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Netanyahu claimed Iran had nukes and wanted to attack. Trump sent Tosa Gilbert, who reported in March that Iran didn't appear to have nukes. Trump told Netanyahu to chill out, wanting peace and economic benefits, but Netanyahu, seemingly wanting to stay in power through war, insisted Iran had nukes. Ayatollah Khomeini said "death to America." Trump refused to fund or arm Israel, wanting peace and staying out of it. After Israel bombed Iran, Ayatollah threatened everyone. Trump warned against involving America, reiterating the desire for peace. Trump discovered three potential nuclear sites in Iran. He launched strikes, obliterating these sites that could withstand 20 feet of concrete. Trump eliminated Iran's alleged nuclear capabilities, aiming to prevent further conflict. He demanded Iran stop mentioning America. North Korea and China were warned. The goal is peace and economic prosperity.

In 2018, Donald Trump's decision to withdraw troops from the Sea area led to the Fekara government deciding to take him down in 2020. This decision was based on the financial impact it had on the charter government, as Leonardo was involved in military logistics. Despite Trump's attempts to unite with the shadow government for 2024, the Sharjah government has also decided not to have him back in 2020. The power of the shadow government was evident in how they successfully took him down, regardless of his entourage or billionaire supporters. The speaker emphasizes the need for the United States to have Trump back, as he is not part of the shadow government system.

- New footage from Tel Aviv is shown, including videos outside windows of what sources say they are seeing, with a claim that Fox News is not covering this damage in Tel Aviv. The discussion centers on the reality of buildings being hit near City Hall, and questions why it isn’t being widely covered by Fox News. - The conversation shifts to missile stocks and interceptors. A comment references Keith Kellogg on Fox News discussing a Wall Street Journal report about running out of interceptor missiles within four to five weeks, and a claim that there is no problem because orders were placed and allies could supply missiles. The speaker notes that UAE reportedly has about a week left of interceptor missiles and says missiles from Iran are getting through “like a sieve.” - It is argued that the U.S. has a limited stockpile because many missiles have been transferred to Israel and Ukraine over the past years, leaving the U.S. inventory low. The claim is made that continuing the war with depleted missiles would heighten national security risk and vulnerability globally. - The transcript discusses potential international responses. The speaker contends that Europe’s mobilization rhetoric (France, Greece) should not be expected to deter Iran, noting that Greece does not have a major army and that NATO-funded contingents are involved rather than independent power. The assertion is made that Iran’s strikes in Tel Aviv, Tehran, Qom, and other cities show that Iran believes it can strike back effectively, signaling a preference to fight the United States and Israel rather than submit again. - The central point is that the conflict is described as 100% about missiles and air-defense missiles, not ground forces. The speaker argues Iran likely has enough offensive missiles to prolong the conflict for months, possibly longer than U.S. capacity to sustain it, especially with Hormuz potentially shut or partially shut, which could hurt the western economy. - Admiral James Stavridis is cited by Speaker 0, noting that as the U.S. and Israel expend hundreds of precision weapons, the focus should shift to logistics and stockpiles. The discussion emphasizes the need for inventory clarity, planning, and alignment between political objectives and military capabilities. - Speaker 1 asserts that the planning should have assessed inventories, timeframes, and whether the means match the objectives. The argument states that risking all resources without sufficient offensive or defensive capacity is a dangerous gamble, suggesting the current course could be a “huge blunder.” - The conversation touches on General Dan Kane, who reportedly told the president two weeks earlier that there were not enough ammunition and it would not be pretty to win. A reference is made to Trump’s Truth Social claiming Kane’s assessment was incorrect, with talk of whether Kane did or did not say the president’s characterization was accurate. The claim is made that there are concerns about integrity and whether senior leaders would publicly contradict the administration’s framing if necessary. - A follow-up question is raised about whether admitting a ground invasion would imply insufficient missiles to sustain the mission, with Speaker 1 acknowledging that admitting ground troops would signal a lack of missiles for sustained action. - The segment then shifts to a sponsorship note about depression treatment options, promoting Ataybekli and its lead program BPL-003 (a nasal spray psychedelic-based therapy) developed for treatment-resistant depression, with background on the company, its investors, and the roadmap toward Phase 3 in 2026. It emphasizes the potential for faster, more scalable treatment sessions and invites viewers to learn more at a website, with disclaimers about not providing medical or financial advice.

Trump's bombing of Baghdad airport, resulting in the targeted killing of Iran's top military general, is considered an act of war lacking congressional authorization. This action has escalated the conflict with Iran, potentially leading to an endless quagmire. The speaker questions the ultimate goal of this action, asserting that Trump's policies are damaging and undermine national security. The proposed solution is to withdraw troops from Iraq and Syria to prevent further entanglement in a war with Iran.

I left troops in Syria to take the oil, not to protect. Maybe we should take it, but we have the oil. Military experts disagree with Trump's plan to take oil from Iraq, saying it's dangerous and irrational. This could be his downfall.

President Trump criticized Dick and Liz Cheney for advocating military interventions while remaining safe in Washington. He emphasized that they send brave service members into dangerous situations without facing the risks themselves. Trump highlighted his decisions to withdraw troops from Syria and Iraq, contrasting his approach with Liz Cheney's desire for continued military presence. He labeled her a "radical war hawk" and suggested that her views would change if she were in a combat situation. Trump argued that those who promote war from a distance should experience the realities of conflict firsthand.

John Mearsheimer and Glenn discuss the trajectory of the United States’ foreign policy under Donald Trump, focusing on the shift from an anticipated pivot to Asia and a reduction of “forever wars” to the current Iran confrontation and its global implications. - Initial optimism about Trump: Glenn notes a widespread belief that Trump could break with established narratives, recognize the post–Cold War power distribution, pivot to the Western Hemisphere and East Asia, end the “forever wars,” and move away from Europe and the Middle East. Mearsheimer agrees there was early optimism on Judging Freedom that Trump would reduce militarized policy and possibly shut down the Ukraine–Russia war, unlike other presidents. - Drift into Iran and the current quagmire: The conversation then centers on how Trump’s approach to Iran evolved. Mearsheimer argues Trump often vacillates between claims of victory and deep desperation, and he characterizes Trump’s current stance as demanding “unconditional surrender” from Iran, with a 15-point plan that looks like capitulation. He describes Trump as sometimes declaring a “great victory” and other times recognizing the need for an exit strategy but being unable to find one. - The escalation ladder and strategic danger: A core point is that the United States and its allies initially sought a quick, decisive victory using shock and awe to topple the regime, but the effort has become a protracted war in which Iran holds many cards. Iran can threaten the global economy and Gulf state stability, undermine oil infrastructure, and harm Israel. The lack of a credible exit ramp for Trump, combined with the risk of escalation, creates catastrophic potential for the world economy and energy security. - Economic and strategic leverage for Iran: The discussion emphasizes that Iran can disrupt global markets via the Strait of Hormuz, potentially shut down the Red Sea with Houthis participation, and target Gulf desalination and energy infrastructure. The U.S. should maintain oil flow to avoid devastating economic consequences; sanctions on Iran and Russia were strategically relaxed to keep oil moving. The longer the war drags on, the more leverage Iran gains, especially as Trump’s options to harm Iran’s energy sector shrink due to the global economy’s needs. - Exit possibilities and the limits of escalation: Glenn asks how Trump might avoid the iceberg of economic catastrophe. Mearsheimer contends that a deal on Iran’s terms would entail acknowledging Iranian victory and a humiliating US defeat, which is politically challenging—especially given Israeli opposition and the lobby. The Iranians have incentive to string out negotiations, knowing they could extract concessions as time passes and as U.S. desperation grows. - Ground forces and military options: The possibility of a U.S. ground invasion is deemed impractical. Mearsheimer highlights that Desert Storm and the 2003 invasion involved hundreds of thousands of troops; proposed plans for “a few thousand” light infantry would be unable to secure strategic objectives or prevent Iranian counterattacks across the Gulf, Red Sea, and Persian Gulf, with Iran capable of inflicting significant damage on bases and ships. The discussion stresses that even small-scale operations could provoke heavy Iranian defense and strategic backlash. - European and NATO dynamics: The Europeans are portrayed as reluctant to sign onto a risky campaign in support of U.S. objectives, and the episode warns that a broader economic crisis could alter European alignment. The potential breaching of NATO unity and the risk of diminished transatlantic trust are underscored, with Trump’s stance framed as blaming Europeans for strategic failures. - Israel and the lobby: The influence of the Israel lobby and its potential consequences if the war deteriorates are discussed. Mearsheimer notes the danger of rising antisemitism if the war goes catastrophically wrong and Israel’s role in pressuring continued conflict. He also observes that a future shift in U.S. strategy could, in extreme circumstances, diverge from traditional Israeli priorities if the global economy is at stake. - Deep state and decision-making: The final exchange centers on the role of expertise and institutions. Mearsheimer argues that Trump’s distrust of the deep state and reliance on a small circle (Kushner, Whitkoff, Lindsey Graham, media figures) deprived him of necessary strategic deliberation. He contends that a robust deep-state apparatus provides essential expertise for complex wars, offering a counterpoint to Trump’s preferred approach. He contends the deep state was not fully consulted, and that reliance on a limited network contributed to the strategic miscalculations. - Concluding tone: Both acknowledge the grave, uncertain state of affairs and the high risk of escalation and miscalculation. They express a desire for an optimistic resolution but emphasize that the current trajectory is precarious, with signs pointing toward a dangerous escalation that could have wide-ranging geopolitical and economic consequences. They close with a note of concern about the potential for rash actions and the importance of considering responsible exits and credible diplomatic channels.

There is a significant conflict between Donald Trump, his adviser Steve Bannon, and U.S. intelligence agencies, particularly the CIA. This tension centers on Syria, where the CIA has invested heavily in efforts to overthrow Bashar al-Assad. Trump's campaign policy suggested cooperation with Assad and Russia to combat ISIS, which contradicts the CIA's objectives. This creates challenges for the CIA, as many of its personnel have built careers and alliances with countries like Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Turkey to support the overthrow of Assad.

After 9/11, a general told me the decision to go to war with Iraq was made without evidence linking Saddam to Al Qaeda. Plans were revealed to take out 7 countries in 5 years, starting with Iraq, then Syria, Lebanon, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, and Iran. Military operations began in Iraq and Syria. The situation in Syria was discussed, acknowledging the distressing images coming out of the country.

Wanna get on to Ukraine. But, given that Israel is signaling it doesn't like the, Al Qaeda operative, Jelani in Damascus, and we know Tulsi Gabbard is something of an expert on Syria because she exposed the lies and the, phony war in Syria when The United States was supporting the ISIS and Al Qaeda rebels there. How do you and Trump has been very brave arguably saying, he's not gonna, start sending loads of money like Britain is to Tchelani. There's still thousands of American troops, though, in Syria. What is American Syrian policy Syria policy? America's policy towards Syria is basically Israel's policy. And what The United States was bent on doing was wrecking Syria and keeping it wrecked. That's the Israeli objective here. This is what the Israelis wanna do with Iran. They don't simply wanna do away with Iran's nuclear capability. They surely do wanna do that, but they wanna wreck Iran. They wanna turn Iran into Syria. And what the Israelis are doing in Syria is going to great lengths to make sure that Syria remains, a dysfunctional state. They don't want Syria to become, a formidable adversary. They want it to remain broken. And, of course, The United States will support the Israelis in that regard. So, of course, the Israelis are not gonna allow the Americans to give huge amounts of aid to Jalani so that he can produce a viable Syrian state because that's not Israeli policy. Just look at what they're doing in Iran. I mean, excuse me, what they're doing in Lebanon. It's a similar situation.

The transcript centers on a loud, multi-voiced discussion about the prospect of war with Iran, U.S. policy dynamics, and the influence of allied actors—especially Israel—on Washington’s decisions. - The opening segment features sharp, provocative claims about President Trump’s stance toward Iran. One speaker asserts that Trump gave Iran seven days to comply or “we will unleash hell on that country,” including strikes on desalinization plants and energy infrastructure. This is framed as part of a broader, catastrophic escalation in Iran under heavy pressure on Trump to commit U.S. forces to Israel’s war. - Joe Kent, a former director of the National Counterterrorism Center who resigned from the administration, presents the central prognosis. He warns that Trump will face immense pressure to commit ground troops in Iran, calling such a move a “catastrophic escalation” that would increase bloodshed. Kent urges the public to contact the White House and members of Congress to oppose boots on the ground in Iran, advocating for peaceful resolution and public pressure for peace. - The discussion shifts to Israeli involvement. The panel notes that Israeli media report Israel will not commit ground troops if the U.S. invades Iran, and some assert Israel has never, in any conflict, committed troops to support the U.S. The conversation questions this claim, noting counterpoints from analyst Brandon Weichert that Israel has undermined American forces in certain areas. - The debate then returns to Trump’s diplomacy and strategy. The host asks whether Trump’s stated approach toward Iran—potentially including a peace plan—is credible or “fake news.” Kent responds that Iran will not take diplomacy seriously unless U.S. actions demonstrate credibility, such as restraining Israel. He suggests that a more restrained Israeli posture would signal to Iran that the U.S. is serious about negotiations. - The program examines whether the MAGA movement has shifted on the issue. There is testimony that figures like Mark Levin have advocated for some form of ground action, though Levin reportedly denies calls for large-scale deployment. Kent explains that while he believes certain special operations capabilities exist—units trained to seize enriched uranium—the broader question is whether boots on the ground are necessary or wise. He emphasizes that a successful, limited operation could paradoxically encourage further action by Israel if it appears easy, potentially dragging the U.S. deeper into conflict. - A recurring theme is the perceived dominance of the Israeli lobby over U.S. foreign policy. Several participants contend that Israeli influence drives the war timeline, with Israeli action sometimes undermining U.S. diplomacy. They argue that despite public differences, the United States has not meaningfully restrained Israel, and that Israeli strategic goals could be pushing Washington toward conflict. - The conversation also covers domestic political dynamics and civil liberties. Kent argues that the intelligence community’s influence—infused with foreign policy aims—risks eroding civil liberties, including discussions around domestic terrorism and surveillance. The group notes pushback within the administration and among some members of the intelligence community about surveillance proposals tied to Palantir and broader counterterrorism practices. - Kent addresses questions about the internal decision-making process that led to the Iran policy shift, denying he was offered a central role in any pre-crime or AI-driven surveillance agenda. He acknowledges pushback within the administration against aggressive domestic surveillance measures while noting that the debate over civil liberties remains contentious. - The program touches on broader conspiracy-like theories and questions about whether individuals such as Kent are “controlled opposition” or pawns in a larger plan involving tech elites like Peter Thiel and Palantir. Kent insists his campaign funding was modest and transparent, and he stresses the need for accountability and oversight to prevent misuse of powerful tools. - In closing, the speakers converge on a common refrain: no U.S. boots on the ground in Iran. They stress that the priority should be preventing another ground war, avoiding American casualties, and pressing for diplomacy rather than expansion of hostilities. The show highlights public involvement—urging viewers to contact representatives, stay vigilant about foreign influence, and oppose a march toward war. - Across the exchange, the underlying tension is clear: competing visions of American sovereignty, the balance between counterterrorism and civil liberties, and the extent to which foreign actors (notably Israel) shape U.S. policy toward Iran. The participants repeatedly return to the need for accountability, restraint, and a peaceful path forward, even as they recognize the high stakes and the intense political pressure surrounding any potential intervention.

President Trump, along with Mike Pompeo, met with Taliban leaders to negotiate a conditions-based withdrawal from Afghanistan. Trump made it clear that any harm to Americans would result in consequences, showing a satellite photo of a Taliban leader's home as a warning before leaving the room.

The speaker emphasizes that to understand the situation, we should consider what Jack Keane is saying. We have one aircraft carrier strike group, plus land-based air power and a lot of air defense missiles on the ground, and a lot of air power there, but there are no ground troops. Don Rumsfeld had about 300,000 total ground troops at his disposal, and we went in on the ground and defeated the regime in about a month. There was a profound amount of air power, much more air power than exists in The Gulf right now, and altogether there was a lot more air power then, yet we still underestimated them. We defeated them militarily in about a month, but then an insurgency rose up afterward because you can’t kill everybody, which is what happened. Jack Keane, Dan Raisin Cain, and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff—the man Trump has talked about—are highlighted as significant military leaders. The question is how many ground troops does he have available? Nada. And you are talking about destroying the civilian and military leadership the way Don Rumsfeld successfully did. He did...

President Trump wanted a conditions-based withdrawal from Afghanistan. During negotiations with the Taliban, Trump told the Taliban leader through a translator that if they harmed a single American, he would kill them. Trump then handed the Taliban leader a satellite photo of his home. According to the speaker, after this incident, no Americans were killed in Afghanistan for 18 months. The speaker equates this to strength, suggesting that under President Trump, other countries would fear harming American interests abroad due to the potential consequences.

Chas Freeman and the interviewer discuss a rapidly unraveling international order and rising tensions in the Gulf, with implications for Europe, Asia, and global security. - Freeman argues that the five-century European domination of the world is over, Pax Americana is dead, NATO is moribund, and the Atlantic alliance is failing. He claims Europe views NATO as a defensive alliance but sees neither role NATO purportedly serves, and notes European countries (Spain, France, Austria) restricting U.S. access to bases and airspace in relation to Iran actions. - He describes a rearranged Gulf regional order being shaped by war, with Iran’s position strengthened. He highlights Donald Trump’s rhetoric as decoupling the U.S. from guaranteeing passage through the Strait of Hormuz, pointing out that the Strait cannot be opened by force, and that other actors must negotiate to ensure their energy exports remain routable. Freeman notes Macron’s similar view and explains that the solution would be an agreement with Iran, accompanied by IRGC verification and a signaling code for safe passage. - Freeman identifies Iran gaining two outcomes: the end of oil sanctions due to global price concerns and the acquiescence of the world to its de facto control of the Strait of Hormuz. He asserts Gulf Arab states have little choice but to negotiate with Iran, and that other regional players (China, India, Japan, Turkey, perhaps Bangladesh) are already anticipating this, with a Korean vessel reportedly passing through after negotiating with Iran. - He observes the geopolitical rearrangement: Pakistan is favored by China as a mediator, offering extended deterrence to Saudi Arabia; Pakistan’s strong Shia population and cultural ties to Iran put it in a pivotal role. Israel’s and the U.S.’s disinformation campaigns in the Gulf are noted, as are attacks on desalination plants and the vulnerability of Gulf states that harbor U.S. bases. Oman is highlighted as the only Gulf state anchoring U.S. naval presence and maintaining relative peace with Iran. - Freeman also points to the broader shift in regional security arrangements: a move away from dependence on Western military technology, with the Pakistan-Turkey-Egypt-Saudi alignment seeking more autonomy and potential Chinese participation in security architectures. He highlights the five-nillar meeting in Islamabad and a joint statement with Wang Yi outlining principles for Gulf security, suggesting a tilt toward regional solutions. - He notes the European Union’s sluggish diplomacy and lack of appetite for active diplomacy, contrasting Macron’s call for Europe to shape the world with reality. He argues that proxy wars are fading as the U.S. exits Ukraine as a proxy battleground, and Europe cannot rely on American arms in the same way, given stock replenishment needs and Israeli priority. - Freeman discusses nuclear proliferation concerns: Iran’s potential push toward nuclear weapons, and possible regional moves by Saudis, Turks, Egyptians, and others toward their own nuclear capabilities, including Japan’s latent capabilities and the broader fear of a chain reaction of nuclearization across regions, including Europe and Latin America (Brazil and South Africa’s defense agreements). He suggests Europe might need a more vigorous self-defense posture and a rethinking of security architecture beyond a Russia-centric framework. - He emphasizes the difficulty of achieving diplomacy amid eroding trust, noting that Western leaders lack imagination and that the UN and NATO's relevance has weakened. He envisions a Eurasian security framework that includes China, Japan, and Korea, moving toward a pan-Eurasian approach rather than block-based security. - On how the current war might end, Freeman argues that the conflict is unlikely to end at the negotiating table; instead, Iran is expected to continue pressuring Israel, and the conflict could persist as Iran maintains its missile and deterrence capabilities. He suggests the end is likely to come on the battlefield with Iran achieving objectives, while Western and regional actors may fail to secure a lasting stabilization. He concludes with a wary note on leadership and responsibility, lamenting the absence of statesmen capable of forging a new security architecture. - The discussion closes with a blunt observation about leadership, the unpredictability of Trump, and the uncertain future of American involvement in West Asia, leaving open questions about how or when the current war might actually end.

ISIS and Taliban are enemies fighting each other. The speaker questioned why the US should intervene, suggesting they should let them fight as both are enemies. The generals disagreed and ended up fighting both groups, which the speaker found to be crazy.

The speakers discuss the potential for war between Iran and Israel, with one noting the US embassy in Iraq evacuated nonessential personnel and military bases were told to evacuate non-military personnel. One speaker expresses disappointment that Trump, who campaigned on preventing new wars, seems to be leading the US toward conflict. One speaker claims Trump could stop the conflict by telling Israel they are on their own, withholding intelligence and support. They lament American troops being in danger for no reason. The speakers criticize Trump for acting like Biden, merely expressing disapproval without taking action. They claim Congress is completely in Israel's pocket, despite public opinion, especially among younger Republicans, being unfavorable towards Israel. One speaker cites a post from Tom Cotton about Iran seeking nuclear weapons, likening it to the lead-up to the Iraq War.

The conversation centers on current Middle East troop deployments, strategic calculations, and the potential paths the conflict could take. The hosts discuss publicly reported moves, including the eighty second Airborne Division being deployed, Green Berets from the seventh group transferred to the eighty second, and some from the seventh special forces unit moved to the tenth special forces unit in the European sector. They also note President Trump’s behavior as a factor in timing, mentioning “Friday evenings when the markets are closed” and suggesting that the last round of attacks began in Tel Aviv around 2 AM in Tel Aviv time. Douglas MacGregor and Daniel Davis, both retired military officers, are invited for a deeper analysis. MacGregor begins by describing what he sees as a potentially limited, not game-changing force buildup, arguing that there are enough forces to “control much of Los Angeles, if that’s what we need to do,” but not a significant commitment that would alter the war’s outcome. He contends Trump faces “the very real probability of total humiliation” at home and abroad, given the credibility of his rhetoric about defeating Iran. He flags plans for a “war winning offensive,” comparing it to Market Garden in September 1944, suggesting the U.S. would seek to secure bridges to advance into Germany, but asserts Market Garden failed and warns Iran’s capabilities—“precision guided weapons,” the ability to reach out almost a thousand miles, and persistent surveillance—could blunt any light infantry insertions into the Persian Gulf, including Kharg Island and other Hormuz Strait locations. He criticizes the notion of a rapid success and argues that Iran could respond effectively, potentially leading to regional chaos and European spillover if the operation succeeds or fails. Daniel Davis responds by highlighting a recent Trump True Social posting indicating a pause in “energy plant destruction” for ten additional days, implying ongoing talks are “very well.” He notes the tension between Trump’s statements about having destroyed Iran and the visible Iranian activity, including multiple rounds of missiles and rockets against Israel. Davis emphasizes the danger of underestimating Iran’s capabilities and warns that the plan resembles a poorly resourced, improvised operation lacking sufficient rehearsal, equipment, and planning. He likens the approach to a history of ill-fated offensives and stresses that even if a withdrawal or pause is intended as an off-ramp, the plan remains risky and potentially disastrous. The discussion broadens to consider strategic and economic consequences. MacGregor points out that England and Australia may face energy and refinery shortages, while Russia benefits economically from higher oil prices due to the Strait of Hormuz disruption. He notes a developing global crisis in food, fuel, fertilizer, and feed, with a potential impact on India and broader Asia-Europe markets. He questions the effectiveness and purpose of seizing a small number of offshore islands versus maintaining control of sea lanes, warning that Iran’s defenses and surveillance make landings highly challenging. Davis adds that the Israeli military is reportedly near collapse from within, requiring new conscription or reserve laws, and that Israel’s internal stability is a crucial factor in the broader campaign. Both analysts discuss the Pentagon’s options for escalation, including potential ground troops, and reflect on the possibility of a “final blow” that would give Trump leverage to declare victory. They acknowledge Iran’s mobilization claims (up to a million fighters) and Iranian reliance on alternate supply chains, including China’s manufacturing capacity, to replenish munitions. They consider the risk of a broader, multi-theater conflict, including potential reactions from Russia and China, and the possibility of a strategic miscalculation leading to wider war or even nuclear consideration if the situation deteriorates. Super chats bring additional questions about the potential American draft and the reactions of Russia and China. Dan Davis argues a draft would be domestic disaster and unlikely to alter outcomes; MacGregor adds that the volunteer force has structural limitations and may not sustain extended campaigns. They discuss how China and Russia might respond—potentially urging restraint or seeking to avert a broader catastrophe—while stressing that the ultimate decisions lie with President Trump, and that the pause and escalating bombardment may reflect a struggle to maintain momentum and resource constraints. In closing, the hosts emphasize the uncertain and high-stakes nature of the unfolding situation: contested troop deployments, debated strategic aims, and significant international economic and political repercussions as the conflict evolves.

- Trump has been presenting optimistic updates about negotiations with Iran, despite Iran denying them, and there is a belief that Monday morning actions are an attempt to manipulate markets, keep oil prices low, and keep the stock market high. - If a weekend land invasion of Iran occurs, many military experts suspect US troops would have to land or parachute in, which would change gold demand and pricing dynamics. - Speaker 1 explains that a true war outcome would require ground troops to take control of territory, not just air strikes or bombs. He notes Trump promised no troops on the ground, but argues that regime change would be impossible without occupying the country, leading to higher American casualties and families affected. - He warns that sending troops would mean they would have to stay in Iran, creating a prolonged conflict akin to Iraq or Afghanistan, with no clear exit strategy and ongoing political and strategic problems. - He suggests that Trump could alternatively declare victory and withdraw, claiming the destruction of Iran’s military capabilities (no navy, no air force, no nuclear program) as a complete victory and greatest military achievement. - The discussion then notes that the Strait of Hormuz was open before the war, implying strategic stakes and continued vulnerability. - Speaker 0 points out that Iran has pledged not to allow US occupation and would fight back, describing Iran as a country of 90 million with rugged terrain and highly motivated, religiously committed people who could be willing to die for their country. - They acknowledge the assumption that Iranians are uniformly supportive of a US liberation, labeling that notion as crazy. - They conclude that there could be even greater anti-American sentiment in Iran now than a month ago, recognizing that the population’s reaction to war may be hostile despite US actions.

- The discussion opens with claims that President Trump says “we’ve won the war against Iran,” but Israel allegedly wants the war to destroy Iran’s entire government structure, requiring boots on the ground for regime change. It’s argued that air strikes cannot achieve regime change and that Israel’s relatively small army would need U.S. ground forces, given Iran’s larger conventional force, to accomplish its objectives. - Senator Richard Blumenthal is cited as warning about American lives potentially being at risk from deploying ground troops in Iran, following a private White House briefing. - The new National Defense Authorization Act is described as renewing the involuntary draft; by year’s end, an involuntary draft could take place in the United States, pending full congressional approval. Dan McAdams of the Ron Paul Institute is described as expressing strong concern, arguing the draft would treat the government as owning citizens’ bodies, a stance attributed to him as supporting a view that “presumption is that the government owns you.” - The conversation contrasts Trump’s public desire to end the war quickly with Netanyahu’s government, which reportedly envisions a much larger military objective in the region, including a demilitarized zone in southern Lebanon akin to Gaza, and a broader aim to remove Hezbollah. The implication is that the United States and Israel may not share the same endgame. - Tucker Carlson is introduced as a guest to discuss these issues and offer predictions about consequences for the American people, including energy disruption, economic impacts, and shifts in U.S. influence in the Persian Gulf. - Carlson responds that he would not credit himself with prescience, but notes predictable consequences: disruption to global energy supplies, effects on the U.S. economy, potential loss of U.S. bases in the Gulf, and a shrinking American empire. He suggests that the war’s true goal may be to weaken the United States and withdraw from the Middle East; he questions whether diplomacy remains viable given the current trajectory. - Carlson discusses Iran’s new supreme leader Khomeini’s communique, highlighting threats to shut Hormuz “forever,” vows to avenge martyrs, and calls for all U.S. bases in the region to be closed. He notes that Tehran asserts it will target American bases while claiming it is not an enemy of surrounding countries, though bombs affect neighbors as well. - The exchange notes Trump’s remarks about possibly using nuclear weapons, and Carlson explains Iran’s internal factions, suggesting some seek negotiated settlements while others push for sustained conflict. Carlson emphasizes that Israel’s leadership may be pushing escalation in ways that diverge from U.S. interests and warns about the dangers of a joint operation with Israel, which would blur U.S. sovereignty in war decisions. - A discussion on the use of a term Amalek is explored: Carlson’s guest explains Amalek from the Old Testament as enemies of the Jewish people, with a historical biblical command to annihilate Amalek, including women and children, which the guest notes Christianity rejects; Netanyahu has used the term repeatedly in the conflict context, which Carlson characterizes as alarming and barbaric. - The guests debate how much influence is exerted in the White House, with Carlson noting limited direct advocacy for war among principal policymakers and attributing decisive pressure largely to Netanyahu’s threats. They question why Israel, a client state of the U.S., is allowed to dictate war steps, especially given the strategic importance of Hormuz and American assets in the region. - They discuss the ethical drift in U.S. policy, likening it to adopting the ethics of the Israeli government, and criticize the idea of targeting family members or civilians as a military strategy. They contrast Western civilization’s emphasis on individual moral responsibility with perceived tribal rationales. - The conversation touches on the potential rise of AI-assisted targeting or autonomous weapons: Carlson’s guest confirms that in some conflicts, targeting decisions have been made by machines with no human sign-off, though in the discussed case a human did press play on the attack. The coordinates and data sources for strikes are scrutinized, with suspicion cast on whether Israel supplied SIGINT or coordinates. - The guests warn about the broader societal impact of war on civil liberties, mentioning the increasing surveillance and the risk that technology could be used to suppress dissent or control the population. They discuss how war accelerates social change and potentially normalizes drastic actions or internal coercion. - The media’s role in selling the war is criticized as “propaganda,” with examples of government messaging and pop culture campaigns (including a White House-supported video game-like portrayal of U.S. military power). They debate whether propaganda can be effective without a clear, articulated rationale for war and without public buy-in. - They question the behavior of mainstream outlets and “access journalism,” arguing that reporters often avoid tough questions about how the war ends, the timetable, and the off-ramps, instead reinforcing government narratives. - In closing, Carlson and his co-hosts reflect on the political division surrounding the war, the erosion of trust in media, and the possibility of rebuilding a coalition of ordinary Americans who want effective governance without perpetual conflict or degradation of civil liberties. Carlson emphasizes a longing for a politics centered on improving lives rather than escalating war. - The segment ends with Carlson’s continued critique of media dynamics, the moral implications of the war, and a call for more transparent discussion about the true aims and consequences of extended military engagement in the region.

10 days after 9/11, a general informed me that we were going to war with Iraq. When I asked why, he didn't have a clear answer but mentioned that our military was capable of taking down governments. Weeks later, while we were bombing Afghanistan, I asked if we were still going to war with Iraq. To my surprise, he showed me a memo from the secretary of defense's office outlining a plan to take out 7 countries in 5 years. The countries listed were Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, and Iran.