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China's military has been increasingly testing Taiwan's defenses, including encircling the island with aerial drones and detecting fighter jets off its East Coast. This has sparked debate about Taiwan's defense strategy, which relies on its mountainous East Coast as a safe haven. Retired Admiral Lee Si Min advocates for asymmetrical warfare, focusing on mobile, civilian-operated defenses like anti-ship missiles and drones, to deter China. He believes China would only invade if confident in its ability to blockade Taiwan's East Coast, preventing allied assistance. Conversely, Dr. Su Tsu Yun of Taiwan's Institute for National Defense and Security Research emphasizes a maritime defense strategy, utilizing systems like Patriot missiles and Phalanx cannons to create a "design loan" and hinder Chinese forces. New US access to bases in the Philippines could also aid Taiwan's defense. Taiwan's defense ministry asserts there will be no safe rear during wartime. Despite strategic debates, the military agrees that deterring conflict is the ultimate goal.

The speaker discusses whether Xi Jinping will attack Taiwan. They mention that in a previous interview, Xi Jinping stated that he would not attack Taiwan until 2027 or 2035. However, many people doubt the credibility of his statement. The speaker also reveals recent information about large-scale power outages in Xinjiang, Fujian, and Beijing, suggesting that these outages may be part of military preparations. They mention that this information is a leak. The speaker concludes by mentioning that the US government officials want to verify Xi Jinping's statements.

Xu Qinhua, host of Dialogue at CGTN, joined Glenn to discuss Donald Trump’s meeting with Xi Jinping in Beijing on 05/14/2026, including the atmosphere, objectives, and key issues shaping China–U.S. relations. Xu Qinhua said the day’s atmosphere was “very positive.” Trump was impressed by the welcoming ceremony, reviewing the ceremonial guards with Xi Jinping, visits to the Temple of Heaven, and a state banquet. The leaders spent the morning in discussions with their teams, then met at the Temple of Heaven in the afternoon. In the evening, they attended a state banquet hosted by the presidency. Xi Jinping’s speech emphasized that China–U.S. should be “partners rather than rivals,” while Trump’s warm response highlighted shared values between Chinese and Americans and referenced long engagement between the peoples over about 250 years. Trump cited early U.S. contact with China in 1784, including the arrival of a U.S. ship, Chinese terms for newcomers, Chinese workers helping link the Pacific and Atlantic through a continental railroad, the establishment of Tsinghua University, U.S.-China allied cooperation during World War II, and Confucius being respected in the U.S. Xu Qinhua said both sides agreed on a vision described as “strategic constructive… strategic stability” to guide the relationship for the next three years or even beyond. Glenn raised the broader concern that Trump’s administrations, and more broadly U.S. views that China is the main peer rival, often place China in the spotlight. He referenced Xi Jinping’s idea of overcoming the “Thucydides’ trap” and asked about prospects for easing the economic war shaped by trade, technology, and tariffs. Xu Qinhua said Xi Jinping meant overcoming the trap and setting a new model for major-power relationships. Xu described China and the U.S. as peers in terms of economy, high-tech development, innovation, and military capabilities, arguing that how they handle the relationship affects not only both countries but global stability. He said trade used to serve as a “ballast” stabilizer because of investment and exports, but the relationship is now again at a challenging time involving trade war, tech war, and tariffs. Xu said both sides were discussing the possibility of a “new model” of coexistence, emphasizing “cooperation” and limiting “zero sum” thinking. Glenn asked what specific issues must be resolved, including whether the focus is tariffs, chip export limitations, or China’s willingness to export rare earths, and noted U.S. interest in Chinese purchases of U.S. energy and agriculture. Xu Qinhua responded that they were discussing building a “border for trade” and a “board of investment” to institutionalize dialogues and communications to address individual issues regularly rather than in isolated cases. Xu said from China’s perspective the trade war has brought suffering to both sides; China’s exports continued to grow even as U.S. tariff efforts did not stop Chinese exports. Xu said the Chinese side was pragmatic about expanding trade in areas that are not sensitive, such as advanced chips, and that U.S. companies could be willing to sell items like oil, agriculture products (including soybeans and beef), and Boeing airplanes if trade targets fall outside high-tech and national-security sensitivities. He said China’s theme is cooperation-focused “strategic stability,” with limited competition, and communication across multiple areas including military and trade. Xu argued trade itself is mutually beneficial and that trade imbalance is not the real issue, tying underlying concerns to the U.S. role as the supplier of the major reserve currency. On energy security, Glenn described U.S. efforts to reduce exports from key energy exporters and replace them with U.S. supplies, including claims about Europe after Nord Stream and a push for U.S. centrality in energy infrastructure and sales. Xu Qinhua said China has concern about over-reliance on U.S. oil and LNG and forming reliance on the U.S. market amid negative U.S. media coverage and low trust. He said China has diversified exports to ASEAN, Southeast Asia, African countries, Latin America, and European markets, and diversified energy sources so reliance on a single source is usually not over 20%, with oil and gas coming from Russia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Brazil, Ghana, among others. Xu said China is rapidly developing renewable energy (EVs, solar panels, and wind turbines), investing in nuclear power plants under construction, and also has coal resources and technology to transform coal into gas so that coal can provide electricity in worst-case scenarios. He linked this to energy security being both about sufficient supply and access to energy resources globally. Glenn raised Taiwan as a central security issue and asked how central it was in talks and whether a reduced-tension common meeting point existed. Xu Qinhua said Xi Jinping raised Taiwan as expected in discussions with Trump, calling it the most important issue between China and the U.S. and warning that mishandling it could put the overall relationship in jeopardy. Xu said the Chinese side increased the volume and severity of its messaging, warning that Taiwan separatist activity threatens regional peace and stability; Xu said arms sales to Taiwan embolden secessionists and create security risks. Xu said the U.S. “one China” principle has been hollowed out, citing that while a 1982 communiqué foundation includes that the U.S. would reduce arms sales until zero, Xu claimed the U.S. has increased arms sales to Taiwan. Xu argued that if Washington truly cared about peace, it would make clear to separatists that it opposes Taiwan independence and support peaceful reunification efforts, which Xu said would remove a persistent irritant and allow cooperation on issues such as AI governance and crises including the Strait of Hormuz and Ukraine. Xu added that even with U.S. intervention, Taiwan purchases of arms would not match Mainland capabilities, and he said U.S. support for separatists would fail to slow China’s modernization. Glenn asked about Iran and the Strait of Hormuz as an issue discussed between Xi and Trump. Xu Qinhua said the leaders’ discussions covered the Iranian crisis. Xu said some U.S. media coverage claimed Trump should pressure China to pressure the Iranians, but Xu said the “wrong approach” would be pressure from Washington; Xu said Beijing has nothing to do with the crisis and that the crisis is tied to a war launched by Washington and the Israelis without UN authorization, without proper explanation, and without legitimacy. Xu said China and the U.S. share some common interest in opening the Strait of Hormuz because Gulf nations’ exports rely on it and because China purchases about 50–40% of its energy from the region. Xu said Washington would need to restrain demands, respect the fact that it launched the war and failed to achieve its goals, and accept reality, while the Chinese side would help seek a long-term deal and stable relationship between the U.S. and Iran. Xu said the U.S. side had not been seen as earnest or faithful in resolving the problem. When Glenn asked how this aligns with a common stance that Iran should not have nuclear weapons, Xu Qinhua said he did not see tensions upcoming between China and Iran. Xu said multiple oil tankers were navigating the Strait of Hormuz with limited disruption, and that about 90% of Iranian oil exports go to China, meaning there is no point for China to ask for tolls on tankers destined for China. Xu said if Iranian control or tolls occur, China would not oppose, especially if the U.S. refuses compromise, refuses to lift sanctions, and does not allow normal business with other countries. Xu described the key issue as how long the U.S. will tolerate inflationary pressure and how the U.S. continues its approach against what he characterized as an Iranian blockade against the U.S. blockade. In closing, Glenn asked whether the meeting would produce a “grand bargain” or only minor tweaks to resolve disputes. Xu Qinhua said the encounter was significant, not only between the leaders but also because top executives mingled and talked, which Xu said could increase understanding and opportunities for engagement that had been absent for nine years or longer. Xu said 2026 could be a milestone year for China–U.S. relations due to frequent future meeting opportunities: Trump’s invitation for Xi to visit the U.S. in late September, plus further opportunities on the sidelines of APEC in Shenzhen and the G20 summit in the U.S. Xu said they had found the “right approach” of constructive strategic stability with cooperation-focused limited competition, moving away from zero-sum mentality, which Xu said could benefit both sides and the world.

The speaker believes that America's global standing is at an all-time low, with Taiwan feeling vulnerable due to Chinese bombers flying over it. During the speaker's presidency, Taiwan was not threatened like this. The situation is concerning for Taiwan with constant bomber activity.

- The discussion begins with concern about the quality of Speaker 1’s internet connection for recorded YouTube work. Speaker 1 explains that their neighborhood has a monopolist limiting updates to local software/hardware, and says their own Starlink setup is going up, with 20+ or ~30 satellites already online and deploying quickly. Speaker 1 then jokes about sponsoring revolutions abroad, noting France and the UK should be ready. - The conversation shifts to international developments, focusing on the “Iran war” and later Ukraine/Russia, and then on Trump’s visit to China. - Speaker 1 describes alleged details from Trump’s China visit: Tajikistan’s president was visiting the same day, and during Trump’s arrival only part of the route’s flags were reportedly changed from Tajik to US flags. Speaker 1 frames this as a “soft insult.” - On Xi Jinping meeting Kim Jong Un and Vladimir Putin at airports/tarmacs, Speaker 1 says some claims are not true and emphasizes protocol and past examples: in prior meetings (Xi and Putin; Trump arriving previously), Xi reportedly met Putin at the tarmac, sat down with the top down, and drove into the city. Speaker 1 also says that in Trump’s last China arrival, Trump reportedly had Xi waiting. - Speaker 1 assesses the Xi–Trump meeting as unprepared compared with highly structured US-style or adversarial-country meetings. They describe how security teams, working diplomats, document preparation, possible joint statements, and agenda negotiation are typically handled before leaders meet. Speaker 1 compares this to earlier dynamics seen in Anchorage (with Trump allegedly seeking speed for a PR/picture moment). - The thread links the China visit to energy leverage involving Iran and Venezuela. Speaker 1 says Venezuela’s capacity is limited (around 800,000 barrels/day) and that significantly expanding it takes time and large investment. Speaker 1 argues US refining limitations matter: US refineries were set up for heavier sour crude (described as “viscous” and “sour” due to sulfur) and the US has not built a new refinery in over 30 years, citing bureaucracy and environmental laws as reasons companies left. - Speaker 1 elaborates on why the US cannot easily expand refining quickly, citing high insurance costs for factory work and related regulatory burdens, leading factories to move elsewhere. - Speaker 0 asks whether Trump intended a different sequence: Speaker 1 says the initial idea was to seek earlier wins and use Venezuela and Iran concessions to gain leverage, but the meeting reportedly came with Trump facing weaker leverage and needing help on Iran. - Taiwan discussions: Speaker 1 says reunification preferences exist among the Taiwanese opposition party that met Xi in China, with Taiwan described as the “Republic of China” and some groups categorized as seeking reconquest/reunification. Speaker 1 discusses why supplying Taiwan for conflict is difficult across open water and notes past US War College war-game conclusions that China would win if the US fleet intervened between China and Taiwan, while US strategy (as described) aims to make invasion costly rather than “winning.” - Proxy-war framing: Speaker 1 describes Ukraine and Iran/Yemen conflict patterns as proxy dynamics, referencing Marco Rubio’s admission that one war is a proxy war. - Iran supply/blockade claims: Speaker 1 says Iran is supplied via multiple routes—ports on the Caspian connected through Russian ports, and a rail line through Pakistan to China—plus other smaller export/storage options. Speaker 1 argues Iran’s weakness has historically included refining and diesel shortages, comparing it to the US importing refined product because it cannot refine enough to meet demand. - Venezuela capacity and US-advantaged/refinery/infrastructure problems are revisited, including discussion of reserves being held in gold in the US, social spending reductions of reinvestment, and US confiscation/export restrictions on equipment replacement, leading to worn-out infrastructure and the lack of “quick fixes.” - Straits of Hormuz and alleged “fee” idea: Speaker 0 cites a White House statement that China agreed to buy American oil to diversify from Hormuz and that Iran should not charge a fee for the Straits of Hormuz. Speaker 1 responds that Iran does not charge China fees (as stated by Speaker 1), then argues China’s commitments would only be clear if China confirms them, and compares this to past statements where purchases were claimed without matching agreements. - Speaker 1 argues sanctions can be moved/bypassed by the US government, not lifted by it, and says only US Congress can remove sanctions. Speaker 1 also claims the US continues buying sanctioned Russian products, while Europeans are criticized for accepting costly resell markups. - Speaker 1 also argues Hormuz isn’t treated as international waters in their view, and that Oman involvement matters, including claims about Oman not installing tollbooths and Iran striking ships—contrasted with the idea that a long-term/perpetual fee would open global choke-point “can of worms.” - Broader geopolitical framing: Speaker 1 says the “global system” is effectively gone, arguing the US helped build it and then killed it when it no longer served US interest, citing examples like the WTO and the strategic focus on controlling key choke points. Speaker 1 contrasts sea routes with Eurasia land connectivity and high-speed rail, linking this to belt-and-road connectivity. - Back to Iran: Speaker 0 asks whether China is pressuring Iran to concede or offering Trump political support with words. Speaker 1 says China prefers status quo and would prefer an end to war without weakening American stockpiles; Speaker 1 also says Iran’s ceasefire is not a full ceasefire and that both sides continue actions. - US military capacity and escalation: Speaker 1 argues that if Trump restarts the war, missile production is “null and void” at scale, and US manufacturing/industrial ramp-up would take years, citing the “missile production is null and void” point and the difficulty of rapid industry re-shoring due to state regulations. Speaker 1 discusses rare earths as a limiting factor in a different way—refining/processing capacity rather than shortage of elements—then argues chemical/electrolysis processing is expensive, energy intensive, and environmentally complex, often causing multi-year delays similar to refineries. - Soft-power indicators from Xi’s alleged absence and flag changes are used to explain Chinese behavior toward Trump, contrasted with prior high-level airport greetings and seating/handshake optics. Speaker 1 compares seating arrangements and perceived humiliation in European/Serbia contexts as a recurring pattern of power display. - Iran-war outcome speculation: Speaker 0 proposes a 50/50 scenario: continuation of conflict with Israeli strikes (and Iran mirroring strikes in the Gulf) versus Trump walking away. Speaker 1 says Israelis are driving outcomes and that APAC donors and money make turning away difficult, arguing Trump wants out but is constrained. Speaker 1 also says Iran and even Saudis/Kuwaitis reportedly would prefer US withdrawal from the Persian Gulf. - US military withdrawal and logistics: Speaker 1 says the US fifth fleet has left, its forward headquarters is moving to Israel, and damage estimates/repair costs are discussed. Speaker 1 argues the US is drawn into a genocide-perception dynamic once bases/equipment and US involvement are present. - Historical Iraq/Kuwait/Persian Gulf narrative: Speaker 0 asks why the US wanted Saddam to invade Kuwait. Speaker 1 asserts the US wanted Iraq to enter the Persian Gulf and become positioned for broader US presence, describing US backing for conflicts involving Iran and chemical weapons channels, and claiming Kuwait engaged in slant drilling stealing Iraqi oil. Speaker 1 says the US/Soviet coalition dynamics allowed the Gulf buildup and entry point into the region. - Final escalation discussion and regional future: Speaker 0 asks whether Trump will walk away or get trapped into escalation for a “win.” Speaker 1 says Israel’s influence over the US is expected to decline, claims generational shifts among American Jews/Christians and anti-Israel demonstrations, and argues Iran and the Gulf could reshape into new blocks with improved Gulf-Iran relations if stability is prioritized. - The conversation ends with debate over perceived misconceptions about Iran’s treatment of minorities and religious/political representation, plus discussion contrasting Iran with Saudi Arabia in terms of women’s legal status and religious policing, followed by a plan to do a future live recording using appropriate software.

Wang Wen, professor and dean of the Changyang Institute of Financial Studies and the School of Global Leadership at Renmin University of China, discusses Beijing’s view on the Iran war and its broader implications for China and the international order. - China’s position on the Iran conflict: Beijing emphasizes a resolution through political negotiation and opposes unilateral military action not authorized by the UN. China calls for a ceasefire, an end to hostility, respect for sovereignty and development rights, and opposes the maximum pressure campaign and long-term sanctions. This stance reflects adherence to international law, multilateralism, and safeguarding global peace, while aligning with China’s strategic interests as a major energy importer and advocate of multilateral solutions. - Context of a shifting world order: The justifications for a multipolar world are growing. The U.S. and Germany are viewed as nearing the end of their post–Cold War order, with the world entering a multipolar era. Two features cited: the U.S. has largely lost the capacity to dominate globally and may retreat to regional influence, while emerging powers (China, Russia, India, Brazil, and others) rise and constrain U.S. ability to contain them. Iran is seen as part of this broader transition, with the possibility of greater regional and systemic shifts over the coming decade. - China’s cautious but steady approach: China maintains a low-profile stance and continues normal trade with all sides (including the U.S., Israel, and Iran) while urging ceasefires and political resolution. US sanctions targeting Chinese banks and Iran are deemed unreasonable threats; Beijing signals it will counter such measures if pressed. - Belt and Road and Middle East investments: China’s Middle East investments and the Belt and Road Initiative (BI) face disruption due to the war. Oil imports via the Strait of Hormuz (about 35% of China’s oil) and China’s broader energy security are affected. China’s approach emphasizes diversification: expanding overland corridors (e.g., North–South routes, Eurasian Railway Express, Trans-C-Cascadia paths, Central Asia Land Corridor) and increasing energy sourcing from non-Middle Eastern suppliers (Russia, Central Asia, Africa, South America) to reduce reliance on maritime routes. Investment in Iran (about $5 billion, with projects across the region) has slowed as the war continues, with evacuations and impeded progress, though China’s strategic emphasis on diversified transport and energy remains central. - Taiwan issue and potential conflict: Wang argues that if China intends to resolve Taiwan by force, the U.S. would have already lost the capacity to stop it; a peaceful resolution is increasingly likely. He states that any use of force would target independence rather than the general public in Taiwan, and reiterates China’s long-standing preference for peaceful unification. - US–China–Russia triangle: The conflict reshapes this triangle. The U.S. is constrained by Iran, becoming more erratic, and signaling toward China and Russia. Russia benefits from higher oil prices and the Ukraine situation, while China faces oil-import pressures and market volatility. Overall, the U.S. strategy appears less capable of containing both China and Russia; both Beijing and Moscow gain strategic leverage in this environment. - Risks and opportunities for China if the war continues: Energy security risks rise due to higher oil costs and potential disruption to Middle East trade, complicating BI projects and regional diplomacy. The situation increases the appeal of diversification of energy sources and transport corridors. However, China typically prefers peace and stability as the best path for growth. - The new book and strategic opportunity: Wang promotes his book, New Strategic Opportunity: China and the World toward 2035, arguing that the world’s turbulence highlights China’s peace, stability, and prosperity as valuable. He contends that no matter the adverse environment, China can seize new strategic opportunities by focusing on domestic development, reinforcing that the longer the U.S. seeks conflict, the more China upholds peace and rises. - Closing observations: The interviewer notes the broader perception of China’s growing influence and responsibility in shaping a responsible international system, with Wang affirming a peaceful, opportunity-driven path for China’s rise.

Speaker 0 argues that there is extreme manipulation of oil futures prices in the paper market, diverging from the physical price of oil. He claims the paper market price for oil is around $92–$95, which is heavily manipulated by the U.S. government, while the actual physical price is about $142 a barrel. He asserts the manipulated paper price will eventually collide with the physical price, but the U.S. government and treasury will prevent that from happening soon, noting that markets no longer have true price discovery across gold, silver, stocks, and treasuries due to central bank actions. He contends that from the White House outward, messaging is fake, including a staged DoorDash incident and the claim that there is no inflation, as well as misrepresentations about Iran. He references JD Vance, stating that Vance characterized Iran’s blockage of the Strait of Hormuz as economic terrorism and suggested, “two can play at that game,” while later claiming we will abide by international law. He views Vance as revealing a contradiction in good-faith negotiations, alleging Vance did not have authority to negotiate and had to consult Netanyahu to decide to walk away, portraying Netanyahu as driving the push to keep the war going. Turning back to oil, Speaker 0 discusses global oil supplies and an estimated daily deficit of around 8–10 million barrels per day, projecting that by June the world will run out of above-ground oil. He explains that “above ground oil” is what matters for immediate demand, and that even though oil remains underground, it won’t help fill immediate needs like for tractors. With oil running short, he says desperate buyers could bid prices higher, potentially reaching $200–$250 per barrel if the Strait of Hormuz remains closed. He views this as a scenario in which the United States could face economic pain and allied countries could experience industrial, power grid, and economic collapse, possibly even regime collapse, with prolonged damage taking years to recover. Speaker 0 predicts that the United States could lose Taiwan as an ally, risking loss of Taiwan’s semiconductor supply, which he says would be devastating to the U.S. and Western countries but a victory for China. He argues that the opposite narratives about “winning” are incoherent; he portrays a cycle of changing claims about whether the Strait is open or closed as evidence of a lack of consistent “winning conditions.” Finally, Speaker 0 urges preparedness, promoting his podcast and websites for further information, and endorses satellite communications as part of resilience planning. He does not endorse the promotional content at the end in this summary.

The United States believes China will attack Taiwan because America is always looking to start new wars to justify defense spending. America needs to find new enemies, and it believes that the greatest threat to American empire right now is China, even though there's no evidence of this. Currently, China sends America cheap goods, and the U.S. gives China U.S. dollars. The Communist Party is storing the wealth of the Chinese people in American banks, which benefits America, Wall Street, and the Chinese Communist Party. If China takes over Taiwan, America doesn't lose much. The semiconductor industry in Taiwan could be moved elsewhere. However, America has hubris and must save face.

The next US president needs to clearly state that the US will defend Taiwan and strengthen its relationship with India to counter China's influence. The speaker believes that the Second Amendment can also deter foreign autocrats, as it has in America. The lack of a specific deterrent strategy allows Xi Jinping to encroach on Taiwan. The reason for this is fear, stemming from the US's economic dependence on China. The speaker highlights the double standards in economic relations, where China is given preferential treatment despite its actions. The US cannot rely on China for pharmaceuticals and semiconductors, and an outsider is needed to fix the broken establishment.

The speaker updates viewers on developments between Donald Trump and Xi Jinping and says the talks are “getting very interesting.” The speaker contrasts Trump’s approach toward different countries: they say Trump “bullies” European leaders and that those opponents are “weak,” but that this pattern does not apply with Russia or Iran. The speaker claims that when Trump goes to China, he will not be able to negotiate in the way he usually does, citing the situation involving Iran. The speaker reports that China is taking a harder stance. China is described as saying that future sanctions will not matter—“we’re not gonna pay attention”—and that China will continue tariffs with the United States, including a 77% tariff on American beef and a 22% tariff on soybeans. The speaker adds that these tariffs have upset American farmers. The speaker says China’s position is that it will consider lowering tariffs if the United States comes to China “and you ask nicely,” and describes this as a reversal. The speaker then introduces the “Thucydides trap,” attributing it to a Greek warrior turned philosopher and describing it as a theory about US–China relations: when one power grows much larger, it can overtake another, making war between them difficult to avoid. The speaker says Xi raised this concept in his opening remarks, expressing hope the United States and China can “transcend the Thucydides trap” and “forge a new model” for relations, with the idea that both countries being large does not automatically require them to clash. The speaker highlights Xi’s warning about Taiwan. They say Xi called the “Taiwan question” the most important issue in China–US relations and stated that if it is handled properly, the bilateral relationship will enjoy overall stability. The speaker reports that Xi then warned that mishandling it would lead to clashes and even conflicts, putting the entire relationship in jeopardy—framing it as a direct warning to Trump that interference over Taiwan could become “really serious.”

The war in Ukraine and potential conflict over Taiwan are driven by misguided policies in Washington. There's a belief that the U.S. must prevent China from becoming the dominant power in East Asia, which could lead to nuclear war. Game theory suggests cooperation is often overlooked; real people tend to cooperate more than expected when they communicate. Historical examples, like Kennedy's approach during the Cuban Missile Crisis, show that dialogue can lead to peace. Current leaders, however, focus on military solutions and insults rather than diplomacy. The notion that China poses an intrinsic threat is misguided; it has not invaded other countries in its long history. Instead, the U.S. has been continuously engaged in wars, reflecting a militarized mindset that hinders the possibility of peaceful resolutions.

The speaker emphasizes the need to address the declining balance of power in the Indo Pacific region. They stress the importance of investing in our own defense and adopting a strategy of peace through strength. The speaker highlights the logic of deterrence and warns that projecting weakness could lead to a devastating war in the Pacific, dwarfing the current crises in the Middle East and Ukraine.

Brian Berletic discusses connections between the US “economic war against China” and wars/proxy conflicts involving Russia and Iran, arguing that the US seeks primacy rather than balance of power and uses diplomacy to build pretexts for additional war and to shape geopolitics. He says US policymakers do not expect China to pressure Iran or to pressure Russia, because China has reasons to avoid helping isolate itself, and he frames US actions as deliberate attempts to keep adversaries from becoming independent centers of power. He argues the US aims to weaken Russia, Iran, and China by creating wedges and subordination through client regimes and proxies. He claims Europe, Israel, Persian Gulf states, Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines are treated as extensions of US foreign policy rather than independent balancing powers. He also contrasts what he describes as US strategic framing—portraying America as reasonable while treating opponents as “evil”—with the claimed reality of proxy war, including in Europe and Iran. When asked about the goal of restoring primacy, Berletic says the US tries to pursue multiple forms of dominance—military, financial, trade-route control, and technological dominance—while acknowledging it is becoming less realistic as China surpasses the US plus its proxies. He says US strategy, as he describes it, shifts to wrecking multiple theaters and trade systems rather than direct head-to-head conflict, including efforts to disrupt energy exports and contested waterways. He cites US-created crises in the Middle East and describes US pressure on Indonesia near the Strait of Malacca, attempts to gain military access to that chokepoint, and blockading tactics affecting Russian energy exports and other routes. He claims the US has reorganized the Marine Corps into an anti-shipping force “specifically” for interdicting shipping, with preparation starting before the Trump administration. He argues that these actions aim to increase leverage over Asian states through energy dependence on US LNG exports, and to coerce regional countries away from balancing China. He compares this to how he says the US subordinated Europe via energy dependence, including by disrupting Russia–Europe energy flows over years. Addressing the US strategy’s “double blockade” concept and chokepoints, Berletic argues it is not about shutting everything down instantly. He claims the US does not need to seize every ship; he says ships often turn back and/or are disabled or seized, and he points to examples of US warplanes disabling ships. He argues this creates deterrence and manages economic damage rather than causing total collapse at once, with the goal of controlled destabilization and increased dependency that can be used to disrupt what China is doing in the region. On the Russia–China dynamic, he says Russia is a large energy producer and shares a direct border with China, leaving fewer “middle countries” through which disruption can be mediated compared with routes like Russia–Europe gas via Ukraine. He argues that because Russia and China together can attract other states into a broader gravitational pull, the US strategy carries risks but fits a longstanding pattern of maritime corridor control and chokepoint strategies. Berletic expands on what he describes as long-running pressure against Belt and Road corridors: he claims US-backed militants attack Belt and Road infrastructure in Myanmar and that the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor is attacked by US-backed terrorists. He also describes attacks in Afghanistan against the Afghan government and Chinese investments, framing this as a long-term “global dirty war” against China and its partners. When discussing Iran and Russia, he says Iran and Russia could strike deals with the US but are instead aiming to prevent a return to the prior status quo of sanctions/perpetual threats and NATO’s incremental expansion. He frames their posture as insisting adversaries must be included in the security architecture. He then compares the current era to a “new great game,” arguing it extends beyond Eurasia and now involves technology and rapid integration of advanced capabilities into deterrence for states such as Iran. He characterizes US behavior as either dividing adversaries or weakening them to prevent coordination. He says the US does not want friends among Iran or Russia because it wants them to be subordinated or weakened; otherwise, he claims they would work together with China. Finally, regarding Taiwan, he says the US “keeps” the one-China policy rhetorically but undermines it in practice through laws, troop presence, and military cooperation with Taiwan alongside regional partners, framing US support as preventing any meaningful back-off. He says US diplomacy functions as cover, including in relation to Russia/Ukraine and Iran, and describes US strategy as a multi-domain approach that already functions as economic and proxy war against China while escalating across Russia, Iran, the Middle East, and Asia-Pacific military integration. He concludes by warning that US policy will likely continue escalating and that China’s ability to build faster than the US can disrupt and destroy is central to whether open conflict can be deterred.