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Glenn (Speaker 0) and Seyed Mohamed Marandi discuss the posturing and developments in the Iran–US confrontation around May 2026, focusing on the Strait of Hormuz, regional dynamics, and potential war trajectories. - Glenn notes that the United States had announced it would break open the Strait of Hormuz and that conflicting reports followed, seeking clarity on whether the conflict was moving toward all-out war. - Seyed Marandi says the situation is moving toward all-out war. He explains that the Americans initiated a new stage by attempting to carry out an operation to take ships out of the Strait of Hormuz, which did not succeed; instead, civilian boats were destroyed, and there were no military boats involved according to Iran. Iran is not using its military boats in these circumstances; it is using missiles as warnings, to avoid initiating a full war. - He states the Americans bombed boats carrying goods, resulting in five civilian deaths, citing news reports but noting Western media often follows the official narrative. Iran issued a statement blaming the Americans regarding Emirati targets being struck, though he acknowledges it could be read as either an American action or as American fault for the Emirati strikes. - Marandi asserts the operation was a failure for the United States: the Strait of Hormuz was not opened, and the Emiratis suffered damage. He describes the Emirates as an ally of the Israeli regime, noting its distancing from other Arab states, leaving OPEC, and paying for social media campaigns to shape public perception. He observes worldwide street sentiment toward Iran is largely supportive, except among Wahhabi/Salafi groups aligned with intelligence agencies and those who historically opposed Iran. - He contends that the global economy is entering a crisis phase: high oil and energy prices and rising food costs are the “fever,” with supply chains at risk of collapse and the global economy vulnerable to interruptions in any single link. He argues Iran’s economy is a “resistance economy” under siege for decades, while other global economies are more interlinked and fragile. - On troop movements and targets, Marandi says large US troop numbers and equipment have been deployed in the region, with many ground troops potentially based in Kuwait, Bahrain, and the Emirates; air refueling and other assets involve Saudi Arabia, the Israeli regime, and Qatar. - Glenn asks why the UAE is disproportionately aggressive toward Iran compared with Saudi Arabia or Qatar. Marandi explains the UAE’s alignment with Israel, its departure from OPEC, and the perception that striking Emirati targets amounts to striking Israeli targets. - They discuss predictability of Iran’s strategy: Marandi has long warned Iran would disrupt oil and gas production; he notes Iranian officials have historically warned about the Strait of Hormuz. He criticizes Western analyses of Iran’s capabilities as underestimating Tehran’s military and strategic sophistication, while Western narratives have repeatedly expected Iran to collapse in various wars, which Iran has repeatedly resisted. - On the potential course of a renewed war, Marandi outlines two broad scenarios: a short, intense clash with limited strikes on non-critical infrastructure could provoke a strong Iranian response, including missiles at Israel and allied targets; a more extensive war targeting Iran’s critical infrastructure, such as power plants and bridges, could devastate Persian Gulf countries and precipitate a global economic downturn. He emphasizes that Iran has historically avoided targeting civilians, but warns that destruction of critical infrastructure could force populations to flee. - Regarding escalation and timing, Marandi argues the Americans misjudged Iran’s resolve and that Tehran has rebuilt assets and developed new capabilities since ceasefire discussions. He suggests Trump’s aim may have been to probe whether Iran would capitulate or escalate, a calculation he believes underestimated Iran’s preparedness. - He predicts that the scale and duration of escalation will hinge on American choices: the Red Sea’s closure and Gulf actions depend on how far the United States escalates, what targets are attacked, and how long the strikes last. In general, he contends that the world economy’s vulnerability will intensify with any extended or severe conflict, particularly if critical infrastructure is targeted. - In closing, Glenn and Marandi acknowledge the peril of the situation, with Marandi urging awareness of the broader implications, including regional stability and global economic impacts, and both hoping for a path away from further escalation.

Speaker 0 and Speaker 1 discuss the unfolding conflict with Iran, focusing on miscalculations, strategy, and potential trajectories. - Speaker 1 says the war is a major miscalculation, identifiable before it began. Signs were evident: movement of military equipment, force postures, and statements suggested that absent an eleventh-hour change by Trump, the plan was to use prepositioned forces and enablers for sustained combat. He notes this pattern matches previous experiences in which the U.S. saw a buildup as a precursor to war, citing Russia’s 2022 invasion and his own observations of earlier prepositioning, logistics, air support, refueling, and large-scale aviation assets (C-17s, C-5s, fighter jets, aircraft carriers). - He argues Iran’s leadership intended to pursue war rather than negotiation, pointing to what he calls a central missed opportunity: the Oman foreign minister’s Friday-night submissions to the Iranian negotiator offering zero reprocessing, stockpile reductions, and at least preliminary talks on long-range missiles and proxies. He asserts that if the Trump administration had accepted those terms, a ceasefire or settlement might have been possible; instead, he claims the next morning’s attack signaled that negotiations were never the aim. - Regarding U.S. objectives, Speaker 1 says the stated aims from Trump were unattainable given Iran’s resolve and the regime’s calculations that fighting a war with the U.S. is less risky than submitting to U.S. demands. He cites a New York Times report indicating Iran believed war with the U.S. was a viable risk, yet he notes Iran’s leadership now appears to be consolidating support at home and regionally after the Ayatollah’s assassination and the subsequent martyrdom of Qasem Soleimani’s successor in Iran’s internal narrative. - On battlefield dynamics, he emphasizes that Iran’s force deployment is not merely pressure but designed for use, with extensive underground facilities capable of withstanding sustained pressure. He forecasts continued high-intensity operations for a period, but warns the U.S. faces a tightening window: if the Iranian side holds firm and the U.S. cannot sustain supplies and missiles, the U.S. could reach a crisis point. - He discusses possible ceasefire dynamics and political reaction: Trump’s suggestion of a ceasefire could be “complete BS” if the Ayatollah’s position remains solid; the martyrdom and regional protests strengthen Iran’s stance. He expects continued escalation and a hardening of Iran’s demands, including sanctions relief or designation changes, should the conflict drag on. - On regional response, Speaker 1 notes that Iran has drawn regional actors into the conflict, with protests supporting Iran across Iraq, Pakistan, Bahrain, Oman, Kuwait, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Israel. He says many Iranians—though opposed to the regime—are unlikely to embrace Israel or the United States as a path out of the crisis, given decades of antagonism and past betrayals by Western powers. - Regarding U.S. vulnerabilities, he says there are reports of U.S. casualties (three killed, five seriously wounded, others lightly wounded) though some figures are disputed; the public reporting may lag behind direct sources. He mentions possible gaps in air defense and the risk of shortages in interceptors as drones and missiles proliferate, warning that Iran could escalate if U.S. stocks are depleted. - Looking ahead, Speaker 1 argues the conflict is a battle of wills and a war of attrition. The U.S. attempted a “cheap” approach with naval and air power but no ground forces; Iran appears ready to continue long enough to force concessions. He warns the Iranian threat could extend to oil infrastructure and the broader economy if the United States or its regional partners target Iran’s energy sector, potentially broadening the conflict. - In sum, he characterizes Iran’s strategy as all-in, aiming to impose pain to compel a negotiated settlement unfavorable to the U.S., while the U.S. faces a narrowing margin to sustain supply chains, missiles, and air defenses as the conflict potentially drags on for weeks to months. He cautions that the escalation ladder remains with higher rungs available, including strikes on energy infrastructure, if the conflict widens.

The speaker argues that Iran studied the wars of the last two decades and concluded that you can win by not losing. To preserve leadership, Iran has kept a core leadership alive, and the leadership has been strengthened by the strikes faced. There is a belief that there is currently a lot of support inside Iran for the regime, more than a few months ago when support appeared weaker. The speaker notes Iran’s impressive capability to manufacture and disperse ballistic missiles and drones. They point to the Strait of Hormuz as a narrow chokepoint that Iran can exploit by intermittently deploying drones, ballistic missiles, and mines to disrupt world energy flows. Iran is using this leverage while allowing oil to move through the Straits, and they are leveraging relations with China and other world powers to keep oil flows open, suggesting a strategic use of economic diplomacy. The claim is that Iran is deliberately signaling that oil can pass through but that the regime is willing to complicate that flow when it serves their aims. Politically, Iran is portrayed as knowing that a protracted war would not be popular globally, so they have found a steady-state: they can continue striking targets in the Middle East and make life uncomfortable for GCC countries. This ongoing pressure is seen as something they can sustain while external support for them remains, though the speaker expects that support to erode over time. The speaker also highlights a fissure in relations with Saudi Arabia, describing growing fractures that complicate the ability of the United States to project power against Iran. Saudi Arabia’s cooperation is deemed key for countering Iran, and the rifts undermine that dynamic. Overall, the speaker concludes that, from their perspective, there are few downsides for Iran in continuing the war. They believe Iran can maintain their efforts with minimal exertion and continue the conflict far longer than the United States and its allies can sustain, thereby preserving and potentially strengthening Iran’s position over an extended period.

Scott Ritter discusses the widening role of European drones in the Ukraine conflict and the potential Russian response. He argues that Russia is aiming to elevate the conflict this year and may prepare a summer offensive, moving from shadow policy to official action. He contends Europe is acting as an active participant by supplying drones and intelligence to strike Russia’s depth, calling it an act of war and warning that there will be consequences if it continues. He believes a decisive Russian strike could deter Europe and force a reckoning about European military capability and funding, suggesting that a single, devastating blow to the identified target set could end Europe’s ability to support Ukraine’s drone war. The conversation then moves to potential targets for a Russian strike. Ritter rejects the idea of token “warning strikes,” arguing that Russia should strike decisively to obliterate the targeted systems and demonstrate that it can alter the strategic balance. He posits that a large strike against not only the Baltic states and Finland but also Germany could occur, and contemplates the U.S. response, noting that NATO’s Article 5 may not be triggered since the actions are by individual European nations rather than a collective NATO decision on drones. He predicts that under a Trump administration, the U.S. might withdraw support if Europe provokes a broader conflict, which could hasten NATO’s demise. He asserts that a decisive summer offensive by Russia could bring Donbas under its control and escalate implications for European security and U.S. commitment. On the Ukraine battlefield, Ritter cites indicators of a spring Russian offensive, with front preparation, control of critical terrain, and attrition of Ukrainian forces through well-planned cause-and-effect operations. He notes Ukraine has exhausted its reserves and that if Russia seizes Sloviansk and Popasna, much of Donbas could fall. He also comments on Hungary’s elections and their impact, dismissing the significance of Hungary’s influence on European or Ukrainian battlefield outcomes, arguing that the €90 billion aid package does not resolve Europe’s structural problems and may not significantly strengthen Ukraine. Ritter discusses the wider geopolitical consequences, including the Iran situation and its economic impact on Europe, arguing that European energy security has deteriorated and that NATO’s unity is strained. He claims the U.S. is abandoning NATO in practice, and Europe is left with insufficient defense capabilities. He also questions whether the U.S. would sustain a renewed conflict with Iran, arguing the risk of a large-scale war would be economically devastating for both continents and would likely push Europe toward peace negotiations with Russia and Iran. Regarding China, Ritter contends the U.S. rhetoric on sanctioning Chinese energy flows has had little practical effect, as China continues to source Iranian oil and resist U.S. pressure. He emphasizes that China views energy security as vital to its economy and will respond prudently, maintaining that American posturing has not restricted Chinese energy imports. Finally, Ritter suggests negotiations continue intermittently with Iran and Russia, with Islamabad’s technical teams working toward a final peace agreement and Trump seeking a narrative of victory through a peace deal. He asserts that Russia may have a strategic window to secure a settlement, with Trump wanting to present himself as pivotal in achieving peace. He concludes that the conflict could be moving toward a Russian advantage as Iran’s war and European economic strain ripple through.

Glenn: Welcome back. Stanislav Krappivnik, a former US military officer, born in Dolbaz and recently returned, joins us again. Stanislav: Always a pleasure, Glenn. Glenn: In the last two days, Russians entered the strategic city of Orekhov in the Saporiyansko region, which may indicate that if this falls, the whole region might begin to collapse. In Slaviansk, the last Donetsk conglomeration, there are real advances that, if successful in circling the region, could mean the entirety of Donbas falls. Is the Russian spring offensive already begun? Stanislav: It’s hard to say, partly because mud season is ongoing in those areas. The South is still mud-prone; the terrain there is different from Haryakov and Sudirmy, where ground is firmer, forested. In the South, there’s black earth with fewer trees, causing severe mud this time of year. If the melt is fast, flooding can occur; if slow, the ground acts like a sponge and mud persists as water seeps down. Nightly freezes persist while daytime temperatures rise above zero. Weather affects movement and logistics. He notes that the briefings from the Russian command vary from independent mappers, suggesting either undisclosed advances or battlefield confusion. The Russian high command’s reports and geolocations may not always align with independent assessments. If credible, Russia’s forces from the South may have entered Ariakhov, with two parallel rows advancing toward Ariyakara and a long urban sprawl to the south. There is a gray zone because Ukrainian claims differ from Russian assertions. Ukrainians often withhold confirmations for long periods; e.g., Gudaiipoya/Gulyaporiya discrepancies show how contested reports can be. Stanislav says it’s not clear that this is a bold, continuous offensive up and down the lines. A big push would require enough armored vehicles, artillery, and aviation, which he has not seen yet, though it could be developing. Ukrainians have conducted desperate counteractions not just to retake territory but to disrupt Russian preparation for a potential spring offensive. If he were in command, he would launch a big spring offensive, at least partially toward Sumy, which is about 14 kilometers from Kharkiv. Sumy would be a key logistics hub and could cut off Kharkiv from the west, accelerating the fall of the region. He explains that Kharkiv could be surrounded by blowing bridges from the south and encircling through Sumy to the west and the east along the Russian line toward Bianka and the Big Water Reserve. He mentions continuing Russian movement in the north and the city of Kasatirivka, which has been split by a river; all bridges were blown about a month ago, complicating approaches. North of Slaviansk, the gates of Krasnyomar require closing first. There are contested claims about Yaman, with Russians saying around 50% controlled vs. Ukrainians claiming 10–15%. The central concern is the Russian push in the south, where Yemen sits in a triangle formed by the Oka and the Sri Bianca rivers, and Russian forces are closing in from the north as well. Crossing Yamana is expected to fall; it’s a matter of time, though how long remains uncertain. Glenn: Ukraine does not withdraw after encirclement. There’s a rational explanation tied to PR wars: if the US and Europeans lose interest in Ukraine, weapons and money dry up, and Zelensky appears addicted to PR victories to keep support. Do you think the war in the headlines affects Western support? How does the Iran conflict influence Ukraine, given weapon and money dynamics? Stanislav: There’s additional pressure on Western governments from the military and certain military societies not to rush into direct NATO engagement or a large-scale conflict with Iran. He notes Iran’s demonstrated ability to strike American bases and key targets, and that Iran’s actions have shown the US and its allies that American power isn’t unlimited. He argues Iran’s strikes and the broader Middle East conflict complicate Western calculations, as American bases and interests face increased threats. He asserts that Iran has shown it can strike at American bases and that American casualties would be far higher than reported. He claims Iran’s actions press Western governments to reconsider involvement in the region and to reassess commitments to allies such as the Saudis, who reportedly told American bases to stand down. He also discusses how Russia’s deterrence posture could shift in response to ongoing Iran–US tensions, and suggests that if Russia sees an opportunity to restore deterrence, it might be tempted to push back more forcefully. Glenn: Russia’s approach to diplomacy with Europe and the US is complex. Macron’s bid to join a Russia–US–Ukraine format could spoil negotiations. Belgium’s stance on Russian assets and broader EU politics complicate any settlement. Stanislav: He explains distrust in European leadership, questioning whom to trust in Europe. He suggests that a broader reform in European leadership and doctrine is unlikely soon. He notes that among European politicians, there’s disagreement and strategic posturing, with some populist voices but institutional leadership often failing to present a coherent strategy. Glenn: What about China and Russia’s support for Iran? How might that evolve? Stanislav: Russia previously explored a mutual defense pact with Iran; the document lacks substance, and real support has been practical, including MiG-29s, Su-30s, and S-400s, along with jamming systems enabling Iran to counter US satellites and missiles. He describes Iran’s military buildup and how Russia’s support has extended to drone technology and air defenses. He predicts Syria could reemerge as a battleground, especially if Iran’s militancy expands and if the US and Israel are drawn into broader conflict. He suggests China may reassess its stance and consider leveraging its position as US capabilities wane, potentially viewing Taiwan’s reunification as a strategic opportunity. Glenn: Any final thoughts? Stanislav: He emphasizes the high level of risk and unpredictability in the current international security environment, with multiple actors pursuing aggressive strategies and the potential for rapid shifts in alliances and deterrence calculations. He notes Iran’s broader influence and the risks to regional stability, hinting at a world where war remains a possible, though increasingly costly, option for major powers.

Colonel Douglas MacGregor discusses the likelihood and dynamics of a potential new war involving Iran, the Middle East, and broader great-power competition. - On a possible Iran strike: MacGregor says there will be a resumption of the war, though he cannot predict timing. He cites Western attempts to destabilize Iran (Mossad, CIA, MI6-backed unrest) and argues Iran is more cohesive now than it was forty years ago, with demonstrations representing a small minority and not a broad collapse of support for the government. He contends that those who want to destroy Iran or empower Israel believe the regime can be toppled with Western support and Israeli action, but he asserts that such a regime change is unlikely and that Iran will respond forcefully if attacked. He notes that current deployments are heavy on airpower with limited naval presence, and he suggests Israel’s broader goals (Gaza, Lebanon, Syria) will not be achievable without addressing Iran. - Regional actors and incentives: Netanyahu’s regional aims require confronting Iran, and Turkish involvement with the Kurds could influence the balance. He describes a recent Kurdish incursion into northern Iran that Iran suppressed, aided by Turkish coordination. He frames BRICS as militarizing in reaction to Western actions, including in Venezuela, Russia, and Ukraine, and says disrupting the Persian Gulf oil flow would harm China, prompting cooperation with Azerbaijan and Turkey against Iran to undermine the One Belt, One Road project. He also argues that BRICS countries—Russia, China, India—will not easily align with U.S. plans if Washington proceeds toward war. - Russian and Chinese calculations: On Russia and China, MacGregor says they have supplied Iran with military tech and missile/radar capabilities and helped counteract efforts to disrupt Iran with Starlink. He believes many Iranians still oppose regime collapse and that a broader war would risk escalation with Russia and China backing Iran. He cites Moscow’s withdrawal of Russian personnel from Israel and the sense in Moscow that Trump is unreliable, leading Russia to hedge against U.S. actions. He notes Russians are concerned about Europe and envision potential conflicts with Europe, while he questions U.S. strategy and end states. - No first-use and nuclear considerations: MacGregor discusses the idea of no-first-use (NNU) as a potential framework to reduce the risk of nuclear escalation, suggesting a multilateral agreement among the major nuclear powers (US, Russia, China, India, Pakistan, Israel, North Korea, Britain, France). He posits that such an agreement could advance diplomacy, including on Korea, and reduce the likelihood of Armageddon. He mentions that Trump could leverage such a stance, though he notes Trump’s tendency to pursue more aggressive policies in other areas. - Europe and NATO: He argues Europe is unprepared for renewed large-scale conflict and has disarmed substantially over decades. He criticizes Britain and France for rhetoric and capability gaps and suggests the United States is fatigued with European demands, though he doubts Europe could sustain a conflict against Russia. - Venezuela and domestic budget: He emphasizes the futility of long wars in certain contexts (Venezuela) and the mismatch between spending and real capability gains. He references the defense budget as largely consumed by fixed costs like veterans’ medical care and pensions, arguing that simply increasing the budget does not guarantee meaningful strategic gains. He notes the role of special operations as valuable but not decisive in major wars. - Concluding view: MacGregor reiterates that war in the region is likely, with many overlapping alarms and uncertainties about timing, leadership decisions, and the risk of escalation. He stresses that both Russia and China have stakes in the outcome and that the Middle East conflict could influence global alignments and deterrence dynamics. He closes by underscoring the potential importance of no-first-use diplomacy and broader nuclear risk reduction as a path forward.

Gilbert Doktorov and the host discuss how the Iran war is shaping Russia’s strategic thinking, deterrence, diplomacy, and domestic political psychology. - The central impact in Russia is not economic bets on oil or gas, or European gas demand, but a shift in elite psychology in Moscow. Russians feel they have been jolted by a disaster scenario for their country, prompting a re-evaluation of strategy and leadership. This has driven a more acute public scrutiny of Putin and the feasibility of gradual, negotiated restraint versus decisive action. - A key theme is the perceived weakness or inconsistency of Western deterrence. Russians note that Trump's actions against Iran showed that American leadership can be unpredictable and capable of abrupt, decisive moves that undermine Russia’s sense of security. This has contributed to a loss of confidence in the long-standing belief that restraint and negotiation would preserve deterrence. - The discussion emphasizes a perceived “electric shock” in the Russian political class: doubts about the wisdom of a slow, nuanced approach, and concern that Washington might carry out decapitation-like or otherwise aggressive actions if Moscow does not appear capable of credible deterrence. The panel cites examples such as past American strikes and drone activity that highlighted vulnerabilities in Russia’s security posture and raised existential anxieties about Russia’s own durability. - Some interviewers and analysts describe a growing perception that Russia’s deterrence has been eroded by Western escalation, with NATO posture and Ukrainian military support intensifying pressure. There is fear that restraint by Moscow is interpreted as weakness, pushing Russia toward recalibrating its own posture to reassert deterrence, potentially through more aggressive or rapid actions. - The conversation notes internal Russian media dynamics and the shifting stance of influential figures. Salovyev’s and Lavrov’s recent critiques of negotiation, the discussion of Sergei Dabkov’s “spirit of Anchorage” remark, and other domestic debates reflect a broader realignment away from pacific, slow negotiations toward a more hardline posture. Alexander Dugin’s criticisms are mentioned as a sign of growing dissent about the current course. - The broader strategic environment includes concerns about Russia’s relations with China. Russian observers are disappointed that China’s support for Iran did not translate into the expected practical backing; Chinese aid and the efficacy of Chinese weapons are questioned after the Iran-Israel conflict began. This has undermined Russian confidence in China as a reliable partner in countering U.S. pressure. - The discussion highlights the possibility that Iran’s use of economic and political warfare—such as threatening Hormuz and impacting Gulf economies—could have major global consequences, increasing Europe’s energy insecurity and persisting higher prices, which could influence Western political dynamics and, in turn, Russia’s calculations. - There is speculation about whether Russia might seek to draw in Iran more deeply or exploit broader regional escalations. The interview notes that the Russians never concluded a mutual defense pact with Iran, viewing Iran’s reluctance as a factor that complicates Russian confidence in Tehran’s reliability. The possibility of Russia assisting Iran more robustly remains uncertain and is framed as a sensitive strategic option. - The interlocutors stress that the situation is developing into a high-stakes, all-or-nothing dynamic for major powers. Putin’s future decisions, Trump’s political fate, and the Western willingness to escalate further all feed into a fragile balance. The experts warn that escalating to large-scale action becomes a dangerous and destabilizing path for Russia, the United States, Iran, and regional players. - In closing, both speakers acknowledge the difficult, precarious trajectory ahead. The analyst emphasizes that if Russia does not bolster its deterrence and adapt its strategy, the domestic and international consequences could be severe; the host notes the dangerous incentives created by an all-or-nothing strategic environment and the potential for rapid, unintended escalations.

The discussion centers on whether Israel is driving a war against Iran and how the United States fits into that effort, with conflicting reporting from major outlets and a mosaic of intelligence interpretations. - The hosts outline two competing major-news stories. The New York Times reports that Netanyahu has asked Trump not to bomb Iran, arguing Israel is not prepared to withstand Iran’s retaliation. The Washington Post had reported a few weeks earlier that Israel sent a delegation to Russia to assure Iran that Israel does not intend to strike first, while Netanyahu in Washington was pressing Trump to strike Iran. The implication is that Israel is trying to avoid being seen as the aggressor while hoping the U.S. acts, effectively using the United States to carry out escalation. - The Post’s framing suggests Israel wants to escalate tensions but avoid the perception of initiating the conflict; Iran, according to the Post, responded positively to Israeli outreach but remains wary that the US could still carry out attacks as part of a joint campaign. - Iran’s perspective: they are wary and believe the U.S. and Israel are not to be trusted, even as they respond to outreach. There is a suggestion that Iran, with Russia and China, is prepared to counter, and that Tehran is not fully aligned with Western narratives about Iran as a terrorist state. - Larry Johnson (Speaker 2), a former CIA intelligence officer, joins to break down the behind-the-scenes dynamics. He references an alleged economic operation around Trump’s meeting with Zelensky that targeted Iran’s currency, triggering protests and destabilization, allegedly orchestrated with CIA/Mossad involvement. He lists various actors (Kurds, the MEK, Beluchis) and claims they were directed to inflame unrest, with the aim of manufacturing chaos to enable a military strike that could be stopped or degraded by outside intervention. He argues the plan failed as Iran’s security forces countered and electronic warfare helped by Russia and China blocked the destabilization. - Johnson emphasizes a broader geopolitical balance: Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Turkey told the United States they would not permit overflight for strikes; Russia and China bolster Iran, raising the cost and risk of Western action. He notes that 45% of global oil passes through the Persian Gulf and that Iran could close the Strait of Hormuz, which would massively impact oil prices and global economies, benefiting Russia. - On the potential next moves, the panel discusses whether Israel might consider nuclear options if faced with existential threats, and they acknowledge the difficulty of countering hypersonic missiles with current defenses. They reference reports of an earthquake or saber-rattling related to Dimona and mention that some in Israel fear escalation could be imminent, but there is no consensus on what comes next. - The conversation also touches on U.S. political voices, including Lindsey Graham’s reaction to Arab involvement, and questions whether there is any mainstream American call to accommodate Iran rather than confront it. Overall, the dialogue presents a complex, multi-layered picture: Israel seeking US-led action while trying to avoid direct attribution as aggressor; Iran resisting Western pressure but positioning to counter with support from Russia and China; and a regional and global economic dimension that could amplify or deter conflict depending on strategic choices and alliance dynamics.

In the discussion, Speaker 1 argues that Iran’s objective is simply to survive; their strategy is to continue lobbing missiles, launching drones, and striking back as the U.S. approaches within Iran’s vicinity. He contends Iran has maintained command and control, dispersed forces, and possesses a large and enduring supply of missiles and drones, so the minimal victory for Iran is to endure the conflict. When asked what the U.S. should do to win, Speaker 1 criticizes bombastic rhetoric about U.S. superiority and questions the efficacy of regime change through bombing. He suggests that killing the supreme leader backfires by galvanizing the population and Shiites worldwide, noting Iran’s developed succession mechanisms that compensate for leadership losses. He argues that attempts to destroy Iran or disintegrate its society are misguided and that, if the U.S. pushes toward such aims, it may trigger greater confrontation with China and Russia. He also implies mixed signals from U.S. leadership, contrasting expectations under Biden with actual actions, and contemplates a similar pattern under Trump. Speaker 2 adds that President Trump could claim success by neutralizing key figures like the Ayatollah, but suggests that Israel’s preferences are driving U.S. policy, implying limited autonomy for America. He notes the risk of being drawn back into conflict and emphasizes uncertainty about public perception as the war continues. He remarks on the presence of pro-war voices and social media pushback, interpreting it as a sign that the audience may be “over the target.” Speaker 0 seeks a military assessment of the current state: the Iranian capacity, the Israeli position, and American casualty figures. Speaker 1 assesses Israel as internally distressed: internal unrest, exhausted armed forces, and a large exodus of citizens; he predicts Israel faces an ominous future and foresees Israel possibly deteriorating before Iran. He describes Israel’s use of mercenaries and acknowledges substantial damage on both sides, with Netanyahu’s visibility limited. In the broader Persian Gulf, Speaker 1 states that deterrence has failed among regional powers such as the Emirates and Saudi Arabia. The United States is perceived as hampered by a long logistical footprint; uncertainty about missile stocks and intercepts persists, but Speaker 1 asserts that Iran can sustain war for a long time and that bombing alone will not compel Iranian capitulation. He foresees intensified U.S. troop and firepower deployment, including three carrier battle groups over the next two weeks, to replace the current forces. Overall, the conversation centers on Iran’s resilience, the limited likelihood that bombing will force regime change, the risk of broader great-power involvement, and growing weariness and strategic complications for all sides, with Iran poised to endure and possibly prevail in the long term.

In this discussion, Speaker 0 interviews Scott Ritter, a former UN weapons inspector and US Marine Corps intelligence officer, about the implications of a phone call between Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin and the broader geopolitics around Ukraine, Iran, and energy. - On the Trump-Putin call and diplomacy with the US: Ritter notes that Trump initiated the call, and Russia has kept a diplomatic channel open with the United States, despite tensions and distrust. Russia reportedly invited figures like Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner to continue diplomacy. He interprets Russia’s openness as a strategic move to maintain influence in decision-making, particularly with the US seeking Russian assistance on energy and conflict termination in Ukraine and Iran. - Russia’s behavior in response to Western strikes and its strategic calculus: Ritter argues Russia has deliberately avoided a rapid military overreaction to Western actions (e.g., UK strikes on Bryansk using Storm Shadow missiles and Flamingo systems) to prevent elevating Ukrainian nationalism or provoking a harsher Western stance. He suggests Russia can legally justify countermeasures against British facilities tied to Storm Shadow and Flamingo production, but chooses restraint to avoid elevating domestic political backlash and to exploit diplomatic openings. - Economic dimensions and sanctions: He contends Russia benefits from the lifting of oil sanctions, with Russia able to sell crude at much higher market prices, improving its budget and war finances without further escalation. This is framed as a strategic reward for keeping the diplomatic channel open and for not overreacting militarily. - The strategic objective in Ukraine and the West: Ritter states Russia aims to remove Ukrainian nationalism from Europe’s security equation and to establish Ukraine as a neutral party. He argues that Russian actions, including potential pressure on Ukraine and Western states, are designed to compel a settlement more favorable to Moscow, with less emphasis on Ukrainian terms. - The Iran context and US leverage: The conversation posits that Russia’s phone call with Trump could enable further discussions with Kushner and Witkoff on terms that reflect Russian objectives, given the US’s urgent need for Russian help on energy and geopolitical cover. Ritter suggests Moscow could pressure Iran to negotiate in a way that aligns with broader Russian goals and reduces US influence, including potentially linking Ukraine settlements to Iran’s termination or moderation. - Off-ramps and the Iranian war: In Iran, the sole off-ramp is one Iran accepts; the US and Israel no longer control the process. Ritter argues that US strategies (e.g., general Cain’s claims about missile successes) are misguided, with Iran reportedly evading decisive pressure and maintaining leverage. The path forward would involve Russia acting as mediator and engaging Iranian leadership more directly, while the US’s ability to impose a decisive settlement appears limited. - US military options and feasibility: Ritter points out the limits of US military options in Iran and the Strait of Hormuz. He argues that large-scale ground involvement (e.g., 80,000 Marines to seize territories around Hormuz) is impractical given resource constraints, political risk, and logistical challenges. He criticizes the reliance on bombing campaigns with insufficient precision munitions and questions target selection and legality, highlighting a historical precedent where strategic air campaigns did not compel German surrender in World War II. - Broader geopolitical consequences and alliances: The discussion covers how a perceived US strategic defeat could reshape global alignments. Ritter foresees BRICS strengthening as the US loses credibility, with China advancing in Taiwan and the South China Sea, and Russia expanding influence in the Middle East. He suggests Iran could emerge as a regional power, while Israel’s nuclear program could come under renewed pressure. Russia’s involvement in the Middle East, grounded in a strategic framework with Iran, provides Moscow with diplomatic legitimacy to lecture Gulf states. - Lavrov’s stance and Gulf politics: The speakers address Lavrov’s public admonition of Gulf states for pressuring Iran and seeking Western support, arguing this reflects Russia’s adherence to its diplomatic framework and a legally grounded position. Russia’s recent strategic framework with Iran underpins its legitimacy to influence Gulf behavior. - Closing assessment: Ritter emphasizes that the war’s trajectory is being driven by Iranian resilience and US strategic miscalculations. He maintains that Russia’s role as mediator and its leverage over energy markets position Moscow to shape outcomes, while the United States appears increasingly constrained, resource-drained, and vulnerable to strategic defeats on multiple fronts. The result could be a reordering of global alliances and regional power dynamics, with Russia and Iran gaining greater influence and the US recalibrating its priorities accordingly.

Glenn Deeson frames the Iran war as fundamentally about regime change, noting that this regime change could entail destruction or balkanization of Iran rather than a simple replacement government. He argues that irredentist fear and existential threats would drive Iran to respond aggressively, including closing the Strait of Hormuz and attacking American bases in the region, if attacked. He emphasizes that this is about the survival of the regime and the country’s unity, suggesting that the conflict could escalate toward greater regional chaos, including potential actions around Kharg Island. On the broader geopolitical implications, Deeson discusses how four years of efforts to curb Russia failed and how European and American efforts have continued to try to sustain pressure on Russia. He explains that the Ukraine war has faced manpower and weapons shortages, and that economic strains in Europe—especially energy prices—compound the difficulty of maintaining support for prolonged conflict. He asserts that with the Iran war, there are even fewer weapons available from the US, worsening European energy and economic outlooks. He argues that Europeans’ and some policymakers’ failure to recognize Russia’s security concerns has contributed to escalatory dynamics. Regarding China, Deeson notes that China imports oil from Iran but would not welcome disruptions. He suggests that if the United States succeeds in regime-changing Iran, China would be adversely affected, whereas failure could push Iran to align more closely with Russia and China. He discusses potential shifts in global resource control and the petrodollar system, and he frames the conflict as part of a broader great-power competition where the United States seeks to preserve energy flows to allies. He highlights the possibility that successful US or Western pressure could backfire, as Iranian outcomes might push regional actors toward deeper cooperation with Russia and China. He also ties these dynamics to a broader transition from a unipolar liberal hegemon to a multipolar order, with BRICS-like groupings seeking to balance US influence. Deeson broadens the discussion to the potential death of American hegemony, arguing this would be a longer transition rather than a sudden collapse. He explains that after the Cold War the US promoted a liberal hegemonic framework with one center of power, but over time this leads other centers to balance against the US. He identifies the emergence of multipolar dynamics and institutions like BRICS as indicators of shifting power. He suggests that attempts to break China or Iran could backfire, since enemies may realign with Russia or China, and the US might eventually recalibrate to a more restrained role in Eurasia to rebuild domestic strength. He envisions a scenario where the US reduces its European and Middle Eastern footprint, potentially strengthening East Asia. On Israel’s perspective, Deeson says Israelis and Europeans similarly believe US capabilities can be leveraged to defeat adversaries, and Israel sees the opportunity to use US involvement to topple Iran and possibly Balkanize the country. He argues that this clashes with the United States’ need to prioritize its own strategic interests in a multipolar world, which would require pivoting toward East Asia and away from Europe and the Middle East. He cites strategic misalignment in Trump-era policy, noting that continuing engagement in Europe and the Middle East may divert resources from East Asia. He suggests that tolerance of prolonged conflict could exacerbate divergences between the US and Israel as American strategic priorities shift. The discussion ends with appreciation for Glenn Deeson and a plug for his channel.

Speaker 0 and Speaker 1 discuss the potential for a regional war surrounding Iran and the Gulf, examining miscalculations, pathways to escalation, and the interests and responses of regional and global powers. Key points: - The likelihood of a regional war is increasing. Compared to Ukraine, miscalculations today could lead to broader conflict, with concerns about missed opportunities for peace and the involvement of NATO contributing to a harsh trajectory. - Several escalation pathways exist. If Gulf states push back against Iran, Bahrain could become a flashpoint, and Israel or other actors could attempt to destabilize Gulf states by targeting energy facilities, finance hubs, and expatriate communities to provoke economic and social crisis. - Iran’s capacity and alliances matter. Iran alone cannot sustain attacks on multiple Gulf states, especially if Kurdish movements pressure the regime. While there are allegations of Russian and Chinese intelligence backing, there is debate about direct military backing. Escalation could occur if allied powers or regional actors become involved. - The potential for a power grab in Iran. If Iran descends into civil chaos, multiple neighboring countries with competing interests (Azerbaijan, Turkey, Iraq, and other regional players) could intervene to protect their concerns about ethnic groups or separatist movements. A significant fear is that control of the Strait of Hormuz could shift to different actors, creating a strategic chokepoint crisis. - Turkey’s role is complex. Turkey, a major NATO ally with a large Kurdish minority, could be wary of consequences from Kurdish empowerment in Iran. Although Turkey might benefit from stability, it has security concerns about Kurdish autonomy and potential spillovers into Turkey, Syria, and Iraq. Turkey’s stance may deter wholehearted support for Iranian destabilization, given its own security dependencies. - The impact of Kurdish dynamics. U.S.-backed Kurdish groups in Syria and broader Kurdish populations across Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Syria raise concerns about cross-border spillovers and regional realignments. Historical U.S. involvement with Kurdish groups is cited as a factor that could provoke Turkish concern and complicate alliances. - The broader strategic environment. The Gulf states’ vulnerability is tied to energy exports, real estate, and financial networks, including the expulsion of expatriates under crisis. The possibility of striking energy infrastructure could trigger cascading economic and political crises across the region. - Deterrence and misperception. Iran has been viewed as a deterrent to Israeli actions; its potential degradation or destruction is contrasted with the risk that a diminished Iran could still present a long-term challenge through drone warfare and asymmetric means. Drone capabilities are noted as being cheaper to produce and harder to intercept than some missiles. - Comparisons to Ukraine and uncertainty about outcomes. While some suggest Iran could be defeated without ground troops, there is no consensus. Ukraine’s resilience is highlighted as an example that large states can endure prolonged resistance, and Iran’s larger population and geography complicate straightforward assumptions about quick outcomes. - Acknowledgment of evolving realities. The discussion emphasizes that current events have altered regional norms and expectations, with Gulf nations experiencing a changed security landscape, including the potential for broader conflict and a greater likelihood of arms competition among regional actors.

Glenn (Speaker 0) and John Mersheimer (Speaker 1) discuss the Iran war and its trajectory. Mersheimer asserts the war is not going well for the United States and that President Trump cannot find an off ramp because there is no plausible endgame or decisive victory against Iran. He notes that if Iran can turn the conflict into a protracted war of attrition, it has incentives and means to do so, including a strong bargaining position to demand sanctions relief or reparations. He argues the United States and Israel are not the sole drivers; Iran has a say, and there is no credible story about ending the war on American terms. Mersheimer cautions that even heavy bombardment or “today being the day of the heaviest bombardment” would not necessarily compel Iran to quit. He suggests Tehran will respond by escalating, potentially striking Gulf States and Israel with missiles and drones, given Iran’s capability with accurate drones and ballistic missiles in a target-rich environment. He emphasizes Iran’s incentive to avoid a settlement that yields no gains for Tehran while seeking concessions or relief from sanctions as time passes, increasing American pressure to settle. He warns that if international economic effects worsen, the United States may push for an end to the war, but that would constitute conceding to the Iranians rather than achieving victory. Glenn asks about escalation dominance, noting Iran’s potential vulnerability of Gulf desalination and energy infrastructure. Mersheimer confirms Gulf desalination plants are a critical vulnerability (Riyadh’s desalination plant servicing 90% of Riyadh’s water; Kuwait 90%; Oman 76%; Saudi water about 70%; desalination is essential). He reiterates that Iran can target desalination alongside petroleum infrastructure to cripple Gulf States and that such actions would also affect Israel and the wider economy. He asserts Iran has the option to damage the Gulf States and thus impact the world economy, making escalation unlikely to yield a favorable US-Israeli outcome. The energy dimension is central: 20% of the world’s oil and gas comes from the Persian Gulf. The Straits of Hormuz are unlikely to be opened easily, and destroying Gulf States’ infrastructure would make that moot anyway. He explains that even if Hormuz were open, damaged Gulf States would not export oil, and American naval escorting would be impractical due to vulnerability. He observes that the Iranians’ options threaten the international economy, and the United States’ off ramp is not readily available. Mersheimer provides a historical perspective on air power: strategic bombing cannot win wars alone, as seen in World War II and later conflicts. He notes that the present campaign lacks boots on the ground, relying on air power, but history shows air power alone is insufficient to achieve regime change or decisive victory against formidable adversaries like Iran. He argues that the decapitation strategy, followed by escalation, is unlikely to succeed and that the literature on air wars and sanctions supports this. They discuss previous warnings within the administration: General James Mattis (General Keane) and the National Intelligence Council warned before the war that regime change and quick victory were unlikely. Mersheimer highlights that only 20% of Americans supported the war initially, with 80% skeptical or opposed. He attributes some of the current predicament to Trump and Netanyahu's insistence on a quick victory, arguing that Netanyahu has pushed for a regime-change approach that failed. The conversation turns to Russia and China. Mersheimer contends that Russia benefits from the war by diverting US resources and relations away from Europe and Ukraine, strengthening Russia’s own strategic position. He suggests Russia may be aiding Iran with intelligence and possibly with weapons or energy, as well as improving its image in Iran. He asserts that this war distracts the US from Ukraine, harming Ukrainian efforts and potentially strengthening Russia economically by boosting demand for Russian oil and gas if Gulf supply is constrained. Europe’s position is examined. Mersheimer claims the European Union’s support is largely rhetorical; Europe’s elites fear a US departure from Europe and want to preserve NATO. He argues Europe’s interests will be largely ignored in a US-dominated conflict, with Macron’s stance portrayed as exaggerated power. He suggests Europe is hurt by the war and that their leverage over the United States is limited unless they diversify away from exclusive dependence on the US. In closing, Glenn and John reflect on leadership and propaganda. Mersheimer reiterates that leaders lie in international politics, with democracies more prone to lying to their publics than autocracies, and notes that Trump’s statements—such as Iran possessing Tomahawk missiles or the nuclear capability being erased—are examples of implausible or untruthful claims. He emphasizes the rational strategic thinking of Iranian and Russian leaders, but critiques the American leadership’s strategic understanding. The discussion concludes with reflections on Europe’s potential hardball approach toward the United States, and the need for diversification in European strategy to counter American leverage. The interview ends with appreciation for the exchange and a shared wish that the subject were less depressing.

The discussion centers on Iran’s response to the latest US peace terms and the broader trajectory of the conflict. Iran publicly rejected the terms, calling them “completely unrealistic” and signaling that they would not open the Strait of Hormuz. At the same time, the claim is made that the rumblings from US outlets and the president’s rhetoric suggested closeness to a deal, but those impressions are challenged as inconsistent with Iran’s stance. Project Freedom is said to have been shelved after Saudi Arabia reportedly refused to allow US forces to use its airspace and a key regional airbase, making the Trump administration’s stated option to advance that plan unworkable. The host asks where things stand on the escalation ladder. Professor Robert Pape, director of the Chicago Project on Security and Threats, describes the situation as a trap. He argues that the fundamental issues in play have not changed since the bombs began falling about seventy days ago. He praises the US military’s tactical performance—air, naval, and leadership-target strikes—but criticizes the strategy as fundamentally flawed. According to Pape, tactical successes do not yield meaningful strategic results, and Iran’s power is growing due to geography and cheap technologies like drones and mines. He notes that even after sinking Iran’s navy, the impact was negligible because Iran’s power persists and expands, especially given a Gulf-wide vulnerability to Hormuz. A critical development discussed is Iran’s action near the UAE, striking a pipeline that bypassed Hormuz and moved nearly 2,000,000 barrels of oil per day. This demonstrated Iran’s capacity to inflict damage despite a naval blockade, contributing to Gulf states’ reluctance to participate in or support US actions. The implication is that US punitive measures—hitting energy infrastructure or power grids—are unlikely to force Iran to kneel and may instead provoke greater retaliation. Pape warns that the escalation could drag on for months, with consequences such as rising gasoline prices in the US, potentially reaching about $6 in May or higher in some places like Chicago. The conversation turns to more immediate developments: fresh drone attacks around Kishem Island with Iran claiming air defenses intercepted the assaults; Iranian officials reportedly require compensation for damages and the withdrawal of all US forces from the Gulf as preconditions for ending the war. Pape reframes these attacks as part of Iran’s effort to keep the United States off balance and off leadership leverage, suggesting that Trump’s approach—driven by civilian leadership and charisma—misses the realities of great-power politics. He discusses the broader risk of increased Gulf infrastructure targeting if the US escalates, including the potential for higher gas prices and substantial infrastructure repair costs. The interview ends with reflections on the limits of punishment as a strategy, the enduring influence of Iran’s geopolitical position, and the likelihood that even if further force is used, it may not yield the desired strategic outcome. The speakers acknowledge the difficulty of predicting exact moves but emphasize the persistence of the escalation trap and the real-world consequences for energy markets and regional stability.

Professor Seyed Mohammad Marandi joins the program to discuss a fast-escalating confrontation involving Iran, Israel, and the United States, with warnings of a potential global crisis. He emphasizes, repeatedly, that Iran is retaliating rather than initiating, and that Western media has downplayed the start of hostilities. Key points and claims as presented: - Recent strikes targeted Iran’s nuclear facilities and energy-related sites. Israel attacked the Bosher (Bushehr) and Natanz facilities; Iran reportedly retaliated against Dimona in Israel, with attacks occurring near the Israeli nuclear site rather than the plant itself. - Trump has issued a 48-hour ultimatum to Iran to open the Strait of Hormuz, threatening to strike Iran’s energy fields if Iran does not capitulate. Iran’s military leadership warned that if the United States proceeds with threats, they would strike energy facilities and desalination plants across the Gulf states, with the claim that such actions could spell “the end of this state.” - Marandi asserts the war began earlier, with U.S.-Israel aggression about eight to nine months ago, and Iran has been retaliating in response to Israeli strikes on Iranian infrastructure. He cites Iran’s responses to the South Pars gas field strikes and subsequent retaliations against Qatari and Emirati energy facilities as signals that Tehran will respond to escalation. - He contends that Iran’s leadership believes escalation will place greater costs on the other side, given Iran’s access to assets across the Persian Gulf and the potential to destroy Western targets. He warns that a strike on Iran’s vital infrastructure could trigger a global economic catastrophe, with cascading consequences such as mass displacement and industrial collapse. - Marandi criticizes Western media, the UN Security Council, and regional regimes allied with the U.S. and Israel for condemning Iran’s retaliation while not addressing the Israeli-U.S. aggression. He describes Western media as “Epstein class controlled” and calls for deterrence that remains credible. - He argues Iran possesses escalation dominance: confronting greater Western military capabilities with more robust regional assets and allied groups (including the axis of resistance). He asserts that if the United States expands the conflict to attack Iranian territory or regional infrastructure, Iran would respond by destroying assets on the other side of the Persian Gulf, potentially leading to the fall of allied regimes. - The discussion touches on potential consequences if Iran escalates to the destruction of Gulf energy infrastructure or desalination plants: global energy shortages, food insecurity due to fertilizer and agricultural disruptions, and a broader collapse of the world economy. - The role of regional proxies and geopolitics is explored. Azerbaijan’s Aliyev regime, Iraqi factions, Yemeni resistance, and Gulf regimes are discussed as vulnerable to Iranian retaliation or as complicit in the broader conflict. Marandi suggests that any move by the U.S. to invade Iranian territory would provoke severe retaliation across multiple fronts, including in the Arabian Peninsula and Red Sea. - The possibility of broader geopolitical chain reactions is considered: Europe’s energy dependence, Russia’s position, and potential shifts in North Africa and the Middle East. He states that Europe is losing influence, and Russia could gain strategic advantages as the conflict deepens. - The refugee and humanitarian dimension is acknowledged. Iran hosts many refugees, complicating regional dynamics if conflicts worsen. - On leadership and probability, Marandi casts Trump as unpredictable, with statements and threats oscillating; he predicts a grim trajectory unless deterrence is credibly maintained, and he suggests that even a withdrawal or ceasefire would not be straightforward, given the on-the-ground realities and Iran’s demands. - He concludes with a broad warning: a global catastrophe is possible if escalation continues, and while Iran seeks to deter and respond proportionally, the path to de-escalation remains uncertain, with the possibility that the world could be drawn into a larger—and potentially third-world-war—conflict. Overall, the conversation frames Iran as retaliatory and strategically calculating, asserting that escalation could become uncontrollable and produce widespread economic, political, and humanitarian devastation unless restraint and credible deterrence prevail.

Pepe Escobar and Glenn discuss the Iran situation amid escalating US-Israeli pressure and Iran’s response. Key points: - Iran as “the holy grail” in US policy: Iran has long been seen as the ultimate target within a broader project that includes Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, and Iran, with the goal of reshaping West Asia and advancing a Greater Israel concept. The project dates back to at least the nineties, with frameworks like the Project for the New American Century and Clean Break cited as influencing DC thinking. - War planning and messaging: The war was described as planned for decades, with Iran identified as the likely target when other measures failed. The Trump administration reportedly pressed forward, and the “barbarian baboon in the White House” metaphor is used to underscore perceived Zionist influence and financial beneficiaries around the war. - Domestic US-financial dynamics: The war’s perceived profitability for insiders is highlighted, naming Jared Kushner, Ivanka Trump, Steve Lutnick, and others as profiting from related moves. The discussion emphasizes that financial markets (bond yields, gold, oil) influence US decisions, with high bond yields constraining US action. - Iranian strategic posture: Iran’s leaders reportedly signaled that there are no conversations with the US at the moment, and that a deal is impossible given the lists of demands from both sides. The Iranians have shifted from defense to offense, with missiles and drones increasingly employed. - Iranian deterrence and capabilities: The talk notes Iran’s use of missiles such as the Khorramshahr 4 and Fateh-2, with added emphasis on underground missile cities in the Sistan Baluchistan region and near the Afghan border. Iran’s deterrence is described as decentralized and mosaic, enabling precise targeting and escalation control. The Iranian approach includes limiting attacks to dual-use civilian infrastructure in Israel while avoiding civilianTargeted attacks in Iran, and threatening Dimona if Natanz is bombed. - Israeli and Iranian targeting: Iran has begun to attack civilian dual-use infrastructure in Israel and is targeting Haifa refineries and military installations near Ben Gurion Airport, while Israel continues to strike near Natanz and other Iranian sites. The balance of escalation is framed as a deterrence dynamic, with both sides escalating in different ways. - International alignment and support: Russia and China are described as backing Iran diplomatically and with intelligence support, including satellite intel and the movement of Iranian Shahids between Russia and Iran. The three BRICS actors—Russia, China, and Iran—are cited as central to a multipolar Eurasian integration project, with BRICS described as currently comatose or nonfunctional due to internal divisions and external pressures (e.g., UAE and India’s actions). - BRICS and SCO status: The Shanghai Cooperation Organization released a weak statement; BRICS is portrayed as having internal problems, with India’s actions, especially in relation to Iran, criticized as betrayals from many countries. Russia and China are positioned as active backers of Iran, while BRICS’s future is uncertain. - Iran’s regional strategy and neighbors: The discussion covers Azerbaijan, Turkey, and India’s roles. Azerbaijan could be drawn into potential conflicts, with Iran warning that involvement could bring severe consequences. Turkey is described as hedging and pursuing its own strategy; Erdogan’s stance is viewed as unreliable. India’s involvement is criticized for inviting Iran to participate in naval exercises and later backing away from condemning US actions against Iran, while still seeking to preserve a Middle East corridor aligned with energy and transport routes. - Long-term outlook: Iran is portrayed as fighting for the global South with Russia and China, challenging Western-dominated orders. The potential for a postwar settlement remains remote, given the Iranians’ demands (no more US bases in West Asia, reparations, no sanctions). Mediation is considered unlikely unless Russia intervenes as a mediator. The conversation concludes with the view that Iran’s resistance, continuity through leadership like the IRGC, and soft-power appeal have changed global perceptions, while the broader Eurasian integration project remains dependent on Iran, Russia, and China. - Closing note: The participants reflect on the costs and uncertainty of the conflict, noting that ending the crisis will require navigating deep geopolitical fault lines, including Azerbaijan and the broader energy architecture of Eurasia.

Alastair Crook outlines a two-component Iranian retaliation that is unfolding in three stages. The first component, driven by Iran’s missile and drone capabilities, was expected to target American bases in the Persian Gulf and Gulf area rather than Gulf States themselves. Ali Larragyani has stressed that the attack is not on Gulf States but on American bases and CIA facilities that use Gulf States to pursue Iran’s conflict. The second element, aimed at Israel, focuses on degrading Israel’s early warning radar systems and AIGs that allow United States and Israel to monitor Iran. This involves striking major radar sites in Gulf States such as Qatar and other locations to hinder Israel’s ability to attack Iran. The second phase then employs older missiles and drones to exhaust Israeli air defenses, wearing them down so they can no longer intercept subsequent strikes. Observations of Israeli intercepts against incoming missiles, with many intercept attempts yet frequent misses, are cited as evidence of this wear-down strategy. In the Gulf, Iranian drones have begun to operate more freely over Dubai and other sites, indicating that Gulf air defenses are strained or exhausted. Iran may continue destroying American bases and evacuating certain installations, notably in Bahrain, where the Fifth Fleet facilities have suffered significant damage. In the Israel domain, after degrading radar and defense networks, Iran may transition to more modern, faster missiles. There is speculation about hypersonic missiles with higher speeds (potentially Mach 8–10) and multi-warhead configurations arriving in Iranian inventories, though Crook hedges that he is not a military expert. A longer-term objective of Iran, according to Crook, is to drive the United States out of the Middle East, with the broader aim of reconfiguring regional power dynamics and energy infrastructure—potentially shifting influence toward BRICS and reducing Western dominance over seaborne oil and gas routes. He notes signs that the United States is attempting to control chokepoints and detain or seize tankers linked to Russia, China, or sanctioned states, albeit with questionable legal justification. The economic and geopolitical costs are significant: gas prices for Europe have surged, oil prices are up, and markets are crashing. He suggests the Gulf States may never be the same, with security concerns driving some Western residents to relocate. The conflict is also prompting discussions among Gulf States about changing their relationships with Iran and potentially limiting future American or British military presence on Gulf bases, as illustrated by warnings to the British about the Cyprus and broader Gulf basing roles. On the American side, Crook argues that the U.S. strategy is not going as planned. He asserts the killing of the Iranian supreme leader (Khamenei) was a grave miscalculation that failed to trigger regime change and instead sparked widespread protests in Baghdad, Bahrain, and Iraq, potentially destabilizing Bahrain’s ruling Emir and provoking regional unrest. He emphasizes that the attack undermined U.S. credibility and highlighted the vulnerability of American interests, with protests and regional backlash challenging the U.S. narrative and complicating domestic political considerations, including potential ramifications for Trump’s political standing. Regarding the Israeli-American relationship, Crook suggests the clash and miscalculations are likely to affect U.S.–Israel ties. He argues that attempts at decapitation strikes and hopes for a Western-aligned Iran have not only failed but also intensified anti-American and anti-Israeli sentiment in parts of the region, challenging the traditional “Israel-first” posture and implying significant implications for how the United States will engage with Israel in future policy, diplomacy, and security commitments. He also notes that even within the Democratic Party, there may be demand for a thorough rethink of U.S.–Israel relations. Crook concludes that Iran’s hard-to-predict responses, combined with U.S. miscalculations and regional blowback, signal broad and potentially lasting geopolitical shifts in West Asia, with the possibility of broader implications for Russia–Ukraine dynamics and global energy security. The discussion ends with an acknowledgment that an immediate diplomatic de-escalation seems unlikely unless substantial concessions—such as lifting sanctions, returning frozen Iranian assets, and a broader shift in U.S. policy—are offered.