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In this discussion, Zhang Shuay Shin and Speaker 1 analyze the evolving U.S.-Iran confrontation through the lens of global power dynamics, the petrodollar, and the shifting balance among major powers. - The war is framed as primarily about preserving the petrodollar. Speaker 1 argues the United States, burdened by enormous debt, seeks to maintain the dollar’s dominance by controlling energy trade through naval power and strategic choke points. The belief is that the U.S. can weaponize the dollar against rivals, as seen when it froze Russian assets and then moved to stabilize oil markets. BRICS and others are moving toward alternatives, including a gold corridor, challenging the petrodollar’s centrality. The aim is to keep Europe and East Asia dependent on U.S. energy, reinforcing American hegemony, even as historical hubris risks a global backlash turning growing powers against Washington. - The sequence of escalation over six weeks is outlined: after the American attack on Tehran and the Iranian move to close the Strait of Hormuz, the U.S. eased sanctions on Russian and Iranian oil to maintain global stability, according to Treasury statements. Escalations targeted civilian infrastructure and strategic chokepoints, with discussions of striking GCC energy infrastructure and desalination plants. A U.S. threat to “bomb Iran back to the stone age” was countered by Iran proposing a ten-point framework—encompassing uranium enrichment rights, lifting sanctions, and security guarantees for Iran and its proxies. The Americans reportedly suggested the framework was workable, but negotiations in Islamabad stalled when U.S. officials did not engage seriously. - The broader objective is posited as not simply a tactical war but a strategic move to ensure U.S. imperial supremacy by shaping energy flows. Speaker 1 speculates Trump’s motive centers on keeping the petrodollar intact, potentially forcing China and other partners to buy energy with dollars. Iran’s willingness to negotiate in Islamabad is linked to pressure from China amid China’s economic strains, particularly as energy needs and Belt and Road investments create vulnerabilities for China if Middle East energy becomes unreliable. - The proposed naval blockade is discussed as difficult to implement directly against Iran due to ballistic missiles; instead, the plan may aim to choke off alternative routes like the Strait of Malacca, leveraging trusted regional partners and allies. Iran could respond via the Red Sea (Bab al-Mandab) or other leverage, including the Houthis, challenging Western control of energy corridors. The overarching aim would be to force a global energy reorientation toward North America, though it risks long-term hostility toward the United States. - The roles of great powers are analyzed: the U.S. strategy is described as exploiting Middle East disruption to preserve the petrodollar, with short-term gains but long-term risks of a broader alliance against U.S. hegemony. Europe and Asia are pressured to adapt, with China’s energy needs especially salient as sanctions tighten Middle East supply. Russia is identified as the principal challenger to U.S. maritime hegemony, while China remains economically entangled, facing strategic incentives to cooperate with the United States if required by economic pressures. - The dialogue considers NATO and Europe, arguing that the real contest is between globalists and nationalists in the United States, with Trump viewed as an agent of empire who may threaten the existing globalist framework. The speakers discuss whether this competition will redefine alliances, the future of NATO, and the possibility that a more Eurasian-led order could emerge if Western powers fail to maintain their maritime advantages. - Finally, Russia’s role is emphasized: Moscow is seen as the key counterweight capable of challenging American maritime dominance, with the war in Iran serving, in part, to counter Russian actions in Ukraine and to incentivize alignment with Russia, China, and Iran against U.S. leadership over the next two decades.

The president's strategy drove recent events. He and the speaker discussed it at length on Sunday. The president may have goaded China into a bad position, leading them to be perceived as bad actors. The U.S. is willing to cooperate with allies and trading partners who did not retaliate. The message was simple: don't retaliate, and things will turn out well.

Ashwin Ratanji introduces New Order’s new season, arguing that the war in West Asia has moved beyond regional containment and is reshaping energy flows, alliances, and “neutrality.” Ratanji cites US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, speaking to a Senate hearing in Washington, saying the Trump administration wants to end the license allowing countries such as India to continue buying Russian oil. He links this to Prime Minister Modi’s planned visit to Moscow for the annual India-Russia summit later this year, and to Modi’s trip to the G7 in Evian, France, in under two weeks—potentially his first face-to-face with Trump since February 2025—where Russian oil, tariffs, and the Strait of Hormuz are expected to be discussed. Ratanji then interviews Professor Charles Kupchan, former US National Security Council director for European affairs under Clinton and Obama, and author of The End of the American Era and Bringing Order to Anarchy: Governing the World to Come. Kupchan frames the current moment using Gramsci’s “Prison Notebooks,” saying “the old is dying and the new cannot be born,” and describes the liberal international system anchored by the United States and democratic allies as having peaked in the 1990s and now ending without a clear replacement order. He characterizes Trump as “the demolition man” rather than an architect of what comes next, calling the period a historical hiatus between twentieth-century order and a twenty-first-century one. On whether the US is prepared for its empire to go the way of the British empire, Kupchan says the United States shows “schizophrenia”: a foreign policy establishment committed to American hegemony and dollar/military anchoring, alongside a MAGA approach emphasizing being “done being the Atlas of the world,” returning to a Monroe Doctrine focus, and pushing allies to carry more burdens. He argues Trump has shifted from an America-first posture into a pattern similar to predecessors by launching or escalating conflicts in the Middle East without achieving goals, contributing to unpredictability. Kupchan also says domestic political fracture has replaced an earlier bipartisan centrist coalition, leaving the US oscillating between incompatible visions of its role. Discussing Ukraine and Iran, Kupchan argues there is “no clear strategic vision” guiding Trump, describing him as acting “on instinct,” with shifting justifications. He says on China there has been a shift from early-term confrontational tariff-driven policy and escalated confrontation during Biden’s presidency, to a more cooperative posture in a recent trip to Beijing where Trump sought to lower the temperature and pursue trade deals with Xi Jinping, while noting the outcome depends on reciprocal Chinese moves. Kupchan addresses domestic political backlash: he says civil society, courts, Congress, and Republicans have increasingly pushed back, especially regarding executive authority and constraints around the Iran war. He describes a possible peak in Trump’s presidency, with uncertainty about midterms and 2028, and adds that Democrats lack ideological unity between moving to the center or the left, expecting voters to “throw the bums out” because no party answers key affordability and economic questions. He links this to the impact of technological change, automation, and hollowing out of the political center. In a sanctions segment, Kupchan argues sanctions will remain a “go-to” tool because they are politically easy for the US but says sanctions repeatedly fail to achieve stated goals in an interdependent world. He describes how Russia redirected supply chains after Ukraine-related sanctions, and says Iran has not been toppled or deterred despite long-standing US/EU sanctions and blockade measures. He connects the declining effectiveness of sanctions to de-dollarization trends, including Chinese payment system development and BRICS efforts for internal payment mechanisms, which he says reduce US leverage over dollar-denominated transactions. On global governance and the US role, Kupchan says the US “damaged its brand” but believes it is not permanent, tying recovery to rebuilding the American middle class through employment and education for the digital era. He argues China and Russia want multipolarity and an end to American hegemony but “don’t really know what” multipolarity means in terms of governing proposals. He calls for sustained cross-bloc dialogue rather than fly-in, fly-out summits, pointing to G20-like structures and emphasizing that ongoing dialogue between China, Russia, India, Europe, the US, and global-south countries is lacking. Regarding whether the US is too poor or too isolated to participate in a new order, Kupchan says the US remains dominant in GDP and maintains unmatched military capacity and global bases, while noting China faces demographic and economic problems and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine will have consequences “for generations,” though the US also has problems. He says the US is likely to remain among the most influential for decades. Zara Khan then fields audience questions. One asks about Trump and the midterms; Kupchan says he “never makes predictions” but indicates Trump may lose. Another asks whether Israel is sovereign or an extension of US foreign policy; Khan frames it as a “full duplex” relationship. The session ends with a question to viewers: whether “secondary sanctions” turn “middle powers into frontline actors” in great power rivalry, inviting responses on X at neworder_underscore_tv.

Trump is officially three in o with China. Here's what nobody's talking about. China had a heavy investment in Iran. Trump neutered them. China had a heavy investment in Gaza. Trump secured a regional firewall. China straightforwardly controlled Venezuela for two decades. Trump's moving in and China's blinking for a third time. And that's why everyone is asking the wrong questions when it comes to Venezuela. The cover story is this: Trump's military buildup toward Venezuela is about countering narcoterrorism and targeting drug cartels like Trend Agua, which are tied to the president Nicolas Maduro's regime. But analysts go a step further and they still miss the mark when they say, well, this is really about regime change. It's neither of these things. I mean, yes, we've got a drug problem, but it's actually ties to a much bigger issue. Trump's Venezuela offensive is much bigger. It's his proxy war against China, and he's the only president in history who was actually fighting China where it hurts. As of this week, Trump has positioned over 10,000 US troops and eight warships in the region. We have helicopters and Reaper drones taking out narco boats. We have F-35s, and Venezuela has scrambled their jets. And this week, Trump has authorized the CIA to carry out lethal operations in Venezuela. We'll dive into that one a little deeper in the next segment. All this to ostensibly go after drug boats and fight narco terrorism. Yet everyone is taking this at face value. Listen. Why not have the coast guard stop them, which it is empowered by law to do? So Trump answers question as asked. Because we've been doing that for thirty years, and it has been totally ineffective. Even the ostensibly right-leaning National Review gets it wrong by musing that this is all about regime change. Here's why this whole Venezuela offensive is really about China, and this is a shadow war against Beijing. The first in history that looks like it will actually work. You see, attacking Maduro is attacking Xi Jinping. To think that Maduro is some independent agent is naive and foolish. Why is Venezuela basically China? Well, follow the money, the oil money. Again, remember what I said yesterday about why China is likely the biggest force behind the Gaza war in promoting Palestine and Hamas protests around the globe? Remember, it's about taking advantage of bad leadership that sits over cheap oil and cheap resources. China sweeps in, buys out the leadership, gets free gas, essentially. Venezuela is the poster boy of this predatory China oil game. Beijing is Venezuela's largest creditor by far. Venezuela has over 60,000,000,000 in debt to Beijing since 02/2007. It pays Beijing back in, you guessed it, oil. Venezuela is economically paralyzed by sanctions. The only country supporting Venezuela meaningfully is Beijing because they're the primary buyers. This forces Venezuela to sell their oil for next to nothing, meaning they'll forever be indebted to Beijing. That's the whole game. That's the way China plays. In May 2025, at the China CELAC Forum, Beijing gave Venezuela an additional billion dollars in new oil investments, solidifying Venezuela's position as the front lines of The US China shadow war. But China's interests in Venezuela go far beyond cheap oil and economics. Chinese companies are neck deep in modernizing Venezuela's ports and telecom infrastructures. And in all things related to Chinese companies, you're a fool to think the Chinese Communist Party does anything without making it a dual military civilian use project. I'll say it again. China does not allow its companies to operate in the world unless it could also be used for their national security purposes. So don't be fooled when Trump is using all this force and manpower and CIA expertise in Venezuela. This is Trump taking the war to China. He's doing what no other president before him was even remotely capable of accomplishing. Trump is declaring war on China's most valuable assets, Iran, Venezuela, Gaza. What do these tin pot dictatorships have in common? They'd be nothing without the Chinese Communist Party. And China would be nothing in the geopolitical stage without them. And now Trump is taking them, Iran, Gaza, and now Venezuela. Three strikes, and you're out, Xi.

Speaker 0 outlines steps Donald Trump has taken to create a war with Iran: first, he tore up the Iran nuclear agreement. Speaker 1 confirms, “I am announcing today that The United States will withdraw from the Iran nuclear deal.” Speaker 0 notes a second step: he has escalated crippling sanctions against Iran. Speaker 1 adds, “The sanctions kicking in at midnight Sunday target Iran's oil exports, banking, and shipping. Even though UN inspectors say Iran is still complying with the nuclear deal. The United States will pursue sanctions tougher than ever before.” Speaker 0 identifies a third step: he designated Iran's military as a terrorist organization. Speaker 2 states, “Secretary of state Mike Pompeo has announced that The US is designating the Iranian revolutionary guard as a terror group. Today, The United States is continuing to build its maximum pressure campaign against the Iranian regime. I'm announcing our intent to designate the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, including its good force, as a foreign terrorist organization.” The summary adds that, with this designation, the US can sanction “pretty much anybody who talks to or deals with or has any business whatsoever with the IRGC.” Speaker 0 lists a fourth step: he continues to deploy more and more US troops to the region. Speaker 2 reports, “Just moments ago, the Pentagon authorized an additional 1,000 American troops to The Middle East in response to growing concerns over Iran.” He also notes that “a US aircraft carrier and a bomber task force are being sent to areas closer to Iran.” Speaker 2 adds a bellicose message: “Yes. There will indeed be hell to pay. Let my message today be very clear. We are watching, and we will come after you.” Speaker 0 shifts to a political appeal, saying, “We’ve got to stop Donald Trump from starting a war with Iran. I'm asking you to join me and support my legislation, the No More Presidential Wars Act.” To participate in the third presidential debate, she states that “in order to qualify … I need at least a 130,000 people to contribute to our campaign.” She asks viewers to donate, instructing them to click the link or donate at tulsi twenty twenty dot com.

Speaker 0: The GCC allies are largely blockaded and not getting anything through; only UAE or Oman might be getting a few shipments due to being on the Gulf of Oman side. This is driving higher oil prices. We can’t simply bluff or "play a game of chicken" because it affects the entire world—Asia, Africa, Europe, and the United States. The shortage extends beyond oil to things like helium, and it’s impacting chip manufacturing and broader economic activity. These are medium-term issues already baked in and in short supply, so we’re facing real problems and a question of how long we can endure this. Speaker 1: As energy becomes more expensive—oil at $110, then $120, $130, $140, $150, rising until this crisis ends globally—the risk is a financial collapse worse than 2007–2008, potentially a depression in much of the world. Economists predict a serious recession, possibly a depression, and these dynamics are what Putin was trying to convey to Trump because Americans are perceived as potentially catastrophic. China is dependent on energy but is expanding nuclear power, has substantial coal, and is investing in renewables; China will survive this. Japan and Korea are on the edge; India is affected; Egypt is trying to feed 100,000,000 and facing famine; Turkey is involved. These states are being pushed toward war not just with Israel but with the United States, since without Israel none of this would be happening, and they know it. Russia, China, Egypt, Turkey, India, and possibly others may join a coalition to force the United States to stop. The speaker would prefer not to go there and believes President Trump should end the blockade, which was adopted because it was the only measure short of returning to war, but the blockade won’t work because the world won’t tolerate it. The president of the Republic of Korea (South Korea) has publicly said it’s time for Korea to defend itself. It’s been time for Korea to take control of its own armed forces for a long time, but the U.S. currently controls all their armed forces and Koreans have not liked that for at least twenty years. Now they want control of their own armed forces. The speaker expects the dissolution of the United States’ unofficial overseas imperial holdings, predicting the Koreans will expel the U.S., with Japan likely following. In the Pacific, trilateral efforts among Korea, the Philippines, and Japan are forming to cooperate with the U.S. in a future war with China—not in our lifetimes or on the planet, as no one wants war with China. Nobody wants war with China; China is increasingly seen as a safer place for cash and investments in the U.S. This shift began when the U.S. began telling Russians they would not allow them to access billions of rubles and may seize funds, possibly giving cash to Ukrainians. People are watching and asking whether they want to depend on the U.S. financial system or face interference with bank accounts. There are many bad developments right now, and the last thing the American people need is a war, certainly not one involving China, Russia, or any other powers along with Iran, yet that seems to the direction in which things are headed.

Ironically, it’s happening organically outside of BRICS anyway. For example, Enbridge and Brazil trade with China 48% in non-dollar terms. Russia–China trade is 95% in rubles and renminbi. Russia also trades with India similarly. BRICS is not driving this alone; these are individual developments. BRICS, a bit more than a decade ago, was the first to implement a framework agreement between them to move toward using national currencies more. It was still a time of less turbulence in the international scene, and the move was not for each country at once but addressed different pockets of activity. China, at that point, not only advanced this BRICS framework agreement but also struck agreements with 22 countries outside BRICS to use the renminbi. Russia did not abandon the dollar; it started using its own currency and other currencies as well. The aim was not to be against the dollar but to avoid being ordered by others about what they should or should not do. This shift occurred before Trump, though Trump contributed to the trend as well; the speaker notes they cannot simply blame Biden. The era of dollar and SWIFT being used as a weapon began to become explicit. The claim is that the dollar was promoted as a public good available to everyone no matter what happened, and then that expectation was broken. Russia has faced the most sanctions, over 20,000 in total, and the speaker suggests there may be more to come. There is large pressure from the US on each country. The UAE is mentioned as being cautious about moving too far, but each BRICS member now understands that this could be turned against them as well. That awareness is driving the direction toward greater use of national currencies and non-dollar transactions.

Speaker 0 warned that if any ally tries to help the ICC, they will be sanctioned. They said, "we're gonna sanction you," and that "we should crush your economy because we're next." They referenced Justin in Canada and his position, asking, "What should the penalty be?"

The conversation centers on punitive measures allegedly imposed by the United States and the accusations surrounding who is responsible for violent crime and support of extremist groups. Speaker 0 accuses Speaker 1 of being shut down because of criticisms of people profiting from mass murder. In response, Speaker 1 details a cascade of sanctions and restrictions: “I’m banned from travel to The US. I am financially censored. I cannot have a a credit card. I cannot be receive payment. I cannot make payments.” Speaker 1 adds that health insurance has been suspended “because I’m sanctioned by The United States,” indicating a broad range of denials tied to U.S. sanctions. Speaker 0 challenges Speaker 1, asking if anything is being left out and probing whether Speaker 1 has engaged in activities such as sending money to Hamas or participating in actions against the IDF, labeling Hamas as “A terror group.” The implication of the question is to suggest that Speaker 1’s sanctions might be connected to support for hostile or criminal activity. Speaker 1 responds by reframing the accusation, stating, “The only one who’s aiding and abetting someone else committing crime is The United States.” This assertion presents the United States as the active party in aiding or abetting crimes, according to Speaker 1. Speaker 0 concludes the exchange with a soft expression of concession, saying, “I’m sorry. I’m sorry to agree with you on that,” implying reluctant agreement with Speaker 1’s critical stance toward U.S. actions. Key points emphasize the scope of Speaker 1’s sanctions: travel ban to the United States, financial censorship, inability to use a credit card, inability to receive or make payments, and suspension of health insurance due to U.S. sanctions. The dialogue also highlights a dispute over responsibility for violence and crime, with Speaker 1 asserting that the United States is the one aiding and abetting crimes, while Speaker 0 questions whether Speaker 1 has engaged with or supported extremist activity such as funding Hamas or opposing the IDF. The exchange ends with Speaker 0 acknowledging agreement with Speaker 1’s critical position on U.S. involvement, albeit reluctantly.

The speaker updates viewers on developments between Donald Trump and Xi Jinping and says the talks are “getting very interesting.” The speaker contrasts Trump’s approach toward different countries: they say Trump “bullies” European leaders and that those opponents are “weak,” but that this pattern does not apply with Russia or Iran. The speaker claims that when Trump goes to China, he will not be able to negotiate in the way he usually does, citing the situation involving Iran. The speaker reports that China is taking a harder stance. China is described as saying that future sanctions will not matter—“we’re not gonna pay attention”—and that China will continue tariffs with the United States, including a 77% tariff on American beef and a 22% tariff on soybeans. The speaker adds that these tariffs have upset American farmers. The speaker says China’s position is that it will consider lowering tariffs if the United States comes to China “and you ask nicely,” and describes this as a reversal. The speaker then introduces the “Thucydides trap,” attributing it to a Greek warrior turned philosopher and describing it as a theory about US–China relations: when one power grows much larger, it can overtake another, making war between them difficult to avoid. The speaker says Xi raised this concept in his opening remarks, expressing hope the United States and China can “transcend the Thucydides trap” and “forge a new model” for relations, with the idea that both countries being large does not automatically require them to clash. The speaker highlights Xi’s warning about Taiwan. They say Xi called the “Taiwan question” the most important issue in China–US relations and stated that if it is handled properly, the bilateral relationship will enjoy overall stability. The speaker reports that Xi then warned that mishandling it would lead to clashes and even conflicts, putting the entire relationship in jeopardy—framing it as a direct warning to Trump that interference over Taiwan could become “really serious.”

Ashton Rutansi introduces New Order’s first season finale, arguing that India and its allies sit at the center of a wider transformation in world history as conflicts and geopolitical pressure spread beyond West Asia. Rutansi describes the BRICS foreign ministers meeting in Delhi under India’s 2026 chairmanship, with senior officials from the UAE, China, Russia, and Iran in attendance. He also links India’s diplomacy—Prime Minister Modi touring the UAE and Europe—with the need to balance energy security, trade stability, Western partnerships, and global South leadership. Rutansi frames the situation as sensitive due to Iran’s demands for stronger BRICS political backing against US and Israeli violations of the UN Charter, amid Saudi Arabia and the UAE attempting to avoid direct confrontation. Rutansi interviews international relations scholar Professor Richard Sakwa. Asked whether a unipolar order is ending in real time, Sakwa says the unipolar model has been on its way out and is giving way to unilateralism in the United States, producing what he calls the “twilight” of the Atlantic/Political West. He argues that multipolarity is only a symptom and that the alternative model aligns with UN norms, international law, and the post-1945 international system, which he says the Political West challenged while it still held power. On global war, Sakwa says the Russo-Ukrainian war has become a Russo-European war and Europe is experiencing “war fever,” comparing the language to the atmosphere before World War I. He says commentators argue the West is in the thick of it, but that “we’re only in the foothills,” and that the global South has more balanced talk. Rutansi highlights European resistance to diplomacy and questions the impact of weapons and sanctions. Sakwa says the EU is adopting its twentieth sanctions package and working on a twenty-first, noting they are running out of “things to sanction” but “digging and digging their heels in.” He adds that US sanctions under Trump after an Alaska meeting in August 2025 affected Russian oil exports and deeply impacted India, while sanctions dependence persists. Sakwa responds that many countries, including China, can withstand tariffs and sanctions; he contrasts China’s scale with India’s vulnerability given reliance on imported oil, including from the Gulf. He notes Russia’s survival under heavy sanctions while taking a “very heavy toll.” On whether India exemplifies successful multipolar power, Sakwa is skeptical of the term multipolarity and argues the UN Charter system and postwar decolonization have matured into a “multiplex world,” where many states—including middle powers such as Brazil, South Africa, Nigeria, the Philippines, Indonesia, and others—refuse being “bossed around” by a traditional hegemon. He emphasizes that international organizations and corporations also function as quasi-state actors, and he argues Western arrogance about being hegemonic has not matured. Rutansi raises criticism that the UN has struggled to act during a Gaza genocide and discusses an alleged UN leadership role of Annalena Baerbock. Sakwa calls the UN’s crisis its most desperate stage since 1945, argues that the solution is to double down to support the UN rather than dismiss it, and says India should be an essential permanent member. He also suggests resetting elements of the UN system by adding Brazil, India, and other countries—especially Africa—as permanent Security Council members. Later, Sakwa discusses NATO and US participation, saying the United States has historically retained autonomy and that Trump has left dozens of international organizations, including UN agencies such as the World Health Organization. Sakwa says the US “go[es] it alone,” meeting China as equals and that US-India relations have faced the most difficult period in decades amid sanctions and threats. Rutansi asks about whether human rights “weaponization” will continue, including references to freedom of expression in Western Europe and Sakwa’s detention at Heathrow on June 13, 2025. Sakwa says he was detained under the 2019 Counterterrorism Act and that refusing to answer or saying “no comment” could be taken as indicating guilt, allowing arrest. He describes questioning as a “fishing expedition,” says his views are open to debate, and says the case later went quiet. Sakwa argues that Western Europe exhibits groupthink, permanent war, militarism, remilitarization, and “profound Russophobia,” and he says global South countries increasingly treat US and European actions with contempt. He also argues secondary sanctions are irresponsible and illegal, and that attempts to defend international law by undermining it create double standards. The show then shifts to viewer questions via Zara Khan (Azarakan). One asks how to stop the US and Israel from mass killings; Khan and Rutansi respond by identifying complicit states and supply chain links, including countries Rutansi lists as providing Israeli weaponry, warplane components, and related support. Another asks what alternative security architectures India should prioritize in the Indian Ocean if it exits the Quad; Rutansi says India could expand cooperation within the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and BRICS, strengthen a Russia-India-China format (RIC) as a possible “new quad,” and consider strengthening the North South transit corridor involving India, Russia, and Iran. Rutansi closes by asking viewers: how India and the global South should deal with Western Europe’s war fever against Russia.

Speaker 0: China appears to be the only country pushing back against Trump’s tariff stance, with other countries—including neighboring ones and India—reaching deals with Trump. India, which initially showed resilience, moved toward China after the Shanghai summit and the tariffs. Recently, India and the US signed a deal to gradually reduce Russia oil exports to 50% of imports. This suggests China is the sole major power resisting the US in this round of measures. The discussion then shifts to a broader pattern: the US has overplayed its hand in its dollar dominance and control of the financial system via SWIFT. In the wake of sanctions on Russia after the Ukraine conflict—freezing assets and limiting access to SWIFT—many nations have begun moving away from the US dollar toward gold. The speaker sees China’s current move as accelerating other countries’ push toward self-reliance, particularly in rare earths. The US is investing in its own rare earth industry, while Europe seeks alternatives. There is mention of a US deal with Ukraine involving rare earths, and speculation that Greenland’s abundant rare earth reserves could be relevant to what Trump sought with Greenland. The long-term downside or repercussions for China from this move are noted. Speaker 1: The discussion distinguishes between the financial sanctions used after the Ukraine war and the current situation. While sanctions are not perfect substitutes for dollar assets like crypto or gold, they remain available, so US leverage is not as strong as China’s leverage in rare earths. The speaker agrees that in the long term, China’s move will push other countries to build processing capacity for rare earths. Although rare earths are not truly rare, the processing and concentration are. Countries will be motivated to develop processing facilities. Japan is innovating substitutes for rare earths, which may take time and will not provide immediate relief for the US.

Speaker 0 argues that Venezuela may not want to ally with this Western form of economic exchange, noting they have tried to join BRICS twice but were vetoed by neighboring Brazil. They describe Venezuela as one of the few countries not controlled by private equity oligarchs and central banksters, and say Venezuela pushed back on a monetary exchange that relies on high-interest promissory notes back to Rothschild Boulevard, like Saddam Hussein, Bashar al-Assad, and Muammar Gaddafi. They claim Maduro has effectively been kidnapped, and that Trump said, “kidnapped is fine.” The question is how such events can be real and presented as beneficial to Americans, asserting that economically, there is no benefit to the average citizen or to national security, and that it puts the United States in more imminent, grave danger as the U.S. “agitates around the world,” including in relation to Israel’s enemies. Speaker 1 adds that there will be a political and economic reset, suggesting that silver and gold are at record highs and that gold and silver have tripled historically in short periods, leading to a system reset of sorts. They say Venezuela’s attempts to join the system were to be part of a new framework that Russia, China, Iran and BRICS were trying to create, which would go against the dollar as the global reserve currency and directly affect the U.S. economy. They ask whether this should change. Speaker 0 elaborates that the issue is about flipping countries into the same central banker–controlled monetary exchange system. Speaker 1 notes that Trump, from day one, warned that if you mess with the U.S. dollar or trade outside of the dollar, the U.S. will punish you via sanctions or strikes, and that this is what has been happening. They discuss the possibility that if the system resets and a combination of gold, silver, and possibly crypto or other minerals backs a new dollar or digital currency emerges, the entire game could reset and eliminate these types of issues. In such a scenario, countries might have a looser ability to choose or replace the type of system their country is under.

The speaker argues that Russia, China, and India are the major powers, with a potential union under SCO or BRICS posing a US disaster, a result of failed US policy. He claims only three powers matter—Russia, China, and the United States—and suggests a two-against-one dynamic, with the US aligning with Russia to isolate China. Citing Nixon’s 1971 pivot to China, he asserts this approach helped isolate the Soviet Union. He urges engaging with Russia rather than treating it as a pariah, noting the war in Ukraine blocks a pivot. At the Alaska summit, Trump reportedly listened to Putin unfiltered, and Putin seeks a comprehensive peace treaty with security guarantees, though misunderstandings over those guarantees (and Article 5) persist. The plan would involve Russia, China, perhaps Turkey, with minimal Western boots, and sidelining Zelensky to seal a quick deal.

Speaker 0 conveys a policy stance: 'When I came in, the first thing I said is any BRICS state that even mentions the destruction of the dollar will be charged a 150% tariff, and we don't want your goods. We don't wanna partake. And' The central assertion is that any BRICS state mentioning the destruction of the dollar would incur a 150% tariff, with the speaker stating they do not want the goods or participation from those states. The transcript ends with an unfinished conjunction, 'And', suggesting the thought continued beyond the excerpt. The excerpt provided ends abruptly, with 'And' indicating continuation.

Speaker 0 argues that Trump’s shift from “opening the Shadow Homos” to “blockading it” is ironic and reflects a strategic question for the United States. They say the irony highlights a broader question about American strategy and emphasize that their criticism is not merely to criticize but to assess the situation objectively. They note an interesting point raised by an expert: while blockade is not difficult to implement, it “just doesn’t work.” They reference economic experts who have weighed in, recognizing that Iran has undetermined but significant funds and multiple import/export avenues. Although Iran cannot freely pass ships through the Strait of Hormuz, they have alternative routes: the Caspian Sea for imports via land routes, and “floating oil across the world” for exports. The core question becomes how far Trump is willing to go to “strangle the Iranian economy” and whether that would pull the global economy into the mix. In this framing, the conversation centers on the feasibility and consequences of a harsher economic blockade against Iran and the potential global repercussions. Speaker 1 responds by characterizing Trump as lacking empathy for the economic impact on ordinary Americans and, more broadly, on people worldwide. They reference Trump’s own statements, noting that he has said it will “cost us more,” but “we’re gonna make a lot of money.” This quoted sentiment is used to support the claim that Trump does not consider or prioritize the cost to average citizens. Speaker 1 asserts that Trump “doesn’t feel it,” and therefore does not feel a sense of urgency to take action. They summarize Trump’s attitude as not demonstrating concern for the economic impact on the average American or global populations, which underpins the claim that there is no urgency to intervene despite potential price increases for gasoline or other goods. This exchange frames the discussion around the practicality of sanctions, the resilience of Iran’s economic channels, and the perceived indifference of Trump to domestic and international economic costs.

Speaker 0 and Speaker 1 discuss a cascade of developments around Ukraine, Russia, and Western policy. - Speaker 0 notes that Trump reportedly changed his stance on Tomahawk missiles, mentions a meeting with Zelensky where Zelensky supposedly urged acceptance of a Putin deal, and recalls that the Trump-Putin meeting was canceled. Speaker 1 responds that Russia has 100% made clear there will be no freeze and that for the war to end, Ukraine must leave all Russian territory. He says Tomahawk missiles were never on the table, that this was a pressure ploy by Trump to push Russia, and that it could have led to a thermonuclear war, which Putin reminded the US about in their conversations. - According to Speaker 1, Ukrainians will die, Russians will advance, Ukrainian economy will be destroyed, and Ukrainian energy infrastructure will be annihilated, leading to the collapse of Ukraine as a nation. Speaker 0 sketches a timeline: initial plans for a Putin-Trump-Zelensky sequence, Putin’s call after Trump hinted at Tomahawks, then a Zelensky meeting where Zelensky allegedly pressed Trump to accept a Putin deal, after which Tomahawks were no longer on the table and the Trump-Putin meeting was canceled. - Speaker 1 repeats: Tomahawks were never on the table; this was a pressure tactic. He explains the Russia-US exchange as frank, with Russia laying down the law; he asserts that the US would have faced a major escalation if Tomahawks had been supplied, because Tomahawks are nuclear-capable. He claims Ukraine would have been made a party to the conflict through US involvement. He adds that Russia will not accept a freeze because, constitutionally, Ukraine must leave all Russian territory, including Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, Donetsk, and Lugansk. - Speaker 0 asks why Tomahawks would matter, and Speaker 1 reiterates that Storm Shadow and Scout missiles are not nuclear capable, while Tomahawks would be, and contrasts this with Ukraine’s Flamingo drone, dismissing Flamingo as a propaganda tool. He describes Flamingo as a wooden drone designed to mimic a flock of birds and says it will be shot down and is not a serious threat; Ukraine’s drone capability is strong, with Ukrainians as the second-best fighters and drones in the world, while Russians are first in drone capability. - They discuss the trajectory of the war: Speaker 1 emphasizes that Russia’s advance is strategic, with drone warfare transforming the battlefield into piecemeal advances. He asserts Russia’s kill ratio of 36 Ukrainians to 1 Russian, and argues the West’s narrative of Russia suffering more is fantasy. He notes the West’s support for Ukraine drains Ukraine’s resources while Russia’s defense industry booms, and that Russia’s economy, energy, and sanctions resistance show resilience. - On economics, Speaker 1 claims the Russian economy is thriving; gas is cheap in Russia, Novosibirsk and Ekaterinburg are booming, and sanctions have not toppled Russia. He argues Europe’s sanctions are not beating Russia and that Russia’s ruble remains strong; he contrasts this with Western expectations of Russia’s collapse. - They discuss casualty figures and manpower. Speaker 0 asks for a definite casualty number; Speaker 1 cites Ukrainians dying daily (tens of thousands over time) and asserts Russians suffer hundreds daily on their worst day, noting Ukraine’s manpower shortages and Russia’s mobilization efforts: Russia conducted a one-time 300,000-mobilization; Ukraine has mobilized seven or eight times and relies on volunteers and external manpower, including Western units in some cases. He contends Russia’s total forces expanded to 1.5 million due to NATO expansion and ongoing operations. - On battlefield tactics, Speaker 1 explains Russia’s algorithm: three-man assault teams using drone support to seize bunkers held by larger Ukrainian forces, followed by reinforcement, all while drone warfare dominates. He asserts Ukraine’s drone capacity is strong, but Russia counters with its own drones and targeting of Ukrainian drone operators. - They debate why Russia would not freeze lines even if Ukraine yielded Donbas, Lugansk, and Donetsk. Speaker 1 insists those regions are Russian territory per referendum and constitutional absorption in September 2022, and argues that Ukraine cannot give up Donbas, which is Russia’s, and that a freeze would not be acceptable to Russia. He asserts that Moscow will not abandon these territories and that any idea of a freeze is a Western fantasy. - The discussion touches on the Minsk accords, the Istanbul talks, and the argument that Ukraine’s leadership initially pursued peace but later prepared for renewed conflict with NATO backing. Speaker 1 contends that Minsk was a sham agreed to buy time, and that Russia’s goal was to compel Ukraine to honor commitments to protect Russian speakers; Ukraine’s leadership is accused of pursuing war rather than peace after early negotiations. - They discuss Wagner and Prigozin’s role: Wagner provided a vehicle to surge capabilities into Lugansk and Donetsk; after September 2022 these troops were to be absorbed into the Russian military, but Prigozin continued operations in Bachmuth, recruited prisoners, and pressured for offensive allocations; this culminated in a confrontation with Shoigu and Gerasimov, and Wagner eventually faced disbandment pressure and a mobilization response. - In closing, Speaker 0 notes recent sanctions and Putin’s response condemning them as attempts to pressure Russia, while Speaker 1 reiterates that Russia seeks to end the war and rebuild relations with the US, but not under ongoing Ukraine conflict. He emphasizes that India and China will stand with Russia, citing strategic partnerships and the desire to maintain sovereign energy decisions, and predictsRussia will endure sanctions while seeking new buyers and alliances. - The exchange ends with Putin signaling that new sanctions will have costs for the EU, while Speaker 1 reiterates that Russia will adapt and maintain its strategic position, with China and India aligned with Russia rather than yielding to Western pressure.

Any BRICS state that mentions the destruction of the dollar will be charged a 150% tariff, and the U.S. does not want their goods.

Speaker 0 describes a high-stakes geopolitical confrontation framed as a poker match between the United States and BRICS, especially China. He asserts that the early 2026 period is explosive and that US actions against Iran are imminent, escalating the stakes. He then lays out a narrative beginning with Venezuela, a key Chinese trading partner, where the United States not only sanctioned and condemned Venezuela but launched “devastating strikes,” captured Nicolas Maduro and his wife, and brought them to New York City for prosecution. He claims the Chinese delegation was meeting Maduro in Venezuela on Saturday, but Trump’s actions disrupted the meeting, and the Chinese delegation remains in Venezuela as of Sunday morning. He argues that this is not about narcoterrorism or fentanyl but a larger strategic move, and notes the apparent lack of resistance from Maduro’s side, suggesting direct CIA involvement and a stand-down agreement to allow the operation. He condenms what he calls “phony outrage,” arguing Democrats are not truly anti-war and contending that the incident marks a dangerous precedent for militarized actions in sovereign nations. Speaker 1 contributes by agreeing that China and Russia are not stupid enough to threaten the United States militarily in the homeland, but contends they will act through economic and financial measures. He predicts China and Russia will liquidate debt holdings and trigger negative impacts on the U.S. bond market, while avoiding direct military confrontation. He emphasizes that the response will be economic rather than kinetic. Speaker 0 returns to the 30,000-foot view, stating that the Venezuelan event signals an open head-to-head between the U.S. and China, with globalization receding and regionalization rising. He highlights two key leverage moves: the United States using tariffs as a market-access tool, while China employs choke points through export controls on critical materials. He notes that China quietly moved nearly $2 billion worth of silver out of Venezuela before Trump’s invasion. He points to China’s January 1 policy implementing a new export license system for silver, requiring government permission and designed to squeeze foreign buyers, which coincided with a sharp rise in silver prices. He connects this to broader concerns about supply chains and critical inputs like rare earths and magnets, noting that China produces over 90% of the world’s processed rare earth minerals and magnets, a powerfully strategic lever. He argues that China has tightened rare earth export controls targeting overseas defenses and semiconductor users, and that these factors contribute to a shift from globalization to regionalization where supply chains become weapons. He frames Trump’s tariff strategy as a means to gain access to the U.S. market, branding April 2 as “liberation day” for tariffs due to how markets reacted, and mentions discussions of a tariff dividend proposal to fund a new economic model, as floated by the administration. Speaker 0 concludes that Venezuela is a focal point where resources, influence, and dollars collide, with potential implications for the U.S. dollar, and asserts that the geopolitical chessboard is being redrawn as the U.S. and China move into open competition. He ends by forecasting further moves, including a controversial note about Greenland, and invites viewers to subscribe for coverage of stories the “Mockingbird media” will not discuss.

Pepe and Mario discuss a broad set of geopolitical developments, focusing on Venezuela, Iran, and broader U.S.-led actions, with insights on Russia, China, and other regional players. - Venezuela developments and U.S. involvement - Venezuela is described as a “desperate move related to the demise of the petrodollar,” with multiple overlapping headlines about backers maneuvering for profit and power in Latin America, and about the U.S. declaring “this is my backyard.” Delcy Rodríguez, the daughter of a slain revolutionary killed by the CIA, leads a new government, described as old-school Chavista with strong negotiation skills, who prioritizes Venezuela’s interests over U.S. interests. - The operation is criticized as having no clear strategy or forward planning for reorganizing the Venezuelan oil industry to serve U.S. interests. Estimates from Chinese experts suggest it would take five years to recondition Venezuela’s energy ecosystem for American needs and sixteen years to reach around 3 million barrels per day, requiring approximately $183 billion in investment—investment that U.S. CEOs are reportedly unwilling to provide without total guarantees. - There is debate about the extent of U.S. influence within Maduro’s circle. Some Venezuelan sources note that the head of security for the president, previously aligned with the regime, was demoted (not arrested), and there is discussion of possible U.S. ties with individuals around Maduro’s inner circle, though the regime remains headed by Maduro with key loyalists like the defense minister (Padrino) and the interior minister (Cabello) still in place. - The narrative around regime change is viewed as a two-edged story: the U.S. sought to replace Maduro with a pliant leadership, yet the regime remains and regional power structures (including BRICS dynamics) persist. Delcy Rodríguez is portrayed as capable of negotiating with the U.S., including conversations with Marco Rubio before the coup and ongoing discussions with U.S. actors, while maintaining Venezuela’s sovereignty and memory of the revolution. - The broader regional reaction to U.S. actions in Venezuela has included criticism from neighboring countries like Colombia and Mexico, with a sense in Latin America that the U.S. should not intrude in sovereign affairs. Brazil (a major BRICS member) is highlighted as a key actor whose stance can influence Venezuela’s BRICS prospects; Lula’s position is described as cautious, with Brazil’s foreign ministry reportedly vetoing Venezuela’s BRICS membership despite Lula’s personal views. - The sanctions regime is cited as a principal reason for Venezuela’s economic stagnation, with the suggestion that lifting sanctions would be a prerequisite for meaningful economic recovery. Delcy Rodríguez is characterized as a skilled negotiator who could potentially improve Venezuela’s standing if sanctions are removed. - Public opinion in Venezuela is described as broadly supportive of the regime, with the U.S. action provoking anti-American sentiment across the hemisphere. The discussion notes that a large majority of Venezuelans (over 90%) reportedly view Delcy Rodríguez favorably, and that the perception of U.S. intervention as a violation of sovereignty influences regional attitudes. - Iran: protests, economy, and foreign influence - Iran is facing significant protests that are described as the most severe since 2022, driven largely by economic issues, inflation, and the cost of living under four decades of sanctions. Real inflation is suggested to be 35–40%, with currency and purchasing power severely eroded. - Foreign influence is discussed as a factor hijacking domestic protests in Iran, described as a “color revolution” playbook echoed by past experiences in Hong Kong and other theaters. Iranian authorities reportedly remain skeptical of Western actors, while acknowledging the regime’s vulnerability to sanctions and mismanagement. - Iranians emphasize the long-term, multi-faceted nature of their political system, including the Shiite theology underpinning governance, and the resilience of movements like Hezbollah and Yemeni factions. Iran’s leadership stresses long-term strategic ties with Russia and China, as well as BRICS engagement, with practical cooperation including repair of the Iranian electrical grid in the wake of Israeli attacks during the twelve-day war and port infrastructure developments linked to an international transportation corridor, including Indian and Chinese involvement. - The discussion notes that while sanctions have damaged Iran economically, Iranians maintain a strong domestic intellectual and grassroots culture, including debates in universities and cafes, and are not easily toppled. The regime’s ability to survive is framed in terms of internal legitimacy, external alliances (Russia, China), and the capacity to negotiate under external pressure. - Russia, China, and the U.S. strategic landscape - The conversation contrasts the apparent U.S. “bordello circus” with the more sophisticated military-diplomatic practices of Iran, Russia, and China. Russia emphasizes actions over rhetoric, citing NATO attacks on its nuclear triad and the Novgorod residence attack as evidence of deterrence concerns. China pursues long-term plans (five-year plans through 2035) and aims to elevate trade with a yuan-centric global south, seeking to reduce dollar reliance without emitting a formal de-dollarization policy. - The discussion frames U.S. policy as volatile and unpredictable (the Nixon “madman theory” analog), while Russia, China, and Iran respond with measured, long-term strategies. The potential for a prolonged Ukraine conflict is acknowledged if European leaders pursue extended confrontation, with economic strains anticipated across Europe. - In Venezuela, Iran, and broader geopolitics, the panel emphasizes the complexity of regime stability, the role of sanctions, BRICS dynamics, and the long game of global power shifts that may redefine alliances and economic arrangements over the coming years.