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If Russia and China form a military alliance and the US enters World War 3, there is a high likelihood that the United States could cease to exist. The foreign policy establishment that led us to Iraq and Afghanistan has failed to protect our borders and cyber defenses. A super EMP attack from a country like Iran could take out our electric grid, causing millions of Americans to become impoverished. Russia and China have advanced space-based offensive capabilities, while the US lacks both offensive and defensive capabilities. Russia is accumulating nuclear weapons at a faster pace than the US. Going to war would be a huge risk, especially when our own homeland is vulnerable and our industrial capacity is lacking. Both parties in the US support a pro-war agenda, increasing the risk of World War 3. The American people are not being informed about the potential consequences of such a war.

Speaker 0 and Speaker 1 discuss the Trump administration’s approach to foreign policy and its global impact. - Unpredictability as a negotiation asset: Speaker 0 notes that Trump’s rhetoric is out of the norm and concerning, citing statements about Greenland, Iran, Venezuela, and Gaza. Speaker 1 counters that Trump starts with a very tough position and then moderates it as a negotiation tactic, arguing that unpredictability has value but erodes credibility because “what he says this week will not be what he might do next week or the week after.” - Gaza, Venezuela, and Iran as case studies: Gaza is described as having no peace, only ongoing uncertainty. In Venezuela, Speaker 0 sees a new regime leader working with the old regime, making regime change unlikely; Speaker 1 cautions that Rodriguez would have to dismantle the army and paramilitaries to improve Venezuela, implying changes may be blocked by corruption and drug trafficking networks. In Iran, despite expectations of a strike, Trump did not strike, which Speaker 1 attributes to calculated restraint and the need to avoid provoking Iranian retaliation; Speaker 0 asks why, and Speaker 1 emphasizes the complexity and the risk of escalation. - Domestic and diplomatic capacity under Trump: Speaker 1 argues the administration relies on nontraditional figures (e.g., Jared Kushner, Steve Witkoff) rather than professional diplomats, contributing to a lack of sustained policy execution. He notes the Pentagon, State Department, and National Security Council have been stripped of expertise, with many positions unfilled. He describes diplomacy as being conducted by envoy, with trusted associates who lack deep diplomatic experience. - Global power shifts and alliances: Speaker 1 says unpredictability can undermine US credibility; however, there is a real shift as the US appears to retreat from international engagement. He asserts that Russia and China have lost clients due to various internal and regional dynamics, while the US withdrawal from international organizations has allowed China to gain influence, including within the UN. He predicts that the US could become weaker in the long run relative to its previous position, even if economically stronger domestically. - Regional dynamics and potential alliances: The conversation touches on the theoretical possibility of an Islamic or Middle Eastern NATO-like alliance, led by Pakistan and Saudi Arabia with potential Turkish involvement. Speaker 1 argues that such an alliance would not resemble NATO but that regional powers are likely to form bilateral and regional arrangements to counterbalance major powers like the US, Russia, and China. In the Middle East, Israel is cast as an influential actor shaping regional alignments, with Gulf states wary of Iranian retaliation and crisis spillover. - The Iran crisis and military posture: Speaker 1 explains why Gulf states and Israel did not want an immediate strike on Iran due to the risk of massive retaliation and limited US regional presence at the time. He notes the Abraham Lincoln and George H.W. Bush carrier groups' movements suggest potential future force projection, but states that any strike would likely be small if undertaken given current hardware positioning. He suggests the crisis will continue, with Iran’s internal repression and external deterrence shaping the dynamics. He also points to the 2000 missiles and the IRGC’s scale as factors in regional calculations. - Reflection on impact and timing: The discussion notes the potential for longer-term consequences in US credibility and global influence once Trumpism passes, with the possibility of the US reemerging weaker on the world stage despite possible internal economic strength. Speaker 0 closes with appreciation for the discussion; Speaker 1 agrees.

Jeffrey Sachs argues that we are witnessing the limits of Western power, including the limits of U.S. power, and that this is part of a long-term trend toward the waning dominance of the Western world as Asia rises. He frames the broader arc as follows: - After World War II, Europe lost its colonies and the United States emerged to replace European empires, competing with the Soviet Union as the two major imperial powers. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, the United States appeared to be the sole superpower, leading to an era some called the unipolar moment. Sachs contends this moment was largely an illusion economically: for about a century and a half leading up to 1950, the West dominated, but the long-term trend was the narrowing of the gap between the West and Asia. - From the end of World War II onward, Asia began a sustained process of catching up in literacy, education, infrastructure, and industrialization. While Western economic and military dominance remained evident, Asia’s rise gradually altered the balance of power. By the 1990s and into the 2000s, Asia’s relative power had grown substantially, with China emerging as a major economic and technological force. - The “unipolar moment” faded as reality: Asia has been rising since the mid-20th century, and the post-1991 euphoria in the United States about unipolarity was economically questionable. Sachs notes that even at the height of U.S. power, the U.S. could not defeat Vietnam or sustain European empires, and that China’s rise began well before 2010, becoming evident in manufacturing and heavy industry led by China. - He highlights the Ukraine war as another demonstration of the limits of American expansion and NATO’s enlargement, arguing that the war marks the end of NATO enlargement and challenges the notion that the U.S. could redraw power on Eurasia at will. He recalls Zbigniew Brzezinski’s idea of U.S. dominance over Eurasia and argues that Putin’s stance showed that such dominance would not be realized. - Sachs emphasizes that technology and economic growth diffuse over time, making monopolies unsustainable. He cites historical examples: Britain’s early industrial edge, Germany and the United States catching up, and even the limited lasting power of nuclear monopoly due to espionage and scientific advances. He argues that “choke points” are a recurring meme that eventually fail to prevent rising challengers. - He discusses realist theories: offensive realism (John Mearsheimer) arguing that great powers cannot find stable balance and constantly seek advantage, versus defensive realism (and Kissinger’s Concert of Europe-inspired view) suggesting some stability through negotiation and norms. He notes that U.S. strategists often view China and Russia as destabilizing and dangerous, though he himself advocates cooperative accommodation with China, avoiding confrontations over red lines and arms sales to Taiwan. - Sachs connects these ideas to ideology, noting that dominant powers often rationalize dominance through imperialist or civilizing ideologies. He references Robert Kagan’s liberal imperialism concept and traces it back to European imperial thought, suggesting that Western mentalities persist even as formal empires fade. He argues that imperial mindsets continue in Britain and the United States, with imperial ideologies shaping how power is exercised and justified. In sum, Sachs frames the current era as a gradual but undeniable shift away from Western, particularly American, dominance toward a more multipolar order led by Asia, with the Ukraine war and Iran as illustrating events showing the limits of unipolarity and the enduring, complex dynamics of great-power competition.

- The speaker asserts that the United States is not just containing China but is attempting a rollback of Chinese economic growth, arguing that military power is largely a function of economic power. - They claim, “The United States… is a ruthless great power,” and that Americans are tough despite liberal rhetoric used to cover up ruthless behavior. - The speaker recounts a late-1980s/early-1990s warning to China: if China continues to grow economically, there will be a fierce security competition, and China would be shocked by how ruthless the United States is. - They state that China did not believe the warning at the time because the United States was treating China very well. - The speaker explains the underlying mechanism: “the structure’s gonna change, and when we go from unipolarity to multipolarity, and you’re a peer competitor, we’re gonna think about you very differently than we think about you now.” - They claim that this structural shift is exactly what is happening, with China moving toward being a peer competitor and the United States now treating China differently as a result.

The US is no longer the dominant economic and technological power, though it remains the most powerful military country. The US has become a problem, especially since 2017, blocking multilateral initiatives and withdrawing from agreements like the Paris Climate Accord and the JCPOA. The US is engaged in a trade war on China due to China's rising technological capabilities. US grand strategy is based on primacy, which is no longer viable. The US is attacking digital taxation, cutting corporate taxes, and dismantling the WTO. The US Treasury threatened to confiscate Iraq's foreign exchange reserves when Iraq requested US military forces to leave. The world cannot stop because of the US; multilateralism must continue. There is no global crisis about multilateralism, but there is fear of the US. The US is acting as a bully, but the world should not back down. US unilateralism has been in vogue for about twenty years, but it has worsened recently with overt hostility and lawlessness.

The discussion centers on India’s position in 2025 amid a shifting international order and U.S. efforts to recalibrate a multipolar world. - The year 2025 is characterized as eventful for India, with the country under pressure to choose a path in a world where power is more distributed. The conversation opens with a framing of the U.S. adjusting to multipolarity, the return of Trump, and various global tensions, noting that India’s role has received relatively less attention. - Speaker 1 reflects that 2025 was not a good year for India. At the start of the year, India expected to remain a fulcrum of U.S. policy to contain China and to shuttle between powers, maintaining a growing trade relationship with China while navigating U.S. pressures. The Trump presidency disrupted this balance. India perceived U.S. interference in its domestic politics, including alleged U.S. fingerprints in color revolutions in Bangladesh and Nepal, and a perception that U.S. entities like the National Endowment for Democracy were involved. The 50% trade tariff on India by the U.S. shocked New Delhi, and Trump’s public and private statements criticizing India complicated the relationship. - The discussion notes India’s sensitivity to becoming overly dependent on the U.S. for strategic protection against China, given Modi’s emphasis on Indian sovereignty and self-reliance. Modi’s perceived humility toward Trump, followed by a cooling of the relationship after Trump’s tariff threats, created a crisis of confidence in the U.S.-India alignment. Modi’s personal interactions with Trump—such as a cordial birthday exchange followed by threats of 100% tariffs on India—were seen as signaling mixed signals from Washington. - India’s options in 2025 include: (1) retrenchment and continuing to seek a balancing act between the U.S., China, and Russia; (2) charting an independent course by strengthening ties within BRICS and the Global South; or (3) aligning more with the U.S. with the hope of future U.S. policy shifts. The economic reality complicates choices: while India’s exports did reasonably well despite tariffs and some FDI, opening Indian dairy and agriculture to the U.S. market would threaten farmers’ livelihoods, potentially destabilizing an electorate sensitive to domestic issues. - There is a broader point about Washington’s approach: demand loyalty from regions and countries while using tariffs and pressure to shape alignment, and Trump’s approach is described as a fear-and-intimidation strategy toward the Global South. - On the China-India axis, the speakers discuss how China’s rise and India’s size create a power disparity that makes simple dominance difficult for either side. India’s strategy involves leveraging BRICS and other forums (including the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, SCO) to expand multipolar governance and reduce dependence on a single power center. The interlocutors emphasize that BRICS operates by consensus and is not a vetoed UN-style body; thus, it offers a platform where major powers can cooperate without a single dominant voice. - The potential paths for India include growing within BRICS and the Global South, seeking mutual economic advantages, and developing a strategy that reduces vulnerability to U.S. coercion. One line of thought suggests using digital tools to help Indian small and medium-sized enterprises access global markets, and building coalitions using shared developmental and financial needs to negotiate better terms in global trade, similar to how an OPEC-like approach could coordinate commodity pricing for the Global South. - The conversation also touches on border and regional issues: a historical context where Russia resolved border tensions with China via settlements that altered the balance of power; the suggestion that India and China could adopt joint administrative arrangements for disputed border zones to reduce conflict risk and foster cooperation, though this requires careful handling to avoid loss of face for either side. - The role of China is described as patient and multipolar-friendly, seeking to buy more from India and to cultivate mutual trade, while recognizing India’s internal challenges, such as power reliability and structural issues like caste and crony capitalism, which affect India’s ability to produce and export higher-value goods. - The broader takeaway is a vision of a more integrated multipolar Eurasia, where India’s leadership within BRICS/SC0 and its ability to create innovative economic arrangements—such as “resource bourses” or shared supply chains—could alter the balance of power and reduce dependency on U.S. policy dynamics. There is an emphasis on avoiding a new Cold War by fostering dialogue and joint governance mechanisms that include China, India, Russia, Brazil, South Africa, and other Global South actors. - The speakers close with a cautious optimism: 2026 could be better if nations learn to push back against coercive power, redefine security around development and governance rather than force, and pursue multipolar institutions that preserve autonomy while enabling peaceful competition. The expectation is that seeds of hope exist within these analyses, even as the present year has been challenging.

Speaker 0: The GCC allies are largely blockaded and not getting anything through; only UAE or Oman might be getting a few shipments due to being on the Gulf of Oman side. This is driving higher oil prices. We can’t simply bluff or "play a game of chicken" because it affects the entire world—Asia, Africa, Europe, and the United States. The shortage extends beyond oil to things like helium, and it’s impacting chip manufacturing and broader economic activity. These are medium-term issues already baked in and in short supply, so we’re facing real problems and a question of how long we can endure this. Speaker 1: As energy becomes more expensive—oil at $110, then $120, $130, $140, $150, rising until this crisis ends globally—the risk is a financial collapse worse than 2007–2008, potentially a depression in much of the world. Economists predict a serious recession, possibly a depression, and these dynamics are what Putin was trying to convey to Trump because Americans are perceived as potentially catastrophic. China is dependent on energy but is expanding nuclear power, has substantial coal, and is investing in renewables; China will survive this. Japan and Korea are on the edge; India is affected; Egypt is trying to feed 100,000,000 and facing famine; Turkey is involved. These states are being pushed toward war not just with Israel but with the United States, since without Israel none of this would be happening, and they know it. Russia, China, Egypt, Turkey, India, and possibly others may join a coalition to force the United States to stop. The speaker would prefer not to go there and believes President Trump should end the blockade, which was adopted because it was the only measure short of returning to war, but the blockade won’t work because the world won’t tolerate it. The president of the Republic of Korea (South Korea) has publicly said it’s time for Korea to defend itself. It’s been time for Korea to take control of its own armed forces for a long time, but the U.S. currently controls all their armed forces and Koreans have not liked that for at least twenty years. Now they want control of their own armed forces. The speaker expects the dissolution of the United States’ unofficial overseas imperial holdings, predicting the Koreans will expel the U.S., with Japan likely following. In the Pacific, trilateral efforts among Korea, the Philippines, and Japan are forming to cooperate with the U.S. in a future war with China—not in our lifetimes or on the planet, as no one wants war with China. Nobody wants war with China; China is increasingly seen as a safer place for cash and investments in the U.S. This shift began when the U.S. began telling Russians they would not allow them to access billions of rubles and may seize funds, possibly giving cash to Ukrainians. People are watching and asking whether they want to depend on the U.S. financial system or face interference with bank accounts. There are many bad developments right now, and the last thing the American people need is a war, certainly not one involving China, Russia, or any other powers along with Iran, yet that seems to the direction in which things are headed.

Colonel Lawrence Wilkerson and Glenn discuss the current U.S. posture toward Iran, Russia, and China within a broader critique of U.S. diplomacy and imperial overreach. They begin by contrasting the era of diplomacy with today’s approach, noting that Donald Trump paused his plan to open the Strait of Hormuz by force after earlier objectives were not met, while Marco Rubio claimed that Operation Epic Fury had already achieved its goals. Wilkerson contends Rubio’s statements are egregiously wrong and emphasizes that a blockade is an act of war, citing post–World War II international law and Kennedy’s Cuban Missile Crisis decisionmaking, where quarantine was used as an alternative to a blockade. He dismisses the idea of kamikaze dolphins and argues the Iran situation failed objectively; Trump appears to seek an exit from a costly engagement, and the only way to open the Strait would be if an Omani-Iranian consortium controlled it and charged a modest pass-through fee. Wilkerson argues the Strait of Hormuz plan was cocked up, and he criticizes the Pentagon and Pete Gaskdast for missteps. He suggests genuine strategic outcomes depend on Iranian control of the strait, and he questions how 2,000 ships in the North Arabian Sea could be escorted without sufficient naval power. The discussion then moves to European involvement; Wilkerson dismisses the French carrier strike group as a meaningless display that does not enhance combat power, noting current and rising costs of U.S. and allied carriers and the obsolescence of carriers in first-tier warfare. He highlights BRICS as a counterpoint to Western strategy, pointing to the BRICS Summit in September in Delhi under Modi, with the theme “building for resilience, innovation, cooperation, and sustainability,” and contrasts this with U.S. emphasis on primacy and sanctions. The conversation shifts to the historical arc of empire, with Wilkerson likening today’s U.S. posture to the regimes of the 1930s and arguing that the empire’s methods are eroding alliances. He critiques U.S. leaders and the psychological willingness to pursue warlike paths, suggesting that the BRICS framework represents a potential alternative to the U.S.-led order. He invokes Eisenhower’s preference for diplomacy and the UN, warning that the current trajectory risks becoming a modern-day breach of international norms. He warns that if Europe’s leaders are displaced and if the U.S. continues to threaten war, the global balance could shift toward a multipolar confrontation where China and Russia align more closely, potentially undermining the Bretton Woods system and Swift, and leaving the U.S. vulnerable to sanctions regimes and other strategic restraints. The dialogue then addresses Israel, Netanyahu, and Lebanon. Wilkerson asserts that Israel’s current actions in Lebanon and the broader region reflect a “Hitlerian/Tojoian” posture, describing the Israeli stance as violent and undermining regional stability. He notes Haaretz and other Israeli media critiques of Netanyahu’s approach, suggesting that a democracy with inclusive governance could offer a path forward, but in its present form, Israel faces existential questions about its future statehood. He argues that Europe’s political leaders are unlikely to endure the current trajectory, and he emphasizes the central role of nuclear weapons in shaping the strategic risk of the era. Wilkerson asserts that the current imperial framework relies on existential threats to unify populations, and he hopes BRICS and other powers will adopt climate-security as a unifying concern to avert catastrophic conflict. Towards the end, Wilkerson cautions that if the U.S. and its allies do not reframe diplomacy, the world may turn against the empire, with Xi Jinping’s potential to transform the global financial system and sanctions regimes as a signal of a broader realignment. He concludes with a sobering reminder that the planet remains vulnerable to catastrophic outcomes if diplomacy fails, and he acknowledges the possibility of renewed bombing of Iran being discussed in some quarters.

US leaders, according to the discussion, have pushed Russia and China closer by trying to prevent a stronger alliance outside the Western Hemisphere. President Vladimir Putin met with President Xi Jinping, and the two signed a record number of agreements covering energy, finance, AI, transportation, manufacturing, and military coordination. Key developments highlighted include new pipeline infrastructure permanently directing Russian energy toward China and growing efforts to bypass the US dollar in global trade. The discussion links these moves to Western pressures such as high energy prices, deindustrialization, debt, stagnant growth, and economic fallout from years of proxy wars and sanctions policy, framing the Russia-China trade corridor as on track to become a strategically important global route. The speakers contrast the Putin-Xi agreements with President Trump’s recent trip to China, describing one set of deals as historic and growth-based and the other as diplomatic and transactional. They portray Trump-era US-China deals as tariff pauses, trade concessions, agricultural purchases, and efforts to stabilize and correct issues created, while portraying Putin-Xi agreements as going beyond commerce—building long-term energy infrastructure and alternative financial systems outside the US dollar, effectively aiming at a parallel economic order rather than managing trade tensions. Former State Department diplomat Jim Jatris says US foreign policy has driven the two powers into a historic alliance, and he argues that the real question is whether Russia and China still see themselves as invested in the dollar-denominated system as it stands. He points to the joint statement’s “hoping” for a future multipolar order with the US stepping down from ambitions for global unipolar power, adding that they may not yet know whether the US can be persuaded to do so. When asked about the nature of the Russia-China partnership and whether the US could do something similar, Jatris responds that US diplomacy often arrives with minimal substance, while he claims Americans are not offering the kind of comprehensive, sustained partnership described. On the US dollar, Jatris says the agreements involve multipolar cooperation and end-around arrangements to settle transactions in yuan and ruble outside the US petrodollar system, describing this as potentially the “final nail in a coffin” for the dollar and noting that earlier predictions of replacement currencies have not yet come to pass. He argues both Russia and China also have corrupt interests and that short-term deals could benefit individuals rather than national interests. Asked about Iran, Jatris calls it the “big question,” arguing that Russia, China, and Iran are loath to admit that the United States is not “agreement capable,” citing a hypothetical example involving sanctions relief and control of the Straits of Hormuz. He says Russia and China may instead view the situation as an opportunity to weaken the US “empire,” offering an off ramp for Trump that could result in a “Minsk type deception.” On military cooperation, Jatris says China is interested in technical knowledge gained by Russia in Ukraine, describing joint training missions as Russians training Chinese on lessons from drone warfare and related experience. He frames Russia as the stronger military power with a larger nuclear arsenal and notes direct experience in a paradigm-changing war only Russia and Ukraine have. Regarding Europe and the prospect of a western war against Russia, Jatris argues Europe is the main problem, asserting Washington is trying to offload burdens to Europeans. He describes low willingness among Europeans to fight, ties it to constraints including cheap Russian energy’s role in industry, and argues Europeans are making noise but are not positioned to fight materially, spiritually, morally. He suggests Russia may be overestimating that European problem and makes the case that Russia should finish the Ukraine war sooner rather than later. On Putin’s political prospects and Russian appetite for continued conflict, Jatris says he sees not an inability to win but a deliberate decision shaped by classic statecraft: forcing the enemy to agree to terms. He cites Putin’s June 2024 terms—four oblasts, Crimea agreements including no NATO neutrality, denazification, and demilitarization—and argues that even if the West agreed, those terms would not be honorably enforceable without Russian control of Kyiv. He also contends that Russian questioning of treaty guarantees and the possibility of denazification/demilitarization lacks a workable answer. The conversation also includes claims of frustration in Russia over the war being prolonged, references to large numbers of dead including non-Ukrainians serving as mercenaries, and the view that money continues to flow into the conflict.

Ashwin Rutansi introduces New Order, a global show tracing how India and its allies sit at the center of a transformation in world history. The program aims to explore partnerships, shifting alliances, and how structural changes ripple from global powers to streets, villages, markets, and boardrooms. The show promises to examine diplomatic architecture, networks of power, money flows, and levers of influence, presenting a fundamental reordering rather than mere turbulence. Zara Khan will join later to field viewer questions. Guest: John Mearsheimer, University of Chicago professor and coauthor of The Israel Lobby and US Foreign Policy. The discussion opens with the recent incident of Iran firing missiles at an F-35 and what it implies given anticipated US and allied arms purchases. Mearsheimer notes that aircraft over adversary territory face real risks from surface-to-air missiles and air defenses, even if the US and Israel have degraded Iran’s defenses. He suggests this is a factor behind why the US and Israel refrain from flying over Iran. Geopolitical framing: Who benefits from the ongoing war (in Iran) at the time of the interview? Mearsheimer identifies two clear winners: Russia and China. Russia benefits from sanctions relief on oil and gas pushed by Trump-era policies, and the war diverts munitions away from Ukraine, aiding Russia in its position. China gains as US credibility in foreign policy deteriorates, increasing its influence in the Middle East and globally as nations worry about an unreliable US, with Europe showing signs of leaning toward China. India’s position is discussed as a potential loser in this new order. The discussion asserts that India’s relations with Israel and Iran, and its ties to both the US and the Gulf, place it in a precarious position. The possibility of a summit or peace conference is deemed unlikely to solve inflation, gas prices, fertilizer costs, or Indian food production challenges; the war is characterized as bad news for India, as reflected in Indian media. On US policy and the Israel lobby: Mearsheimer contends that the Israel lobby has significant influence over US foreign policy and that its role in dragging the United States into wars, including Iraq in 2003, was central. He notes with some irony that the lobby’s power is increasingly in the open, referencing Joe Kent’s statements and public figures like Tucker Carlson and Bernie Sanders endorsing similar criticisms. He points to Francesca Albanese, UN official on Palestinian territories, describing the Israeli actions in Gaza as genocidal, and notes the lobby’s efforts to undermine her career. Policy advice for the Global South, focusing on India: Mearsheimer argues that India should maintain distance from excessive US alignment to avoid heavy leverage over Indian policy. He suggests speaking up against US policy when it harms national interests but avoiding becoming overly dependent on the United States. He cites examples such as Indonesia where maintaining friendly ties with China while balancing US relations would be prudent. He warns that excessive closeness to the US invites sanctions and pain, whereas diversifying partnerships could reduce vulnerability. BRICS and multipolarity: The war could benefit BRICS and the Global South, with Russia and China gaining, while some BRICS members like India and possibly Indonesia could suffer. The conflict may prompt a strategic rethinking of US ties, encouraging greater independence from Washington. The discussion also touches on Europe’s economic strain and NATO’s perceived setback if Russia prevails in Ukraine, describing a “double whammy” for European leadership from the Gulf conflict alongside Ukraine. End of interview: The program teases future exploration of the Israel lobby’s influence and the potential for a broader discussion on the end of the Israel lobby era, followed by viewer questions. Zara Khan presents questions from the audience, including whether the broader humanity will gain a say on the world stage and how the Iran war might differ from Vietnam and Afghanistan, emphasizing asymmetrical warfare and the risk of ground involvement. The show signs off, inviting viewers to follow and watch future episodes.

BRICS will continue to expand and may announce a new currency or trading system to counteract the American-led system. BRICS doesn't have to replace the dollar, it just has to threaten it, as finance is based on confidence. Putin will maintain a close relationship with China; he needs China to remain neutral so Russia can pressure the American empire. Over the next few years, the Ukraine war will continue without expanding. Iran will take the initiative against the United States. North Korea will become more belligerent, forcing America to focus on East Asia. The relationship between Putin and Xi Jinping will strengthen.

Richard Wolff and Glenn discuss the future of the West, NATO, Europe, and the international economic system. - The central dynamic, according to Wolff, is the rise of China and the West’s unpreparedness. He argues that the West, after a long era of Cold War dominance, is encountering a China that grows two to three times faster than the United States, with no sign of slowing. China’s ascent has transformed global power relations and exposed that prior strategies to stop or slow China have failed. - The United States, having defeated various historical rivals, pursued a unipolar, neoliberal globalization project after the Cold War. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of that era left the U.S. with a sense of “manifest destiny” to shape the world order. But now time is on China’s side, and the short-term fix for the U.S. is to extract value from its allies rather than invest in long-run geopolitics. Wolff contends the U.S. is engaging in a transactional, extractive approach toward Europe and other partners, pressuring them to concede significant economic and strategic concessions. - Europe is seen by Wolff as increasingly subordinated to U.S. interests, with its leadership willing to accept terrible trade terms and militarization demands to maintain alignment with Washington. He cites the possibility of Europe accepting LNG imports and investments to the U.S. economy at the expense of its own social welfare, suggesting that Europe’s social protections could be jeopardized by this “divorce settlement” with the United States. - Russia’s role is reinterpreted: while U.S. and European actors have pursued expanding NATO and a Western-led security architecture, Russia’s move toward Greater Eurasia and its pivot to the East, particularly under Putin, complicates Western plans. Wolff argues that the West’s emphasis on demonizing Russia as the unifying threat ignores the broader strategic competition with China and risks pushing Europe toward greater autonomy or alignment with Russia and China. - The rise of BRICS and China’s Belt and Road Initiative are framed as major competitive challenges to Western economic primacy. The West’s failure to integrate and adapt to these shifts is seen as a strategic misstep, especially given Russia’s earlier openness to a pan-European security framework that was rejected in favor of a U.S.-led order. - Within the United States, there is a debate about the proper response to these shifts. One faction desires aggressive actions, including potential wars (e.g., Iran) to deter adversaries, while another emphasizes the dangers of escalation in a nuclear age. Wolff notes that Vietnam and Afghanistan illustrate the limits of muscular interventions, and he points to domestic economic discontent—rising inequality, labor unrest, and a growing desire for systemic change—as factors that could press the United States to rethink its approach to global leadership. - Economically, Wolff challenges the dichotomy of public versus private dominance. He highlights China’s pragmatic hybrid model—roughly 50/50 private and state enterprise, with openness to foreign participation yet strong state direction. He argues that the fixation on choosing between private-market and public-control models is misguided and that outcomes matter more than orthodox ideological labels. - Looking ahead, Wolff is optimistic that Western economies could reframe development by learning from China’s approach, embracing a more integrated strategy that blends public and private efforts, and reducing ideological rigidity. He suggests Europe could reposition itself by deepening ties with China and leveraging its own market size to negotiate from a position of strength, potentially even joining or aligning with BRICS in some form. - For Europe, a potential path to resilience would involve shifting away from a mindset of subordination to the United States, pursuing energy diversification (including engaging with Russia for cheaper energy), and forming broader partnerships with China to balance relations with the United States and Russia. This would require political renewal in Europe and a willingness to depart from a “World War II–reboot” mentality toward a more pragmatic, multipolar strategy. - In closing, Wolff stresses that the West’s current trajectory is not inevitable. He envisions a Europe capable of redefining its alliances, reconsidering economic models, and seeking a more autonomous, multipolar future that reduces dependency on U.S. leadership. He ends with a provocative suggestion: Europe might consider a realignment toward Russia and China as a way to reshape global power balances, rather than defaulting to a perpetual U.S.-led order.

The White House officials were part of the foreign policy establishment that contributed to China becoming a strong competitor. Back in the early 2000s, when some of us suggested that the US should take action to slow down China's rise, we were ignored and considered to be remarkably dismissible.

The speaker argues that Russia, China, and India are the major powers, with a potential union under SCO or BRICS posing a US disaster, a result of failed US policy. He claims only three powers matter—Russia, China, and the United States—and suggests a two-against-one dynamic, with the US aligning with Russia to isolate China. Citing Nixon’s 1971 pivot to China, he asserts this approach helped isolate the Soviet Union. He urges engaging with Russia rather than treating it as a pariah, noting the war in Ukraine blocks a pivot. At the Alaska summit, Trump reportedly listened to Putin unfiltered, and Putin seeks a comprehensive peace treaty with security guarantees, though misunderstandings over those guarantees (and Article 5) persist. The plan would involve Russia, China, perhaps Turkey, with minimal Western boots, and sidelining Zelensky to seal a quick deal.

America would want China's help to avoid fighting too many wars, ensuring China continues buying US dollars to sustain American debt. Also, historically, Russia has been more of a threat to China, so US friendship with China would force Putin to focus on defense. China is now transferring its US dollars into gold, encouraging others to do the same because America's debt is a huge problem. It makes sense for China and the US to be friends because the US is a huge market for Chinese exports and provides technology. China wants to be friends with Russia because it feels threatened by the US, which has military bases surrounding China. China needs oil and food imports to sustain its economy, and if the US launches an embargo, China collapses. China needs new trade routes, and Russia is the best partner for energy and oil access. Chinese policymakers know China's economy and demographics have collapsed, making it vulnerable and dependent on the world.

One speaker considers the possibility that China, India, or Pakistan might escort a ship through the Strait of Hormuz and worries about a potential direct confrontation between the United States and those countries. He notes there is no expected confrontation between Pakistan and India, highlighting an open line of communication, a good relationship, and that one of them is a mediator in negotiations. China, however, is described as a different case, with increasing parallels to what was seen between the United States and Russia in the early Cold War era. The other speaker expresses hope that the Chinese will not decide to confront the Americans over the Strait. He bluntly states that the Chinese are not friends with the United States anymore; while they have long-term economic partnership and linked economies, the current administration has been placing tariffs on China and threatening more tariffs. News reports are cited indicating that China will provide the HQ-9 air defense system, which is described as far superior to the Russian S-300, to Iran. He emphasizes these are defensive weapons, not offensive capabilities, and notes that the administration is likely to be distressed by this development. Despite the administration’s stance, the speaker asserts that providing defensive weapons to another country is something done routinely and acknowledges that this move could enhance Iran’s defensive posture. He mentions the possibility that the Chinese supply could even enable Iran to detect F-35 aircraft, though he notes uncertainty about this point. The situation is characterized as a game changer and described as a behind-the-scenes nuance that the average American might not fully understand, as well as perhaps the administration not fully grasping it. The speaker reiterates that the Chinese plan is to provide these defensive weapons to Iran, describing it as a soon-to-occur development.

India will decide its own relationships with other countries, including Russia, China, and the United States. India's relationship with China is growing stronger. India is not required to halt its relationship with China because of Donald Trump or close ties with the U.S. government. The world is multipolar, not bipolar, and it is not "America first and everybody else last."

The discussion centers on the rapidly evolving geopolitical landscape, with a focus on Venezuela, Iran, and the broader US-led strategic environment, as seen through the perspectives of Mario and Pepe Escobar. Venezuela and the Venezuelan crisis - Escobar frames Venezuela as a desperate move tied to the demise of the petrodollar, with a broader matrix of actors maneuvering in the back to profit from a potential annexation and to test regional security strategies. He notes that the United States has stated “this is my backyard, and I own it,” and questions whether Washington is ready to back that stance against the will of the Venezuelan people, including Chavistas and the new government led by Delcy Rodríguez, who he describes as “an old school Chavista” with a strong legal and negotiation background. - He argues that the operation against Maduro lacked a coherent strategy, including planning for reorganizing the Venezuelan oil sector to serve American interests. He cites expert opinion suggesting it would take five years to recondition Venezuela’s energy ecosystem to produce around 3,000,000 barrels per day, requiring about $183 billion in investment, which CEOs would require guarantees for before engaging. - The regime-change objective as pursued by Trump-era policy did not materialize; the core regime persists with figures like Padrino and Cabello still in place. The “mini Netflix special” of the operation did not translate into a durable political outcome, and the regime’s leadership remains, even as some key security figures were demoted or accused in the operation. - Dulce Rodríguez (Delcy), the vice president, is portrayed as a capable negotiator who must persuade the Venezuelan public that the security betrayal by the head of Maduro’s security apparatus was real. Escobar emphasizes that the domestic narrative faces a hard sell because the core regime remains and the security apparatus has not been fully neutralized. - Escobar stresses that sanctions are the most critical barrier to Venezuela’s economic recovery and argues that without sanctions relief, meaningful economic reconstitution is unlikely. He notes that Delcy Rodríguez enjoys broad popular support, and he argues that Latin American sentiment toward U.S. intervention complicates Washington’s position. - He warns Brazil’s Lula, a BRICS member, plays a crucial role; Brazilian foreign policy, influenced by Atlanticists, could veto Venezuela’s BRICS membership, complicating Venezuela’s regional integration. He contends that Maduro’s removal is not assured, and a more open Venezuelan regime under Delcy could potentially collaborate with the West, but sanctions and governance challenges remain central obstacles. Iran, protests, and sanctions - The Iranian protests are framed as economically driven, with inflation and cost-of-living pressures fueling dissent. Iran’s currency and real inflation are cited as severe stressors, and the regime’s subsidy policies are criticized as inadequate. Escobar emphasizes that the protests are hijacked by foreign actors to turn into a regime-change playbook, echoing familiar color-revolution patterns observed in other contexts. - He describes Iran’s resilience under extensive sanctions, highlighting infrastructure deficits and the broader economic stagnation as long-running issues. He stresses that Iranian society contains grassroots debate and a robust intellectual culture, including Shiite theology studies, universities, and a tradition of long-term strategic thinking with sustained cross-border alliances (Russia and China) as part of a broader BRICS alignment. - On foreign involvement, Escobar notes differing perspectives: some Iranians blame foreign meddling, while others point to domestic mismanagement and sanctions as primary drivers of discontent. He emphasizes that Iran’s leadership remains wary of external coercion and seeks to strengthen ties within BRICS and other partners, while being cautious about provoking Western escalation. Russia, China, and the evolving great-power dynamic - Escobar argues that Moscow, Beijing, and Tehran view US actions as part of a broader long-term strategy rather than short-term wins. He describes a sophisticated, long-horizon approach: China pursuing a multi-decade plan with five-year cycles, Russia testing BRICS-centered financial and payment systems to reduce dependence on SWIFT, and Iran leveraging BRICS relationships to counterbalance Western pressure. - He contrasts this with what he calls the “bordello circus” of American political-military maneuvering, suggesting that the US’s episodic threats and unpredictable diplomacy undermine any similar credibility or effectiveness. He emphasizes that Russia and China prioritize acts and long-term power balancing over American-style unpredictability. - The 12-day war and the Orishnik missile attack on Lviv are framed as signaling a more volatile phase in the Russia-Ukraine conflict, with Putin signaling that the war could extend beyond the previously imagined timelines if Western escalation continues. The missile strike is presented as a clear warning to NATO and the Polish border region, underscoring heightened geopolitical risk. The broader outlook and conclusions - Escobar remains deeply pessimistic about a swift resolution to the Russia-Ukraine war, citing the potential for a prolonged European conflict that could strain European economies. He views regime stability in Iran as fragile but enduring, while Venezuela’s path remains contingent on sanctions relief, domestic governance, and the strategic posture of Latin American neighbors and BRICS members. - The conversation closes with a reminder of the complexity of modern geopolitics, where sanctions, domestic economics, regional alignments, and long-term strategic planning interact in ways that defy simple “winner-loser” narratives.

The discussion argues that India is paying a price for being a US ally. It claims that, not long ago, Trump imposed about a 50% tariff on India and attempted to dictate which energy India could buy or sell from Russia. Later, the US reversed this after needing oil prices to go lower, un-sanctioning Russian oil that India was purchasing. The speaker says that Modi or other Indian leaders would be frustrated by trying to ally with the United States. The conversation then focuses on fertilizer and food costs. The speaker states that the Indian government subsidizes fertilizer costs for farmers to keep end prices low. They claim that Israel is effectively cost-shifting by ensuring the war continues and sabotages peace deals, creating an ongoing need to subsidize higher fertilizer prices to prevent starvation. The response agrees that India will face fertilizer shortages and that subsidies may not cover total costs, so the Indian government will bear a huge expense that ultimately comes out of ordinary people’s pockets. The speaker adds that rising oil costs and shortages of diesel and LNG are worsening the situation. The transcript also reports survey-based claims: according to polls shared by Indian colleagues, most Indians oppose Trump and have become critical of the Israeli regime compared to a year ago. The speakers say this is likely to get worse as fertilizer shortages continue into 2027. One speaker, identifying as a food scientist running a food laboratory, says their published projections show some level of famine in marginalized countries including Bangladesh and Yemen, and potentially India, with Somalia and Egypt also affected. The speakers then discuss whether countries will blame political leaders. They say it is already happening that global public opinion has turned against the Israeli regime, and that as economic conditions deteriorate, anger and hostility will increasingly target the Israeli regime and the United States, since Trump is US president and the economic effects reflect broadly on the country. Finally, they argue the US is paying a heavy price militarily and economically and that its international reputation is being damaged due to the war. They reference the resignation of Joe Kent, the Trump-appointed counter-terrorism chief, who resigned at the beginning of the war; the resignation letter is described as stating that Iran was not developing a nuclear weapon, not a threat to the US, and that the war is about the Israeli/Zionist regime rather than something carried out for the American people. They conclude that as things worsen in the US, people will blame Trump, Netanyahu, and the Zionist lobby, and that the war’s costs and ongoing genocide are driving hostility worldwide.

The fallout with India will cause repercussions for America. It will push India away from America, strengthening the Eastern bloc of Russia, China, India, and the rest of the world under BRICS. Dedollarization will become a reality.

Professor Jeffrey Sachs argues that the current moment represents dramatic and dangerous upheaval, with the war against Iran in its second week and a “regime change operation” not going as planned. He says there is tremendous confusion about war aims and the ground situation, describing Washington as “fogged” and characterizing Donald Trump’s public messaging as “ravings” from a “madman.” He contends that escalation control is illusory and that the world is sliding toward a broader and more dangerous conflict. Sachs asserts that the war is not limited to Iran: Iran has claimed to strike U.S. bases in several countries while denying attacks on Saudi Arabia, Azerbaijan, and Turkey. He suggests the U.S. and Israel are pulling in proxies, including Kurdish fighters, and that Russia may be supplying Iran with intelligence while the U.S. supplies Ukraine. He contends that after decapitation strikes on Iran, Moscow faces pressure to deter NATO attacks, while Europe contemplates increasing nuclear weapons. He views the conflict as part of a wider global struggle, with fighting across the world and potential linkages to energy markets, indicating that an energy crisis is likely to be severe and poorly priced in by markets. He argues that if China and Russia support Iran, it underscores a broader strategic dynamic, given China’s oil interests and the U.S.’s efforts to cut off oil supplies to China from Venezuela, Russia, and Iran. On international law, Sachs reiterates his argument that the U.S.-Israel attack on Iran is also an attack on the United Nations. He asserts that the U.S. under Trump “despises the UN” and seeks to kill it “through a thousand cuts and through a devastating blow,” pointing to the U.S. withdrawal from UN agencies and rejection of key treaties. He emphasizes that Europe is complicit, with European leaders and ambassadors at the UN Security Council focusing critiques on Iran rather than on the U.S.-Israel strike. He invokes Article 2(4) of the UN Charter as the essence of the UN’s purpose to stop the use of force, contrasting this with the belief that the U.S. “rules the world” and uses violence to impose demands, including the call for “unconditional surrender” in Iran. Sachs describes the U.S. foreign policy machinery as dominated by the CIA and a network of “off the books militaries” that pursue regime change and hegemony. He recalls historical episodes: the 1953 coup in Iran, the Kennedy and Eisenhower era, and the long-standing pattern of U.S. interference in other countries’ leadership. He asserts that performance of checks and balances is deteriorating, with democracy weakening under threat and dissent punished, both in the U.S. and in Europe. He likens Trump’s rhetoric to a hyperbolic assertion that he would determine Iran’s next leader, calling this symptomatic of a broader U.S. imperial project. In discussing European responses, Sachs criticizes Germany for showing subservience to the U.S. stance, with European leaders at times prioritizing confrontation with Iran over engagement with Russia or seeking peace. He laments the decline of European strategic autonomy and the EU as a whole, noting the Danish ambassador’s focus on Iran while ignoring U.S.-Israeli actions. He argues that Europe’s leadership has failed to act in the spirit of postwar peace, contrasting current leadership with figures like de Gaulle, Mitterrand, Kohl, or Schroeder. Toward multipolarity, Sachs traces the idea back to Roosevelt’s vision for a United Nations-centered postwar order and contrasts it with the post-1990s U.S. unilateralism. He argues that the United States, Britain, Russia, and China would need to cooperate to avert catastrophe, and that the current trajectory—led by an obsession with global dominance—risks war, economic crisis, and widespread destabilization. He suggests that China and Russia are the most likely to push back against U.S. hegemony, with India possibly playing a role, though its alignment remains ambivalent. Sachs closes by noting that a move toward peaceful multipolar cooperation would require different leadership and a rejection of the Leviathan-style dominance mindset.

Glenn: Welcome back. We are joined today by Professor John Mersheimer to understand what is happening in the world with this new great power rivalry and how the outcome of the Ukraine war will impact this new Cold War. Have we entered a new Cold War? Who are the players, competing interests, and the rules? Mersheimer: I think we have entered a new Cold War. We're in a multipolar system, and the United States, China, and Russia are the three great powers. The United States is certainly in a cold war with China. China is powerful and threatens to dominate East Asia, and the United States will almost certainly go to great lengths to prevent that from happening, which axiomatically creates an intense security competition in China. An intense security competition is a cold war, and the name of the game is to make sure that security competition does not turn into a hot war. We are in a cold war with the Chinese, or the Chinese are in a cold war with us. The hot war is avoided. Regarding Russia, since we moved into multipolarity, the Russians and the Chinese have been close allies against the United States. This is largely a result of the Ukraine war, which has pushed the Russians into the arms of the Chinese and caused closer Sino-Russian cooperation. The United States, through the Biden administration, was involved in a cold war with both Russia and China. Trump tried to change that, seeking good relations with Russia to form a Russia-plus-US alliance against China, but he has been unable to make that happen. The result is that the United States is basically still in a cold war with both Russia and China. The war in Ukraine has made me worry greatly that the Cold War in Europe could turn into a hot war, even as the U.S.-China relationship remains cooler so far. Glenn: European leaders hoped the United States and Europe would unite in this new Cold War, with liberal hegemony fading and a return to unity against Russia. But Ukraine has instead divided Europe. How do you explain this? Is it the US not seeing Russia as the same threat as Europeans, or a concern about pushing Russia toward China, or Europe’s costs of the partnership? Is this uniquely a Trump-era approach? Mersheimer: From an American point of view, good relations with Russia make sense. China is the peer competitor, and the United States wants to pivot to East Asia to prevent China’s dominance. Russia is the weakest of the three great powers and not a major threat to Europe. The Americans believe Europe can deal with Russia, freeing them to focus on China. Europe, by contrast, is threatened by Russia’s proximity and thus prioritizes Russia. NATO expansion into Ukraine is seen by many Europeans as a disaster, poisoning Russia–Europe relations, making Europe deeply committed to using Ukraine to weaken Russia. The transatlantic alliance becomes strained, especially with Trump raising the possibility of leaving NATO. Europeans fear losing the American pacifier that keeps centrifugal forces in check, which would complicate European coordination with Russia. Glenn: If the United States signals a departure, won’t Europe face greater challenges in managing Russia? And is Russia truly an empire-building threat, or is this a post-2014 narrative that intensified after February 2022? Mersheimer: Bringing Ukraine into NATO was destined to cause trouble. The crisis began in 2014, and the 2022 war is ongoing. The Ukrainians and Europeans want a security guarantee for Ukraine, essentially NATO membership, while Russia demands territory and rejects a security guarantee that would enshrine NATO’s presence near its borders. The Europeans see NATO expansion as threatening, while the Americans view Russia as the weaker power and the need to pivot to China. The controversy over responsibility for this disaster arises from competing interpretations of NATO expansion and Russian aggression. Glenn: Do you see Russia changing course soon? There has been escalation—Odessa blockades, port attacks, and targeting infrastructure. Could this signal a new stage of the war? Mersheimer: The Russians believe Ukraine is on the ropes and expect to win on the battlefield in 2026, possibly expanding fronts in Kharkiv and Sumy. They may consider increasing conventional force and possibly using nuclear weapons if the war drags on. They view the conflict as existential and fear losing, which could push them toward drastic measures to end the war. The Russians could escalate if they think they cannot win conventionally. Glenn: What are the non-nuclear options to win quickly? Could the Russians deliver a decisive conventional victory? Mersheimer: It’s a war of attrition. If Ukraine’s army is weakened, Russia could surround large Ukrainian formations, disrupt logistics, and open larger fronts. They may build up forces in the rear, potentially for a breakthrough or to deter Western escalation. The battlefield outcome may determine the next steps, including whether nuclear options are considered. Glenn: How will Ukraine end? Is it a military defeat, economic collapse, or political fragmentation? Mersheimer: Ukraine is likely to be defeated on the battlefield. Its economy is in desperate shape, and losing Odessa or more territory would worsen it. Politically, Ukraine will face internal divisions once the war ends. Europe will face a broken Russia–Ukraine relationship, with some European states viewing the conflict differently. Ukraine’s demographic decline compounds its bleak outlook, and the country may become a problematic rump state. The war should have been settled earlier; the negotiators in Istanbul in 2022 could have sought a different path. Zelensky’s choice to align with Western powers and walk away from Istanbul negotiations deepened Ukraine’s predicament. Glenn: Any final reflections? Mersheimer: The war’s outcome will reshape Western unity and European security. Historians may view this as a major mistake in weakening the West. The blame for the disaster will likely be attributed in the West to Russia’s imperialism, but the expansion of NATO is also central. Europe’s economic and political landscape will be altered, and Ukraine’s future will be deeply challenging.

Brian Berletic discusses connections between the US “economic war against China” and wars/proxy conflicts involving Russia and Iran, arguing that the US seeks primacy rather than balance of power and uses diplomacy to build pretexts for additional war and to shape geopolitics. He says US policymakers do not expect China to pressure Iran or to pressure Russia, because China has reasons to avoid helping isolate itself, and he frames US actions as deliberate attempts to keep adversaries from becoming independent centers of power. He argues the US aims to weaken Russia, Iran, and China by creating wedges and subordination through client regimes and proxies. He claims Europe, Israel, Persian Gulf states, Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines are treated as extensions of US foreign policy rather than independent balancing powers. He also contrasts what he describes as US strategic framing—portraying America as reasonable while treating opponents as “evil”—with the claimed reality of proxy war, including in Europe and Iran. When asked about the goal of restoring primacy, Berletic says the US tries to pursue multiple forms of dominance—military, financial, trade-route control, and technological dominance—while acknowledging it is becoming less realistic as China surpasses the US plus its proxies. He says US strategy, as he describes it, shifts to wrecking multiple theaters and trade systems rather than direct head-to-head conflict, including efforts to disrupt energy exports and contested waterways. He cites US-created crises in the Middle East and describes US pressure on Indonesia near the Strait of Malacca, attempts to gain military access to that chokepoint, and blockading tactics affecting Russian energy exports and other routes. He claims the US has reorganized the Marine Corps into an anti-shipping force “specifically” for interdicting shipping, with preparation starting before the Trump administration. He argues that these actions aim to increase leverage over Asian states through energy dependence on US LNG exports, and to coerce regional countries away from balancing China. He compares this to how he says the US subordinated Europe via energy dependence, including by disrupting Russia–Europe energy flows over years. Addressing the US strategy’s “double blockade” concept and chokepoints, Berletic argues it is not about shutting everything down instantly. He claims the US does not need to seize every ship; he says ships often turn back and/or are disabled or seized, and he points to examples of US warplanes disabling ships. He argues this creates deterrence and manages economic damage rather than causing total collapse at once, with the goal of controlled destabilization and increased dependency that can be used to disrupt what China is doing in the region. On the Russia–China dynamic, he says Russia is a large energy producer and shares a direct border with China, leaving fewer “middle countries” through which disruption can be mediated compared with routes like Russia–Europe gas via Ukraine. He argues that because Russia and China together can attract other states into a broader gravitational pull, the US strategy carries risks but fits a longstanding pattern of maritime corridor control and chokepoint strategies. Berletic expands on what he describes as long-running pressure against Belt and Road corridors: he claims US-backed militants attack Belt and Road infrastructure in Myanmar and that the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor is attacked by US-backed terrorists. He also describes attacks in Afghanistan against the Afghan government and Chinese investments, framing this as a long-term “global dirty war” against China and its partners. When discussing Iran and Russia, he says Iran and Russia could strike deals with the US but are instead aiming to prevent a return to the prior status quo of sanctions/perpetual threats and NATO’s incremental expansion. He frames their posture as insisting adversaries must be included in the security architecture. He then compares the current era to a “new great game,” arguing it extends beyond Eurasia and now involves technology and rapid integration of advanced capabilities into deterrence for states such as Iran. He characterizes US behavior as either dividing adversaries or weakening them to prevent coordination. He says the US does not want friends among Iran or Russia because it wants them to be subordinated or weakened; otherwise, he claims they would work together with China. Finally, regarding Taiwan, he says the US “keeps” the one-China policy rhetorically but undermines it in practice through laws, troop presence, and military cooperation with Taiwan alongside regional partners, framing US support as preventing any meaningful back-off. He says US diplomacy functions as cover, including in relation to Russia/Ukraine and Iran, and describes US strategy as a multi-domain approach that already functions as economic and proxy war against China while escalating across Russia, Iran, the Middle East, and Asia-Pacific military integration. He concludes by warning that US policy will likely continue escalating and that China’s ability to build faster than the US can disrupt and destroy is central to whether open conflict can be deterred.

The speaker warns of an economic collapse three to four times worse than COVID, driven by a roughly 20% reduction in global energy supply. He notes that under modern modeling, energy is the prerequisite that enables labor, capital, and technology; without energy, GDP falls far more than traditional neoclassical models predict. Key points: - COVID-era lockdowns caused GDP destruction; the coming shock will be three to four times worse, with COVID-style contractions appearing mild in comparison. - A 1% drop in global GDP historically pushes about 40–50 million people worldwide into extreme poverty. A 10% global GDP decline could thrust about 500 million people into extreme poverty (unable to eat, dress, shelter, or pay for basic needs). - The Strait of Hormuz has been effectively shut, reducing oil flow; this is part of a broader energy squeeze impacting global economies. The existing buffer of energy and spare parts will evaporate in a matter of months, worsening supply chains and transportation. - The result will be a global energy shock causing a significant GDP hit (the speaker estimates at least 10% in GDP, possibly 12–14% or more). This is framed as “triple COVID” with numbers centered around a 10%+GDP reduction. - The current U.S. energy advantage is described as temporary; allied economies (Taiwan, South Korea, Japan, Australia) will suffer, and Europe faces energy lockdowns as the U.S. allegedly influenced energy geopolitics (including Nord Stream incidents) and the dollar’s role in global energy trade is challenged as BRICS nations move toward other currencies (e.g., yuan). - The collapse is framed as global and systemic: once energy supplies tighten, there will be a cascade of shortages—tires, lubricants, food, housing—and a widening wealth gap between a small entrenched elite and impoverished masses, with the middle class largely disappearing. - Social and political consequences are predicted: increased desperation could lead to uprisings and revolutions in some countries; domestic political upheaval in the U.S. is expected, including talk of impeachment dynamics and shifts in power. - The analysis criticizes neoclassical economics (Cobb-Douglas production function) for treating energy as interchangeable with other inputs; the speaker argues that without energy, you cannot operate the rest of the economy, regardless of labor or capital. - Historical comparisons: the Great Depression saw a 30% GDP contraction; the 2008 Great Financial Crisis caused about 1–2% global GDP reduction; COVID caused about 3% globally. The coming energy shock is argued to exceed these, with an estimated minimum of a 10% GDP reduction. - The audience is urged to prepare by decentralizing, becoming more self-reliant, and developing resilience: own gold and silver, consider privacy-focused crypto, grow food, pay off debts, keep stored diesel, and acquire practical skills to survive long-term systemic breakdowns. - The speaker emphasizes the need to trade with diverse global partners (including China, Russia, Iran) rather than engage in coercive or militaristic policies, arguing that the current path will impoverish the U.S. and hollow out its infrastructure. - A recurring theme is that the American quality of manufacturing and supply chains has declined; examples are given of quality-control failures in U.S. industry (e.g., a John Deere machine with a poorly tightened bolt, poor auto manufacturing standards) and the claim that the U.S. cannot match China’s manufacturing automation and scale in weapons production. The argument is made that the U.S. would struggle to produce effective weapons at scale and that China’s capabilities (drones, hypersonics, robotics) are far ahead. - The discussion ties economic collapse to broader geopolitical shifts, warning that sanctions and aggressive postures will backfire, leading to currency collapse and widespread hardship unless a pivot to peaceful, global trade and internal resilience is adopted. - The message concludes with a practical call to action: take steps to weather the coming period by building self-reliance, acquiring knowledge, and preparing for a prolonged period of economic and societal stress. Throughout, the speakers frame these developments as imminent and systemic, affecting not only economics but also social stability, infrastructure, and daily life. They stress preparedness, self-reliance, and strategic global engagement as the path to mitigating the coming challenges. The content also includes promotional segments about Infowars-related branding and merchandise, which are not part of the core factual points about the economic analysis.

The discussion centers on the Venezuelan operation that resulted in the capture of Maduro and the broader implications for global power dynamics. Larry asserts that many aspects of Maduro’s kidnapping were “odd,” noting that Caracas possessed significant air defense systems, most of which were not activated, and that one security service leader was a full cooperator with the United States, facilitating U.S. entry and avoiding return fire. He describes the operation as not replacing the Maduro government but “hold off Maduro, get US control of the oil, and get China and Russia and Iran out.” The plan, he states, was not regime change; the regime remained in power, but Maduro was removed temporarily to pursue strategic objectives. In recounting the operation, Larry explains that Delta Force operators from Task Force 160 carried out the mission in full moonlight, which he says reduced the usual advantage of nighttime execution. He compares the Caracas action to a pre-planned, staged exercise at Otis Air Force Base decades earlier, suggesting the Caracas operation was similarly staged, with the United States not facing ground fire. He notes conflicting casualty reports—“32 Cubans were killed” versus “80 Venezuelans”—and emphasizes the cooperation with Venezuelan forces, with no replacement of the government. A key point concerns a potential stand-down order. Larry indicates that the anti-air defenses bought from Russia—S-300s and Buk missiles—were not disabled; rather, they were not activated due to a stand-down order. He proposes that an insider within Maduro’s security apparatus cooperated with the U.S., and he names the possibility of a particular senior commander but declines to identify him publicly. He also discusses a theory that interim president Delcy Rodríguez might have been involved in providing intelligence or cooperation, but he regards such claims as a diversion from the real participants. The discussion then turns to the political and strategic objectives behind capturing Maduro. Mario asks about why capture was pursued if regime change was not intended, and Larry responds that the plan was to “get US control of the oil” and to push out rivals like China, Russia, and Iran from influence in Venezuela. They discuss potential future actions if Rodríguez or other internal leaders do not cooperate, including the possibility of escalating through force or covert operations that could provoke U.S. casualties and thus justify greater U.S. troop involvement. They compare this to the Iraq 2003 invasion planning, noting a lack of long-term stabilization plans. The Monroe Doctrine is invoked and contrasted with a Dunno/“Dunrold” framing. Larry argues that the Monroe Doctrine was misinterpreted as a unilateral U.S. claim to the Western Hemisphere, calling current U.S. actions a blend of Polk and Teddy Roosevelt’s doctrine rather than a strict, modern application of Monroe. He asserts that Russia and China are building a new international order with India and Brazil, and that Trump’s rhetoric may accelerate multipolar alignment, particularly with BRICS members like Brazil. They discuss how U.S. actions could push countries toward cooperating with China and Russia, potentially eroding U.S. hegemony. Turning to Iran, the analysts discuss protests and foreign involvement. They contend that Iranian protests are largely manufactured or supported by Western intelligence, including Mossad and the CIA, highlighting sources like the NCIR/Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK) as part of Western intelligence influence. They note that Iran has strengthened ties with Russia and China since September, reducing sanctions pressure and improving economic options. They contend that Iran’s leadership—Pozheskin’s regime—has shown signs of adapting to internal pressures, including firing an economic minister, while maintaining a posture of resilience against Western demands. They discuss the twelve-day war with Israel, arguing Iran recovered quickly and maintained a strong stance, with deep hypersonic capabilities and robust air defense. The speakers conclude by debating whether the U.S. could replicate Maduro’s capture in Iran or whether a regime change attempt there is feasible. They contend there are no existing U.S. networks in Iran comparable to those in Venezuela, making a similar operation unlikely. They reflect on U.S. leverage, the role of foreign backing for Iran, and the potential for Iran to leverage its growing ties with Russia and China to resist Western pressure. The conversation ends with mutual appreciation and a New Year closing note.