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- The video argues that the ceasefire in the Iran conflict is collapsing and predicts a renewed crisis in three days, citing Professor Robert Pape who predicted “three days left” for a developing disaster. The Strait of Hormuz is described as never having truly opened, with ongoing restrictions and navigation dangers. - The presenters criticize mainstream reports that markets were surging and that the Strait was open, asserting these were lies. They claim Iran is signaling through radio to ships and that ships, including those linked to the United States and Israel, remain barred or require special coordination with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. They note continued mine risks flagged by the U.S. Navy and that several vessels attempted to pass on Friday but turned back. - They quote a statement that a deal would be announced and a supposed opening would be conditional and unstable, and they reference Trump aboard Air Force One admitting that bombs would likely start falling again if no deal is reached by Wednesday when the ceasefire ends. - A discussion of purported market manipulation follows: Reuters reportedly stated that about twenty minutes before an announcement that Hormuz was open, traders dumped nearly 8,000 Brent crude futures, a $760 million bet that oil would fall. After the president’s announcement, crude prices dropped sharply. The presenters claim someone in the Trump administration likely knew the announcement in advance, suggesting insider trading and a broader pattern of insiders making large bets just before news hits. - On Saturday, the narrative of “open passage” collapsed publicly: Britain’s foreign secretary said there was still no normal passage; Iran’s Revolutionary Guard officials said only a limited number of tankers would pass and that Hormuz would remain under strict Iranian control, allowing certain nations but not the U.S. They note the U.S. did not ensure full freedom of navigation for Iranian-linked shipping, and that at least two merchant ships, including two Indian-flagged vessels, were hit while attempting to cross. - Iran’s side is cited: a professor on the show claimed Trump lied and fabricated the whole situation, suggesting that Iran did not agree to the commitments Trump claimed. The blockade by the U.S. is described as ongoing, with over 10,000 U.S. personnel and multiple ships involved, and U.S. officials reportedly planning to board and seize Iranian-linked tankers in international waters with gunships. - An Iranian general is quoted as warning that if the war restarts, it could become a wider world war. Professor Pape’s warning is emphasized: within ten days, shortages could occur, moving from price shocks to physical constraints to economic disaster, with today’s date cited as April 19 and the three-day forecast implying disaster around April 22. The Financial Times is cited for a story about a coming global food crisis due to the war. The Strait’s lack of genuine normalization is claimed to threaten fuel, plastics, fertilizer, supply chains, food prices, and manufacturing, potentially impacting every family. - The video ends with a warning to prepare with food stores and family protection, reiterating that the Strait was never truly opened and that a market fairy tale was fed to investors. It suggests a new escalation could occur in the coming week, with those who lied on Friday potentially denying responsibility. - Sponsorship segment: The video promotes US Gold Mining Incorporated (ticker USGO) and the Whistler project in Alaska, detailing a positive preliminary economic assessment (PEA) projecting 2.7 million ounces of gold, nearly 600 million pounds of copper, and nearly 6.6 million ounces of silver over about a 15-year mine life. It notes a potential life-of-m mine of about 3.6 million gold-equivalent ounces, with payback estimates varying based on gold pricing. The sponsor highlights favorable tailwinds from Washington, Alaska’s mining-supportive policies, and a tight ownership structure (roughly 74% held by the parent company and 4.5% by insiders). The presenter urges viewers to conduct their own research using links in the description and highlights exploration targets and political support for domestic mineral production.

A discussion centers on multiple fast-developing conflict events and escalating regional tensions. In Monaco, three people were injured in an explosion described by commentators as a “terror attack” despite not being confirmed, with new details emerging as information comes out. The victims were reported to be of Russian and Ukrainian national origin, and the exchange later includes showing images of a suspected attacker found on video/footage after the Monaco incident. The conversation then broadens to Israel’s stated retaliatory posture and its regional scope. Defense Minister Katz is cited saying that, within the last 12 hours, attacks involved Syria and “Sass in Monaco,” while Israel framed its actions in Syria as responding to an attack by Syrian militants. Katz is also quoted asserting that if Iran attacks Israel with ballistic missiles in response to Lebanon actions, the IDF will respond and is preparing to operate independently, saying Israel has targets to strike in Iran even without American support, while also suggesting the scenario would be a “third war.” Katz further claims there is an Israeli intent to occupy Lebanese territories and not withdraw “a millimeter” until Hezbollah disarms, and states there is no intent to withdraw from areas occupied over the last three years, including Syria, Gaza, and Lebanon. On Lebanon and weapons use, the discussion describes prior comments about Hezbollah-linked systems and HMX-related long-range precision munition development, with Israel allegedly trying to disrupt depots storing HMX while Hezbollah maintains an arsenal. The speakers argue that Israel’s actions are part of a “Gaza model,” aiming to make populated areas of southern Lebanon uninhabitable and to create a security cordon/no-man’s-land, forcing displacement and using Hezbollah munitions as part of that objective. A major thematic question is whether the conflict is shifting from direct warfare to proxy warfare. The speakers describe proxy escalation as an “escalation” step: whenever direct de-escalation is not possible, indirect conflict expands through decentralized activation of militias and strikes across Syria, Lebanon, and Gaza. Yemen mobilization and militia activation are referenced alongside strikes in multiple territories. One speaker discusses the idea of arming Kurdish forces in northern Iraq and sending them toward Iran, comparing it to a “Bay of Pigs”-style operation, and claims there is a pattern of weapons and money being handled and redistributed in ways that may make outcomes worse rather than better. They also suggest proxy escalation could eventually merge into a more direct escalation. Regarding diplomacy and negotiations, Katz’s remarks are framed alongside a broader critique that events on the ground make deals unlikely. The conversation references the UAE response to Syria, saying the UAE condemned the incident. It also discusses Lebanon’s involvement in a MOU and speculation about how and whether Iran influenced negotiations or benefited from Israel holding territory, arguing that maintaining conflict helps justify Hezbollah’s continued role. Lebanese domestic dynamics are described: some factions in Lebanon reportedly blame Hezbollah for attacks initiated without government approval, pointing to Lebanon’s large-scale destruction and economic collapse since October 7. The Strait of Hormuz becomes another focal point, with claims that traffic is down and that the US and Iran dispute who controls navigation. The discussion cites an Omani-Iranian committee meeting and statements from an Israeli official that the leverage over the strait is changing. There are also images described of ships with fortified machine gun positions traversing the strait. Iran’s president is mentioned regarding $6 billion of frozen assets in Qatar being released, and statements about Iran’s nuclear activity being “proportionate” to needs. Defense capabilities are also covered: Katz is quoted claiming Israel is developing space-based laser weapons and calling the project a strategic priority, asserting no country has the ability to mount attacks in space and that Israel must lead in the capability. As the conversation turns toward Gaza and ceasefire politics, Hamas and other Palestinian factions are described as preparing a response involving partial rejection of a ceasefire proposal connected to Nikolai Mladenov. The discussion predicts further bloodletting near-term and suggests long-term outcomes could include major geopolitical changes where Israel declines and Palestine’s status could evolve, potentially toward a one-state scenario, framed as a structural outcome of continued escalation. The exchange ends with an emphasis on the idea that both direct and proxy conflict patterns persist, uncertainty about deals, and continued calls for the United States to reduce its military involvement in the region, followed by a closing conversation about public figures and politics, then the show transitions toward future interviews.

The conversation discusses how vague commitments in the Iran-related MoU and regional agreements are being contested amid renewed fighting around the Strait of Hormuz, where ships are struck on the Omani side and the U.S. retaliates when Iran does so. The guests argue that the MoU’s language is not meant to be applied word-by-word because it was designed to remain vague to allow time for specifics. Instead, they frame the situation as a practical contest over control: Iran does not want the Omani side of the Strait to return to open “freedom of navigation” as before, while the U.S. does not want a new status quo that is controlled by Iran. The repeated kinetic exchanges are described as part of diplomacy rather than its opposite. One speaker argues the MoU functions as an invitation to talk, not as a system with an enforceable international-law mechanism, noting there is no judge empowered to determine whether either party violated it. He characterizes the current environment as Hobbesian after the Persian Gulf system was broken by the U.S. and Israel, with Iran believing it must retain control over the strait for its ongoing existence and viewing diplomacy as “war by other means.” He adds that Iran’s leadership sees the U.S. and Israel as dedicated to their destruction, so even when bombing stops temporarily, the strategic goal of deterrence through control of the strait remains. The discussion turns to why Iran wants operational and administrative control over day-to-day maritime traffic rather than just military capability. The speaker says Iran’s power includes the ability to shut down traffic kinetically via missiles and drones, especially given the effect on international insurance markets. However, Iran also wants ships to coordinate with the relevant authority (PGSA) because it is easier than repeatedly bombing ships. He emphasizes that Iran wants to demonstrate to Gulf states and others that transit occurs only by Iranian “sufferance,” not merely that Iran can close the strait at will. He also argues that this is not primarily about money now because there could be a period with no tolls or service fees, but about full operational control. He references a Bloomberg report quoting Oman telling European officials there is no way to return to the pre-war status quo, with possible fees for services such as depolluting the strait or helping ships navigate, and he contrasts this with the uncertainty around whether fees are obligatory. The other speaker asks why the U.S. strikes Iran every time Iran strikes ships, including whether it aims to degrade Iran’s ability to control the strait (such as destroying radars and fast attack boats) or whether it is trying to dissuade Iran from seeking control. The response is that the U.S. cannot keep the strait open by military means alone and that the U.S. is improvising rather than executing a fully thought-out strategy. He argues the U.S. is trying to preclude an Iranian-controlled outcome without conceding prematurely, noting Iran is reconstituting coastal capabilities quickly. On Lebanon, the conversation explains that both the Iranian MoU and a separate Lebanon agreement relate to Hezbollah, yet Hezbollah is not a signatory to either. One speaker says the Lebanese agreement is essentially a sop offered to the U.S. to show cooperation, but that it will not change the underlying dynamic: the Lebanese armed forces cannot disarm Hezbollah, Hezbollah will not disarm unilaterally, and Israel will not withdraw from southern Lebanon while Hezbollah is there. He argues Lebanon is therefore stuck with a state-within-a-state problem unless Hezbollah control changes, and he links the broader instability to Israel’s trauma after October 7th and its belief that threats must be eliminated—an approach he suggests Israel is still learning cannot work as hoped. The speakers also discuss Hezbollah’s role as Iran’s “extended defense” and describe Hezbollah as currently weaker than before but still essential for Iran’s forward-defense strategy. They argue Iran will not back down on the strait and Hezbollah, and also will not give up indigenous enrichment, though enrichment might be suspended while retaining certain capabilities. They discuss a possible long-term normalization pathway: gradually lifting sanctions and unfrozen assets over years could make it harder to revert to isolation later, which they frame as a hypothetical deal structure that could involve Lebanese military rearmament as a deterrent against Israel. The counterpoint is that Iran views global economic integration as U.S.-controlled, and that the leadership prefers “reigning in hell” rather than serving in “heaven,” with Iran also profiting under sanctions conditions. Towards broader regional dynamics, the conversation argues the Persian Gulf system must find a new normal after being broken. It predicts the U.S. will be less important in the Gulf than before, GCC states will adjust, and Iran’s post-war condition could make it more dangerous because it is weaker and more militarized under IRGC elites. It adds that transitional periods are dangerous and notes the U.S.’s stated shift in focus toward China, alongside the idea that earlier military commitments have wasted armaments that take years to reconstitute. The conversation closes by tying conflicts back to narratives and myths, arguing that the Israeli-Palestinian issue underpins multiple actors’ positions and that different groups use it as a vehicle for broader nationalistic or ideological goals. The final question addresses heated rhetoric between Turkey and Israel, concluding that while it can be political and domestic-support driven, it reflects deeper strategic interest clashes and is concerning.

The speaker says the war with Iran is “back on” after renewed bombings. They claim the sequence began when the U.S. was trying to guide tankers and ships through the southern portion of the Strait of Hormuz, an area Iran “doesn’t want ships to use” near the Omani shoreline. The speaker states Iran has asserted control over traffic through the Strait of Hormuz and has granted safe passage through a “Northern Channel” closer to the Iranian border. They say this relates to Iran’s territorial waters out to about 11 nautical miles from shore, and that the U.S. preferred not to use the northern route because it would require paying fees to Iran. The speaker claims that as three to five tankers sailed through the southern portion, the IRGC warned them to turn around and stop, but they did not, and the ships were “struck by drones,” with some “set on fire” and “kinetically attacked.” The speaker then says the United States bombed Iran in response, citing CENTCOM, which they state reported striking 80 targets. They say CENTCOM stated U.S. forces struck Iranian air defense systems and coastal radar sites, anti-ship missile capabilities, and small boats. The speaker questions the presence of small boats, referencing a claim that Iran’s Navy had already been destroyed. Next, the speaker says Iran has begun retaliatory strikes against U.S. forces, firing anti-ship cruise missiles and drones at U.S. Navy warships in the Sea of Oman. The speaker adds that Iran is asserting it will “assert control over the Strait of Hormuz.” They cite Professor Robert Pape (University of Chicago) saying: “trump is playing with nationalist fire by striking civilian targets in iran with millions demanding revenge at the supreme leader's funeral,” and also: “Trump just handed the regime a clear trigger for major retaliation. The entire world economy is now at risk.” The speaker also references political commentary from Marjorie Taylor Greene about “bombing Iran during the ceasefire” and says the war is “not a war.” They further mention Pete Hegseth (as referenced by the speaker), and that Marco Rubio is described as saying the U.S. would not allow Iran to control the Strait of Hormuz or charge a toll. The speaker turns to energy markets, stating that oil is spiking again and that a supply shock they have warned about will “kick in in a very harsh manner,” leading to “motor oil shortages,” “diesel shortages,” and higher prices for gasoline, diesel, and “jet fuel” by less than one month, accelerating into September and October. They link the worsening energy situation to escalation in conflicts and to attacks on infrastructure, claiming Ukrainian drone attacks hit multiple Russian oil tankers. They also claim that oil refining and refined product output are suffering “both out of Russia and also out of… the Middle East,” and that this is “engineered” to create a global energy crisis. They say the Strategic Petroleum Reserve is at its lowest level since the 1980s. They also claim the U.S. revoked a sanctions waiver/license that allowed Iran to sell oil through roughly the end of August, stating: “the MOU is dead,” and that Iran’s oil will not contribute to Western supply because sanctions are back on. The speaker predicts additional choke-point escalation, asserting “closure of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait” could come next. They also mention Iran ballistic missiles striking U.S. military bases in Bahrain “apparently,” and conclude that fuel costs, food prices, fertilizer impacts, and supply-chain problems will intensify. They say fertilizer shortages for the fall planting season will lead to “increased famine in 2027,” and that “many items” could become unaffordable in the U.S. Finally, they predict U.S. economic and geopolitical consequences, including spillover into U.S. treasury markets if Japan sells treasuries to buy oil or gas, and they claim this could lead to a U.S. invasion of Iran. They state the IRGC says the U.S. will not be allowed to interfere in the Strait of Hormuz and argue that Iran will hold control until the West cannot handle energy “strangulation.”

The discussion begins with the plan for an economic interview—covering the economy, the price of gold, oil prices, and why oil dropped quickly—then shifts to a fast-changing Middle East situation involving Iran, the U.S., and shipping through the Strait of Hormuz. The host says Iran “had a bad day” after striking a ship and that Trump posted about it calmly; the next day the U.S. bombs Iran. During the same time period, the Lebanese government reportedly makes a separate deal with Israel, and Iran later strikes additional ships. The host describes Iran’s responses as limited at first—such as drones against Bahrain—and then continues today, suggesting Iran is trying to assert control over shipping chokepoints. The host summarizes a power struggle over who controls the Strait of Hormuz: the U.S. convinces Oman to open a corridor; Oman does; Iran becomes upset; and the host links Iran’s ship strikes to that sequence. He also notes a massive drop in the number of ships going through the strait and says this could affect markets. Chris (the economist/analyst) discusses reports about the ships being struck: a “super max” large VLCC crude carrier reportedly is on fire after being hit, and earlier it was said Iran struck a container ship with a likely drone, possibly only a “light tap.” He explains a “disconnect” between a memorandum of understanding (MOU) that Iran says allows reasonable openness for 60 days with conditions, and the U.S. position that the strait must be completely open immediately with no restrictions. He asks who will “blink,” and then focuses on the U.S. Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) as a “ticking clock.” Chris estimates a minimum threshold mentioned as 243 million barrels remaining. With 331 million barrels currently, that leaves 88 million barrels to go. He accounts for an additional rule to leave 10% in reserve (total capacity 713 million), subtracting about 71 million barrels from drawdown, yielding roughly two weeks at current drawdown rates (about 9 million barrels per week). If there is no strict minimum floor, he says the timeline could extend toward October 4th—stating possible drawdown windows between two and 14 weeks depending on assumptions. He adds that drawdown rates are currently around 1.3–1.4 million barrels, and he says the next weekly report will show whether it is slowing, with fewer bids for released oil. He argues that Iran can “wait,” because Iran’s leverage depends on missing barrels emerging from the strait while pressure builds on the U.S. The host pivots back to oil pricing and Trump’s incentives. He argues that oil’s collapse gives Trump “breathing room” to take more risks, since when oil is higher Trump prefers de-escalation, while below certain price levels he has more leeway. He asks why oil is at this level, emphasizing the “elephant in the room” of China: whether China reduced demand through strategic reserves, why China still is not buying up oil at cheap prices, and what happened after the Trump-Xi meeting. Chris responds that China did not reduce domestic demand; it reduced imports. He says Chinese stockpiles likely persisted and that inventory is effectively state-linked. He states that China took imports down by 4.4 million barrels per day in the last month. He ties this reduction to political trade dynamics, saying Trump traveled with corporate dignitaries and that “quid pro quo” must have occurred. The host suggests the “something to do with Taiwan,” noting the U.S. suspended arms sales to Taiwan about a week after the trade delegation, which Chris links to the earlier import reduction. Chris then shifts to market structure, stating that Western spot markets reflect “paper markets,” and that participants with deep pockets can drive down commodities using short positions. He describes managed money becoming “the most bearish” on oil ever, citing about $19 billion in shorts on Brent contracts versus a normal range of two to five. He adds that the U.S. oil ETF USO is allegedly dominated by short positions—93% of outstanding float, likened to “GameStop level short.” He asks who is doing the shorting and argues that the “question arises, how do you get max bearish oil” despite supply deficits and declining inventories that normally should push prices higher. He claims that demand at the pump is not down and that supplies are still “missing eight, nine million barrels a day,” with a “flush” from the Gulf being a one-time factor. He also claims tankers leaving are “beelining for china,” “mostly Iranian oil,” and says that despite these pressures, oil prices are collapsing, implying an unraveling risk if the suppression persists. The host and Chris discuss what Iran might infer from falling oil prices while the strait remains open in periods and ships continue to be struck. They speculate Iran may hold off to see whether the suppression will weaken the U.S. through depleted reserves, and they consider the possibility of Iran encouraging escalation by testing U.S. limits. Chris says it would be “silly” for the U.S. to drain reserves without an exit plan, but if reserves are drained and the strait closes, U.S. markets would be badly affected. Jeff Curry is mentioned as also looking at the China question: Curry believes China may be using undisclosed reserves and asks why imports do not spike at lower prices if reserves are being used. To frame manipulation, Chris compares oil price suppression risks to the 1969 London gold pool, where governments coordinated selling from reserves when gold rose to keep gold down. He contrasts gold’s durability with oil’s economic necessity and lack of easy substitution, saying shortages would trigger triage and rationing, with retail hardest hit first. He argues that manipulation that “denies reality” is particularly dangerous for oil. The conversation then broadens to other financial and geopolitical themes. The host claims the pattern of Western “values” being attacked aligns with broader changes (mass immigration, border issues, and debates about gender and mandates). Chris connects this to an idea of coordinated deconstruction and says energy shocks can destabilize nations. They discuss the WEF and “great reset” concepts, and Chris says debt levels are at a point that makes repayment unlikely, implying inflation, default, or other outcomes. He describes a “puzzle piece” he cannot explain and says tweets and escalation decisions by Trump do not make sense to him without assuming Trump “walks away.” They return to energy markets and the unknown role of China, describing China as “so quiet” and claiming this is inconsistent with China being heavily impacted. They also mention a scenario in which Russia stops exporting to Europe, which they say could be significant. Toward the end, they shift into commodities and monetary themes: Chris mentions gold price bets and says the Fed’s printing is driving parts of markets. He claims the U.S. government is running large deficits and that Fed balance sheet expansion and interest payments act similarly to stimulus. He says the broader commodities complex is under pressure (copper, wheat, corn) and warns that shortages can be structural when mines are not opened. He describes copper as structurally short—requiring many new mines annually to keep up—yet mines are not opening because paper prices stay below replacement costs. He similarly discusses silver as a structural shortfall commodity, largely consumed and hard to substitute, and says silver supply is concentrated as a byproduct of other mining. The episode ends with the host thanking Chris and saying he will digest the conversation, while encouraging viewers to share thoughts in comments.

Stanislav (Speaker 1) and Speaker 0 engage in a wide-ranging, combative analysis of the Iran-Israel-U.S. conflict and broader geopolitical implications. Key points and claims are as follows: - On Iran’s military activity: The volume of Iranian drone and rocket attacks has dropped by about 95% in the last few days, but Iran’s strategic goals appear to be advancing. The Strait of Hormuz remains closed, and Iran has not fallen from power, suggesting a durable regime in Iran despite reduced attack tempo. Israel is said to be taking a pounding with strikes on Haifa refinery, electrical plants, and other targets, while Iran is pursuing a long-haul campaign rather than a rapid blitz. - Terminology and legitimacy: Stanislav objects to labeling Iran’s leadership as a “regime,” arguing it’s a derogatory term and positing that the regime is a theocracy that is comparatively stable under pressure. He notes that air campaigns have never toppled governments and argues that people rally around governments when their families are being harmed, especially within Shia culture. - Information and truth in war: Both sides are accused of misrepresenting losses and capabilities; the Pentagon’s numbers on drones and rockets are treated with skepticism. There is emphasis on the difficulty of verifying battle damage in real time, and the reality that “the first sacrifice of any war is truth” in war reporting. - Military capabilities and constraints: Stanislav emphasizes that the U.S. and Israel have suffered damage to critical infrastructure, and the U.S. faces munitions shortages. He cites the first six days of conflict as consuming thousands of missiles (3,600 missiles across defensive and offensive systems). He argues U.S. industrial/munitions capacity is strained, with missiles being produced in small quantities and largely by hand, constraining rapid replacement. - Iran’s defense and offense: Iran is portrayed as possessing underground “missile cities” and being able to move and launch missiles from concealed locations. The use of decoy aircraft and other decoys is noted, complicating target acquisition. Iran is described as capable of sustaining a long campaign, with continued missile production and hidden launch capability, including launchers that can be moved and re-deployed quickly. - Sensor/shooter network: The discussion mentions a new U.S.-reported capability described as a “sensor shooter network” that uses satellites to spot a missile launcher as it emerges, relaying coordinates to fighters such as F-35s to intercept before launch. This is framed as making missile launches harder for Iran and easier to strike launchers for Israel and the U.S. - Strait of Hormuz as the central objective: The primary objective for Iran, per Speaker 0, is to close the Strait of Hormuz for as long as possible and disrupt Gulf states, with closing the strait potentially forcing an American exit due to economic pressure. Attacks that target Israel are framed as secondary (“bonus”) relative to the Hormuz objective. - Ground warfare and invasions: Both speakers argue that a U.S. or allied ground invasion of Iran would entail massive casualties and potential domestic political backlash, making it a less likely option. The difficulty of projecting power through Iran’s mountainous terrain and the risk of a popular uprising are highlighted. - Regime durability and external support: Iran’s government is described as a theocracy with deep cultural unity, making political collapse unlikely. Russia and China are discussed as critical backers: Russia provides MiG-29s, SU-35s, S-400s, and jamming capabilities, while China provides satellite connections and political cover, and both nations see Iran as an existential interest—Russia especially, given Central Asia and the Caucasus. Iran is portrayed as having backing from Russia and China that would prevent a wholesale collapse. - U.S. allies and credibility: The U.S. is portrayed as depleting its ability to defend Gulf allies, with discussions of allied air-defense systems being diverted elsewhere (to Israel) and questions about long-term U.S. willingness or capacity to sustain a commitment in the Gulf. - Ukraine comparison and broader geopolitics: The dialogue touches on Ukraine, NATO, and the differential treatment of Ukraine versus Iran, noting perceived manipulation by Western actors and the difficulty of achieving durable peace through negotiations when proxies and local actors have entrenched interests. Zelensky and Kyiv’s internal politics are referenced to illustrate broader critique of Western interventions. - Potential off-ramps and negotiations: There is debate about whether a political settlement could be engineered that would preserve the Iranian regime while offering concessions (e.g., limitations on ballistic missiles or nuclear ambitions) and provide Trump with a way to claim a diplomatic win. Stanislav suggests the unpredictable nature of the current leadership and that an off-ramp may be difficult to secure; Speaker 0 contends that a pragmatic, deal-oriented path could exist if a credible intermediary or concessions are arranged, perhaps involving a different leadership or mediator. - Final reflections on strategy and endurance: Stanislav stresses that drones, missiles, and human ground forces all have limits, and argues that real military victory rarely comes from air campaigns alone; the fundamental test remains whether ground forces can secure and hold territory. Speaker 0 adds that the regime’s resilience in Iran and the long-term strategic calculus—especially regarding Hormuz, energy, and allied alliances—will shape the conflict’s trajectory in the coming weeks. Both acknowledge the enormous complexities and the high stakes for regional and global stability.

- The discussion centers on the Strait of Hormuz blockade amid a claimed ceasefire. The hosts question the ceasefire’s meaning, noting the blockade blocks Iranian ports while talk of abiding by a ceasefire continues. They describe the blockade as highly scripted and incomplete: “The US has a version of what’s going on… stopping every ship. There’s not a ship getting out.” Meanwhile, Iran appears to allow some ships to depart, and China-bound oil shipments have reportedly left the strait and were not stopped. - They compare the situation to “Japanese Kabuki theater,” with a security-guard-like role for some actors and limited real authority. The discussion emphasizes Iran’s multifaceted defense capabilities: coastal defense cruise missiles, short-range ballistic missiles, and drones (air, surface, underwater) that could threaten ships within about 200 miles of the coast. The Abraham Lincoln reportedly suffered damage within 220 miles of Iran’s coast, with Trump later acknowledging multiple attack sources. - On enforcement challenges, it’s noted that effective interdiction would require helicopters, destroyers, and other assets; however, aircraft carriers with helicopters still cover only limited areas. Tracking ships at sea is difficult without transponders, making enforcement complex. - The blockaded objective is debated. Early Trump administration moves lifted sanctions on Russia and Iran to keep oil flowing, but more recently sanctions on Russian oil have been reimposed while efforts to choke Iranian oil continue. The global oil market shows a dissonance: futures prices suggesting relief, but actual dockside prices for oil can be extremely high (up to around $140–210 per barrel). The economic impact is emphasized as potentially severe and not aligned with market signals. - There is critical discussion of Donald Trump’s leadership and decision-making: he is portrayed as emotionally volatile, with shifting beliefs and a tendency to see in headlines what he wants to see. A vivid analogy likens Trump to a child living with an alcoholic father, reacting to threats and stimuli rather than rational policy. J. D. Vance is highlighted as one of the few who has opposed Trump’s war approach and faced pressure from others close to Trump. - Diplomatic moves: Russia and China are described as stepping up efforts to broker peace, working with Saudis, Emiratis, and Iranians, and even approaching Turkey. There are signs that a peace process could be built around resurrecting or reformatting JCPOA-style arrangements, such as on-site IAEA inspections and nonproliferation commitments, potentially making them permanent. The possibility of a ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah is discussed as part of broader regional negotiations. - The blockade is criticized as unsustainable, with concerns about maintenance bases (Diego Garcia) and the risk of escalation if ships are forced into closer proximity to Iran. It’s noted that China has warned it would treat interference with Chinese maritime traffic as an act of war; Iran could still route commerce through Turkmenistan and other corridors, limiting the blockade’s effectiveness. - The broader geopolitical shift is highlighted: the United States is losing influence in the Gulf. UAE resistance to Iran and the Saudis’ precarious balance are pointed out, with Iran signaling it could charge fees for entering the Gulf. The dollar’s waning influence is noted, along with rising Chinese and Russian influence in the Gulf region. - The wider consequences anticipated include energy and food shocks, with cascading economic effects globally. The prospect of extended conflict, internal U.S. political chaos, and potential impeachment pressure on Trump are discussed as factors that could influence the war’s trajectory. The hosts suggest that while a negotiated settlement could emerge, the path is fraught with contradictions, shifting alliances, and competing narratives between Washington, Tehran, and regional players.

The discussion began with a light exchange about forgetting a seafood item (“Clams”) and then shifted to caviar preferences and favorite appetizers before turning to Middle East conflict developments. They returned repeatedly to a pattern they described as “Groundhog Day,” comparing yesterday’s events to today’s. The speakers said Iran attacked another ship after a prior incident involving the route coordination between Iran and the UAE/Oman, with the UK Maritime Trade Operations organization (UK MTO) involved in telling a ship to use a route despite Iranian procedures. The speakers described yesterday’s drone attack on a bridge and said the United States reacted and emphasized that it “violated the ceasefire,” but later discussion claimed the strike was “inconsequential” with limited damage attributed to the initial U.S. response. They then said today’s attacks were different and more significant. The speakers claimed that Iran attacked Bahrain today, causing major damage, and that Iran also stopped at least one other oil tanker trying to get through the Omani Strait. They said the U.S. claimed its response was retaliation for the Bahrain damage. They also said the U.S. strikes targeted additional locations and broader categories of targets than the previous night, citing CENTCOM statements that the U.S. targeted military surveillance infrastructure, drone storage facilities, communication systems, air defense sites, and mine layer capabilities. They said these strikes occurred roughly in response to an Iranian attack on an “Ever Lovely” ship (described as Panama-flagged). A commodities trader had previously suggested the possibility that the ship attack was carried out without authorization by Iranian leadership, implying internal factions that do not want the MOU to succeed. The discussion returned to this idea after Iran’s Assembly of Experts reportedly warned officials not to negotiate against Ayatollah Khamenei’s red lines and emphasized multiple points: avoiding reopening the Strait of Hormuz while Israel is still occupying and killing in Lebanon; responding immediately to violations; respecting nuclear rights; calling for compensation, return of frozen assets, sanctions relief, and U.S. withdrawal from the region; and warning officials not to portray Iran as weak. The speakers interpreted the warning as tied to factional concerns about implementing the MOU. On the Strait of Hormuz framework, they described a June 24 Iran-Oman agreement involving a joint working group to define future navigation rules, administration, services, associated costs, and sovereignty. They quoted a clause asserting that Iran would arrange safe passage for commercial vessels with no charge for 60 days and then conduct dialogue within 30 days about future administration and maritime services. They said Iran would institute removal of technical and military obstacles and address team mining. They also argued that European/UK route instructions to use the Omani side contradicted the agreement’s described structure, and that Iran enforced MOU procedures by requiring ships to register with the IRGC to pass without paying a fee. They discussed how U.S. actions could undermine the MOU, and proposed that U.S. strikes on coastal capabilities (radars, communications, drone storage) were meant to degrade Iran’s ability to control the strait. They claimed Iran “controls the Strait of Hormuz along with Oman,” attacked ships attempting to avoid the “PGSA” structure, and would not give up control through negotiations. Explosions in Bahrain were reported as the conversation progressed, with the speakers noting sirens sounded and that there were no reports of alerts, which they found “bizarre.” They stated the attack location might be within a short drive of the U.S. Fifth Fleet presence, and they debated whether the damage was more extensive than the prior limited incident, given the presence/absence of alerts and OSINT indicators. They then moved to Lebanon and a proposed Israeli-Lebanon framework. Daniel Levy and Aaron David Miller were referenced as having different critiques of the deal. The speakers said Daniel Levy believed the framework effectively requires “mission impossible” disarmament of Hezbollah as a condition for Israeli withdrawal, and that Hezbollah cannot be disarmed because Iran would not allow it. They also said Aaron David Miller viewed the deal as theoretically coherent because it links Israeli withdrawal to Hezbollah disarmament in a vague way that Lebanon could interpret, while also requiring coalition support to help Lebanon rebuild and deter Israel; however, he argued it was not feasible in practice, including because trust in Israel is difficult and Hezbollah disarmament cannot occur. The speakers described a map with overlapping yellow/red zones where they said only a tiny “sliver” of Israeli withdrawal would occur, implying the unconditional withdrawal was minimal. Finally, they cited statements attributed to Benjamin Netanyahu about Lebanon, including claims that a signing step is courageous and telling Hezbollah and Iran to leave, along with internal Lebanese military concerns about jihadists. They also relayed a reported Hezbollah message rejecting linking Israeli withdrawal to disarming “the resistance in all of Lebanon,” describing the Washington agreement as humiliating and illegitimate, calling instead for implementing the Iran-U.S. ceasefire understanding and forcing Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanon via international and Arab pressure and “necessary measures.” The speakers discussed concern that Lebanon could see civil war, pointing to sectarian demographics and long-standing tensions. They ended by expecting continued escalation or limited scope depending on negotiations, noting the U.S. and Iran were supposed to reconvene in Switzerland the following day. They reiterated that today’s exchange appeared more significant than yesterday’s, partly due to sirens in Bahrain, and said they would monitor for further retaliation as the situation developed.

The conversation centers on a newly discussed MOU involving Iran, Israel, the GCC, and shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, and the downstream effects on markets, alliances, and investment. Regarding the MOU, Jeffrey Krigsmann says it is the same MOU that was meant to be signed Sunday but is now on Friday, and that not all parties have agreed publicly to its terms. He says Israelis and GCC members have been kept in the dark, raising questions about sustainability: if Israel launches attacks on Hezbollah immediately after signing, he argues, Iran’s actions regarding the straits could affect shipping operations. He notes that Maersk has already said it will not change plans because of it, and that how long the arrangement lasts matters for ship movement and whether ships can be brought back out. Krigsmann also says other parties were not consulted on the “logistics service fee,” described as tolls. He highlights a key point: when J.D. Vance was asked about $300 billion in who pays it, Vance indicated Gulf friends are paying it. He frames this as a large cost for some party to shoulder. If Gulf states are not paying, he says the U.S. would have to, and he connects that to the need for congressional involvement. He adds that Iranian reporting has already circulated the $300 billion figure and that parties are claiming victories even though nothing is broadly agreed. The discussion then shifts to details of what the MOU actually states: the host notes that leaks suggest Iran would manage shipping and reopen the Strait of Hormuz under Iranian management, but the fee is not clearly stated in the MOU details they have seen. Krigsmann says he has not seen the details yet. The host asks whether Iran will control the Strait of Hormuz, how significant that is for Iran and the global economy, and whether there could be a long-term deal integrating Iran into the global economy that investors are considering. Krigsmann says investors are not currently talking about it but argues it should be brought back into focus as the leverage Iran wanted from its nuclear program, describing that leverage as the most it has had since the revolution. On how the Gulf is hurt and how long recovery takes, Krigsmann says the region is a big victim, especially countries like Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait, and also Iraq. He says Saudi and the Emiratis are richer and can roll with impacts more easily, but countries such as Qatar derive a large share of GDP from oil and gas, and he says Qatar’s major LNG facilities have been permanently damaged. He argues that if Gulf states were paying war reparations, it would be an insult for countries severely hurt as bystanders. When asked whether security and stability perceptions in places like the UAE will return, the host suggests people forget quickly and references COVID. Krigsmann compares the dynamic to the Global Financial Crisis and says a key lesson is diversification—specifically diversification of energy supply. He says the Middle East will likely remain a dominant energy supplier but with alternative routes that cost more. He argues that a similar “new set of players” dynamic followed the 2008 crisis, and he expects a parallel shift on the energy side. He adds that the pain could become more asymmetric as shortages approach and restart takes time. The host broadens diversification beyond energy and mentions security and alliance structures. Krigsmann says countries will try to be self-sufficient and diversify friends, with Middle East alliances shifting and becoming transactional. He frames diversification across supply lines, defense, and finance as a response to the risk of being dependent on one entity. The conversation then turns to asset flows and market behavior. Krigsmann describes a rotation out of “new economy” tech into “old economy” commodities that he says ran through the ceasefire on April 8, with commodity names later giving back gains during a sell-off. He argues that capital has flowed into SpaceX/NASDAQ and tech, and because it is a “zero-sum game,” less capital going into energy and commodities means they fall. He also says retail investors destock physical commodities and sell equity exposure expecting cheaper prices tomorrow. He expresses concerns about how uncertainty and volatility affect markets, arguing that the “information content” of markets is reduced when rules shift. He cites regulatory changes in the U.S. and Europe as reasons markets may not function with the stable regulatory framework they previously relied on. He says oil companies are down and oil price down because uncertainty is too high to hold positions, making it too painful to hold long or short. He references volatility swinging sharply within months and states this pushes people out because holding positions has become too dangerous. On Asia, he says conditions calmed somewhat because it is before peak summer driving season and before heating/cooling ramps, but he says places like Japan and Korea face problems ahead. He estimates that oil shut-ins fell from about 12 million barrels per day to about 10 million due to leaks from the Gulf, and he says trapped ships decreased after ships were freed through the strait, though he says it is not a long-term solution. Strategically and economically, Krigsmann says the U.S. has not “actually had to feel it yet,” but that impacts will be evident in years. He contrasts the situation with 1991: he argues this is a different strategic world where globalization “blew” apart opposite to the Gulf War I context and describes a game-changing shift with polarization. He also argues that the “grand bargain” broken—sea-lane security by the U.S. Navy in exchange for dollar-based trade—means questions about strategic alliances and the link between oil, dollar, and navy. When asked about integrating Iran into the global economy, he says capital wants certainty and confidence that investments will not lose everything. He calls Iran “uninvestable right now,” comparing it to Venezuela where guarantees were offered and where investment viability depended on them. He says guarantees are what institutions like the World Bank and IMF were designed to support after World War II, and he asks who would provide guarantees for Iran. The host adds that Iran has looked for guarantees from multiple countries, but no one could guarantee U.S. promises, leaving the guarantor as the party that cannot guarantee. The discussion concludes with agreement that uncertainty is unprecedented and that hard assets may benefit, followed by closing remarks about the show and upcoming guests.

The host notes the ceasefire appears to be over after Israel scuttled Trump’s plans for a two-week peace; the Wall Street Journal reports that Netanyahu was furious he wasn’t included in the peace plan discussions. The host says Israel wasn’t formally part of Iran negotiations and was unhappy it learned a deal was finalized late and wasn’t consulted, according to mediators and a promoter familiar with the matter. Speaker 1 interjects apologetically, then remarks that online narrative suggests that if you say Israel led the US into this war, you’re antisemitic, which they call antisemitic, and speculate that they’re all antisemitic. Speaker 0 describes Israel as throwing a tantrum “like a toddler” after the peace plan’s collapse and launching massive airstrikes on residential buildings in southern Lebanon, supposedly with no military purpose. Speaker 2 counters that civilians are involved and mentions tunnels under the area. Speaker 0 notes these attacks also targeted Iranian and Chinese Belt and Road Initiative infrastructure, calling it a direct attack on China, and claims at least 250 people were killed in these attacks on civilian apartment complexes in southern Lebanon. Speaker 1 adds that bombs continue to hit Beirut, with images described as horrific; there are 256 confirmed deaths at that point. Israel is also ramping up attacks in Gaza and the West Bank, which some warned would happen once the ceasefire was announced. Speaker 3 states that Netanyahu says the ceasefire with the US and Iran “is cute, but it doesn’t really have much to do with Israel,” and that Israel will keep fighting whenever they want, noting that two weeks were announced but not the end of the world. Acknowledgment follows that “we were not surprised in the last moment.” Calls for Netanyahu’s resignation in Israel rise. Iran announces it will close the Strait of Hormuz; the Trump administration says water will open but contradicts Fox News reporting that tankers have been stopped due to the ceasefire breach. Fox News reports raise concerns about whether the plan is credible. Speaker 4 mentions that Iran’s parliament says the ceasefire is violated in three ways: noncompliance with the ceasefire in Lebanon (civilians being slaughtered), violation of Iranian airspace, and denial of Iran’s right to enrichment; Iran insists uranium enrichment remains part of the deal, while the Trump administration claims they will not enrich uranium. Speaker 5 adds that Iran’s ability to fund and support proxies has been reduced, claiming Iran can no longer distribute weapons to proxies and will not be able to acquire nuclear weapons; prior to the operation, Iran was expanding its short-range ballistic missile arsenal and its navy, which posed an imminent threat to US assets and regional allies. The host counters that June had claimed “done enriching uranium,” but Iran says they will do whatever they want, having “won the war.” Speaker 6 asks how one eliminates a proxy’s ability to distribute weapons if the weapons and proxy networks already exist. Speaker 1 notes the points are contentious and shifts to a discussion with Ryan Grimm from Dropside News. The host, Speaker 0, asks Grimm to weigh in on the 10-point plan circulated as Trump’s plan, which Grimm says is not a formal document and not necessarily accurate; a “collection of different proposals” from Iran that was “collected into a single proposal” and later claimed to be new when presented as a new 10-point plan. Grimm describes the process as inconsistent and says the administration’s narrative has become convoluted. A segment follows about a centenarian, Maria Morea (born 1907, died 2024 at 117), whose gut microbiome showed diverse beneficial bacteria; studies of long-lived people show similar patterns, suggesting longevity relates to daily habits and gut health. The sponsor pitch for kimchi capsules is included, noting it provides gut-beneficial bacteria with Brightcore’s product, offering a discount. Speaker 0 returns to the ceasefire discussions, arguing that Israel’s actions indicate it does not want peace. Grimm expands, saying Israel is in a worse position than before and aims to push north into Lebanon and perhaps target maritime resources; Iran’s control of the Strait of Hormuz would elevate its regional status, with Belt and Road targets implying a significant structural shift. The host questions whether Trump would abandon Netanyahu if necessary and whether Trump would throw Netanyahu under the bus to stop the war. Grimm suggests Trump may prefer an out to avoid broader conflict, while noting the political stakes in the US and international responses. The discussion then revisits how Netanyahu allegedly sold the war to Trump and cabinet members, with New York Times reporting that the aim was to kill leaders, blunt Iran’s power, and potentially replace the Iranian government, while acknowledging that the initial strikes did not achieve regime change and that Iran’s ballistic missiles and proxies have been affected by the conflict. The segment closes with a humorous analogy to a Broadway line about a fully armed battalion.

Hussein meets with a podcast host to recap rapidly changing events involving the US, Iran, and regional spillovers, after planning to discuss how Iraqi oil sale proceeds move through a US bank system. The host describes a sharp escalation in the past 24–48 hours: Iran struck three ships near the Omani side of the Strait of Hormuz/Strait of Homs, the US retaliated heavily (one update cited as striking 170 Iranian military targets, another figure described as about 14 times the size of late-June retaliation), and Iran responded by striking targets in Bahrain, Kuwait, and Qatar (with Jordan also struck today). The host notes reports that the White House is bracing for a fight over the strait lasting weeks or longer. Additional claims include Iran exporting about 10 million barrels of crude and fuel in one night to anticipate a possible blockade, Iran placing armed forces on the highest alert, and deploying thousands of special forces on the border with Iraqi Kurdistan. The host adds that an IRGC warning told Kurds to stay out of it, with an Iranian field commander saying that if Kurdish groups infringe on Iranian sovereignty, Iran would push them back and establish a security zone of several kilometers. The host frames this as a shift away from earlier hopes for an off-ramp and toward renewed war, citing conflicting statements that a ceasefire/MOU ended or was temporarily on hold. The host also emphasizes that Iran has not closed the Strait of Homs and that it is unclear whether US strikes continue today. In response, Hussein says this is a major setback for the MOU/so-called ceasefire but not the end of it. He argues the core problem is lack of trust and that Iran wants movements of ships in the Strait of Hormuz coordinated with Iran; he says analysts viewed US efforts to use the Omani/southern corridor to encourage ship movement without coordination, while Iran treats this as crossing a red line and wants to “pay a price.” He also states that the US and Iran dispute MOU points, including that fighting was not stopped on all fronts (including Lebanon) and that frozen assets were not released or sanctions discussed. Hussein previously said the MOU “looked too good to be true,” suggesting it might be aimed at buying time for the US and reloading capability. He notes JD Vance said the MOU time would be used to refill oil reserves, and he links the escalation to damaged trust and a broader regional atmosphere shift that began improving around the funeral processions in Tehran. Hussein argues the MOU’s underlying purpose is ending outright war, despite skirmishes. He claims the short-term US interest is to keep the Strait of Hormuz open, lower oil prices, and achieve political advantage before elections, while Iran frames issues as a long-term package including sanctions relief, withdrawal from Lebanon, and other regional concerns. He says Iran does not want to give the US advantage by signing before US elections, and also argues that Arab Gulf relations were improving (he references normalization efforts and “behind the scenes” steps that would make attacks on the UAE unlikely unless Iran faced an existential threat). He adds that Iran’s retaliation has so far targeted American bases rather than attempting broader Gulf attacks, and that Iran controlling the strait is the key objective. Turning to Kurdish-region claims, the host asks whether Iran is worried Kurds could be used to bring down the regime. Hussein says the concern is infiltration by intelligence operators and assassins to cause disturbances inside Iran, not an outright invasion or regime change. He says Kurdish areas are mountainous and difficult to control, functioning as a possible infiltration route, and mentions coordination by some Kurdish groups with Israeli and other Western interests, while Iraq is careful to avoid direct confrontation with Iran. The host then asks about a railway strike in Iran near Turkmenistan and whether it relates to a Belt and Road corridor. Hussein connects the attack to the Mashhad Saras Railway and describes it as part of the China-Central Asia-West Asia Corridor (extending from China through Central Asia and Iran toward Iraq and onward). He says he wrote about the railway in 1996, calling it a “reopens the Silk Road” signal, and argues the strike carries symbolic and military implications: it warns Iran and Central Asia that working with China on Belt and Road could bring trouble, including showing the ability to reach far interior regions even beyond coastal distances. Hussein elaborates on Belt and Road rail and connectivity plans, describing existing and planned links between Iran, Central Asia, and the Gulf, including routes that he says connect to Mashhad, Bandar Abbas, and Central Asia, and extensions toward Turkey and toward Iraq (Basra and Shalamcha border crossing). He also describes the broader regional industrial and logistics integration he attributes to Chinese engagement, citing normalization efforts involving Saudi Arabia and Iran and Chinese cooperation with GCC members. He frames the broader geopolitical conflict as a contest over shifting global economic and technological power, portraying Belt and Road connectivity as undermining US and European hegemony by offering developing nations an alternative development model. When pressed on the specific “message” of the railway strike, Hussein says the warning is symbolic and also includes a military dimension—demonstrating reach and arguing that US/European powers cannot offer equivalent infrastructure. He says the central warning is that Belt and Road work with China could “bring you trouble,” while the US cannot provide an alternative rail and bridge model. The conversation ends with the host thanking Hussein, noting appreciation for the railway strike discussion and comparing corridor dynamics to historical patterns around World War I, before Hussein offers to share an article he wrote in 1996 about the railway.

The discussion began with speculation about whether Mustafa Khamenei would attend the funeral for his father, Ali Khamenei, after claims that Israel might attempt to assassinate him. One participant expected Mustafa Khamenei to appear, describing it as his first public appearance and an “intent to show courage” in the face of Israeli threats. They argued that killing the “accommodation argument” would make destroying Israel the objective, and also claimed Iran has the missile technology to do so while Israel lacks air defense to prevent it. Another participant said they would be surprised if Mustafa Khamenei did not show because of uncertainty about the severity of his injuries. They discussed the scale of past funerals, referencing 1989 and describing expectations of millions on streets. They also said the mourning period extends for about seven days (July 2 to July 9) and is not confined to Iran, noting Shia commemorations throughout the Levant. Attendance estimates were given as 30 million in Iran and 5 to 10 million in Iraq. The conversation then shifted to “today’s news,” described as involving hostilities across multiple countries. They cited an explosion in Lebanon tied to underground tunnels, reports of Israeli bombing and demolition activities in southern Lebanon, airstrikes in Gaza in a camp, clashes and Israeli strikes in Syria, and mobilization in Yemen involving Saudi-backed and Emirati-backed militias. They debated who is mobilizing against whom in Yemen, ultimately describing mobilization as involving the Saudi group versus the Houthis, with another claim that it is not between Saudis and Emiratis uniting against someone else. They framed Yemen, Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq as likely locations for intensified proxy conflict, contrasting with a shared reluctance among major powers to fight directly with Iran. They discussed a statement by Israeli Defense Minister Katz saying the IDF has no intent to withdraw from areas captured since October 7 across Syria, Lebanon, and Gaza. The same statement was described as saying the U.S. agreed with CENTCOM’s chief Brad Cooper’s visit, and that if Iran attacks with ballistic missiles in response to actions in Lebanon, Israel would be prepared to operate independently. Concerns were raised about scenarios involving Iran responding to Lebanon and about what alternatives remain if Iran does not withdraw from South Lebanon. On Hezbollah’s role, they said Hezbollah is not dependent on Iran in the same way as earlier decades, describing Hezbollah as having multiple business ventures. They also discussed reported Israeli breaches of a ceasefire, including a strike in southern Lebanon around Al-Qantara and Deir Serian, and showed photos and details of large Hezbollah tunnel infrastructure. They said one explosion network was described by Israelis as 200 meters long under the town of Majdal zoo, with the blast heard widely and triggering earthquake detection systems. They then covered diplomacy involving Iran and the U.S. in Doha. They referenced claims that Trump posted Iran requested a meeting, while Iranian statements were described as denying scheduled technical talks with the U.S. and saying an Iranian delegation would visit Doha to follow up on implementation of the MOU, particularly frozen funds. They said the Iranian delegation’s purpose is monitoring U.S. implementation of MOU clauses, not negotiating final agreement with the U.S., and highlighted expectations of $6 billion to be unfrozen from Qatar. They also discussed Oman’s first meeting with Iran about future management of the Strait of Hormuz. For the Strait of Hormuz, they emphasized MOU language described as giving Iran sole responsibility for arranging safe passage of commercial vessels using “best efforts” through PGSA protocols, while they also discussed Iranian measures against ships attempting to transit outside the stipulated protocols. They noted maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz reportedly surged after the MOU and then collapsed again after clashes. They also returned to the day’s regional military actions: reiterating Israeli strikes in Gaza, Lebanon, and Syria, and mentioning discussion about whether the U.S. retaliated after Sunday. The show closed with the idea that the next day might be calmer, with a brief tangent about World Cup developments and mention that Paraguay had apparently removed Germany from the tournament.

The discussion centers on the Strait of Hormuz, potential global repercussions, and how investors are reading the shifting geopolitical and technological landscape. - The Strait of Hormuz is portrayed as a critical chokepoint with the potential for devastating global economic reverberations. The hosts question whether the strait will stay closed and warn it could push the world toward a global recession if blocked for an extended period. A peace delegation has arrived in Pakistan to negotiate, with JD Vance, Jared Kushner, and Steve Witkoff among those involved, but officials warn bombing could resume within 24 hours if no plan is reached. - Israel reportedly views Iran’s new leadership as more dangerous and is accused of continuing military actions in Lebanon and civilian attacks, undermining hopes for peace. President Trump issued statements criticizing Iran’s restrictions on shipping through Hormuz, while a graph shows Hormuz traffic collapsing to about 10% of normal. Kevin Hassett, the White House adviser, suggested the strait could reopen in two months, a claim met with skepticism. - Trump and White House spokespeople are characterized as projecting an immediate and complete reopening of the strait, with others labeling that view as unrealistic. Trump said results of talks with Iran would be known in about 24 hours, while describing a “reset” and signaling a pause in Operation Epic Fury before a potential relaunch with harsher consequences. Iran is described as seemingly buying into the pause, with ships refueling and ammunition flowing into the Middle East. - Marc Rutte (Netherlands) is cited as stating NATO will assist in securing the strait and ensuring safe passage, prompting questions about the logistical capabilities of NATO and the weapons available to support such an operation, raising concerns about the feasibility of a NATO-backed effort. - On the investment side, the guest, Mark Wilburn, president of Neo’s Capital and author of Understanding the Matthew Effect, emphasizes that a two-month Hormuz closure could trigger a global recession and inflation spikes, while any constructive peace talks could spur market upside. He notes a current bias toward cash and a bearish tilt given geopolitical tensions and the AI/tech disruption cycle. - The discussion covers “expanded tech,” including Anthropic’s Claude and its potential to replace traditional SaaS functions, leading to capital leaving expanded tech from Intuit, Adobe, ServiceNow, Cadence Designs, and others, and moving into consumer goods, industrials, and utilities. Claude is described as capable of creating agents that could replace standard software solutions, with anecdotes about AI-enabled businesses reaching high valuations and single-person ventures achieving substantial scale. - The AI revolution raises questions about job displacement, surveillance, and the potential societal transformation, with concerns about a transition to a more monitored, possibly socialist framework if governments fund broad programs. - The housing market and energy strategy are discussed in the U.S. context. The president’s policies are scrutinized, with speculation that he might emphasize energy dominance to influence global oil dynamics, including Venezuela, Iran, and Saudi Arabia. The potential impact of higher oil prices on inflation and recession risks is highlighted. - On manufacturing and the dollar, there is debate about a Trump-era push to bring制造 back to the U.S., the costs of domestic production, and whether firms will relocate supply chains despite higher costs, versus continuing offshore production for cheaper inputs. The Nord Stream pipeline destruction and Europe’s LNG shift are cited as context for U.S. energy strategy. - Mark’s current trading posture is largely cash-based due to the conflict, with a plan to deploy capital if peace talks progress, particularly in tech equities like Amazon. He emphasizes avoiding chasing trades and using inverse ETFs to profit from potential declines. He points to a “transition” phase in many big tech names and suggests opportunities in semiconductor and other meme sectors. - The two free live training sessions hosted by Mark are scheduled for April 16 at 6 PM ET and April 18 at 4 PM ET, with a landing page at redactedtrading.com. Attendees will learn chart-reading skills, risk management, and portfolio positioning to navigate potential market volatility. - Final notes stress staying educated and prepared for both optimistic outcomes and downturns, with the overarching message that financial education is essential for protecting assets and making informed decisions amid geopolitical and technological upheaval.

The discussion centers on shifting U.S. rhetoric toward Iran and Israel amid negotiations and escalating conflict. As the interview goes live, news reports Iran suspended its trip to Switzerland for the opening round of nuclear negotiations. Iran’s stated reason is ongoing Israeli military operations in southern Lebanon, arguing Israel is operating over six miles inside Lebanese territory in violation of Article 1 of the MOU calling for an immediate end to hostilities on all fronts, including Lebanon. Iran says if the ceasefire clause is being breached before negotiations begin, there is nothing to go to Geneva for. Trump is also described as posting a call for a complete ceasefire on all fronts, including Lebanon, Hezbollah, and Israel. The interview then focuses on Israel as a “wild card” in the MOU and whether Trump can restrain Netanyahu. The colonel says Israeli leadership and U.S. billionaire supporters helped put Trump into office and are turning current events into “a test of Jewish power,” aiming to pressure Trump back into attacking Iran. He argues this approach reflects disproportionate influence already held by these actors, and predicts efforts to bully the president toward war. A CNN report is referenced describing Netanyahu lobbying to shape the final U.S.-Iran agreement by pressuring Trump through allies and intermediaries in Washington, mobilizing pro-Israeli senators and media allies. Netanyahu is said to believe a final agreement will be reached but is concerned Tehran will not uphold it. Separately, Netanyahu is described as saying Israel will restore security to the north through maintaining a security zone in southern Lebanon until Israel’s security needs require it, which the interviewer links to Netanyahu rallying U.S. influence to pressure Trump. When asked whether Trump can withstand this pressure, the colonel describes a transformation in Trump’s foreign-policy posture: he says Trump did not want a war with Iran, believed an arrangement could be reached, and showed reluctance to go to war generally. The colonel describes interruptions in foreign-policy dialogue after Ukraine in April 2022, then describes increasing belligerence around the early Iran conflict, including an account of Trump’s expectation that military action could end the war quickly. He then says Trump concluded the approach was not going well, became concerned about financial markets and the U.S. economy, and that the repeated claim “this war is going to end soon” could not end the conflict without a closure. The colonel argues Trump found no military solution and that using a nuclear weapon was “off the table.” He frames Trump’s challenge as dealing with Israel in a context where only an MOU exists as a rough framework, and highlights provisions aligned with Trump’s instincts, including not meddling in internal affairs and desire for forces to return home. He claims Trump was shown information about atrocities by Israelis against people in Gaza and Lebanon and that Trump’s statement about not needing to destroy an entire apartment building to eliminate one person reflects a broader realization. The colonel says some people are calling for Trump’s resignation because he “lost a war,” and responds that major powers do not achieve permanent “perfect victory streaks,” but instead must cut losses and move on. The colonel argues that future power in the Middle East will be dominated by Iran and Turkey, describing them as different from Israel and emphasizing that provoking Turkey would lead to a “fight to the finish.” He argues Israel’s existential threat is not Iran but Turkey, and contends that Israel and others are operating in a changing global environment where ISR-strike complexes and persistent surveillance plus standoff attack weapons enable new defensive and offensive capabilities. He concludes that the war must be brought to an end because the world has fundamentally changed and efforts to “reset it to backwards” are tied to calls for bombing more. A question is raised about how escalation could work if Israel continues strikes in Lebanon and Iran retaliates, and Trump chooses not to get involved, including not intercepting missiles. The colonel replies that this is “almost already happening,” citing Israeli shelling from southern Lebanon artillery positions and predicting Israel will attack Hizballah positions, which he describes as an existential threat for Israel. He says Israel would need U.S. assistance—munitions, missiles, intelligence—and predicts Netanyahu would pressure Trump politically if support were withheld, including threats aimed at Trump’s political survival. He also says he is “genuinely concerned” about the president’s safety. The conversation then shifts to claimed political and systemic factors limiting presidential agency and the possibility of escalation beyond normal pressure campaigns. The colonel suggests investigations involving members of the president’s family and references wealth growth and “Epstein files” as elements that could return to center stage. He also describes how criminal or political actions and unpredictable events have historically led leaders to be removed or harmed, and compares concerns to the experience of President Kennedy’s assassination. When discussing how pressure campaigns could become more sinister, he outlines ways investigations, media narratives, and orchestrated blame could be pursued. Near the end, the colonel discusses how broader U.S. and military bureaucracies operate, stating commanders can be constrained by service chiefs and confirmed positions, and arguing that institutional incentives discourage independent action. He recommends his book “A Margin of Victory: Five Battles That Changed the Face of War, Modern Warfare,” and says it addresses the limits of what government can accomplish on an average day due to other people’s decisions and confirmed constraints. The interview closes with the colonel referencing a Substack piece coming out Sunday or Monday discussing a shift in power and asserting that Iran has won the war and is “invincible,” “humbled, but not broken.”

The conversation centers on competing analyses of how the current Iran-US risk escalates and what might drive Trump’s decisions. - Robert Pape’s framework is invoked: the escalation trap guarantees a ground operation. Speaker 0 asks Speaker 1 for his view after having seen Pape’s remarks; Speaker 1 acknowledges Pape’s expertise on escalation, noting he laid out an escalation ladder and taught at senior military colleges. He still questions whether Pape adequately accounts for Donald Trump’s psychology. - Trump’s mindset and advisers: Speaker 1 suggests Trump wants out and might be constrained by hard-right advisers like Pete Hegseth and Stephen Miller, with Lindsey Graham also urging “epic” moves. He argues there has been no decisive operation giving Trump a victory arc, noting the war has involved destroying outdated Iraqi/F-5 fighter jets rather than a clear strategic win. - The Iran situation and off-ramps: The debate touches on whether Iran can or will offer Trump an off-ramp. Speaker 1 says Trump will make or take his own off-ramp, citing the blockade as an example. They discuss a recent movement toward the Western Strait of Hormuz, with ships turning to Iran’s EZ Pass toll-booth route; one cruise ship chose a shallow, non-regular path, suggesting a calculated bypass of typical traffic schemes. - Official statements on the Strait of Hormuz: The discussion quotes Iran’s foreign minister, Sayyid Abbas, who stated that passage for all commercial vessels through the Strait of Hormuz is open for the remaining period of a four-day ceasefire, on the coordinated IRGC EZ Pass route, with inspection and authorization by the IRGC. Trump claimed the Strait of Hormuz is open, which Speaker 1 terms a desperate interpretation, noting that Iran is effectively charging a toll and that the situation is tied to the Lebanon ceasefire, though Trump claims it is not. - Potential outcomes and strategic interpretations: The speakers weigh whether this is the beginning of broader acceptance of Iran’s conditions, with Iran potentially accepting a World Liberty Financial-backed US stable coin in exchange for keeping enriched uranium. They describe Iran’s tactic as the “cup of chai” strategy—effectively allowing the other side to reveal concessions gradually. - War planning and escalation scenarios: The group discusses possible futures, including a fifth-day US bombing campaign or a renewed air operation, but neither speaker sees an imminent air campaign as likely. They consider the risk of US actions that would violate the ceasefire, such as sinking IRGC boats in the Strait, which would restart full-scale war and imperil the global economy. They also reflect on Trump’s personal incentives to seek a legacy through a dramatic victory, fueled by advisers who push for dramatic moves, versus the financial and political costs for Gulf states. - Concluding viewpoint: There is skepticism about a decisive, orchestrated victory for Trump in the near term and tension between the possibility of limited military actions and a broader, open-ended confrontation.

The conversation begins with a sleep-deprived recap of ongoing news, focusing first on Iran. A pro-monarchist/pro-Pahlavi account revived a theory that Iran’s supreme leader Mustafa Khamenei is dead, citing New York Times reporting about severe burns and leg injuries, Trump’s March quote that they “don’t know if he’s dead or not,” and a new claim based on PDF metadata matching the same software setup used by Mohammad Ghalibaf’s publication office. The claim concludes Mushtaba (Mustafa) is dead and Ghalibaf’s office is ghostwriting him. One guest argues the shared metadata could be explained by written statements delivered via human couriers rather than computers, while another focuses on what the death rumor would change: potential fracturing within the IRGC. They discuss a Strait of Hormuz incident as evidence of internal pressure, including factions allegedly causing “havoc,” attacking a ship after it violated Iranian protocol (including transponder/route requirements), and the idea that some actors want to provoke a response to show proof of life. Attention then shifts to a broader Hormuz “power struggle” involving Oman and Iran. The discussion describes Oman opening an alternative transit route and the rejection of an Oman IMO transit corridor by the IRGC as “unacceptable and completely dangerous.” Iran then required vessels to use Iran’s declared routes and coordinate via VHF Channel 16, leading to ships turning around and at least three vessels (including two oil supertankers) changing course near Oman’s coastline, after Iranian naval broadcasts reportedly instructed ships not to proceed. A vessel was struck near Oman, and the Wall Street Journal reports, citing senior U.S. officials, that IRGC was responsible. One guest frames the conflict as about long-term control and influence rather than money. A separate thread looks at marinetraffic.com and the Persian Gulf Shipping Authority (pgsa.ir). The guest describes using a PGSA form requiring vessel and cargo details, and notes a “funny” observation that “Israel” is not available in an origin-country dropdown but “Palestine” appears, with discussion of whether that relates to trolling or messaging. They add that “there are none now on the Omani side,” with debate about transponder behavior and concealment. They then connect regional tensions to Lebanon. Israeli forces are described as advancing toward Beit Yehoun while Hezbollah ambushes and clashes reportedly last over an hour; Israel responds with airstrikes, and the discussion portrays a regional pattern of things “going back downhill.” The Gulf and U.S.-Iran negotiation context is discussed through MOU disputes over unfrozen assets and conditions. A key debate centers on U.S. options if ships are attacked. One guest argues the U.S. cannot practically escalate via ground forces, confronting in the Strait of Hormuz, or launching new airstrikes without triggering retaliation and killing the MOU. They also bring up an energy-analyst claim about diesel vs aviation fuel constraints at refineries: increased bombing would raise jet-fuel demand and cause fuel shortages within two weeks. The conversation also notes concerns among some Iranian voices that Iran is not doing enough during Lebanon clashes, while another replies that Hezbollah’s fighting and casualties against Israel may be preferable to dramatic retaliation that could disrupt strategic timing. Further negotiation details include a claim that Iranian negotiators insist on an Israeli withdrawal from occupied Lebanese territories as a “red line” for any deal, and an article alleging Netanyahu persuaded Trump not to withdraw from southern Lebanon while remaining committed to a ceasefire, with negotiations focusing on pilot zones instead of withdrawal. They ask whether Netanyahu could prevent Israel from withdrawing and whether Trump might become more hawkish after U.S. midterms. A separate “wild card” is a reported Syrian military buildup along the Lebanese border. The discussion says Syrian troops have been amassing since April, with pace increasing after Trump’s June 14 announcement involving al-Shara and targeting Hezbollah. One guest reports an explanation that the buildup is defensive—aimed at potential internal threats or protecting corridors—rather than an attack plan against Hezbollah, while broader reports refer to thousands of troops, rockets, armored vehicles for border security, smuggling prevention, and a Qusair corridor connected to Captagon trafficking. They argue logistics/resupply signs would matter if troops are truly assembling. They pivot briefly to broader regional diplomacy through a J.D. Vance comment: Emiratis have conversations with Iranians, including the IRGC, about economic incentives. Another guest interprets this as a sign the Gulf states may adjust to a new reality and that more regional alignment could follow. The latter part of the discussion turns to Russia-Ukraine. They discuss Zelensky’s warning about Belarus moving equipment and debate its practicality, then discuss claims about Russian fuel shortages in multiple regions, including mandatory gasoline/diesel sales restrictions and long lines. One guest rejects the credibility of the Moscow Times, citing prior alleged misinformation, and argues Ukraine is striking refineries and terminals enough to cause localized issues but disputes the scale of nationwide shortages. They also discuss Russia’s expanded offensives across a wider front, including actions around Sumy, Kharkiv near Kupyansk, Konstantinovka, Krasnyi Liman, Slavyansk and Kramatorsk, Zaporizhia, and Kherson, framing it as a shift from prior concentrated campaigns. Finally, they discuss escalation risks and NATO concerns. One guest argues the West is “fully participating” through attacks inside Russia that kill civilians, and expects Russia to retaliate with strikes inside European countries if escalation continues. Zelensky is also described as approving a 40-day operation by Ukraine’s security service to influence Russia to end the war, but the guest portrays Russian resolve as increasing rather than decreasing, citing the shift to offensive operations in multiple locations this year. The segment ends with a brief wrap-up that the Iran rumor about Mustafa’s death is discussed but not treated as central, emphasis on conflicting messages in the MOU (assets, obligations), continued tension in the Strait of Hormuz, and ongoing Lebanon clashes with no full ceasefire. The host concludes with mention of upcoming interviews and plans for further coverage due to exhaustion.

The conversation focuses on developments around U.S.-Iran nuclear negotiations, the Israel–Lebanon war, and concerns that actions in the region could undermine or complicate a potential agreement. The discussion begins with a reported Israel–U.S. tension: the IDF was said to be abandoning plans to bomb Beirut after American pressure, driven by fears Iran might retaliate. The caller links this to U.S. opposition to Israeli plans to restart a large-scale war in Lebanon, particularly mass bombing campaigns in Shia-majority districts of Beirut, and to concerns Iran might walk away from peace talks. The Iranians are described as being “very serious” about negotiations, even while the war between Iran and Hezbollah continues, including strikes and counterfire between Hezbollah and Israel. Attention then shifts to U.S.-Iran clashes at sea: the Americans said they shot down two boats laying mines, while the Iranians shot down one drone and posted video showing targeting of another fighter jet that was not shot down. The Americans also shut down one surface-to-air missile site on the Iranian side. The caller asks how worried the participants are that negotiations could break down, noting that Donald Trump had been unusually quiet the same day—no posts and no media leaks—creating an impression of behind-the-scenes activity, though the conversation treats the silence as out of the ordinary. The conversation then broadens into patterns of escalation: the caller says Israel often intensifies actions in Lebanon when negotiations approach an end or a solution seems possible, accelerating operations while not heeding the United States, despite periodic Trump statements. The caller argues that U.S. forces are not at “optimal capability” after prolonged deployments at sea, and suggests that if military action is planned, it could be preferable sooner rather than later. The discussion also reflects concern about timing after the Hajj and the possibility that strikes could occur after major public milestones, potentially undermining trust in the U.S. if negotiations were treated as a “facade.” A central topic is Iran’s demands and lack of compromise. The conversation states Iran is firm on what it requires, including unfreezing assets, and that this posture could indicate diplomacy moving in the right direction. However, the caller also suggests Trump would face opposition from Israelis and neocons if a deal advances. The discussion includes detailed domestic U.S. politics around a potential agreement: Rubio reportedly said a deal was possible within days, with holdup tied to specific nuclear-language and sanctions language in the initial document. Meanwhile, Ted Cruz called the announced deal an “MOU” a disastrous mistake; Roger Wicker warned it would be null/useless; Pompeo criticized it; and additional senators and figures piled on criticism. The caller describes a shift when Trump said the deal would be expanded to include the Abraham Accords, leading to conflicting reactions from figures like Senator Lindsey Graham. The conversation claims other countries (Qatar, Pakistan, Saudi) said no, while Iran also said no and positions were not changing. The caller argues the Abraham Accords have not helped Gulf signatories in practice and have been linked to broader issues involving Palestinian rights. The conversation then introduces a harsh statement by Mustafa Kamane during the “hush season,” describing a new order in which U.S. influence shrinks and framing Israel’s actions as a religious confrontation between Islam and what he calls the “Zionist regime.” The speakers express concern that Iran’s messaging is becoming more radical and anti-U.S. compared with earlier positions. They also discuss a purported power struggle between Netanyahu and Trump, emphasizing that the next steps will reveal who is directing events. Several reports about Israel–Lebanon dynamics are cited: the foreign minister calls Iranian actions and ceasefire violations blameworthy; Iran accuses the U.S. of maritime piracy and claims the strikes show suspicion justified. On the military side, Israeli commanders reportedly say the situation in southern Lebanon is “more unbearable by the day,” with footage described of drones hitting Israeli troops and trucks. Israel is said to have moved toward more nighttime operations, while Hezbollah reportedly uses FPV drones with night vision. Additional reports claim Israel is procuring more anti-drone nets from Europe due to drone threats, and an Israeli official says Israel cannot accept the current reality in Lebanon without ability to respond, constrained by understandings and agreements with both the U.S. and the Lebanese government. The Lebanese government is described as refusing to negotiate unless bombing stops before talks. A particular focal report states senior Israeli officials say Israel does not want to be seen as deliberately sabotaging Trump’s potential agreement with Iran. It claims Israel rejects random building bombings in Beirut at this stage due to fears of harming the ongoing Iran negotiations, while maintaining freedom of action in southern Lebanon. The conversation interprets this as evidence that strikes in Beirut are restricted compared with activity in the south. The speakers also analyze the region’s broader security shift: they describe regional countries seeking security architectures that replace U.S. bases and may not include Israel, referencing institutionalizing control of Persian Gulf straits under a Gulf security system by a “Gulf Strait Authority.” They also mention “Isaac Accords” as a similar Israel-centric concept applied to Latin America and Central America, involving trade/technology cooperation and countering Iranian influence. Finally, the conversation includes concerns about escalation risks if Trump uses military force, including the possibility of catastrophic retaliation affecting energy infrastructure, undersea cables, and the wider Gulf economy. They discuss information warfare and social media influence, including a claim that social media accounts of Colonel Aguilar may have been wiped out simultaneously with upscaling across pro-Palestinian platforms. The closing return to geopolitics includes discussion of a “new world order” and multipolarity, the Saudi–U.S. civilian nuclear track, and related regional missile developments attributed to North Korea. The conversation ends with acknowledgment of a technical glitch earlier in the show and a preview of upcoming guest interviews.

The conversation centers on fast-moving developments involving Iran, the Strait of Hormuz/Homs, U.S. military posture in the region, and competing reports about talks and potential strikes. According to Axios and CBS, a U.S. official said Iranians reached out to the administration after two days of skirmishes earlier in the week to seek further talks to resolve the dispute. The Iranians allegedly returned to negotiations saying, “we screwed up” and “let’s keep talking.” Axios also reported that a second U.S. official warned of harsh consequences if Iran refuses to commit to cease firing on commercial vessels in the Strait of Homs. The discussion then shifts to satellite/force posture claims. The number of U.S. Air Force aircraft parked at Prince Sultan Air Base in Saudi Arabia reportedly fell to its lowest level since the buildup began in early February. The last three AWACS left early this week, leaving a single E-11 and nine tankers, and mediators/analysts argue this suggests critical assets have left the theater while the conversation includes the idea that assets may be brought back if strikes are expected. Israel’s military posture is also referenced. At an Israeli Air Force pilots graduation ceremony, IDF Chief of Staff Ayal Zamir reportedly said “major operations” are expected against Iran, that the air force remained on standby for a major operation on June 8, and that the alert remains high, adding that if they need to return, they will return with even greater force. On negotiations, competing claims are highlighted. Iranian Fars News reportedly denied that a new Iran–U.S. round in Islamabad next week is happening, saying preparations have not been finalized and technical discussions are false and baseless, and that developments will be announced only through official Iranian channels. Axios is cited saying the next round of talks is expected in Switzerland. CNN claims intensive diplomacy is underway behind the scenes, with the U.S. prioritizing negotiations over further military action and adopting a “striking and then pausing” approach to avoid escalation. Reuters is cited saying Qatari negotiators are in Iran to de-escalate and create conditions for talks focused on implementing the MOU and stopping clashes in Hormuz. Shipping and activity levels are treated as signals. The Strait of Homs reportedly saw only 22 verifying transits logged on Thursday (according to Kepler), far below recent weeks and pre-war daily averages. Some ships are said to have switched off transponders, implying tracking data may undercount real activity. A Chinese heavy load carrier reportedly transited. The U.S. demand side is also detailed. An Axios summary says U.S. officials are demanding that Iran, on Saturday, issue a public statement acknowledging the Strait is open and committing to stop firing on commercial ships—while also explicitly or implicitly acknowledging errors related to recent attacks. The discussion describes additional demands including that every channel on the strait will be open and “toll-free,” plus expectations of an apology. One key claim is that no strikes occurred that day. There is emphasis on “not many ships” transiting, and multiple mediators supposedly trying to restart talks. The transcript also covers alleged assassination-plot reporting. CNN says U.S. intelligence detected reporting of a possible Iranian plot to assassinate Trump, while stating the Israeli warning remains unclear and has not been independently verified. A Barak Ravid report is cited as saying Israeli intelligence did not share a specific organized detailed plan, describing Iranian figures discussing the matter without a concrete plan. The New York Post is cited as saying Trump left instructions for “a devastating response” if Iran assassinated him. The discussion includes an argument about U.S. constitutional/legal effect if the president is incapacitated. A story from the Wall Street Journal is cited about Trump returning from Turkey and changing aircraft (older Air Force One and later switching back to a newer Qatari-donated aircraft), tied to U.S. officials receiving Israeli intelligence about an elevated-risk mission lacking certain defensive capabilities. The transcript notes uncertainty about timing and stresses the reports’ emphasis on threat information and aircraft defensive differences. For Israel and Lebanon/Southern Lebanon, the transcript claims the U.S. asked Israel to refrain from sensitive military operations in southern Lebanon, and that Israel froze sensitive IDF operations while strikes continued at a lower level. The Financial Times is cited as saying a U.S. team was sent to Beirut to ensure a ceasefire between Israel and Hezbollah, alongside references to Israel’s mixed messaging and shifting operational posture. Turkey/Syria/Lebanon becomes another thread. Israel’s Energy Minister Eli Cohen is quoted saying Turkey must not establish itself militarily in Syria, with a cabinet statement that if Turkey establishes bases in Syria, Israel will establish bases there as well. Turkish influence and related plans (including pipeline discussions involving Syria and a pipeline proposal between Israel and Cyprus mentioned as “plan” rather than concrete construction) are referenced. The transcript also discusses reports about Turkey seeking Russian S-400 air defenses and how that interacts with potential U.S. F-35 access, including a stated U.S. rationale about preventing compromise of F-35 stealth via S-400 data. On Ukraine, Zeluzhny is discussed. The transcript cites his Telegraph opinion piece warning against a Western narrative that Russia has effectively lost, describing the war as attritional and saying victory depends on which side can sustain economic, military, and psychological burdens longer with consistent international support. Reuters is then cited as saying Putin is rejecting calls for peace with Ukraine despite Ukrainian drone strikes on Russian oil refineries and ports, with sources describing increased resolve to continue the war and references to Donbas. The transcript concludes with a broad recap of its central “Strait of Hormuz” framing: carrot-and-stick sanctions/lifting dynamics, mediator pressure for de-escalation, and continued attention to whether attacks resume. It notes “no strikes today,” but emphasizes ongoing risk of escalation and continuing uncertainty about whether Iran will stop charging a fee in the Strait of Hormuz or accept terms in return. The speakers also mention threats discussed in the context of major escalations and hope for “cooler heads prevail” and a pause in escalation.

The discussion centers on social media visibility, censorship, and the political and military implications of the conflicts discussed, especially Israel’s role and U.S. policy. Speaker 2 says Kushner follows them so they are not blocked and asks whether Netanyahu blocked them. Speaker 0 responds that Netanyahu cannot stand even minor “jabs,” implying a need for “all or nothing” treatment. Speaker 2 then describes a post: Netanyahu shared a video greeting “Happy 4th of July” and “Happy 250th Independence Day,” and Anna replied “fuck you,” which drew about twice the engagement of Netanyahu’s post. Speaker 0 says they pinned the reply and emphasizes that replies gaining more engagement than the original tweet is “very rare.” Speaker 0 argues that Israel cannot reverse its public-relations damage and claims Israel and supporters rely on bans, algorithm control, and influencing AI so the public will “forget.” They argue that, even where people have been favorable to Israel, international views are shifting and that the ongoing war against Iran began “specifically on behalf of Israel.” They also connect continued kinetic action with potential global economic depression if the Strait of Hormuz remains closed, predicting that people will redirect anger toward Israel due to shared suffering. Speaker 0 contrasts the spending on bots and social media manipulation with what they say is “everyone knows” about underlying responsibility. Speaker 2 asks whether censoring critical voices could affect younger generations. Speaker 0 says young people are “too savvy,” and points to Nick Fuentes being banned on most platforms but continuing to build a “pretty significant audience” on at least one remaining platform, arguing that bans can create “forbidden fruit” appeal. Speaker 0 adds that calling people anti-Semites previously worked but has become less effective because it is now applied broadly, “including Jews.” They claim that this conflation of the Jewish population with the Zionist project has harmed Jewish people and insist Zionism is “a political ideology” rather than a religion, ethnicity, or identity. The conversation shifts to YouTube and algorithms. Speaker 0 says YouTube is “pretty good,” but argues the algorithm rewards repeating the same topics and punishes deviation; they describe their channel as heavy on foreign policy and say domestic coverage performs worse. They also claim algorithm incentives can push audiences toward more extreme thought. Speaker 2 asks whether public perception has changed since earlier discussions about censorship. Speaker 0 says public opinion against Israel continues to grow and cites Associated Press and NORC polling, including that 30% of American Jews say Israel has carried out a genocide in Gaza. Speaker 0 also discusses a “disconnect” between populations and political leadership in Western countries and Gulf countries, and warns that systems not representing constituents can lead to unrest, uprisings, or civil war amid economic strain and concentrated wealth. They then focus on U.S. legislative action. Speaker 0 discusses “Section 219” in the National Defense Authorization Act, claiming it would merge the U.S. military with the IDF, calling it problematic and saying the House Armed Services Committee gatekeeps whether a full House vote occurs. They criticize committee assignment processes and the Senate parliamentarian system and legislative filibuster as mechanisms that prevent bills from passing. Speaker 2 asks about who is talking about Section 219. Speaker 2 references Massey and Ro Khanna (and others) raising attention, plus Trita Parsi’s Quincy Institute analyzing it first. Speaker 0 says voters should pressure committee members by contacting their offices “incessantly,” naming them, and warning of political consequences if they “sell our country out” to Israel. Speaker 0 states the provision “has to be stripped out.” The conversation then turns to NATO allies, Turkey, and U.S.-Israeli dynamics. Speaker 2 describes escalating rhetoric about a possible Turkey conflict, noting statements attributed to Smotrich and Netanyahu, and contrasts that with Trump praising Erdogan, considering F-35 approval, and removing CAT sanctions. Speaker 0 says details may be unknown, speculates Trump might have personal business motives, and adds an alternative explanation: Turkey is described as an important component for European/NATO preparation for a face-off with Russia. They argue the U.S. may eventually have to choose between Israeli ambitions and NATO plans involving Turkey, with Israel wanting war with Turkey. Speaker 0 also mentions internal Israeli politics, stating that Ben-Gvir is reportedly favored in Israel polls and interpreting that as reflecting Israel’s cultural and political direction. They say they do not expect Israel to pull back and describe Israel as “lashing out.” Speaker 2 discusses the shifting U.S. posture, arguing that if unconditional support changes, Israel would have to adapt. Speaker 0 says they see public sentiment shifting in the U.S. and describes formerly “forbidden” topics becoming discussable. Speaker 0 argues Israel is bombarded with a 24-hour news cycle intended to terrify Israelis and create a sense that “the whole globe hates them,” distinguishing what they call propaganda aimed at the Israeli public from what they describe as bad-faith behavior by Israeli politicians and media figures. They debate the rationale for actions against Hezbollah and describe Hezbollah as a resistance group formed after Israel’s occupation of southern Lebanon. Speaker 0 argues that disarming neighboring countries is “ridiculous” and that engaging in behavior that creates “reasons to resist” perpetuates resistance. In the middle of the transcript, Speaker 2 shares emotional examples from Gaza. They mention Palestinians watching World Cup matches amid rubble and describe an organizer, Mohamed El Wahidi, who helped set up giant screens for families to watch Egypt vs. Argentina but was killed in an Israeli airstrike before kickoff, with two brothers aged 8 and 10 also killed. They ask how anyone could respond without being upset and say Gaza is being forgotten. Finally, Speaker 2 returns to “strikes back and forth” between the U.S. and Iran. Speaker 0 says Israel did not play a role in “the latest developments,” but maintains the war is “because of Israel.” They argue the conflict should be called “war,” criticizing attempts to downplay it as not war or as a “special military operation.” Speaker 0 claims U.S. actions are provoking Iran, that diplomatic solutions for transiting vessels through the Strait are the only option, and that continued hostilities deplete weaponry, fertilizer supply, and strategic petroleum reserves.

The conversation covers a wide, interwoven set of points about Iran, the Gulf, and international power dynamics, centering on how Iran’s posture and regional actions are shaping the future balance of power. - Strait of Hormuz and ownership: The speakers discuss whether Iran believes the Strait of Hormuz permanently belongs to Iran. There is mention of a deputy parliamentary speaker saying “the Strait Of Hormuz belongs forever to the great nation of Iran,” and the implications of Iran’s rhetoric for sanctions, cables, and fees. The dialogue notes that this rhetoric risks pushing Trump toward continued conflict and highlights a distinction between legal territorial claims and the practical control Iran seeks to exercise. - Leverage, sanctions, and war aims: Speaker 1 argues Iran faces immense pressure and has suffered enormous casualties and damage, and would use all leverage to prevent a US victory. The frame presented is that Trump cannot easily compensate Iran for its losses, and that Iran’s leadership seeks to deter further US action, potentially by threatening critical regional chokepoints and economic channels. - UAE, Israel, and regional bases: The discussion addresses UAE’s normalization and hosting Israeli assets, with Speaker 1 insisting that if a country starts an illegal war, “you get to hit these assets.” They note Israeli presence in the UAE before the war and Israeli bases in the region, arguing that alliance and bases do not equal occupation, and acknowledging the UAE’s sovereign choices amid a complex security environment. - Iranian strategy and volume of attacks: The participants discuss why Iran used hundreds of drones and missiles against the UAE and other targets, suggesting the aim was to overcome air defenses and to send a signal given the breadth of anti-missile systems in the region. There is acknowledgment that while such strikes cause damage, they occur within a context of a broader blockade and ongoing hostilities, including the broader war dynamics in Lebanon, Gaza, and beyond. - Fujairah and other theaters: The discussion turns to the Fujairah incident (and a similar strike in Qatari waters) and whether Iran officially claimed responsibility. Speaker 1 notes that Iran did not accept responsibility due to ceasefire constraints, invoking terminology from Persian/Arabic to describe such “shots that come out of the blue.” There is speculation about other potential targets along alternative routes to bypass Hormuz, including Fujairah and Yanbu, to deter or disrupt overflow routes. - Regional outlook and strategic lists: The speakers speculate that Iran may maintain a prioritized list of targets among those responsible for significant damage to Iran (including Fujairah and Saudi pipeline routes) and that it could pursue other routes as part of a broader strategy to constrain Hormuz and diversify its leverage. - Ideology vs national interest in Iran: A major thread concerns whether Iran’s Islamic-republic ideology should or will give way to more pragmatic, interests-based diplomacy (such as re-entering or renegotiating the nuclear deal, minimizing sanctions, and engaging with the US while criticizing its allies). Speaker 0 argues the ideology often appears to guide policy, while Speaker 1 contends that Iran’s ideology is an enduring element of its foreign policy, shaping its support for Palestinians, Lebanese groups, and other allies, and that this ideological frame is not easily separated from national interests. - JCPOA and US policy: The dialogue references missed opportunities to return to the 2015 JCPOA framework, highlighting Robert Malley’s position that a revised, longer, stronger agreement could have been pursued after 2015, and noting that the withdrawal under Trump and subsequent sanctions contributed to the current crisis. There is critique of US internal politics and alleged influence from various actors, including assertions about the role of the “Epstein class” and other external pressures. - Post-ceasefire expectations: Looking ahead, Speaker 1 anticipates Iran becoming more aggressive in advancing its interests after any ceasefire, while Speaker 0 probes how Iran’s approach might shift if diplomacy were more effective, and whether a more calibrated policy toward the US and Israel could ease sanctions and improve conditions for ordinary Iranians. - Concluding note: The dialogue closes with mutual reflections on the enduring competition between ideology and national interests, regional power dynamics, and the potential trajectories for Iran and its neighbors in a post-ceasefire or negotiated settlement environment.

The conversation begins with a discussion of vesselfinder.com as the focus of attention rather than the World Cup, with talk of making bets on how many ships will depart. Attention then shifts to Iran and Israel around the death and funeral arrangements for Iran’s Supreme Leader. Ali Adolahi, a commander in Iran’s army, warned Israel and the U.S. against attacking during the funeral processions. The discussion includes differing views on what retaliation would look like if Israel struck: one speaker argues that while an attack would be heavy, Israel would mainly face long-term consequences through a major global “red line,” such as killing a supreme leader at a funeral attended by world leaders during peace negotiations against U.S. wishes. The other speaker argues that retaliation would likely continue until every Israeli military base was unusable, pointing to patterns of escalating strikes in prior exchanges and to pressure from Iran’s hardliners. The speakers also discuss risks tied to the funeral timing and the public appearance of IRGC leaders during the ceremonies. One concern raised is not an attack on the day itself, but the possibility that the funeral could reveal whereabouts of key figures currently in hiding, enabling Israel to track and potentially conduct a decapitation strike weeks later. A separate focus is the scale of the funeral: it is described as unprecedented, potentially the largest in history, with more than 100 leaders or countries represented between the start of the commemoration and the 9th, including Russia, China, India, and major countries. The conversation contrasts it with prior benchmark funerals and states that Iran already holds Guinness records for attendance percentages, while this event would set a new record. Political and military reporting is also mentioned. Netanyahu’s press office denies New York Times claims that Israel fabricated plans to assassinate Ghalibaf and Arachi during Pakistani negotiations. The discussion also notes recent movement of U.S. military aircraft away from forward positions: B-52 Shadow Fortress strategic bombers leave RAF Fairford in the UK and return home, and additional F-15 Strike Eagles return from Jordan to the UK, with aircraft markings described as reflecting use against Iran. On U.S. signaling about the USS Boxer and broader regional military posture, one speaker says the U.S. statement about the USS Boxer being in position is meant to draw attention away from other assets already present, arguing that the timeline suggests the ship did not arrive as quickly as claimed. The discussion then returns to negotiations affecting Hormuz and the Strait of Hormuz/Homs-related fees: Axios is cited as reporting that sanctions lifting and unfreezing of assets are part of a “carrot” offered by the U.S. Iran reportedly rejects a proposal about charging a fee. A negotiation detail is shared from a source in Doha: an Iranian delegation was reported to have not shown up despite claims that a delegation was present. The transcript then covers a separate topic: reporting that an IDF delegation visited Venezuela, described as the first significant bilateral engagement since Caracas severed ties with Tel Aviv in 2009. Israeli deployment is described as humanitarian in nature, with Venezuelan officials welcoming the mission, and skepticism discussed regarding whether it reflects deeper alignment under a new Venezuelan leadership. Another speaker connects the claim to long-running intelligence links in Central and South America. Returning to regional proxy dynamics, the discussion mentions Houthi media reporting that two Saudi fighter jets breached Yemeni/Houthi airspace to bomb a capital airport to prevent an aircraft carrying a Houthi delegation from departing and missing the funeral. The incident is described as ending after Houthi air defenses attempted to shoot down the jets and threatened retaliation on Riyadh. The conversation also ties this to broader regional tensions, including an Iraqi anti-corruption campaign targeting Iran-linked figures and speculation about how power struggles might play out. The main “big story” becomes Poland and NATO risk. One speaker cites reports that the U.S. warned Poland Russia may prepare a limited provocation on Polish territory within months to test NATO’s resolve. Possible actions are described as missile or drone strikes on critical infrastructure, cyber/hybrid attacks, or small cross-border incursions from Kaliningrad or Belarus. Another scenario described includes soldiers crossing into Poland claiming GPS failure or a rescue mission, followed by negotiations using withdrawal as leverage to demand an end to Western aid to Ukraine. Poland’s prime minister is referenced as warning that coming months may be critical. The conversation frames “testing NATO resolve” as probing whether Article 5 would be triggered and whether the U.S. would respond, while also debating assumptions about Russian restraint and cost-benefit calculations. A Reuters-related mention describes an incident in the Baltic where a NATO effort to stop a Russian tanker was met by a fast Russian approach, raising the possibility of future miscalculation. Finally, a reference is made to NATO unity concerns amid reports of proposed U.S. troop reductions in Europe, with those cuts described as being reviewed and blocked by Rubio and other senior Trump officials, followed by a six-month review instead. The segment ends with emphasis from one speaker on the Iranian funeral’s historical scale and that it is not being covered by Western media, alongside plans to continue with an emergency interview focused on Poland.

The hosts discuss an unusually intense Iranian funeral, with estimates of 9 to 10 million attendees and widespread anger expressed in the streets, including chants calling for death to Israel and the United States. A temperature conversion is debated (mid-to-high 90s Fahrenheit), and the discussion focuses on concern about where the hatred and anger could lead over “years from now.” They then turn to remarks by Donald Trump about the funeral turnout, with Trump initially saying he was surprised by the number of people and later calling the turnout “very impressive,” comparing it to crowds at his campaign rallies. The conversation shifts to whether Trump could be operating within a “bubble,” with claims that information is curated for him and that supporters may tailor what he sees, including an anecdote about people buying ad space to get onto Fox News at times Trump is watching. A separate U.S.-Israel discussion is driven by clips from Benjamin Netanyahu. When asked whether Israel is in a permanent state of war, Netanyahu says Israel is not, citing “four peace deals” and the Abraham Accords, attributing weakening of Iran to common “military action.” He argues Lebanon has “more cards in play,” asserting Lebanon wants to free itself from Hezbollah and that Christians, Druze, Sunni Muslims, and some Shiite Muslims seek protection. He also says that “some” Christian villages in Lebanon asked to be annexed to Israel because he says Israel protects them from Hezbollah. Additional Netanyahu remarks address anti-Israel sentiment in the United States. In the clip discussion, Netanyahu links hatred of Israel to hatred of America, claims protests often burn both Israeli and American flags, and says supporters of Israel wave both flags. He also describes social-media influence and “bot farms,” arguing it correlates with declining patriotic feelings and support for Israel, while insisting the alliance is based on “common values.” The hosts react by questioning how many Americans believe Netanyahu’s four main claims (that anti-Israel sentiment is anti-American; that Lebanese Christians want annexation; that younger and online shifts come from bot farms; and that Israel is a small self-defending country facing evil neighbors). They conclude that while a minority may accept those ideas, they argue the majority opposes them and that this represents a major change compared with prior U.S. history. Discussion then returns to regional military developments tied to Iran. There are claims of U.S. air asset repositioning: B-52s pulling out from England, F-15s leaving Jordan for the UK, and reports that at least six A-10s have flown into Jordan. The conversation connects this to potential escalation involving the Strait of Hormuz and Iranian actions against ships. They cite updates that traffic through the Strait of Hormuz remains around the same level over several days (about 30-something ships per 24 hours) and mention an escort of ships, suggesting no major change in that narrow snapshot. A statement by Mohammed Medvedev is discussed, presented as claiming Iran has two maritime “weapons,” with the other not yet used besides the Strait of Hormuz—also referring to the Bab al-Mandib Strait. On Lebanon and Gaza, Netanyahu’s claims are summarized by the hosts: Iran trying to remove Israel from southern Lebanon, pressure on Lebanon, and Netanyahu’s assertion that Trump did not ask Israel to ease attacks on tunnels and did stop action earlier according to the hosts’ recounting of Netanyahu’s position. The conversation also includes Gaza: “no reconstruction in Gaza without disarmament and demilitarization” in a designated area, with Hamas not having given up, and discussion of impacts on Israel’s economy such as tourism. The hosts then mention a viral video of USS Liberty survivor Phil Turney saying he burned an “evil flag” on July 4 in remembrance of 34 brothers tattooed on his arm who were “slaughtered” June 8, 1967. They also discuss the broader idea of perceptions shifting in the U.S., comparing it to the process of mainstreaming beliefs (described through an “emperor with no clothes” example) and referencing COVID as an analogy for when information becomes widely accepted. They wrap up by broadening to U.S. society and recurring themes of “forever wars,” debt, inequality, and concerns about instability. They discuss a trending film, “Citizen Vigilante,” described as inspired by European rape-gang-related controversies and reflecting frustration with political handling of immigration and related social tensions. The conversation ends with stories about local law enforcement programs in Florida (rehabilitation-focused jail programs and sheriff-managed community structures), and a final return to the Iranian funeral photos showing Max Blumenthal and Jackson Hinkle attending, with Jackson described as attending multiple controversial international events.

The discussion centers on the prospect of a renewed full-scale war in the Middle East, the motivations behind it, and the strategic implications for the United States, Israel, Iran, and regional partners. - Probability of renewed conflict: Speaker 1 argues that the chances of another US-Israeli assault are high and could be imminent. The war’s continuation is described as driven by Zionist policy, not by US national interests, and there is belief that “the forces surrounding Trump” are not rational. The capacity and readiness for a major operation are described as significant, with US equipment and ground-force preparations in Kuwait, the Emirates, and Bahrain, plus jets in Qatar and Saudi Arabia. - Iran’s stance and Hormuz: The conversation asserts that Iran did not intend to take control of the Strait of Hormuz; rather, that move came as a response to the war and hostile actions in the Persian Gulf. Iran’s side contends that the Strait should not be used as a foothold to wage war against Iran, and that its demand for secure passage is tied to preventing further attacks on Iranian infrastructure. The claim is that Netanyahu pushed for occupying the region and that the war’s origins relate to Zionism. - Netanyahu and policy: The speakers attribute the onset of the war to Netanyahu’s actions, arguing that his approach forced escalation and that the US reoriented its strategy in line with Netanyahu’s goals. The claim is made that the real policy of the US and Europe supports a scenario in which Israel could dominate the region, with the two-state solution presented as a long-standing facade. - Trump’s stance and rhetoric: The dialogue notes fluctuations in Trump’s rhetoric, including posts that reference military action against Iran. It is suggested that Trump wants to withdraw but is constrained by the gap between Iranian demands and what the US is willing to concede. There is a sense that Iran is not satisfied with limited concessions and that Tehran seeks broader sanctions relief plus a permanent adjustment to the Hormuz situation. - Negotiations and concessions: The speakers discuss the negotiations’ sticking points, particularly Iran’s nuclear program and sanctions relief. There is a view that Iran should retain control over the Strait of Hormuz permanently, rejecting any plan to relinquish control or limit enrichment in a way that would be perceived as a concession to Trump or the West. The suggestion is that while limits could be easy to manage through the IAEA, the control of Hormuz must not be offered as a temporary concession. - UAE and Gulf dynamics: The UAE is described as strategically vulnerable and heavily aligned with the US and Israel, creating a target profile for Iran. Iran’s attacks are framed not as personal but as strategic, aiming to impact the global economy by targeting the UAE as a hub. The UAE’s role in regional politics is portrayed as aggressive in its push toward conflict, although the possibility of reconciliation with Iran is acknowledged. - Alaster Crook and decision-making: An anecdote about Alastair Crook is used to illustrate a point about Western decision-making, suggesting that rational analysis often does not drive policy; emotional factors and perceptions influence choices in Washington and European capitals. - Human costs and damage: The discussion references the human and infrastructural toll, including the destruction seen in Gaza and Lebanon, and alleges the US and Israeli campaigns have caused widespread harm, including to schools and civilians. The speakers assert that the war has inflicted severe economic and humanitarian costs and warn of deeper global recession or depression if conflict deepens. - Specific incident and online safety concerns: The host reveals that Speaker 1 has a bounty on his head, stemming from a Twitter account fundraising for kidnapping him; the account was initially not removed, drawing attention to online threats associated with the conflict. - Nuclear diplomacy and a potential deal: When considering a hypothetical deal, Speaker 1 asserts that Hormuz control must be permanent and rejects a proposal for temporary limits or enrichment concessions in exchange for sanctions relief or assets unfrozen. He emphasizes that Iran believes its nuclear program is a sovereign right and should be handled through international mechanisms like the IAEA rather than through punitive terms tied to Hormuz control. He also reiterates that the nuclear issue has long been used as a pretext for broader policy aims. - Final takeaway: The conversation closes with a sense of caution about the likelihood of avoiding a renewed war, a recognition of the high stakes involved, and an insistence that Hormuz control be non-negotiable for Iran, while acknowledging the potential for reconciliation if Gulf states reevaluate alignment with Israel and the US.