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Glenn: Welcome back. We’re joined by professor Syed Mohammed Marandi, from Tehran University and former adviser to Iran’s nuclear negotiation team. Thank you for coming back. Marandi: Hi, Glenn. Thank you. It shows how much I like your show because I went through a lot of trouble to get online. Glenn: I appreciate it. Regarding the riots in Iran, Tehran included, it seems every time there’s a buildup to regime change or invasion, the script follows a pattern: first destabilize with sanctions and an information war, then build on public grievances and instigate violent protests. You announce the intention to help locals in their aspirations for freedom, with rhetoric reduced to a binary: either you don’t care about the protesters or you support sanctions or intervention. After a coup or invasion, the US and its allies have a zero-sum geopolitical interest and power interest, not altruism. The result, from the Arab Spring onward, is that the country to be liberated is destroyed. Iranian protests are an internal issue, but once international, geopolitics intrudes. How do you assess the situation on the ground in Tehran, domestic grievances, and the geopolitical component? Marandi: Western media and think tanks periodically declare Iran on the verge of collapse, but the state has popular support and a strong constitutional adherence. Currency suddenly fell—perhaps 30–50% in a brief period—and was managed from abroad, with pressure from the US and Western allies on currency-exchange places. Peaceful protests in Tehran and other cities followed mainly by business people whose shops were threatened by rising prices; if the currency isn’t stabilized, they’d go out of business. Protests continued into day two, with larger crowds in some cities. Then infiltration occurred: small, well-disciplined groups began to riot. Over the past days, over 100 officers were murdered, some beheaded or burned alive, some police faces smashed. A nurse in a clinic was burned alive in the top floor; ambulances and fire engines were burned; a Red Crescent worker was killed. Western media claims “protesters” and ignores footage. Across the country today, demonstrations in support of the Islamic Republic and the constitution were large—city by city like Isfahan, Tabriz, Ahvaz, Mashhad, Tehran. The crowd in Tehran was among the largest ever. Despite rioters, millions showed up in demonstrations across the country. The Iranian state’s media is outspent by a global Persian-language media empire in the West, with billions spent on online campaigns, bot armies, and networks. Yet millions demonstrated in support of the state. People can see the footage themselves. The internet was shut down to coordinate rioters across groups including ISIS-related elements, monarchists, and Kurdish groups. The rioters’ coordination collapsed when the internet went down. The regime’s supporters remain, and demonstrations in Tehran and across Iran show broad, diverse perspectives, all affirming support for the constitution and the state. Glenn: I’ve seen pro-government marches here as well; they’re huge, though not always covered in Europe. Marandi: There’s a narrative control to label the government illegitimate to topple it. The rhetoric claims Iranians are freedom-loving, yet those who claim to support them have bombs and blood. Pompeo’s tweet suggesting Mossad agents among protesters, and Mossad’s Persian-language statements, indicate foreign interference. The internet blackout aimed to prevent coordination among rioters; footage shows violent acts—two men burned in a mosque, a nurse burned in a clinic, ambulances and public buses destroyed. The “millions on the streets” claim is contradicted by the actuality of coordination via foreign paymasters. Glenn: Trump claimed Iran had fallen and would negotiate; is this about a new nuclear deal, stalled or about missiles and Iran’s regional support? What are Washington’s aims? Marandi: No one contacted him; his claim about the second-largest city falling is baseless. His ignorance shows inchoate knowledge of ground realities. Trump’s past statements about surrendering Iran suggest aims aligned with the Israeli regime’s goals: a broken West Asia and North Africa, fragmentation of states, and meddling across the region. Erdogan’s miscalculation—allying with Israel and Qatar—empowered Israeli policy at the expense of Turkey, Syria, Egypt, and Iran. The “woman, life, freedom” protests were initially fueled by Western narratives; BBC Persian and other outlets spread misinformation about Massa Amini, which was later corrected, but the cycle repeats. The West uses propaganda to push riots; Iran’s endurance of sanctions and propaganda demonstrates broad legitimacy for the Islamic Republic even amid external pressure. The demonstrations today show support for the state, the constitution, and Iran’s policies while denouncing the US, the Israeli regime, and their supporters. AOC’s stance and Trump’s stance reflect a uniparty tendency toward empire preservation. Glenn: Regarding potential war, Lindsey Graham floated strikes; how likely is war? Marandi: The currency manipulation aimed to justify instability for war. The CIA, Mossad, and others would seek to justify strikes, but Iran is prepared for war. If the US attacks, Iran may strike back; the population that stood with the state could unite in the face of aggression. Iran’s capabilities include underground drone and missile bases, short- to medium-range missiles, more easily moved than long-range missiles. Iran could devastate US installations if attacked. If war occurs, Iran could retaliate in the Persian Gulf and beyond, potentially impacting global economies. If the US begins, Iran could respond decisively, targeting American interests abroad and in the region. The Zionists allegedly favor war for their regional aims, regardless of Western consequences. Glenn: Professor Malandy, thank you for traveling and for the discussion. Marandi: Always a pleasure, Glenn.

Speaker 0 and Speaker 1 discuss the unfolding conflict with Iran, focusing on miscalculations, strategy, and potential trajectories. - Speaker 1 says the war is a major miscalculation, identifiable before it began. Signs were evident: movement of military equipment, force postures, and statements suggested that absent an eleventh-hour change by Trump, the plan was to use prepositioned forces and enablers for sustained combat. He notes this pattern matches previous experiences in which the U.S. saw a buildup as a precursor to war, citing Russia’s 2022 invasion and his own observations of earlier prepositioning, logistics, air support, refueling, and large-scale aviation assets (C-17s, C-5s, fighter jets, aircraft carriers). - He argues Iran’s leadership intended to pursue war rather than negotiation, pointing to what he calls a central missed opportunity: the Oman foreign minister’s Friday-night submissions to the Iranian negotiator offering zero reprocessing, stockpile reductions, and at least preliminary talks on long-range missiles and proxies. He asserts that if the Trump administration had accepted those terms, a ceasefire or settlement might have been possible; instead, he claims the next morning’s attack signaled that negotiations were never the aim. - Regarding U.S. objectives, Speaker 1 says the stated aims from Trump were unattainable given Iran’s resolve and the regime’s calculations that fighting a war with the U.S. is less risky than submitting to U.S. demands. He cites a New York Times report indicating Iran believed war with the U.S. was a viable risk, yet he notes Iran’s leadership now appears to be consolidating support at home and regionally after the Ayatollah’s assassination and the subsequent martyrdom of Qasem Soleimani’s successor in Iran’s internal narrative. - On battlefield dynamics, he emphasizes that Iran’s force deployment is not merely pressure but designed for use, with extensive underground facilities capable of withstanding sustained pressure. He forecasts continued high-intensity operations for a period, but warns the U.S. faces a tightening window: if the Iranian side holds firm and the U.S. cannot sustain supplies and missiles, the U.S. could reach a crisis point. - He discusses possible ceasefire dynamics and political reaction: Trump’s suggestion of a ceasefire could be “complete BS” if the Ayatollah’s position remains solid; the martyrdom and regional protests strengthen Iran’s stance. He expects continued escalation and a hardening of Iran’s demands, including sanctions relief or designation changes, should the conflict drag on. - On regional response, Speaker 1 notes that Iran has drawn regional actors into the conflict, with protests supporting Iran across Iraq, Pakistan, Bahrain, Oman, Kuwait, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Israel. He says many Iranians—though opposed to the regime—are unlikely to embrace Israel or the United States as a path out of the crisis, given decades of antagonism and past betrayals by Western powers. - Regarding U.S. vulnerabilities, he says there are reports of U.S. casualties (three killed, five seriously wounded, others lightly wounded) though some figures are disputed; the public reporting may lag behind direct sources. He mentions possible gaps in air defense and the risk of shortages in interceptors as drones and missiles proliferate, warning that Iran could escalate if U.S. stocks are depleted. - Looking ahead, Speaker 1 argues the conflict is a battle of wills and a war of attrition. The U.S. attempted a “cheap” approach with naval and air power but no ground forces; Iran appears ready to continue long enough to force concessions. He warns the Iranian threat could extend to oil infrastructure and the broader economy if the United States or its regional partners target Iran’s energy sector, potentially broadening the conflict. - In sum, he characterizes Iran’s strategy as all-in, aiming to impose pain to compel a negotiated settlement unfavorable to the U.S., while the U.S. faces a narrowing margin to sustain supply chains, missiles, and air defenses as the conflict potentially drags on for weeks to months. He cautions that the escalation ladder remains with higher rungs available, including strikes on energy infrastructure, if the conflict widens.

In a discussion with Glenn about rising US-Iran tensions and the prospect of war, Syed Mohamed Marandi, a professor at Tehran University and former adviser to Iran’s nuclear negotiation team, outlines several key points and scenarios. - He asserts that Iranians are preparing for war, with the armed forces building new capabilities and underground bases, while ordinary Iranians remain calm and continue daily life. He notes large demonstrations on February 11, with up to 4,000,000 in Tehran and 26–34,000,000 nationwide, seen as a show of solidarity against what he calls Western “rioters or terrorists” and against aggressive posturing by Israel. He stresses that Iran government negotiations will be framed around Iranian sovereignty: Iran will not negotiate who its friends are, who its allies are, or give up its rights to a peaceful nuclear program or enrichment, but could consider a nuclear deal. He argues any new deal would not revert to JCPOA terms given Iran’s technological advances and sanctions. He says a deal is unlikely under current conditions, though not impossible, and that even with a deal, it wouldn’t necessarily endure long. Ultimately, Iran is portrayed as preparing for war to deter aggression and preserve sovereignty. - The conversation discusses broader regional security, linking Israeli-Palestinian issues to potential peace. Marandi argues that Zionism has ethnosupremacism and that Western media often whitewashes Israeli actions in Gaza, the West Bank, and Lebanon. He emphasizes that a genuine peace would require recognizing Palestinian humanity and restoring fair treatment, arguing that a one-state solution could be the only viable path given the West’s failure to secure a lasting two-state arrangement. He contends the West has allowed colonization of the West Bank and that only a one-state outcome will resolve the situation, while portraying growing international hostility toward the Netanyahu regime and Zionism, including among young Jews. - On possible US strategies, Marandi rejects the notion of token strikes, arguing that even limited actions would invite broader conflict and potentially false-flag provocations that could be used to escalate toward war. He warns that Iran would respond with full force and could target US bases, naval assets, and regional interests, potentially shutting the Strait of Hormuz or sinking ships, with widespread economic ramifications. He predicts a regional war involving Iran’s allies in Iraq (where PMF played a key role against ISIS) and Yemen, and Hezbollah, suggesting that Arab Gulf regimes hosting US bases would likely collapse quickly in such a conflict. He stresses that Iran’s missile and drone capabilities are heavily focused on the Persian Gulf area and that war would be existential for Iran and its allies, but a dangerous, protracted challenge for the United States. - The potential consequences of US oil and petrochemical disruption are discussed. Marandi notes that Iran could retaliate against Iranian tankers or, conversely, seize Western tankers in response to piracy. He emphasizes Iran’s comparatively lower dependence on oil exports due to sanctions and sanctions-driven diversification, arguing that attacking Iran would backfire economically for the US and its allies. He also highlights that such a war would be regional, not just Iran versus the US, given Iran’s relationships with Iraq, Yemen, and other actors, and that Gulf regimes would be under immediate pressure. - Regarding current US leadership and narrative control, Marandi critiques the inconsistency of Western narratives around regime change, human rights, and democracy, pointing to the Epstein files as revealing a distrustful climate in Western politics. He argues Western media often uniformly pushes a narrative of Iranian repression while ignoring or whitewashing similar or worse actions by Western allies. He suggests that the lack of a cohesive, credible Western narrative signals a shift in geopolitical dynamics and could limit the ability to mobilize public support for aggressive actions against Iran. - They also touch on US-Israeli diplomacy, noting Trump and Netanyahu’s posturing and the Epstein documents’ potential implications. Marandi contends time is not on the side of aggressive policy, given midterm political pressures in the US and growing public skepticism about war, which could undermine leadership like Trump and Netanyahu if conflict escalates. The discussion ends with acknowledgment of the complexity and volatility of the situation, and gratitude for the opportunity to discuss it.

John Mersheimer argues that the war against Iran is not proceeding as the United States hoped and that there is no plausible off-ramp or decisive pathway to victory. He contends that Washington cannot narrate a decisive end to the conflict the way it could have against Nazi Germany or Imperial Japan, because the war has not produced a decisive Iranian collapse. Instead, Iran has an incentive to convert the fight into a protracted war of attrition and possesses the means to do so, including a broad set of missiles and drones and the ability to retaliate across the region. The result, he says, is a stalemate in which Iran would drive a hard bargain to secure sanctions relief or other concessions, and escalation by the U.S. and Israel will simply provoke Iran to escalate further. On why Iran will not settle on American terms, Mersheimer emphasizes that Iran has a strong hand and time on its side. He notes that the more time passes, the more desperate the U.S. will be to settle, which strengthens Iran’s position. He argues that even heavy bombardment would not compel Iran to quit; rather, Iran could strike back against Gulf states, Israel, and American assets with significant effect. The Gulf States are particularly vulnerable due to a small number of petroleum sites, short-range missiles, drones, and, crucially, desalination plants that provide most of their fresh water. He cites Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Oman as heavily dependent on desalination, implying that destroying such infrastructure would have catastrophic humanitarian and economic consequences. Iran could also target energy infrastructure, and even if the Strait of Hormuz remains open, widespread damage to Gulf energy infrastructure would devastate the regional and global economy. He warns that Israel could suffer increasing Iranian pressure as time goes on, especially as interceptors become depleted. Regarding energy and the Strait of Hormuz, Mersheimer stresses that 20% of the world’s oil and gas passes through the Persian Gulf, making the energy dimension the war’s most consequential aspect. He argues that opening the Strait of Hormuz would be exceedingly difficult, and destroying desalination and petroleum infrastructure in the Gulf States would negate any advantage of keeping the straits open. He suggests that escalation without a viable endgame will have grave economic repercussions for the world, pushing the U.S. toward a coerced end that would not be a victory. Mersheimer contends that strategic bombing or air power alone cannot win such wars. He contrasts World War II and Korea/Vietnam with the present, where there are no boots on the ground and no clear path to victory via air power alone. He notes that the deterrent value of air power is limited, and a regime change strategy is notoriously difficult without ground forces. He argues that the decapitation strategy and ongoing escalations are unlikely to produce a decisive American/Israeli victory, and could instead lead to a stalemate or American concession under economic strain. On leadership and credibility, Mersheimer critiques U.S. leadership, particularly President Trump, for ignoring warning from generals and the National Intelligence Council that regime change was unlikely to succeed. He cites General James Mattis-era warnings that there was no viable military option and notes the pre-war intelligence that suggested limited prospects for quick regime change. He points to Trump’s sometimes contradictory and inaccurate statements about Iranian capabilities, including claims that Iran possessed Tomahawk missiles and that U.S. strikes had erased Iran’s nuclear capability. He argues that such statements undermine U.S. credibility, though he distinguishes between outright lies and genuine mistaken beliefs by leaders. The discussion also covers Russia’s involvement, with Russia believed to be providing intelligence to Iran and possibly supplying matériel and oil if needed. Mersheimer asserts that the war benefits Russia strategically: it diverts U.S. resources from Europe and Ukraine, potentially worsens Ukraine’s trajectory, and could raise global energy prices that benefit Russian revenue. He suggests that Russia, and possibly China, have strong incentives to aid Iran to counter American power. Europe’s role is analyzed as largely symbolic or marginal in determining the war’s outcome. Mersheimer argues that European elites are aligned with the U.S., prioritizing NATO continuity and the maintenance of American military presence, despite the damaging consequences for Europe. He suggests a radical approach for Europe: adopt a hardball stance toward the U.S., diversify its economic and strategic relations (including with China, Russia, and India), and resist being economically manipulated or coerced by Washington. He emphasizes that Europe’s interests would be better served by reducing overreliance on the United States and pursuing a more balanced set of strategic partners. Towards the end, the hosts revisit the idea that leaders lie and that liberal democracies tend to rely more on public persuasion and propaganda, with Trump’s statements illustrating the complexities of truth in international politics. The conversation ends with a reflection on whether Europe should recalibrate its posture toward the United States and broaden its strategic hedges to protect its own interests, rather than assuming continued U.S. leadership in a costly and protracted confrontation with Iran.

Mario: Do you think The US should attack Iran? Joel: He could do a large but limited strike designed to punish the Iranian regime, but not explicitly try to topple it. Clint (Glenn): Now it's in the national interest of Iran to acquire nuclear weapons as a deterrent. You think that Iran the authority enemy. Of Not America being responsible for killing thousands of Iranians. It's very strange that we don't recognize the security competition here. You're unbelievable. No legitimate security concerns for Iran. None of your rules. Mario: Gentlemen. Astonishing. Joel: Does Iran need to be an enemy of The US? Clint: I see that’s very dishonest. This idea that The United States and Israel are worried about the Iranian civilians. I think this is ludicrous. If anything, they're doing everything they can to fuel the violence. If we stop threatening them, perhaps we can get something in return. They stop the threat. No. Mario: Never tried we've never gone down this path at all. Joel: You’re just completely ignoring tens of billions of Iranian dollars that go funneling into terrorist organizations that kill Americans, kill our Arab allies, kill our Israeli allies. It doesn't seem to bother you. Mario: Joel, I’m gonna start with you. A pretty broad question. Do you think The US should attack Iran, and do you think they will? Joel: The president has set his own terms. He has three choices: do nothing and frame that as diplomacy; do a large but limited strike designed to punish the regime but not topple it; or go all in toward regime change. He hasn’t made regime change his explicit objective yet. I think he’ll pick option two, a large but limited strike, because negotiations aren’t designed to lead somewhere. The Iranians are not serious, in his view. Mario: Do you think Trump should go with option two, or seek regime change? Joel: He should go with number two. Regime change is something I would love to see, but it’s too big an objective with air power. If the regime is toppled by force, the risks are immense. Damaging the regime—ballistic missiles, some nuclear components—could be enough to protect citizens and allies, even if it doesn’t topple the regime. If a coup follows, that’s a risk. Mario: Glenn, you argued against regime change but acknowledged concerns about the regime’s brutality. Please respond to Joel and the broader points. Glenn: I don’t think Trump should attack. It’s very likely he will, and the objective will probably be a limited bloody nose attack that is going bombed for two or three days or, like last time, twelve, and then pull away, with an implicit understanding that if Iran retaliates, it could be a big war. There is no diplomatic solution because the Iranians reject multi-issue deals; they want nuclear issues to be separate. The Iran regime is existentially threatened, so they’ll respond. The aim should be to recognize key security concerns and pursue a broader security understanding, not just use force. Mario: Joel, respond to Glenn’s point about whether Iran must be considered an enemy and about potential diplomacy. Joel: Does Iran need to be an enemy of The US? No. But this regime is an enemy. The people of Iran do not have to be enemies. The supreme leader believes the United States and Israel are enemies, and for forty-seven years they say, death to America, death to Israel. The Iranian regime has decided they’re the enemy. The Iranian people largely despise the regime. Mario: If Iran agrees to stop the nuclear program, should The US accept such a deal? Is that enough? Joel: The nuclear program is almost 100% destroyed; you wouldn’t negotiate solely on that. If diplomacy exists, it would be to address threats beyond the nuclear issue—ballistic missiles, regional alliances, human rights, etc. The Iranians were willing to accept transparency around their nuclear program in JCPOA-era diplomacy, but the Americans pulled out. If a nuclear deal is possible, it would require mutual concessions; insisting on broader concessions risks collapse. Glenn: The problem is that Iran has legitimate security concerns too. The strategy after the Cold War linking security to global hegemony is problematic. There should be recognition of Iran’s legitimate security needs, not a complete defanging. We should explore a grand bargain—recognize a Palestinian state, get out of Syria, and pursue a path with Iran that reduces the threat without destroying Iran. Mario: There’s a debate about whether the Gulf states see Israel as a bigger threat than Iran now. Joel, what’s your take? Joel: Two countries—Qatar and Turkey—see Israel as an enemy. Turkey’s Erdogan has threatened Jerusalem; Qatar hosts anti-American and anti-Israel propaganda via Al Jazeera and has hosted Hamas leaders. Israel has the right to defend itself and has pursued peace deals with several Arab states, but the region remains dangerous. Israel should avoid destabilizing moves and pursue peace where possible, while recognizing the security challenges it faces. Glenn: Israel’s internal politics and policy flaws exist, but law in Israel provides equal rights to Arab citizens; policy can be improved, but not all claims of apartheid reflect law. Arabs have political rights, though issues with funding and policy remain. The West Bank is a flashpoint; Gaza is controlled by Hamas, complicating Palestinian governance. There’s a broader discussion about whether regime change in Iran is desirable given potential fragmentation and regional instability. Mario: Final question: where is Iran by year’s end? Glenn: If Trump attacks, Iran will perceive an existential threat and may strike back hard, possibly shutting the Strait of Hormuz. Russia and China may intervene to prevent complete destruction of Iran. Joel: I hope Glenn’s scenario doesn’t come true. Iran might pursue nuclear weapons as a deterrent. If the regime is weakened, the region’s stability could be jeopardized. The options remain: negotiate, strike, or regime-change—prefer a large but limited strike to deter further advancement without taking ownership of an unknown future. Mario: Thank you both. This was a vigorous, wide-ranging exchange. End of time.

We're heading toward war with Iran, with few Republicans pushing back. Bombing Iran's oil infrastructure, as Senator Graham suggests, could lead to disaster. About 20% of the world's oil passes through the Straits of Hormuz and Iran has missiles that can reach as far as 1,200 miles. If we attack Iran, our bases in Iraq and Syria will be targeted. Hezbollah, with a presence in Mexico, could cause trouble here at home. Our sanctions haven't stopped Iran from developing advanced missiles and cyber warfare capabilities. Our military isn't in a strong position to respond to a war with Iran, and our naval power may not have the impact we desire. The army is depleted and lacks the capacity for rapid deployment. Destroying Hamas means systematically rooting them out and likely causing mass civilian casualties. The support for Israel will erode as more destruction is captured coming out of Gaza.

Glenn: Welcome back. Stanislav Krappivnik, a former US military officer, born in Dolbaz and recently returned, joins us again. Stanislav: Always a pleasure, Glenn. Glenn: In the last two days, Russians entered the strategic city of Orekhov in the Saporiyansko region, which may indicate that if this falls, the whole region might begin to collapse. In Slaviansk, the last Donetsk conglomeration, there are real advances that, if successful in circling the region, could mean the entirety of Donbas falls. Is the Russian spring offensive already begun? Stanislav: It’s hard to say, partly because mud season is ongoing in those areas. The South is still mud-prone; the terrain there is different from Haryakov and Sudirmy, where ground is firmer, forested. In the South, there’s black earth with fewer trees, causing severe mud this time of year. If the melt is fast, flooding can occur; if slow, the ground acts like a sponge and mud persists as water seeps down. Nightly freezes persist while daytime temperatures rise above zero. Weather affects movement and logistics. He notes that the briefings from the Russian command vary from independent mappers, suggesting either undisclosed advances or battlefield confusion. The Russian high command’s reports and geolocations may not always align with independent assessments. If credible, Russia’s forces from the South may have entered Ariakhov, with two parallel rows advancing toward Ariyakara and a long urban sprawl to the south. There is a gray zone because Ukrainian claims differ from Russian assertions. Ukrainians often withhold confirmations for long periods; e.g., Gudaiipoya/Gulyaporiya discrepancies show how contested reports can be. Stanislav says it’s not clear that this is a bold, continuous offensive up and down the lines. A big push would require enough armored vehicles, artillery, and aviation, which he has not seen yet, though it could be developing. Ukrainians have conducted desperate counteractions not just to retake territory but to disrupt Russian preparation for a potential spring offensive. If he were in command, he would launch a big spring offensive, at least partially toward Sumy, which is about 14 kilometers from Kharkiv. Sumy would be a key logistics hub and could cut off Kharkiv from the west, accelerating the fall of the region. He explains that Kharkiv could be surrounded by blowing bridges from the south and encircling through Sumy to the west and the east along the Russian line toward Bianka and the Big Water Reserve. He mentions continuing Russian movement in the north and the city of Kasatirivka, which has been split by a river; all bridges were blown about a month ago, complicating approaches. North of Slaviansk, the gates of Krasnyomar require closing first. There are contested claims about Yaman, with Russians saying around 50% controlled vs. Ukrainians claiming 10–15%. The central concern is the Russian push in the south, where Yemen sits in a triangle formed by the Oka and the Sri Bianca rivers, and Russian forces are closing in from the north as well. Crossing Yamana is expected to fall; it’s a matter of time, though how long remains uncertain. Glenn: Ukraine does not withdraw after encirclement. There’s a rational explanation tied to PR wars: if the US and Europeans lose interest in Ukraine, weapons and money dry up, and Zelensky appears addicted to PR victories to keep support. Do you think the war in the headlines affects Western support? How does the Iran conflict influence Ukraine, given weapon and money dynamics? Stanislav: There’s additional pressure on Western governments from the military and certain military societies not to rush into direct NATO engagement or a large-scale conflict with Iran. He notes Iran’s demonstrated ability to strike American bases and key targets, and that Iran’s actions have shown the US and its allies that American power isn’t unlimited. He argues Iran’s strikes and the broader Middle East conflict complicate Western calculations, as American bases and interests face increased threats. He asserts that Iran has shown it can strike at American bases and that American casualties would be far higher than reported. He claims Iran’s actions press Western governments to reconsider involvement in the region and to reassess commitments to allies such as the Saudis, who reportedly told American bases to stand down. He also discusses how Russia’s deterrence posture could shift in response to ongoing Iran–US tensions, and suggests that if Russia sees an opportunity to restore deterrence, it might be tempted to push back more forcefully. Glenn: Russia’s approach to diplomacy with Europe and the US is complex. Macron’s bid to join a Russia–US–Ukraine format could spoil negotiations. Belgium’s stance on Russian assets and broader EU politics complicate any settlement. Stanislav: He explains distrust in European leadership, questioning whom to trust in Europe. He suggests that a broader reform in European leadership and doctrine is unlikely soon. He notes that among European politicians, there’s disagreement and strategic posturing, with some populist voices but institutional leadership often failing to present a coherent strategy. Glenn: What about China and Russia’s support for Iran? How might that evolve? Stanislav: Russia previously explored a mutual defense pact with Iran; the document lacks substance, and real support has been practical, including MiG-29s, Su-30s, and S-400s, along with jamming systems enabling Iran to counter US satellites and missiles. He describes Iran’s military buildup and how Russia’s support has extended to drone technology and air defenses. He predicts Syria could reemerge as a battleground, especially if Iran’s militancy expands and if the US and Israel are drawn into broader conflict. He suggests China may reassess its stance and consider leveraging its position as US capabilities wane, potentially viewing Taiwan’s reunification as a strategic opportunity. Glenn: Any final thoughts? Stanislav: He emphasizes the high level of risk and unpredictability in the current international security environment, with multiple actors pursuing aggressive strategies and the potential for rapid shifts in alliances and deterrence calculations. He notes Iran’s broader influence and the risks to regional stability, hinting at a world where war remains a possible, though increasingly costly, option for major powers.

Colonel Douglas MacGregor discusses the likelihood and dynamics of a potential new war involving Iran, the Middle East, and broader great-power competition. - On a possible Iran strike: MacGregor says there will be a resumption of the war, though he cannot predict timing. He cites Western attempts to destabilize Iran (Mossad, CIA, MI6-backed unrest) and argues Iran is more cohesive now than it was forty years ago, with demonstrations representing a small minority and not a broad collapse of support for the government. He contends that those who want to destroy Iran or empower Israel believe the regime can be toppled with Western support and Israeli action, but he asserts that such a regime change is unlikely and that Iran will respond forcefully if attacked. He notes that current deployments are heavy on airpower with limited naval presence, and he suggests Israel’s broader goals (Gaza, Lebanon, Syria) will not be achievable without addressing Iran. - Regional actors and incentives: Netanyahu’s regional aims require confronting Iran, and Turkish involvement with the Kurds could influence the balance. He describes a recent Kurdish incursion into northern Iran that Iran suppressed, aided by Turkish coordination. He frames BRICS as militarizing in reaction to Western actions, including in Venezuela, Russia, and Ukraine, and says disrupting the Persian Gulf oil flow would harm China, prompting cooperation with Azerbaijan and Turkey against Iran to undermine the One Belt, One Road project. He also argues that BRICS countries—Russia, China, India—will not easily align with U.S. plans if Washington proceeds toward war. - Russian and Chinese calculations: On Russia and China, MacGregor says they have supplied Iran with military tech and missile/radar capabilities and helped counteract efforts to disrupt Iran with Starlink. He believes many Iranians still oppose regime collapse and that a broader war would risk escalation with Russia and China backing Iran. He cites Moscow’s withdrawal of Russian personnel from Israel and the sense in Moscow that Trump is unreliable, leading Russia to hedge against U.S. actions. He notes Russians are concerned about Europe and envision potential conflicts with Europe, while he questions U.S. strategy and end states. - No first-use and nuclear considerations: MacGregor discusses the idea of no-first-use (NNU) as a potential framework to reduce the risk of nuclear escalation, suggesting a multilateral agreement among the major nuclear powers (US, Russia, China, India, Pakistan, Israel, North Korea, Britain, France). He posits that such an agreement could advance diplomacy, including on Korea, and reduce the likelihood of Armageddon. He mentions that Trump could leverage such a stance, though he notes Trump’s tendency to pursue more aggressive policies in other areas. - Europe and NATO: He argues Europe is unprepared for renewed large-scale conflict and has disarmed substantially over decades. He criticizes Britain and France for rhetoric and capability gaps and suggests the United States is fatigued with European demands, though he doubts Europe could sustain a conflict against Russia. - Venezuela and domestic budget: He emphasizes the futility of long wars in certain contexts (Venezuela) and the mismatch between spending and real capability gains. He references the defense budget as largely consumed by fixed costs like veterans’ medical care and pensions, arguing that simply increasing the budget does not guarantee meaningful strategic gains. He notes the role of special operations as valuable but not decisive in major wars. - Concluding view: MacGregor reiterates that war in the region is likely, with many overlapping alarms and uncertainties about timing, leadership decisions, and the risk of escalation. He stresses that both Russia and China have stakes in the outcome and that the Middle East conflict could influence global alignments and deterrence dynamics. He closes by underscoring the potential importance of no-first-use diplomacy and broader nuclear risk reduction as a path forward.

Clayton interviews Professor Morandi about the Iranian military situation amid claims of a US-Israeli aggression and a media blackout. - Morandi asserts the Iranian air force is intact. He says Americans and Israelis bomb decoys and provides examples of footage showing explosions on painted ground objects that do not move afterward, indicating decoys are being used to mislead about real strikes. He states Iran has deployed decoys across the region for planes, helicopters, and missile launchers. The navy’s true strength is described as underground, with bases full of speedboats that fire surface-to-sea and sea-to-surface missiles; these underground bases are reported as intact. The Iranian air force is not heavily used, operating mainly from bases to the east/northeast where access is more limited. Missiles and drones are fired day and night. - Morandi contends that Iran’s naval power for asymmetrical warfare remains intact, and that the enemy’s claims of dwindling launchers or missiles are inaccurate. He notes the initial use of older, cheap missiles to exhaust air defenses, after which Iran fires fewer missiles but still successfully penetrates defenses. - On the strategic Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz, Morandi dismisses the idea that capturing Kharg Island would significantly alter outcomes. He argues that even if Kharg Island were taken, the Strait of Hormuz would remain closed unless Iran agrees to reopen it. Iran has long prepared defenses across the Persian Gulf, including naval and shore defenses, anticipating possible US attack. Iran’s missile, drone, and naval capabilities—long-, medium-, and short-range missiles, cruise and ballistic missiles, drones, and speedboats in underground bases—are positioned to deter. - If the US were to open the Strait by attacking, Morandi foresees heavy casualties, destruction of tankers and oil/gas installations, and a collapse of global oil prices, potentially around extreme levels like $250 a barrel, with severe global economic consequences. He argues the United States would lose more than Iran and would need compensation from Gulf regimes hosting US bases for allowing attacks. He asserts that traditional negotiations fail with the US given past breaches of agreements (citing the JCPOA) and implies distrust toward Washington. - Regarding a reported border invasion by Kurds or other groups, Morandi says US collaboration with Kurdish forces would likely be defeated by Iran, who would then threaten the autonomous Kurdish regional government in Northern Iraq. He suggests such actions would harm regional economies and erode Western influence, noting that Gulf states have borne significant economic and political costs from the conflict. He argues the US has harmed its own interests by engaging in war with Iran, increasing oil prices, and pushing regional countries toward confrontation. - Morandi concludes by stating that without genuine assurances on non-aggression and guarantees on future behavior, negotiations with the US are untrustworthy. He emphasizes that the US’s hostility affects not only Iran but the broader regional and global economy, and he criticizes American leadership as acting in concert with the Israeli regime.

Stanislav (Speaker 1) and Speaker 0 engage in a wide-ranging, combative analysis of the Iran-Israel-U.S. conflict and broader geopolitical implications. Key points and claims are as follows: - On Iran’s military activity: The volume of Iranian drone and rocket attacks has dropped by about 95% in the last few days, but Iran’s strategic goals appear to be advancing. The Strait of Hormuz remains closed, and Iran has not fallen from power, suggesting a durable regime in Iran despite reduced attack tempo. Israel is said to be taking a pounding with strikes on Haifa refinery, electrical plants, and other targets, while Iran is pursuing a long-haul campaign rather than a rapid blitz. - Terminology and legitimacy: Stanislav objects to labeling Iran’s leadership as a “regime,” arguing it’s a derogatory term and positing that the regime is a theocracy that is comparatively stable under pressure. He notes that air campaigns have never toppled governments and argues that people rally around governments when their families are being harmed, especially within Shia culture. - Information and truth in war: Both sides are accused of misrepresenting losses and capabilities; the Pentagon’s numbers on drones and rockets are treated with skepticism. There is emphasis on the difficulty of verifying battle damage in real time, and the reality that “the first sacrifice of any war is truth” in war reporting. - Military capabilities and constraints: Stanislav emphasizes that the U.S. and Israel have suffered damage to critical infrastructure, and the U.S. faces munitions shortages. He cites the first six days of conflict as consuming thousands of missiles (3,600 missiles across defensive and offensive systems). He argues U.S. industrial/munitions capacity is strained, with missiles being produced in small quantities and largely by hand, constraining rapid replacement. - Iran’s defense and offense: Iran is portrayed as possessing underground “missile cities” and being able to move and launch missiles from concealed locations. The use of decoy aircraft and other decoys is noted, complicating target acquisition. Iran is described as capable of sustaining a long campaign, with continued missile production and hidden launch capability, including launchers that can be moved and re-deployed quickly. - Sensor/shooter network: The discussion mentions a new U.S.-reported capability described as a “sensor shooter network” that uses satellites to spot a missile launcher as it emerges, relaying coordinates to fighters such as F-35s to intercept before launch. This is framed as making missile launches harder for Iran and easier to strike launchers for Israel and the U.S. - Strait of Hormuz as the central objective: The primary objective for Iran, per Speaker 0, is to close the Strait of Hormuz for as long as possible and disrupt Gulf states, with closing the strait potentially forcing an American exit due to economic pressure. Attacks that target Israel are framed as secondary (“bonus”) relative to the Hormuz objective. - Ground warfare and invasions: Both speakers argue that a U.S. or allied ground invasion of Iran would entail massive casualties and potential domestic political backlash, making it a less likely option. The difficulty of projecting power through Iran’s mountainous terrain and the risk of a popular uprising are highlighted. - Regime durability and external support: Iran’s government is described as a theocracy with deep cultural unity, making political collapse unlikely. Russia and China are discussed as critical backers: Russia provides MiG-29s, SU-35s, S-400s, and jamming capabilities, while China provides satellite connections and political cover, and both nations see Iran as an existential interest—Russia especially, given Central Asia and the Caucasus. Iran is portrayed as having backing from Russia and China that would prevent a wholesale collapse. - U.S. allies and credibility: The U.S. is portrayed as depleting its ability to defend Gulf allies, with discussions of allied air-defense systems being diverted elsewhere (to Israel) and questions about long-term U.S. willingness or capacity to sustain a commitment in the Gulf. - Ukraine comparison and broader geopolitics: The dialogue touches on Ukraine, NATO, and the differential treatment of Ukraine versus Iran, noting perceived manipulation by Western actors and the difficulty of achieving durable peace through negotiations when proxies and local actors have entrenched interests. Zelensky and Kyiv’s internal politics are referenced to illustrate broader critique of Western interventions. - Potential off-ramps and negotiations: There is debate about whether a political settlement could be engineered that would preserve the Iranian regime while offering concessions (e.g., limitations on ballistic missiles or nuclear ambitions) and provide Trump with a way to claim a diplomatic win. Stanislav suggests the unpredictable nature of the current leadership and that an off-ramp may be difficult to secure; Speaker 0 contends that a pragmatic, deal-oriented path could exist if a credible intermediary or concessions are arranged, perhaps involving a different leadership or mediator. - Final reflections on strategy and endurance: Stanislav stresses that drones, missiles, and human ground forces all have limits, and argues that real military victory rarely comes from air campaigns alone; the fundamental test remains whether ground forces can secure and hold territory. Speaker 0 adds that the regime’s resilience in Iran and the long-term strategic calculus—especially regarding Hormuz, energy, and allied alliances—will shape the conflict’s trajectory in the coming weeks. Both acknowledge the enormous complexities and the high stakes for regional and global stability.

Jeffrey Sachs and Glenn discuss the threat environment around Iran amid Trump-era tensions. - Observed mobilization: The United States has a massive military build-up in the region; allied transports appear en route to the Middle East. The impression, from Tehran’s view, is that an attack seems unavoidable, with Israel and Washington seemingly seeking regime change. - Threat framing and regime change: Sachs says Israel has pursued over thirty years to overthrow the Iranian government, with the United States broadly acting in lockstep with Israel. He notes that last summer’s effort aimed at regime change did not succeed, and that a carrier task group is now moving toward Iran, signaling imminent attack. He asserts that “the goal here has never been negotiation.” - JCPOA history and negotiations: A nuclear deal, JCPOA, was reached and ratified by UN Security Council resolution 2231 (2015). Trump ripped it up in his first term. Sachs argues there has never been genuine readiness by the United States or Israel for a negotiated settlement; when negotiations occurred, Israel resisted, and the attack on Iran two days before scheduled U.S.–Iran negotiations in June 2025 is cited as proof that the goal is regime change, not diplomacy. - Hybrid warfare and tactics: The plan is described as a regime change operation carried out through hybrid warfare—cyber, street unrest, economic strangulation, bombing, assassinations. Trump is characterized as blustering to pressure Iran to comply with demands that would amount to dismantling the regime. - UN Charter and legality: Sachs invokes UN Charter Article 2(4), stating that all members shall refrain from threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, and argues the current posture is a gross violation of the charter. - Venezuela comparison and propaganda accusation: He likens the current stance to the coercive U.S. approach seen in Venezuela, accusing the United States of invasion, kidnapping, oil seizures, and confiscation of oil profits, with Trump claiming the money goes to him. He alleges similar propaganda is present in major media regarding Iran, including misrepresentation of economic collapse as a sign of Iranian misgovernment. - Economic statecraft and its effects: Scott Bessent, the U.S. Treasury Secretary, is cited as stating that sanctions aimed to “collapse” Iran’s currency and provoke mass unrest, enabling a political outcome favorable to U.S. aims. Sachs claims sanctions caused a December economic collapse, bank failures, currency issues, and imports shortages, driving people into the streets. - Marketed outcomes and media treatment: Bessent is accused of describing a “positive” outcome from destabilization, with mainstream media avoiding coverage of this stance. The claim is that weaponized finance is a tactic to destabilize Iran without conventional warfare. - Containment risk and nuclear considerations: Sachs warns that if the situation deteriorates, Iran could decide to dash for nuclear weapons, particularly if existential threats mount. He emphasizes that a broader regional war could involve many countries and risk nuclear escalation, making prevention imperative. He argues the UN Security Council should convene immediately to stop escalation. - Prospects for Europe and regional actors: He criticizes European leaders for not resisting aggression, noting skepticism about who would oppose U.S. aggression. He suggests some regional players (Saudi Arabia, Qatar, UAE, Turkey) may not want a wider war, but questions whether they can prevent it given U.S. leadership and Israeli influence. - Final note: Sachs calls for a strong, principled international response to prevent an explosion in a highly volatile region, urging opposition to unilateral threats and actions.

In the discussion, Speaker 1 argues that Iran’s objective is simply to survive; their strategy is to continue lobbing missiles, launching drones, and striking back as the U.S. approaches within Iran’s vicinity. He contends Iran has maintained command and control, dispersed forces, and possesses a large and enduring supply of missiles and drones, so the minimal victory for Iran is to endure the conflict. When asked what the U.S. should do to win, Speaker 1 criticizes bombastic rhetoric about U.S. superiority and questions the efficacy of regime change through bombing. He suggests that killing the supreme leader backfires by galvanizing the population and Shiites worldwide, noting Iran’s developed succession mechanisms that compensate for leadership losses. He argues that attempts to destroy Iran or disintegrate its society are misguided and that, if the U.S. pushes toward such aims, it may trigger greater confrontation with China and Russia. He also implies mixed signals from U.S. leadership, contrasting expectations under Biden with actual actions, and contemplates a similar pattern under Trump. Speaker 2 adds that President Trump could claim success by neutralizing key figures like the Ayatollah, but suggests that Israel’s preferences are driving U.S. policy, implying limited autonomy for America. He notes the risk of being drawn back into conflict and emphasizes uncertainty about public perception as the war continues. He remarks on the presence of pro-war voices and social media pushback, interpreting it as a sign that the audience may be “over the target.” Speaker 0 seeks a military assessment of the current state: the Iranian capacity, the Israeli position, and American casualty figures. Speaker 1 assesses Israel as internally distressed: internal unrest, exhausted armed forces, and a large exodus of citizens; he predicts Israel faces an ominous future and foresees Israel possibly deteriorating before Iran. He describes Israel’s use of mercenaries and acknowledges substantial damage on both sides, with Netanyahu’s visibility limited. In the broader Persian Gulf, Speaker 1 states that deterrence has failed among regional powers such as the Emirates and Saudi Arabia. The United States is perceived as hampered by a long logistical footprint; uncertainty about missile stocks and intercepts persists, but Speaker 1 asserts that Iran can sustain war for a long time and that bombing alone will not compel Iranian capitulation. He foresees intensified U.S. troop and firepower deployment, including three carrier battle groups over the next two weeks, to replace the current forces. Overall, the conversation centers on Iran’s resilience, the limited likelihood that bombing will force regime change, the risk of broader great-power involvement, and growing weariness and strategic complications for all sides, with Iran poised to endure and possibly prevail in the long term.

Saeed Mohamed Marandi explains that Iranians view current events as an extension of the twelve-day war, where Israel and the Trump administration allegedly collaborated to undermine Iran and failed. He cites US Treasury remarks at Davos about manipulating Iranian currency to provoke protests, which he says led to peaceful demonstrations followed by highly trained groups that caused destruction and police casualties. He asserts that Israel claimed responsibility, with Mossad statements and Channel 14 reporting that weapons brought into Iran caused police deaths, and he notes Western media glossed over these facts. He argues this campaign aimed to push Trump toward confrontation with Iran, while messaging about Iran’s nuclear program and regional alliances shifted over time. Iran’s response, he says, has been that any attack will be treated as all-out war with an overwhelming Iranian retaliation. He contends Trump is boxed in: a larger strike would provoke a massive Iranian response across the region, affecting oil and gas flows through the Persian Gulf and potentially collapsing the global economy. He suggests the “smart” outcome would be to back off and end peacefully, potentially declaring victory without concessions, as Trump did in Yemen, though he believes Iran will not accept any deal that compromises sovereignty or core capabilities. Marandi lays out Iran’s view of the regional and strategic landscape: Iran’s counterstrike would target US interests across the region, not just bases, and would involve allies in Iraq, Yemen, and other areas. He argues the Persian Gulf is highly vulnerable because regional regimes hosting US bases are complicit, and a war would disrupt global energy supplies. He asserts Iran’s capabilities are primarily directed at the United States, given US threats since the Afghanistan and Iraq invasions, and that Iran has strengthened missiles and drones, along with air defenses. He contends Israel is vulnerable, and the aim of some in the US political circle is to sacrifice US interests for Israeli interests. He asserts that Iran’s real objective is to prevent a repeat of the “sword over Iran”—to avoid six-month cycles of provocations—and to end the possibility of ongoing CIA-backed unrest being used as pretext for further strikes. On the possibility of negotiation, Marandi says Iran will not give up nuclear enrichment, missile capabilities, or regional alliances. He notes there was a JCPOA, but Iran would not accept a repeat of that deal; any future agreement would need to be better for Iran. A deal could be discussed about the nuclear program, but not one that cedes sovereignty or enrichment rights. He suggests Trump could try to retreat by declaring victory or offering a hollow concession, but Iran is ready for all-out war if attacked. He emphasizes that if the US backs down, it would be a major defeat for Washington; if it engages in war, it would be a world tragedy and the US would be defeated, with global implications. He argues Iran’s stance is clear: they will respond massively to any attack, and the only viable path for the US would be to walk away and pretend it gained something it did not. Glenn notes that regional allies feel exposed as world power shifts toward multipolarity, and asks about whether Iran would treat this as an existential threat and how it would fight. Marandi responds that Iran views the objective as balkanization, supported by Israeli interests, and that Iran would confront attempts to seize control of the country. He reiterates that Iran will not compromise sovereignty or support for Palestine, and that a conflict would be devastating for the world, with Iran prepared to fight to defend its existence.

Mario asks Larry for his analysis of the likelihood of a US attack on Iran. Larry says he thinks it will happen, probably by March or sooner, and that the operation would be a cooperative intelligence effort involving the CIA, Mossad, and Britain’s MI6. He claims the Iranian regime is fighting for survival and that the December 28 currency crash was a consequence of actions initiated by US intelligence, describing it as deliberate, and comparing it to George Soros crashing the British pound to argue that unified intelligence communities could destabilize an economically weaker country. He says the protests were legitimate anger at economic mismanagement by the Pazheshkin government, not a call to overthrow the Islamic Republic, and asserts Iran’s leadership began responding immediately by removing the central banker. Mario notes a regional military buildup: USS Abraham Lincoln, F-15s, Pegasus, Stratotankers, Globemaster, and other assets moving toward the region, with Iran warning the US not to strike. He asks for analysis of the likelihood of a US strike. Larry reiterates his view that such an attack is likely by March or sooner and argues the initial plan was long in the works, a joint intelligence operation, and not a reaction to protests. He asserts the urgency was to crash Iran’s economy to incite protests and weaken the regime, and emphasizes that the cyber- and information-dominance aspect was anticipated, with Starlink terminals smuggled into Iran prior to December 28. He claims Netanyahu’s appearance at Mar-a-Lago on December 29 and discussions between Trump and Netanyahu shaped the military plan, with dissident groups acting to inflame the situation using a Maidan-like playbook of snipers and protests. Larry describes Iran’s internet shutdown on January 8-9 as a turning point that reduced protest organization and led millions to demonstrate in support of Khamenei, arguing the US briefing to Trump could not guarantee a decisive strike and therefore the operation was postponed. He says Iran now has Russia and China backing more robustly, with Russian technicians and air defenses on the ground, and China providing air defense and assisting with Starlink interdiction. He adds that Iran could shut the Strait of Hormuz if attacked, highlighting its economic stakes and the potential global impact on oil supply. Mario asks about casualty numbers from the crackdown and how credible Western reports are. Larry argues much of Western reporting has been driven by intelligence sources and cites a historical example: collaboration with the MEK starting in 2004 and into 2009, suggesting much of the western narrative around Iranian protests is propaganda. He references conversations with Iranian dissidents and an engineering professor in Brazil who argued the West’s portrayal of mass deaths does not match what he observed. He notes Mossad assets on the ground and suggests the CIA has acknowledged this in some form, and contends sanctions, while damaging to ordinary Iranians, are part of a broader US strategy. The discussion shifts to Iran’s potential internal dynamics and regional relations. Mario asks whether sanctions might eventually lead to a more conciliatory Iran, pointing to improved ties with Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Larry counters that the sanctions strategy has previously failed to deliver lasting regime change, drawing parallels to Syria’s experience and suggesting BRICS ties, including with Russia and China, would help Iran economically. He argues Iran has no desire to pro-actively attack other countries, but is prepared to respond to aggression, including potential strikes on US bases or Israel if provoked, and warns that an Israeli nuclear response could escalate the conflict. The conversation explores the idea of regime change versus coercive diplomacy. Larry notes the difficulty of removing Iran’s leadership given the IRGC’s power and the possibility that any strike could lead to broader chaos, including potential desertion or reconfiguration of alliances in the region. He mentions Reza Pahlavi as a potential opposition figure but asserts regime change remains unlikely. He discusses the role of Netanyahu, Trump, and Zionist lobbying in policy decisions, and emphasizes the broader historical pattern of US interventionism, citing past coups and regime changes in various countries. Towards Greenland, Mario references Trump’s post about a framework for the Arctic deal and a halt to tariffs, questioning the motive behind Greenland-related strategies. Larry dismisses Greenland as a distraction, noting Russia’s existing Arctic advantages and suggesting economic interests or donor benefits may be at play rather than strategic necessity. The two discuss air defense capabilities and the challenges of the US’s missile defense, contrasting Patriot systems with hypersonic threats and arguing that America’s military hardware has not kept pace with evolving threats. They contemplate the broader implications for Ukraine, Russia, and the possibility of a peace settlement, with Larry predicting a settlement favorable to Russia, including potential annexation votes in several Ukrainian oblasts. The interview ends with reflections on media manipulation, the value of independent voices, and the enduring question of Iran’s future, with Mario and Larry agreeing they hope the discussion remains speculative rather than prescriptive of imminent conflict.

In the conversation, Syed Mohammed Marandi, a professor at Tehran University and former adviser to Iran’s nuclear negotiation team, addresses multiple interwoven geopolitical issues, centering on Iran, Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, and the broader strategic rivalry with the United States and its allies. Syria and ISIS release - Marandi asserts that the Damascus regime, described as al-Qaeda/ISIS-aligned factions, would not tolerate Kurdish forces backed by the United States. He notes prior violence against Alawites, Christians, and Druze as context for the current disturbing images from Syria. - He argues the United States is not a reliable partner for its allies, pointing to past episodes such as Obama’s refusal to support Arbil when ISIS threatened the Kurdish government, and Soleimani’s rapid military response to save the city. - He states that ISIS prisoners have been released in Syria, implying that thousands of ISIS members are now free and could destabilize Syria and possibly Iraq. He emphasizes that both Jolani (an ISIS-linked figure) and the Kurdish groups in northeast Syria are allied to the United States, making it unclear who released the prisoners but suggesting that those actors are aligned with the U.S. - The broader implication is that the release increases instability in Syria and potentially across the region. Border security and spillover fears - The discussion turns to Iraq’s border with Syria, with Marandi weighing whether U.S.-backed jihadist forces might spill into Iraq or Lebanon. He suggests a likelihood that ISIS/Al-Qaeda remnants could be used to pressure Lebanon and Iraq to prevent closer Iranian influence. - He notes that Iran’s potential responses could include its missile and drone capabilities, should security worsen on a front involving its allies in Lebanon and Iraq; however, Iran currently refrains from large-scale involvement in Syria but would consider action if threats to Iran or its allies escalate. Regime change, fragmentation, and U.S.-Israel aims - The conversation shifts to Iran post-riots, with questions about U.S./Israel strategies for regime change. Marandi contends the plan is to destabilize and fragment Iran, not to establish a unified post-regime scenario. - He cites alleged Israeli and Western involvement in organizing riots as evidence of a broader conspiracy to create chaos and justify military action. He claims Mossad and other intelligence agencies were on the ground, and public statements from former CIA officials acknowledged Israeli involvement. - He describes the riot phase as highly organized, with foreign funding (including Bitcoin), online recruitment, and careful targeting of police and infrastructure. He portrays the protests as initially legitimate grievances that devolved into violent chaos fueled by external coordination, with widespread destruction and deaths, including the killing of police officers. - In contrast, he highlights large pro-government demonstrations, especially a national day of demonstrations that he says showed widespread popular support for the Islamic Republic and condemnation of rioters. He points to extensive media coverage highlighting peaceful protests, while arguing that the riot narrative dominated Western coverage. Internal Iranian dynamics and public opinion - Marandi emphasizes the fragmentation among Iranian opposition groups: MEK, monarchists, Takfiri remnants near the Pakistan border, and Kurdish separatists, all of whom he asserts lack credible popular support. - He argues that even if the regime were at risk, fragmentation would prevent any single faction from stabilizing the country post-regime change. He suggests this aligns with his view of broader Israeli aims to weaken and fragment Iran and neighboring states, as seen in Syria and Iraq. Military capability and deterrence - He asserts Iran’s substantial missile and drone capabilities and asserts that Iran could defend allies in Lebanon and Iraq if needed. He notes Iran’s long-term preparedness against U.S. threats, including underground bases and extensive drone/missile stocks. - He contends that if war occurred, it would have wide regional and global economic consequences, potentially destabilizing oil markets and prompting broader geopolitical upheaval. He argues that U.S. restraint may be influenced by the risk of a global economic meltdown. Russia, China, and Starlink - Regarding technological assistance for countering communications, he mentions rumors of Russian or Chinese involvement in aiding Iran's internet disruption and Starlink-related issues, acknowledging uncertainty but highlighting a growing trilateral closeness among Iran, Russia, and China in the face of U.S. pressure. media narratives and leadership - He criticizes Western media for portraying protests as peaceful, while Israeli claims and cyber/disinformation around the events are presented as demonstrations of foreign involvement. He maintains that internal Iranian unity—visible in large-scale demonstrations—contrasts with the portrayal of a fractured nation. - He closes by suggesting that while some European leaders may align with U.S. policies, the overall strategic outlook remains uncertain, with a warning that Trump’s approach could escalate tensions rather than yield stability.

Glenn Deeson frames the Iran war as fundamentally about regime change, noting that this regime change could entail destruction or balkanization of Iran rather than a simple replacement government. He argues that irredentist fear and existential threats would drive Iran to respond aggressively, including closing the Strait of Hormuz and attacking American bases in the region, if attacked. He emphasizes that this is about the survival of the regime and the country’s unity, suggesting that the conflict could escalate toward greater regional chaos, including potential actions around Kharg Island. On the broader geopolitical implications, Deeson discusses how four years of efforts to curb Russia failed and how European and American efforts have continued to try to sustain pressure on Russia. He explains that the Ukraine war has faced manpower and weapons shortages, and that economic strains in Europe—especially energy prices—compound the difficulty of maintaining support for prolonged conflict. He asserts that with the Iran war, there are even fewer weapons available from the US, worsening European energy and economic outlooks. He argues that Europeans’ and some policymakers’ failure to recognize Russia’s security concerns has contributed to escalatory dynamics. Regarding China, Deeson notes that China imports oil from Iran but would not welcome disruptions. He suggests that if the United States succeeds in regime-changing Iran, China would be adversely affected, whereas failure could push Iran to align more closely with Russia and China. He discusses potential shifts in global resource control and the petrodollar system, and he frames the conflict as part of a broader great-power competition where the United States seeks to preserve energy flows to allies. He highlights the possibility that successful US or Western pressure could backfire, as Iranian outcomes might push regional actors toward deeper cooperation with Russia and China. He also ties these dynamics to a broader transition from a unipolar liberal hegemon to a multipolar order, with BRICS-like groupings seeking to balance US influence. Deeson broadens the discussion to the potential death of American hegemony, arguing this would be a longer transition rather than a sudden collapse. He explains that after the Cold War the US promoted a liberal hegemonic framework with one center of power, but over time this leads other centers to balance against the US. He identifies the emergence of multipolar dynamics and institutions like BRICS as indicators of shifting power. He suggests that attempts to break China or Iran could backfire, since enemies may realign with Russia or China, and the US might eventually recalibrate to a more restrained role in Eurasia to rebuild domestic strength. He envisions a scenario where the US reduces its European and Middle Eastern footprint, potentially strengthening East Asia. On Israel’s perspective, Deeson says Israelis and Europeans similarly believe US capabilities can be leveraged to defeat adversaries, and Israel sees the opportunity to use US involvement to topple Iran and possibly Balkanize the country. He argues that this clashes with the United States’ need to prioritize its own strategic interests in a multipolar world, which would require pivoting toward East Asia and away from Europe and the Middle East. He cites strategic misalignment in Trump-era policy, noting that continuing engagement in Europe and the Middle East may divert resources from East Asia. He suggests that tolerance of prolonged conflict could exacerbate divergences between the US and Israel as American strategic priorities shift. The discussion ends with appreciation for Glenn Deeson and a plug for his channel.

Host: Welcome back. We’re joined by Larry Johnson, a former CI analyst, to discuss what looks like a war with Iran coming sooner rather than later. The world is watching as the US mobilizes more military assets to the region. How should we read this? Is this preparation for war, or a show of strength during negotiations? Larry Johnson: I hoped it was intimidation, but people I trust in national security say this is far more serious. It’s described as one of two things: either a reprise of Midnight Hammer, when US and Iran coordinated two raids into northern Iran, or they’re preparing for an Israeli attack and to back Israel. It’s not just to force concessions at the negotiating table; it’s a warning indicator. Steve Bryan, a former undersecretary of defense, reacted emotionally to US–Iran negotiations, arguing that Iran is using a rope-a-dope strategy. This pressure toward attacking Iran is enormous, and Netanyahu’s visit suggests coordination. The issue has moved beyond nuclear weapons to ballistic missiles and support for Hamas and Hezbollah. The rhetoric around Hamas and Hezbollah is, in my view, a red herring; Israeli claims don’t match the facts. Trump is under heavy pressure from the Zionist lobby to act, and I think a violence outbreak in the next two weeks is plausible, though I hope I’m wrong. Host: The debate you referenced about motives is revealing. If the goal is to destabilize or create chaos to justify action, which past interventions show that hasn’t produced sustainable stability. If the aim is negotiation leverage, what can be achieved now? It seems the US insists on tying any nuclear deal to Iran abandoning its allies and deterrence. Johnson: Iran has built a formidable arsenal: 18 types of ballistic missiles, a recently reportedly successful intercontinental ballistic missile test, five types of cruise missiles, and over 15 types of drones. They’ve learned from decades of conflict with the US and see themselves as at war with the United States. The US narrative of Iran as the aggressor clashes with historical US actions that damaged Iran’s economy and civilian life. Iran’s patience has been tested; they’ve drawn a line in the sand and are prepared to defend themselves, retaliating massively if attacked. They now have support from China and Russia, including advanced radar and air defense, with Chinese and Russian ships headed to the Arabian Sea for a joint exercise. If conflict escalates, Iran could retaliate across the region, with regional actors potentially joining in. Host: You mentioned the tactical realities of the region. The US has deployed many F-35s to the region, including land-based F-35s for SEAD. There are reports of a large US presence in Armenia, and Iran’s potential to strike Haifa or Tel Aviv if attacked. The geopolitical picture is complex, with Russia and China providing support to Iran. The US carrier fleet in the Gulf would face Iranian, Russian, and Chinese air defenses and missiles, including hypersonics. The question is whether the US can sustain a prolonged, scalable war against Iran. Johnson: The US’s sea-based strength is being tested. In the Red Sea, the US faced difficulties against the Houthis with two carriers and a robust air-defense screen; in the current scenario, Iran’s capabilities—air defenses, missiles, drones, and support from Russia and China—make a quick, decisive victory unlikely. Moreover, Israel’s own readiness for a broader war is uncertain; Netanyahu’s visit to the US could signal coordination, but Israeli media note that they may join only if Iran is on the back foot. There’s concern about intelligence reliability: Mossad assets that aided last year’s operations in Iran may be compromised, while Iran benefits from new radar and integrated air defenses. Host: Regional reactions could be pivotal. Iran has contingency plans against regional targets, and Armenia/Azerbaijan might be used as launch pads. Saudi Arabia and Qatar may sit this out if possible, while Iraq has aligned with Iran. The broader question is whether diplomacy can prevail, or whether the cycle of treating conflicts with force will continue. There’s a critique of Western policy: the idea that Iran wants to destroy the US is simplistic, and the region’s dynamics are far more nuanced. Johnson: Iran’s potential to escalate, regional dynamics, and great-power backing mean this could be more than a localized conflict. The overarching point is that there are limits to military power; politics and diplomacy remain essential, and the West’s current posture underestimates the complexity of Iran’s deterrence and regional links. Host: Thanks, Larry. I’ll link to Sonar 21 for more of your writings.

Seyed Mohamed Marandi, a professor at Tehran University and former adviser to Iran’s nuclear negotiation team, discusses the war launched against Iran, Iran’s aims, and the shifting regional dynamics. He argues that Western analyses over the years have been incorrect and that Iran’s objectives are clear: Iran will not accept a ceasefire until its demands are met, will no longer tolerate U.S. threats or Gulf regimes acting as bases against Iran, and will seek compensation from regional adversaries for destruction and slaughter attributed to the conflict. He asserts that Iran’s position and strength are growing, with widespread street support for the leader and resilience under missile and drone strikes against U.S. assets and Israel’s regime. Key points on Iran’s war aims and the conflict: - Iran’s demands: ceasefire is not an option; the war will continue until Iran’s demands are met. Iran will no longer accept a situation in which the United States can threaten it again, and will demand that Gulf regimes stop operating bases that threaten Iran. Yemen will demand and obtain full compensation for destruction. - Regional balance: Iran views the Palestinian and Lebanese causes as linked to regional resistance; Hezbollah, Yemen, Iraq, and other groups are actively undermining the regime’s regional military and political position. - Ground realities: Iran’s missiles and drones are striking U.S. assets across the Persian Gulf; Israel is being heavily targeted; resistance in Lebanon and Iraq is damaging the regime; Yemen is prepared to escalate its actions. The longer the war lasts, the more compensation Iran anticipates extracting from Gulf regimes. Escalation and tactics: - Civilian targets: Iran’s leadership says the United States has failed on the battlefield and is now targeting civilians and infrastructure, including attacks on fuel depots, desalination plants, and oil facilities, creating toxic rain and ecological harm in Iran. - Desalination and water security: destruction of desalination plants is described as a major risk to civilian water supply; Iranian civilians face environmental and health consequences from the attacks. - Economic impact and energy markets: Marandi contends that 20 million barrels of oil per day are missing from the market and that Western reserves could only offset two months; closing the Strait of Hormuz or sustained disruption could precipitate a global economic crisis and undermine the petrodollar system. - Strategic posture: Iran will respond with countermeasures, and if Gulf regimes push further against Iran, Tehran asserts it could take actions that would profoundly affect the region’s energy infrastructure and Western interests. International actors and alignment: - France and other Western allies: France has announced a defensive mission to reopen the Strait of Hormuz, while Trump has made highly contradictory statements about ending the war or destroying Iran, illustrating perceived Western moral and strategic hostility. - China and Russia: Marandi notes closer alignment among Iran, China, and Russia, with China and Russia benefiting from opposing U.S. dominance in West Asia; Iran’s geography allows multiple overland routes for weapons and supplies, and Moscow and Beijing are seen as unlikely to allow a Western victory in the region. - Azerbaijan and Turkey: Azerbaijan’s response and Turkey’s involvement are discussed; Iran emphasizes it would respond decisively against Gulf and regional actors supporting Israel if pushed. Domestic and regional reactions: - Iranian public sentiment: there is strong public support for the leadership, with mobilization and resilience evident in Tehran and across the country despite missile and drone strikes. - Perceived Western narratives: Marandi argues that Western elites have remained morally and strategically bankrupt, using demonstrable inconsistency in statements and policy to justify continued escalation. Broader implications: - The war is reshaping regional power dynamics, with Iran asserting greater confidence and influence, and with China and Russia increasingly integrated with Iran against U.S. hegemony in West Asia. - The deteriorating situation could produce far-reaching consequences for global energy markets, security arrangements in the Persian Gulf, and the dollar-centered economic order, depending on how escalation and potential reciprocal actions unfold.

The discussion centers on contrasting narratives about the U.S.-Israel confrontation with Iran and what is actually happening on the ground and inside Iran. - Speaker 0 relays the “fog of war,” noting Western media claims that the U.S. and Israel are delivering a rapid victory in Iran, with leadership and navy wiped out and the war ending soon, referencing statements by Secretary of War Pete Hegseth that the war “should not be protracted” and will wrap up “very soon.” Speaker 1 and Speaker 2 push back, asking whether the war could spiral into a longer conflict and what the timeline may be, noting top general Dan Cain’s warning that the objectives will take time and that President Trump also suggested the operation could take weeks. - The program then goes to Tehran with Professor Syed Mohammed Morandi, a geopolitical analyst at the University of Tehran. Morandi explains the succession process after the death of the Ayatollah: the constitution provides a council of three that runs the government until the leader is chosen by the council of experts, which should happen in the next few days. In the meantime, the president, the head of the judiciary, and a representative from the Guardian Council run the state. He notes the councilors are being arranged to meet from abroad to avoid being targeted. - On the ground in Tehran, Morandi counters the idea that a rapid regime change is possible, detailing that U.S. and Israeli strikes have targeted Tehran and civilian infrastructure, including a claim that the government ordered people to leave the city and that an elementary school was bombed, killing about 165 girls in Minab. He describes a situation where rescue teams are struck again at the scene. He asserts that the U.S. and Israel are striking civilian targets and that there is a pattern of double tapping at sites like Fair Doce Square. - Morandi disputes U.S. claims of destroyed leadership and navy: he says that ships of the Iranian navy are in port, there are thousands of small speed boats prepared for asymmetrical warfare, and the U.S. has not touched them. He argues that the underground bases and missiles/drones remain intact, and that senior commanders were not all killed—only a handful. He notes that Iran is firing missiles at Israel and striking U.S. targets in the Persian Gulf, and that oil facilities and tankers could be attacked if escalation continues. He warns of an energy crisis if oil facilities are destroyed and notes that the price of energy has risen. - Regarding public sentiment inside Iran, Morandi states that there are no celebrations; instead, people are mourning. He describes gatherings across the country under missile fire, with demonstrations in Tehran despite security concerns. He shares that slogans included “We are prepared to die. We won’t accept humiliation. Death to Trump, death to Netanyahu,” and that millions were seen on the streets via his Telegram channel, though many left the city due to danger. He characterizes Western media portrayal as propaganda and says the sentiment on the ground is in opposition to U.S. and Israeli actions. - The host suggests that the Iranian perspective views this as a prolonged confrontation, with Iran prepared to sustain resistance for years because the United States is “completely unreliable.” Morandi notes that while negotiations have repeatedly failed, Iran aims to compel the U.S. and Israeli regime to recognize that military assault has consequences, including economic and political costs. - The program later notes that U.S. and Israeli figures frame the conflict as epically swift, while Morandi’s account emphasizes Iran’s resilience and long-term resistance, highlighting the discrepancy between Western media narratives and on-the-ground Iranian realities.

The discussion centers on the alleged Iranian nuclear threat and the possibility of a U.S.-led or Israel-led military confrontation, with a mix of arguments about intelligence, strategy, and public appetite for war. - Recurrent warnings about Iran: The hosts note that for decades the U.S. government has warned Iran is on the brink of reconstituting a nuclear weapons program. They reference claims of “fresh intelligence” and “new evidence” of a renewed program, contrasting them with past warnings during the Obama, Trump, and Biden administrations. The tone suggests these claim cycles reappear with each new administration or set of negotiations. - Netanyahu and Iran timing: A compilation is shown of Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu stating over two decades that Iran has a nuclear program that could be imminent. One clip claims Iran could produce a weapon in a short time, with phrases like “weeks away,” “three to five years,” and even apocalyptic projections. The conversation then questions whether those warnings have come to fruition and whether media and public commentary have overstated the immediacy or impact of those claims. - Stuxnet and sanctions context: The moderator recalls that during the Bush era the U.S. launched Stuxnet against Iran’s centrifuges, and argues that Obama continued those efforts with sanctions; they portray sanctions as bipartisan pressure intended to justify claims about Iran’s nuclear ambitions. A guest mentions “demonic officials” and cites a book to underscore a harsh view of the two-term sanction era. - Diplomatic vs. military options: The panel describes the Biden administration sending negotiators to address the nuclear issue, while noting that “other options” exist. They discuss the tension between diplomacy and potential coercive measures, including the possibility of coalition or unilateral strikes. - Military balance and potential outcomes (Colonel Douglas MacGregor’s view): The guest emphasizes the complexity and risk of fighting Iran. He argues: - Iran is capable and not a “backward desert” opponent, with an arsenal including roughly 2,000 ballistic missiles and significant, varied air defenses. - Iranian forces could target U.S. bases and Israel, potentially inflicting substantial losses, though the duration and scale of any campaign are uncertain. - The aim would be to “disintegrate the state” and induce chaos rather than secure swift compliance; the scenario could produce high casualties among both sides, potentially thousands for Iran and substantial American losses, depending on scale and duration. - The long-term goal, he says, is to “make the region safe for Israel” and establish Israeli hegemony, noting the defensiveness and regional power dynamics in play, including rising concerns about Turkey as a threat. - Intelligence reliability and sources: A CIA veteran (John Kiriakou) challenges the immediacy and reliability of intelligence asserting that Iran reconstituted a nuclear program. He contends: - The Israelis and the U.S. have historically provided intelligence that may be biased toward aggressive action. - The CIA has produced intelligence estimates stating Iran did not have a nuclear weapons program; he questions whether boots-on-the-ground intelligence would confirm otherwise. - He emphasizes the risk that media outlets amplify “existential threat” narratives rooted in political calculations rather than verified evidence. - The domestic political-media dynamic: The discussion highlights perceived incentives for hawkish messaging from certain U.S. and Israeli actors, including prominent commentators who push the threat narrative. One commentator argues that the push for war serves particular political or financial interests, suggesting that public opinion in the U.S. is not aligned with an immediate military conflict. - Regional and alliance implications: The panel debates how a U.S.-led or Israeli-led strike would affect alliances, regional stability, and the global economy. They highlight: - The possibility that Iran could retaliate with volumes of missiles and unmanned systems, inflicting damage on Israel and regional targets. - The risk that a prolonged conflict could undermine NATO cohesion and Western diplomatic credibility in the Middle East and beyond. - Concerns about the effect on energy routes, particularly the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz, and broader economic ramifications. - Operational and logistical strains: They discuss the practical challenges of sustained conflict, including: - Navy and air defenses, the need for replenishment of carrier groups, and the strain on logistics and maintenance after extended deployments. - The impact of political missteps and controversial statements (such as comments linked to public pro-war stances) on alliances and military readiness. - Speculation on timing and signals: The guests speculate about when or whether a conflict might occur, noting that political leaders may face pressure “between now and March” or around certain holidays, while acknowledging uncertainty and the potential for last-minute changes. - Ending note: The conversation closes with a recognition that the set of actors—intelligence, defense officials, media, and political leaders—are collectively influencing public perception and policy directions. The speakers emphasize contrasting views on Iran’s threat, the legitimacy and consequences of potential war, and the stakes for the United States, Israel, and global stability.

The discussion centers on the view that the United States has entered into a war with Iran on behalf of Israel, with the war framed as one that could be protracted and costly in American lives. The speakers contend that this conflict will not be resolved quickly despite assurances from the administration or Israel, and they warn of immediate economic and strategic consequences, including the closing of the Strait of Hormuz and potential damage to the US economy as energy infrastructure becomes a target. Scott Ritter, a former UN weapons inspector, is cited as warning that the US and Israel cannot win against Iran and that Iran is prepared for years of conflict. He is cited as recalling his testimony about Iraq’s supposed weapons of mass destruction and arguing that the pretext for the current war—Iran’s alleged uranium enrichment to build nuclear weapons—lacks supporting evidence from the CIA and the DNI. Ritter is described as asserting that the war will not be short and that the United States will face a drawn-out confrontation. Speaker 1 adds that the conflict is regional and will have consequences for the American public, noting the closure of the Strait of Hormuz as unprecedented and signaling an economic phase to the conflict. The claim is made that Iran has not experienced a popular uprising against its government; rather, there are rallies in support of the government. The war plan, initially predicated on a decapitation strategy, is described as having gone awry from the start, with the Joint Chiefs of Staff reportedly telling the president that there are insufficient resources to win, yet the campaign proceeded. The proximity of the initial strikes to a “decapitation” objective is emphasized, and the assertion is made that the war is already lost due to resource constraints and misalignment of the plan. Speaker 0 references an operation named “lion’s roar” by the Israeli Air Force, describing it as the largest sortie in Israeli history with 200 jets and 500 targets, calling it the genesis of the opening strike. The expectation discussed is that the initial phase could involve using less advanced weapons to overwhelm air defenses, while Iran claims to possess capabilities not yet demonstrated publicly. Over the next 24 to 96 hours, the speakers anticipate continuous strikes aimed at regime change, destruction of air defenses, and suppression of ballistic missile launches, including production capacity near Tehran. The discussion suggests that Iran has prepared extensive dispersal of targets (creating thousands of additional targets) and that Iranian forces are likely to relocate to avoid interdiction, complicating intelligence and targeting efforts for Israel and the United States. A key conclusion asserted by the speakers is that the conflict represents a war of choice, and they describe it as an illegal war of aggression contravening the U.S. Constitution and the United Nations Charter. They argue that Iran will respond forcefully and that the United States and Israel will face escalating resistance, with Iran viewed as likely to gain the upper hand and to pursue a diplomatic settlement favorable to Iranian objectives, including non-nuclear goals. The expectation is that Russia and China will push for a diplomatic resolution that aligns with Iran’s terms, particularly in avoiding a nuclear outcome.

The conversation centers on Iran, potential U.S. action, and the wider strategic spillovers across the Middle East and beyond. The speakers discuss what prompted a delay in striking Iran, the likelihood of a broader attack, and how regional and great-power dynamics might unfold. - On why a strike against Iran was postponed, the consensus from the guest is that Netanyahu asked for more time to prepare for defending against Iranian missiles and to enable a larger attack footprint. The guest also cites public statements by U.S. figures supporting a bigger operation: Lindsey Graham emphatically said last Friday that the delay was so we can go bigger; General Jack Keane stated that military operations would target political and military leaders and destroy their military infrastructure to take the regime out. The guest emphasizes that the most likely scenario is an expanded target set and greater combat power in the region to defend bases and improve the attack’s effectiveness, rather than a symbolic strike. - Regarding whether Russia or China would become involved, the guest doubts active involvement by either country, but suggests indirect support or intelligence help could occur. The logic is that direct involvement would be costly for these powers, though they might assist Iran indirectly. - On the readiness and capability of Iran, the guest argues Iran is now far more prepared than in the twelve-day war. They note that insiders were purged after the prior conflict, defenses were strengthened, and missile production likely accelerated since June, with production areas shielded from prior attacks. Iran’s ability to respond quickly and with significant damage is viewed as higher, and the guest warns that if Iran experiences an existential threat, it could abandon restraint and retaliate in a way that makes a broader war more likely. - The discussion covers U.S. bases in the region, where the guest concedes that the U.S. air defense is not at the level of Israel’s Iron Dome and David Sling, THAAD, and other integrated systems. Some bases lack robust defense against ballistic missiles, drones, and other threats, and, while 30,000 U.S. troops remain in the area, the overall air-defense capability is described as insufficient to stop all Iranian missiles. - Would Iran strike Gulf nations directly to pressure them to push the U.S. to end the war? The guest says not likely, arguing that Iranian leadership has signaled a preference for good relations with Gulf states and that attacking Gulf bases or cities would create more enemies and complicate Iran’s strategic posture. - A decapitation strike targeting leadership is considered plausible by some but deemed risky. The guest notes Iran has continuity of government plans and could designate successors; even if leadership is removed, a power vacuum could ignite internal fighting. The possibility of an existential attack by Iran—coupled with a broader regional war—could be catastrophic and is something to avoid. - The discussion turns to Lebanon, Hezbollah, the Houthis, Hamas, and the broader spillover risk. The guest suggests that if Iran’s retaliation is strong and Hamas or Hezbollah see an opportunity, there could be escalations, including potential involvement by Turkey. However, Iran would likely avoid opening new fronts that would diffuse its capability to strike U.S. bases in the region. - The problem of Iran’s internal diversity is highlighted: Persians, Azeris, Kurds, Lurs, Arabs, Baluchs, and Turkmen, among others, complicate any post-regime-change scenario. The guest argues Iran could fragment, but emphasizes that a successful Western-backed regime change could still lead to civil strife rather than a stable replacement, warning of a “textbook failed regime change” akin to past Middle East interventions. - On NATO and Western unity, the guest asserts NATO is dead or in deep trouble, citing European leaders who doubt U.S. stability and reliability. He notes European politicians discuss building an autonomous European security architecture, implying growing European reluctance to rely on U.S. leadership for defense. - Greenland as a strategic issue: the guest argues there is no rational military need for Greenland for security, and that the notion of occupying or militarizing Greenland is driven more by Trump’s personal preferences than strategic necessity. He points out that even if Greenland were militarized, Russia and China would have little to gain, given logistical and strategic barriers. - Finally, the future trajectory: the guest predicts Iran will likely be pressed hard in a large strike but warns that the consequences could be severe, including regional destabilization, potential civil conflict inside Iran, and long-term strategic costs for the U.S. and its European partners. He suggests that as long as the U.S. overextends itself in multiple theaters (Iran, Greenland, Ukraine, Venezuela), global stability and the U.S. economic footing could be endangered. The guest closes by highlighting the uncertainty of Trump’s next moves, citing possible abrupt shifts and cognitive concerns that could influence decisions in unpredictable ways.

Scott Ritter argues that indicators suggest a major US military action against Iran is being prepared, with US naval forces and air power in the region and discussions of precision strikes against Iranian officials. He assessment that the move toward war seems likely, noting Iran’s capabilities to retaliate in multiple devastating ways: Iran can terminate regional energy production at will and inflict horrific harm on American bases, potentially killing hundreds or thousands of American service members; Iran could also deliver near-lethal damage to Israel. He warns that the US could suffer losses of ships, including an aircraft carrier. Israel reportedly has told the US it is prepared to absorb up to 700 Iranian ballistic missiles if the US ensures removal of the Iranian regime from power. Ritter contends the US lacks the means to remove Iran’s military and civilian leadership from power, especially after telegraphing a strike. He recalls the 2006 or 2008-style dynamic where Iran would respond forcefully if attacked, including a possible knockout strike against Israel with long-term consequences for regional energy security and the global economy. He discusses Iran’s preparedness, including underground command posts and buried enrichment capabilities (citing Ferdow as an example) and the likelihood that Iran has continuity plans that would withstand decapitation attempts. He asserts Iran would respond by disrupting energy and possibly Hormuz, with a broad, existential resilience against disruption. On the objective of potential operations, Ritter believes the aim would be to destroy Iran’s national-level command and control, suppress regional security institutions, and enable uprisings in various regions (Balochistan, Arab regions, Azeris, MEK-supported factions). He notes the CIA-backed groups and a possible attempt to resurrect a monarchy, suggesting Trump may have been influenced by expatriate anti-regime voices. He says Iran is prepared for such moves, including networks in Northern Iraq, Kurdish forces, and other regional proxies, and anticipates a surge of paramilitary activity, assassination campaigns, and widespread sabotage to create chaos and fracture the country. Ritter asserts that Russia and China would resist a US-Israeli strike against Iran. Russia has strategic ties with Iran and could push for Iranian retaliation against US assets, including the possibility of shooting down US B-2 bombers to humiliate American military superiority. He argues that Moscow and Beijing would support Iran to blunt US actions, including potential disruptions of US naval power or shipping. Regarding a possible off-ramp, Ritter suggests that an off-ramp would require the US to claim it forced concessions and to double down on sanctions, avoiding another large-scale strike. He cites that a “deal” from Trump would resemble a gangland arrangement rather than a treaty, warning that Iran should seek a comprehensive treaty based on international law rather than a high-pressure bargain. He contends Iran should avoid preemptive strikes that might invite nuclear retaliation, though he believes Iran could justify self-defense under UN Article 51 if threatened imminently. In closing, Ritter states that the situation is dangerous, with surveillance and reconnaissance ongoing, and notes that while war seems likely, an off-ramp could still be presented through sanctions and political messaging rather than immediate military action. He acknowledges the tension and pressures on both sides, and offers a cautious, war-weary perspective.

Glenn: Welcome back. We’re joined again by Seyyed Mohamed Marandi, a professor at Tehran University and a former adviser to Iran’s nuclear negotiation team. There’s talk in the US of seizing Kharg Island, which would handle 80–90% of Iran’s oil shipments, effectively a nuclear option to shut down Iran’s economy. What would be Iran’s likely response if the US pursued this path? Marandi: It would be a major problem to access the island because the US would have to fly over Arab regimes in the Persian Gulf. Iran would retaliate if Iranian territory were occupied, taking the war toward a major escalation. The regimes hosting the island would have to pay a heavy price, far greater than now. For the United States, the island is well protected, with Iranian assets on the shore supporting the islanders, and it’s farther from the US Navy and closer to Iran’s shore. But more importantly, such an aggression would be futile: it would not change the Persian Gulf trade through Hormuz, which Iran has effectively controlled by requiring permission to pass. An invasion or occupation would lead to fierce combat and punishment of the regimes that enabled it—Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, the Emirates, Bahrain, Qatar—desert-based states with oil and gas but little water. If the US succeeds in taking the island, Iran’s retaliation would involve destroying assets of the cooperating countries. Long-term, Hormuz could be effectively closed, with upstream infrastructure damaged and no oil or gas able to move, making a later reopening contingent on a peace agreement. The operation would be logistically, militarily, and economically disastrous for global markets. Glenn: There are reports Iran is mining Hormuz. Do you know anything about that operation? Marandi: Iran hasn’t mined Hormuz, the Persian Gulf, or the Indian Ocean. The Iranian navy capable of wartime actions is largely in underground tunnels and includes speedboats, surface-to-sea missiles, and a network of underground bases. Iran has not moved to mine the Gulf. It does not want escalation. Iran has always negotiated; US claims that Iran wanted nuclear weapons at the negotiating table are rejected by Iran, the fatwa, and IAEA history. If negotiations had failed, the US invasion would be unjustified. Doha and Qatar are prepared to restart gas facilities and allow oil to flow if peace returns. If the US escalates to destroy key infrastructure, Iran will retaliate, and Iran can hurt US assets and its proxies more than the US can hurt Iran, with long-term global energy consequences. Iran has been striking bases in the region and says it is prepared to continue until after the midterm elections. Glenn: The US energy secretary says the US Navy is studying options to escort tankers through Hormuz. What are the main challenges? Marandi: It would be virtually impossible. Iran’s navy is largely underground, with mines, surface-to-sea missiles, and drones capable of targeting Hormuz from Iran. If open war begins, Iran would retaliate against regimes hosting US bases. Even if Hormuz were opened temporarily, without oil, gas, tankers, or production, there would be no purpose, and energy prices would spike permanently. The US would likely be forced to accept Iran’s terms for peace to allow oil to flow. Glenn: Trump has spoken of further destruction if needed, but says he’s run out of targets. What do you expect from the American side? Marandi: The US is already targeting nonmilitary sites and civilian targets in Iran. They slaughter civilians, including families and children, with premeditation. They could intensify attacks on oil, gas, electricity infrastructure, which would invite Iran to retaliate. Iran’s society is united, with people on the streets despite the bombardments. If the US destroys infrastructure, Iran would respond, but Iran does not want escalation; it would be catastrophic for the global economy. The media in the West is controlled, and there is little outrage at threats to destroy Iran. Glenn: Israeli and American aims now—what’s at stake, and how end this? Marandi: Since the Gaza genocide and Lebanon escalation, Zionism is increasingly viewed as evil, and public opinion against Zionism is growing in the US. The destruction of Israel’s credibility is the greatest defeat, not battlefield losses. End this war now would be prudent; as Iran strikes back, global sympathy for Iran grows and the empire weakens. If Israel were to use a nuclear weapon, that would be catastrophic and could prompt broader proliferation. Glenn: Any chance Iran could retaliate against Britain or European states? Marandi: Europe and the US will have diminished presence in the region; bases would be forced to leave. He notes the possibility of false-flag attacks in the West and asserts Zionist manipulation as a risk, but emphasizes Iran’s determination to defend sovereignty and support for Palestinians and others. Glenn: Just a final note—Iran had three negotiations, not two, including the JCPOA. Thank you for joining. Marandi: Thank you.