risk, implying that time is not on the side of the West because energy and petrochemical shortages will escalate. He also emphasizes that the real core issue is control over oil, LNG, petrochemicals, and fertilizer, and that the US would face severe economic and social disruption if those supplies are cut off. - The conversation ends with a note of hope that, despite the grim prospects, there is optimism for a better future, even if the days ahead look darker.

Professor Syed Mohammed Marandi, a professor at Tehran University and former adviser to Iran’s nuclear negotiation team, discussed the aftermath of Donald Trump’s meeting with Xi Jinping in Beijing, arguing that the trip and US requests to pressure Iran achieved nothing. He said Trump and his team were “detached from reality,” pointing to Trump having “expelled so many” Iran, Chinese, and Russian experts from national security structures, and claiming they entered negotiations “blinded.” Marandi referenced monitoring Iranian and Chinese signals during the Iranian foreign minister’s trip to China, suggesting US efforts should have been understood in advance as unlikely to produce results. Marandi predicted that after returning to the United States, the Trump regime would move toward renewed violence against Iran. He said the United States lacked the political will to implement a ceasefire, end the siege on Iranian ports, and bring about ceasefires in Lebanon and Gaza so ships associated with five countries could pass through the Strait of Hormuz. He attributed the absence of political will to the “Zionist lobby” and the Israeli regime, stating they would not accept a ceasefire or end hostilities due to Netanyahu’s personal agenda, elections ahead, his court case, and coalition partners. He also claimed war could be “quite soon,” involving Iran’s readiness for “a very, heavy assault” by Netanyahu and Trump regimes, and the mobilization of remnants of January armed insurrection fighters, Kurdish groups in Northern Iraq (about 5,000), and “Taqfiri, the Wahhabi Salafi” groups along the Pakistan border in “no man’s land” regions of Pakistan. He said Iran is preparing for this scenario and that Iranian armed forces are on “full alert.” Responding to media reporting that diplomacy has failed and Iran has rebuilt most missile bases, Marandi stated Iran’s response would be “very harsh,” “more decisive than even the thirty nine day war,” describing an environment he said is hostile for an American assault due to “hot season” conditions in the Persian Gulf and Arabian Peninsula. He argued that if the United States strikes Iran’s critical infrastructure, Iran would destroy the critical infrastructure of countries he listed as involved in the war against Iran: Jordan, Saudi Arabia, the Emirates, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and “all of these” that participate. He asserted that the most harmed would be the Emirates, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia, and claimed that if electricity and water supplies were struck, populations would have to empty or evacuate. He connected this to a likely deep, long-lasting economic depression. Marandi said Iran would not initiate retaliatory escalations only once, asserting that when Israel struck Iran’s South Pars gas field, Iran responded by heavily hitting Qatar’s and Emirati oil and gas installations. He further stated Trump posted dismissive claims during the war, and that Iran’s retaliation “won’t be pulling any punches.” On diplomacy, Marandi said the United States’ proposal depends on the American side, asserting that the ceasefire was a US defeat and that Iran would not change its stance. He said the US was under the illusion it could pressure Iran into accepting a watered-down version of US demands, and he argued the US and world were not “winning” siege warfare. He emphasized a route for the United States to accept agreed ceasefire conditions the US “failed to fulfill,” arguing that otherwise slaughter in Lebanon and Gaza and the inability of ships to pass would continue. Marandi said the decision for war is “not Trump’s” but “Netanyahu’s,” and said the Zionist lobby and Israeli regime control it. He described an Iranian goal as applying pressure so Washington’s political elites would conclude they must impose peace by telling Israel to “sit this one out,” claiming this had not yet happened. He also cited Tucker Carlson’s account of his discussion with Trump and Joe Kent’s resignation and interviews as supporting the idea of decision-making power behind continued war. When asked how fighting would differ, Marandi said Iran’s handling of proxies on the Pakistan border (Wahhabi and Salafi groups) would be “dealt with rather easily,” while Kurdish and accompanying terrorists would be more complicated due to their larger numbers. He claimed the Iraqi resistance would escalate “all out,” that Yemen is prepared for war, and that the Red Sea would be shut down, ending oil and other exports through the Red Sea. He said Israel would be “hammered very hard” and that the war would be more intense and quick to unfold. Regarding allies and outsourcing war-fighting, he said the Gulf states’ capacity to fight Iran was limited, describing the Emirates as lacking effective fighting forces and emphasizing that he expected Arab streets to respond differently than regime media during the prior war. On China and Russia, Marandi said Iran’s relations with China and Russia are “very good,” pointing to the Iranian foreign minister’s meetings with President Putin and in Beijing. He asserted that ultimately Iran “won the war based on its own capabilities,” while friends assisted. He claimed Iran’s missile and drone capabilities are more powerful now and that Iran has prepared underground missile and drone bases for decades, as well as plans for ground invasion readiness. He argued the US would be “foolish” to conduct a ground assault and said Iran would likely allow incursions and island-taking, then ambush and counterattack to wear forces out over months. He referenced communications during the earlier war, stating Iranians initially did not respond to messages to prolong fighting, and that after days they allowed communications and forced acceptance of an Iranian framework. He said Iran wants the war to last as long as possible now to deter future aggression. In reassessment of Iranian influence narratives, Marandi referenced Leon Panetta stating Iran holds a gun to the head of the United States, and Robert Kagan writing “checkmate” in The Atlantic, claiming “reality eventually catches up.” He said Robert Kagan was “on the payroll” and maintained that war would end poorly for Trump, the Israeli regime, and Zionism, while predicting a global economic depression if critical infrastructure is struck. He closed by repeating that Iran would fight decisively and not back down until the conflict ends.

Stanislav (Speaker 1) and Speaker 0 engage in a wide-ranging, combative analysis of the Iran-Israel-U.S. conflict and broader geopolitical implications. Key points and claims are as follows: - On Iran’s military activity: The volume of Iranian drone and rocket attacks has dropped by about 95% in the last few days, but Iran’s strategic goals appear to be advancing. The Strait of Hormuz remains closed, and Iran has not fallen from power, suggesting a durable regime in Iran despite reduced attack tempo. Israel is said to be taking a pounding with strikes on Haifa refinery, electrical plants, and other targets, while Iran is pursuing a long-haul campaign rather than a rapid blitz. - Terminology and legitimacy: Stanislav objects to labeling Iran’s leadership as a “regime,” arguing it’s a derogatory term and positing that the regime is a theocracy that is comparatively stable under pressure. He notes that air campaigns have never toppled governments and argues that people rally around governments when their families are being harmed, especially within Shia culture. - Information and truth in war: Both sides are accused of misrepresenting losses and capabilities; the Pentagon’s numbers on drones and rockets are treated with skepticism. There is emphasis on the difficulty of verifying battle damage in real time, and the reality that “the first sacrifice of any war is truth” in war reporting. - Military capabilities and constraints: Stanislav emphasizes that the U.S. and Israel have suffered damage to critical infrastructure, and the U.S. faces munitions shortages. He cites the first six days of conflict as consuming thousands of missiles (3,600 missiles across defensive and offensive systems). He argues U.S. industrial/munitions capacity is strained, with missiles being produced in small quantities and largely by hand, constraining rapid replacement. - Iran’s defense and offense: Iran is portrayed as possessing underground “missile cities” and being able to move and launch missiles from concealed locations. The use of decoy aircraft and other decoys is noted, complicating target acquisition. Iran is described as capable of sustaining a long campaign, with continued missile production and hidden launch capability, including launchers that can be moved and re-deployed quickly. - Sensor/shooter network: The discussion mentions a new U.S.-reported capability described as a “sensor shooter network” that uses satellites to spot a missile launcher as it emerges, relaying coordinates to fighters such as F-35s to intercept before launch. This is framed as making missile launches harder for Iran and easier to strike launchers for Israel and the U.S. - Strait of Hormuz as the central objective: The primary objective for Iran, per Speaker 0, is to close the Strait of Hormuz for as long as possible and disrupt Gulf states, with closing the strait potentially forcing an American exit due to economic pressure. Attacks that target Israel are framed as secondary (“bonus”) relative to the Hormuz objective. - Ground warfare and invasions: Both speakers argue that a U.S. or allied ground invasion of Iran would entail massive casualties and potential domestic political backlash, making it a less likely option. The difficulty of projecting power through Iran’s mountainous terrain and the risk of a popular uprising are highlighted. - Regime durability and external support: Iran’s government is described as a theocracy with deep cultural unity, making political collapse unlikely. Russia and China are discussed as critical backers: Russia provides MiG-29s, SU-35s, S-400s, and jamming capabilities, while China provides satellite connections and political cover, and both nations see Iran as an existential interest—Russia especially, given Central Asia and the Caucasus. Iran is portrayed as having backing from Russia and China that would prevent a wholesale collapse. - U.S. allies and credibility: The U.S. is portrayed as depleting its ability to defend Gulf allies, with discussions of allied air-defense systems being diverted elsewhere (to Israel) and questions about long-term U.S. willingness or capacity to sustain a commitment in the Gulf. - Ukraine comparison and broader geopolitics: The dialogue touches on Ukraine, NATO, and the differential treatment of Ukraine versus Iran, noting perceived manipulation by Western actors and the difficulty of achieving durable peace through negotiations when proxies and local actors have entrenched interests. Zelensky and Kyiv’s internal politics are referenced to illustrate broader critique of Western interventions. - Potential off-ramps and negotiations: There is debate about whether a political settlement could be engineered that would preserve the Iranian regime while offering concessions (e.g., limitations on ballistic missiles or nuclear ambitions) and provide Trump with a way to claim a diplomatic win. Stanislav suggests the unpredictable nature of the current leadership and that an off-ramp may be difficult to secure; Speaker 0 contends that a pragmatic, deal-oriented path could exist if a credible intermediary or concessions are arranged, perhaps involving a different leadership or mediator. - Final reflections on strategy and endurance: Stanislav stresses that drones, missiles, and human ground forces all have limits, and argues that real military victory rarely comes from air campaigns alone; the fundamental test remains whether ground forces can secure and hold territory. Speaker 0 adds that the regime’s resilience in Iran and the long-term strategic calculus—especially regarding Hormuz, energy, and allied alliances—will shape the conflict’s trajectory in the coming weeks. Both acknowledge the enormous complexities and the high stakes for regional and global stability.

Glenn: Welcome back. We’re joined again by Prof. Syed Muhammad Marandi of Tehran University and former adviser to Iran’s nuclear negotiation team. The latest news is a U.S. peace proposal for Iran, with expectations of Iran’s response. The deal reportedly doesn’t address nuclear issues or the Strait of Hormuz. What can we make of this, and what wider negotiations are taking place? Marandi: Regarding the American proposal, we’ll have to wait to see the content, but Iran’s position is clear and unlikely to shift from its current priorities. First, a ceasefire and end to the fighting. The United States and the Israeli regime are currently violating the ceasefire, and until they end the slaughter in Lebanon and Gaza and the siege, there will be no possibility to move forward. After that, it will be the 10 Plan that Iran put forward and Trump accepted. Iran is not going to move away from that. If the Americans think over time this is just internal consumption, they are mistaken. It’s a major miscalculation akin to the miscalculation of launching the war. The Americans are now insisting that Iran respond within a time frame; Iran will respond when ready, possibly a day or two or three later, to avoid being intimidated. The American proposal, if true, likely violates Iran’s sovereignty and seeks something it could not gain on the battlefield. Iran would be flexible on issues but not on principles. On nuclear program, enrichment, sovereignty over the Strait of Hormuz, these won’t be given up. Iran is willing to do a deal, like in 2015, but not the Obama-era version; it would need an upgraded agreement that Iran envisions, not one Trump thinks is upgraded. Any deal, if it occurs, would have to be far more favorable than the 2015 agreement. The war participants gambled and lost; an attack could still occur. There’s a strong possibility of an imminent attack, and Iranian preparations reflect that outlook. No ships have left the Strait of Hormuz; Iran’s response to previous U.S. actions has been robust, while avoiding heavy escalation. The Strait of Hormuz has not been closed by Iran; it remains open for friendly states and those who have not joined the war against Iran. Glenn: It does seem the U.S. is returning to potential all-out war against Iran, though the U.S. may have limitations in what it can actually achieve. You mentioned Lebanon and Israel; has the push to address Lebanon’s siege dropped out of talks, or is it still on the table from the American side? Marandi: Iran’s stance is that there must be a regional ceasefire that includes Gaza; Lebanon is part of that regional ceasefire condition. Iran will not remove that from the table. Washington and Netanyahu demanded unconditional surrender at the war’s start, but after 39 days they accepted Iran’s 10-Plan as the basis for negotiations. Iran will not accept a shift in the American position, nor the continued slaughter of Palestinians and Lebanese as a precondition for talking. Glenn: What about disruption in Gulf cooperation with the U.S.? Saudi airspace was limited then reversed; are there splits in the U.S.-led alliance, or was that transient? Marandi: It’s unclear; the Iranians know U.S. airpower is concentrated in Qatar, the Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Kuwait. The Iranians are prepared for attack and believe the U.S. has not yet achieved its aims. Western reporting suggests Iran’s missiles and drones have advanced beyond what was seen in the 39-day war, with new underground-produced systems demonstrating greater capability. Glenn: On China, Xi Jinping and Iran recently met; how will that affect talks with the U.S. President and Xi’s approach? Marandi: China and Iran held a good meeting; China is impressed by Iran’s performance in the war, as are Russia and many others. China recognizes that the U.S. is targeting China, Russia, and Iran simultaneously. Iran’s relations with China are strong, but Iran won the war largely on its own—resilience, leadership, and the people’s support. The Strait of Hormuz is controlled by Iran, and the U.S. cannot overturn that within any negotiation framework. Glenn: If the U.S. returns to full-scale war, what red lines would Iran consider triggers for a broader conflict? Marandi: The likelihood is a major assault combined with terrorist incursions from northern Iraq and Pakistan-based groups, with ground actions against Iran. Iran believes it could counter and destroy critical infrastructure, including in Gulf states, which would escalate and likely devastate regional and global markets. Iran would retaliate against infrastructure targets, maintaining restraint toward civilians, but would not refrain from destroying critical assets if Iran’s infrastructure is attacked. If a new war begins, Iran expects a comprehensive defeat of the invading forces and non-cooperation with further aggression. Glenn: Thank you for the insights. We’ll likely speak again as this situation evolves. Marandi: Thank you, I appreciate it.

Saeed Mohamed Marandi explains that Iranians view current events as an extension of the twelve-day war, where Israel and the Trump administration allegedly collaborated to undermine Iran and failed. He cites US Treasury remarks at Davos about manipulating Iranian currency to provoke protests, which he says led to peaceful demonstrations followed by highly trained groups that caused destruction and police casualties. He asserts that Israel claimed responsibility, with Mossad statements and Channel 14 reporting that weapons brought into Iran caused police deaths, and he notes Western media glossed over these facts. He argues this campaign aimed to push Trump toward confrontation with Iran, while messaging about Iran’s nuclear program and regional alliances shifted over time. Iran’s response, he says, has been that any attack will be treated as all-out war with an overwhelming Iranian retaliation. He contends Trump is boxed in: a larger strike would provoke a massive Iranian response across the region, affecting oil and gas flows through the Persian Gulf and potentially collapsing the global economy. He suggests the “smart” outcome would be to back off and end peacefully, potentially declaring victory without concessions, as Trump did in Yemen, though he believes Iran will not accept any deal that compromises sovereignty or core capabilities. Marandi lays out Iran’s view of the regional and strategic landscape: Iran’s counterstrike would target US interests across the region, not just bases, and would involve allies in Iraq, Yemen, and other areas. He argues the Persian Gulf is highly vulnerable because regional regimes hosting US bases are complicit, and a war would disrupt global energy supplies. He asserts Iran’s capabilities are primarily directed at the United States, given US threats since the Afghanistan and Iraq invasions, and that Iran has strengthened missiles and drones, along with air defenses. He contends Israel is vulnerable, and the aim of some in the US political circle is to sacrifice US interests for Israeli interests. He asserts that Iran’s real objective is to prevent a repeat of the “sword over Iran”—to avoid six-month cycles of provocations—and to end the possibility of ongoing CIA-backed unrest being used as pretext for further strikes. On the possibility of negotiation, Marandi says Iran will not give up nuclear enrichment, missile capabilities, or regional alliances. He notes there was a JCPOA, but Iran would not accept a repeat of that deal; any future agreement would need to be better for Iran. A deal could be discussed about the nuclear program, but not one that cedes sovereignty or enrichment rights. He suggests Trump could try to retreat by declaring victory or offering a hollow concession, but Iran is ready for all-out war if attacked. He emphasizes that if the US backs down, it would be a major defeat for Washington; if it engages in war, it would be a world tragedy and the US would be defeated, with global implications. He argues Iran’s stance is clear: they will respond massively to any attack, and the only viable path for the US would be to walk away and pretend it gained something it did not. Glenn notes that regional allies feel exposed as world power shifts toward multipolarity, and asks about whether Iran would treat this as an existential threat and how it would fight. Marandi responds that Iran views the objective as balkanization, supported by Israeli interests, and that Iran would confront attempts to seize control of the country. He reiterates that Iran will not compromise sovereignty or support for Palestine, and that a conflict would be devastating for the world, with Iran prepared to fight to defend its existence.

The discussion centers on the alleged failure of Trump’s ceasefire with Iran and the dramatic military moves around it. The hosts point to Reuters and other outlets reporting thousands of Marines being rapidly transferred from San Diego into the region, suggesting preparations for a potential ground invasion rather than a real ceasefire. They highlight that Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner are involved in the efforts, and question why American forces are being moved if a ceasefire is in place. They argue that the U.S. and Israel show no intention of a genuine ceasefire or meeting Iran’s ten-point plan. After Trump’s administration celebrated a “ceasefire breakthrough” with Iran, Israel reportedly launched a series of attacks inside Lebanon, with Lebanese sources claiming hundreds of civilians were killed (more than 300) and millions displaced, undermining the ceasefire. They note Israel’s continued strikes on Lebanon, with Netanyahu’s side stating they would not stop and would continue to strike Hezbollah with full force, portraying Hezbollah as a target tied to Iran and Lebanon’s invasion. The program raises questions about whether the ceasefire could be limited to the United States and Iran, excluding Israel, and whether Iran could exclude Israel. They wonder if the ceasefire is a mechanism to reset or rearm rather than to establish lasting peace. They reference a draft ceasefire approved by the U.S., which Lebanese Hezbollah and others argue should include an end to Israeli expansion in Lebanon. Trump spokespeople claimed Lebanon was not included, but the hosts and guests argue Lebanon was indeed part of the terms, noting that the U.S. supplied a draft to Pakistan’s prime minister that included Lebanon, which Pakistan reposted. Dave DeCamp (antiwar.com) and Max Blumenthal (The Grey Zone) join to discuss. Dave notes that Iran’s ceasefire includes Lebanon, and Israel escalated with “operation eternal darkness,” killing hundreds. He questions JD Vance’s comments that Lebanon was never part of the terms and suggests the negotiations hint at a deal only between the U.S. and Iran, potentially allowing Iran and Israel to fight. He notes the involvement of Kushner and Witkoff in negotiations and observes that the day after the ceasefire was announced, the U.S. and Israel acted in ways inconsistent with a real ceasefire. Max adds that the White House has rebranded operations to “Epic Fury” and suggests a ground invasion appears more likely as a response to a failed ceasefire. He argues the ceasefire has fallen apart within hours and asserts the broader geopolitical dynamics—where the Straits of Hormuz act as a choke point and Iran uses cryptocurrency-based tolls—shift leverage toward Iran. He contends the war strengthens Iran’s political position while weakening those advocating appeasement or renewal of the JCPOA, and asserts that the U.S. can only cause more death and destruction. They discuss the international response to the Beirut bombing, noting tepid Western condemnation and arguing the U.S. and Israel depend on U.S. weapons and bombs to carry out the assault. They observe that Western officials have not condemned the attack vigorously, and that the Lebanese public is rallying around Hezbollah and seeking Iranian intervention in response to Israel’s actions. They reference New York Times reporting about Israel “dragging the United States into war” and the backlash against that characterization. They discuss the Pentagon’s integration with Israeli/Israeli-linked operations, and suggest that senior Trump advisers may have disputed Netanyahu’s narrative, with Ratcliffe expressing doubts about Israeli intelligence. They note internal tensions and potential fall guys like Pete Hegseth, while acknowledging Trump’s central role and the possibility of accountability at the ballot box. In closing, they emphasize the ongoing travel of Kushner, Vance, and other figures to broker a 10-point plan in Pakistan, while questioning trust in the process and urging scrutiny of who is driving the talks and under what terms. They promote Dave DeCamp’s antiwar.com coverage as a resource.

Alistair Crook and Alistair Crook discuss two linked crises: Iran and the US/Israel framework for a ceasefire, and a Europe-coordinated escalation against Russia after a major strike on Moscow. Crook begins with Iran, referencing a memorandum of understanding that has allegedly already been signed but remains shrouded in secrecy. He asks whether the Americans will uphold it, how it will reshape the region, and how it affects US-Israeli dynamics. Crook notes that Netanyahu appears weaker and raises the possibility that his replacement could be more hawkish, questioning whether Arab-party support for Netanyahu has shifted. He suggests that regardless of whether the framework is implemented, it will have a major impact across the US, Israel, and the wider region. Alistair Crook responds that the arrangement is a “framework” rather than a treaty or ceasefire: it is the “easiest part,” while the hardest element is constructing a protective zone and managing disruption. He describes visible elements already approaching within this “framework.” He then breaks down three areas Crook raised. First, he says the agreement is controversial in the United States and also controversial in Iran. He describes tension rooted in Iran’s experience with the JCPOA not being upheld and Iran remaining constrained. He cites a statement by Iran’s Supreme Leader, saying the Supreme Leader opposed the framework but was persuaded by Tazashian and Kaleva that there would be no backsliding on the framework terms or Iranian interests, which predominantly center on Hormuz. He frames Hormuz as a pivot for Iran’s potential shift into a new geopolitical context. He adds that the Supreme Leader is putting on notice both Iran’s reformist wing and a skeptical public that Iran will not allow precedents that expand the meaning of the framework until it is emptied of its purpose. Second, he highlights Lebanon as crucial. He says Iran has changed its position because it previously did not intervene directly against Israel in the axis-of-resistance way until the last period. He describes this as the first time Iran threatened heavy missile strikes on northern Israel if Israel flattened Beirut’s Dahir, arguing that this threatened the border-to-Galilee “path.” He says Trump then intervened and the attacks were stopped, but now the “thing” is being tested again. He links this to a breach question: he says Iran refuses to attend negotiating sessions and that Lebanon would be seen as a breach of the ceasefire from Iran’s perspective. Third, he turns to Israel and US politics. He claims Israeli press coverage reflects “real turmoil,” portraying the situation as a huge defeat for the “victory narrative” involving American support to destroy Iran, destroy Hezbollah, and annex parts of Lebanon with proxy permission. He describes an incident near Bofor Castle where Hezbollah attacked with an anti-tank missile, resulting in four soldiers dead, including the commander of the 82nd Brigade. He says figures and polling pressure are intensifying for Netanyahu, arguing that if Netanyahu does nothing militarily in Lebanon, his election will be lost and that there is “wall-to-wall consensus” for action. He adds that Trump’s language is shocking to Israelis: he reports Trump criticized Israel’s handling in Beirut and implied that an ex-ISIS leader could manage Lebanon more “sophisticatedly,” describing it as an unparalleled slap. He says Israelis interpret this as a Middle East that has changed: they believe there is no way to destroy Iran without the United States, and therefore that regime change is not achievable. He characterizes the result as a psychological defeat for the “Gratial Israel” concept and an acceptance that the US may impose penalties on Israel if it retaliates or breaches the framework, particularly in ways that could undermine Trump’s achievement of opening Hormuz. He argues that the framework triggered a US shift, driven by Hormuz and an “economic cliff,” saying Trump said the US was “four weeks away from running out of oil,” with figures describing US strategic reserve levels down to about 20 million barrels. He describes the ensuing US domestic battle between pro-Israel Zionist groups and Trump supporters insisting on “America first.” He counters a simple prediction of Republican losses by suggesting the midterms are rotational, with about 20 Republican seats in contention, and that loyalty to Trump’s personality could reduce defection. He also suggests that if Netanyahu attacks Lebanon, the shift could frame it as “slapping America in the face,” potentially rebounding politically for Trump among some voters. Crook then shifts topics to Russia, focusing on what he presents as an unprecedented Western escalation: a massive strike on Moscow, with NATO footprints being “advertised almost.” He asks how such escalation could be controlled and prevent nuclear escalation. He also complains that Western participation is now openly visible despite earlier efforts to conceal or downplay it. Alistair Crook says the strike involved many drones and missiles into a refinery area in Moscow and was intended to put Russians “on edge.” He links it to coordination around EU and allied meetings, stating that Macron and Merz met in London beforehand and brought Zelensky to stage European ultimatums. He says the point was to change the narrative, with Europe trying to present that Ukraine is not on the back foot and to push for more defense resources. He describes Europe’s aim as a ceasefire framework and UK/France and other participation in peacekeeping, with Ukraine eventually aligned with Europe, and bringing America back into the process via stage-managed messaging. He argues that Europe is escalating toward a war with Russia but lacks practical clarity on what such a war would look like, questioning whether it would be conventional, asymmetrical, air, or nuclear. He recounts arguments by Russian figures at the St. Petersburg Conference about stopping the “ratchet” of escalation and says the debate is growing over more procurement, missiles, drones, and co-production—reassembling shipped systems in Ukraine for use against Russia. He says Europe’s assumption that Russia would capitulate is a misunderstanding of Russia’s consciousness and history with Europe, similar to what he earlier described as a misunderstanding of Iran. He concludes that the strategy is dangerous because there is no clear escalation control if Russia perceives the threat, and he links this to Russia’s history of restraint before retaliation. The discussion ends with Crook urging readers to consult Alistair Crook’s Substack, and Crook thanking him for his insights.

In the dialogue, Seyyed Mohammed Marandi, a Tehran University professor and former Iran nuclear negotiation adviser, discusses the prospect of renewed U.S. aggression against Iran and the stability of any ceasefire. He says that since the ceasefire began, preparations for war in Tehran have been ongoing “twenty four hours a day,” driven by the belief that Trump will not accept defeat and that the “Zionist lobbying” and the Israeli regime remain behind the war. He suggests that although it is not certain, a new round of conflict could erupt over a weekend or soon after markets close, noting that the U.S. and Netanyahu’s positions previously clashed with ceasefire terms. He recounts that Iran had insisted on an off-ramp when Netanyahu accepted the ceasefire, but Trump then claimed the Strait of Hormuz would remain open while maintaining a siege on Iranian ports, implying that an off-ramp was possible but not pursued. Marandi emphasizes that the Strait of Hormuz was never closed by Iran, except to ships linked to adversaries, and argues that the escalation followed Netanyahu’s actions despite Iranian signals. He asserts that even if a limited agreement allows more ships through, the broader pain from any renewed conflict will persist, potentially causing a global economic depression if critical infrastructure is destroyed or if negotiations on Hormuz or Gaza/ Lebanon ceasefires are delayed for weeks due to fighting. On the U.S. side, the host notes that the U.S. was in trouble and desperate, pointing to missile defenses and ammunition shortages as signs of strain, and remarks that Trump accepted Iran’s 10-point plan as a ceasefire framework but later abandoned it, while presenting an extended ceasefire as a favor. Marandi agrees that Trump’s actions have been inconsistent and that the Iranians might expect the U.S. to pursue assassinations and infrastructure strikes again, with Iran prepared to retaliate robustly. A key point is Iran’s stated willingness to escalate in response to attacks on its leadership and critical infrastructure. An Iranian MP, associated with the Islamabad delegation, reportedly warned that if any assassinations occur, Iran will target leaders of Arab regimes in the Persian Gulf (Kuwait, Bahrain, the Emirates, Qatar, Saudi Arabia) because they are complicit in the war. The discussion outlines that Iran would retaliate not only against Israeli targets but also within the Persian Gulf region, potentially striking infrastructure and power facilities, with implications for the region’s electricity and climate conditions during the hot season. Marandi argues that Iran has already demonstrated strategic restraint, saying that Iranian authorities aim to minimize civilian casualties and that Iranians would respond to attacks on critical Iranian infrastructure by striking broader targets in the Israeli regime and in regional partners. He contends that Iran does not initiate escalation but escalates in response, pointing to past cycles where Iran’s retaliation was effective without targeting civilians. He notes that Iran has assets across its mountainous interior, including deep underground factories and bases, which he claims the United States underestimates, leading to miscalculations about Iran’s missile and drone capabilities. Regarding the broader geopolitical landscape, Marandi notes rising Western and Israeli concerns about Iran’s expanding influence, while acknowledging growing sympathy for Iran in parts of the world, including some shifts in India and Latin America. He highlights the Putin-Trump dynamic, suggesting Putin’s meeting with Iran’s Foreign Minister and Russia’s praise for the Iranian people signal a strengthening axis of resistance against Western pressures. He also remarks that Iran’s resilience under sanctions and its ability to mobilize regional allies, such as Hezbollah, complicates Western expectations of quick regime change. Finally, Marandi suggests that Iran’s role on the global stage is shifting perceptions of Iran’s strength and legitimacy, and he foresees continued pressure, potential escalation, and a regional balance of power that narrows Western maneuvering space as the crisis evolves.

In a discussion about the Iran confrontation and its wider implications, Glenn and John Mearsheimer analyze the sequence of events and underlying dynamics behind President Donald Trump’s statements and policy shifts. - Trump’s two Monday tweets frame the episode: an initial threat to “wipe Iran off the face of the earth” to force concession, followed by a reversal to announce a ceasefire based on Iran’s 10-point plan. Mersheimer emphasizes that this sequence reveals Trump’s desperation to end the war and to secure a ceasefire quickly, then to shift to negotiations with Iran’s plan as the basis. - The framework of the negotiations is contrasted with the US’s prior maximalist aims. The United States had demanded four core goals: regime change, Iran’s nuclear enrichment cessation, elimination of long-range missiles, and cessation of support for groups like the Houthis, Hezbollah, and Hamas. Mersheimer notes none of these have been realized, while Iran reportedly gains leverage through control of the Strait of Hormuz. - The Iranian 10-point plan is presented as a basis for negotiations that would, in effect, concede the big US demands. Trump’s evening tweet signaling acceptance of the 10-point plan is read as a defeat for the US position and a shift toward Iranian maximalism on its own terms. The claim is that the ceasefire, if it occurs, would involve concessions that Iran had already proposed. - The feasibility of a ceasefire is questioned. Iran’s open Strait of Hormuz depends on Israel halting attacks in Lebanon (on Hezbollah), which has not happened. Therefore, a true ceasefire is not in place, and the Israelis’ actions are seen as undermining any potential halt to hostilities. - The broader strategic picture is outlined. Iran’s leverage includes allied groups (Houthis, Hezbollah, Hamas) and the ability to close chokepoints like the Strait of Hormuz or the Bab el-Mandab strait via the Houthis. The discussion notes Iran’s large missile/drone arsenal and potential to threaten American bases, though Mersheimer stresses that sanctions and the prolonged war have devastated Iran’s economy, which complicates assessments of its strength. - The role of external powers and economies is highlighted. Mersheimer argues that the global economy—especially oil and fertilizers—drives the push to end the conflict. He suggests China and Pakistan, with Russian input, pressured Iran to negotiate, given the global economic risks of a prolonged war. He also notes that the New York Times reported that all 13 US bases in the Gulf were damaged or destroyed, undermining U.S. presence there. - Domestic political concerns are discussed. Trump’s ability to declare victory while acknowledging defeat creates a political hazard. Vance is presented as a potentially capable negotiator who could press for a ceasefire, but there is concern about internal political blowback if he concedes too much. - Israel’s position is considered crucial. Netanyahu’s government is described as having promoted the war, and the war’s outcome is said to damage U.S.-Israel relations. There is speculation that Israel may consider drastic options, including nuclear consideration against Iran, given the perceived failure of conventional means. - The Ukraine war and its relation to the Iran conflict are explored. If Iran’s war ends or is perceived as winding down, European capacity and willingness to support Ukraine become central questions. The U.S. may shift blame to Europe for Ukraine’s defeat if Russia advances, while withholding weapons to Ukraine to avoid further strain on U.S. stockpiles. - The discussion on rationality in international relations emphasizes that states act rationally when their decisions align with a plausible theory of international politics and a sound decision-making process. Mersheimer argues Europe’s behavior toward the U.S. is not irrational, though he criticizes its liberal-theory basis (NATO expansion) as potentially misguided but not irrational. He contrasts this with Trump’s Iran attack in February 2029, which he deems irrational due to a lack of a plausible theory of victory. - The multipolar world dynamic is reinforced. The war’s outcomes are viewed as weakening U.S. ability to project power, diminishing transatlantic cohesion, and boosting Russia and China’s relative position. The loss of Gulf bases and diminished American influence are expected to push Europe toward greater strategic autonomy, with NATO potentially becoming less meaningful by 2029, depending on future leadership. - Final notes include concerns about the political risk for Vance as a negotiator, the likelihood of a difficult peace process, and the possibility that misperceptions and propaganda—analyzed through historical parallels like the Vietnam War and Walter Lippmann’s ideas—have locked leaders into an “evil enemy” narrative that complicates peacemaking. Overall, the conversation portrays Trump’s messaging as a sign of desperation to end a costly conflict, the ceasefire as a fragile construct dependent on Iranian terms, Iran’s expanding leverage in the region, the fragility of U.S.-Israel and transatlantic bonds, and a shifting global order moving toward multipolarity with lasting economic and strategic consequences.

Seyyed Mohamed Marandi, a professor at Tehran University and former adviser to Iran’s nuclear negotiations, joins Glenn to discuss the latest dramatic escalations in the war with Iran. Marandi describes a multi-front confrontation: an attack near the Buchāe Nuclear Power Plant, repeated assassinations of Iranian leaders, and a recent strike on South Pars, the world’s largest natural gas field. He argues Iran has leverage in the region through control of the Strait of Hormuz, capabilities in missiles and drones, and a navy that is largely subterranean and prepared to move into the Persian Gulf, Gulf of Oman, and Indian Ocean when needed. He contends the U.S. leadership miscalculated Iran’s response and that Trump’s threats to obliterate Iran did not materialize. Marandi suggests a shifting operational dynamic: “the operational control has shifted from The United States to the Israeli regime,” with Israel selecting targets and the U.S. agreeing to cooperate. He posits that the Israeli regime may seek escalation to destroy oil and gas assets in the Persian Gulf, possibly with U.S. backing, while Iran signals it will escalate if Israel or U.S. targets strike Iranian infrastructure. He argues the United States is “stuck with the Strait Of Hormuz,” while Iran “holds all the cards.” He notes that escalations have thus far failed to achieve strategic objectives, and that the martyrdoms have mobilized Iranian society rather than demoralized it, citing massive demonstrations in Tehran and at funerals, including the funeral for Doctor Larijani and for naval officers killed in attacks on an Iranian vessel. On retaliation and potential scenarios, Marandi says Iran could respond against strikes on its key facilities; if the U.S. or its allies act to “destroy Iranian key installations,” Iran will “hit back,” with implications for the global economy if oil and gas infrastructure are damaged. He highlights that Yemen could become a more active theater, capable of threatening the Red Sea and potentially disrupting the Bab al-Mandab passage, which would complicate oil routes if Hormuz were already shut. He notes strikes against Qatar and Saudi Arabia may have occurred and asserts Yemen might “enter the full war,” with the UAE and Saudi campaigns increasingly pushing the region toward broader conflict. He argues that while US troops in the region could attempt to “open up the Strait of Hormuz,” Iran could counter with missiles and drones from within its borders, potentially targeting ships or installations far from the coast, and that any limited success by the U.S. would be outweighed by broader disruption and losses to Western interests, including petrodollars and regional assets. Marandi emphasizes the problem with a ceasefire as a solution: Iran’s foreign minister stated Iran does not want a ceasefire, but a political settlement, arguing ceasefires allow the enemy to regroup. He contends the settlement must be inclusive of Iran’s regional allies and address “the facts on the ground”—not just a paper agreement. Iran’s demands include regional security arrangements that ensure Iran’s security without being forced into another short-term ceasefire, reparations for damages, and structural changes to how Gulf security is arranged so Iran does not feel threatened by U.S. forces or by Israeli actions. He predicts a long, sustained conflict if the United States and its allies insist on injections of force, arguing the Iranian public now views Western actions as unacceptable and that Iran is prepared for a protracted contest. Marandi also challenges Western framing of legitimacy and moral authority, criticizing those who label Iran or others as “evil” while failing to acknowledge their own governments’ actions. He contends that the West’s support for allied regimes in the Persian Gulf has long funded aggression and he asserts that these regimes will not be able to return to their prior influence or behavior. He ends by noting Iranians’ broad unity and willingness to defend the Islamic Republic, regardless of external pressure, and he suggests that the United States will eventually have to withdraw, allowing a new regional order to emerge.

The discussion centers on conflicting statements attributed to Benjamin Netanyahu and Donald Trump shortly after a call, with Netanyahu saying there would be no ceasefire and operations would continue as normal, while Trump allegedly claimed a full ceasefire would take effect. The speakers argue this contradiction is expected, and they suggest Netanyahu may pause for 24–48 hours but will likely resume operations, framing the conflict as continuing rather than stopping. They describe Netanyahu’s political survival as the key driver, arguing he cannot afford politically to end the war, and instead needs to maintain momentum to justify his leadership to the Israeli public and handle legal and political challenges that they expect to intensify after the war. They also claim Netanyahu would prefer “the man on top of a burning cinder” to losing position in a more stable environment. The speakers say Trump may use harsh language to pressure Netanyahu, but that Netanyahu has “experienced far worse” from other U.S. presidents, with Obama cited as particularly difficult due to resisting involvement and pursuing an attempted nuclear agreement with Iran. A separate point is raised about U.S. legislative constraints—specifically Section 224 of the Pending National Defense Authorization Act—described as ensuring future administrations cannot reverse aid to Israel and integrating Israel more fully into U.S. defense and industrial infrastructure, making it harder to disentangle. On escalation and de-escalation, the speakers say a real de-escalation is not happening, arguing that violence resumes quickly when ceasefire arrangements break down. They claim Israeli actions show they are not pulling back, including continued strikes and specific reference to Beirut. They argue that Israel could be slowing or “slow-walking” strikes temporarily, potentially to reposition, while Hezbollah prepares defenses and maintains contingency planning. The conversation also addresses an I24-reported assessment that Hezbollah has not resumed its core leadership or central command structure in southern Beirut’s Dahi district since the ceasefire, with Hezbollah reportedly relocating major parts of its command network to other Beirut areas. Israeli officials in the report are described as believing additional Israeli strikes on Dahi would have limited impact on Hezbollah’s operational capabilities, and that Israel’s push toward Beirut is partly to pressure Lebanese actors against Hezbollah. A broader strategic framing is offered: the speakers suggest Iran’s threats to strike Israel’s northern homeland could provide Netanyahu with political leverage to portray continued fighting as existential and necessary. They also discuss “red lines,” saying Iran drew a red line and that what comes next depends on which side dictates actions. Trump is described as wanting a peace deal, while the speakers claim Israel does not mind sabotaging it. Regarding Iran’s posture, the speakers say Iran escalated in a way that surprised them less than it might have otherwise, noting Iran threatened significant escalation against Israel and recommended citizen evacuations. They argue this looks more like calibrated retaliation than chaotic escalation, describing Iran as a “counter puncher” and suggesting the conflict could include off-ramps. They also criticize rhetoric that labels Iran “crazy,” arguing that ceasefire terms involving Lebanon were not implemented and Israel was breaching the ceasefire. The conversation extends to the broader question of U.S. involvement, debating arguments that the U.S. should walk away versus the idea that the U.S. owes allies an effort to stabilize—particularly stopping hostilities in Lebanon. One speaker argues the U.S. struggles with post-war stabilization and that pulling back could force regional actors to be more reasonable, describing this as reducing moral hazard. Finally, the speakers discuss press access and censorship, including reporting that the Pentagon restricted journalists by designating its press office as a classified area and barring journalists from entering to interact with public affairs staff. They argue this is inconsistent with claims of free speech, and they also mention bans or restrictions in the UK against controversial media figures in connection with Israel-related debates. The transcript closes with the host listing additional interviews and guests from the channel lineup and stating more interviews will follow.

Professor Seyed Mohammad Marandi joins the program to discuss a fast-escalating confrontation involving Iran, Israel, and the United States, with warnings of a potential global crisis. He emphasizes, repeatedly, that Iran is retaliating rather than initiating, and that Western media has downplayed the start of hostilities. Key points and claims as presented: - Recent strikes targeted Iran’s nuclear facilities and energy-related sites. Israel attacked the Bosher (Bushehr) and Natanz facilities; Iran reportedly retaliated against Dimona in Israel, with attacks occurring near the Israeli nuclear site rather than the plant itself. - Trump has issued a 48-hour ultimatum to Iran to open the Strait of Hormuz, threatening to strike Iran’s energy fields if Iran does not capitulate. Iran’s military leadership warned that if the United States proceeds with threats, they would strike energy facilities and desalination plants across the Gulf states, with the claim that such actions could spell “the end of this state.” - Marandi asserts the war began earlier, with U.S.-Israel aggression about eight to nine months ago, and Iran has been retaliating in response to Israeli strikes on Iranian infrastructure. He cites Iran’s responses to the South Pars gas field strikes and subsequent retaliations against Qatari and Emirati energy facilities as signals that Tehran will respond to escalation. - He contends that Iran’s leadership believes escalation will place greater costs on the other side, given Iran’s access to assets across the Persian Gulf and the potential to destroy Western targets. He warns that a strike on Iran’s vital infrastructure could trigger a global economic catastrophe, with cascading consequences such as mass displacement and industrial collapse. - Marandi criticizes Western media, the UN Security Council, and regional regimes allied with the U.S. and Israel for condemning Iran’s retaliation while not addressing the Israeli-U.S. aggression. He describes Western media as “Epstein class controlled” and calls for deterrence that remains credible. - He argues Iran possesses escalation dominance: confronting greater Western military capabilities with more robust regional assets and allied groups (including the axis of resistance). He asserts that if the United States expands the conflict to attack Iranian territory or regional infrastructure, Iran would respond by destroying assets on the other side of the Persian Gulf, potentially leading to the fall of allied regimes. - The discussion touches on potential consequences if Iran escalates to the destruction of Gulf energy infrastructure or desalination plants: global energy shortages, food insecurity due to fertilizer and agricultural disruptions, and a broader collapse of the world economy. - The role of regional proxies and geopolitics is explored. Azerbaijan’s Aliyev regime, Iraqi factions, Yemeni resistance, and Gulf regimes are discussed as vulnerable to Iranian retaliation or as complicit in the broader conflict. Marandi suggests that any move by the U.S. to invade Iranian territory would provoke severe retaliation across multiple fronts, including in the Arabian Peninsula and Red Sea. - The possibility of broader geopolitical chain reactions is considered: Europe’s energy dependence, Russia’s position, and potential shifts in North Africa and the Middle East. He states that Europe is losing influence, and Russia could gain strategic advantages as the conflict deepens. - The refugee and humanitarian dimension is acknowledged. Iran hosts many refugees, complicating regional dynamics if conflicts worsen. - On leadership and probability, Marandi casts Trump as unpredictable, with statements and threats oscillating; he predicts a grim trajectory unless deterrence is credibly maintained, and he suggests that even a withdrawal or ceasefire would not be straightforward, given the on-the-ground realities and Iran’s demands. - He concludes with a broad warning: a global catastrophe is possible if escalation continues, and while Iran seeks to deter and respond proportionally, the path to de-escalation remains uncertain, with the possibility that the world could be drawn into a larger—and potentially third-world-war—conflict. Overall, the conversation frames Iran as retaliatory and strategically calculating, asserting that escalation could become uncontrollable and produce widespread economic, political, and humanitarian devastation unless restraint and credible deterrence prevail.

Glenn welcomed Seyyed Muhammad Marandi, a Tehran University professor and former Iran nuclear negotiator adviser, and asked about the terms of the current ceasefire and why clarity is hard to get. Marandi explained the progression: the U.S. initially demanded unconditional surrender, then shifted to a “15 plan,” which Iran rejected. Iran developed its own plan, with the Supreme National Security Council sending a modified version to the leader, Ayatollah Bahamani, who finalized it and sent it to Pakistan. Trump ostensibly accepted Iran’s framework as the basis for negotiations, though “that doesn’t mean that we’re going to have peace” and there’s little faith in U.S. willingness to concede the 10 points Iran presented. He described the U.S. as an empire whose capitulation is unlikely, given internal and international pressure and the current closure of the Strait of Hormuz. He warned that the U.S. military footprint in the region would be hard to sustain and would face logistical and environmental strain, which could complicate any new war; nonetheless, Iran is preparing for the worst, having previously negotiated with the U.S. twice and seeing both efforts end in renewed conflict. He attributed recent Israeli actions against Lebanon as an effort to derail the ceasefire, noting that Israeli leadership (Netanyahu) appears motivated to induce more violence to gain leverage domestically, while Western media outlets largely abstain from criticizing these actions. Glenn pressed on how to interpret the two-week window for negotiations and whether Lebanon’s inclusion in the ceasefire remains valid. Marandi reiterated skepticism that the full Iran-focused 10-point plan would be accepted by the United States, calling Trump inconsistent and unpredictable. He suggested the two-week period might be extended if negotiations progress modestly, but doubted any comprehensive agreement would be reached given the U.S. tendency to resist rights-based terms and to change positions rapidly. The two discussed the possibility of renewed U.S.-Iran conflict, with Iran continuing to strike at Israeli targets and American assets in the Gulf if necessary. The conversation then moved to the question of who bears responsibility for the broader regional disruption. Marandi argued that Gulf regimes (the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Qatar) are not in a position to fight Iran; without electricity and infrastructure, they would suffer cataclysmic losses. He asserted that the U.S. could not unify the Gulf states in a new campaign and that Iran would control the Strait of Hormuz if attacked. The UAE’s rumored strike on petrochemical facilities was cited as an example of the ongoing broader conflict. He also suggested Lebanon’s fate is tied to whether Israel continues striking Lebanon or shifts its focus back to Iran, and warned that a failure to constrain Israel would undermine any peace talks. Marandi asserted that the ceasefire’s terms could be undermined by the “Epstein class” influence over Western media and governments, arguing that the global media’s support for Israel’s actions betrays a broader humanitarian and democratic legitimacy crisis in the West. He also noted that Oman’s cooperation around Hormuz might be part of a negotiated arrangement, given Oman’s more favorable relationship with Iran and its geographic position on the strait. He stressed that Iran’s apparent victory could reshape global power dynamics, weakening the U.S. and empowering Iran and other Global South actors, with implications for the petrodollar system and regional alignments. Towards the end, Glenn and Marandi touched on the potential long-term regional changes, including borders and governance in the Gulf, and the broader economic and political costs for Gulf monarchies. Marandi attributed the crisis to Zionist influence on U.S. policy and lamented missed opportunities to pursue normal relations with the United States, referencing authors Flint and Leverett and their book Going to Tehran, which he suggested could have altered current events if heeded. He concluded by reiterating that lessons were not learned and that the war’s consequences would be lasting.

Glenn: Welcome back. We’re joined again by Seyyed Mohamed Marandi, a professor at Tehran University and a former adviser to Iran’s nuclear negotiation team. There’s talk in the US of seizing Kharg Island, which would handle 80–90% of Iran’s oil shipments, effectively a nuclear option to shut down Iran’s economy. What would be Iran’s likely response if the US pursued this path? Marandi: It would be a major problem to access the island because the US would have to fly over Arab regimes in the Persian Gulf. Iran would retaliate if Iranian territory were occupied, taking the war toward a major escalation. The regimes hosting the island would have to pay a heavy price, far greater than now. For the United States, the island is well protected, with Iranian assets on the shore supporting the islanders, and it’s farther from the US Navy and closer to Iran’s shore. But more importantly, such an aggression would be futile: it would not change the Persian Gulf trade through Hormuz, which Iran has effectively controlled by requiring permission to pass. An invasion or occupation would lead to fierce combat and punishment of the regimes that enabled it—Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, the Emirates, Bahrain, Qatar—desert-based states with oil and gas but little water. If the US succeeds in taking the island, Iran’s retaliation would involve destroying assets of the cooperating countries. Long-term, Hormuz could be effectively closed, with upstream infrastructure damaged and no oil or gas able to move, making a later reopening contingent on a peace agreement. The operation would be logistically, militarily, and economically disastrous for global markets. Glenn: There are reports Iran is mining Hormuz. Do you know anything about that operation? Marandi: Iran hasn’t mined Hormuz, the Persian Gulf, or the Indian Ocean. The Iranian navy capable of wartime actions is largely in underground tunnels and includes speedboats, surface-to-sea missiles, and a network of underground bases. Iran has not moved to mine the Gulf. It does not want escalation. Iran has always negotiated; US claims that Iran wanted nuclear weapons at the negotiating table are rejected by Iran, the fatwa, and IAEA history. If negotiations had failed, the US invasion would be unjustified. Doha and Qatar are prepared to restart gas facilities and allow oil to flow if peace returns. If the US escalates to destroy key infrastructure, Iran will retaliate, and Iran can hurt US assets and its proxies more than the US can hurt Iran, with long-term global energy consequences. Iran has been striking bases in the region and says it is prepared to continue until after the midterm elections. Glenn: The US energy secretary says the US Navy is studying options to escort tankers through Hormuz. What are the main challenges? Marandi: It would be virtually impossible. Iran’s navy is largely underground, with mines, surface-to-sea missiles, and drones capable of targeting Hormuz from Iran. If open war begins, Iran would retaliate against regimes hosting US bases. Even if Hormuz were opened temporarily, without oil, gas, tankers, or production, there would be no purpose, and energy prices would spike permanently. The US would likely be forced to accept Iran’s terms for peace to allow oil to flow. Glenn: Trump has spoken of further destruction if needed, but says he’s run out of targets. What do you expect from the American side? Marandi: The US is already targeting nonmilitary sites and civilian targets in Iran. They slaughter civilians, including families and children, with premeditation. They could intensify attacks on oil, gas, electricity infrastructure, which would invite Iran to retaliate. Iran’s society is united, with people on the streets despite the bombardments. If the US destroys infrastructure, Iran would respond, but Iran does not want escalation; it would be catastrophic for the global economy. The media in the West is controlled, and there is little outrage at threats to destroy Iran. Glenn: Israeli and American aims now—what’s at stake, and how end this? Marandi: Since the Gaza genocide and Lebanon escalation, Zionism is increasingly viewed as evil, and public opinion against Zionism is growing in the US. The destruction of Israel’s credibility is the greatest defeat, not battlefield losses. End this war now would be prudent; as Iran strikes back, global sympathy for Iran grows and the empire weakens. If Israel were to use a nuclear weapon, that would be catastrophic and could prompt broader proliferation. Glenn: Any chance Iran could retaliate against Britain or European states? Marandi: Europe and the US will have diminished presence in the region; bases would be forced to leave. He notes the possibility of false-flag attacks in the West and asserts Zionist manipulation as a risk, but emphasizes Iran’s determination to defend sovereignty and support for Palestinians and others. Glenn: Just a final note—Iran had three negotiations, not two, including the JCPOA. Thank you for joining. Marandi: Thank you.