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If Saddam's regime is removed, it will impact international terrorism. A regime change in Iran and Iraq is desired. Preemptive attacks on nations like Iraq, Iran, and Libya, which are pursuing nuclear weapons, are recommended to prevent their aggression. Collaboration is needed to halt Iran's expansion with Israel.

If Israel faces annihilation, they might use their nukes. Iran and Hezbollah need to understand they cannot wipe out the Israeli people. If Israel is about to be totally destroyed, they need to be thinking about all their options. The US military being stretched is not Israel's fault. The US should fund its military and not treat it like a secondary agency. This country has a lot of problems, but that's not on the head of the Israeli people who are trying to survive. When the US looks weak, violence and threats increase. Israel's gotta do what it's gotta do.

Afshin Rattansi introduces claims of renewed U.S. and Israeli bombardment of Iran amid ongoing violence in Gaza and Lebanon, including the assertion that Trump bombed southern Hormuzgan province leaving 20,000 Iranians without water. He says Israel launched a surprise attack on Iran a year earlier during negotiations, striking military and nuclear facilities and killing senior commanders, nuclear scientists, and their families. Rattansi further says Tehran responded with missile waves, whose impact is “heavily censored,” and that days later the U.S. entered the war by striking Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan with B-2 bombers and Tomahawk missiles, after which Trump declared Iran’s nuclear program “obliterated.” This year, Rattansi alleges that Washington and Tel Aviv used “so-called imminent threat” and peace negotiations as a pretext to kill Iran’s supreme leader Ali Khamenei and family members, and to kill 168 elementary schoolgirls, while Iran still retains a “massive stockpile” of enriched uranium and could produce 10–20 nuclear weapons in days. Rattansi asks Professor Ted Postol, a nuclear weapons and missile defense expert, whether the U.S. has a sustainable strategic position. Postol says the U.S. does not have such a position and argues Trump is constrained by domestic politics and pressured by an Israeli lobby with outsized influence and major financial power affecting U.S. and Congressional actions. Rattansi questions contradictions between Pentagon/CENTCOM self-defense framing and Trump rhetoric about “destroying” and even threatening to destroy Oman if it does not behave. Postol responds that the operation is not defensive, is a war of choice initiated with Israel, and from Iran’s perspective is a war of survival and existential protection against U.S. and Israeli aims to destroy Iranian civilization. He emphasizes that Iranian resistance would be driven by survival rather than U.S. internal politics. On war gaming and nuclear strike planning, Postol says military officers are servants of the Constitution, reserved about limits of military action, and that if Trump ordered nuclear weapons use, there is a real chance people would refuse due to nuclear weapons being in a special category. Asked about claims that Iran’s nuclear knowledge could be removed, Postol says knowledge cannot be erased and that even killing experts would not stop a program because societies have large numbers of capable people; he gives an analogy to Russia under Stalin, describing how reconstitution occurred after large purges. He also argues Israel lacks a chance of successfully stopping Iran via this approach. Rattansi asks why Iran would not declare it has nuclear warheads and delivery mechanisms. Postol answers that doing so would be bad for Iran and could provoke neighbors into developing nuclear weapons, reducing Iran’s security. He describes an Iranian strategy of preparing capability without crossing the line, including enriching 60% uranium hexafluoride to 90%, converting it to uranium metal, and using deep underground facilities; he states this could be achieved in weeks or months, potentially even in weeks, based on available centrifuge capability and setup. When discussing Trump’s fear of nuclear weapons, Postol says he is more comfortable with Trump being afraid of nuclear weapons and argues Iran is not the main source of nuclear instability—Israel is—asserting Israeli leadership has been pushing toward escalation despite military limits. He claims Iran’s ballistic missiles are more capable than initially seen, are hard to intercept, have larger warheads, greater accuracy, and are backed by large numbers, alongside drones and air defense misuse. On ballistic missile defense effectiveness, Postol disputes claims about Patriot performance and says air defenses have almost no capability against ballistic missiles. He also addresses regional nuclear risks: for Bushehr, he says a catastrophic meltdown could spread radioactivity depending on weather and winds, potentially reaching Dubai under some conditions. For Zaporizhzhia, he says if plants are shut down for a period of weeks, residual core energy is small enough that loss of cooling would not necessarily lead to major release; if operating, there is danger. On Dimona, he suspects the reactor is shut down; if shut down long enough, plutonium production could be lost, and severe core damage would likely not cause major radioactive release unless near and affected by wind. He warns that if Israel believed it had no choice but to attack Iran with nuclear weapons, Iran would respond differently, using underground facilities to convert 60% enriched uranium hexafluoride to nuclear weapons in potentially weeks.

Mario: Do you think The US should attack Iran? Joel: He could do a large but limited strike designed to punish the Iranian regime, but not explicitly try to topple it. Clint (Glenn): Now it's in the national interest of Iran to acquire nuclear weapons as a deterrent. You think that Iran the authority enemy. Of Not America being responsible for killing thousands of Iranians. It's very strange that we don't recognize the security competition here. You're unbelievable. No legitimate security concerns for Iran. None of your rules. Mario: Gentlemen. Astonishing. Joel: Does Iran need to be an enemy of The US? Clint: I see that’s very dishonest. This idea that The United States and Israel are worried about the Iranian civilians. I think this is ludicrous. If anything, they're doing everything they can to fuel the violence. If we stop threatening them, perhaps we can get something in return. They stop the threat. No. Mario: Never tried we've never gone down this path at all. Joel: You’re just completely ignoring tens of billions of Iranian dollars that go funneling into terrorist organizations that kill Americans, kill our Arab allies, kill our Israeli allies. It doesn't seem to bother you. Mario: Joel, I’m gonna start with you. A pretty broad question. Do you think The US should attack Iran, and do you think they will? Joel: The president has set his own terms. He has three choices: do nothing and frame that as diplomacy; do a large but limited strike designed to punish the regime but not topple it; or go all in toward regime change. He hasn’t made regime change his explicit objective yet. I think he’ll pick option two, a large but limited strike, because negotiations aren’t designed to lead somewhere. The Iranians are not serious, in his view. Mario: Do you think Trump should go with option two, or seek regime change? Joel: He should go with number two. Regime change is something I would love to see, but it’s too big an objective with air power. If the regime is toppled by force, the risks are immense. Damaging the regime—ballistic missiles, some nuclear components—could be enough to protect citizens and allies, even if it doesn’t topple the regime. If a coup follows, that’s a risk. Mario: Glenn, you argued against regime change but acknowledged concerns about the regime’s brutality. Please respond to Joel and the broader points. Glenn: I don’t think Trump should attack. It’s very likely he will, and the objective will probably be a limited bloody nose attack that is going bombed for two or three days or, like last time, twelve, and then pull away, with an implicit understanding that if Iran retaliates, it could be a big war. There is no diplomatic solution because the Iranians reject multi-issue deals; they want nuclear issues to be separate. The Iran regime is existentially threatened, so they’ll respond. The aim should be to recognize key security concerns and pursue a broader security understanding, not just use force. Mario: Joel, respond to Glenn’s point about whether Iran must be considered an enemy and about potential diplomacy. Joel: Does Iran need to be an enemy of The US? No. But this regime is an enemy. The people of Iran do not have to be enemies. The supreme leader believes the United States and Israel are enemies, and for forty-seven years they say, death to America, death to Israel. The Iranian regime has decided they’re the enemy. The Iranian people largely despise the regime. Mario: If Iran agrees to stop the nuclear program, should The US accept such a deal? Is that enough? Joel: The nuclear program is almost 100% destroyed; you wouldn’t negotiate solely on that. If diplomacy exists, it would be to address threats beyond the nuclear issue—ballistic missiles, regional alliances, human rights, etc. The Iranians were willing to accept transparency around their nuclear program in JCPOA-era diplomacy, but the Americans pulled out. If a nuclear deal is possible, it would require mutual concessions; insisting on broader concessions risks collapse. Glenn: The problem is that Iran has legitimate security concerns too. The strategy after the Cold War linking security to global hegemony is problematic. There should be recognition of Iran’s legitimate security needs, not a complete defanging. We should explore a grand bargain—recognize a Palestinian state, get out of Syria, and pursue a path with Iran that reduces the threat without destroying Iran. Mario: There’s a debate about whether the Gulf states see Israel as a bigger threat than Iran now. Joel, what’s your take? Joel: Two countries—Qatar and Turkey—see Israel as an enemy. Turkey’s Erdogan has threatened Jerusalem; Qatar hosts anti-American and anti-Israel propaganda via Al Jazeera and has hosted Hamas leaders. Israel has the right to defend itself and has pursued peace deals with several Arab states, but the region remains dangerous. Israel should avoid destabilizing moves and pursue peace where possible, while recognizing the security challenges it faces. Glenn: Israel’s internal politics and policy flaws exist, but law in Israel provides equal rights to Arab citizens; policy can be improved, but not all claims of apartheid reflect law. Arabs have political rights, though issues with funding and policy remain. The West Bank is a flashpoint; Gaza is controlled by Hamas, complicating Palestinian governance. There’s a broader discussion about whether regime change in Iran is desirable given potential fragmentation and regional instability. Mario: Final question: where is Iran by year’s end? Glenn: If Trump attacks, Iran will perceive an existential threat and may strike back hard, possibly shutting the Strait of Hormuz. Russia and China may intervene to prevent complete destruction of Iran. Joel: I hope Glenn’s scenario doesn’t come true. Iran might pursue nuclear weapons as a deterrent. If the regime is weakened, the region’s stability could be jeopardized. The options remain: negotiate, strike, or regime-change—prefer a large but limited strike to deter further advancement without taking ownership of an unknown future. Mario: Thank you both. This was a vigorous, wide-ranging exchange. End of time.

Iran has kicked out IAEA inspectors, potentially concealing parts of its nuclear program. Israel, which won't allow inspections and is secretive about its nuclear weapons, is also a concern. The speaker does not blame Israel for wanting nuclear weapons but finds it hypocritical to push for regime change wars over secret nuclear weapons when it has them. The speaker suggests a deal where both Iran and Israel give up their secret nuclear weapon programs. The speaker references South Africa's denuclearization before ending apartheid and notes that if Israel recognizes sovereignty over Judea and Samaria, it may have to enfranchise millions of Palestinians. The speaker believes that the South Africa model for denuclearization is not totally off base. The speaker criticizes the Iraq War, stating it cost America $3 trillion and aided the rise of China and ISIS. The speaker questions whether those advocating for attacks on Iran understand the country.

If the Soviet Union and the PLO were removed, international terrorism would collapse. Removing Saddam's regime would have positive effects on the region. Regime change is desired in both Iran and Iraq. The practical question is not if Iraq's regime should be removed, but when. When asked if the U.S. should launch preemptive attacks on other nations, the answer is yes. Iraq and Iran are competing to be the first to achieve nuclear weapons, and Libya is also rapidly trying to build an atomic bomb. These three nations must be stopped to halt Iran's conquest, subjugation, and terror. Everyone stands with Israel.

Speaker 0: And so, I mean, it sounds to me like that that it's leaving Iran with this choice of either rolling over, literally given everything we want, the, you know, the the nuclear enrichment, the the missiles, the proxies, etcetera, And that would buy you a little time, but then leave you utterly powerless. And the next day Speaker 1: That's right. Speaker 0: Either Israel or anybody else can come in, you would literally be helpless. And and, I mean, so we're correct me if I'm wrong, but we're offering Iran the option of either lay down and die by death later or stand firm and maybe die shortly now, but at least this way, you're gonna have some missiles to shoot back. I mean, do you see it differently? Speaker 1: No. I think you're exactly right. And, basically, we're we're inviting them to to become Qaddafi. You remember Qaddafi basically gave us a nuclear program. They basically said, fine. You know, I saw what you did in Iraq. I don't wanna end up up like that. I'll meet your terms, and we'll come to an agreement. We'll all be out. And we said, great. Now that you're defenseless, let's destroy you. Stick a bayonet up your rear rear end and shoot you in the head. Now if you're if you're the Iranian leadership, do you wanna end up like that? Look. I've always said the Iranians basically have a choice. They could be North Korea or they can be Libya. Which would you rather be? Speaker 0: That's not a choice for anybody to have to make. Speaker 1: Yeah. But that's that's the position we're putting them in. And frankly, I'm a little surprised they haven't gone for a nuclear breakout up till now. Because if they if they're looking for real security, say, okay. Fine. None no more of this nonsense. We don't wanna be Libya. We're North Korea now. Back off. Yeah. That that would make that would make sense from their point of view, wouldn't it?

Iran could produce a nuclear weapon in a very short time. It could be a year. They have the wherewithal, the stored up preserved knowledge to make a bomb very quickly if they wanted to. Iran is so dangerous. Weeks away from having the fissile material for an entire arsenal of nuclear bombs. They're very close. They're six months away from being about 90% of having the rich uranium for an atom bomb. Iran is gearing up to have to produce 25 bombs, atomic bombs a year, 250 bombs in a deck. Iran will be capable of producing alone without importing anything nuclear bombs within three to five years. Once Saddam has nuclear weapons, the terror network will have nuclear weapons. Next thing you'll see is a nuclear bomb in the World Trade Center. If you take out Saddam Saddam's regime, I guarantee that it will have enormous positive reverberations on the region.

Stanislav and Speaker 0 discuss a rapidly evolving, multi-front crisis that they argue is in its early days but already sprawling across the region and the global energy order. Key military and strategic points - The conflict has expanded from warnings into a broader destruction of regional economic infrastructure, extending from Israel to Iran. Israel began by hitting southern oil fields; Iran responded with attacks on oil and gas facilities and US bases, and warned it would strike “everywhere” including US bases if attacked again. - Iran’s stated aim includes purging the US from the Persian Gulf by destroying American bases and making hosting US forces prohibitively expensive. This has been coupled with actions that blinded US radars and pressured Gulf Arab states to expel the Americans. - Israel attacked infrastructure and a nuclear power plant associated with Russia’s project; Israel’s destruction of oil infrastructure and oil fires contributed to a widespread environmental contamination event, with oil smoke and carcinogenic particulates dispersing over Central Asia, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Northern India, and potentially further. - The war is generating cascading economic damage, including a potential long-term hit to energy supply chains. The speaker who has oil-industry experience (Speaker 1) explains that refinery expansions and LNG projects involve complex, lengthy supply chains and custom equipment; extensive damage means years, not months, to recover, with LNG output potentially 20%–30% lower for Europe, and cascading effects on fertilizer supplies and food production. - European energy and fertilizer dependencies are stressed: Russia supplies a large share of chemical fertilizer; Europe could face severe energy and food crises, while the US appears more flexible on sanctions and fertilizer sourcing. - On the military side, there is discussion of a possible ground invasion by US forces, including the 82nd Airborne (as part of the XVIII Airborne Corps) and Marines. The analysis emphasizes the daunting difficulty of any cross-border operation into Iran or even taking forward positions in the Strait of Hormuz or on nearby islands. The speaker argues that the 80th/82nd Airborne’s capabilities are limited (light infantry, no back-up armor), making large-scale incursions extremely costly and unlikely to achieve strategic objectives (e.g., seizing enriched uranium on Kare Island). The argument stresses that “mission impossible” scenarios would yield heavy casualties and limited gains, especially given Iran’s mountainous terrain, entrenched defense, and pervasive drone threat. - Kare Island (Hormuz Strait) is described as highly vulnerable to drone swarms. FPV drones, longer-range drones, and loitering munitions could intercept or complicate the deployment of troops, supply lines, and casualty evacuation. Even with air superiority, drones combined with coastal defenses could make an island seizure a “turkey shoot” for Iran unless ground troops can be rapidly reinforced and sustained against a rising drone threat. - The role of drones is emphasized: drones of various sizes, including small FPV systems and larger retranslated-signal drones, could operate from Iranian coastlines to disrupt coastlines such as Kare Island and other Hormuz approaches. The talk highlights how drones complicate casualty evacuation, medical triage, and resupply, and how air assets (helicopters, Ospreys) are vulnerable to drone attacks. Nuclear and regional deterrence questions - Enriched uranium: Iran reportedly has around 60% enrichment; 90% would be necessary for weapons, which could provide a deterrent or escalation leverage. The possibility of nuclear weapons remains a major concern in the discussion. - Fatwas and leadership: The new supreme leader in Iran could alter policy on nuclear weapons; there is debate about whether Iran would actually pursue a weapon given its political culture and regional risk. Regional and international dynamics - The role of Russia and China: The discussion suggests the US is being leveraged by adversaries through proxy relationships, with Russia and China potentially supporting Iran as a way to undermine US influence and the Western-led order. - Regime and leadership dynamics in the US: Speaker 1 predicts intense internal political pressure in the US, including potential civil unrest if casualties rise and if policies become unsustainable. There is skepticism about the willingness of US political leadership to sustain a protracted conflict or a ground invasion. Recent events and forward-facing notes - A ballistic missile strike on southern Israel and simultaneous missile salvos from Iran were reported during the interview; there were also reports of air-defense interceptions near Dubai. - The discussion closes with warnings about the potential for catastrophic outcomes, including a nuclear meltdown risk if nuclear facilities are struck in ways that disable cooling or power systems, and emphasizes the fragility of the current strategic balance as this crisis unfolds.

Saddam having nuclear weapons means the terror network will too, possibly leading to a nuclear bomb in the World Trade Center. Removing Saddam's regime would have positive effects on the region. Iraq is the right choice for a regime change and to eliminate the nuclear threat. Portable centrifuges, slightly larger than two cameras, make it easy for Saddam to hide his nuclear weapons. If he had them on September 11th, we wouldn't be here. Arafat needs to be removed due to the nuclear threat.

The conversation centers on multiple competing narratives about the war and its wider regional significance, with the speakers presenting their interpretations and challenging each other’s points. - The hosts open by acknowledging competing narratives: some view the war as a necessary action against a regime seen as destabilizing and dangerous (nuclear ambitions, regional havoc); others see it as Israel removing a geopolitical threat with U.S. involvement; a third perspective argues it stemmed from miscalculations by Trump, perhaps driven by Israeli influence. The dialogue frames the war within broader questions of American, Israeli, and Iranian aims. - Speaker 1 references Joseph Kent’s resignation letter, arguing Iran was not an immediate U.S. threat and that Netanyahu and the Israeli lobby influenced Trump toward war. They assert Trump’s stated interest in Iranian oil and control of the Strait of Hormuz; they describe Trump as guided by business interests. They frame U.S. actions as part of a long-standing pattern of demonizing enemies to justify intervention, citing Trump’s “animals” comment toward Iranians and labeling this demonization as colonial practice. - Speaker 0 pushes back on Trump’s rhetoric but notes it suggested a willingness to pressure Iran for concessions. They question whether Trump could transition from ending some wars to endorsing genocidal framing, acknowledging disagreement with some of Trump’s statements but agreeing that Israeli influence and Hormuz control were important factors. They also inquire whether Trump miscalculated a prolonged conflict and ask how Iran continued to fire missiles and drones despite expectations of regime collapse, seeking clarity on Iran’s resilience. - Speaker 1 clarifies that the Iranian system is a government, not a regime, and explains that Iranian missile and drone capabilities were prepared in advance, especially after Gaza conflicts. They note Iran’s warning that an attack would trigger a regional war, and reference U.S. intelligence assessments stating Iran does not have a nuclear weapon or a program for one at present, which Trump publicly dismissed in favor of Netanyahu’s view. They recount that Iran’s leaders warned of stronger responses if attacked, and argue Iran’s counterstrikes reflected a strategic calculus to deter further aggression while acknowledging Iran’s weaker, yet still capable, position. - The discussion shifts to regional dynamics: the balance of power, the loss of Israel’s “card” of American support if Iran can close Hormuz, and the broader implications for U.S.-Israel regional leverage. Speaker 1 emphasizes the influence of the Israeli lobby in Congress, while also suggesting Mossad files could influence Trump, and notes that the war leverages Netanyahu’s stance but may not fully explain U.S. decisions. - The two then debate Gulf states’ roles: Saudi Arabia and the UAE are depicted as providing bases and support to the United States; Kuwait as a near neighbor with vulnerability to Iranian action and strategic bases for American forces. They discuss international law, noting the war’s alleged illegality without a UN Security Council authorization, and reference the unwilling-or-unable doctrine to explain Gulf state complicity. - The conversation covers Iran’s and Lebanon’s involvement: Iran’s leverage via missiles and drones, and Lebanon’s Hezbollah as a Lebanese organization with Iranian support. They discuss Hezbollah’s origins in response to Israeli aggression and their current stance—driving Lebanon into conflict for Iran’s sake, while Hezbollah asserts independence and Lebanon’s interests. They acknowledge Lebanon’s ceasefire violations on both sides and debate who bears responsibility for dragging Lebanon into war; Hezbollah’s leaders are described as navigating loyalties to Iran, Lebanon, and their people, with some insistence that Hezbollah acts as a defender of Lebanon rather than a mere proxy. - Towards the end, the speakers reflect on personal impact and future dialogue. They acknowledge the war’s wide, long-lasting consequences for Lebanon and the region, and express interest in continuing the discussion, potentially in person, to further explore these complex dynamics.

Speaker 0 asserts that removing the Soviet Union and its chief proxy, the PLO, would cause international terrorism to collapse. Speaker 1 argues for regime change as a strategic goal: removing Saddam’s regime would have enormous positive reverberations in the region, and there is interest in regime change in Iran as well. The question is not whether Iraq’s regime should be taken out, but when. It is not a question of whether to seek regime change in Iran, but how to achieve it. He also asks whether there are other nations the United States should consider launching preemptive attacks against, answering yes: Iraq and Iran are competing to be the first to acquire nuclear weapons, and Libya is also attempting to rapidly build an atomic bomb capability. He identifies three nations in focus: Iraq, Iran, and Libya. Speaker 2 emphasizes a unified front: they are together to stop Iran’s march of conquest, subjugation, and terror, and asserts that no matter one’s political stance, you stand with Israel.

Mario asks Larry for his analysis of the likelihood of a US attack on Iran. Larry says he thinks it will happen, probably by March or sooner, and that the operation would be a cooperative intelligence effort involving the CIA, Mossad, and Britain’s MI6. He claims the Iranian regime is fighting for survival and that the December 28 currency crash was a consequence of actions initiated by US intelligence, describing it as deliberate, and comparing it to George Soros crashing the British pound to argue that unified intelligence communities could destabilize an economically weaker country. He says the protests were legitimate anger at economic mismanagement by the Pazheshkin government, not a call to overthrow the Islamic Republic, and asserts Iran’s leadership began responding immediately by removing the central banker. Mario notes a regional military buildup: USS Abraham Lincoln, F-15s, Pegasus, Stratotankers, Globemaster, and other assets moving toward the region, with Iran warning the US not to strike. He asks for analysis of the likelihood of a US strike. Larry reiterates his view that such an attack is likely by March or sooner and argues the initial plan was long in the works, a joint intelligence operation, and not a reaction to protests. He asserts the urgency was to crash Iran’s economy to incite protests and weaken the regime, and emphasizes that the cyber- and information-dominance aspect was anticipated, with Starlink terminals smuggled into Iran prior to December 28. He claims Netanyahu’s appearance at Mar-a-Lago on December 29 and discussions between Trump and Netanyahu shaped the military plan, with dissident groups acting to inflame the situation using a Maidan-like playbook of snipers and protests. Larry describes Iran’s internet shutdown on January 8-9 as a turning point that reduced protest organization and led millions to demonstrate in support of Khamenei, arguing the US briefing to Trump could not guarantee a decisive strike and therefore the operation was postponed. He says Iran now has Russia and China backing more robustly, with Russian technicians and air defenses on the ground, and China providing air defense and assisting with Starlink interdiction. He adds that Iran could shut the Strait of Hormuz if attacked, highlighting its economic stakes and the potential global impact on oil supply. Mario asks about casualty numbers from the crackdown and how credible Western reports are. Larry argues much of Western reporting has been driven by intelligence sources and cites a historical example: collaboration with the MEK starting in 2004 and into 2009, suggesting much of the western narrative around Iranian protests is propaganda. He references conversations with Iranian dissidents and an engineering professor in Brazil who argued the West’s portrayal of mass deaths does not match what he observed. He notes Mossad assets on the ground and suggests the CIA has acknowledged this in some form, and contends sanctions, while damaging to ordinary Iranians, are part of a broader US strategy. The discussion shifts to Iran’s potential internal dynamics and regional relations. Mario asks whether sanctions might eventually lead to a more conciliatory Iran, pointing to improved ties with Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Larry counters that the sanctions strategy has previously failed to deliver lasting regime change, drawing parallels to Syria’s experience and suggesting BRICS ties, including with Russia and China, would help Iran economically. He argues Iran has no desire to pro-actively attack other countries, but is prepared to respond to aggression, including potential strikes on US bases or Israel if provoked, and warns that an Israeli nuclear response could escalate the conflict. The conversation explores the idea of regime change versus coercive diplomacy. Larry notes the difficulty of removing Iran’s leadership given the IRGC’s power and the possibility that any strike could lead to broader chaos, including potential desertion or reconfiguration of alliances in the region. He mentions Reza Pahlavi as a potential opposition figure but asserts regime change remains unlikely. He discusses the role of Netanyahu, Trump, and Zionist lobbying in policy decisions, and emphasizes the broader historical pattern of US interventionism, citing past coups and regime changes in various countries. Towards Greenland, Mario references Trump’s post about a framework for the Arctic deal and a halt to tariffs, questioning the motive behind Greenland-related strategies. Larry dismisses Greenland as a distraction, noting Russia’s existing Arctic advantages and suggesting economic interests or donor benefits may be at play rather than strategic necessity. The two discuss air defense capabilities and the challenges of the US’s missile defense, contrasting Patriot systems with hypersonic threats and arguing that America’s military hardware has not kept pace with evolving threats. They contemplate the broader implications for Ukraine, Russia, and the possibility of a peace settlement, with Larry predicting a settlement favorable to Russia, including potential annexation votes in several Ukrainian oblasts. The interview ends with reflections on media manipulation, the value of independent voices, and the enduring question of Iran’s future, with Mario and Larry agreeing they hope the discussion remains speculative rather than prescriptive of imminent conflict.

The United States will not allow Iran to acquire a nuclear weapon. An attack on Iran would occur if, during the next ten years, they considered launching an attack on Israel. The U.S. would be able to totally obliterate them. A nuclear-armed Iran is a challenge that cannot be contained. It would threaten the elimination of Israel, the security of Gulf nations, and the stability of the global economy, risking a nuclear arms race and the unraveling of the non-proliferation treaty. The United States will do what it must to prevent Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon. Ensuring that Iran never achieves the ability to be a nuclear power is one of the highest priorities. Iran's key nuclear and nuclear facilities have been completely and totally obliterated.

Iran faces three options: compliance with the US and IAEA, further integration with China and Russia, or seeking a nuclear bomb. Compliance would mean humiliation and loss of sovereignty, without stopping Israeli aggression. Increased integration with China and Russia, especially in air defense, would mean some loss of independence but aligns with Iran's current partnerships. Seeking a nuclear bomb would provide deterrence like North Korea, but could trigger nuclear proliferation in the Middle East, opposed by Russia and China. The speaker believes compliance is unacceptable. Stronger alliances with China and Russia are more probable, given Iran's importance for oil and transit. Securing a nuclear bomb is the second most likely path. The speaker warns that current ceasefires are a trick to rearm Israel for further escalation. Given Israel's actions in Gaza, the speaker wouldn't be surprised if Israel dropped a tactical nuclear bomb on Iran, enabled by Western control of the narrative. The war is far from over.

Saddam Hussein is actively pursuing the development of nuclear weapons, with support from Russia and other countries. He no longer needs large reactors, as he can produce the necessary materials in hidden centrifuges. Inspections will not uncover these portable manufacturing sites. While it is unclear when he will attack Israel, it is not difficult for him to deceive inspectors and hide his activities. The application of power is crucial in winning the war on terrorism, and the more victories we achieve, the easier the next one becomes. The choice to target Iraq is the right one, as Saddam's acquisition of nuclear weapons would have immediate and dangerous consequences.

Iran is the main force behind various groups like the Houthis, Hezbollah, and Hamas. They pose a threat not only to us but also to the Middle East and the world. We must stop Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons to prevent them from conquering the region, collapsing regimes, and threatening global security. As the Prime Minister of Israel, I am committed to doing everything possible to prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons.

Netanyahu may be pushing for regime change in Iran to distract from his political troubles at home, as he recently survived a vote of no confidence by only two votes. The speaker believes the focus on Iran's nuclear program is a pretext, as North Korea poses a greater nuclear threat to the U.S. because they possess the bomb, delivery system, and reentry vehicle, unlike Iran. While Iran's rhetoric is hostile, North Korea openly threatens to wipe out US cities. The speaker suggests a diplomatic approach with Iran, similar to Trump's approach with North Korea, but acknowledges Iran has expelled IAEA inspectors, raising concerns about a secret nuclear program. The speaker points out that Israel, which also possesses nuclear weapons, allows no international inspections. While not judging Israel's nuclear ambitions, the speaker deems it hypocritical to initiate a regime change war over secret nuclear weapons when Israel has them too. The speaker proposes a deal where both Iran and Israel give up their secret nuclear weapon programs, suggesting Trump could broker such a deal.

John Mearsheimer and Glenn (Speaker 0) discuss the current state of the international system, its shifts since World War II, and the implications for U.S. foreign policy, Europe, the Middle East, and East Asia. - Structural changes since the Cold War: Mearsheimer argues fundamental changes are underway in the international system due to two forces: evolving structural dynamics and the rise and actions of Donald Trump. The Cold War produced a bipolar order with the United States shaping a Western security architecture (NATO, European Community) designed to wage the Cold War. After 1989–1991, the Western order expanded globally during the unipolar moment, with NATO enlargement, EU expansion, and globalization (including China joining the WTO). From 2017, the world has entered a multipolar era with three great powers, and East Asia becomes the United States’ most important region outside the Western Hemisphere, overtaking Europe and the Persian Gulf. - East Asia as a priority: The U.S. pivot to East Asia (explicitly discussed by Clinton and then pursued under Trump) reorients strategic priorities away from Europe in a multipolar world where China is a peer competitor. This shift redefines where the U.S. focuses its resources and attention. - Trump as a destabilizing factor: Trump’s presidency is described as sui generis—a one-man wrecking ball that amplified unilateralism and contempt for international law, institutions, and allies. After initial containment of China in his first term, Trump’s policies intensified a unilateral approach. The Iran war decision (February 28) is presented as a catastrophic misstep that worsened U.S. positions globally and risked destabilizing the region further. - Three major strands of American policy causing trouble: NATO expansion, the global war on terror, and the Iran war. NATO expanded eastward in the 1990s and 2000s, culminating in Ukraine’s entry in 2022, aggravating Russia and complicating U.S.–Russia relations and European security. The global war on terror led to Afghanistan and Iraq conflicts and other interventions (Libya), generating domestic fatigue and a populist backlash that helped propel Trump. The February 28 Iran invasion created a broader, more consequential set of regional and global ramifications, with China, Russia, and Europe pressuring limits on U.S. actions. - The Iran war: Mearsheimer stresses that Iran presents a more dangerous theater than Iraq because the stakes are higher globally, with potential for a worldwide depression and cascading economic impacts, particularly in Asia. He outlines three options for ending or de-escalating the Iran conflict: (1) maintain the status quo with ongoing blockades; (2) blockade plus bombing, which risks catastrophic economic damage and Iranian retaliation; (3) cut a deal with Iran, which would be politically difficult in Washington given Israeli influence and the desire to avoid conceding that Iran “wins.” He asserts that the blockade alone won’t force surrender, bombing would escalate risk and deplete U.S. military capacity, and the only viable path is a negotiated settlement, though domestic and allied opposition makes this hard. - Israel–Iran–U.S. dynamics: The relationship between the United States and Israel creates a “tag team” dynamic, with Israel viewing Iran as an existential threat. If Iran preserves its nuclear enrichment capability, it could push Israel toward considering nuclear options, which raises the possibility of catastrophic outcomes. Trump’s rhetoric has even hinted at extreme objectives against Iran, complicating efforts to reach a deal. Mearsheimer emphasizes the influential role of the Israeli lobby in U.S. policy and notes the broader risk of nuclear escalation in the region. - Ukraine and nuclear deterrence: The Ukraine war has surprised many by showing Ukraine’s ability to threaten Russian strategic forces with Western support, which underscores Karaganov’s point about Europeans underestimating the nuclear dimension of security and deterrence. Mearsheimer highlights that the current era features a complex web of regional and great-power interdependencies—Russia, China, Iran, and European security architectures are all interlinked, affecting and being affected by one another. - Conclusion and outlook: The discussion emphasizes that managing security competition, rather than relying solely on military solutions, is essential. The speakers warn that the contemporary shift toward multipolarity and the interwoven regional dynamics heighten the risk of escalation and miscalculation, making prudent diplomacy and restraint crucial to avoiding a broader catastrophe. They acknowledge the difficulty of achieving lasting peace in the Middle East given domestic political constraints and the powerful influence of regional actors, but stress the necessity of recognizing the geopolitical realities of a world in which power is distributed more unevenly than in the Cold War.

Attacking a nation like Iran would quickly teach them to acquire nuclear weapons to prevent future attacks. Israel, North Korea, France, the United States, and Russia all obtained nuclear weapons for this reason. The speaker references the United States killing 250,000,000 people in two days in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, stating that it was not a high moral moment for America. The speaker suggests that attacking Iran could push them to develop nuclear weapons.

- The discussion opens with trying to map a post-war world, considering both a quick end to the war and a prolonged one, with a focus on US–China relations, US allies, Iran, and the broader region. A participant notes a broader battle between a China–Russia–Iran alignment and the Western alliance, including financial systems. - A major regional shift is already underway: by 2000, the top banks were dominated by Japanese and European players; by 2025, China dominates the top four banks. The speaker argues that power is moving from Western banks to China, and that countries with US-dollar-denominated debt are converting debt into renminbi because it’s cheaper. - In the last week, Russia and China signaled to Iran a push to revisit the Gulf security architecture. Putin spoke to Iraq about Gulf security; Wang Yi did the same. The implied shift is toward a Gulf security framework less dependent on US protection. - The current Gulf security model is described as US bases guaranteeing protection from Iran, coupled with a demand that recipient states buy US Treasuries and military equipment. The speakers argue this model left Gulf states vulnerable and exposed as US defense systems failed to prevent Iranian attacks in the recent episode. - Saudi Arabia and Qatar (and to a lesser extent the UAE) are discussed as potentially moving away from the United States toward Russia and China. A Pakistani ISI general reportedly said Saudi and Qatari leaders are breaking from the US; one NBC report cited Trump canceling Project Freedom due to Saudi resistance to air operations from Prince Saud Air Base. The implication is a Persian Gulf broadly shifting into the Russian–Chinese sphere, potentially altering Gulf financial flows away from the US dollar toward gold and the yuan. - An opposing view, aired by another economist, suggests the US will strengthen its deterrence in the Gulf, with UAE as an indicator. The counterpoint argues that the Gulf countries previously supported Iran’s adversaries, including indirect funding for attacks on Iran, implying US deterrence remains necessary. - The conversation emphasizes the gulf’s deterrence history: Iran has largely avoided offensive military action in the Gulf against the region, while Gulf states have relied on US protection. The lack of a robust Chinese or Russian security guarantee in the region is highlighted as a real risk to Gulf security calculations. - There is a debate about whether US military power remains credible. One participant argues the US has not won a major war since World War II, with recent actions described as limited or draw outcomes; another contends that US protection remains essential despite past failures, given Iran’s capabilities and history. - Military-strategy discussions cover the feasibility of a ground invasion vs. airstrike-only approaches. The speakers outline logistical challenges (water, supply lines, mountainous terrain) and the scale of forces needed (potentially large, multi-month training and buildup) to degrade Iran’s missile and drone capabilities. Arguments are made that holding the Strait of Hormuz would be difficult if Iran can still launch missiles and drones from interior positions. - The strategic importance of Gulf exports is quantified: Gulf oil about 32% of world supply; LNG around 20% (centered on Qatar and the Gulf), urea and sulfur for agriculture and industry (urea ~36%; sulfur for refining and semiconductors), and helium from Qatar at about 33%. Keeping the Gulf open is framed as essential to global energy, inflation, and agriculture. - A possible pathway to open the Hormuz is proposed: Iran could offer broad access to global markets except for countries allied with Israel or those that attacked Iran; Iran would leverage this to restart global flows, particularly to Asia. The idea is that a near-term crisis could force a negotiated settlement with Iran. - The timeline mentions a forthcoming peace negotiation in Beijing next week, with skepticism about it proceeding smoothly. If negotiations occur, Trump would not likely receive a warm reception due to recent sanctions and US actions against China; China has signaled resolve against US sanctions, instructing its companies not to acquiesce to pressure. - Overall, the dialogue frames the war as a potential catalyst for a broader realignment: power shifting toward China and Russia, a Gulf region hedging its security through new alliances, and the global economy recalibrating around yuan- and gold-based financial flows, with the Strait of Hormuz remaining a central strategic chokepoint.

A nuclear-armed Iran would bring stability to the region because nuclear weapons are weapons of peace and deterrence with hardly any offensive capability. If Iran had a nuclear deterrent, the United States and Israel would not threaten to attack, similar to how the US didn't invade Iraq when Saddam potentially had nuclear weapons, or Libya when Gaddafi did not. While proliferation is possible with countries like Turkey or Saudi Arabia acquiring nuclear weapons, it's unlikely because Iran wouldn't be able to blackmail anyone. The US would extend its nuclear umbrella over Saudi Arabia and Turkey, deterring Iran from blackmail. Nuclear weapons are the ultimate deterrent, which is why states pursue them. The US and Israel would back off from threatening Iran if it obtained nuclear weapons. Gaddafi gave up his nuclear program and was killed, while North Korea won't give up its nuclear weapons because they are the ultimate deterrent. The US and Israel aren't giving up their nuclear weapons either. There are powerful incentives for countries in dangerous neighborhoods to acquire nuclear weapons.

Speaker 0 argues that feeding their enemy is unprecedented in history and rejects the notion that it is consistent with Jewish morality, saying, “that isn’t” Jewish morality. He recalls October 1973 during the Yom Kippur War, when Henry Kissinger instituted an arms embargo against them, and explains that “an a four Skyhawk was parked at Telenorf Air Base with some interesting weapons under its wings,” and that they told the Americans to “take your eye in the sky and take a good look at the airplane that’s on that runway.” He continues that the next day “the airlift started to the to Israel,” describing an arms airlift, and notes that they “threatened their We threatened to use unconventional weapons,” and that they indicated, “So in other words, we threatened their We threatened to use unconventional weapons. I’ll leave it at that.” He asserts a policy stance: “is this what you’re want us to threaten now?,” and responds, “I said, absolutely. Except this time, I want us to go forward with it if necessary. If they think we’re bluffing, we go forward with it.” He states that, regarding existential threats, “as far as I’m concerned, when we are faced with an existential threat, we have the right to use any and all weapons in our disposal to eliminate that existential threat.” The speaker then contends that many people “don’t know anything about nuclear weapons at all. What they are, how they can be used,” and expresses fatigue with euphemisms, declaring, “I’m tired of using euphemisms. I’m tired of saying, well, we have something, you know, in the basement, but we won’t be the first to introduce, nuclear weapons in The Middle East. It’s enough already.” In sum, Speaker 0 highlights a historical precedent of threatening and delivering arms to counter existential threats, asserts the right to use any and all weapons if needed, and calls out the lack of public understanding and reluctance to acknowledge the potential introduction of nuclear weapons in the Middle East.

Theodor Postal, a professor at MIT and former adviser to the Pentagon, discusses Iran’s nuclear capabilities and what sort of nuclear deal would be necessary. He argues that the war against Iran has created incentives for Iran to develop nuclear weapons as an “ultimate deterrent,” especially because the United States and Israel might attempt further efforts after any failure, with no clear government ready to replace the current one. He emphasizes that Iran possesses know-how and enriched uranium, making the challenge “real.” Postal argues that a diplomatic solution is possible and that a military solution is not. He says Iranian leaders do not want to build nuclear weapons; instead, they want to deter enemies—particularly Israel—from striking them with nuclear weapons, which he characterizes as an existential or genocidal threat. He describes Iranian diplomacy and discipline during the outbreak of war as evidence of rationality. He adds that Iran understands that building nuclear weapons would likely cause Saudi Arabia to pursue nuclear weapons, potentially rapidly, and that Saudi Arabia has indicated it will not tolerate an Iran with nuclear weapons without obtaining them itself. He also points to Turkey and Egypt as potential future nuclear-armed actors under similar conditions. Postal frames Iran as a rational actor who would negotiate to avoid being surrounded by hostile nuclear weapon states. He contrasts this with a scenario in which “irrational” Western behavior drives Iran into a corner where it reaches the conclusion that it has no choice but to have nuclear weapons. He notes internal Iranian debates: besides highly rational leadership, there are people who would like to build nuclear weapons immediately, and domestic politics could decide when and whether they prevail. Postal’s key technical points include that Iran could produce between 10 and 20 atomic weapons quickly, rather than the commonly cited rapid production of about 10. He says that widely used estimates assume each bomb would require 25 kilograms of highly enriched uranium, but he argues weapons can be built with 14 or 15 kilograms depending on design. He describes a conceptual approach for rapid weapons: a hollow sphere of uranium-238 surrounding a 15-kilogram weapons-grade core. He claims the uranium-238 reflector provides two benefits: reflecting neutrons back into the core to allow a smaller critical mass, and delaying weapon expansion during supercriticality to increase yield before weapons-grade uranium disassembles. He says the resulting weapon weight and dimensions would be compatible with delivery by an existing tested long-range ballistic missile used for conventional attacks on Israel, and he characterizes Israel’s ballistic missile defenses as near useless. He also argues that centrifuge efficiency may be 2–3 times higher than generally assumed based on analysis of International Atomic Energy Agency information. Postal also discusses centrifuge production and enrichment capacity, focusing on IR-6 centrifuge cascades. He claims Iran can couple cascades—for example, a combined 348-centrifuge cascade—based on IAEA reporting. He presents calculations using a reported production outcome: in an experiment under IAEA observation involving a double cascade feeding 20% into one end and producing 60% at the other end, the IAEA reported the production of 34 kilograms of uranium hexafluoride per month at 60%. Postal uses this to infer that centrifuges could produce roughly 12.75 separative work units per centrifuge per month and, extrapolated annually, that a 348-centrifuge cascade could produce about 4,437 separative work units per year. He then argues that the required work units to produce enriched uranium for multiple bombs imply production of approximately 10 or 11 bombs in a very short timeframe (weeks, possibly months depending on equipment integration). He further argues that estimates minimizing weapon feasibility—attributed in his comments to the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists—are “complete nonsense,” and he frames this as dangerous misinformation affecting decision-making. His conclusion is that Iran has the technology and expertise to build between ten and twenty atomic bombs quickly, not years. Postal ties the technical assessment to policy: he argues that Iran doesn’t want to become a weapons state because it would undermine national security, but that any continued military pressure increases incentives and could lead Iran to proceed. He says the appropriate response is negotiation, arguing that if Iran eventually decides to build nuclear weapons it would create a security nightmare across multiple regional states and Israel and the United States. He rejects the premise that Iran would use nuclear weapons against Israel, saying Iranian leaders understand nuclear retaliation and would see using a nuclear weapon on Israel as ending Iran. In discussion, Postal emphasizes differences in nuclear capacity (one vs. two vs. 10 vs. 20) and argues that regional stability worsens as arsenals grow. He supports military force only as a last resort but states that in this scenario he believes diplomacy is necessary and “no option” remains other than negotiation. Toward the end, Postal says he will give another talk in Warsaw about the Patriots’ performance and claims his data show limited interception capability. He adds that replenishing depleted Patriot interceptors with billions of dollars would still not stop ballistic missiles carrying nuclear weapons in the future, and he urges taxpayers and Israelis to consider this.

Glenn and Chas Freeman discuss the rapidly evolving Iran-Israel-Gulf crisis sparked by Donald Trump’s 48-hour threat to “open the Strait of Hormuz” and destroy Iran’s energy infrastructure, and the apparent push-and-pull over whether talks are actually taking place. - Trump’s maneuvering: Freeman notes Trump appears to be trying to walk back the threat, arguing there were “two days of good productive discussions,” while Iranian Foreign Minister says there have been no talks. Freeman emphasizes that diplomacy remains indispensable, even as Trump’s posture leans toward coercive tactics. - The wider pattern: Freeman argues the region’s dynamics have driven Israel and Iran toward force, with diplomacy sidelined. He contends Washington’s challenge now is the price of energy (gas at the pump) and domestic political concerns rather than allied welfare. The Strait of Hormuz currently operates as a toll booth: many countries can pass if they have the license and pay. - Escalation and responses: There is a recurring cycle of Israeli and American escalation met by Iranian counter-escalation (e.g., Iranian missiles fired near Dimona in response to Natanz, and Iran listing targets including Ras Al Khair desalination plant in Saudi Arabia). Iran’s stated willingness to devastate Gulf desalination capacity signals a readiness to impose extreme costs. - International diplomacy and actors: Freeman highlights quiet diplomacy behind the scenes with China, India, Japan, Turkey, and behind-the-scenes talks by Italy and France with Iran. He notes European leaders’ unease and questions whether Europe will push more assertively, with Spain showing some potential for distancing from US and a possible NATO rethink. He argues the Atlantic alliance’s conceptual basis has eroded, risking a shift from a defensive to an offensive posture in Europe, and suggests the Gulf states may gradually distance from the United States while privately leveraging Israel’s tech and security advantages. - The Gulf Arab position: Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states remain publicly tied to the United States but fear becoming casualties in a miscalculated conflict. Freeman posits that long-term strategists in Saudi Arabia recognize the need to reduce threat through diplomacy with Iran and diversify defense dependencies (including growing Chinese weapons collaboration) as U.S. security guarantees wane. - The question of a negotiated settlement: Freeman suggests two ingredients for any settlement: a regional security architecture and a credible path for a phased American withdrawal from the Gulf. He cites Iran’s proposals (e.g., postwar regional management, toll-sharing for Hormuz) and Iran’s openness to multilateral diplomacy through bodies like the OIC, coupled with Gulf-Arab cooperation. He acknowledges Washington’s current lack of credible diplomacy and worries about whether negotiators on both sides can imagine a stable framework that preserves balance without American military primacy. - Iran’s strategic posture: Freeman argues Iran is not deterred by American or Israeli pressure and may pursue a broader missile and nuclear-capable capability build, particularly after leadership changes. He notes Iranian restraint has lessened since the late supreme leader’s era, and Iran continues missile and drone activity despite escalation. He also references possible false-flag concerns and Israel’s assassination campaigns against potential Iranian interlocutors as obstacles to diplomacy. - U.S. strategy and domestic politics: Freeman observes Trump’s incentives are mixed—gas prices at home influence his political prospects, and MAGA backers are increasingly unhappy with the war. He suggests Trump’s earlier “maximum pressure” approach is counterproductive: power without purpose, and tactics without a coherent strategy. He implies a negotiated solution is preferable to ongoing low-intensity conflict, but notes it would require both sides to accept a recalibrated security arrangement rather than total capitulation. - Saudi perspective and future: Freeman notes Saudi Arabia’s desire to link more closely with the United States in the short term while also seeking greater strategic autonomy—building domestic military production and reducing sole dependence on U.S. security guarantees. He warns that public alignment with Israel in any confrontation is politically untenable for Gulf publics. - Outlook: Freeman closes by acknowledging the difficulty of predicting Trump’s behavior, the credibility issues around interlocutors like Stephen Witkoff, and the urgent need for diplomacy. He emphasizes the indispensability of diplomacy and suggests that a pathway toward a new regional security architecture, with reduced U.S. troop presence and coordinated Hormuz governance, would be a constructive turn if pursued by capable diplomats.