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Glenn (Speaker 0) and Seyed Mohamed Marandi discuss the posturing and developments in the Iran–US confrontation around May 2026, focusing on the Strait of Hormuz, regional dynamics, and potential war trajectories. - Glenn notes that the United States had announced it would break open the Strait of Hormuz and that conflicting reports followed, seeking clarity on whether the conflict was moving toward all-out war. - Seyed Marandi says the situation is moving toward all-out war. He explains that the Americans initiated a new stage by attempting to carry out an operation to take ships out of the Strait of Hormuz, which did not succeed; instead, civilian boats were destroyed, and there were no military boats involved according to Iran. Iran is not using its military boats in these circumstances; it is using missiles as warnings, to avoid initiating a full war. - He states the Americans bombed boats carrying goods, resulting in five civilian deaths, citing news reports but noting Western media often follows the official narrative. Iran issued a statement blaming the Americans regarding Emirati targets being struck, though he acknowledges it could be read as either an American action or as American fault for the Emirati strikes. - Marandi asserts the operation was a failure for the United States: the Strait of Hormuz was not opened, and the Emiratis suffered damage. He describes the Emirates as an ally of the Israeli regime, noting its distancing from other Arab states, leaving OPEC, and paying for social media campaigns to shape public perception. He observes worldwide street sentiment toward Iran is largely supportive, except among Wahhabi/Salafi groups aligned with intelligence agencies and those who historically opposed Iran. - He contends that the global economy is entering a crisis phase: high oil and energy prices and rising food costs are the “fever,” with supply chains at risk of collapse and the global economy vulnerable to interruptions in any single link. He argues Iran’s economy is a “resistance economy” under siege for decades, while other global economies are more interlinked and fragile. - On troop movements and targets, Marandi says large US troop numbers and equipment have been deployed in the region, with many ground troops potentially based in Kuwait, Bahrain, and the Emirates; air refueling and other assets involve Saudi Arabia, the Israeli regime, and Qatar. - Glenn asks why the UAE is disproportionately aggressive toward Iran compared with Saudi Arabia or Qatar. Marandi explains the UAE’s alignment with Israel, its departure from OPEC, and the perception that striking Emirati targets amounts to striking Israeli targets. - They discuss predictability of Iran’s strategy: Marandi has long warned Iran would disrupt oil and gas production; he notes Iranian officials have historically warned about the Strait of Hormuz. He criticizes Western analyses of Iran’s capabilities as underestimating Tehran’s military and strategic sophistication, while Western narratives have repeatedly expected Iran to collapse in various wars, which Iran has repeatedly resisted. - On the potential course of a renewed war, Marandi outlines two broad scenarios: a short, intense clash with limited strikes on non-critical infrastructure could provoke a strong Iranian response, including missiles at Israel and allied targets; a more extensive war targeting Iran’s critical infrastructure, such as power plants and bridges, could devastate Persian Gulf countries and precipitate a global economic downturn. He emphasizes that Iran has historically avoided targeting civilians, but warns that destruction of critical infrastructure could force populations to flee. - Regarding escalation and timing, Marandi argues the Americans misjudged Iran’s resolve and that Tehran has rebuilt assets and developed new capabilities since ceasefire discussions. He suggests Trump’s aim may have been to probe whether Iran would capitulate or escalate, a calculation he believes underestimated Iran’s preparedness. - He predicts that the scale and duration of escalation will hinge on American choices: the Red Sea’s closure and Gulf actions depend on how far the United States escalates, what targets are attacked, and how long the strikes last. In general, he contends that the world economy’s vulnerability will intensify with any extended or severe conflict, particularly if critical infrastructure is targeted. - In closing, Glenn and Marandi acknowledge the peril of the situation, with Marandi urging awareness of the broader implications, including regional stability and global economic impacts, and both hoping for a path away from further escalation.

Mario and Glenn discuss the evolving Iran–U.S. confrontation after Trump’s speech and recent military actions. They explore whether Trump is seeking an off-ramp and how Iran might respond, focusing on strategic leverage around the Strait of Hormuz, escalation dynamics, and regional implications. - Trump’s posture and off-ramp: Mario notes Trump’s speech yesterday seemed like a threat if Iran doesn’t grant an off-ramp, with comments suggesting further precision attacks if peace isn’t achieved quickly. Glenn agrees Trump is signaling for an off-ramp but warns the President lacks obvious military targets to push Iran toward surrender. Both acknowledge Trump’s dual tendency to escalate while also hinting at ending the conflict. - Strait of Hormuz as leverage: The discussion emphasizes that Iran’s ability to control, or at least influence, the Hormuz strait is a key factor in determining the war’s outcome. If Iran maintains dominance over Hormuz, they can set transit conditions, demand concessions, or push for non-dollar trade. The speakers agree that Iran can “hold on to the Strait of Hormuz” to prevent a clean U.S. victory, making it a central bargaining chip. - Historical lens on victory and war termination: Glenn argues that raw military power often doesn’t translate into lasting political victory, citing Vietnam and the Iraq war as examples, and notes Iran views the conflict as existential for legitimate reasons. Trump’s stated goal of “destroying everything of infrastructure and energy” would raise global energy prices and provoke Iranian retaliation against Gulf states, complicating U.S. aims. - Possible outcomes and shifts in posture: They consider multiple scenarios: - If Trump off-ramps, Iran might reciprocate, potentially halting strikes on U.S. bases and negotiating terms around Hormuz. - If the U.S. presses ahead or escalates, Iran could intensify attacks on Gulf states or even Israel, leading to broader regional destabilization. - A mutually acceptable security framework may require the U.S. to reduce its Middle East footprint while Gulf states participate in a collective security arrangement over Hormuz. - Israel’s veto power and potential U.S. decisions: Israel’s security considerations complicate any exit, but the U.S. might act unilaterally if core national security interests are threatened. - Ground troops and regional dynamics: Both acknowledge the ambiguity around ground deployments; Trump’s denial of ground troops conflicts with the impulse to escalate, creating a paradox that makes miscalculations likely. The possibility of renewed ground involvement remains uncertain, with skepticism about sustaining a ground campaign given logistics and supply constraints. - Regional actors and diplomacy: They discuss whether a broader regional rapprochement is possible. Iran’s willingness to negotiate could depend on assurances about its security and status quo changes in the Gulf. Tasnim News reports Iran and Oman are developing a joint maritime protocol for Hormuz in the post-war period, with Iran planning a toll-based framework for tanker traffic, signaling monetization and control even as Hormuz reopens for the world. - NATO, U.S. defense spending, and leadership changes: The conversation touches on geopolitics beyond Iran, noting a forthcoming $1.5 trillion defense budget and a leadership shift at the U.S. Army, with secretary of war P. Hexath ordering the Army chief of staff to retire, signaling a potential reorientation of U.S. military strategy. - Israel–Iran–Gulf triangle: They consider how Iran’s actions could affect Israel and Gulf states, noting that Iran’s retaliation could prompt U.S. or Israeli responses, while Gulf states struggle with the economic and security repercussions of sustained conflict. - Timing and next steps: Mario predicts the war could end soon, driven by off-ramps and Iranian willingness to negotiate, whereas Glenn cautions that the conflict will likely continue given the deep-seated security demands and the strategic importance of Hormuz. Both acknowledge daily developments could shift trajectories, and express cautious optimism that some form of resolution may emerge, though the exact terms remain uncertain. - Final reflections: The discussion closes with reflections on how fragile the current balance is, the possibility of a peace-through-strength stance, and the high stakes for global energy markets, regional stability, and the international order. Mario thanks Glenn for the dialogue, and they sign off.

In this conversation, Brian Berletic discusses the current collision between the United States’ global strategy and a rising multipolar world, arguing that U.S. policy is driven by corporate-financier interests and a desire to preserve unipolar primacy, regardless of the costs to others. - Structural dynamics and multipolar resistance - The host notes a shift from optimism about Trump’s “America First” rhetoric toward an assessment that U.S. strategy aims to restore hegemony and broad, repeated wars, even as a multipolar world emerges. - Berletic agrees that the crisis is structural: the U.S. system is driven by large corporate-financier interests prioritizing expansion of profit and power. He cites Brookings Institution’s 2009 policy papers, particularly The Path to Persia, as documenting a long-running plan to manage Iran via a sequence of options designed to be used in synergy to topple Iran, with Syria serving as a staging ground for broader conflict. - He argues the policy framework has guided decisions across administrations, turning policy papers into bills and war plans, with corporate media selling these as American interests. This, he says, leaves little room for genuine opposition because political power is financed by corporate interests. - Iran, Syria, and the Middle East as a springboard to a global confrontation - Berletic traces the current Iran crisis to the 2009 Brookings paper’s emphasis on air corridors and using Israel to provoke a war, placing blame on Israel as a proxy mechanism while the U.S. cleanses the region of access points for striking Iran directly. - He asserts the Arab Spring (2011) was designed to encircle Iran and move toward Moscow and Beijing, with Iran as the final target. The U.S. and its allies allegedly used policy papers to push tactical steps—weakening Russia via Ukraine, exploiting Syria, and leveraging Iran as a fulcrum for broader restraint against Eurasian powers. - The aim, he argues, is to prevent a rising China by destabilizing Iran and, simultaneously, strangling energy exports that feed China’s growth. He claims the United States has imposed a global maritime oil blockade on China through coordinated strikes and pressure on oil-rich states, while China pursues energy independence via Belt and Road, coal-to-liquids, and growing imports from Russia. - The role of diplomacy, escalation, and Netanyahu’s proxy - On diplomacy, Berletic says the U.S. has no genuine interest in peace; diplomacy is used to pretext war, creating appearances of reasonable engagement while advancing the continuity of a warlike agenda. He references the Witch Path to Persia as describing diplomacy as a pretext for regime change. - He emphasizes that Russia and China are not credibly negotiating with the U.S., viewing Western diplomacy as theater designed to degrade multipolar powers. Iran, he adds, may be buying time but also reacting to U.S. pressure, while Arab states and Israel are portrayed as proxies with limited autonomy. - The discussion also covers how Israel serves as a disposable proxy to advance U.S. goals, including potential use of nuclear weapons, with Trump allegedly signaling a post-facto defense of Israel in any such scenario. - The Iran conflict, its dynamics, and potential trajectory - The war in Iran is described as a phased aggression, beginning with the consulate attack and escalating into economic and missile-strike campaigns. Berletic notes Iran’s resilient command-and-control and ongoing missile launches, suggesting the U.S. and its allies are attempting to bankrupt Iran while degrading its military capabilities. - He highlights the strain on U.S. munitions inventories, particularly anti-missile interceptors and long-range weapons, due to simultaneous operations in Ukraine, the Middle East, and potential confrontations with China. He warns that the war’s logistics are being stretched to the breaking point, risking a broader blowback. - The discussion points to potential escalation vectors: shutting Hormuz, targeting civilian infrastructure, and possibly using proxies (including within the Gulf states and Yemen) to choke off energy flows. Berletic cautions that the U.S. could resort to more drastic steps, including leveraging Israel for off-world actions, while maintaining that multipolar actors (Russia, China, Iran) would resist. - Capabilities, resources, and the potential duration - The host notes China’s energy-mobility strategies and the Western dependency on rare earth minerals (e.g., gallium) mostly produced in China, emphasizing how U.S. war aims rely on leveraging allies and global supply chains that are not easily sustained. - Berletic argues the U.S. does not plan for permanent victory but for control, and that multipolar powers are growing faster than the United States can destroy them. He suggests an inflection point will come when multipolarism outruns U.S. capacity, though the outcome remains precarious due to nuclear risk and global economic shocks. - Outlook and final reflections - The interlocutors reiterate that the war is part of a broader structural battle between unipolar U.S. dominance and a rising multipolar order anchored by Eurasian powers. They stress the need to awaken broader publics to the reality of multipolarism and to pursue a more balanced world order, warning that the current trajectory risks global economic harm and dangerous escalation.

- Messi scored a goal after missing a penalty. - The U.S. began launching “powerful strikes against Iran” via CENTCOM, described as imposing heavy costs for attacking commercial shipping. The strikes were said to respond to Iranian attacks on three commercial vessels transiting the Strait of Hormuz in the last 24 hours, involving one Saudi, one Qatari (al-Raqayat), and one vessel “we don’t know about.” The vessels were said to have been hit on the Omani/Indian Ocean side of the Strait after transit. - Explosions were reported in Iran at Qeshm Island and Bandar Abbas, with significant aerial activity observed over Bandar Abbas (Hormuzan province). Reports within Iran characterized the attacks as more symbolic, but attacks nonetheless. - The discussion claimed the U.S. strikes targeted sites including the Syriac island/Syriac Tunnel Complex for the IRGC, and were likely aimed at additional assets around Qeshm Island, including a surface search radar and operations connected with Hormuzgan inland launches. It was also argued that Iranian assets strike in ways that can reach ships despite U.S. air defense structures. - On the Qatari LNG carrier al-Raqayat, the discussion said a Shahid drone hit the vessel amidships, and that the ship likely had to be empty as it did not explode into a giant fireball. A pattern was described: U.S. warships providing air defense coverage while ships transit in clusters, with vessels turning AIS off and back on at points near the Omani-UAE border. - The discussion asserted the Iranians “verified these transits,” using maritime intelligence (including tracking high-speed boats) and IRGC fast attack boats. It referenced satellite/visual confirmation of squadrons of 20–40 high-speed boats and described small-boat movement between areas near Larak Island and Sirik base into the Strait of Hormuz. - A broader argument was made that repeated tit-for-tat strikes (including potential retaliation) risk pushing oil supply toward “tank bottom” and economic consequences. Oil throughput through the Strait was claimed to be “less than 15% to 5%,” and “95% below” pre-war amounts in the prior week’s context. - The U.S. sanctions waiver removal and continued attacks were framed as significant drivers of escalation, alongside claims that U.S. warships remained on alert to reimpose a blockade on Iranian ports if Trump decides. - Additional reports cited included: U.S. officials stating strikes targeted Iranian air defense systems, coastal surveillance systems, surface-to-air missiles, anti-ship cruise missile sites, drone launch sites, and port facilities; and PBS describing an Iranian posture of “turning up the volume” after demonstrating they were “not listening.” - The conversation described ongoing or renewed strikes in Qeshm Island/Siri (and also portrayed continued U.S. strikes as involving primary/secondary targeting), and stated the George Herbert Walker Bush and Abraham Lincoln’s air wings were being used more extensively. - Iran’s possible future response was discussed as potentially shifting tactics toward sinking ships rather than merely damaging them, including use of small boats, cruise missiles, torpedoes, or unmanned underwater vehicles, with the stated goal of ensuring a vessel and its cargo are lost. The discussion also tied ship-sinking risk to incentives for rerouting via specific traffic separation schemes. - Reported Iranian site impacts during the exchange were summarized as: Sirik struck “eight plus times,” Qeshm Island and surrounding waters struck “ten times,” and Bandar Abbas struck “three times,” according to reports from Iran. - Lebanon and Yemen were also discussed in relation to broader proxy dynamics. Israel’s alleged Lebanon strike timing was described as coordinating with U.S. indications of an “alpha strike” on the Syracuses, while Kyiv was mentioned as being struck nightly since February 28, 2022. - A sequence of commentary tied the wider strategy to pressure on regional allies and potential port/airbase targeting. It referenced claims of fires at Bandar Abbas (including near an air base and a port area identified in the discussion) and speculated about targeting civil aviation maintenance hangars and runways. - The MOU was discussed as potentially “dead,” with the view presented as an overreaction and framed as a “big dick contest” dynamic, with Iran portrayed as seeking leverage through continued ability to disrupt Strait of Hormuz shipping. - Near the end, the discussion stated: the American airstrikes targeted the small boat port in Bandar Abbas, likely striking IRGC speedboats; the imagery was said to suggest high-speed craft at Iranian navy piers/ports; and the attack was characterized as the biggest U.S. attack on Iran since the ceasefire, with expectations it could continue into early morning. - Retaliation possibilities were discussed with the view that Kuwait and Bahrain were more likely than the UAE, including the idea that Iran could target aircraft and maritime assets (including P-8s and aircraft at Bahrain/other bases), and that the Strait might be closed for some period if escalation continues.

The speaker says the war with Iran is “back on” after renewed bombings. They claim the sequence began when the U.S. was trying to guide tankers and ships through the southern portion of the Strait of Hormuz, an area Iran “doesn’t want ships to use” near the Omani shoreline. The speaker states Iran has asserted control over traffic through the Strait of Hormuz and has granted safe passage through a “Northern Channel” closer to the Iranian border. They say this relates to Iran’s territorial waters out to about 11 nautical miles from shore, and that the U.S. preferred not to use the northern route because it would require paying fees to Iran. The speaker claims that as three to five tankers sailed through the southern portion, the IRGC warned them to turn around and stop, but they did not, and the ships were “struck by drones,” with some “set on fire” and “kinetically attacked.” The speaker then says the United States bombed Iran in response, citing CENTCOM, which they state reported striking 80 targets. They say CENTCOM stated U.S. forces struck Iranian air defense systems and coastal radar sites, anti-ship missile capabilities, and small boats. The speaker questions the presence of small boats, referencing a claim that Iran’s Navy had already been destroyed. Next, the speaker says Iran has begun retaliatory strikes against U.S. forces, firing anti-ship cruise missiles and drones at U.S. Navy warships in the Sea of Oman. The speaker adds that Iran is asserting it will “assert control over the Strait of Hormuz.” They cite Professor Robert Pape (University of Chicago) saying: “trump is playing with nationalist fire by striking civilian targets in iran with millions demanding revenge at the supreme leader's funeral,” and also: “Trump just handed the regime a clear trigger for major retaliation. The entire world economy is now at risk.” The speaker also references political commentary from Marjorie Taylor Greene about “bombing Iran during the ceasefire” and says the war is “not a war.” They further mention Pete Hegseth (as referenced by the speaker), and that Marco Rubio is described as saying the U.S. would not allow Iran to control the Strait of Hormuz or charge a toll. The speaker turns to energy markets, stating that oil is spiking again and that a supply shock they have warned about will “kick in in a very harsh manner,” leading to “motor oil shortages,” “diesel shortages,” and higher prices for gasoline, diesel, and “jet fuel” by less than one month, accelerating into September and October. They link the worsening energy situation to escalation in conflicts and to attacks on infrastructure, claiming Ukrainian drone attacks hit multiple Russian oil tankers. They also claim that oil refining and refined product output are suffering “both out of Russia and also out of… the Middle East,” and that this is “engineered” to create a global energy crisis. They say the Strategic Petroleum Reserve is at its lowest level since the 1980s. They also claim the U.S. revoked a sanctions waiver/license that allowed Iran to sell oil through roughly the end of August, stating: “the MOU is dead,” and that Iran’s oil will not contribute to Western supply because sanctions are back on. The speaker predicts additional choke-point escalation, asserting “closure of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait” could come next. They also mention Iran ballistic missiles striking U.S. military bases in Bahrain “apparently,” and conclude that fuel costs, food prices, fertilizer impacts, and supply-chain problems will intensify. They say fertilizer shortages for the fall planting season will lead to “increased famine in 2027,” and that “many items” could become unaffordable in the U.S. Finally, they predict U.S. economic and geopolitical consequences, including spillover into U.S. treasury markets if Japan sells treasuries to buy oil or gas, and they claim this could lead to a U.S. invasion of Iran. They state the IRGC says the U.S. will not be allowed to interfere in the Strait of Hormuz and argue that Iran will hold control until the West cannot handle energy “strangulation.”

The discussion centers on whether Israel is driving a war against Iran and how the United States fits into that effort, with conflicting reporting from major outlets and a mosaic of intelligence interpretations. - The hosts outline two competing major-news stories. The New York Times reports that Netanyahu has asked Trump not to bomb Iran, arguing Israel is not prepared to withstand Iran’s retaliation. The Washington Post had reported a few weeks earlier that Israel sent a delegation to Russia to assure Iran that Israel does not intend to strike first, while Netanyahu in Washington was pressing Trump to strike Iran. The implication is that Israel is trying to avoid being seen as the aggressor while hoping the U.S. acts, effectively using the United States to carry out escalation. - The Post’s framing suggests Israel wants to escalate tensions but avoid the perception of initiating the conflict; Iran, according to the Post, responded positively to Israeli outreach but remains wary that the US could still carry out attacks as part of a joint campaign. - Iran’s perspective: they are wary and believe the U.S. and Israel are not to be trusted, even as they respond to outreach. There is a suggestion that Iran, with Russia and China, is prepared to counter, and that Tehran is not fully aligned with Western narratives about Iran as a terrorist state. - Larry Johnson (Speaker 2), a former CIA intelligence officer, joins to break down the behind-the-scenes dynamics. He references an alleged economic operation around Trump’s meeting with Zelensky that targeted Iran’s currency, triggering protests and destabilization, allegedly orchestrated with CIA/Mossad involvement. He lists various actors (Kurds, the MEK, Beluchis) and claims they were directed to inflame unrest, with the aim of manufacturing chaos to enable a military strike that could be stopped or degraded by outside intervention. He argues the plan failed as Iran’s security forces countered and electronic warfare helped by Russia and China blocked the destabilization. - Johnson emphasizes a broader geopolitical balance: Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Turkey told the United States they would not permit overflight for strikes; Russia and China bolster Iran, raising the cost and risk of Western action. He notes that 45% of global oil passes through the Persian Gulf and that Iran could close the Strait of Hormuz, which would massively impact oil prices and global economies, benefiting Russia. - On the potential next moves, the panel discusses whether Israel might consider nuclear options if faced with existential threats, and they acknowledge the difficulty of countering hypersonic missiles with current defenses. They reference reports of an earthquake or saber-rattling related to Dimona and mention that some in Israel fear escalation could be imminent, but there is no consensus on what comes next. - The conversation also touches on U.S. political voices, including Lindsey Graham’s reaction to Arab involvement, and questions whether there is any mainstream American call to accommodate Iran rather than confront it. Overall, the dialogue presents a complex, multi-layered picture: Israel seeking US-led action while trying to avoid direct attribution as aggressor; Iran resisting Western pressure but positioning to counter with support from Russia and China; and a regional and global economic dimension that could amplify or deter conflict depending on strategic choices and alliance dynamics.

Lieutenant Colonel Daniel Davis and Speaker 1 (Galloway) discuss domestic and international political currents surrounding Donald Trump, Iran tensions, and the Ukraine conflict, weighing consequences, risks, and strategic realities. Epstein and distraction debate: - Davis argues Trump is not convincing anyone to divert attention from the Epstein files, noting a core supportive base that defends him regardless of accusations. He observes a faction around Trump’s inner circle (Todd Blanche, etc.) pushing to move on and deny accountability, while impeachment remains the legislative route to any justice in the United States. - Davis emphasizes a dynamic where a loyal core persists, but that base is “leaking” and may erode as evidence and claims mount. The potential for impeachment remains a central, if unlikely, pathway to accountability given Republican control of the House and Senate. - He notes Trump’s domestic and international actions could fuel a “blue wave” for Republicans, but insists the public’s perception of the economy and released (and unreleased) files could undermine support. There is skepticism about whether the core will accept the unfolding disclosures. War with Iran and the wag-the-dog concern: - The discussion touches on whether Trump’s mobilization and rhetoric are intended to distract (a wag-the-dog scenario) or whether diplomacy could prevail. Davis cautions that few feel reassured by the prospect of a limited air-dominant campaign without ground troops, describing it as a gamble with “nearly no chance of success” and potential for significant strategic and credibility damage. - Galloway counters that some Trump advisers advocate diplomacy, while others press for hardline action. He notes the domestic political pressure to strike and questions the plan for post-regime-change Iran, citing Secretary of State testimony indicating uncertainty about what would follow a successful removal of the Ayatollah. - Both acknowledge the risk of severe economic and regional instability: the destruction of oil infrastructure, closure of straits, and cascading repercussions in Europe and globally, with Iran’s proxies potentially exacerbating conflict. Iraq, post-conflict planning, and economic stakes: - The conversation revisits the 2003 Iraq War, highlighting the lack of a credible plan for post-regime outcomes and the possibility of unleashing broader regional upheaval, including ISIS and Al Qaeda resurgence. - They stress the economic carnage that could accompany any conflict: the potential for an “economic nuclear winter” in the West and in Europe, with oil and gas disruptions and a collapse of allied economies, especially if adversaries fight to the last. Ukraine track and Russia’s leverage: - On Ukraine, Davis notes the discrepancy between public statements by political figures (e.g., Mark Rutte’s coalition-building claims) and battlefield realities: Russia continues to gain ground while Ukraine’s military resources lag. - Russia reiterates demilitarization and denazification terms; Western pivot toward terms favorable to Moscow appears uncertain but possibly underway due to growing recognition of Russia’s gains. - Davis suggests President Trump’s private ultimatum rhetoric to Zelensky—about deadlines for negotiations or withdrawal—reflects a broader sense that Russia has effectively won the war, with Ukraine bearing substantial losses. - The overall assessment is that, regardless of whether Trump acts, Russia’s victory in Ukraine appears likely to redefine the regional balance, with the total costs and consequences of any Western intervention remaining unclear.

The discussion centers on the scope and pattern of U.S.-led attacks during the day and how Iran may retaliate and sustain pressure. Speaker 0 says he is not tracking events “blow by blow” but indicates strikes were directed toward targets along the coastline rather than a nuclear power facility, and that Bashir was hit. Speaker 1 adds that the attacks struck the coastline with more significance than yesterday and references Axios reporting that a railway near the Turkmenistan border—connected to China’s Belt and Road—was struck. Speaker 1 says the initial impression was sabotage, but then reported that the U.S. struck it, which surprised Speaker 1. Speaker 0 frames the attacks as “finishing the job,” arguing the president is targeting Iran’s entire energy profile—production and, crucially, transportation. Speaker 0 specifically says the strikes are aimed at collapsing Iran’s ability not only to produce energy but to move it, citing Karg and saying additional attacks against Karg are likely. The Belt and Road Railway is described as keeping Iran’s energy production viable during the war by enabling shipment out, and Speaker 0 says the goal is to remove that capability. Speaker 0 then states: “Now Iran is retaliating.” Speaker 1 discusses reported air-defense and early-warning activity in Gulf locations: air defenses in Kuwait and Bahrain, and early warning alerts reportedly sent in Qatar, followed by “all clear.” Speaker 1 notes speculation that the UAE might be targeted but says there were no alerts or reports of anything in the UAE, and that explosions were heard in Kuwait and Bahrain. Speaker 0 says Qatar is “on the menu,” but not yet confirmed as a strike target. The speakers outline the U.S. target set as consistent with prior strikes since a ceasefire: targets from Bashir “all the way” down to Shabahar, Iran’s main port linking to the sea, and Abu Musa. Speaker 0 adds that beyond degrading Iran’s ability to control the Strait of Homs/coastline, the attacks also degrade Iran’s ability to defend the strait, and he worries this could be a prelude to attempts at landing. He emphasizes that the U.S. is methodically hitting what it can see, while “a boatload of stuff” cannot be seen, and he asks how Iran will retaliate both immediately and long-term, including what weapons and quantities Iran still holds in reserve. A major theme is whether the escalation pattern will broaden to additional Gulf countries. Speaker 1 asks why Iran is not responding “in kind” every time the U.S. escalates. Speaker 0 argues Iran does not have to escalate further because time is an advantage for Iran and a disadvantage for the U.S., describing the U.S. as operating on a countdown tied to oil reserves. Speaker 0 also argues Trump’s “escalate to de-escalate” approach is unstable: “a pause is not a de-escalation,” and he says the situation is continuing rather than genuinely de-escalating. The exchange turns to prior actions involving “Project Freedom.” Speaker 1 claims Trump has previously de-escalated when Iran retaliated (including the Fujairah response), while Speaker 0 disputes that those were true de-escalations, attributing outcomes to external constraints such as Saudi refusal to allow use of bases and the resulting “gap.” Speaker 0 characterizes the overall U.S. approach as being “dictated to by events” rather than controlled. Speaker 1 and Speaker 0 discuss the operational picture regarding shipping. Speaker 1 says the Strait is not closed, with discussion around “30, 40” ships and claims that Iranian-side waters are still open enough for ships to pass using Iranian traffic separation. Speaker 0 responds that the dispute is tied to Iran’s traffic separation scheme and claims U.S. efforts aim to prevent use of that scheme. Towards the end, Speaker 1 says there are multiple waves of explosions ongoing from Iran, with many interceptions and likely impacts expected near the Fifth Fleet headquarters. Speaker 0 shifts to a broader strategic argument: the Iranians allegedly do not need to do much beyond sustaining blockade-like conditions, because forcing the strait’s flow below pre-war levels is what matters. Speaker 0 argues Iran is playing an economic/survival game and that the regime’s metric is to remain in power, even while sustaining damage. Speaker 1 suggests Iran should retaliate more aggressively, but Speaker 1 and Speaker 0 both emphasize that symbolic strikes may not deter U.S. defense efforts. The speakers repeatedly suggest the key question is whether Iran believes a “red line” has been crossed, especially if the U.S. strikes Iranian energy infrastructure and transportation routes like the railway. Speaker 0 says Qatar is still “technically” on the menu but has not been struck yet, which he interprets as evidence Iran does not yet view current actions as crossing that red line. They conclude with continued concern about escalation and uncertainty about any practical off-ramp, while noting the attacks are continuing with patterns that resemble prior targeting rather than ending the memorandum.

Clayton interviews Professor Morandi about the Iranian military situation amid claims of a US-Israeli aggression and a media blackout. - Morandi asserts the Iranian air force is intact. He says Americans and Israelis bomb decoys and provides examples of footage showing explosions on painted ground objects that do not move afterward, indicating decoys are being used to mislead about real strikes. He states Iran has deployed decoys across the region for planes, helicopters, and missile launchers. The navy’s true strength is described as underground, with bases full of speedboats that fire surface-to-sea and sea-to-surface missiles; these underground bases are reported as intact. The Iranian air force is not heavily used, operating mainly from bases to the east/northeast where access is more limited. Missiles and drones are fired day and night. - Morandi contends that Iran’s naval power for asymmetrical warfare remains intact, and that the enemy’s claims of dwindling launchers or missiles are inaccurate. He notes the initial use of older, cheap missiles to exhaust air defenses, after which Iran fires fewer missiles but still successfully penetrates defenses. - On the strategic Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz, Morandi dismisses the idea that capturing Kharg Island would significantly alter outcomes. He argues that even if Kharg Island were taken, the Strait of Hormuz would remain closed unless Iran agrees to reopen it. Iran has long prepared defenses across the Persian Gulf, including naval and shore defenses, anticipating possible US attack. Iran’s missile, drone, and naval capabilities—long-, medium-, and short-range missiles, cruise and ballistic missiles, drones, and speedboats in underground bases—are positioned to deter. - If the US were to open the Strait by attacking, Morandi foresees heavy casualties, destruction of tankers and oil/gas installations, and a collapse of global oil prices, potentially around extreme levels like $250 a barrel, with severe global economic consequences. He argues the United States would lose more than Iran and would need compensation from Gulf regimes hosting US bases for allowing attacks. He asserts that traditional negotiations fail with the US given past breaches of agreements (citing the JCPOA) and implies distrust toward Washington. - Regarding a reported border invasion by Kurds or other groups, Morandi says US collaboration with Kurdish forces would likely be defeated by Iran, who would then threaten the autonomous Kurdish regional government in Northern Iraq. He suggests such actions would harm regional economies and erode Western influence, noting that Gulf states have borne significant economic and political costs from the conflict. He argues the US has harmed its own interests by engaging in war with Iran, increasing oil prices, and pushing regional countries toward confrontation. - Morandi concludes by stating that without genuine assurances on non-aggression and guarantees on future behavior, negotiations with the US are untrustworthy. He emphasizes that the US’s hostility affects not only Iran but the broader regional and global economy, and he criticizes American leadership as acting in concert with the Israeli regime.

Iranian missile and drone attacks continue in real time, with alerts reported in Kuwait and Bahrain and interceptions seen over Oman and other areas. The discussion notes that multiple targets appear to be involved, mentioning Kuwait and Bahrain, and that Jordan was struck first about ten minutes earlier. Interceptions are described from Lebanese skies against missiles heading toward Jordan, framed as Lebanon being “stuck in the middle” of missile traffic and interception. On the comparison of today’s strikes with yesterday, the analysis says the pattern mirrors prior activity: targets are described as Bahrain, Kuwait, and Jordan, with the MSA in Jordan identified as an interesting development. The speakers discuss that earlier US officials denied significant damage from yesterday’s events, and that today’s strikes appear geographically more expansive than yesterday, including areas near Iran’s capital—specifically Qaraj and other locations up north. Geographically, the strikes are said to include concentrated activity around the Strait of Hormuz and additional targeting near the capital, suggesting a broader scope than confinement to the strait region seen earlier. The discussion also links the northern strikes to possible “message” effects—warning/pressure tied to energy infrastructure near the capital—and compares US behavior to Israeli strikes that targeted similar areas. A major theme is why certain Gulf states are not being struck as directly, with suggested explanations including diplomatic concerns within the GCC and the risk of inviting retaliation. The speakers argue that Iran’s selection of targets like Kuwait, Bahrain, and Jordan—described as militarily capable but not large enough to drive major retaliation—could reflect deterrence and escalation management. They also say the UAE and Saudi airspace have been used extensively, and that these states appear less likely to be targeted in this phase. The conversation then shifts to US and allied air operations. Tankers and aircraft are discussed via flight tracking, including a refueling tanker near the Strait of Hormuz and other transport aircraft. The speakers interpret these overflights as supporting ongoing military operations, potentially reconnaissance, drone interception, or preparation for further waves. They highlight that airspace access appears to show integration among Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the US, and that Saudi airspace has not been shut down during this period. The discussion addresses whether radar/flight tracking could be affected by GPS spoofing or data gaps, and asks why the aircraft’s track and transponder behavior changes, including whether it might indicate activity near the Strait of Hormuz or possible operations closer to Iran. Tanker positioning is described as consistent with earlier “waves” and as potentially enabling aircraft to operate inside or near Iran. On escalation, the speakers describe concern that the pattern could become a “new normal” and resemble past high-intensity cycles, even while claiming today’s strikes are not yet targeting oil, power plants, or other major energy infrastructure (based on what is known in the moment). They debate objectives including pressure toward negotiations, symbolic messaging, and deterrence dynamics. They also argue that Iran’s ability to exert pressure on the US via the Strait of Hormuz is the key leverage and that further escalation could involve broader regional disruption (e.g., energy infrastructure or sea-lane closure). Additional real-time developments are mentioned: an explosion is reported in Bahrain near the US fleet base (Manama) and smoke/explosion imagery near a Jordanian base area is referenced. Kuwait Civil Aviation Authority is said to have announced temporary closure of Kuwaiti airspace due to Iranian attacks, and Kuwait’s army general staff is said to announce air-defense interceptions of hostile aerial targets per operational procedures. The speakers also note ongoing Iranian ballistic missile launches from Isfahan, with uncertainty about which country they are targeting as explosions continue. Later, the conversation turns to reports that Kuwait City is affected by Shahed drones, alongside commentary comparing drone intercept scenarios to major symbolic locations. They conclude that the conflict is likely to continue and expect similar cycles “tomorrow,” while acknowledging that additional strikes could come as alerts persist across the mentioned countries.

Iran struck three vessels in the last 24 hours—one Qatari, one Saudi, and one vessel of unknown ownership—while they were transiting via the Omani side through the Strait of Hormuz amid a power struggle between Iran and the United States over control of the waterway. The US wants it kept open like before February 28th, while Iran wants to control it and eventually charge a fee; this was expected to be the main sticking point in the memorandum of misunderstanding (MOU). The initial US response described was the revocation of a sanctions waiver placed about a week earlier covering Iranian oil sales and petrochemical sales and related services. A few hours later, the biggest US strikes on Iran since the ceasefire were described as hitting Bandar Abbas, Sirik, and Kashem, in multiple waves, followed by power outages reported in Kuwait and Bahrain. Axios was cited as reporting that US officials told Axios the response is a direct result of acts of international terrorism perpetrated by Iran on innocent ships transiting the Straits. CNN was cited as reporting that Iranian officials said the attack was not meant to be proportionate, but meant to be punishment. The Iranian president was described as having arrived in Iranian airspace after traveling from Iraq. A separate thread described the timing and authorization of US strikes: it was reported that Trump approved the strike plan against Iran and gave the final order on Tuesday while attending the NATO summit, after a meeting in Ankara with Hexeth, Rubio, Scott Besant, Dan Cain, the chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff, and other senior officials. A US official was cited as saying it remains unclear how long the strikes will continue. Across the discussion, the Strait of Hormuz was framed as the central issue that would not be resolved through consensus between Washington and Tehran, with expectations of continued cycles of violence rather than a lasting peace deal. The recurring use of the Oman route was described as being under pressure from the Americans to avoid further escalation, while Saudi and Qatari positions were described as becoming increasingly awkward as they balance wanting the crisis to end quickly with aligning with Washington. One speaker argued that the strikes could be interpreted as preparing the battle space for a potential amphibious landing by targeting areas related to Iran’s ability to control the Strait of Hormuz. The possibility of further actions—mines, sinking ships, and other ways to disrupt control of the Strait—was discussed, alongside claims that the Iranians believe they can survive economic calamity by keeping the Strait of Hormuz closed better than the Americans can. Another thread emphasized the role of the funeral processions and crowd emotions after the Iranian leadership’s death, describing large crowds chanting revenge as part of why negotiations and rational restraint might fail. At the same time, the counterpoint raised was that Iran faces massive inflation, currency collapse, and unemployment, and that the government prioritizes stabilizing the population and economy; still, revenge remained a major motivational force among many voices. The conversation also linked Iran’s actions to regional dynamics and to broader theaters, including Lebanon and Ukraine. Israeli strikes in Lebanon were described as potentially being part of a pattern connected to the US strikes on Iran, and Lebanon was characterized as inextricably linked to Iran through Hezbollah. Operational constraints and resource depletion were highlighted repeatedly: the defense industrial base was described as struggling to replenish what has been spent, and there were concerns about dwindling strategic petroleum reserve levels and the global price effects of damaging oil refineries. The strategic reserve discussion included claims about usable barrels remaining and accelerating depletion. Retaliation options were reviewed: it was suggested Iran could strike US bases (symbolically), strike Israel (though framed as less logical if Israel is not striking), or keep the Strait almost closed and carry out symbolic strikes. Closing the Strait was described as likely because it would produce immediate systemic shock through insurance and shipping market reactions, potentially restarting earlier pressure dynamics. There was also discussion that sinking a ship or more kinetic attacks would be escalatory. As additional reports emerged, the transcript noted explosions reported around Kashem and Cog (with Cog described as especially concerning). The discussion then turned to reports that Iran launched multiple anti-ship ballistic missile and anti-access area denial threats toward US Navy ships in the Persian Gulf, with saturation dynamics described as drones going first to drain defenses. The speakers discussed uncertainty about whether ships were hit and the likelihood of information gaps depending on what imagery and monitoring are available. The transcript ended with continued monitoring: it stated that Iran had struck three ships via the Strait route, that US strikes on Iran had continued for hours with peak effects early on, and that Iran’s retaliation began with at least two missiles and drones targeting US Navy forces, with no additional confirmed information at the time of the final updates.

John Mearsheimer and Glenn discuss the trajectory of the United States’ foreign policy under Donald Trump, focusing on the shift from an anticipated pivot to Asia and a reduction of “forever wars” to the current Iran confrontation and its global implications. - Initial optimism about Trump: Glenn notes a widespread belief that Trump could break with established narratives, recognize the post–Cold War power distribution, pivot to the Western Hemisphere and East Asia, end the “forever wars,” and move away from Europe and the Middle East. Mearsheimer agrees there was early optimism on Judging Freedom that Trump would reduce militarized policy and possibly shut down the Ukraine–Russia war, unlike other presidents. - Drift into Iran and the current quagmire: The conversation then centers on how Trump’s approach to Iran evolved. Mearsheimer argues Trump often vacillates between claims of victory and deep desperation, and he characterizes Trump’s current stance as demanding “unconditional surrender” from Iran, with a 15-point plan that looks like capitulation. He describes Trump as sometimes declaring a “great victory” and other times recognizing the need for an exit strategy but being unable to find one. - The escalation ladder and strategic danger: A core point is that the United States and its allies initially sought a quick, decisive victory using shock and awe to topple the regime, but the effort has become a protracted war in which Iran holds many cards. Iran can threaten the global economy and Gulf state stability, undermine oil infrastructure, and harm Israel. The lack of a credible exit ramp for Trump, combined with the risk of escalation, creates catastrophic potential for the world economy and energy security. - Economic and strategic leverage for Iran: The discussion emphasizes that Iran can disrupt global markets via the Strait of Hormuz, potentially shut down the Red Sea with Houthis participation, and target Gulf desalination and energy infrastructure. The U.S. should maintain oil flow to avoid devastating economic consequences; sanctions on Iran and Russia were strategically relaxed to keep oil moving. The longer the war drags on, the more leverage Iran gains, especially as Trump’s options to harm Iran’s energy sector shrink due to the global economy’s needs. - Exit possibilities and the limits of escalation: Glenn asks how Trump might avoid the iceberg of economic catastrophe. Mearsheimer contends that a deal on Iran’s terms would entail acknowledging Iranian victory and a humiliating US defeat, which is politically challenging—especially given Israeli opposition and the lobby. The Iranians have incentive to string out negotiations, knowing they could extract concessions as time passes and as U.S. desperation grows. - Ground forces and military options: The possibility of a U.S. ground invasion is deemed impractical. Mearsheimer highlights that Desert Storm and the 2003 invasion involved hundreds of thousands of troops; proposed plans for “a few thousand” light infantry would be unable to secure strategic objectives or prevent Iranian counterattacks across the Gulf, Red Sea, and Persian Gulf, with Iran capable of inflicting significant damage on bases and ships. The discussion stresses that even small-scale operations could provoke heavy Iranian defense and strategic backlash. - European and NATO dynamics: The Europeans are portrayed as reluctant to sign onto a risky campaign in support of U.S. objectives, and the episode warns that a broader economic crisis could alter European alignment. The potential breaching of NATO unity and the risk of diminished transatlantic trust are underscored, with Trump’s stance framed as blaming Europeans for strategic failures. - Israel and the lobby: The influence of the Israel lobby and its potential consequences if the war deteriorates are discussed. Mearsheimer notes the danger of rising antisemitism if the war goes catastrophically wrong and Israel’s role in pressuring continued conflict. He also observes that a future shift in U.S. strategy could, in extreme circumstances, diverge from traditional Israeli priorities if the global economy is at stake. - Deep state and decision-making: The final exchange centers on the role of expertise and institutions. Mearsheimer argues that Trump’s distrust of the deep state and reliance on a small circle (Kushner, Whitkoff, Lindsey Graham, media figures) deprived him of necessary strategic deliberation. He contends that a robust deep-state apparatus provides essential expertise for complex wars, offering a counterpoint to Trump’s preferred approach. He contends the deep state was not fully consulted, and that reliance on a limited network contributed to the strategic miscalculations. - Concluding tone: Both acknowledge the grave, uncertain state of affairs and the high risk of escalation and miscalculation. They express a desire for an optimistic resolution but emphasize that the current trajectory is precarious, with signs pointing toward a dangerous escalation that could have wide-ranging geopolitical and economic consequences. They close with a note of concern about the potential for rash actions and the importance of considering responsible exits and credible diplomatic channels.

Saeed Mohamed Marandi explains that Iranians view current events as an extension of the twelve-day war, where Israel and the Trump administration allegedly collaborated to undermine Iran and failed. He cites US Treasury remarks at Davos about manipulating Iranian currency to provoke protests, which he says led to peaceful demonstrations followed by highly trained groups that caused destruction and police casualties. He asserts that Israel claimed responsibility, with Mossad statements and Channel 14 reporting that weapons brought into Iran caused police deaths, and he notes Western media glossed over these facts. He argues this campaign aimed to push Trump toward confrontation with Iran, while messaging about Iran’s nuclear program and regional alliances shifted over time. Iran’s response, he says, has been that any attack will be treated as all-out war with an overwhelming Iranian retaliation. He contends Trump is boxed in: a larger strike would provoke a massive Iranian response across the region, affecting oil and gas flows through the Persian Gulf and potentially collapsing the global economy. He suggests the “smart” outcome would be to back off and end peacefully, potentially declaring victory without concessions, as Trump did in Yemen, though he believes Iran will not accept any deal that compromises sovereignty or core capabilities. Marandi lays out Iran’s view of the regional and strategic landscape: Iran’s counterstrike would target US interests across the region, not just bases, and would involve allies in Iraq, Yemen, and other areas. He argues the Persian Gulf is highly vulnerable because regional regimes hosting US bases are complicit, and a war would disrupt global energy supplies. He asserts Iran’s capabilities are primarily directed at the United States, given US threats since the Afghanistan and Iraq invasions, and that Iran has strengthened missiles and drones, along with air defenses. He contends Israel is vulnerable, and the aim of some in the US political circle is to sacrifice US interests for Israeli interests. He asserts that Iran’s real objective is to prevent a repeat of the “sword over Iran”—to avoid six-month cycles of provocations—and to end the possibility of ongoing CIA-backed unrest being used as pretext for further strikes. On the possibility of negotiation, Marandi says Iran will not give up nuclear enrichment, missile capabilities, or regional alliances. He notes there was a JCPOA, but Iran would not accept a repeat of that deal; any future agreement would need to be better for Iran. A deal could be discussed about the nuclear program, but not one that cedes sovereignty or enrichment rights. He suggests Trump could try to retreat by declaring victory or offering a hollow concession, but Iran is ready for all-out war if attacked. He emphasizes that if the US backs down, it would be a major defeat for Washington; if it engages in war, it would be a world tragedy and the US would be defeated, with global implications. He argues Iran’s stance is clear: they will respond massively to any attack, and the only viable path for the US would be to walk away and pretend it gained something it did not. Glenn notes that regional allies feel exposed as world power shifts toward multipolarity, and asks about whether Iran would treat this as an existential threat and how it would fight. Marandi responds that Iran views the objective as balkanization, supported by Israeli interests, and that Iran would confront attempts to seize control of the country. He reiterates that Iran will not compromise sovereignty or support for Palestine, and that a conflict would be devastating for the world, with Iran prepared to fight to defend its existence.

The discussion centers on recent U.S. strikes and Iran’s retaliatory actions involving Kuwait, Bahrain, and sometimes Jordan, with emphasis on whether the exchanges are primarily symbolic or meant to cause deeper operational and economic damage, particularly around the Strait of Hormuz. Stefano explains that the strikes have expanded geographically and in scale compared with earlier rounds. He notes that the targets have gone beyond the usual focus near the straits (Oman–Iran point-to-point areas) and include areas such as Sistan-Balochistan and railway bridges in the north. He frames the strikes as a demonstration of President Trump’s “extreme frustration” with the lack of progress in negotiations and also highlights a mismatch in expectations between the U.S. and Iran about how expansive a U.S. response would be. Stefano also argues that both sides may be miscalculating intent and the willingness to tolerate military pain. Mario and Stefano discuss the pattern of prior tit-for-tat exchanges as largely symbolic, while the newer packages are portrayed as more expensive and intended to impose greater pain. They stress that, despite Trump’s statements about escalation, the Iranian response seen so far has been limited and has not demonstrated the ability to meaningfully impact U.S. operations. Mario asks what would worry Iran from its perspective if Iran’s retaliation goes “outside the tit for tat” pattern. Stefano says the two major targets he would watch to gauge whether Iran wants to “cause a dent” are Prince Sultan Air Base in Saudi Arabia and Al Dhafra Air Base in the UAE, noting that U.S. air force activity and launches from those areas appear to be ongoing, even if it remains unclear what would be targeted. They discuss why attacks have kept returning to Kuwait and Bahrain and not shifted as clearly to Saudi Arabia or the UAE. Stefano suggests possible reasons include negotiation dynamics with Gulf states and the idea that Iran may calculate that strikes in Kuwait and Bahrain can still deliver a symbolic message regardless of direct military effectiveness. Mario adds that they lack full visibility into behind-the-scenes developments, including possible changes in regional support and informal arrangements. A major theme is the Strait of Hormuz and Iran’s strategic objective. Stefano says Iran has an interest in keeping the northern route “open” for non-Iranian ships, which he links to revenue/tolls and the longer-term goal of making the northern passage the preferred route. He argues that pushing maritime vessels through Iranian territorial waters could allow Iran to charge tolls and pilot fees without violating UNCLOS, and he describes a longer-term vision of the straits operating “like a Suez Canal, but for Iran.” Mario presses whether this creates a “free pass” for the U.S. to keep escalating without equivalent consequences. Stefano instead points to U.S. sanctions waiver removals as potentially more consequential for Iran’s economy than the military campaign alone. He explains that the risk for Iran is tied to how much sanctions and business uncertainty constrain commerce, noting concerns that waivers could be “flipped on and off” and that businesses may not rush back to Iran because they fear sudden changes. They also discuss the economic dimension of strikes, including an attack on the Shabahar maritime tower/asset, which Stefano says was aimed at Iran’s ability to control and manage the port and would harm long-term economic development if ports are damaged. Regarding next steps, Mario asks what the U.S. would do tomorrow and in the next few days. Stefano predicts another round of strikes is likely, citing historical patterns where bombings occurred over consecutive days and threats preceded or followed negotiation steps. He also notes President Trump’s public comments while in Air Force One and points to continued U.S.-Israeli coordination. If U.S. strikes do not resume, Stefano says that could indicate a shift back toward diplomacy. The conversation shifts to Iran’s specific retaliation limits and the possible reasons behind those choices, including the type of weaponry used. They discuss whether recent attacks involved drones, cruise missiles, or ballistic missiles. Stefano compares cruise missiles and ballistic missiles in terms of detection/interception challenges: cruise missiles are harder to detect due to low flight and maneuverability but are slower and can be intercepted with various air defense systems; ballistic missiles are faster and have fewer interception options, typically relying on systems like Patriot/THAAD rather than SHORAD. A separate topic covers Syria and statements about Al-Sharaa. Stefano says he does not see Al-Sharaa deploying Syrian forces into Lebanon, and he frames Al-Sharaa’s actions in Syria as cutting the land route to Hezbollah from Iran, which he connects to the U.S. and regional objectives of limiting Iran and Hezbollah’s free operational reach. He also discusses broader U.S. preferences regarding Syria’s internal governance—seeking a central government while accounting for Kurdish and Druze sensitivities and preventing Syria from becoming “Libya”-like chaos. On allegations of massacres of Alawites, Stefano says the situation could involve both an intent to respond harshly and ground-level commanders taking actions even harsher than intended, emphasizing that investigations would be needed to determine facts. Finally, Stefano and Mario discuss the possibility of regime change in Iran. Stefano says that airstrikes alone (especially targeting oil/energy infrastructure) are unlikely to collapse a regime, and that regime change would require more than an air campaign, such as a ground component or severe internal fracture. He suggests Iran may be conserving ballistic missile capabilities because of losses, and Mario notes a CNN report claiming a large percentage of missiles remain operational. Stefano counters that ballistic missile capabilities are not interchangeable in the way some systems might be, and he links the observed choice of drones versus ballistic launches to preserving remaining capability. The transcript ends with Mario stating that attacks appeared to have ended at the time of the discussion, with no escalation to mass casualty events or massive destruction comparable to earlier wartime periods, but with uncertainty about what happens next, including whether additional U.S. strikes occur or Iran changes its response pattern.

In the dialogue, Seyyed Mohammed Marandi, a Tehran University professor and former Iran nuclear negotiation adviser, discusses the prospect of renewed U.S. aggression against Iran and the stability of any ceasefire. He says that since the ceasefire began, preparations for war in Tehran have been ongoing “twenty four hours a day,” driven by the belief that Trump will not accept defeat and that the “Zionist lobbying” and the Israeli regime remain behind the war. He suggests that although it is not certain, a new round of conflict could erupt over a weekend or soon after markets close, noting that the U.S. and Netanyahu’s positions previously clashed with ceasefire terms. He recounts that Iran had insisted on an off-ramp when Netanyahu accepted the ceasefire, but Trump then claimed the Strait of Hormuz would remain open while maintaining a siege on Iranian ports, implying that an off-ramp was possible but not pursued. Marandi emphasizes that the Strait of Hormuz was never closed by Iran, except to ships linked to adversaries, and argues that the escalation followed Netanyahu’s actions despite Iranian signals. He asserts that even if a limited agreement allows more ships through, the broader pain from any renewed conflict will persist, potentially causing a global economic depression if critical infrastructure is destroyed or if negotiations on Hormuz or Gaza/ Lebanon ceasefires are delayed for weeks due to fighting. On the U.S. side, the host notes that the U.S. was in trouble and desperate, pointing to missile defenses and ammunition shortages as signs of strain, and remarks that Trump accepted Iran’s 10-point plan as a ceasefire framework but later abandoned it, while presenting an extended ceasefire as a favor. Marandi agrees that Trump’s actions have been inconsistent and that the Iranians might expect the U.S. to pursue assassinations and infrastructure strikes again, with Iran prepared to retaliate robustly. A key point is Iran’s stated willingness to escalate in response to attacks on its leadership and critical infrastructure. An Iranian MP, associated with the Islamabad delegation, reportedly warned that if any assassinations occur, Iran will target leaders of Arab regimes in the Persian Gulf (Kuwait, Bahrain, the Emirates, Qatar, Saudi Arabia) because they are complicit in the war. The discussion outlines that Iran would retaliate not only against Israeli targets but also within the Persian Gulf region, potentially striking infrastructure and power facilities, with implications for the region’s electricity and climate conditions during the hot season. Marandi argues that Iran has already demonstrated strategic restraint, saying that Iranian authorities aim to minimize civilian casualties and that Iranians would respond to attacks on critical Iranian infrastructure by striking broader targets in the Israeli regime and in regional partners. He contends that Iran does not initiate escalation but escalates in response, pointing to past cycles where Iran’s retaliation was effective without targeting civilians. He notes that Iran has assets across its mountainous interior, including deep underground factories and bases, which he claims the United States underestimates, leading to miscalculations about Iran’s missile and drone capabilities. Regarding the broader geopolitical landscape, Marandi notes rising Western and Israeli concerns about Iran’s expanding influence, while acknowledging growing sympathy for Iran in parts of the world, including some shifts in India and Latin America. He highlights the Putin-Trump dynamic, suggesting Putin’s meeting with Iran’s Foreign Minister and Russia’s praise for the Iranian people signal a strengthening axis of resistance against Western pressures. He also remarks that Iran’s resilience under sanctions and its ability to mobilize regional allies, such as Hezbollah, complicates Western expectations of quick regime change. Finally, Marandi suggests that Iran’s role on the global stage is shifting perceptions of Iran’s strength and legitimacy, and he foresees continued pressure, potential escalation, and a regional balance of power that narrows Western maneuvering space as the crisis evolves.

The conversation centers on Iran, potential U.S. action, and the wider strategic spillovers across the Middle East and beyond. The speakers discuss what prompted a delay in striking Iran, the likelihood of a broader attack, and how regional and great-power dynamics might unfold. - On why a strike against Iran was postponed, the consensus from the guest is that Netanyahu asked for more time to prepare for defending against Iranian missiles and to enable a larger attack footprint. The guest also cites public statements by U.S. figures supporting a bigger operation: Lindsey Graham emphatically said last Friday that the delay was so we can go bigger; General Jack Keane stated that military operations would target political and military leaders and destroy their military infrastructure to take the regime out. The guest emphasizes that the most likely scenario is an expanded target set and greater combat power in the region to defend bases and improve the attack’s effectiveness, rather than a symbolic strike. - Regarding whether Russia or China would become involved, the guest doubts active involvement by either country, but suggests indirect support or intelligence help could occur. The logic is that direct involvement would be costly for these powers, though they might assist Iran indirectly. - On the readiness and capability of Iran, the guest argues Iran is now far more prepared than in the twelve-day war. They note that insiders were purged after the prior conflict, defenses were strengthened, and missile production likely accelerated since June, with production areas shielded from prior attacks. Iran’s ability to respond quickly and with significant damage is viewed as higher, and the guest warns that if Iran experiences an existential threat, it could abandon restraint and retaliate in a way that makes a broader war more likely. - The discussion covers U.S. bases in the region, where the guest concedes that the U.S. air defense is not at the level of Israel’s Iron Dome and David Sling, THAAD, and other integrated systems. Some bases lack robust defense against ballistic missiles, drones, and other threats, and, while 30,000 U.S. troops remain in the area, the overall air-defense capability is described as insufficient to stop all Iranian missiles. - Would Iran strike Gulf nations directly to pressure them to push the U.S. to end the war? The guest says not likely, arguing that Iranian leadership has signaled a preference for good relations with Gulf states and that attacking Gulf bases or cities would create more enemies and complicate Iran’s strategic posture. - A decapitation strike targeting leadership is considered plausible by some but deemed risky. The guest notes Iran has continuity of government plans and could designate successors; even if leadership is removed, a power vacuum could ignite internal fighting. The possibility of an existential attack by Iran—coupled with a broader regional war—could be catastrophic and is something to avoid. - The discussion turns to Lebanon, Hezbollah, the Houthis, Hamas, and the broader spillover risk. The guest suggests that if Iran’s retaliation is strong and Hamas or Hezbollah see an opportunity, there could be escalations, including potential involvement by Turkey. However, Iran would likely avoid opening new fronts that would diffuse its capability to strike U.S. bases in the region. - The problem of Iran’s internal diversity is highlighted: Persians, Azeris, Kurds, Lurs, Arabs, Baluchs, and Turkmen, among others, complicate any post-regime-change scenario. The guest argues Iran could fragment, but emphasizes that a successful Western-backed regime change could still lead to civil strife rather than a stable replacement, warning of a “textbook failed regime change” akin to past Middle East interventions. - On NATO and Western unity, the guest asserts NATO is dead or in deep trouble, citing European leaders who doubt U.S. stability and reliability. He notes European politicians discuss building an autonomous European security architecture, implying growing European reluctance to rely on U.S. leadership for defense. - Greenland as a strategic issue: the guest argues there is no rational military need for Greenland for security, and that the notion of occupying or militarizing Greenland is driven more by Trump’s personal preferences than strategic necessity. He points out that even if Greenland were militarized, Russia and China would have little to gain, given logistical and strategic barriers. - Finally, the future trajectory: the guest predicts Iran will likely be pressed hard in a large strike but warns that the consequences could be severe, including regional destabilization, potential civil conflict inside Iran, and long-term strategic costs for the U.S. and its European partners. He suggests that as long as the U.S. overextends itself in multiple theaters (Iran, Greenland, Ukraine, Venezuela), global stability and the U.S. economic footing could be endangered. The guest closes by highlighting the uncertainty of Trump’s next moves, citing possible abrupt shifts and cognitive concerns that could influence decisions in unpredictable ways.

The discussion centers on Iran’s response to the latest US peace terms and the broader trajectory of the conflict. Iran publicly rejected the terms, calling them “completely unrealistic” and signaling that they would not open the Strait of Hormuz. At the same time, the claim is made that the rumblings from US outlets and the president’s rhetoric suggested closeness to a deal, but those impressions are challenged as inconsistent with Iran’s stance. Project Freedom is said to have been shelved after Saudi Arabia reportedly refused to allow US forces to use its airspace and a key regional airbase, making the Trump administration’s stated option to advance that plan unworkable. The host asks where things stand on the escalation ladder. Professor Robert Pape, director of the Chicago Project on Security and Threats, describes the situation as a trap. He argues that the fundamental issues in play have not changed since the bombs began falling about seventy days ago. He praises the US military’s tactical performance—air, naval, and leadership-target strikes—but criticizes the strategy as fundamentally flawed. According to Pape, tactical successes do not yield meaningful strategic results, and Iran’s power is growing due to geography and cheap technologies like drones and mines. He notes that even after sinking Iran’s navy, the impact was negligible because Iran’s power persists and expands, especially given a Gulf-wide vulnerability to Hormuz. A critical development discussed is Iran’s action near the UAE, striking a pipeline that bypassed Hormuz and moved nearly 2,000,000 barrels of oil per day. This demonstrated Iran’s capacity to inflict damage despite a naval blockade, contributing to Gulf states’ reluctance to participate in or support US actions. The implication is that US punitive measures—hitting energy infrastructure or power grids—are unlikely to force Iran to kneel and may instead provoke greater retaliation. Pape warns that the escalation could drag on for months, with consequences such as rising gasoline prices in the US, potentially reaching about $6 in May or higher in some places like Chicago. The conversation turns to more immediate developments: fresh drone attacks around Kishem Island with Iran claiming air defenses intercepted the assaults; Iranian officials reportedly require compensation for damages and the withdrawal of all US forces from the Gulf as preconditions for ending the war. Pape reframes these attacks as part of Iran’s effort to keep the United States off balance and off leadership leverage, suggesting that Trump’s approach—driven by civilian leadership and charisma—misses the realities of great-power politics. He discusses the broader risk of increased Gulf infrastructure targeting if the US escalates, including the potential for higher gas prices and substantial infrastructure repair costs. The interview ends with reflections on the limits of punishment as a strategy, the enduring influence of Iran’s geopolitical position, and the likelihood that even if further force is used, it may not yield the desired strategic outcome. The speakers acknowledge the difficulty of predicting exact moves but emphasize the persistence of the escalation trap and the real-world consequences for energy markets and regional stability.

Speaker 0 begins by noting a new escalation in the war: after the president's Easter-weekend speech, the United States struck a massive bridge in Tehran, described as part of Tehran’s pride because it would cut about an hour from Iranians’ commutes. Trump posts, “the biggest bridge in Iran comes tumbling down, never to be used again,” and says, “Make a deal before it’s too late.” He warns that nothing is left of what could still become a great country. Speaker 1 responds with skepticism about the administration, mocking the idea of “the Nord Stream pipeline” being blown up as a lie by the prior administration. Speaker 0 notes that Trump boasted about the bridge strike on Truth Social and questions the strategic value of targeting civilian infrastructure, comparing it to striking the Golden Gate Bridge and asking whether that would be labeled a war crime. Iranian retaliation follows: a strike at the center of Tehran (clarified as Tel Aviv in error in the transcript) with a ballistic missile, causing a neighborhood to burn, as shown on Fox News and circulating on social media. Reports also emerge that an Amazon data center was struck in Bahrain, Oracle in the UAE, and that Iran had claimed it would strike Microsoft, Google, Amazon and other large American companies. The United States is not protecting them. Speaker 2 engages Colonel Daniel Davis, host of The Deep Dive with Dan Davis, to assess the latest moves alongside the president’s speech. Speaker 2 argues that the president’s remarks about “bomb you back into the stone age” indicate punishing the civilian population, not just military targets, which could unite Iranians against the United States and Israel. The bridge strike appears to align with that stance, making a regional outcome that contradicts any stated aims. He calls it nearly a war crime, since civilian infrastructure has no military utility in this context. He suggests the action undermines any potential peace path and could prompt stronger resistance within Iran. He warns that, politically, Trump could face war-crimes scrutiny, especially under a Democratic-controlled House, and that it damages the United States’ reputation by appearing to disregard the rule of law and morality. Speaker 1 asks whether such tactics are ever effective, noting a lack of evidence that inflicting civilian suffering yields political concession. Speaker 0 and Speaker 2 reference historical examples (Nazis, British during the Battle of Britain, Hiroshima-era considerations) to suggest such tactics have not succeeded in breaking civilian resolve, arguing this approach would harden Iranian resistance. Speaker 2 cites broader historical or regional patterns: torture or collective punishment has failed against Germans, Japanese, Palestinians in Gaza, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and Iran in the Iran-Iraq War. He contends the appeal of using such power is seductive but dangerous, likening it to “war porn.” He notes that the number of Iranian fatalities floated by Trump has fluctuated (3,000, 10,000, 30,000, then 45,000), describing them as not credible, yet the administration seems unconcerned with accuracy. Speaker 3 adds that the rhetoric justifies escalating violence with humanitarian consequences, including potential energy-system disruption. Speaker 0 asks about the discrepancy between Trump’s claim of decimating Iran and subsequent attacks on multiple targets in the Gulf and the firepower Iran still holds, including underground facilities and missile capabilities. Speaker 2 explains that Iran can absorb punishment and still strike back, suggesting that the Strait of Hormuz cannot be opened by force and that escalation could involve considerations of a larger false-flag scenario. He mentions a warning about a potential nine-eleven-level attack and potential media complicity, implying fears of a false-flag operation blamed on Iran. Speaker 0 notes the possibility of Israeli involvement undermining negotiations and cites JD Vance’s planned meeting with Iranian Foreign Minister Kamal Kharazi, noting Kharazi’s injury and his wife’s death, implying an assassination attempt. Speaker 2 critiques U.S. reliance on allies, arguing that Israel’s actions threaten U.S. interests and that the White House should constrain Israel. He asserts there is no military solution to the conflict, warns of long-term costs to the United States and its European and Asian relations, and predicts economic consequences if the conflict continues. Speaker 1 remarks that Iranian leaders’ letter to the American people shows civilian intent not to surrender, while Speaker 0 and Speaker 2 emphasize the risk of ongoing conflict, with Colonel Davis concluding that there is no feasible open-strand resolution. The discussion ends with thanks to Colonel Davis for his analysis.

Glenn: Welcome back. We’re joined again by Seyyed Mohamed Marandi, a professor at Tehran University and a former adviser to Iran’s nuclear negotiation team. There’s talk in the US of seizing Kharg Island, which would handle 80–90% of Iran’s oil shipments, effectively a nuclear option to shut down Iran’s economy. What would be Iran’s likely response if the US pursued this path? Marandi: It would be a major problem to access the island because the US would have to fly over Arab regimes in the Persian Gulf. Iran would retaliate if Iranian territory were occupied, taking the war toward a major escalation. The regimes hosting the island would have to pay a heavy price, far greater than now. For the United States, the island is well protected, with Iranian assets on the shore supporting the islanders, and it’s farther from the US Navy and closer to Iran’s shore. But more importantly, such an aggression would be futile: it would not change the Persian Gulf trade through Hormuz, which Iran has effectively controlled by requiring permission to pass. An invasion or occupation would lead to fierce combat and punishment of the regimes that enabled it—Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, the Emirates, Bahrain, Qatar—desert-based states with oil and gas but little water. If the US succeeds in taking the island, Iran’s retaliation would involve destroying assets of the cooperating countries. Long-term, Hormuz could be effectively closed, with upstream infrastructure damaged and no oil or gas able to move, making a later reopening contingent on a peace agreement. The operation would be logistically, militarily, and economically disastrous for global markets. Glenn: There are reports Iran is mining Hormuz. Do you know anything about that operation? Marandi: Iran hasn’t mined Hormuz, the Persian Gulf, or the Indian Ocean. The Iranian navy capable of wartime actions is largely in underground tunnels and includes speedboats, surface-to-sea missiles, and a network of underground bases. Iran has not moved to mine the Gulf. It does not want escalation. Iran has always negotiated; US claims that Iran wanted nuclear weapons at the negotiating table are rejected by Iran, the fatwa, and IAEA history. If negotiations had failed, the US invasion would be unjustified. Doha and Qatar are prepared to restart gas facilities and allow oil to flow if peace returns. If the US escalates to destroy key infrastructure, Iran will retaliate, and Iran can hurt US assets and its proxies more than the US can hurt Iran, with long-term global energy consequences. Iran has been striking bases in the region and says it is prepared to continue until after the midterm elections. Glenn: The US energy secretary says the US Navy is studying options to escort tankers through Hormuz. What are the main challenges? Marandi: It would be virtually impossible. Iran’s navy is largely underground, with mines, surface-to-sea missiles, and drones capable of targeting Hormuz from Iran. If open war begins, Iran would retaliate against regimes hosting US bases. Even if Hormuz were opened temporarily, without oil, gas, tankers, or production, there would be no purpose, and energy prices would spike permanently. The US would likely be forced to accept Iran’s terms for peace to allow oil to flow. Glenn: Trump has spoken of further destruction if needed, but says he’s run out of targets. What do you expect from the American side? Marandi: The US is already targeting nonmilitary sites and civilian targets in Iran. They slaughter civilians, including families and children, with premeditation. They could intensify attacks on oil, gas, electricity infrastructure, which would invite Iran to retaliate. Iran’s society is united, with people on the streets despite the bombardments. If the US destroys infrastructure, Iran would respond, but Iran does not want escalation; it would be catastrophic for the global economy. The media in the West is controlled, and there is little outrage at threats to destroy Iran. Glenn: Israeli and American aims now—what’s at stake, and how end this? Marandi: Since the Gaza genocide and Lebanon escalation, Zionism is increasingly viewed as evil, and public opinion against Zionism is growing in the US. The destruction of Israel’s credibility is the greatest defeat, not battlefield losses. End this war now would be prudent; as Iran strikes back, global sympathy for Iran grows and the empire weakens. If Israel were to use a nuclear weapon, that would be catastrophic and could prompt broader proliferation. Glenn: Any chance Iran could retaliate against Britain or European states? Marandi: Europe and the US will have diminished presence in the region; bases would be forced to leave. He notes the possibility of false-flag attacks in the West and asserts Zionist manipulation as a risk, but emphasizes Iran’s determination to defend sovereignty and support for Palestinians and others. Glenn: Just a final note—Iran had three negotiations, not two, including the JCPOA. Thank you for joining. Marandi: Thank you.