reSee.it - Related Video Feed

Europe should have been negotiating with Russia, but now that Trump is, some are in an uproar. If the US stops sending arms and funding, the war will end. This all stems from American arrogance, going back decades to the US declaring itself the sole superpower and expanding NATO eastward, ignoring Russian concerns. The US participated in a violent coup in Ukraine in 2014, further escalating tensions. Europe needs a grown-up foreign policy, not one based on hate speech or Russophobia, but real diplomacy. NATO should have been disbanded in 1991. The US sees this as a game, but for Russia, it's about core national security.

The idea of Ukraine joining a Western military alliance is unacceptable to any Russian leader. After the Soviet Union collapsed in 1990, Gorbachev agreed to let Germany unify and join NATO, with the condition that NATO wouldn't expand eastward. However, NATO quickly moved to East Germany and later expanded to Russia's borders under Clinton. The new Ukrainian government voted overwhelmingly to join NATO, which Russia sees as a strategic threat. They believe Petro Poroshenko's government is not protecting Ukraine but rather threatening it with a major war. This situation poses a serious threat to Russia, and any Russian leader would have to react accordingly.

Ray McGovern recounts a long, inside view of U.S.–Soviet/Russian arms control and how it shaped or hindered security over decades, tying personal experience to broader strategic lessons. - Continuity and historical perspective. McGovern notes that, after decades in the CIA, he has witnessed both continuity and change in U.S. strategy across eras and administrations. He emphasizes that serious arms control and verification work has often depended on skilled, principled diplomacy even amid bureaucratic friction and political constraints. - Early arms-control work and verification. As chief of the Soviet Foreign Policy Branch in the CIA during the SALT era, he helped support Kissinger and Nixon while recognizing that the Russians faced pressure from both arms racing and concerns about China’s progress. He recalls briefing the Moscow delegation and the importance of verification: “Trust but verify.” He describes witnessing the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty negotiations and the process of uncovering Russian cheating (a radar at Krasnoyarsk later identified as ABM-related). The experience reinforced the value of independent verification mechanisms. - Personal anecdotes about diplomacy and decision-making. McGovern shares instances illustrating how diplomacy operated in practice: Kissinger touring Moscow covertly to broker deals; ambassador Beam's reaction in Helsinki; the sense that a president’s trusted aides could push forward arms-control progress even amid Senate resistance. He stresses the role of credible, informed analysis about the Soviet Union and Gorbachev, and the way that genuine engagement with Moscow helped reduce tensions at key moments (e.g., the late-1970s/early-1980s path toward detente and arms control). - Key treaties and turning points. He highlights several milestones: - ABM Treaty (1972): limiting ABM sites to two, then one, to preserve deterrence stability; verification challenges and the Russians’ willingness to negotiate under pressure. - Reykjavik and the late-1980s era: Reagan’s willingness to pursue arms-control breakthroughs; the shift that helped lead to meaningful reductions. - INF Treaty (1991/1992 onward) and its later withdrawal under Trump: the collapse of a pillar of strategic stability and its consequences for future arms control. - New START (2011): described as “really good” in limiting offensive missiles; its expiry topic is central to the current security calculation. Putin’s public suggestion to extend the treaty for another year, conditional on U.S. reciprocity, is noted; Trump’s stance is portrayed as uncertain or inconsistent. - The broader security architecture and indivisible security. McGovern stresses that “there is no security without mutual security” and points to the OSCE concept of indivisible security—no country should increase its security at the expense of others. He argues that NATO expansion and security dynamics in Europe have undermined mutual security and contributed to the current fragility in the security architecture. - Ukraine, NATO, and the stakes of perception. He contends that Moscow viewed NATO expansion and Ukraine’s trajectory as threats to its core security interests, contributing to Russia’s actions in Ukraine. He argues that Americans are often not educated about mutual security principles, which fuels misperceptions and escalatory dynamics. - Putin as a cautious actor and the risk of leadership reliability. McGovern describes Putin as a cautious statesman who aims to protect Russia’s core interests and avoid existential risk. He suggests Putin is calculating the reliability of U.S. leadership, especially under Trump, whose unpredictability complicates trust and predictability in negotiations. He notes Trump’s perceived narcissism and the possibility that Trump’s motivations in pursuing a peace process could be mixed with personal prestige or political gain. - Current and near-term outlook. The discussion touches on the likelihood of renewed arms-control leverage if U.S. and Russian leaders can agree on Ukraine-related constraints and verify compliance. It also notes that the broader trend—toward weaker, inconsistent adherence to treaties and a perceived decline in diplomacy—risks fueling a renewed arms race and greater instability. - Closing sentiment. McGovern underscores that genuine arms-control diplomacy, mutual restraint, and credible verification are essential for reducing the security dilemma that drives dangerous competition. He frames Putin as a potential hinge for stabilizing relations if U.S. leadership can articulate and sustain a credible, reciprocal security posture. Overall, the dialogue weaves historical memory with current geopolitics, stressing that lasting security rests on mutual restraint, verifiable agreements, and a shared understanding of indivisible security—even as political winds shift and alliances realign.

The Ukraine war didn't begin with Putin's invasion; it's rooted in broken promises. In 1990, the US assured Gorbachev NATO wouldn't expand eastward, a pledge violated starting in 1994. NATO expansion, coupled with US actions like the 1999 bombing of Serbia and the 2002 withdrawal from the ABM treaty, fueled Russian insecurity. The US involvement in Ukrainian politics, including the 2014 coup, further escalated tensions. Putin's 2021 security proposal, seeking to prevent NATO expansion, was rejected. The US's "open door" policy for NATO enlargement, and its support for Ukraine's continued fight, directly contradicts the assurances made to Gorbachev, leading to the current conflict. This is not a simple case of Russian aggression, but a culmination of decades of broken promises and escalating tensions.

- Democrats' spending caused inflation, and Biden's administration ignited global unrest after a peaceful period under Trump. Biden's Afghanistan withdrawal was botched, and NATO expansion talks provoked Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Opportunities for peace were rejected, leading to a prolonged war with mass casualties and depleted US stockpiles. - The US has a history of military interventions, including the bombing of Belgrade, and illegal wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria, as well as involvement in the 2014 coup in Kyiv. The US government cannot be trusted. - NATO expansion was promised not to move "one inch eastward" but Clinton signed off on plans to expand NATO to Ukraine. The US unilaterally withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 2002, leading to missile systems in Eastern Europe that Russia views as a threat. - Putin sought to force Ukraine to negotiate neutrality, aiming to keep NATO off Russia's border. The US rejected negotiations, and a draft Russia-US security agreement proposing no NATO enlargement. - Germany has aligned with the US, supporting NATO expansion, but previously had an independent foreign policy. Merkel knew NATO expansion was a bad idea but gave in to US pressure. - The US is in a hot war with Russia, with US personnel on the ground in Ukraine. Russia could disable critical American infrastructure. - The war in Ukraine is a US-Russia conflict provoked by the US with the aim of NATO enlargement. The American people have been told the opposite. - The war started in 2014 with US involvement in the overthrow of Ukraine's government. The US rejected off-ramps and continues to fund the war, resulting in Ukrainian deaths and territorial losses. - The US should negotiate with Russia, acknowledging mutual security concerns and halting NATO enlargement. - The US is trying to destroy Russia through CIA operations in Ukraine. Russia is defending its right to survive. - Globalists aim to exploit Ukraine's resources and destroy Russia. The BRICS nations are moving towards a gold-backed currency. - The US has invested billions in Ukraine since 1991 to support a democratic government. Zelenskyy's team is adding fuel to the fire. - The US blew up the Nord Stream pipeline, as promised by Biden. - The US is turning Ukraine into a de facto member of NATO.

Jeffrey Sachs argues that we are witnessing the limits of Western power, including the limits of U.S. power, and that this is part of a long-term trend toward the waning dominance of the Western world as Asia rises. He frames the broader arc as follows: - After World War II, Europe lost its colonies and the United States emerged to replace European empires, competing with the Soviet Union as the two major imperial powers. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, the United States appeared to be the sole superpower, leading to an era some called the unipolar moment. Sachs contends this moment was largely an illusion economically: for about a century and a half leading up to 1950, the West dominated, but the long-term trend was the narrowing of the gap between the West and Asia. - From the end of World War II onward, Asia began a sustained process of catching up in literacy, education, infrastructure, and industrialization. While Western economic and military dominance remained evident, Asia’s rise gradually altered the balance of power. By the 1990s and into the 2000s, Asia’s relative power had grown substantially, with China emerging as a major economic and technological force. - The “unipolar moment” faded as reality: Asia has been rising since the mid-20th century, and the post-1991 euphoria in the United States about unipolarity was economically questionable. Sachs notes that even at the height of U.S. power, the U.S. could not defeat Vietnam or sustain European empires, and that China’s rise began well before 2010, becoming evident in manufacturing and heavy industry led by China. - He highlights the Ukraine war as another demonstration of the limits of American expansion and NATO’s enlargement, arguing that the war marks the end of NATO enlargement and challenges the notion that the U.S. could redraw power on Eurasia at will. He recalls Zbigniew Brzezinski’s idea of U.S. dominance over Eurasia and argues that Putin’s stance showed that such dominance would not be realized. - Sachs emphasizes that technology and economic growth diffuse over time, making monopolies unsustainable. He cites historical examples: Britain’s early industrial edge, Germany and the United States catching up, and even the limited lasting power of nuclear monopoly due to espionage and scientific advances. He argues that “choke points” are a recurring meme that eventually fail to prevent rising challengers. - He discusses realist theories: offensive realism (John Mearsheimer) arguing that great powers cannot find stable balance and constantly seek advantage, versus defensive realism (and Kissinger’s Concert of Europe-inspired view) suggesting some stability through negotiation and norms. He notes that U.S. strategists often view China and Russia as destabilizing and dangerous, though he himself advocates cooperative accommodation with China, avoiding confrontations over red lines and arms sales to Taiwan. - Sachs connects these ideas to ideology, noting that dominant powers often rationalize dominance through imperialist or civilizing ideologies. He references Robert Kagan’s liberal imperialism concept and traces it back to European imperial thought, suggesting that Western mentalities persist even as formal empires fade. He argues that imperial mindsets continue in Britain and the United States, with imperial ideologies shaping how power is exercised and justified. In sum, Sachs frames the current era as a gradual but undeniable shift away from Western, particularly American, dominance toward a more multipolar order led by Asia, with the Ukraine war and Iran as illustrating events showing the limits of unipolarity and the enduring, complex dynamics of great-power competition.

Checklist for summary approach: - Identify and preserve the core causation chain from 1990 to the present. - Retain all direct claims about NATO expansion, treaties, regime changes, and key US actions. - Highlight unique or surprising elements (intercepted calls, personal connections, blunt quotes). - Exclude repetition, filler, and off-topic discussions. - Do not judge the claims; present them as stated, without added qualifiers. - Translate any non-English nuances into concise English where needed. - Aim for 395–494 words. According to the speaker, the Ukraine war is not a Putin-initiated attack as framed by common narratives, but a long sequence beginning in 1990. James Baker (Secretary of State) told Mikhail Gorbachev that NATO would not move eastward if Germany unified; Gorbachev agreed. The speaker asserts the US then “cheated” with a 1994 Clinton plan to expand NATO to Ukraine, arguing that neoconservatives took power and NATO enlargement began in 1999 with Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. Russia initially cared little, seeing no direct border threat beyond Kaliningrad, and NATO’s bombing of Belgrade in 1999 aggravated Moscow. Putin’s leadership is described as initially pro-European; he even considered joining NATO when a mutually respectful relationship existed. After 9/11, Russia supported the US in counterterrorism, but two decisive later actions altered it. In 2002 the United States unilaterally withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, which the speaker says triggered US missile deployments in Eastern Europe—Aegis systems—prompting Russia to fear a decapitation strike from missiles near Moscow. He claims the US then invaded Iraq in 2003 on phony pretenses. In 2004–2005 a “soft regime change operation” in Ukraine (the first color revolution) installed leaders connected to US interests; the speaker recalls advising Ukraine’s government in the early 1990s and knows Yushchenko personally. Yanukovych won Ukraine’s 2009 election and pursued neutrality; the US pressed NATO expansion despite Ukrainian public preference for neutrality amid ethnic divides. On 22 February 2014, the US actively participated in overthrowing Yanukovych, with a leaked call between Victoria Nuland and Jeffrey Pyatt discussing a preferred next government (names like Yatsenyuk/Yats, and influence from Biden) and vowing Western support; the speaker asserts the Americans told Yanukovych to fight on, promising “we’ve got your back” but “we don’t have your front,” pushing Ukraine into front lines and contributing to a high death toll—“six hundred thousand deaths now of Ukrainians since Boris Johnson flew to Kyiv to tell them to be brave.” The speaker contends the war is misrepresented as a madman invading Europe and criticizes it as “bogus, fake history” and a PR narrative by the US government; he claims NYT suppressed his commentary and argues the US ignores prudence in favor of open-ended enlargement. He cautions against pursuing China and Taiwan, warning about nuclear risk if a power challenges the US. He notes Putin’s 2021 security proposal to bar NATO enlargement, the White House’s rejection of negotiations, and NATO’s “open door” stance, which he decries as unstable. The narrative concludes with a focus on preventing further escalation and avoiding a nuclear confrontation.

There's debate over expanding NATO to Central European countries like Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia. Russia is against further expansion, warning of a potential "cold peace." While the US hasn't set a date, the understanding is that expansion will happen eventually. The issue isn't *if*, but *when*. Germany primarily advocates for expansion within NATO. While keeping the option open, expansion should only proceed if there's a real threat. The focus should be on encouraging Russia to cooperate peacefully. It's also more important for Eastern European countries to join the European Union for economic benefits. Expanding NATO to protect borders that aren't currently threatened doesn't make sense. Creating a buffer zone in Central Europe could lead to renewed tensions between Russia and Germany. We should aim for friendly relations with Russia.

George Beebe discusses how NATO expansion and Western narratives changed from the 1990s to the present, focusing on concerns within the U.S. and Europe about how enlargement would affect relations with Russia. He explains that after the Cold War ended—after the Berlin Wall fell, the Warsaw Pact broke up, and the Soviet Union dissolved—the West faced the question of what foreign policy should be. He says Western judgment was that the Western community was successful and should be extended: transforming former Warsaw Pact members, Russia, and even the Middle East through liberalization and “globaliz[ing] the Western system.” He argues this involved “social engineering” that the West was “really not capable of” and that it failed to account for Russia’s reactions. Beebe says NATO enlargement was built on the idea that extending the NATO and EU “security umbrella” would foster Westernization and liberalization, while Russia viewed this as offering subordinate status rather than co-equal partnership. He describes Russian concerns as including the placement of NATO forces on Russia’s borders. He adds that many Russia experts in Washington and Europe—especially those with deep expertise from the Cold War—believed expansion would trigger increasingly intense reactions as NATO moved closer to Russian borders. He says that in the mid-1990s it was widely considered “crazy” to expand NATO, and that it was “unthinkable” to go beyond Warsaw Pact states and bring core elements of the former Soviet Union—specifically Ukraine—into NATO. In his view, what is now treated as conventional wisdom—that Ukraine can choose its military allies and host forces—is “almost a sacred principle” that is central to the root of the current conflict. Beebe emphasizes that understanding these dynamics is critical to finding an exit from the war, stating that arguing the conflict was “completely unprovoked” ignores history and shaping dynamics. He also addresses how initial disagreement became a narrative that NATO enlargement had “nothing whatsoever to do with this” even after warnings. He mentions William Burns’ “Nyet Means Nyet” cable and its argument that no matter Russia’s political spectrum, Ukrainian NATO membership would be intolerable and would provoke reaction. Beebe says that after enlargement decisions were made, some opponents accepted the “new situation on the ground,” in part because power brokers in Washington would not publicly admit they were wrong and because a “new generation of Russia experts” emerged who were trained during a period expecting transformation of Russia into liberal democracies through internal-system-focused reasoning, with geography and balance of power treated as less important. He argues the European Union’s post-Cold War evolution left it unable to act coherently as a geopolitical actor because it became a regulatory superpower focused on transmitting values and expanding a Western community. He says Russian objections force Europeans into an “existential question” about Europe’s purpose, which he links to difficulties settling the war. Beebe then outlines how he believes Russia interpreted events in Ukraine as not starting in 2014 but rooting back to early NATO enlargement steps, especially the Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary joining. He recounts Russia’s concern that NATO claimed to be defensive while intervening in Serbia without UN Security Council authorization, and how this led Russia to conclude that deterrence depended less on NATO’s stated nature than on Russia’s own ability to deter. He connects this to the 2008 Bucharest summit signaling Ukraine and Georgia could join NATO, describing Russia’s view that Ukraine was becoming “NATO-ized” through deepening military links. He says Russia believed a window was closing: Ukraine’s enmeshment would eventually remove Russia’s military option except war with NATO. He characterizes Putin’s action as “preemptive and illegally,” while also maintaining that there were causes beyond “Putin’s own imperialist desires.” In discussing current escalation, Beebe describes NATO involvement as something Ukrainians would like to see directly, believing it mitigates Russia’s advantages. He says Russia understands it is being baited into an overreaction, but that provocations have intensified, including attacks he references on Russian territory and nuclear-relevant capabilities. He says Russia’s messaging aims to pressure Washington and Europe to restrain Ukrainians, including Foreign Intelligence Service warnings about Latvian involvement in drone strikes and threats against Latvian facilities. He portrays a scenario where Article 5 could trigger a painful U.S. choice between fighting Russia—potentially nuclear—or hollowing out NATO, arguing that U.S. interest lies in diplomacy to avoid that decision. He also warns that Western fear of nuclear war has diminished, which he calls dangerous because nuclear deterrence relies on fear to bring sobriety. He cites Sergei Karganov’s view that fear of nuclear war must be restored and says restoring it could create a catastrophic escalatory spiral. On the “narrative war,” Beebe calls claims that Ukraine is winning “propaganda,” describing it as designed to buy time and allow opponents of settlement to avoid compromise. He argues the “stay the course” line seeks to avoid any need to compromise and that it is a fantasy, asserting that a compromise would require Russia giving up important things and the West and Ukraine also doing so. He compares the logic to the war on Iran analogy raised by the host: Western unwillingness to accept Russia’s existential threat perception prevents understanding why Moscow cannot accept capitulation terms. He closes by saying his optimism about compromise has fluctuated, becoming more hopeful after developments in the Israel-U.S.-Iran conflict that he connects to renewed prospects for negotiations in Ukraine. He adds that making Zelensky accept a settlement and getting Europeans to think about “the world as it is, not how they wish it was” would be complicated. He frames the struggle as between the Trump administration and a “deep state,” including links in Europe, and says the next weeks will show whether resistance can be overcome.

We've seen five waves of NATO expansion, with military bases and attack systems now deployed in Romania and Poland. Ukraine is also being considered for NATO membership. We didn't threaten anyone; they came to our borders. Instead of treating Russia as a potential ally and building trust, they kept breaking us up and expanding NATO to the East. We expressed our concerns, but they didn't care. We prioritize our own security.

Jeffrey Sachs and the host discuss the four-year anniversary of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and reference the 12-year anniversary of the NATO-backed coup in Ukraine. They frame the conflict as humanitarian and strategic disaster, arguing it risks Europe and potentially nuclear escalation. They question why the war persists given high stakes. Sachs argues the war started from Western delusions in the 1990s that the US could bring Russia into a US-led world and reduce Russia to a secondary power or even fragment it. He cites Zbigniew Brzezinski’s 1990s predictions of a divided Russia as evidence of “triumphalism” and says when Russia resisted Western demands after 2014 and 2022, those resistances were used by Western politicians to justify prolonging the conflict. He condemns Boris Johnson for saying Ukraine could not sign a peace with Russia without threatening Western hegemony, calling the situation “millions of lives” lost over a game of Western dominance. He characterizes European leaders as complicit, noting resistance to NATO enlargement in Europe but eventual acquiescence, and criticizes German leadership (Merkel, Scholz, and Scholz’s successor, Mertz/Merz?—context suggests Olaf Scholz and then Olaf Scholz and Friedrich Merz) for lack of truthful or constructive intervention. He emphasizes that the push for NATO enlargement and the Maidan coup signaled a failure by Europe to prevent war, with specific reference to the 2008 Bucharest Summit (NATO enlargement), the 2014 Maidan coup and the 2015 Minsk agreements, which Sachs claims Germany and France did not enforce. He asserts Merkel initially resisted but capitulated on enlargement, and that Minsk II was treated as a holding period to build Ukraine’s strength for war, a point he attributes to Merkel’s later statements. He argues Germany bears high responsibility as the largest EU member and a central actor in these decisions. Sachs then discusses what could have prevented the war, arguing that Germany should have counseled peace with Putin and engaged directly with the goal of avoiding escalation. He asserts that Merkel, Merkel’s successors, and the German leadership failed to prevent the conflict, calling for German initiative to seek peace. The conversation shifts to the possibility of negotiated settlement. The host notes Russia views NATO expansion and Ukraine’s invasion as existential threats, while Ukraine sees an existential threat from the invasion. The host asks what settlements might look like and what role the US and Europe should play. Sachs reiterates Germany as the key actor and calls for direct diplomacy between Germany and Russia to explore peace, suggesting a need for a political settlement and a reconsideration of Ukraine’s status. Sachs expands the discussion to global order. He references Brzezinski’s The Grand Chessboard, describing how Russia’s shift toward Eurasia and China challenged Western assumptions. He argues the West’s sanctions failed to keep Russia aligned with Europe, pushing Russia toward China and India, and turning the world toward multipolarity. He characterizes the US as a declining hegemon and Europe as demoralized and divided, with BRICS and other regions seeking prosperity through partnerships with China, India, and Russia. He argues that Europe should move away from Russophobia and toward collective security. The hosts touch on Joe Biden’s 1997 Atlantic Council remarks and Joseph Chamberlain’s imperial rhetoric as examples of misjudgments about global power dynamics. Sachs concludes by underscoring the need for a more realistic approach to the world order to avoid further conflict, and the host agrees to continue the discussion in the future.

The speaker expresses deep sadness about the current situation with Russia, noting extensive time spent in Russia in the 1980s and 1990s and connections with people who ran the government then. He argues that a fundamental error by the United States in the mid to late 1980s and early 1990s was the expansion of NATO. He emphasizes that after the Cold War was won, there was debate about NATO’s future, and the idea of expanding it arose despite it being a bureaucracy that “works.” The speaker recounts a key episode from the reunification negotiations with Germany. He says that during those talks, Gorbachev and Jim Baker discussed the treaty, which stated that there would be no NATO troops in East Germany, and Baker told Gorbachev that if Germany were reunified and NATO expanded beyond that, NATO would not expand “one inch further east.” The speaker states that Gorbachev told him and others that Baker had promised this interpretation, and that Gorbachev also told Coal (likely a reference to other Russian officials) the same thing, which he says was new information. He asserts that the first Bush administration kept this promise, or at least appeared to honor it, pursuing a partnership for peace that Russians somewhat liked. With the Clinton administration, the speaker asserts, the first thing done in his first term was to expand NATO. He questions the rationale, referencing Strobe Talbot’s Foreign Affairs article on why NATO was expanded, and implies the reasons were insufficient. In conversations with Russians who ran for president in 1996 and 2000, he recalls a question from the Urals about why the Americans were expanding NATO, noting that although NATO is a military alliance, Russians might not understand puts and calls but do understand tanks. He quotes a Russian politician who says, “Russians might not be able to understand puts and calls, but they certainly understand tanks.” The speaker uses a banking analogy: a friend or supporter goes bankrupt, and you call to offer encouragement; instead, the United States “kicked them when they were down” by expanding NATO. He contends that this expansion created the justification for authoritarianism’s return in Russia and characterizes it as a blunder of monumental proportions. He reflects that at Oxford he studied Cold War origins and believes the Russians were responsible for much of it, describing the expansion as born of bureaucratic inertia within NATO, or, in the worst case, a self-fulfilling prophecy among certain Clinton-era officials who believed Russia would forever be the enemy. Looking forward, the speaker suggests a missed opportunity for a strategic partnership built on common long-term threats and cooperation, noting that Russia would have been a significant partner given its oil and regional influence. He concludes with a sense of profound sadness, arguing that the United States created a problem that could have been avoided and lost an important long-term partner, especially on today’s most threatening issues.

What does "revisionist Russia" mean? It suggests a desire to return to the Soviet Union's former glory. Secretary Hagel mentioned Russia's army being on NATO's doorstep. Some argue this is due to NATO's eastward expansion, but that perspective isn't universally accepted. NATO's expansion is seen as beneficial, not a threat. While NATO is a defensive alliance, Russia's military movements, including actions in Ukraine, are viewed as aggressive. The expansion of NATO doesn't imply hostility; it's about security. The focus should be on Russia's actions that destabilize neighboring countries, rather than blaming NATO for its proximity to Russia.

We've seen 5 waves of NATO expansion, with military bases and attack systems now in Romania and Poland. Ukraine may also join NATO, further increasing their presence. We didn't threaten anyone, they came to our borders. Instead of treating Russia as a possible ally, they kept breaking us up and expanding NATO to the East. We expressed our concerns, but they don't care. We prioritize our own security.

I think President Putin believes NATO's expansion is the reason the Russian army is at NATO's doorstep, but we certainly don't see it that way. NATO has expanded, but that's a good thing. I'm pretty sure it wasn't NATO who ordered troops to the Ukrainian border or destabilized Eastern Ukraine. NATO is a security alliance, not an anti-Russia alliance. For fifty years, it was an anti-Soviet alliance. I'm not going to pretend to know what goes on in President Putin's mind. NATO has expanded, but there's no reason to think the expansion is hostile. We're blaming Russia for violating Ukraine's territorial integrity.

Putin's intention in the war wasn't to take over Ukraine, but to keep NATO, meaning the United States, off Russia's border. After the Soviet Union's end in 1991, an agreement stated NATO wouldn't move eastward, but the US decided to expand NATO eastward, formally deciding in 1994 to include Ukraine and Georgia. NATO enlargement began in 1999, upsetting Russia. By 2008, the US pushed for NATO expansion to Ukraine and Georgia, which Russia protested, drawing a parallel to a hypothetical military base on the US border. In 2014, the US actively worked to overthrow Yanukovych. Putin's intention was to force Zelensky to negotiate neutrality, which initially occurred, but Ukraine withdrew from the agreement, reportedly due to US influence. The US aimed to isolate Russia by controlling the Black Sea, viewing it as a proxy war, while the consequences included significant Ukrainian casualties.

Russia has been invaded three times through Ukraine, and they don't want Ukraine to join NATO. Gorbachev agreed to German reunification under NATO with the promise that NATO wouldn't expand eastward. However, in 1997, plans were made to move NATO eastward, incorporating 15 countries and surrounding the Soviet Union. NATO expanded into 14 new nations and withdrew from nuclear weapons treaties with Russia, placing missile systems in Romania and Poland. The U.S. allegedly overthrew the Ukrainian government in 2014, installing a Western-sympathetic government. Russia then entered Crimea to protect its warm water port. The new Ukrainian government allegedly began killing ethnic Russians in Donbas and Lugans. The Minsk Accords, designed to keep NATO out of Ukraine, were refused by the Ukrainian parliament. Zelenskyy was elected in 2019 promising to sign the Accords, but allegedly pivoted due to threats from ultra-rightists and the U.S. Russia then intervened, aiming to negotiate. A treaty guaranteeing Ukraine wouldn't join NATO was allegedly signed, but Boris Johnson, allegedly under Joe Biden's direction, forced Zelenskyy to abandon it.

Speaker 0 argues that this is not an attack by Putin on Ukraine in the way it is commonly framed. The speaker references 1990, stating that on 02/09/1990 James Baker III told Mikhail Gorbachev that NATO would not move eastward if Germany unified, and that Gorbachev agreed, ending World War II. The speaker asserts that the US then cheated starting in 1994 when Clinton signed off on a plan to expand NATO all the way to Ukraine, marking the rise of the neocons and identifying Clinton as the first agent of this. NATO expansion began in 1999 with Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, at which point Russia did not see a direct threat. The speaker notes the US-led bombing of Serbia in 1999 as problematic, describing it as NATO bombing Belgrade for seventy-eight straight days to break the country apart, which Russia did not like. Putin became president, and the Russians initially tolerated and complained but were largely subdued. The speaker claims Putin started out pro-European and pro-American, even suggesting joining NATO when there was some mutual respect. After 9/11 and the Afghan conflict, Russia supported the effort to root out terror. Two decisive actions are highlighted: in 2002, the United States unilaterally withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, described as perhaps the most decisive event rarely discussed in this context. This led to the US placing missile systems in Eastern Europe, which Russia views as a direct threat. The speaker mentions a soft regime change operation in Ukraine in 2004-2005, followed by Yanukovych winning the election in 2009 and becoming president in 2010 on the basis of neutrality for Ukraine. This calmed tensions because the US was pushing NATO, while Ukrainian public opinion reportedly did not want NATO membership, citing a divided country between ethnic Ukrainians and ethnic Russians and a desire to stay away from certain conflicts. In 02/22/2014, the United States allegedly participated in the overthrow of Yanukovych, described as a typical US regime change operation. The Russians supposedly intercepted a call between Victoria Nuland (then at the State Department, now at Columbia University) and Jeffrey Piot, the US ambassador to Ukraine, discussing who would be in the next government. The speaker asserts that after these events, the US said NATO would enlarge, while Putin repeatedly warned to stop, noting that promises were made not to enlarge NATO. Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia are listed as having joined NATO in 2004, before the broader enlargement. The speaker accuses the US of rejecting the basic idea of not expanding NATO to Russia’s border while placing missile systems after breaking a treaty, including walking out of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty in 2019. On 12/15/2021, Putin allegedly proposed a draft Russia-US security agreement with no NATO enlargement, which the speaker says he communicated to the White House, urging negotiations to avoid war. The speaker claims Jake Sullivan asserted an open-door policy for NATO enlargement, calling it “bullshit,” and asserts that they refused negotiations, leading to the special military operation, with Zelensky offering neutrality and Western leaders pushing Ukraine to fight, resulting in “600,000 deaths now of Ukrainians.”

The speaker explains that the idea of Ukraine joining a Western military alliance is unacceptable to Russia. This goes back to 1990 when the Soviet Union collapsed and NATO agreed not to expand eastward. However, NATO did expand to East Germany and later to the borders of Russia under Clinton. The new Ukrainian government voted to join NATO, which the speaker sees as a serious strategic threat to Russia. The speaker argues that Russia's actions, such as taking Crimea, are reactions to this threat rather than acts of protection.

The Ukraine conflict didn't begin with Putin's 2022 invasion; it's rooted in broken promises dating back to 1990. The US, despite assurances to Gorbachev that NATO wouldn't expand eastward, violated this agreement, starting with NATO expansion in 1999. This was followed by NATO bombing of Serbia in 1999 and the placement of missile systems in Eastern Europe, viewed by Russia as a direct threat. Further US involvement included the 2004 and 2014 Ukrainian regime changes. Despite Putin's initial pro-Western stance and his 2021 proposal for a security agreement barring NATO expansion, the West's continued support for Ukraine escalated the conflict. The narrative of Putin as a madman is a misrepresentation; this is a complex geopolitical game with potentially devastating consequences.

Ray McGovern emphasizes the erosion of the post-World War II security architecture, especially the U.S.-led system that emerged after the Cold War and aimed to globalize the Transatlantic Partnership. He argues that this expansion has strained the United States economically, militarily, and institutionally, and that security has become more volatile as empires exhaust both capabilities and moral legitimacy. He uses NATO’s history to illustrate how shifting perceptions of threat—historically the Soviet menace versus modern Russian and German sensitivities—shape alliance dynamics. He notes that many Americans were taught a one-sided narrative: NATO was created to contain the Warsaw Pact, while the Soviets also felt threatened by Western actions. He recalls his own indoctrination, the evolution of NATO, and the Warsaw Pact’s creation in response to West German NATO entry in 1955, explaining that “security is indivisible” and that each side’s fears drive the other’s behavior. He observes that polls show the U.S. losing its status as Russia’s main adversary, with Germany becoming the more prominent concern, which complicates the security calculus. Speaker 0 adds historical context, referencing John Lewis Gaddis and the Cold War’s security competition, where blocs prompted mutual insecurity. He discusses the Helsinki Accords and the attempt to reduce security competition, contrasting that with post-Cold War optimism that NATO expansion would stabilize Europe. He notes opposition among some American leaders to expanding NATO and argues that the Ukraine conflict reveals a problematic belief in “force for good” through military blocs, suggesting that expanded NATO has contributed to the current crisis rather than preventing it. He highlights the potential consequences of continued reliance on NATO and U.S. guarantees, questioning the credibility of Article 5 guarantees in an era of waning U.S. commitment. Speaker 1 recounts his experiences in Munich (1968) with Radio Free Europe and his opposition to encouraging Czech resistance to Soviet tanks, arguing that the Brezhnev Doctrine has a modern analogue in Ukraine. He describes the sequence leading to Crimea’s annexation, including the 2014 Maidan events, Western negotiations (Minsk Accords), and the dynamic between Western leaders and Putin. He argues that Putin’s decision to invade Ukraine arose from a perception of NATO encroachment and Western deceit, asserting that Moscow’s actions were a response to attempts to place Ukraine in NATO orbit and to secure a vital Black Sea port. He states that Russia halted further invasions in 2022 after Ukrainian negotiations to avoid NATO membership and a ceasefire, and he contends that Western actors, including Boris Johnson, pressured Ukraine to continue fighting. Speaker 0 contends that the war’s conduct was shaped by Western promises and the perception that NATO’s expansion would secure democracy. He criticizes European leaders like Kaya Kaltois (Kallas) and Zakharova’s exchange to illustrate the political theater around NATO and European security. He stresses that European leaders’ rhetoric—such as calls for “no Russian red lines”—and the reliance on U.S. military power created incentives for continued conflict. He also critiques the influence of the military-industrial complex, warning that profiteering from defense production drives war. Speaker 1 emphasizes the CIA’s dual role: one branch “for lying to the public” and overthrowing governments, and another “analysis division” that historically aimed to tell the truth. He cites the 2007 unanimous intelligence assessment that Iran had stopped working on a nuclear weapon at the end of 2003 and had not resumed, noting that later officials removed or reframed statements about immediate threats. He references George W. Bush’s admission that the 2007 estimate deprived him of a military option, and he points to Tulsi Gabbard’s 2019-2024 reluctance to label Iran as an imminent threat. He argues Iran is not a direct threat to the United States but is linked to Israel and regional dynamics, including Netanyahu’s role and the 2003-2007 Iran/Iraq/Israel calculus. He mentions Joe Kent’s resignation as a dissenting voice against continued war in Iran, suggesting that some military leaders and officials pushed back against aggressive policy. Speaker 0 wraps by noting the evolving U.S.-Israel relationship and the need for responsible diplomacy. He highlights the broader international realignment: NATO’s credibility waning, Europe reassessing security guarantees, and potential shifts in alliances with the Gulf States and Asia. He closes with a cautious note that genuine diplomatic leadership and intelligent intelligence analysis could help establish a more stable order, rather than perpetuating disruptive escalation.

Putin's intention in the war was to force Zelensky to negotiate—Neutrality. "The idea was to keep NATO. And what is NATO? It's The United States off of Russia's border. No more, no less." When the Soviet Union ended in 1991, an agreement was made that NATO will not move one inch eastward, but "the decision was taken formally in 1994 when president Clinton signed off on NATO enlargement to the East, all the way to Ukraine and into Georgia." Enlargement continued: 1999 (Hungary, Poland, Czech Republic); 2004 (Baltic states, Romania, Bulgaria, Slovenia, Slovakia). Putin said "stop" in 02/2007; in 02/2008, "The United States jammed down Europe's throat enlargement of NATO to Ukraine and to Georgia." 02/2010, Yanukovych neutrality; US overthrow in 2014; Minsk accords; "autonomy for the Russian speaking regions" in the East. "Blinken told Lavrov in January 2022, The United States reserves the right to put missile systems wherever it wants." The war started; "Ukraine walked away unilaterally from a near agreement" because "The United States told them to." It's the pure proxy war; and "a million Ukrainians have died or been severely"

The discussion focuses on escalating security tensions in Europe and concerns about a potential NATO–Russia war, particularly after drone attacks allegedly originating from beyond Baltic States’ territory. The host says the attacks were first denied by NATO, then acknowledged with claims tied to Ukraine’s use of territory; Russia’s retaliation is described as increasingly likely due to continued escalation over four years. Jeffrey Sachs argues that there is no effective diplomacy between Europe and Russia, and that Europeans are “talking past each other.” He says leadership influence is concentrated among Baltic States and Poland, which he describes as highly Russophobic, and he criticizes the European Union’s external relations structure by saying that the voice of the EU community has been effectively handed to Baltic officials involved in defense policy. Sachs also claims that Germany and France have not “put on the brakes,” and he identifies chancellor Mertz as particularly irresponsible, describing him as an openly pro-militarization leader who has shown no interest in diplomacy such as contacting President Putin or holding meetings between German and Russian foreign ministers. Sachs emphasizes Germany’s responsibility, stating that Germany promised the Soviet Union in unambiguous terms that NATO would not enlarge, and that Germany was the guarantor of the Minsk II agreement, which he says failed as intended. He also claims that Germany has repeatedly “cheated” on commitments and that Mertz’s stance conflicts with the four-plus-two treaty governing German unification, which he says includes no remilitarization provisions. He criticizes France and the UK as well, arguing that “strategic autonomy” in Europe is being implemented in a hostile way toward Russia. Turning to Ukraine, Sachs describes its government as radical, corrupt, and extremist, asserting that a small group runs the state under martial law. He claims Ukraine is attempting to provoke Europe into an expanded war because Ukraine cannot fight Russia directly, and he points to alleged drone operations through Baltic airspace. He also claims Ukraine has attacked Russia’s nuclear triad by bombing aircraft on tarmacs as part of nuclear arms control surveillance mechanisms, and that Ukraine has taken other provocative steps. Sachs argues that the combination of Baltic-front escalation, European policy being driven by Baltic states, and Germany’s remilitarization rhetoric creates an extremely dangerous hotspot, possibly even more dangerous than the Ukraine contact line. The host responds that it is unclear whether Russia is directly responsible for drone incursions into the Baltic States or whether Russia is countering Ukrainian drones, calling it speculation. The host then notes mutual rhetoric and says there is a need to either prevent an entry into war or restore diplomacy. He points to Angela Merkel arguing it is time to speak to Russia and says Europe has spent four years boycotting diplomacy while treating the lack of dialogue as virtuous. He also describes internal EU coordination problems, arguing that common positions tend toward the lowest common denominator, potentially aggressive demands such as Russian capitulation. He asks whether Sachs is optimistic that efforts to restore diplomacy will work. Sachs compares the dynamic to Israel–Palestine, arguing that hatred can “boil over” into genocide. He frames the Ukraine war as great-power politics stemming from NATO enlargement and Russia’s resistance, and he claims it originated from the February 2014 coup under a Russian view that the United States was a major actor. Sachs then argues that European narratives have become dominated by “Russian evil,” while key historical elements are excluded from discussion, including Germany’s and the United States’ roles in reunification commitments, NATO decisions, Minsk II, arms control, and the U.S. abandonment of an anti-ballistic missile treaty. Sachs highlights Bucharest NATO Summit 2008 as a turning point, saying Merkel warned that NATO enlargement could lead to war and that Germany ultimately gave in, allowing an unequivocal NATO enlargement commitment to Ukraine and Georgia. He further describes Germany’s 2014 involvement in negotiating with Viktor Yanukovych to prevent a coup, followed by U.S. recognition of the new government and Germany’s acceptance. He says Minsk II created a new constitutional order granting autonomy in Donbas and that Germany and France were guarantors, while he claims the U.S. and Ukraine privately did not intend to implement it and Germany did not enforce it, later quoting Merkel as saying in 2022 they “never really meant it” to buy time. Finally, Sachs argues that face-to-face discussion is necessary and that responsible diplomacy could force Europeans to remember history and prevent destructive escalation. He says Lavrov would be a good counterpart due to extensive historical knowledge. He closes by repeating that Europe should talk to Russia, emphasizing historical accountability and urging Germany to review its recent diplomatic history before engaging in talks.

Glenn: Welcome back. We are joined today by Professor John Mersheimer to understand what is happening in the world with this new great power rivalry and how the outcome of the Ukraine war will impact this new Cold War. Have we entered a new Cold War? Who are the players, competing interests, and the rules? Mersheimer: I think we have entered a new Cold War. We're in a multipolar system, and the United States, China, and Russia are the three great powers. The United States is certainly in a cold war with China. China is powerful and threatens to dominate East Asia, and the United States will almost certainly go to great lengths to prevent that from happening, which axiomatically creates an intense security competition in China. An intense security competition is a cold war, and the name of the game is to make sure that security competition does not turn into a hot war. We are in a cold war with the Chinese, or the Chinese are in a cold war with us. The hot war is avoided. Regarding Russia, since we moved into multipolarity, the Russians and the Chinese have been close allies against the United States. This is largely a result of the Ukraine war, which has pushed the Russians into the arms of the Chinese and caused closer Sino-Russian cooperation. The United States, through the Biden administration, was involved in a cold war with both Russia and China. Trump tried to change that, seeking good relations with Russia to form a Russia-plus-US alliance against China, but he has been unable to make that happen. The result is that the United States is basically still in a cold war with both Russia and China. The war in Ukraine has made me worry greatly that the Cold War in Europe could turn into a hot war, even as the U.S.-China relationship remains cooler so far. Glenn: European leaders hoped the United States and Europe would unite in this new Cold War, with liberal hegemony fading and a return to unity against Russia. But Ukraine has instead divided Europe. How do you explain this? Is it the US not seeing Russia as the same threat as Europeans, or a concern about pushing Russia toward China, or Europe’s costs of the partnership? Is this uniquely a Trump-era approach? Mersheimer: From an American point of view, good relations with Russia make sense. China is the peer competitor, and the United States wants to pivot to East Asia to prevent China’s dominance. Russia is the weakest of the three great powers and not a major threat to Europe. The Americans believe Europe can deal with Russia, freeing them to focus on China. Europe, by contrast, is threatened by Russia’s proximity and thus prioritizes Russia. NATO expansion into Ukraine is seen by many Europeans as a disaster, poisoning Russia–Europe relations, making Europe deeply committed to using Ukraine to weaken Russia. The transatlantic alliance becomes strained, especially with Trump raising the possibility of leaving NATO. Europeans fear losing the American pacifier that keeps centrifugal forces in check, which would complicate European coordination with Russia. Glenn: If the United States signals a departure, won’t Europe face greater challenges in managing Russia? And is Russia truly an empire-building threat, or is this a post-2014 narrative that intensified after February 2022? Mersheimer: Bringing Ukraine into NATO was destined to cause trouble. The crisis began in 2014, and the 2022 war is ongoing. The Ukrainians and Europeans want a security guarantee for Ukraine, essentially NATO membership, while Russia demands territory and rejects a security guarantee that would enshrine NATO’s presence near its borders. The Europeans see NATO expansion as threatening, while the Americans view Russia as the weaker power and the need to pivot to China. The controversy over responsibility for this disaster arises from competing interpretations of NATO expansion and Russian aggression. Glenn: Do you see Russia changing course soon? There has been escalation—Odessa blockades, port attacks, and targeting infrastructure. Could this signal a new stage of the war? Mersheimer: The Russians believe Ukraine is on the ropes and expect to win on the battlefield in 2026, possibly expanding fronts in Kharkiv and Sumy. They may consider increasing conventional force and possibly using nuclear weapons if the war drags on. They view the conflict as existential and fear losing, which could push them toward drastic measures to end the war. The Russians could escalate if they think they cannot win conventionally. Glenn: What are the non-nuclear options to win quickly? Could the Russians deliver a decisive conventional victory? Mersheimer: It’s a war of attrition. If Ukraine’s army is weakened, Russia could surround large Ukrainian formations, disrupt logistics, and open larger fronts. They may build up forces in the rear, potentially for a breakthrough or to deter Western escalation. The battlefield outcome may determine the next steps, including whether nuclear options are considered. Glenn: How will Ukraine end? Is it a military defeat, economic collapse, or political fragmentation? Mersheimer: Ukraine is likely to be defeated on the battlefield. Its economy is in desperate shape, and losing Odessa or more territory would worsen it. Politically, Ukraine will face internal divisions once the war ends. Europe will face a broken Russia–Ukraine relationship, with some European states viewing the conflict differently. Ukraine’s demographic decline compounds its bleak outlook, and the country may become a problematic rump state. The war should have been settled earlier; the negotiators in Istanbul in 2022 could have sought a different path. Zelensky’s choice to align with Western powers and walk away from Istanbul negotiations deepened Ukraine’s predicament. Glenn: Any final reflections? Mersheimer: The war’s outcome will reshape Western unity and European security. Historians may view this as a major mistake in weakening the West. The blame for the disaster will likely be attributed in the West to Russia’s imperialism, but the expansion of NATO is also central. Europe’s economic and political landscape will be altered, and Ukraine’s future will be deeply challenging.