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- New footage from Tel Aviv is shown, including videos outside windows of what sources say they are seeing, with a claim that Fox News is not covering this damage in Tel Aviv. The discussion centers on the reality of buildings being hit near City Hall, and questions why it isn’t being widely covered by Fox News. - The conversation shifts to missile stocks and interceptors. A comment references Keith Kellogg on Fox News discussing a Wall Street Journal report about running out of interceptor missiles within four to five weeks, and a claim that there is no problem because orders were placed and allies could supply missiles. The speaker notes that UAE reportedly has about a week left of interceptor missiles and says missiles from Iran are getting through “like a sieve.” - It is argued that the U.S. has a limited stockpile because many missiles have been transferred to Israel and Ukraine over the past years, leaving the U.S. inventory low. The claim is made that continuing the war with depleted missiles would heighten national security risk and vulnerability globally. - The transcript discusses potential international responses. The speaker contends that Europe’s mobilization rhetoric (France, Greece) should not be expected to deter Iran, noting that Greece does not have a major army and that NATO-funded contingents are involved rather than independent power. The assertion is made that Iran’s strikes in Tel Aviv, Tehran, Qom, and other cities show that Iran believes it can strike back effectively, signaling a preference to fight the United States and Israel rather than submit again. - The central point is that the conflict is described as 100% about missiles and air-defense missiles, not ground forces. The speaker argues Iran likely has enough offensive missiles to prolong the conflict for months, possibly longer than U.S. capacity to sustain it, especially with Hormuz potentially shut or partially shut, which could hurt the western economy. - Admiral James Stavridis is cited by Speaker 0, noting that as the U.S. and Israel expend hundreds of precision weapons, the focus should shift to logistics and stockpiles. The discussion emphasizes the need for inventory clarity, planning, and alignment between political objectives and military capabilities. - Speaker 1 asserts that the planning should have assessed inventories, timeframes, and whether the means match the objectives. The argument states that risking all resources without sufficient offensive or defensive capacity is a dangerous gamble, suggesting the current course could be a “huge blunder.” - The conversation touches on General Dan Kane, who reportedly told the president two weeks earlier that there were not enough ammunition and it would not be pretty to win. A reference is made to Trump’s Truth Social claiming Kane’s assessment was incorrect, with talk of whether Kane did or did not say the president’s characterization was accurate. The claim is made that there are concerns about integrity and whether senior leaders would publicly contradict the administration’s framing if necessary. - A follow-up question is raised about whether admitting a ground invasion would imply insufficient missiles to sustain the mission, with Speaker 1 acknowledging that admitting ground troops would signal a lack of missiles for sustained action. - The segment then shifts to a sponsorship note about depression treatment options, promoting Ataybekli and its lead program BPL-003 (a nasal spray psychedelic-based therapy) developed for treatment-resistant depression, with background on the company, its investors, and the roadmap toward Phase 3 in 2026. It emphasizes the potential for faster, more scalable treatment sessions and invites viewers to learn more at a website, with disclaimers about not providing medical or financial advice.

Speaker 0 and Speaker 1 discuss the unfolding conflict with Iran, focusing on miscalculations, strategy, and potential trajectories. - Speaker 1 says the war is a major miscalculation, identifiable before it began. Signs were evident: movement of military equipment, force postures, and statements suggested that absent an eleventh-hour change by Trump, the plan was to use prepositioned forces and enablers for sustained combat. He notes this pattern matches previous experiences in which the U.S. saw a buildup as a precursor to war, citing Russia’s 2022 invasion and his own observations of earlier prepositioning, logistics, air support, refueling, and large-scale aviation assets (C-17s, C-5s, fighter jets, aircraft carriers). - He argues Iran’s leadership intended to pursue war rather than negotiation, pointing to what he calls a central missed opportunity: the Oman foreign minister’s Friday-night submissions to the Iranian negotiator offering zero reprocessing, stockpile reductions, and at least preliminary talks on long-range missiles and proxies. He asserts that if the Trump administration had accepted those terms, a ceasefire or settlement might have been possible; instead, he claims the next morning’s attack signaled that negotiations were never the aim. - Regarding U.S. objectives, Speaker 1 says the stated aims from Trump were unattainable given Iran’s resolve and the regime’s calculations that fighting a war with the U.S. is less risky than submitting to U.S. demands. He cites a New York Times report indicating Iran believed war with the U.S. was a viable risk, yet he notes Iran’s leadership now appears to be consolidating support at home and regionally after the Ayatollah’s assassination and the subsequent martyrdom of Qasem Soleimani’s successor in Iran’s internal narrative. - On battlefield dynamics, he emphasizes that Iran’s force deployment is not merely pressure but designed for use, with extensive underground facilities capable of withstanding sustained pressure. He forecasts continued high-intensity operations for a period, but warns the U.S. faces a tightening window: if the Iranian side holds firm and the U.S. cannot sustain supplies and missiles, the U.S. could reach a crisis point. - He discusses possible ceasefire dynamics and political reaction: Trump’s suggestion of a ceasefire could be “complete BS” if the Ayatollah’s position remains solid; the martyrdom and regional protests strengthen Iran’s stance. He expects continued escalation and a hardening of Iran’s demands, including sanctions relief or designation changes, should the conflict drag on. - On regional response, Speaker 1 notes that Iran has drawn regional actors into the conflict, with protests supporting Iran across Iraq, Pakistan, Bahrain, Oman, Kuwait, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Israel. He says many Iranians—though opposed to the regime—are unlikely to embrace Israel or the United States as a path out of the crisis, given decades of antagonism and past betrayals by Western powers. - Regarding U.S. vulnerabilities, he says there are reports of U.S. casualties (three killed, five seriously wounded, others lightly wounded) though some figures are disputed; the public reporting may lag behind direct sources. He mentions possible gaps in air defense and the risk of shortages in interceptors as drones and missiles proliferate, warning that Iran could escalate if U.S. stocks are depleted. - Looking ahead, Speaker 1 argues the conflict is a battle of wills and a war of attrition. The U.S. attempted a “cheap” approach with naval and air power but no ground forces; Iran appears ready to continue long enough to force concessions. He warns the Iranian threat could extend to oil infrastructure and the broader economy if the United States or its regional partners target Iran’s energy sector, potentially broadening the conflict. - In sum, he characterizes Iran’s strategy as all-in, aiming to impose pain to compel a negotiated settlement unfavorable to the U.S., while the U.S. faces a narrowing margin to sustain supply chains, missiles, and air defenses as the conflict potentially drags on for weeks to months. He cautions that the escalation ladder remains with higher rungs available, including strikes on energy infrastructure, if the conflict widens.

John Mersheimer argues that the war against Iran is not proceeding as the United States hoped and that there is no plausible off-ramp or decisive pathway to victory. He contends that Washington cannot narrate a decisive end to the conflict the way it could have against Nazi Germany or Imperial Japan, because the war has not produced a decisive Iranian collapse. Instead, Iran has an incentive to convert the fight into a protracted war of attrition and possesses the means to do so, including a broad set of missiles and drones and the ability to retaliate across the region. The result, he says, is a stalemate in which Iran would drive a hard bargain to secure sanctions relief or other concessions, and escalation by the U.S. and Israel will simply provoke Iran to escalate further. On why Iran will not settle on American terms, Mersheimer emphasizes that Iran has a strong hand and time on its side. He notes that the more time passes, the more desperate the U.S. will be to settle, which strengthens Iran’s position. He argues that even heavy bombardment would not compel Iran to quit; rather, Iran could strike back against Gulf states, Israel, and American assets with significant effect. The Gulf States are particularly vulnerable due to a small number of petroleum sites, short-range missiles, drones, and, crucially, desalination plants that provide most of their fresh water. He cites Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Oman as heavily dependent on desalination, implying that destroying such infrastructure would have catastrophic humanitarian and economic consequences. Iran could also target energy infrastructure, and even if the Strait of Hormuz remains open, widespread damage to Gulf energy infrastructure would devastate the regional and global economy. He warns that Israel could suffer increasing Iranian pressure as time goes on, especially as interceptors become depleted. Regarding energy and the Strait of Hormuz, Mersheimer stresses that 20% of the world’s oil and gas passes through the Persian Gulf, making the energy dimension the war’s most consequential aspect. He argues that opening the Strait of Hormuz would be exceedingly difficult, and destroying desalination and petroleum infrastructure in the Gulf States would negate any advantage of keeping the straits open. He suggests that escalation without a viable endgame will have grave economic repercussions for the world, pushing the U.S. toward a coerced end that would not be a victory. Mersheimer contends that strategic bombing or air power alone cannot win such wars. He contrasts World War II and Korea/Vietnam with the present, where there are no boots on the ground and no clear path to victory via air power alone. He notes that the deterrent value of air power is limited, and a regime change strategy is notoriously difficult without ground forces. He argues that the decapitation strategy and ongoing escalations are unlikely to produce a decisive American/Israeli victory, and could instead lead to a stalemate or American concession under economic strain. On leadership and credibility, Mersheimer critiques U.S. leadership, particularly President Trump, for ignoring warning from generals and the National Intelligence Council that regime change was unlikely to succeed. He cites General James Mattis-era warnings that there was no viable military option and notes the pre-war intelligence that suggested limited prospects for quick regime change. He points to Trump’s sometimes contradictory and inaccurate statements about Iranian capabilities, including claims that Iran possessed Tomahawk missiles and that U.S. strikes had erased Iran’s nuclear capability. He argues that such statements undermine U.S. credibility, though he distinguishes between outright lies and genuine mistaken beliefs by leaders. The discussion also covers Russia’s involvement, with Russia believed to be providing intelligence to Iran and possibly supplying matériel and oil if needed. Mersheimer asserts that the war benefits Russia strategically: it diverts U.S. resources from Europe and Ukraine, potentially worsens Ukraine’s trajectory, and could raise global energy prices that benefit Russian revenue. He suggests that Russia, and possibly China, have strong incentives to aid Iran to counter American power. Europe’s role is analyzed as largely symbolic or marginal in determining the war’s outcome. Mersheimer argues that European elites are aligned with the U.S., prioritizing NATO continuity and the maintenance of American military presence, despite the damaging consequences for Europe. He suggests a radical approach for Europe: adopt a hardball stance toward the U.S., diversify its economic and strategic relations (including with China, Russia, and India), and resist being economically manipulated or coerced by Washington. He emphasizes that Europe’s interests would be better served by reducing overreliance on the United States and pursuing a more balanced set of strategic partners. Towards the end, the hosts revisit the idea that leaders lie and that liberal democracies tend to rely more on public persuasion and propaganda, with Trump’s statements illustrating the complexities of truth in international politics. The conversation ends with a reflection on whether Europe should recalibrate its posture toward the United States and broaden its strategic hedges to protect its own interests, rather than assuming continued U.S. leadership in a costly and protracted confrontation with Iran.

In this conversation, Brian Berletic discusses the current collision between the United States’ global strategy and a rising multipolar world, arguing that U.S. policy is driven by corporate-financier interests and a desire to preserve unipolar primacy, regardless of the costs to others. - Structural dynamics and multipolar resistance - The host notes a shift from optimism about Trump’s “America First” rhetoric toward an assessment that U.S. strategy aims to restore hegemony and broad, repeated wars, even as a multipolar world emerges. - Berletic agrees that the crisis is structural: the U.S. system is driven by large corporate-financier interests prioritizing expansion of profit and power. He cites Brookings Institution’s 2009 policy papers, particularly The Path to Persia, as documenting a long-running plan to manage Iran via a sequence of options designed to be used in synergy to topple Iran, with Syria serving as a staging ground for broader conflict. - He argues the policy framework has guided decisions across administrations, turning policy papers into bills and war plans, with corporate media selling these as American interests. This, he says, leaves little room for genuine opposition because political power is financed by corporate interests. - Iran, Syria, and the Middle East as a springboard to a global confrontation - Berletic traces the current Iran crisis to the 2009 Brookings paper’s emphasis on air corridors and using Israel to provoke a war, placing blame on Israel as a proxy mechanism while the U.S. cleanses the region of access points for striking Iran directly. - He asserts the Arab Spring (2011) was designed to encircle Iran and move toward Moscow and Beijing, with Iran as the final target. The U.S. and its allies allegedly used policy papers to push tactical steps—weakening Russia via Ukraine, exploiting Syria, and leveraging Iran as a fulcrum for broader restraint against Eurasian powers. - The aim, he argues, is to prevent a rising China by destabilizing Iran and, simultaneously, strangling energy exports that feed China’s growth. He claims the United States has imposed a global maritime oil blockade on China through coordinated strikes and pressure on oil-rich states, while China pursues energy independence via Belt and Road, coal-to-liquids, and growing imports from Russia. - The role of diplomacy, escalation, and Netanyahu’s proxy - On diplomacy, Berletic says the U.S. has no genuine interest in peace; diplomacy is used to pretext war, creating appearances of reasonable engagement while advancing the continuity of a warlike agenda. He references the Witch Path to Persia as describing diplomacy as a pretext for regime change. - He emphasizes that Russia and China are not credibly negotiating with the U.S., viewing Western diplomacy as theater designed to degrade multipolar powers. Iran, he adds, may be buying time but also reacting to U.S. pressure, while Arab states and Israel are portrayed as proxies with limited autonomy. - The discussion also covers how Israel serves as a disposable proxy to advance U.S. goals, including potential use of nuclear weapons, with Trump allegedly signaling a post-facto defense of Israel in any such scenario. - The Iran conflict, its dynamics, and potential trajectory - The war in Iran is described as a phased aggression, beginning with the consulate attack and escalating into economic and missile-strike campaigns. Berletic notes Iran’s resilient command-and-control and ongoing missile launches, suggesting the U.S. and its allies are attempting to bankrupt Iran while degrading its military capabilities. - He highlights the strain on U.S. munitions inventories, particularly anti-missile interceptors and long-range weapons, due to simultaneous operations in Ukraine, the Middle East, and potential confrontations with China. He warns that the war’s logistics are being stretched to the breaking point, risking a broader blowback. - The discussion points to potential escalation vectors: shutting Hormuz, targeting civilian infrastructure, and possibly using proxies (including within the Gulf states and Yemen) to choke off energy flows. Berletic cautions that the U.S. could resort to more drastic steps, including leveraging Israel for off-world actions, while maintaining that multipolar actors (Russia, China, Iran) would resist. - Capabilities, resources, and the potential duration - The host notes China’s energy-mobility strategies and the Western dependency on rare earth minerals (e.g., gallium) mostly produced in China, emphasizing how U.S. war aims rely on leveraging allies and global supply chains that are not easily sustained. - Berletic argues the U.S. does not plan for permanent victory but for control, and that multipolar powers are growing faster than the United States can destroy them. He suggests an inflection point will come when multipolarism outruns U.S. capacity, though the outcome remains precarious due to nuclear risk and global economic shocks. - Outlook and final reflections - The interlocutors reiterate that the war is part of a broader structural battle between unipolar U.S. dominance and a rising multipolar order anchored by Eurasian powers. They stress the need to awaken broader publics to the reality of multipolarism and to pursue a more balanced world order, warning that the current trajectory risks global economic harm and dangerous escalation.

Glenn: Welcome back. Stanislav Krappivnik, a former US military officer, born in Dolbaz and recently returned, joins us again. Stanislav: Always a pleasure, Glenn. Glenn: In the last two days, Russians entered the strategic city of Orekhov in the Saporiyansko region, which may indicate that if this falls, the whole region might begin to collapse. In Slaviansk, the last Donetsk conglomeration, there are real advances that, if successful in circling the region, could mean the entirety of Donbas falls. Is the Russian spring offensive already begun? Stanislav: It’s hard to say, partly because mud season is ongoing in those areas. The South is still mud-prone; the terrain there is different from Haryakov and Sudirmy, where ground is firmer, forested. In the South, there’s black earth with fewer trees, causing severe mud this time of year. If the melt is fast, flooding can occur; if slow, the ground acts like a sponge and mud persists as water seeps down. Nightly freezes persist while daytime temperatures rise above zero. Weather affects movement and logistics. He notes that the briefings from the Russian command vary from independent mappers, suggesting either undisclosed advances or battlefield confusion. The Russian high command’s reports and geolocations may not always align with independent assessments. If credible, Russia’s forces from the South may have entered Ariakhov, with two parallel rows advancing toward Ariyakara and a long urban sprawl to the south. There is a gray zone because Ukrainian claims differ from Russian assertions. Ukrainians often withhold confirmations for long periods; e.g., Gudaiipoya/Gulyaporiya discrepancies show how contested reports can be. Stanislav says it’s not clear that this is a bold, continuous offensive up and down the lines. A big push would require enough armored vehicles, artillery, and aviation, which he has not seen yet, though it could be developing. Ukrainians have conducted desperate counteractions not just to retake territory but to disrupt Russian preparation for a potential spring offensive. If he were in command, he would launch a big spring offensive, at least partially toward Sumy, which is about 14 kilometers from Kharkiv. Sumy would be a key logistics hub and could cut off Kharkiv from the west, accelerating the fall of the region. He explains that Kharkiv could be surrounded by blowing bridges from the south and encircling through Sumy to the west and the east along the Russian line toward Bianka and the Big Water Reserve. He mentions continuing Russian movement in the north and the city of Kasatirivka, which has been split by a river; all bridges were blown about a month ago, complicating approaches. North of Slaviansk, the gates of Krasnyomar require closing first. There are contested claims about Yaman, with Russians saying around 50% controlled vs. Ukrainians claiming 10–15%. The central concern is the Russian push in the south, where Yemen sits in a triangle formed by the Oka and the Sri Bianca rivers, and Russian forces are closing in from the north as well. Crossing Yamana is expected to fall; it’s a matter of time, though how long remains uncertain. Glenn: Ukraine does not withdraw after encirclement. There’s a rational explanation tied to PR wars: if the US and Europeans lose interest in Ukraine, weapons and money dry up, and Zelensky appears addicted to PR victories to keep support. Do you think the war in the headlines affects Western support? How does the Iran conflict influence Ukraine, given weapon and money dynamics? Stanislav: There’s additional pressure on Western governments from the military and certain military societies not to rush into direct NATO engagement or a large-scale conflict with Iran. He notes Iran’s demonstrated ability to strike American bases and key targets, and that Iran’s actions have shown the US and its allies that American power isn’t unlimited. He argues Iran’s strikes and the broader Middle East conflict complicate Western calculations, as American bases and interests face increased threats. He asserts that Iran has shown it can strike at American bases and that American casualties would be far higher than reported. He claims Iran’s actions press Western governments to reconsider involvement in the region and to reassess commitments to allies such as the Saudis, who reportedly told American bases to stand down. He also discusses how Russia’s deterrence posture could shift in response to ongoing Iran–US tensions, and suggests that if Russia sees an opportunity to restore deterrence, it might be tempted to push back more forcefully. Glenn: Russia’s approach to diplomacy with Europe and the US is complex. Macron’s bid to join a Russia–US–Ukraine format could spoil negotiations. Belgium’s stance on Russian assets and broader EU politics complicate any settlement. Stanislav: He explains distrust in European leadership, questioning whom to trust in Europe. He suggests that a broader reform in European leadership and doctrine is unlikely soon. He notes that among European politicians, there’s disagreement and strategic posturing, with some populist voices but institutional leadership often failing to present a coherent strategy. Glenn: What about China and Russia’s support for Iran? How might that evolve? Stanislav: Russia previously explored a mutual defense pact with Iran; the document lacks substance, and real support has been practical, including MiG-29s, Su-30s, and S-400s, along with jamming systems enabling Iran to counter US satellites and missiles. He describes Iran’s military buildup and how Russia’s support has extended to drone technology and air defenses. He predicts Syria could reemerge as a battleground, especially if Iran’s militancy expands and if the US and Israel are drawn into broader conflict. He suggests China may reassess its stance and consider leveraging its position as US capabilities wane, potentially viewing Taiwan’s reunification as a strategic opportunity. Glenn: Any final thoughts? Stanislav: He emphasizes the high level of risk and unpredictability in the current international security environment, with multiple actors pursuing aggressive strategies and the potential for rapid shifts in alliances and deterrence calculations. He notes Iran’s broader influence and the risks to regional stability, hinting at a world where war remains a possible, though increasingly costly, option for major powers.

Colonel Douglas MacGregor discusses the likelihood and dynamics of a potential new war involving Iran, the Middle East, and broader great-power competition. - On a possible Iran strike: MacGregor says there will be a resumption of the war, though he cannot predict timing. He cites Western attempts to destabilize Iran (Mossad, CIA, MI6-backed unrest) and argues Iran is more cohesive now than it was forty years ago, with demonstrations representing a small minority and not a broad collapse of support for the government. He contends that those who want to destroy Iran or empower Israel believe the regime can be toppled with Western support and Israeli action, but he asserts that such a regime change is unlikely and that Iran will respond forcefully if attacked. He notes that current deployments are heavy on airpower with limited naval presence, and he suggests Israel’s broader goals (Gaza, Lebanon, Syria) will not be achievable without addressing Iran. - Regional actors and incentives: Netanyahu’s regional aims require confronting Iran, and Turkish involvement with the Kurds could influence the balance. He describes a recent Kurdish incursion into northern Iran that Iran suppressed, aided by Turkish coordination. He frames BRICS as militarizing in reaction to Western actions, including in Venezuela, Russia, and Ukraine, and says disrupting the Persian Gulf oil flow would harm China, prompting cooperation with Azerbaijan and Turkey against Iran to undermine the One Belt, One Road project. He also argues that BRICS countries—Russia, China, India—will not easily align with U.S. plans if Washington proceeds toward war. - Russian and Chinese calculations: On Russia and China, MacGregor says they have supplied Iran with military tech and missile/radar capabilities and helped counteract efforts to disrupt Iran with Starlink. He believes many Iranians still oppose regime collapse and that a broader war would risk escalation with Russia and China backing Iran. He cites Moscow’s withdrawal of Russian personnel from Israel and the sense in Moscow that Trump is unreliable, leading Russia to hedge against U.S. actions. He notes Russians are concerned about Europe and envision potential conflicts with Europe, while he questions U.S. strategy and end states. - No first-use and nuclear considerations: MacGregor discusses the idea of no-first-use (NNU) as a potential framework to reduce the risk of nuclear escalation, suggesting a multilateral agreement among the major nuclear powers (US, Russia, China, India, Pakistan, Israel, North Korea, Britain, France). He posits that such an agreement could advance diplomacy, including on Korea, and reduce the likelihood of Armageddon. He mentions that Trump could leverage such a stance, though he notes Trump’s tendency to pursue more aggressive policies in other areas. - Europe and NATO: He argues Europe is unprepared for renewed large-scale conflict and has disarmed substantially over decades. He criticizes Britain and France for rhetoric and capability gaps and suggests the United States is fatigued with European demands, though he doubts Europe could sustain a conflict against Russia. - Venezuela and domestic budget: He emphasizes the futility of long wars in certain contexts (Venezuela) and the mismatch between spending and real capability gains. He references the defense budget as largely consumed by fixed costs like veterans’ medical care and pensions, arguing that simply increasing the budget does not guarantee meaningful strategic gains. He notes the role of special operations as valuable but not decisive in major wars. - Concluding view: MacGregor reiterates that war in the region is likely, with many overlapping alarms and uncertainties about timing, leadership decisions, and the risk of escalation. He stresses that both Russia and China have stakes in the outcome and that the Middle East conflict could influence global alignments and deterrence dynamics. He closes by underscoring the potential importance of no-first-use diplomacy and broader nuclear risk reduction as a path forward.

Gilbert Doktorov and the host discuss how the Iran war is shaping Russia’s strategic thinking, deterrence, diplomacy, and domestic political psychology. - The central impact in Russia is not economic bets on oil or gas, or European gas demand, but a shift in elite psychology in Moscow. Russians feel they have been jolted by a disaster scenario for their country, prompting a re-evaluation of strategy and leadership. This has driven a more acute public scrutiny of Putin and the feasibility of gradual, negotiated restraint versus decisive action. - A key theme is the perceived weakness or inconsistency of Western deterrence. Russians note that Trump's actions against Iran showed that American leadership can be unpredictable and capable of abrupt, decisive moves that undermine Russia’s sense of security. This has contributed to a loss of confidence in the long-standing belief that restraint and negotiation would preserve deterrence. - The discussion emphasizes a perceived “electric shock” in the Russian political class: doubts about the wisdom of a slow, nuanced approach, and concern that Washington might carry out decapitation-like or otherwise aggressive actions if Moscow does not appear capable of credible deterrence. The panel cites examples such as past American strikes and drone activity that highlighted vulnerabilities in Russia’s security posture and raised existential anxieties about Russia’s own durability. - Some interviewers and analysts describe a growing perception that Russia’s deterrence has been eroded by Western escalation, with NATO posture and Ukrainian military support intensifying pressure. There is fear that restraint by Moscow is interpreted as weakness, pushing Russia toward recalibrating its own posture to reassert deterrence, potentially through more aggressive or rapid actions. - The conversation notes internal Russian media dynamics and the shifting stance of influential figures. Salovyev’s and Lavrov’s recent critiques of negotiation, the discussion of Sergei Dabkov’s “spirit of Anchorage” remark, and other domestic debates reflect a broader realignment away from pacific, slow negotiations toward a more hardline posture. Alexander Dugin’s criticisms are mentioned as a sign of growing dissent about the current course. - The broader strategic environment includes concerns about Russia’s relations with China. Russian observers are disappointed that China’s support for Iran did not translate into the expected practical backing; Chinese aid and the efficacy of Chinese weapons are questioned after the Iran-Israel conflict began. This has undermined Russian confidence in China as a reliable partner in countering U.S. pressure. - The discussion highlights the possibility that Iran’s use of economic and political warfare—such as threatening Hormuz and impacting Gulf economies—could have major global consequences, increasing Europe’s energy insecurity and persisting higher prices, which could influence Western political dynamics and, in turn, Russia’s calculations. - There is speculation about whether Russia might seek to draw in Iran more deeply or exploit broader regional escalations. The interview notes that the Russians never concluded a mutual defense pact with Iran, viewing Iran’s reluctance as a factor that complicates Russian confidence in Tehran’s reliability. The possibility of Russia assisting Iran more robustly remains uncertain and is framed as a sensitive strategic option. - The interlocutors stress that the situation is developing into a high-stakes, all-or-nothing dynamic for major powers. Putin’s future decisions, Trump’s political fate, and the Western willingness to escalate further all feed into a fragile balance. The experts warn that escalating to large-scale action becomes a dangerous and destabilizing path for Russia, the United States, Iran, and regional players. - In closing, both speakers acknowledge the difficult, precarious trajectory ahead. The analyst emphasizes that if Russia does not bolster its deterrence and adapt its strategy, the domestic and international consequences could be severe; the host notes the dangerous incentives created by an all-or-nothing strategic environment and the potential for rapid, unintended escalations.

The discussion centers on whether Israel is driving a war against Iran and how the United States fits into that effort, with conflicting reporting from major outlets and a mosaic of intelligence interpretations. - The hosts outline two competing major-news stories. The New York Times reports that Netanyahu has asked Trump not to bomb Iran, arguing Israel is not prepared to withstand Iran’s retaliation. The Washington Post had reported a few weeks earlier that Israel sent a delegation to Russia to assure Iran that Israel does not intend to strike first, while Netanyahu in Washington was pressing Trump to strike Iran. The implication is that Israel is trying to avoid being seen as the aggressor while hoping the U.S. acts, effectively using the United States to carry out escalation. - The Post’s framing suggests Israel wants to escalate tensions but avoid the perception of initiating the conflict; Iran, according to the Post, responded positively to Israeli outreach but remains wary that the US could still carry out attacks as part of a joint campaign. - Iran’s perspective: they are wary and believe the U.S. and Israel are not to be trusted, even as they respond to outreach. There is a suggestion that Iran, with Russia and China, is prepared to counter, and that Tehran is not fully aligned with Western narratives about Iran as a terrorist state. - Larry Johnson (Speaker 2), a former CIA intelligence officer, joins to break down the behind-the-scenes dynamics. He references an alleged economic operation around Trump’s meeting with Zelensky that targeted Iran’s currency, triggering protests and destabilization, allegedly orchestrated with CIA/Mossad involvement. He lists various actors (Kurds, the MEK, Beluchis) and claims they were directed to inflame unrest, with the aim of manufacturing chaos to enable a military strike that could be stopped or degraded by outside intervention. He argues the plan failed as Iran’s security forces countered and electronic warfare helped by Russia and China blocked the destabilization. - Johnson emphasizes a broader geopolitical balance: Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Turkey told the United States they would not permit overflight for strikes; Russia and China bolster Iran, raising the cost and risk of Western action. He notes that 45% of global oil passes through the Persian Gulf and that Iran could close the Strait of Hormuz, which would massively impact oil prices and global economies, benefiting Russia. - On the potential next moves, the panel discusses whether Israel might consider nuclear options if faced with existential threats, and they acknowledge the difficulty of countering hypersonic missiles with current defenses. They reference reports of an earthquake or saber-rattling related to Dimona and mention that some in Israel fear escalation could be imminent, but there is no consensus on what comes next. - The conversation also touches on U.S. political voices, including Lindsey Graham’s reaction to Arab involvement, and questions whether there is any mainstream American call to accommodate Iran rather than confront it. Overall, the dialogue presents a complex, multi-layered picture: Israel seeking US-led action while trying to avoid direct attribution as aggressor; Iran resisting Western pressure but positioning to counter with support from Russia and China; and a regional and global economic dimension that could amplify or deter conflict depending on strategic choices and alliance dynamics.

Larry Johnson and the host discuss the rapid developments around Iran and the wider regional implications, challenging the narrative of visible damage and highlighting inconsistencies in Western reporting. Key points about Israel, Iran, and propaganda: - Johnson argues Israel’s situation may be worse than Tehran’s, noting that Iran seeks to destroy Israeli infrastructure while Israel aims to project resilience through propaganda, including social media controls. He cites a video on sonar21.com showing what he sees as the ineffectiveness of Israeli and US air defenses in Israel, with four missiles impacting Tel Aviv and across the horizon. - There are reports of significant pushback in Israel: divisions between police and military, shortages of food, inadequate shelters, and protests. Johnson says Western propaganda claiming Israel is unscathed is contradicted by these reports. - Johnson suggests Israel is attempting to broaden the conflict with Iran through false flag attacks (oil facilities in Saudi Arabia, and incidents in Azerbaijan, Turkey, and Cyprus) to draw NATO into a broader confrontation, but asserts Iran has been effective in debunking these false flags. Weapons, logistics, and supply constraints: - A major theme is American and allied weapon shortages and the sustainability of a prolonged campaign against Iran. Johnson and Speaker 1 discuss limits in Patriot and THAAD stocks, and the difficulty of sustaining Tomahawk production due to rare earth minerals controlled by China. - Patriot missiles: production data show a ramp-up from 2015-2020 (approximately 1,800 units total) to higher annual outputs since 2020 (about 550 per year, plus 620 in 2025). Ukraine reportedly exhausted its 974 Patriot missiles. - THAAD missiles are even less abundant (about 79 produced per year; each costs around $12-13 million), with a small overall stockpile. This implies a limited capacity to sustain long campaigns. - The discussion notes that the United States’ missile inventories are not as unlimited as sometimes claimed; logistics and manufacturing limits are real constraints, and resupply for long conflicts would be challenging. - The availability of Tomahawk missiles depends on rare earths from China, adding another constraint beyond factory capacity and labor. Ground force considerations and regional dynamics: - There is skepticism about any credible prospect of American boots on the ground in Iran. The Kurds, if mobilized, would face severe logistical and operational challenges in Iran’s rugged western border, making sustained insurgencies unlikely to impact Iranian politics. Early reports indicate Kurdish infiltrations were quickly repelled by Iranian forces. - Russia’s transfer of 28 attack helicopters to Iran is discussed as part of a broader assessment of Iranian military readiness. Iran has shot down several US air platforms (including multiple F-15s) in the past few days, reinforcing a perception of Iranian resilience. - Johnson notes that the West’s strategy to portray Iran as weak has backfired, strengthening internal Iranian unity and resolve, particularly after the February 28 and earlier June incidents. Regional and global reactions: - The war’s geographic expansion, including the submarine incident near Sri Lanka and broader Gulf security concerns, risks drawing in more regional actors and complicating alliances. - The Gulf states (Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain, Qatar) rely heavily on US protection and expat labor, and there is growing concern about the United States’ ability to guarantee security. Johnson argues this could erode Western credibility and investment in the region. - The strait of Hormuz is pivotal; Iran’s potential control could disrupt global oil flows, with cascading economic effects. Saudi Arabia’s oil infrastructure may be shielded by alternative pipelines, but LNG exporters like Qatar would suffer significant downtime. - The broader strategic picture suggests a shift away from US-dominant security arrangements in the Gulf, with Turkey coordinating with Iran, and Gulf states re-evaluating security guarantees and economic dependence on the United States. Outlook and possible endings: - Johnson forecasts a prolonged attritional conflict, with the United States unlikely to break Iran’s defenses without a substantial and sustained shift in strategy. He argues that air power alone fails to achieve regime change and notes historical examples across Iraq, Serbia, and Vietnam where air campaigns did not produce the desired political outcomes. - He predicts an endgame in which Iran could leverage the Strait of Hormuz to negotiate terms that reduce sanctions in exchange for reopening traffic, but only if Washington concedes to major concessions (including ending military bases in Saudi Arabia and Qatar). - He warns this crisis could accelerate regional instability and potentially erode the United States’ credibility, with domestic political repercussions and potential shifts in both US and European political alignments. Final thoughts: - The discussion emphasizes the mismatch between optimistic Western narratives and the practical limits of militaries, economies, and logistics in sustaining a longer confrontation with Iran. - The speakers stress that a straightforward, decisive victory seems unlikely; instead, the conflict risks deepening regional instability, economic disruption, and lasting strategic realignments in the Middle East.

Stanislav (Speaker 1) and Speaker 0 engage in a wide-ranging, combative analysis of the Iran-Israel-U.S. conflict and broader geopolitical implications. Key points and claims are as follows: - On Iran’s military activity: The volume of Iranian drone and rocket attacks has dropped by about 95% in the last few days, but Iran’s strategic goals appear to be advancing. The Strait of Hormuz remains closed, and Iran has not fallen from power, suggesting a durable regime in Iran despite reduced attack tempo. Israel is said to be taking a pounding with strikes on Haifa refinery, electrical plants, and other targets, while Iran is pursuing a long-haul campaign rather than a rapid blitz. - Terminology and legitimacy: Stanislav objects to labeling Iran’s leadership as a “regime,” arguing it’s a derogatory term and positing that the regime is a theocracy that is comparatively stable under pressure. He notes that air campaigns have never toppled governments and argues that people rally around governments when their families are being harmed, especially within Shia culture. - Information and truth in war: Both sides are accused of misrepresenting losses and capabilities; the Pentagon’s numbers on drones and rockets are treated with skepticism. There is emphasis on the difficulty of verifying battle damage in real time, and the reality that “the first sacrifice of any war is truth” in war reporting. - Military capabilities and constraints: Stanislav emphasizes that the U.S. and Israel have suffered damage to critical infrastructure, and the U.S. faces munitions shortages. He cites the first six days of conflict as consuming thousands of missiles (3,600 missiles across defensive and offensive systems). He argues U.S. industrial/munitions capacity is strained, with missiles being produced in small quantities and largely by hand, constraining rapid replacement. - Iran’s defense and offense: Iran is portrayed as possessing underground “missile cities” and being able to move and launch missiles from concealed locations. The use of decoy aircraft and other decoys is noted, complicating target acquisition. Iran is described as capable of sustaining a long campaign, with continued missile production and hidden launch capability, including launchers that can be moved and re-deployed quickly. - Sensor/shooter network: The discussion mentions a new U.S.-reported capability described as a “sensor shooter network” that uses satellites to spot a missile launcher as it emerges, relaying coordinates to fighters such as F-35s to intercept before launch. This is framed as making missile launches harder for Iran and easier to strike launchers for Israel and the U.S. - Strait of Hormuz as the central objective: The primary objective for Iran, per Speaker 0, is to close the Strait of Hormuz for as long as possible and disrupt Gulf states, with closing the strait potentially forcing an American exit due to economic pressure. Attacks that target Israel are framed as secondary (“bonus”) relative to the Hormuz objective. - Ground warfare and invasions: Both speakers argue that a U.S. or allied ground invasion of Iran would entail massive casualties and potential domestic political backlash, making it a less likely option. The difficulty of projecting power through Iran’s mountainous terrain and the risk of a popular uprising are highlighted. - Regime durability and external support: Iran’s government is described as a theocracy with deep cultural unity, making political collapse unlikely. Russia and China are discussed as critical backers: Russia provides MiG-29s, SU-35s, S-400s, and jamming capabilities, while China provides satellite connections and political cover, and both nations see Iran as an existential interest—Russia especially, given Central Asia and the Caucasus. Iran is portrayed as having backing from Russia and China that would prevent a wholesale collapse. - U.S. allies and credibility: The U.S. is portrayed as depleting its ability to defend Gulf allies, with discussions of allied air-defense systems being diverted elsewhere (to Israel) and questions about long-term U.S. willingness or capacity to sustain a commitment in the Gulf. - Ukraine comparison and broader geopolitics: The dialogue touches on Ukraine, NATO, and the differential treatment of Ukraine versus Iran, noting perceived manipulation by Western actors and the difficulty of achieving durable peace through negotiations when proxies and local actors have entrenched interests. Zelensky and Kyiv’s internal politics are referenced to illustrate broader critique of Western interventions. - Potential off-ramps and negotiations: There is debate about whether a political settlement could be engineered that would preserve the Iranian regime while offering concessions (e.g., limitations on ballistic missiles or nuclear ambitions) and provide Trump with a way to claim a diplomatic win. Stanislav suggests the unpredictable nature of the current leadership and that an off-ramp may be difficult to secure; Speaker 0 contends that a pragmatic, deal-oriented path could exist if a credible intermediary or concessions are arranged, perhaps involving a different leadership or mediator. - Final reflections on strategy and endurance: Stanislav stresses that drones, missiles, and human ground forces all have limits, and argues that real military victory rarely comes from air campaigns alone; the fundamental test remains whether ground forces can secure and hold territory. Speaker 0 adds that the regime’s resilience in Iran and the long-term strategic calculus—especially regarding Hormuz, energy, and allied alliances—will shape the conflict’s trajectory in the coming weeks. Both acknowledge the enormous complexities and the high stakes for regional and global stability.

In the discussion, Speaker 1 argues that Iran’s objective is simply to survive; their strategy is to continue lobbing missiles, launching drones, and striking back as the U.S. approaches within Iran’s vicinity. He contends Iran has maintained command and control, dispersed forces, and possesses a large and enduring supply of missiles and drones, so the minimal victory for Iran is to endure the conflict. When asked what the U.S. should do to win, Speaker 1 criticizes bombastic rhetoric about U.S. superiority and questions the efficacy of regime change through bombing. He suggests that killing the supreme leader backfires by galvanizing the population and Shiites worldwide, noting Iran’s developed succession mechanisms that compensate for leadership losses. He argues that attempts to destroy Iran or disintegrate its society are misguided and that, if the U.S. pushes toward such aims, it may trigger greater confrontation with China and Russia. He also implies mixed signals from U.S. leadership, contrasting expectations under Biden with actual actions, and contemplates a similar pattern under Trump. Speaker 2 adds that President Trump could claim success by neutralizing key figures like the Ayatollah, but suggests that Israel’s preferences are driving U.S. policy, implying limited autonomy for America. He notes the risk of being drawn back into conflict and emphasizes uncertainty about public perception as the war continues. He remarks on the presence of pro-war voices and social media pushback, interpreting it as a sign that the audience may be “over the target.” Speaker 0 seeks a military assessment of the current state: the Iranian capacity, the Israeli position, and American casualty figures. Speaker 1 assesses Israel as internally distressed: internal unrest, exhausted armed forces, and a large exodus of citizens; he predicts Israel faces an ominous future and foresees Israel possibly deteriorating before Iran. He describes Israel’s use of mercenaries and acknowledges substantial damage on both sides, with Netanyahu’s visibility limited. In the broader Persian Gulf, Speaker 1 states that deterrence has failed among regional powers such as the Emirates and Saudi Arabia. The United States is perceived as hampered by a long logistical footprint; uncertainty about missile stocks and intercepts persists, but Speaker 1 asserts that Iran can sustain war for a long time and that bombing alone will not compel Iranian capitulation. He foresees intensified U.S. troop and firepower deployment, including three carrier battle groups over the next two weeks, to replace the current forces. Overall, the conversation centers on Iran’s resilience, the limited likelihood that bombing will force regime change, the risk of broader great-power involvement, and growing weariness and strategic complications for all sides, with Iran poised to endure and possibly prevail in the long term.

In this discussion, Speaker 0 interviews Scott Ritter, a former UN weapons inspector and US Marine Corps intelligence officer, about the implications of a phone call between Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin and the broader geopolitics around Ukraine, Iran, and energy. - On the Trump-Putin call and diplomacy with the US: Ritter notes that Trump initiated the call, and Russia has kept a diplomatic channel open with the United States, despite tensions and distrust. Russia reportedly invited figures like Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner to continue diplomacy. He interprets Russia’s openness as a strategic move to maintain influence in decision-making, particularly with the US seeking Russian assistance on energy and conflict termination in Ukraine and Iran. - Russia’s behavior in response to Western strikes and its strategic calculus: Ritter argues Russia has deliberately avoided a rapid military overreaction to Western actions (e.g., UK strikes on Bryansk using Storm Shadow missiles and Flamingo systems) to prevent elevating Ukrainian nationalism or provoking a harsher Western stance. He suggests Russia can legally justify countermeasures against British facilities tied to Storm Shadow and Flamingo production, but chooses restraint to avoid elevating domestic political backlash and to exploit diplomatic openings. - Economic dimensions and sanctions: He contends Russia benefits from the lifting of oil sanctions, with Russia able to sell crude at much higher market prices, improving its budget and war finances without further escalation. This is framed as a strategic reward for keeping the diplomatic channel open and for not overreacting militarily. - The strategic objective in Ukraine and the West: Ritter states Russia aims to remove Ukrainian nationalism from Europe’s security equation and to establish Ukraine as a neutral party. He argues that Russian actions, including potential pressure on Ukraine and Western states, are designed to compel a settlement more favorable to Moscow, with less emphasis on Ukrainian terms. - The Iran context and US leverage: The conversation posits that Russia’s phone call with Trump could enable further discussions with Kushner and Witkoff on terms that reflect Russian objectives, given the US’s urgent need for Russian help on energy and geopolitical cover. Ritter suggests Moscow could pressure Iran to negotiate in a way that aligns with broader Russian goals and reduces US influence, including potentially linking Ukraine settlements to Iran’s termination or moderation. - Off-ramps and the Iranian war: In Iran, the sole off-ramp is one Iran accepts; the US and Israel no longer control the process. Ritter argues that US strategies (e.g., general Cain’s claims about missile successes) are misguided, with Iran reportedly evading decisive pressure and maintaining leverage. The path forward would involve Russia acting as mediator and engaging Iranian leadership more directly, while the US’s ability to impose a decisive settlement appears limited. - US military options and feasibility: Ritter points out the limits of US military options in Iran and the Strait of Hormuz. He argues that large-scale ground involvement (e.g., 80,000 Marines to seize territories around Hormuz) is impractical given resource constraints, political risk, and logistical challenges. He criticizes the reliance on bombing campaigns with insufficient precision munitions and questions target selection and legality, highlighting a historical precedent where strategic air campaigns did not compel German surrender in World War II. - Broader geopolitical consequences and alliances: The discussion covers how a perceived US strategic defeat could reshape global alignments. Ritter foresees BRICS strengthening as the US loses credibility, with China advancing in Taiwan and the South China Sea, and Russia expanding influence in the Middle East. He suggests Iran could emerge as a regional power, while Israel’s nuclear program could come under renewed pressure. Russia’s involvement in the Middle East, grounded in a strategic framework with Iran, provides Moscow with diplomatic legitimacy to lecture Gulf states. - Lavrov’s stance and Gulf politics: The speakers address Lavrov’s public admonition of Gulf states for pressuring Iran and seeking Western support, arguing this reflects Russia’s adherence to its diplomatic framework and a legally grounded position. Russia’s recent strategic framework with Iran underpins its legitimacy to influence Gulf behavior. - Closing assessment: Ritter emphasizes that the war’s trajectory is being driven by Iranian resilience and US strategic miscalculations. He maintains that Russia’s role as mediator and its leverage over energy markets position Moscow to shape outcomes, while the United States appears increasingly constrained, resource-drained, and vulnerable to strategic defeats on multiple fronts. The result could be a reordering of global alliances and regional power dynamics, with Russia and Iran gaining greater influence and the US recalibrating its priorities accordingly.

In the conversation, Syed Mohammed Marandi, a professor at Tehran University and former adviser to Iran’s nuclear negotiation team, addresses multiple interwoven geopolitical issues, centering on Iran, Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, and the broader strategic rivalry with the United States and its allies. Syria and ISIS release - Marandi asserts that the Damascus regime, described as al-Qaeda/ISIS-aligned factions, would not tolerate Kurdish forces backed by the United States. He notes prior violence against Alawites, Christians, and Druze as context for the current disturbing images from Syria. - He argues the United States is not a reliable partner for its allies, pointing to past episodes such as Obama’s refusal to support Arbil when ISIS threatened the Kurdish government, and Soleimani’s rapid military response to save the city. - He states that ISIS prisoners have been released in Syria, implying that thousands of ISIS members are now free and could destabilize Syria and possibly Iraq. He emphasizes that both Jolani (an ISIS-linked figure) and the Kurdish groups in northeast Syria are allied to the United States, making it unclear who released the prisoners but suggesting that those actors are aligned with the U.S. - The broader implication is that the release increases instability in Syria and potentially across the region. Border security and spillover fears - The discussion turns to Iraq’s border with Syria, with Marandi weighing whether U.S.-backed jihadist forces might spill into Iraq or Lebanon. He suggests a likelihood that ISIS/Al-Qaeda remnants could be used to pressure Lebanon and Iraq to prevent closer Iranian influence. - He notes that Iran’s potential responses could include its missile and drone capabilities, should security worsen on a front involving its allies in Lebanon and Iraq; however, Iran currently refrains from large-scale involvement in Syria but would consider action if threats to Iran or its allies escalate. Regime change, fragmentation, and U.S.-Israel aims - The conversation shifts to Iran post-riots, with questions about U.S./Israel strategies for regime change. Marandi contends the plan is to destabilize and fragment Iran, not to establish a unified post-regime scenario. - He cites alleged Israeli and Western involvement in organizing riots as evidence of a broader conspiracy to create chaos and justify military action. He claims Mossad and other intelligence agencies were on the ground, and public statements from former CIA officials acknowledged Israeli involvement. - He describes the riot phase as highly organized, with foreign funding (including Bitcoin), online recruitment, and careful targeting of police and infrastructure. He portrays the protests as initially legitimate grievances that devolved into violent chaos fueled by external coordination, with widespread destruction and deaths, including the killing of police officers. - In contrast, he highlights large pro-government demonstrations, especially a national day of demonstrations that he says showed widespread popular support for the Islamic Republic and condemnation of rioters. He points to extensive media coverage highlighting peaceful protests, while arguing that the riot narrative dominated Western coverage. Internal Iranian dynamics and public opinion - Marandi emphasizes the fragmentation among Iranian opposition groups: MEK, monarchists, Takfiri remnants near the Pakistan border, and Kurdish separatists, all of whom he asserts lack credible popular support. - He argues that even if the regime were at risk, fragmentation would prevent any single faction from stabilizing the country post-regime change. He suggests this aligns with his view of broader Israeli aims to weaken and fragment Iran and neighboring states, as seen in Syria and Iraq. Military capability and deterrence - He asserts Iran’s substantial missile and drone capabilities and asserts that Iran could defend allies in Lebanon and Iraq if needed. He notes Iran’s long-term preparedness against U.S. threats, including underground bases and extensive drone/missile stocks. - He contends that if war occurred, it would have wide regional and global economic consequences, potentially destabilizing oil markets and prompting broader geopolitical upheaval. He argues that U.S. restraint may be influenced by the risk of a global economic meltdown. Russia, China, and Starlink - Regarding technological assistance for countering communications, he mentions rumors of Russian or Chinese involvement in aiding Iran's internet disruption and Starlink-related issues, acknowledging uncertainty but highlighting a growing trilateral closeness among Iran, Russia, and China in the face of U.S. pressure. media narratives and leadership - He criticizes Western media for portraying protests as peaceful, while Israeli claims and cyber/disinformation around the events are presented as demonstrations of foreign involvement. He maintains that internal Iranian unity—visible in large-scale demonstrations—contrasts with the portrayal of a fractured nation. - He closes by suggesting that while some European leaders may align with U.S. policies, the overall strategic outlook remains uncertain, with a warning that Trump’s approach could escalate tensions rather than yield stability.

Glenn Deeson frames the Iran war as fundamentally about regime change, noting that this regime change could entail destruction or balkanization of Iran rather than a simple replacement government. He argues that irredentist fear and existential threats would drive Iran to respond aggressively, including closing the Strait of Hormuz and attacking American bases in the region, if attacked. He emphasizes that this is about the survival of the regime and the country’s unity, suggesting that the conflict could escalate toward greater regional chaos, including potential actions around Kharg Island. On the broader geopolitical implications, Deeson discusses how four years of efforts to curb Russia failed and how European and American efforts have continued to try to sustain pressure on Russia. He explains that the Ukraine war has faced manpower and weapons shortages, and that economic strains in Europe—especially energy prices—compound the difficulty of maintaining support for prolonged conflict. He asserts that with the Iran war, there are even fewer weapons available from the US, worsening European energy and economic outlooks. He argues that Europeans’ and some policymakers’ failure to recognize Russia’s security concerns has contributed to escalatory dynamics. Regarding China, Deeson notes that China imports oil from Iran but would not welcome disruptions. He suggests that if the United States succeeds in regime-changing Iran, China would be adversely affected, whereas failure could push Iran to align more closely with Russia and China. He discusses potential shifts in global resource control and the petrodollar system, and he frames the conflict as part of a broader great-power competition where the United States seeks to preserve energy flows to allies. He highlights the possibility that successful US or Western pressure could backfire, as Iranian outcomes might push regional actors toward deeper cooperation with Russia and China. He also ties these dynamics to a broader transition from a unipolar liberal hegemon to a multipolar order, with BRICS-like groupings seeking to balance US influence. Deeson broadens the discussion to the potential death of American hegemony, arguing this would be a longer transition rather than a sudden collapse. He explains that after the Cold War the US promoted a liberal hegemonic framework with one center of power, but over time this leads other centers to balance against the US. He identifies the emergence of multipolar dynamics and institutions like BRICS as indicators of shifting power. He suggests that attempts to break China or Iran could backfire, since enemies may realign with Russia or China, and the US might eventually recalibrate to a more restrained role in Eurasia to rebuild domestic strength. He envisions a scenario where the US reduces its European and Middle Eastern footprint, potentially strengthening East Asia. On Israel’s perspective, Deeson says Israelis and Europeans similarly believe US capabilities can be leveraged to defeat adversaries, and Israel sees the opportunity to use US involvement to topple Iran and possibly Balkanize the country. He argues that this clashes with the United States’ need to prioritize its own strategic interests in a multipolar world, which would require pivoting toward East Asia and away from Europe and the Middle East. He cites strategic misalignment in Trump-era policy, noting that continuing engagement in Europe and the Middle East may divert resources from East Asia. He suggests that tolerance of prolonged conflict could exacerbate divergences between the US and Israel as American strategic priorities shift. The discussion ends with appreciation for Glenn Deeson and a plug for his channel.

Host: Welcome back. We’re joined by Larry Johnson, a former CI analyst, to discuss what looks like a war with Iran coming sooner rather than later. The world is watching as the US mobilizes more military assets to the region. How should we read this? Is this preparation for war, or a show of strength during negotiations? Larry Johnson: I hoped it was intimidation, but people I trust in national security say this is far more serious. It’s described as one of two things: either a reprise of Midnight Hammer, when US and Iran coordinated two raids into northern Iran, or they’re preparing for an Israeli attack and to back Israel. It’s not just to force concessions at the negotiating table; it’s a warning indicator. Steve Bryan, a former undersecretary of defense, reacted emotionally to US–Iran negotiations, arguing that Iran is using a rope-a-dope strategy. This pressure toward attacking Iran is enormous, and Netanyahu’s visit suggests coordination. The issue has moved beyond nuclear weapons to ballistic missiles and support for Hamas and Hezbollah. The rhetoric around Hamas and Hezbollah is, in my view, a red herring; Israeli claims don’t match the facts. Trump is under heavy pressure from the Zionist lobby to act, and I think a violence outbreak in the next two weeks is plausible, though I hope I’m wrong. Host: The debate you referenced about motives is revealing. If the goal is to destabilize or create chaos to justify action, which past interventions show that hasn’t produced sustainable stability. If the aim is negotiation leverage, what can be achieved now? It seems the US insists on tying any nuclear deal to Iran abandoning its allies and deterrence. Johnson: Iran has built a formidable arsenal: 18 types of ballistic missiles, a recently reportedly successful intercontinental ballistic missile test, five types of cruise missiles, and over 15 types of drones. They’ve learned from decades of conflict with the US and see themselves as at war with the United States. The US narrative of Iran as the aggressor clashes with historical US actions that damaged Iran’s economy and civilian life. Iran’s patience has been tested; they’ve drawn a line in the sand and are prepared to defend themselves, retaliating massively if attacked. They now have support from China and Russia, including advanced radar and air defense, with Chinese and Russian ships headed to the Arabian Sea for a joint exercise. If conflict escalates, Iran could retaliate across the region, with regional actors potentially joining in. Host: You mentioned the tactical realities of the region. The US has deployed many F-35s to the region, including land-based F-35s for SEAD. There are reports of a large US presence in Armenia, and Iran’s potential to strike Haifa or Tel Aviv if attacked. The geopolitical picture is complex, with Russia and China providing support to Iran. The US carrier fleet in the Gulf would face Iranian, Russian, and Chinese air defenses and missiles, including hypersonics. The question is whether the US can sustain a prolonged, scalable war against Iran. Johnson: The US’s sea-based strength is being tested. In the Red Sea, the US faced difficulties against the Houthis with two carriers and a robust air-defense screen; in the current scenario, Iran’s capabilities—air defenses, missiles, drones, and support from Russia and China—make a quick, decisive victory unlikely. Moreover, Israel’s own readiness for a broader war is uncertain; Netanyahu’s visit to the US could signal coordination, but Israeli media note that they may join only if Iran is on the back foot. There’s concern about intelligence reliability: Mossad assets that aided last year’s operations in Iran may be compromised, while Iran benefits from new radar and integrated air defenses. Host: Regional reactions could be pivotal. Iran has contingency plans against regional targets, and Armenia/Azerbaijan might be used as launch pads. Saudi Arabia and Qatar may sit this out if possible, while Iraq has aligned with Iran. The broader question is whether diplomacy can prevail, or whether the cycle of treating conflicts with force will continue. There’s a critique of Western policy: the idea that Iran wants to destroy the US is simplistic, and the region’s dynamics are far more nuanced. Johnson: Iran’s potential to escalate, regional dynamics, and great-power backing mean this could be more than a localized conflict. The overarching point is that there are limits to military power; politics and diplomacy remain essential, and the West’s current posture underestimates the complexity of Iran’s deterrence and regional links. Host: Thanks, Larry. I’ll link to Sonar 21 for more of your writings.

Speaker 0 and Speaker 1 discuss the potential for a regional war surrounding Iran and the Gulf, examining miscalculations, pathways to escalation, and the interests and responses of regional and global powers. Key points: - The likelihood of a regional war is increasing. Compared to Ukraine, miscalculations today could lead to broader conflict, with concerns about missed opportunities for peace and the involvement of NATO contributing to a harsh trajectory. - Several escalation pathways exist. If Gulf states push back against Iran, Bahrain could become a flashpoint, and Israel or other actors could attempt to destabilize Gulf states by targeting energy facilities, finance hubs, and expatriate communities to provoke economic and social crisis. - Iran’s capacity and alliances matter. Iran alone cannot sustain attacks on multiple Gulf states, especially if Kurdish movements pressure the regime. While there are allegations of Russian and Chinese intelligence backing, there is debate about direct military backing. Escalation could occur if allied powers or regional actors become involved. - The potential for a power grab in Iran. If Iran descends into civil chaos, multiple neighboring countries with competing interests (Azerbaijan, Turkey, Iraq, and other regional players) could intervene to protect their concerns about ethnic groups or separatist movements. A significant fear is that control of the Strait of Hormuz could shift to different actors, creating a strategic chokepoint crisis. - Turkey’s role is complex. Turkey, a major NATO ally with a large Kurdish minority, could be wary of consequences from Kurdish empowerment in Iran. Although Turkey might benefit from stability, it has security concerns about Kurdish autonomy and potential spillovers into Turkey, Syria, and Iraq. Turkey’s stance may deter wholehearted support for Iranian destabilization, given its own security dependencies. - The impact of Kurdish dynamics. U.S.-backed Kurdish groups in Syria and broader Kurdish populations across Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Syria raise concerns about cross-border spillovers and regional realignments. Historical U.S. involvement with Kurdish groups is cited as a factor that could provoke Turkish concern and complicate alliances. - The broader strategic environment. The Gulf states’ vulnerability is tied to energy exports, real estate, and financial networks, including the expulsion of expatriates under crisis. The possibility of striking energy infrastructure could trigger cascading economic and political crises across the region. - Deterrence and misperception. Iran has been viewed as a deterrent to Israeli actions; its potential degradation or destruction is contrasted with the risk that a diminished Iran could still present a long-term challenge through drone warfare and asymmetric means. Drone capabilities are noted as being cheaper to produce and harder to intercept than some missiles. - Comparisons to Ukraine and uncertainty about outcomes. While some suggest Iran could be defeated without ground troops, there is no consensus. Ukraine’s resilience is highlighted as an example that large states can endure prolonged resistance, and Iran’s larger population and geography complicate straightforward assumptions about quick outcomes. - Acknowledgment of evolving realities. The discussion emphasizes that current events have altered regional norms and expectations, with Gulf nations experiencing a changed security landscape, including the potential for broader conflict and a greater likelihood of arms competition among regional actors.

Seyed Mohamed Marandi, a professor at Tehran University and former adviser to Iran’s nuclear negotiation team, discusses the war launched against Iran, Iran’s aims, and the shifting regional dynamics. He argues that Western analyses over the years have been incorrect and that Iran’s objectives are clear: Iran will not accept a ceasefire until its demands are met, will no longer tolerate U.S. threats or Gulf regimes acting as bases against Iran, and will seek compensation from regional adversaries for destruction and slaughter attributed to the conflict. He asserts that Iran’s position and strength are growing, with widespread street support for the leader and resilience under missile and drone strikes against U.S. assets and Israel’s regime. Key points on Iran’s war aims and the conflict: - Iran’s demands: ceasefire is not an option; the war will continue until Iran’s demands are met. Iran will no longer accept a situation in which the United States can threaten it again, and will demand that Gulf regimes stop operating bases that threaten Iran. Yemen will demand and obtain full compensation for destruction. - Regional balance: Iran views the Palestinian and Lebanese causes as linked to regional resistance; Hezbollah, Yemen, Iraq, and other groups are actively undermining the regime’s regional military and political position. - Ground realities: Iran’s missiles and drones are striking U.S. assets across the Persian Gulf; Israel is being heavily targeted; resistance in Lebanon and Iraq is damaging the regime; Yemen is prepared to escalate its actions. The longer the war lasts, the more compensation Iran anticipates extracting from Gulf regimes. Escalation and tactics: - Civilian targets: Iran’s leadership says the United States has failed on the battlefield and is now targeting civilians and infrastructure, including attacks on fuel depots, desalination plants, and oil facilities, creating toxic rain and ecological harm in Iran. - Desalination and water security: destruction of desalination plants is described as a major risk to civilian water supply; Iranian civilians face environmental and health consequences from the attacks. - Economic impact and energy markets: Marandi contends that 20 million barrels of oil per day are missing from the market and that Western reserves could only offset two months; closing the Strait of Hormuz or sustained disruption could precipitate a global economic crisis and undermine the petrodollar system. - Strategic posture: Iran will respond with countermeasures, and if Gulf regimes push further against Iran, Tehran asserts it could take actions that would profoundly affect the region’s energy infrastructure and Western interests. International actors and alignment: - France and other Western allies: France has announced a defensive mission to reopen the Strait of Hormuz, while Trump has made highly contradictory statements about ending the war or destroying Iran, illustrating perceived Western moral and strategic hostility. - China and Russia: Marandi notes closer alignment among Iran, China, and Russia, with China and Russia benefiting from opposing U.S. dominance in West Asia; Iran’s geography allows multiple overland routes for weapons and supplies, and Moscow and Beijing are seen as unlikely to allow a Western victory in the region. - Azerbaijan and Turkey: Azerbaijan’s response and Turkey’s involvement are discussed; Iran emphasizes it would respond decisively against Gulf and regional actors supporting Israel if pushed. Domestic and regional reactions: - Iranian public sentiment: there is strong public support for the leadership, with mobilization and resilience evident in Tehran and across the country despite missile and drone strikes. - Perceived Western narratives: Marandi argues that Western elites have remained morally and strategically bankrupt, using demonstrable inconsistency in statements and policy to justify continued escalation. Broader implications: - The war is reshaping regional power dynamics, with Iran asserting greater confidence and influence, and with China and Russia increasingly integrated with Iran against U.S. hegemony in West Asia. - The deteriorating situation could produce far-reaching consequences for global energy markets, security arrangements in the Persian Gulf, and the dollar-centered economic order, depending on how escalation and potential reciprocal actions unfold.

Colonel Douglas MacGregor and Glenn discuss the current strategic picture across Ukraine, the Russia–China–Iran axis, and the broader Western political environment. On Russia and Ukraine: - MacGregor notes a major “Cauldron battles” situation in Southeastern Ukraine, with remaining Ukrainian forces being encircled and largely annihilated by precision strike weapons, and a Russian swarm anticipated to complete the encirclement. - He identifies two focal points of Russian activity: Odessa (where Russian special operations are reportedly active at night, Odessa largely undefended with air defenses degraded) and Kharkov, with ongoing pressure toward Kyiv. He emphasizes that none of these alone solves the core problem of removing Zelenskyy’s government in Kyiv, which he describes as a facade Europeans seek to preserve. - Russia has increased its force size, adding reservists and training new draftees; options for Moscow appear to be Odessa, Kharkov, and Kyiv. Putin is watching Western European political developments to gauge timing, potentially waiting for Western government changes to move decisively. - MacGregor argues NATO is effectively irrelevant to Russia’s calculus and asserts the United States does not want a war with Russia over Ukraine, giving Moscow more freedom of action than Western audiences realize. On Russia–China relations and Europe: - Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin are pursuing a bilateral strategy to mutually reinforce military and economic capabilities, forming a large continental fortress against the United States. The two powers seek to strengthen ties as they view the U.S. as increasingly belligerent. - MacGregor contends that European leaders, including Starmer, Macron, and Metz, are aligned with globalist and financial elites (referencing ties to BlackRock and others) and that personal relationships between leaders are not meaningful in the international arena; strategic interests drive policy. - He argues that many European elites’ rhetoric about Russia serves to deflect from domestic vulnerabilities and to mobilize anti-Russian sentiment as political cover. On the Middle East and Iran: - The talk about Iran is framed as not serious; MacGregor describes a plan to escalate toward regime change in Iran, driven by U.S., Israeli, and allied intelligence communities, despite Iranian resistance and regional risk. - He claims Mossad, MI6, and CIA influenced President Trump regarding Iran’s fragility, while Iran’s internal protests (economic grievances) were legitimate and quickly mischaracterized as attempts to overthrow the government. He asserts Chinese and Russian assistance helped Iran counter covert efforts, including providing satellite imagery and assisting integrated air and missile defenses. - The declared Western goal is to destroy Iran as a nation-state, with the Iranian leadership prepared to respond with full use of capabilities if attacked. He suggests a potential air and missile campaign could target the regime and strategic hubs, with the United States likely relying on high-altitude precision strikes and long-range missiles, while questioning the effectiveness and survivability of U.S. platforms like B-52s against Iranian defenses. - China and Russia are depicted as unlikely to allow Iran to be pulverized; they could intervene if Iran is near disintegration, possibly through non-nuclear actions such as a collision at sea, leveraging their submarine capabilities and influence. On European political legitimacy and future: - MacGregor connects the Epstein-related discourse in Europe to a broader critique of ruling elites, comparing the potential for political upheaval to late-18th-century France. He argues that as publics grow disillusioned with elites, there could be a crisis of political legitimacy and a shift toward more realistic leadership, with potential upheaval in Britain, France, and Germany. On Putin and future moves: - He suggests Putin views the possibility of reconciliation with Washington as unlikely, having reached somber conclusions about the prospects for meaningful agreement. He predicts Russia will act on its terms, potentially advancing toward the Dnieper River, Odessa, and perhaps Kyiv, while noting Russia does not intend to govern Western Ukraine long-term. He emphasizes that events will unfold on Russian terms, with European irrelevance in the decision-making process fading as Moscow executes its plans.

Glenn (Speaker 0) and John Mersheimer (Speaker 1) discuss the Iran war and its trajectory. Mersheimer asserts the war is not going well for the United States and that President Trump cannot find an off ramp because there is no plausible endgame or decisive victory against Iran. He notes that if Iran can turn the conflict into a protracted war of attrition, it has incentives and means to do so, including a strong bargaining position to demand sanctions relief or reparations. He argues the United States and Israel are not the sole drivers; Iran has a say, and there is no credible story about ending the war on American terms. Mersheimer cautions that even heavy bombardment or “today being the day of the heaviest bombardment” would not necessarily compel Iran to quit. He suggests Tehran will respond by escalating, potentially striking Gulf States and Israel with missiles and drones, given Iran’s capability with accurate drones and ballistic missiles in a target-rich environment. He emphasizes Iran’s incentive to avoid a settlement that yields no gains for Tehran while seeking concessions or relief from sanctions as time passes, increasing American pressure to settle. He warns that if international economic effects worsen, the United States may push for an end to the war, but that would constitute conceding to the Iranians rather than achieving victory. Glenn asks about escalation dominance, noting Iran’s potential vulnerability of Gulf desalination and energy infrastructure. Mersheimer confirms Gulf desalination plants are a critical vulnerability (Riyadh’s desalination plant servicing 90% of Riyadh’s water; Kuwait 90%; Oman 76%; Saudi water about 70%; desalination is essential). He reiterates that Iran can target desalination alongside petroleum infrastructure to cripple Gulf States and that such actions would also affect Israel and the wider economy. He asserts Iran has the option to damage the Gulf States and thus impact the world economy, making escalation unlikely to yield a favorable US-Israeli outcome. The energy dimension is central: 20% of the world’s oil and gas comes from the Persian Gulf. The Straits of Hormuz are unlikely to be opened easily, and destroying Gulf States’ infrastructure would make that moot anyway. He explains that even if Hormuz were open, damaged Gulf States would not export oil, and American naval escorting would be impractical due to vulnerability. He observes that the Iranians’ options threaten the international economy, and the United States’ off ramp is not readily available. Mersheimer provides a historical perspective on air power: strategic bombing cannot win wars alone, as seen in World War II and later conflicts. He notes that the present campaign lacks boots on the ground, relying on air power, but history shows air power alone is insufficient to achieve regime change or decisive victory against formidable adversaries like Iran. He argues that the decapitation strategy, followed by escalation, is unlikely to succeed and that the literature on air wars and sanctions supports this. They discuss previous warnings within the administration: General James Mattis (General Keane) and the National Intelligence Council warned before the war that regime change and quick victory were unlikely. Mersheimer highlights that only 20% of Americans supported the war initially, with 80% skeptical or opposed. He attributes some of the current predicament to Trump and Netanyahu's insistence on a quick victory, arguing that Netanyahu has pushed for a regime-change approach that failed. The conversation turns to Russia and China. Mersheimer contends that Russia benefits from the war by diverting US resources and relations away from Europe and Ukraine, strengthening Russia’s own strategic position. He suggests Russia may be aiding Iran with intelligence and possibly with weapons or energy, as well as improving its image in Iran. He asserts that this war distracts the US from Ukraine, harming Ukrainian efforts and potentially strengthening Russia economically by boosting demand for Russian oil and gas if Gulf supply is constrained. Europe’s position is examined. Mersheimer claims the European Union’s support is largely rhetorical; Europe’s elites fear a US departure from Europe and want to preserve NATO. He argues Europe’s interests will be largely ignored in a US-dominated conflict, with Macron’s stance portrayed as exaggerated power. He suggests Europe is hurt by the war and that their leverage over the United States is limited unless they diversify away from exclusive dependence on the US. In closing, Glenn and John reflect on leadership and propaganda. Mersheimer reiterates that leaders lie in international politics, with democracies more prone to lying to their publics than autocracies, and notes that Trump’s statements—such as Iran possessing Tomahawk missiles or the nuclear capability being erased—are examples of implausible or untruthful claims. He emphasizes the rational strategic thinking of Iranian and Russian leaders, but critiques the American leadership’s strategic understanding. The discussion concludes with reflections on Europe’s potential hardball approach toward the United States, and the need for diversification in European strategy to counter American leverage. The interview ends with appreciation for the exchange and a shared wish that the subject were less depressing.

Professor Seyed Mohammad Marandi joins the program to discuss a fast-escalating confrontation involving Iran, Israel, and the United States, with warnings of a potential global crisis. He emphasizes, repeatedly, that Iran is retaliating rather than initiating, and that Western media has downplayed the start of hostilities. Key points and claims as presented: - Recent strikes targeted Iran’s nuclear facilities and energy-related sites. Israel attacked the Bosher (Bushehr) and Natanz facilities; Iran reportedly retaliated against Dimona in Israel, with attacks occurring near the Israeli nuclear site rather than the plant itself. - Trump has issued a 48-hour ultimatum to Iran to open the Strait of Hormuz, threatening to strike Iran’s energy fields if Iran does not capitulate. Iran’s military leadership warned that if the United States proceeds with threats, they would strike energy facilities and desalination plants across the Gulf states, with the claim that such actions could spell “the end of this state.” - Marandi asserts the war began earlier, with U.S.-Israel aggression about eight to nine months ago, and Iran has been retaliating in response to Israeli strikes on Iranian infrastructure. He cites Iran’s responses to the South Pars gas field strikes and subsequent retaliations against Qatari and Emirati energy facilities as signals that Tehran will respond to escalation. - He contends that Iran’s leadership believes escalation will place greater costs on the other side, given Iran’s access to assets across the Persian Gulf and the potential to destroy Western targets. He warns that a strike on Iran’s vital infrastructure could trigger a global economic catastrophe, with cascading consequences such as mass displacement and industrial collapse. - Marandi criticizes Western media, the UN Security Council, and regional regimes allied with the U.S. and Israel for condemning Iran’s retaliation while not addressing the Israeli-U.S. aggression. He describes Western media as “Epstein class controlled” and calls for deterrence that remains credible. - He argues Iran possesses escalation dominance: confronting greater Western military capabilities with more robust regional assets and allied groups (including the axis of resistance). He asserts that if the United States expands the conflict to attack Iranian territory or regional infrastructure, Iran would respond by destroying assets on the other side of the Persian Gulf, potentially leading to the fall of allied regimes. - The discussion touches on potential consequences if Iran escalates to the destruction of Gulf energy infrastructure or desalination plants: global energy shortages, food insecurity due to fertilizer and agricultural disruptions, and a broader collapse of the world economy. - The role of regional proxies and geopolitics is explored. Azerbaijan’s Aliyev regime, Iraqi factions, Yemeni resistance, and Gulf regimes are discussed as vulnerable to Iranian retaliation or as complicit in the broader conflict. Marandi suggests that any move by the U.S. to invade Iranian territory would provoke severe retaliation across multiple fronts, including in the Arabian Peninsula and Red Sea. - The possibility of broader geopolitical chain reactions is considered: Europe’s energy dependence, Russia’s position, and potential shifts in North Africa and the Middle East. He states that Europe is losing influence, and Russia could gain strategic advantages as the conflict deepens. - The refugee and humanitarian dimension is acknowledged. Iran hosts many refugees, complicating regional dynamics if conflicts worsen. - On leadership and probability, Marandi casts Trump as unpredictable, with statements and threats oscillating; he predicts a grim trajectory unless deterrence is credibly maintained, and he suggests that even a withdrawal or ceasefire would not be straightforward, given the on-the-ground realities and Iran’s demands. - He concludes with a broad warning: a global catastrophe is possible if escalation continues, and while Iran seeks to deter and respond proportionally, the path to de-escalation remains uncertain, with the possibility that the world could be drawn into a larger—and potentially third-world-war—conflict. Overall, the conversation frames Iran as retaliatory and strategically calculating, asserting that escalation could become uncontrollable and produce widespread economic, political, and humanitarian devastation unless restraint and credible deterrence prevail.

Alastair Crook outlines a two-component Iranian retaliation that is unfolding in three stages. The first component, driven by Iran’s missile and drone capabilities, was expected to target American bases in the Persian Gulf and Gulf area rather than Gulf States themselves. Ali Larragyani has stressed that the attack is not on Gulf States but on American bases and CIA facilities that use Gulf States to pursue Iran’s conflict. The second element, aimed at Israel, focuses on degrading Israel’s early warning radar systems and AIGs that allow United States and Israel to monitor Iran. This involves striking major radar sites in Gulf States such as Qatar and other locations to hinder Israel’s ability to attack Iran. The second phase then employs older missiles and drones to exhaust Israeli air defenses, wearing them down so they can no longer intercept subsequent strikes. Observations of Israeli intercepts against incoming missiles, with many intercept attempts yet frequent misses, are cited as evidence of this wear-down strategy. In the Gulf, Iranian drones have begun to operate more freely over Dubai and other sites, indicating that Gulf air defenses are strained or exhausted. Iran may continue destroying American bases and evacuating certain installations, notably in Bahrain, where the Fifth Fleet facilities have suffered significant damage. In the Israel domain, after degrading radar and defense networks, Iran may transition to more modern, faster missiles. There is speculation about hypersonic missiles with higher speeds (potentially Mach 8–10) and multi-warhead configurations arriving in Iranian inventories, though Crook hedges that he is not a military expert. A longer-term objective of Iran, according to Crook, is to drive the United States out of the Middle East, with the broader aim of reconfiguring regional power dynamics and energy infrastructure—potentially shifting influence toward BRICS and reducing Western dominance over seaborne oil and gas routes. He notes signs that the United States is attempting to control chokepoints and detain or seize tankers linked to Russia, China, or sanctioned states, albeit with questionable legal justification. The economic and geopolitical costs are significant: gas prices for Europe have surged, oil prices are up, and markets are crashing. He suggests the Gulf States may never be the same, with security concerns driving some Western residents to relocate. The conflict is also prompting discussions among Gulf States about changing their relationships with Iran and potentially limiting future American or British military presence on Gulf bases, as illustrated by warnings to the British about the Cyprus and broader Gulf basing roles. On the American side, Crook argues that the U.S. strategy is not going as planned. He asserts the killing of the Iranian supreme leader (Khamenei) was a grave miscalculation that failed to trigger regime change and instead sparked widespread protests in Baghdad, Bahrain, and Iraq, potentially destabilizing Bahrain’s ruling Emir and provoking regional unrest. He emphasizes that the attack undermined U.S. credibility and highlighted the vulnerability of American interests, with protests and regional backlash challenging the U.S. narrative and complicating domestic political considerations, including potential ramifications for Trump’s political standing. Regarding the Israeli-American relationship, Crook suggests the clash and miscalculations are likely to affect U.S.–Israel ties. He argues that attempts at decapitation strikes and hopes for a Western-aligned Iran have not only failed but also intensified anti-American and anti-Israeli sentiment in parts of the region, challenging the traditional “Israel-first” posture and implying significant implications for how the United States will engage with Israel in future policy, diplomacy, and security commitments. He also notes that even within the Democratic Party, there may be demand for a thorough rethink of U.S.–Israel relations. Crook concludes that Iran’s hard-to-predict responses, combined with U.S. miscalculations and regional blowback, signal broad and potentially lasting geopolitical shifts in West Asia, with the possibility of broader implications for Russia–Ukraine dynamics and global energy security. The discussion ends with an acknowledgment that an immediate diplomatic de-escalation seems unlikely unless substantial concessions—such as lifting sanctions, returning frozen Iranian assets, and a broader shift in U.S. policy—are offered.