reSee.it - Related Video Feed

Speaker 0 and Speaker 1 discuss the unfolding conflict with Iran, focusing on miscalculations, strategy, and potential trajectories. - Speaker 1 says the war is a major miscalculation, identifiable before it began. Signs were evident: movement of military equipment, force postures, and statements suggested that absent an eleventh-hour change by Trump, the plan was to use prepositioned forces and enablers for sustained combat. He notes this pattern matches previous experiences in which the U.S. saw a buildup as a precursor to war, citing Russia’s 2022 invasion and his own observations of earlier prepositioning, logistics, air support, refueling, and large-scale aviation assets (C-17s, C-5s, fighter jets, aircraft carriers). - He argues Iran’s leadership intended to pursue war rather than negotiation, pointing to what he calls a central missed opportunity: the Oman foreign minister’s Friday-night submissions to the Iranian negotiator offering zero reprocessing, stockpile reductions, and at least preliminary talks on long-range missiles and proxies. He asserts that if the Trump administration had accepted those terms, a ceasefire or settlement might have been possible; instead, he claims the next morning’s attack signaled that negotiations were never the aim. - Regarding U.S. objectives, Speaker 1 says the stated aims from Trump were unattainable given Iran’s resolve and the regime’s calculations that fighting a war with the U.S. is less risky than submitting to U.S. demands. He cites a New York Times report indicating Iran believed war with the U.S. was a viable risk, yet he notes Iran’s leadership now appears to be consolidating support at home and regionally after the Ayatollah’s assassination and the subsequent martyrdom of Qasem Soleimani’s successor in Iran’s internal narrative. - On battlefield dynamics, he emphasizes that Iran’s force deployment is not merely pressure but designed for use, with extensive underground facilities capable of withstanding sustained pressure. He forecasts continued high-intensity operations for a period, but warns the U.S. faces a tightening window: if the Iranian side holds firm and the U.S. cannot sustain supplies and missiles, the U.S. could reach a crisis point. - He discusses possible ceasefire dynamics and political reaction: Trump’s suggestion of a ceasefire could be “complete BS” if the Ayatollah’s position remains solid; the martyrdom and regional protests strengthen Iran’s stance. He expects continued escalation and a hardening of Iran’s demands, including sanctions relief or designation changes, should the conflict drag on. - On regional response, Speaker 1 notes that Iran has drawn regional actors into the conflict, with protests supporting Iran across Iraq, Pakistan, Bahrain, Oman, Kuwait, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Israel. He says many Iranians—though opposed to the regime—are unlikely to embrace Israel or the United States as a path out of the crisis, given decades of antagonism and past betrayals by Western powers. - Regarding U.S. vulnerabilities, he says there are reports of U.S. casualties (three killed, five seriously wounded, others lightly wounded) though some figures are disputed; the public reporting may lag behind direct sources. He mentions possible gaps in air defense and the risk of shortages in interceptors as drones and missiles proliferate, warning that Iran could escalate if U.S. stocks are depleted. - Looking ahead, Speaker 1 argues the conflict is a battle of wills and a war of attrition. The U.S. attempted a “cheap” approach with naval and air power but no ground forces; Iran appears ready to continue long enough to force concessions. He warns the Iranian threat could extend to oil infrastructure and the broader economy if the United States or its regional partners target Iran’s energy sector, potentially broadening the conflict. - In sum, he characterizes Iran’s strategy as all-in, aiming to impose pain to compel a negotiated settlement unfavorable to the U.S., while the U.S. faces a narrowing margin to sustain supply chains, missiles, and air defenses as the conflict potentially drags on for weeks to months. He cautions that the escalation ladder remains with higher rungs available, including strikes on energy infrastructure, if the conflict widens.

Ambassador Chas Freeman, former U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense and former U.S. Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, discusses tensions in the Middle East, focusing on the Israel–U.S. relationship, a potential U.S.-Iran framework, and broader regional and global implications. Freeman says there is “a great deal of tension” between Netanyahu and Trump, asserting that Netanyahu “basically talked Trump into this war,” which “gone very badly” and appears to end without achieving stated objectives. He describes a potential Trump exit strategy: allowing Congress to vote to end the war and portraying it as a betrayal by Democrats and “apostate” Republicans. Freeman argues that any exit would leave Israel “high and dry” and would “invalidate the US partnership with Israel against Iran,” since “no future president is going to do what Donald Trump did.” He characterizes the current status as a “memorandum of understanding” that is “an agreement to negotiate,” not peace or an agreement itself. Freeman contrasts Trump’s earlier approach—going to war “with no negotiations” and using diplomacy as a cover—with current claims that diplomatic means must be exhausted first. He says figures including Mr. Widokoff and Mr. Kushner have been removed and that mediation is now being run by “professional diplomats and leaders from Pakistan and Qatar.” Freeman describes immediate Israeli reaction as subdued due to an election environment, while Israel’s critics in the U.S.—including Lindsey Graham and Ted Cruz—push for returning to war. He portrays Trump as politically cornered: pressured by Netanyahu and Israeli donors, facing rebellion from parts of the Republican base, and dealing with military concerns that there is “no real military option,” with the possibility that the military has sought written orders to avoid blame. On the alleged framework’s key issues, Freeman claims its essence is that the Strait of Hormuz will be open. He disputes that any deal would mean “no tolls,” saying Iran would not accept that and is demanding sanctions relief and release of frozen funds in the “tens of billions of dollars.” He argues Iran will not do anything without receiving something first due to a lack of confidence in the U.S., including the U.S. leaving the JCPOA and repudiating commitments in subsequent negotiations. Freeman argues Iran’s position implies “zugzwang,” where any U.S. actions lead to defeat, stating Iran will not release enriched uranium to third parties, not relinquish control of the Strait of Hormuz, and will not make compromises to appease the U.S. He adds that any deal would face sabotage risk: “If there actually is a deal, Israel is in a perfect position to sabotage it, and will do so,” including insistence on “a real, as opposed to a phony ceasefire in Lebanon.” Freeman broadens the discussion to Lebanon and Israel’s domestic and international standing. He says Israel’s aim in Lebanon remains “an effective annexation,” describing a buffer zone as turning southern Lebanon into “the equivalent of a Gaza.” He also says Hezbollah is using optical fiber-guided drones and that Israel is losing soldiers and equipment, while Lebanese government negotiations are a “sideshow” because Hezbollah has denounced them. He cites Israel’s overstretched forces, declining economy, fatigued reservists, internal divisions, and election pressures on Netanyahu. He also discusses reputational decline abroad, including claims about U.S. political views and European reaction to incidents involving a flotilla. Freeman states that Israel is “essentially a pariah internationally,” while the U.S. continues to back it. He says Israel has “never put forward a single peace proposal” in 78 years and claims this record of belligerence is “unmatched in human history.” He concludes that if the U.S. continues “write blank checks” with no conditions, Israel will not make strategic choices and the state will collapse as foreign support fades. On China, Freeman describes China’s approach as “masterly inactivity” and says China backs Pakistan’s mediation efforts while seeking peace and stability in the Persian Gulf for energy and for restoring UN Charter and international law principles. He claims China has not modified export controls to Iran and that China may be providing technical assistance affecting air defenses. Freeman states it is “ridiculous” to expect China to endorse American aggression against Iran. Freeman argues the war has shifted the strategic environment: Iran is not disarmed, may move toward nuclear capability, and may hold the Strait of Hormuz, improving its leverage. He says the GCC is split, citing Oman’s cooperation with Iran and participation by other Gulf states in discussions about post-war order. He also mentions Hajj as a factor reducing arguments for military action. Finally, Freeman discusses possible U.S. outcomes, comparing the current period to Vietnam but saying Vietnam’s context was different due to Cold War bipolarity. He argues foreign wars are unpopular in the U.S. and predicts reduced alliance strength, discredited international law, and a trend toward arms races and requests for reduced U.S. presence. He describes a turbulent transition toward new polycentric regional orders, with Europe facing questions about viability and international institutions needing replacement. He ends by saying there are “many, many questions, no answers,” and emphasizes that major historical change has been occurring, implying the present is not permanent.

Pepe Escobar and Glenn discuss the secrecy and content of a U.S.-Iran Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) allegedly meant to be signed Friday. Escobar says Iran has provided some information while the U.S. “seems to be not showing their cards.” He claims that he and Larry Johnson have direct access to the negotiating table via Pakistani mediators for the past few weeks. According to Escobar, three weeks earlier they reported a crucial phone call by Pezeshkin to Prime Minister of Pakistan Shabazz Sharif as an ultimatum to the U.S. to “behave” and stop “overstepping” thresholds, warning of “no more nuclear ambiguity.” Three days later, they said an Islamabad Accord was about to be signed and that a similar Trump deal had been ready to be signed six times previously, with Trump backing off. Escobar says their channel was erased from YouTube by direct order of the U.S. government after reporting this. Escobar says the MOU’s key development involved Abbas Arakchi being in Islamabad over the weekend to finalize points with Pakistanis and that the discussions occurred alongside events including an Israeli attack on Dahyeh (south of Beirut). He claims Arakchi told the Pakistanis to warn the Americans that if Israel continued, Iran’s “fingers on the trigger” would be against Israel. Escobar says the White House responded by effectively committing to sign the MOU and to urge Israelis to stop, with the announcement tied to June 14. He further claims that details were withheld even as U.S. officials suggested Trump and Vance had electronically signed the MOU, while no evidence had been shown. On Iran’s side, Escobar describes a delegated decision process: Ayatollah Khamenei’s “green light” is delegated to a Supreme National Security Council with 13 members, requiring a solid majority; he says only two are “reformists,” including President Pesachkin. Escobar says this is why Tehran has not provided official confirmation that it has already signed and expects signing in Geneva Friday, possibly involving Galibaf. He characterizes the MOU as starting a process rather than delivering immediate peace: an initial stage of about 30 days, followed by negotiations in a 60-day period that would extend into late July/early August and across August and September, with acrimonious discussions. Escobar argues Trump’s domestic narrative is built around “twisting narratives” and playing for time, claiming Trump is selling the return of oil flow through the Strait of Hormuz to a “victory,” emphasizing stabilizing oil and bond markets. Escobar says Trump’s stated “victory plan” is effectively about time before rearming the U.S. and resuming war after midterms. Escobar claims Iran’s position on Lebanon is integral to the MOU: “Lebanon is Hezbollah, everything is part of the MOU.” He says Iran told the U.S. that if Israel breaks this, Iran will deal with Israel directly and that if the U.S. intervenes, it would be seen as breaking the MOU, prompting bilateral escalation. He says the Iranian warning includes that continued bombardment of Dahyeh and an Israeli plan aiming at “Gaza 2.0” (permanent occupation of southern Lebanon and turning Dahyeh into a new Gaza) would be met with Iranian retaliation. Glenn asks how Trump will control Israel given Israeli media dissatisfaction about walking back from Lebanon. Escobar replies that the Iranian message already defines the response: Iran says it will bomb Israel “really, really hard” if Dahyeh attacks continue, and that the mediators understand Israel “can break this thing anytime.” The discussion then turns to Pakistan’s diplomatic role. Escobar says Pakistan “played it very well,” involving top-level government figures in mediation. He credits Pakistan’s relationships with Iran and China and says China and Russia supported Pakistan’s mediation, including directing Pakistan to work harder. He argues India could not mediate because India aligned with Israel, referencing close India-Netanyahu ties before February 28. Escobar links Pakistan’s leverage to geoeconomics and infrastructure: Pakistan’s position in the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, Iran’s role in the International North-South Transportation Corridor via Chabahar, and increasing interconnection such as sister-port links between Chabahar and Gwadar. He claims six border crossings between Iran and Pakistan were opened for trade 24/7, and points to a rail link across Central Asia funded by China. Escobar says Pakistan’s mediation is also supported by Gulf communications and defense ties, describing possible Pakistani military presence at Prince Sultan Air Base in Saudi Arabia. He claims Pakistan is working to provide GCC states with a new “protective umbrella” backed by China, after GCC doubts about U.S. guarantees. He suggests UAE stances may shift as “the wind” changes, and that Iran sees negotiating with GCC through Pakistan as a workable structure, with deterrence implied by Iran’s ability to strike. In closing, Glenn and Escobar argue about U.S. adjustment and future war risk, with Escobar stating the situation reflects a strategic defeat and that the U.S. is being expelled from Eurasia. They conclude that the next step is whether there will be actual “solid negotiations” during the first 30-day phase, and whether the U.S. is serious about discussing the “14 points” or using the MOU as “a crude play for time.”

Mario and Professor discuss the current MOU tied to Iran, the Strait of Hormuz, and related negotiations. Professor says Iran is “in the driver’s seat,” that the deal starts “terrifically” for Iran, and that it will “get better over time.” He argues the most important information comes from shippers who want Iran to clearly guarantee their security “by Iran,” not by the United States, UAE, or other Gulf states. He says Iran’s stated demands include $12 billion up front, another $12 billion at the end of the 60 days, and ongoing weekly oil-sale revenue of about a “billion dollars a week,” which he frames as leverage used to “squeeze” Donald Trump during the 60-day window. Professor’s central claim is that oil inventory drawdowns create a timeline advantage for Iran. He says oil shipments to refineries take roughly 30 to 60 days, so during the 60-day window consumers must keep drawing down inventories because “there will be no new oil coming” to them. He predicts Iran’s leverage will grow by the end of 60 days because the world’s buffers will be gone, and oil inventory experts indicate inventories cannot be refilled until next year. He adds that this produces a repeating cycle: if Iran cuts off again, it would be “much worse” for the market, giving Iran additional leverage to demand more, including linked pressure regarding Lebanon and Hezbollah. He also argues that Iran is using the negotiation as a power-maximization tool to reach regional dominance, noting that since March/April Iran has allegedly “taken Hormuz” and then worked to shift Gulf-state alignment through negotiations with Russia, China, Pakistan, Qatar, Oman, and apparently the UAE. He says the Abraham Accords have “gone poof” and frames the shift as “power” and “relative power,” building a sphere of influence while reducing the strategic value of American presence. He expects more regional arrangements “without the U.S.” over the next six months, potentially including Turkey and Saudi Arabia. Regarding U.S. and Israeli reactions, Professor says Israel is the “biggest loser” in a flipped power landscape where Iran becomes the rising power. He argues Israel opened a “second front into Lebanon,” making Israel and the United States more overstretched as Iran’s leverage increases. He says the key question is which Iranian demands matter most: cutting off U.S. military aid to Israel, withdrawing U.S. combat forces from the Persian Gulf, or both. He suggests Israel could respond by “lashing out” if it feels cornered, including possible targeting of Iranian leaders involved in negotiations. Mario asks whether Trump making clear the U.S. would not support Israel in a war would still allow Israel to start one. Professor says “words won’t be enough,” citing internal political pressures on Netanyahu ahead of reelection and the need to appear successful at defending Israel against Iran and Hezbollah. He argues Iran’s leverage trajectory could continue growing and that he expects a period of increased pressure through at least January. On U.S. intelligence, Professor references reporting that CIA Director John Ratcliffe told Trump that U.S. intelligence raised serious doubts about Iran’s willingness to make nuclear concessions, including that Iranian officials discussed the deal inconsistently with what they told American negotiators. He also references Israeli media reporting about Trump potentially allowing opposition figures to be sidelined. In discussing the MOU’s clauses, Professor says ambiguities in the MOU and supposed Israel withdrawal plan (described as non-direct and vague) would tend to advantage Iran across the 60-day window. He frames Iran’s leverage as rising if agreed withdrawal plans do not materialize, with Iran using the resulting circumstances as justification to close the Strait again. He also emphasizes Iran’s strategy of shifting blame—“passing the buck”—so that increased pressure is attributed to America or Israel rather than Iran. Mario and Professor end by noting they will wait for the MOU to be released and then review clauses for political ramifications, while Professor bases his outlook on Iran statements plus the oil inventory drawdown mechanics structured into the 60-day timeframe.

Jiang Shuichin argues that rapid shifts in international power generally become highly disruptive and destabilizing, often coinciding with major world-order changes after major wars or state collapses. He says the Iran war could have wider ramifications beyond the Strait of Hormuz and the region, potentially dragging the broader world into escalating conflict. He explains that the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) has long been a major driver of the global economy by selling oil cheaply in US dollars and recycling revenue into the US economy. If GCC states were removed from the global economy, he says it would have “tremendous consequences.” He claims that within “a month or two” the world could run out of strategic fuel reserves, grounding airplanes. He also links the conflict to global food supply, stating that the Tigray War provides one third of the world’s fertilizer, and that during the global growing season widespread famine could occur within “five months” or “six months,” especially in Africa. On the Middle East’s reorientation, he argues that Iran can control the Strait of Hormuz de facto, collect tolls, and de facto use it to reconstruct its economy, industrialize, and build stronger trade relations with China and Russia. He says the US imposed a naval blockade to embargo Iranian oil exports to China, but that enforcement is difficult due to the Indian Ocean’s scale and US resource limitations. He asserts that the UAE is “most desperate for war” after losing control of trade through the region’s shipping and finance hub. He adds that Saudi Arabia faces long-term threat dynamics because Iranian influence and proxies affect both Hormuz/Straight security and the Red Sea. He claims Israel wants the war to continue to advance the “Greater Israel” project and warns it has discussed attacking Turkey and Egypt next. He frames the region as a “powder keg,” arguing it is hard for the status quo to persist and predicting possible future breakout regional hostilities, including possible US airstrikes against Tehran and possible Israeli false-flag escalation modeled on the Gulf of Tonkin incident. He suggests the status quo could last “the next three to five months,” arguing Trump would avoid being seen as a loser and might pursue a tentative agreement before shifting attention elsewhere. He presents Cuba as a potential “next global flash point,” arguing the US embargo blocks Cuba from accessing fuel, food, and water, and that Raúl Castro could be indicted, recalling a prior pattern involving Maduro and special forces. He says Russia is heavily invested in Cuba and that both Russia and China are trying to support it. He predicts the Middle East conflict could expand to other flashpoints worldwide, including the possibility of tensions involving North Korea and South Korea, and he claims the war in Europe will also escalate. In discussing Russia’s Ukraine war trajectory, he references an attack on a student dormitory in Luhansk that reportedly killed at least six students and says Putin promised swift retaliation, framing this as potential movement from a “special military operation” toward declaring war and switching to “total war.” He then argues that European elites are trapped in a self-reinforcing fantasy that Ukraine is winning, describing domestic and institutional dynamics that prevent acknowledgment of losses and sustain continued war support. Regarding China’s and Russia’s roles, he says Iranian Foreign Minister Araki visited both Russia and China and claims Putin told him Russia is supportive of the Iranian people and views the US and Israel as aggressors. He says if Iran faces difficulties, Russia would reinforce Iran through the Caspian Sea and describes Russia’s response to GCC complaints about Iran. He contrasts China’s approach as neutral and mediation-focused, arguing China seeks peace and ceasefire so the world can return to global trade and that China refuses a clear stance. He also claims China might sign an agreement with the US to buy more LNG to compensate for lost Middle East LNG, especially Qatar. He describes negotiations between the US and Iran as having “three sticking points.” The uranium issue, he says, could allow compromise through allowing international inspectors while keeping uranium. The Strait of Hormuz control, he says, is core to Iranian security and not something Iran would give up. The third sticking point is Lebanon and the requirement that any peace treaty with the US also applies to Lebanon, including Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon. He argues that Israel’s offensive in Lebanon makes lasting peace unlikely and suggests any settlement with Iran would be tentative and could resume within “at most six months.” He argues the US cannot retreat from the Iran war because US financing needs depend on the world continuing to buy US Treasuries and because continuous bombardment is limited by depleted munitions stocks after earlier sustained airstrikes. He states that to “fight this war effectively” the US would need ground troops, which he says would require a national draft and also a chain of events to justify the invasion, including a need for “justification” to rally Americans and create broader economic chaos that would make the invasion acceptable. On Israel’s “Greater Israel” project, he argues that Lebanon is part of the project and that even if the US and Iran reach tentative terms, Israel’s long-term objective would continue, preventing permanent peace. He also claims the Zionist lobby has significant political sway in the US and cites campaign spending aimed at defeating a Republican congressman to warn others. He further argues that conflict models in Europe and Asia are tied to a broader US grand strategy: shifting global conflict to sustain debt and delay economic constraints. He says the US would aim to retreat geographically while still financing and arming partners to prolong wars. For East Asia, he claims the US might allow Japan and South Korea to handle more while American forces and allied structures support containment dynamics. Finally, he argues that Taiwan’s status quo is not sustainable and points to a “grand bargain” after Trump’s China visit. He says Western reporting frames the visit as unproductive, while Chinese media and experts view it as a breakthrough that could end the trade war. He claims the bargain could involve US access to China’s financial market and China opposing Taiwan independence, with the US pausing or blocking a weapons shipment to Taiwan and considering onshoring semiconductors. He states he expects Taiwan to be a future flashpoint only near-term at minimum and argues the next major flashpoint could be North Korea rather than Taiwan. He closes by describing a Western “legitimacy crisis,” attributing it to demographic crisis, financialization, and moral decay, and arguing it will lead to a decline of Western society. He also argues immigration debates are framed as purely pro-immigrant versus racist, while culture and cultural cohesion are not addressed.

If Israel faces annihilation, they might use their nukes. Iran and Hezbollah need to understand they cannot wipe out the Israeli people. If Israel is about to be totally destroyed, they need to be thinking about all their options. The US military being stretched is not Israel's fault. The US should fund its military and not treat it like a secondary agency. This country has a lot of problems, but that's not on the head of the Israeli people who are trying to survive. When the US looks weak, violence and threats increase. Israel's gotta do what it's gotta do.

Colonel Lawrence Wilkerson discusses the escalation involving Israel, Iran, and the United States, describing it as getting worse “with every minute.” He says Iran has “essentially extended its deterrence to Lebanon,” attacking Israel because it attacked Lebanon, and he argues Israel “appears to refuse to accept this extended deterrence,” even though it cannot stop the course of events. He cites former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak: “Neither military pressure nor flattening southern Lebanon can topple Hezbollah,” and says Barak is “caught” in a political bind for Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu: opposition accuses Netanyahu of not being tough enough on Israel’s national security and of yielding to President Trump, while Trump’s stance is portrayed as pressuring Netanyahu to slow down or refrain from some actions, including bombing in Dariya and southern Beirut. Wilkerson frames the situation as both a domestic and personal political issue for Netanyahu as well as a security issue for US and Iran. Wilkerson says much discussion misses “the real point in this entire struggle”: “The struggle is about a Palestinian state,” arguing that Israel’s occupation and regulations governing Palestinians have long been ignored, not only since October 7/8. He describes Palestinians dying “at the rate of about thirty to thirty-five a day,” with deaths attributed to bullets, bombs, and “brutality,” but also to a humanitarian situation he says Israel supports. He gives examples such as eggs costing “two hundred and fifty dollars” per dozen and states black-market conditions make many Egyptians rich, while he also claims a large segment of Egypt supports the system. He argues attention is being diverted to Hezbollah, Daraa, and Beirut while the core issue—Palestinian statehood—is neglected. He links this framing to Iran’s approach, quoting a Haaretz headline he used: “All Iran has to do to win is not lose. All the United States and Israel have to do, and this includes… Who’s Bibi Netanyahu’s future… wins spectacularly.” Wilkerson then emphasizes the idea of multiple “nuclear weapon” components described in a separate account: the Strait of Hormuz, Iran’s relationships with Russia and China, and a third nuclear weapon being built or already made (with possible Pakistani involvement depending on the rumor version). He also references President Trump’s claim that he was the president who “wouldn’t start a war,” and portrays the US situation as further pressured by domestic political conditions ahead of midterms. Wilkerson claims that US domestic politics and legislative moves are “gluing us to Israel” in a way that will give Israel most of the advantage, referencing Tom Cotton in the Senate and Speaker Johnson in the House and “Section two two four” in the “twenty twenty seven NDAA.” He says this would embed Israel legally within the US security apparatus by codifying long-term arrangements without the prior oversight structure, eliminating congressionally visible oversight and restricting the ability to ensure compliance such as prohibitions on using equipment to kill civilians. He argues that intelligence, technology, and other security sharing would be locked in, benefiting Israel “on a twenty-four seven basis,” and he says US defense contractors would also be locked at the hip with Israel, including Lockheed Martin, RTX, Boeing, and other contractors. He claims Israeli systems often rely on US-made equipment or US-funded contracts, so the arrangement “changes everything,” and he adds that a US congressman helped introduce the section at Bibi Netanyahu’s direction, based on a taped telephone call. He concludes that without oversight, the American public cannot know what is occurring in real time. On Ukraine, Wilkerson and the other participant agree that Ukraine is being under-covered compared to the Levant. Wilkerson says Ukraine is “getting increasingly dangerous” and argues that Europe’s actions could eventually lead to consequences involving NATO responses, warning of “sleepwalking into a massive disaster.” He describes Putin as holding restraint “in the dam” and argues that the West is misreading restraint as opposition, while also predicting eventual dangerous outcomes. Wilkerson returns to the Iran-Israel conflict, saying the escalation ladder is being set and that Yemen has reportedly announced Israel will also be banning access to the Red Sea. He argues the US faces limited options because contesting militarily could lead to those restrictions applying to the US as well. He says Iran’s allies are not merely proxies but “allies,” and he reiterates that the conflict cannot be properly handled without correctly characterizing the struggle around Palestinian statehood. In response to a question about whether Iran may attack US ships directly, Wilkerson says he thinks it would be “smart,” and he points to Iran’s capability to hit US vessels using various means, describing videos of hits that strike combat-critical areas without necessarily sinking ships. He says Iran might choose a lower-damage approach to avoid triggering a wider US response. On Israel’s next moves, Wilkerson says Israel is in a difficult spot internally and internationally, and he cites a poll implication: “sixty-seven percent” of people across “thirty-six countries” believe Israel is wrong “for the first time,” reflecting a major change in global sentiment. He also expresses concern that US domestic politics could affect US policy, particularly if midterms turn against Trump and Republicans, while describing legislative leadership as likely to acquiesce to Trump’s approach. He concludes that the overall future direction is uncertain amid rapid global shifts, describing transportation and strategic corridors as changing and warning about multipolar dynamics.

The discussion centers on a “14-point framework,” with Speaker 1 saying its focus under line number one is Lebanon and asking whether Israel will adhere to it by not bombing Lebanon. Speaker 0 says Israel has signaled it is not part of the deal and argues that Lebanon being mentioned three times in the first paragraph shows how much pressure Iran exerted on the U.S. to agree, including that hostilities need to stop in Lebanon and the U.S. is essentially asking it to restrain its ally in Israel. Speaker 0 notes that officials keep repeating they call the deal a disaster and that they will continue attacks “maybe not the attacks,” leaving them in a gray area, while also stating they will not withdraw from southern Lebanon. He says Israel has established a “yellow line” a few kilometers into Lebanese territory and that the MOU states Lebanon’s territorial integrity and sovereignty must be respected, which means withdrawal of Israeli troops. Speaker 0 also highlights that the MOU is the start of a framework toward a peace deal, with a 60-day period of conversations before any potential peace for West Asia, and concludes that taking Israeli officials’ statements at face value, Israel will not stop attacking Lebanon—while emphasizing Lebanon’s repetition to show Iran is serious about ending hostilities on that front. Speaker 2 warns against using the Gaza “peace deal” as a template for what Israel is willing to agree to, citing almost 1,100 deaths in Gaza at the hands of the IDF since the deal and arguing that others may be “hoodwinked” into believing peace exists while Israel proceeds “as it pleases,” changing the narrative. Speaker 0 agrees and adds that he believes Western media coverage has hidden what is happening in Gaza, with headlines describing a ceasefire that “doesn’t exist.” He says the same situation is being pursued in southern Lebanon, where Israel is conducting an “ethnic cleansing” and “extermination” campaign, and he frames the question as whether the U.S. will impose a price on Israel for continued attacks. He says the U.S. is “almost incapable” of saying no to Israel, but says Iran is also presenting itself as guarantor of the clause, telling Israel it will attack and respond in kind if violations continue. He claims Iranian restraint indicates Iran wants to carry out the MOU and end the war, but says if Israel continues to “play spoiler,” Iran will launch attacks against Israel, raising whether the U.S. will step in or follow its prior approach regarding Yemen, where Israel was told it was “on your own.”

Mario: Daniel, after decades of diplomacy, the Middle East is now at war. Early on you suggested Hormuz and economic leverage; as the conflict evolved, US ground invasion talk, targeted Iranian leadership, and new developments—like JD Vance’s reaction to US intel and Israel striking energy infrastructure in Iran—have shaped concerns that Israel wields outsized influence. Broad question: how did we get here and why? Daniel: There’s a long history of American and Israeli influence in play. There is American agency and a geopolitical logic tying chokepoints like Hormuz to broader aims, such as reasserting US primacy vis-à-vis China. But this doesn’t fully explain how the last 10 yards into war were crossed. Netanyahu’s long effort to shape a strategic environment culminated when he found a president open to using American power in the region. Israel’s strategy appears to be to assert greater regional dominion by leveraging US military power and creating dependencies with Gulf states. Netanyahu reportedly offered the president an actionable plan, including on-the-ground assets, to decapitate Iran’s leadership and spark a broader upheaval, which helped push the White House toward a twelve-day war in June. Israel also presented a narrative of rapid US escalation to secure its aims, while the American interagency process—though deteriorated in recent years—had to interpret unusually aggressive, yet selective, Israeli intelligence and objectives. The result is a complex dynamic where US rhetoric and decisions are deeply entangled with Israeli designs for regional hegemony, an outcome that was not broadly anticipated by many regional partners. Mario: If the US administration had not fully understood Israel’s project, how did this come to pass? And how does Mossad factor in? Daniel: Israel has tremendous access to influence over an American administration through lobbying, media echo chambers, and political finance, which Netanyahu exploited to drive a course toward major confrontation with Iran. Before Trump’s term, Netanyahu was nervous about a president who could pivot against allies; he devised a strategy that culminated in Operation Midnight Hammer and subsequent US-Israeli collaboration, reinforced by the possibility of rapid decapitation of Iran’s leadership. There are reports (and debates) about Mossad presenting on-the-ground assets and the possibility of instigating a street revolution in Iran, which may not have been fully believed by Washington but was persuasive enough to shape policy. The question remains how much of Israeli intelligence makes it to Trump and his inner circle, especially given concerns about cognitive ability and decision-making in the White House at that time. Netanyahu’s aim, according to Daniel, was not simply to topple Iran but to maximize Israel’s regional leverage by using American power while reducing other regional peers’ influence. Mario: What about Gulf states and broader regional realignments? How did the Gulf respond, and what does this mean for their security calculus? Daniel: The Gulf states face a stark dilemma. They fear Iran's retaliatory capabilities but also distrust America’s consistency and question whether US support will be cost-effective. Iran’s strikes into the Gulf have forced Gulf capitals to reassess their reliance on US protection and Israel’s influence, particularly given Israel’s aggressive posture and expanded regional footprint—Lebanon, Syria, and Gaza—with potential implications for the Gulf’s own security and economic interests. Some Gulf actors worry about over-dependence on American security assurances while Israel intensifies operational reach. The GCC’s calculus is shifting: they confront a choice between continuing alignment with the US-Israel bloc or seeking more independent security arrangements. The possibility of a broader Gulf-Israel axis, or at least closer coordination, is tempered by concerns over long-term regional stability, public opinion, and the risk of escalation. Mario: How has this affected perceptions of Iran, Israel, and the broader regional order? Has the Gulf’s stance shifted? Daniel: The region’s balance has been unsettled. Iran’s actions have damaged Gulf trust in its neighbors’ security guarantees, while Israel’s aggressive posture and reliance on US power have complicated Gulf states’ calculations. Turkey’s role is pivotal as it balances concerns about Iran and Israel, while also watching how the region realigns. The possibility of a future where Iran’s power is weakened is weighed against the risk of destabilization and long-term security costs. Negotiations between the US, Iran, and regional actors—stoked by Turkish diplomacy and shifting Gulf positions—are ongoing, with Turkey signaling that diplomacy remains important, even as Gulf states reassess their security dependencies. Mario: What about Lebanon and Hezbollah, and the potential for broader spillover? Daniel: Lebanon faces severe consequences: displacement, civilian harm, and a domestic political paralysis that complicates relations with Israel. Hezbollah remains a factor, with ongoing tensions in Lebanon and the South. Israel’s goal of establishing security-control in Lebanon risks reigniting long-standing conflicts, while Lebanon’s government seeks a balance that could prevent further escalation, if possible. The broader picture is that Israel’s approach—driven by a perceived need to neutralize Iran and all potential threats—could provoke wider regional blowback, complicating already fragile domestic politics across the Levant. Mario: Final thoughts as the war unfolds? Daniel: Israel’s strategic ambitions appear to extend beyond countering Iran to shaping a broader order in which it remains the dominant regional power, aided by US military leverage. Gulf states face a difficult reorientation, reassessing longstanding alliances in light of perceptions of US reliability. The coming months will reveal whether regional actors can recalibrate toward diplomatic resolutions or wind up in a deeper, more protracted conflict. The question remains whether a political path could replace military escalation, and whether external powers can deter further aggression and stabilize the region without allowing a broader conflagration.

The conversation centers on multiple competing narratives about the war and its wider regional significance, with the speakers presenting their interpretations and challenging each other’s points. - The hosts open by acknowledging competing narratives: some view the war as a necessary action against a regime seen as destabilizing and dangerous (nuclear ambitions, regional havoc); others see it as Israel removing a geopolitical threat with U.S. involvement; a third perspective argues it stemmed from miscalculations by Trump, perhaps driven by Israeli influence. The dialogue frames the war within broader questions of American, Israeli, and Iranian aims. - Speaker 1 references Joseph Kent’s resignation letter, arguing Iran was not an immediate U.S. threat and that Netanyahu and the Israeli lobby influenced Trump toward war. They assert Trump’s stated interest in Iranian oil and control of the Strait of Hormuz; they describe Trump as guided by business interests. They frame U.S. actions as part of a long-standing pattern of demonizing enemies to justify intervention, citing Trump’s “animals” comment toward Iranians and labeling this demonization as colonial practice. - Speaker 0 pushes back on Trump’s rhetoric but notes it suggested a willingness to pressure Iran for concessions. They question whether Trump could transition from ending some wars to endorsing genocidal framing, acknowledging disagreement with some of Trump’s statements but agreeing that Israeli influence and Hormuz control were important factors. They also inquire whether Trump miscalculated a prolonged conflict and ask how Iran continued to fire missiles and drones despite expectations of regime collapse, seeking clarity on Iran’s resilience. - Speaker 1 clarifies that the Iranian system is a government, not a regime, and explains that Iranian missile and drone capabilities were prepared in advance, especially after Gaza conflicts. They note Iran’s warning that an attack would trigger a regional war, and reference U.S. intelligence assessments stating Iran does not have a nuclear weapon or a program for one at present, which Trump publicly dismissed in favor of Netanyahu’s view. They recount that Iran’s leaders warned of stronger responses if attacked, and argue Iran’s counterstrikes reflected a strategic calculus to deter further aggression while acknowledging Iran’s weaker, yet still capable, position. - The discussion shifts to regional dynamics: the balance of power, the loss of Israel’s “card” of American support if Iran can close Hormuz, and the broader implications for U.S.-Israel regional leverage. Speaker 1 emphasizes the influence of the Israeli lobby in Congress, while also suggesting Mossad files could influence Trump, and notes that the war leverages Netanyahu’s stance but may not fully explain U.S. decisions. - The two then debate Gulf states’ roles: Saudi Arabia and the UAE are depicted as providing bases and support to the United States; Kuwait as a near neighbor with vulnerability to Iranian action and strategic bases for American forces. They discuss international law, noting the war’s alleged illegality without a UN Security Council authorization, and reference the unwilling-or-unable doctrine to explain Gulf state complicity. - The conversation covers Iran’s and Lebanon’s involvement: Iran’s leverage via missiles and drones, and Lebanon’s Hezbollah as a Lebanese organization with Iranian support. They discuss Hezbollah’s origins in response to Israeli aggression and their current stance—driving Lebanon into conflict for Iran’s sake, while Hezbollah asserts independence and Lebanon’s interests. They acknowledge Lebanon’s ceasefire violations on both sides and debate who bears responsibility for dragging Lebanon into war; Hezbollah’s leaders are described as navigating loyalties to Iran, Lebanon, and their people, with some insistence that Hezbollah acts as a defender of Lebanon rather than a mere proxy. - Towards the end, the speakers reflect on personal impact and future dialogue. They acknowledge the war’s wide, long-lasting consequences for Lebanon and the region, and express interest in continuing the discussion, potentially in person, to further explore these complex dynamics.

The conversation centers on Israel’s war with Iran and its broader regional implications, with Speaker 0 (an Israeli prime minister) offering his assessment and critiques, and Speaker 1 pushing for clarification on motives, strategy, and policy directions. Key points about the Iran war and its origins - Speaker 0 recalls learning of the war on February 28 in Washington, and states his initial reaction: the United States’ claim that Iran is an enemy threatening annihilation of Israel is understandable and something to be supported, but questions what the next steps and the endgame would be. - He argues that Iran, through proxies like Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis, posed a global and regional threat by arming missiles and pursuing nuclear capacity, and asserts that Iran deserved punishment for its actions. He raises the question of whether the outcome could have been achieved without war through a prior agreement supervised by international bodies. - He emphasizes that the lack of a clear, articulated next step or strategy undermines the legitimacy of the war’s continuation, even as he concedes the necessity of addressing Iran’s nuclear ambitions. - He also notes that the war affected the global economy and regional stability, and stresses the importance of coordinating a path that would end hostilities and stabilize the region. Speaker 1’s analysis and queries about U.S. interests and Netanyahu’s influence - Speaker 1 questions the rationale behind U.S. involvement, suggesting that strategic interests around the Strait of Hormuz and Iran’s nuclear program were not the only drivers, and cites reporting that Netanyahu presented Iran as weak to push Trump toward regime change, with limited pushback within the U.S. administration. - He asks how much influence Netanyahu had over Trump, and whether the war was pushed by Netanyahu or driven by broader strategic calculations, including concerns about global economic consequences. - He notes that, even if Iran was making concessions on nuclear issues, the war’s continuation raises concerns about broader U.S. and global interests and the potential damage to European and allied relationships. Israeli-Lebanese dimension and Hezbollah - The discussion moves to Lebanon and the question of a ground presence in the South of Lebanon. Speaker 1 asks whether Netanyahu’s administration intends annexation of Lebanese territory and whether there is a real risk of such plans, given the recent destruction of villages and the broader context of regional diplomacy. - Speaker 0 distinguishes between military necessity and political strategy. He says the ground operation in southern Lebanon is unnecessary because Hezbollah missiles extend beyond 50 kilometers from the border, and he argues for negotiating a peace process with Lebanon, potentially aided by the international community (notably France), to disarm Hezbollah as part of a larger framework. - He asserts that there are voices in the Israeli cabinet that view South Lebanon as part of a Greater Israel and would seek annexation, but he insists that such annexation would be unacceptable in Israel and that disarming Hezbollah should be tied to a broader peace with Lebanon and Iran’s agreement if a negotiations-based settlement is reached. - The idea of integrating Hezbollah into the Lebanese military is rejected as artificial; disarmament is preferred, with the caveat that Hezbollah could not be dissolved as a military force if Iran remains a principal backer. Speaker 0 suggests that a Hezbollah disarmed and integrated into Lebanon’s political-military system would require careful design, potentially with international participation, to prevent Hezbollah from acting as an independent proxy. War crimes and accountability - The participants discuss imagery like a soldier breaking a statue of Jesus and broader allegations of misconduct during the Gaza war. Speaker 0 condemns the act as outrageous and unacceptable, while Speaker 1 notes that individual soldier actions do not represent an entire army and contrasts external reactions to abuses with a broader critique of proportionality in Gaza. - Speaker 0 acknowledges that there were crimes against humanity and war crimes by Israel, rejects genocide, and endorses investigations and accountability for those responsible, while criticizing the political leadership’s rhetoric and the behavior of certain ministers. - They touch on the controversial death-penalty bill for Palestinians convicted of lethal attacks, with Speaker 0 characterizing the Israeli government as run by “thugs” and criticizing ministers for celebratory conduct, while Speaker 1 argues that such rhetoric inflames tensions. Two-state solution and long-term vision - The conversation culminates in Speaker 0 presenting a long-standing two-state plan: a two-state solution based on 1967 borders, with East Jerusalem as the capital of Palestine, and the Old City of Jerusalem not under exclusive sovereignty but administered by a five-nation trust (Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Palestine, Israel, and the United States). - He asserts that this approach represents an alternative to the current government’s policies and reiterates his commitment to opposing Netanyahu’s administration until it is replaced. - They close with mutual acknowledgment of the need for a durable peace framework and reiterate that Hezbollah’s disarmament must be a condition for normalization between Israel and Lebanon, while cautioning against artificial or compromised arrangements that would leave Hezbollah armed or entrenched.

Chas Freeman, a former US assistant secretary of defense, and Glenn discuss the current state of diplomacy and security in West Asia, broader great-power dynamics, and Lebanon, Iran, and the Strait of Hormuz. Freeman argues that West Asia shows an ongoing, long-running unraveling, with a core issue being whether the United States still understands diplomacy or relies on inexperienced envoys and “the cronies or the son-in-law” rather than seasoned diplomats. He asserts that the Iranians understand diplomacy and seized an opportunity when the Strait of Hormuz was opened under Iranian-controlled conditions, which could have set the stage for a long-term management arrangement for the strait. Instead, the Trump administration’s response—doubling down on the blockade—led Iran to retract its opening, returning to essential closure and increasing pressure on global economies, including higher gasoline prices for American consumers. Freeman contends the credibility of Iran in this context is greater than that of the United States, and he speculates that the blockade may have been a pretext for a military action that did not materialize. Freeman notes several shifting tactical realities: the U.S. blockade has drawn down the global oil market, and oil markets have changed with India paying Iranian oil in Chinese yuan, suggesting a potential move away from the petrodollar. He observes that a substantial portion of the US Navy is in the Arabian Sea or Gulf of Oman conducting the blockade, with deteriorating shipboard conditions. Iran, by contrast, appears better positioned in a war of attrition, with stored missiles and the ability to resume bombardment if needed. He mentions that Iran has oil to export and can sell it, highlighting the strategic geography beyond Hormuz. On Gulf states, Freeman says Saudi Arabia does not approve the blockade and has been in touch with Tehran; Saudi Arabia is the GCC’s best-positioned state but remains under pressure. The UAE is caught between blocs, Oman is relatively exempt, while Saudi Arabia acts as a conduit for Kuwait and Qatar. Iran has threatened to call on Ansar al-Law/Houthis to close the Bab el-Mandeb and the Red Sea if needed. Even with an open strait and sailing ships, the global oil shock remains likely, and a broader energy realignment could benefit Russia and Venezuela, with Venezuela not yet seeing a substantial production rise. Freeman emphasizes that if the Strait of Hormuz is opened as a mere tactical victory for the U.S., it would be hard to argue for a comprehensive peace process in the region. Freeman asserts that Iran’s strategy emphasizes regime consolidation rather than collapse, with its missiles and energy reserves enabling continued pressure. He argues that China has a different position: China defends the UN Charter and the international system and benefits from a global, multinodal order. China seeks to preserve access to the Persian Gulf and aligns with Pakistan as an intermediary, while developing a broader regional strategy that can facilitate a Belt and Road integration, including energy routes and LNG imports. He notes that China is seen by regional actors as a defender of international law and a stabilizing interlocutor, contrasting with US actions that undermine the rule of law domestically and internationally. China is also doubling down on Central Asia routes and the Power of Siberia gas pipeline, with the possibility of energy swaps from Iran. On Lebanon, Freeman describes an illegitimate Lebanese government aligned with Israel’s objectives and Hezbollah’s resistance to coercive measures. He views Israel’s strategy as destroying Hezbollah’s military and political influence in southern Lebanon, blowing bridges and imposing a Gaza-like model in Lebanon. He predicts a recurrence of a phony ceasefire with Israel continuing its operations, potentially triggering a new confrontation with the United States and Netanyahu’s government, unless the Trump administration capitulates to Israeli priorities. He frames Iran as achieving a regional peace objective through a comprehensive, region-wide approach, rather than mere truces. Regarding diplomacy and negotiations, Freeman criticizes “fantasy foreign policy” driven by media narratives rather than real negotiations. He argues that the Islamabad meeting with Iran’s delegation was not a true negotiation, and the American side lacked expert staff and real leverage. He contrasts this with Iran’s delegation, which arrived with hundreds of knowledgeable participants and full authority. He notes that the overall approach has been amateur, with no binding documents or real settlement. Freeman closes with reflections on historical U.S. grand strategy, noting the United States’ tradition of exporting its values, but arguing that today’s approach is inconsistent with the rule of law, international diplomacy, and lasting peace. He contends that the current trend favors Iran in the Gulf struggle and that China remains a stabilizing, influential actor amid US and Israeli actions.

Hezbollah's capabilities have been degraded, and thousands of terrorists were eliminated, including Nasrallah, his replacement, and the replacement of his replacement. Hezbollah is now weaker than it has been in many years. The Lebanese people are at a crossroads and can take back their country, returning it to peace and prosperity. If they don't, Hezbollah will continue to fight Israel from densely populated areas at the expense of the Lebanese people.

Professor and Host engage in a wide-ranging discussion about the Iran-Israel-Lebanon dynamic, the prospects for war, and the potential paths to change. - They open with tensions around Iran, suggesting that Netanyahu and the Israeli lobby won’t let Iran “rest,” and that Iran is implicated in the current Lebanon conflict while insisting that Lebanon’s fight is Lebanon’s own. The Professor stresses that Hezbollah is a Lebanese organization and not a direct Iranian proxy, and that Iran’s involvement is framed by its own interests rather than as an intrusive occupation of Lebanon. - The Host challenges this view, noting that Lebanon’s government decided not to join the war and that Hezbollah rearmed in the south, arguing that Iran has influence in Lebanon and that Hezbollah’s actions reflect a broader proxy dynamic in the country. The Professor counters that Hezbollah is not a proxy and emphasizes Lebanon’s sovereignty and internal affairs, while arguing that Iran can assist resistance groups when asked but should not be blamed for all Lebanese actions. - They discuss the state of the conflict: is the war over or a ceasefire that could resume? The Host asks for a probability estimate (1–10); the Professor places it at six or seven that it could re-ignite, arguing that Trump and Netanyahu will continue to push Iran and that the regime in Tehran will respond, given new leadership and a determination to avoid being disarmed or appeased. - On aims and capabilities, the Professor cites Trump’s stated desire to take over Iranian oil (per a Financial Times interview) and to “change Iran’s government,” including the idea of disintegrating Iran and establishing an Israeli-driven hegemony in the region. He also suggests Trump views oil leverage as a strategic tool against China, drawing on broader geopolitical ambitions such as the North-South Corridor. The Host and Professor discuss the idea of leveraging Iran’s oil to pressure or blockade China and to influence global power dynamics. - The conversation moves to the larger question of how to achieve U.S. objectives short of full-scale war. The Host suggests non-military options beyond sanctions, including possible tolls, business deals, or new arrangements around the Strait of Hormuz, while the Professor argues that sanctions relief would require Congressional action and that Netanyahu’s influence makes relief unlikely. The Host proposes that sanctions relief could be tied to dismantling proxies like Hezbollah, with Iran receiving asset unfreezing in exchange, and a tollbooth mechanism as possible recompense. - They compare political systems: the Host asks whether a more pragmatic Iranian leadership could compromise with the West, while the Professor challenges the notion of embracing Israel or normalization absent broader regional changes. They discuss Iranian internal politics, including protests and the 2021–2024 leadership shifts, arguing that the current leadership is generally more energetic and less likely to exercise restraint under renewed pressure. - The Wall Street Journal summary is invoked: a shift to a harderline leadership within Iran, with Mustafa Khamenei described as consolidating power and surrounding himself with hardliners who view destroying Israel as central. The Host and Professor debate whether this portends greater confrontation or potential pragmatism in dealing with the United States, emphasizing that any significant rapprochement would hinge on broader regional dynamics and the role of Israel. - The discussion turns to the prospects for a two-state solution versus a one-state outcome in Palestine. The Professor contends that a one-state solution would be unlikely unless Israel changes fundamentally, while the Host notes shifts in Western public opinion and some American youths showing increasing sympathy for Palestinian rights. They acknowledge that most polling in the U.S. still supports a two-state framework, even as younger demographics show divergent views. - They close with mutual acknowledgement that there is no straightforward path to peace, reiterating concerns about possible future confrontations, the influence of external powers, and the complexities of Lebanon’s sovereignty, Hezbollah’s role, and Iran’s internal politics. The Host and Professor each express hopes for peace, while recognizing the likelihood of continued strategic competition rather than a clear, immediate resolution.

The discussion centers on the alleged failure of Trump’s ceasefire with Iran and the dramatic military moves around it. The hosts point to Reuters and other outlets reporting thousands of Marines being rapidly transferred from San Diego into the region, suggesting preparations for a potential ground invasion rather than a real ceasefire. They highlight that Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner are involved in the efforts, and question why American forces are being moved if a ceasefire is in place. They argue that the U.S. and Israel show no intention of a genuine ceasefire or meeting Iran’s ten-point plan. After Trump’s administration celebrated a “ceasefire breakthrough” with Iran, Israel reportedly launched a series of attacks inside Lebanon, with Lebanese sources claiming hundreds of civilians were killed (more than 300) and millions displaced, undermining the ceasefire. They note Israel’s continued strikes on Lebanon, with Netanyahu’s side stating they would not stop and would continue to strike Hezbollah with full force, portraying Hezbollah as a target tied to Iran and Lebanon’s invasion. The program raises questions about whether the ceasefire could be limited to the United States and Iran, excluding Israel, and whether Iran could exclude Israel. They wonder if the ceasefire is a mechanism to reset or rearm rather than to establish lasting peace. They reference a draft ceasefire approved by the U.S., which Lebanese Hezbollah and others argue should include an end to Israeli expansion in Lebanon. Trump spokespeople claimed Lebanon was not included, but the hosts and guests argue Lebanon was indeed part of the terms, noting that the U.S. supplied a draft to Pakistan’s prime minister that included Lebanon, which Pakistan reposted. Dave DeCamp (antiwar.com) and Max Blumenthal (The Grey Zone) join to discuss. Dave notes that Iran’s ceasefire includes Lebanon, and Israel escalated with “operation eternal darkness,” killing hundreds. He questions JD Vance’s comments that Lebanon was never part of the terms and suggests the negotiations hint at a deal only between the U.S. and Iran, potentially allowing Iran and Israel to fight. He notes the involvement of Kushner and Witkoff in negotiations and observes that the day after the ceasefire was announced, the U.S. and Israel acted in ways inconsistent with a real ceasefire. Max adds that the White House has rebranded operations to “Epic Fury” and suggests a ground invasion appears more likely as a response to a failed ceasefire. He argues the ceasefire has fallen apart within hours and asserts the broader geopolitical dynamics—where the Straits of Hormuz act as a choke point and Iran uses cryptocurrency-based tolls—shift leverage toward Iran. He contends the war strengthens Iran’s political position while weakening those advocating appeasement or renewal of the JCPOA, and asserts that the U.S. can only cause more death and destruction. They discuss the international response to the Beirut bombing, noting tepid Western condemnation and arguing the U.S. and Israel depend on U.S. weapons and bombs to carry out the assault. They observe that Western officials have not condemned the attack vigorously, and that the Lebanese public is rallying around Hezbollah and seeking Iranian intervention in response to Israel’s actions. They reference New York Times reporting about Israel “dragging the United States into war” and the backlash against that characterization. They discuss the Pentagon’s integration with Israeli/Israeli-linked operations, and suggest that senior Trump advisers may have disputed Netanyahu’s narrative, with Ratcliffe expressing doubts about Israeli intelligence. They note internal tensions and potential fall guys like Pete Hegseth, while acknowledging Trump’s central role and the possibility of accountability at the ballot box. In closing, they emphasize the ongoing travel of Kushner, Vance, and other figures to broker a 10-point plan in Pakistan, while questioning trust in the process and urging scrutiny of who is driving the talks and under what terms. They promote Dave DeCamp’s antiwar.com coverage as a resource.

The discussion centers on shifting U.S. rhetoric toward Iran and Israel amid negotiations and escalating conflict. As the interview goes live, news reports Iran suspended its trip to Switzerland for the opening round of nuclear negotiations. Iran’s stated reason is ongoing Israeli military operations in southern Lebanon, arguing Israel is operating over six miles inside Lebanese territory in violation of Article 1 of the MOU calling for an immediate end to hostilities on all fronts, including Lebanon. Iran says if the ceasefire clause is being breached before negotiations begin, there is nothing to go to Geneva for. Trump is also described as posting a call for a complete ceasefire on all fronts, including Lebanon, Hezbollah, and Israel. The interview then focuses on Israel as a “wild card” in the MOU and whether Trump can restrain Netanyahu. The colonel says Israeli leadership and U.S. billionaire supporters helped put Trump into office and are turning current events into “a test of Jewish power,” aiming to pressure Trump back into attacking Iran. He argues this approach reflects disproportionate influence already held by these actors, and predicts efforts to bully the president toward war. A CNN report is referenced describing Netanyahu lobbying to shape the final U.S.-Iran agreement by pressuring Trump through allies and intermediaries in Washington, mobilizing pro-Israeli senators and media allies. Netanyahu is said to believe a final agreement will be reached but is concerned Tehran will not uphold it. Separately, Netanyahu is described as saying Israel will restore security to the north through maintaining a security zone in southern Lebanon until Israel’s security needs require it, which the interviewer links to Netanyahu rallying U.S. influence to pressure Trump. When asked whether Trump can withstand this pressure, the colonel describes a transformation in Trump’s foreign-policy posture: he says Trump did not want a war with Iran, believed an arrangement could be reached, and showed reluctance to go to war generally. The colonel describes interruptions in foreign-policy dialogue after Ukraine in April 2022, then describes increasing belligerence around the early Iran conflict, including an account of Trump’s expectation that military action could end the war quickly. He then says Trump concluded the approach was not going well, became concerned about financial markets and the U.S. economy, and that the repeated claim “this war is going to end soon” could not end the conflict without a closure. The colonel argues Trump found no military solution and that using a nuclear weapon was “off the table.” He frames Trump’s challenge as dealing with Israel in a context where only an MOU exists as a rough framework, and highlights provisions aligned with Trump’s instincts, including not meddling in internal affairs and desire for forces to return home. He claims Trump was shown information about atrocities by Israelis against people in Gaza and Lebanon and that Trump’s statement about not needing to destroy an entire apartment building to eliminate one person reflects a broader realization. The colonel says some people are calling for Trump’s resignation because he “lost a war,” and responds that major powers do not achieve permanent “perfect victory streaks,” but instead must cut losses and move on. The colonel argues that future power in the Middle East will be dominated by Iran and Turkey, describing them as different from Israel and emphasizing that provoking Turkey would lead to a “fight to the finish.” He argues Israel’s existential threat is not Iran but Turkey, and contends that Israel and others are operating in a changing global environment where ISR-strike complexes and persistent surveillance plus standoff attack weapons enable new defensive and offensive capabilities. He concludes that the war must be brought to an end because the world has fundamentally changed and efforts to “reset it to backwards” are tied to calls for bombing more. A question is raised about how escalation could work if Israel continues strikes in Lebanon and Iran retaliates, and Trump chooses not to get involved, including not intercepting missiles. The colonel replies that this is “almost already happening,” citing Israeli shelling from southern Lebanon artillery positions and predicting Israel will attack Hizballah positions, which he describes as an existential threat for Israel. He says Israel would need U.S. assistance—munitions, missiles, intelligence—and predicts Netanyahu would pressure Trump politically if support were withheld, including threats aimed at Trump’s political survival. He also says he is “genuinely concerned” about the president’s safety. The conversation then shifts to claimed political and systemic factors limiting presidential agency and the possibility of escalation beyond normal pressure campaigns. The colonel suggests investigations involving members of the president’s family and references wealth growth and “Epstein files” as elements that could return to center stage. He also describes how criminal or political actions and unpredictable events have historically led leaders to be removed or harmed, and compares concerns to the experience of President Kennedy’s assassination. When discussing how pressure campaigns could become more sinister, he outlines ways investigations, media narratives, and orchestrated blame could be pursued. Near the end, the colonel discusses how broader U.S. and military bureaucracies operate, stating commanders can be constrained by service chiefs and confirmed positions, and arguing that institutional incentives discourage independent action. He recommends his book “A Margin of Victory: Five Battles That Changed the Face of War, Modern Warfare,” and says it addresses the limits of what government can accomplish on an average day due to other people’s decisions and confirmed constraints. The interview closes with the colonel referencing a Substack piece coming out Sunday or Monday discussing a shift in power and asserting that Iran has won the war and is “invincible,” “humbled, but not broken.”

Alistair Crook and Alistair Crook discuss two linked crises: Iran and the US/Israel framework for a ceasefire, and a Europe-coordinated escalation against Russia after a major strike on Moscow. Crook begins with Iran, referencing a memorandum of understanding that has allegedly already been signed but remains shrouded in secrecy. He asks whether the Americans will uphold it, how it will reshape the region, and how it affects US-Israeli dynamics. Crook notes that Netanyahu appears weaker and raises the possibility that his replacement could be more hawkish, questioning whether Arab-party support for Netanyahu has shifted. He suggests that regardless of whether the framework is implemented, it will have a major impact across the US, Israel, and the wider region. Alistair Crook responds that the arrangement is a “framework” rather than a treaty or ceasefire: it is the “easiest part,” while the hardest element is constructing a protective zone and managing disruption. He describes visible elements already approaching within this “framework.” He then breaks down three areas Crook raised. First, he says the agreement is controversial in the United States and also controversial in Iran. He describes tension rooted in Iran’s experience with the JCPOA not being upheld and Iran remaining constrained. He cites a statement by Iran’s Supreme Leader, saying the Supreme Leader opposed the framework but was persuaded by Tazashian and Kaleva that there would be no backsliding on the framework terms or Iranian interests, which predominantly center on Hormuz. He frames Hormuz as a pivot for Iran’s potential shift into a new geopolitical context. He adds that the Supreme Leader is putting on notice both Iran’s reformist wing and a skeptical public that Iran will not allow precedents that expand the meaning of the framework until it is emptied of its purpose. Second, he highlights Lebanon as crucial. He says Iran has changed its position because it previously did not intervene directly against Israel in the axis-of-resistance way until the last period. He describes this as the first time Iran threatened heavy missile strikes on northern Israel if Israel flattened Beirut’s Dahir, arguing that this threatened the border-to-Galilee “path.” He says Trump then intervened and the attacks were stopped, but now the “thing” is being tested again. He links this to a breach question: he says Iran refuses to attend negotiating sessions and that Lebanon would be seen as a breach of the ceasefire from Iran’s perspective. Third, he turns to Israel and US politics. He claims Israeli press coverage reflects “real turmoil,” portraying the situation as a huge defeat for the “victory narrative” involving American support to destroy Iran, destroy Hezbollah, and annex parts of Lebanon with proxy permission. He describes an incident near Bofor Castle where Hezbollah attacked with an anti-tank missile, resulting in four soldiers dead, including the commander of the 82nd Brigade. He says figures and polling pressure are intensifying for Netanyahu, arguing that if Netanyahu does nothing militarily in Lebanon, his election will be lost and that there is “wall-to-wall consensus” for action. He adds that Trump’s language is shocking to Israelis: he reports Trump criticized Israel’s handling in Beirut and implied that an ex-ISIS leader could manage Lebanon more “sophisticatedly,” describing it as an unparalleled slap. He says Israelis interpret this as a Middle East that has changed: they believe there is no way to destroy Iran without the United States, and therefore that regime change is not achievable. He characterizes the result as a psychological defeat for the “Gratial Israel” concept and an acceptance that the US may impose penalties on Israel if it retaliates or breaches the framework, particularly in ways that could undermine Trump’s achievement of opening Hormuz. He argues that the framework triggered a US shift, driven by Hormuz and an “economic cliff,” saying Trump said the US was “four weeks away from running out of oil,” with figures describing US strategic reserve levels down to about 20 million barrels. He describes the ensuing US domestic battle between pro-Israel Zionist groups and Trump supporters insisting on “America first.” He counters a simple prediction of Republican losses by suggesting the midterms are rotational, with about 20 Republican seats in contention, and that loyalty to Trump’s personality could reduce defection. He also suggests that if Netanyahu attacks Lebanon, the shift could frame it as “slapping America in the face,” potentially rebounding politically for Trump among some voters. Crook then shifts topics to Russia, focusing on what he presents as an unprecedented Western escalation: a massive strike on Moscow, with NATO footprints being “advertised almost.” He asks how such escalation could be controlled and prevent nuclear escalation. He also complains that Western participation is now openly visible despite earlier efforts to conceal or downplay it. Alistair Crook says the strike involved many drones and missiles into a refinery area in Moscow and was intended to put Russians “on edge.” He links it to coordination around EU and allied meetings, stating that Macron and Merz met in London beforehand and brought Zelensky to stage European ultimatums. He says the point was to change the narrative, with Europe trying to present that Ukraine is not on the back foot and to push for more defense resources. He describes Europe’s aim as a ceasefire framework and UK/France and other participation in peacekeeping, with Ukraine eventually aligned with Europe, and bringing America back into the process via stage-managed messaging. He argues that Europe is escalating toward a war with Russia but lacks practical clarity on what such a war would look like, questioning whether it would be conventional, asymmetrical, air, or nuclear. He recounts arguments by Russian figures at the St. Petersburg Conference about stopping the “ratchet” of escalation and says the debate is growing over more procurement, missiles, drones, and co-production—reassembling shipped systems in Ukraine for use against Russia. He says Europe’s assumption that Russia would capitulate is a misunderstanding of Russia’s consciousness and history with Europe, similar to what he earlier described as a misunderstanding of Iran. He concludes that the strategy is dangerous because there is no clear escalation control if Russia perceives the threat, and he links this to Russia’s history of restraint before retaliation. The discussion ends with Crook urging readers to consult Alistair Crook’s Substack, and Crook thanking him for his insights.

Rula and Mario discuss the broader and regional dimensions of the Israel-Palestine-Lebanon conflict, focusing on the perception of Israel’s actions, Iran’s role, and the future of Lebanon and the wider Middle East. - Rula frames the war as centered on the greater Israel project, describing the military occupation, domination, and violence in Palestinian, Lebanese, and Syrian territories as the core issue. She argues Israel is an occupying power under international law and questions the rationale of asking Palestinians and Lebanese to disarm while occupation persists. - Mario challenges the view that Israel as a single, unified actor always seeks expansion, noting that in Lebanon, Hezbollah’s presence arises from past Israeli actions and that some Israelis want coexistence with Lebanon. He contends there are variations within Israeli society, with some advocating for annexation or permanent conflict, while others prefer coexistence or diplomacy, though he acknowledges a radicalized current in Israeli politics. - The conversation moves to Iran’s role and regional dynamics. Mario argues the conflict has become regional and global, with Iran signaling willingness to act ruthlessly to mirror US and Israeli actions, and with other powers (Gulf states, China, Russia, the US) shaping the war’s scope. He asserts Israel’s strategic goals diverge from American goals, claiming the war serves the Greater Israel project and that Netanyahu has long pursued this vision, aided by a perceived, multi-decade alignment with American power and money from pro-Israel donors. - Rula emphasizes the internal Israeli political and social landscape, citing the Gatekeepers documentary as evidence that Israeli leadership has used Hamas and other actors as strategic tools, and she argues that the state’s actions are guided by a broader ideology (which she attributes to a form of Jewish supremacism) rather than conventional security concerns. She contends that Israel’s security narrative relies on perpetual conflict, and she asserts the United States has become financially and politically subservient to pro-Israel interests through campaign financing and lobbying. - The dialogue addresses US and international responses. Mario notes the US and Western support for Israel, while acknowledging criticisms of American influence. Rula counters by pointing out that US actions, such as sanctioning international courts to shield Netanyahu from war crimes prosecution, reflect a deep, structural alignment with Israeli policy. They discuss how this alignment influences regional dynamics, including the US response to challenges from Iran, Syria, and Hamas. - On Lebanon specifically, they debate whether Israel intends to annex parts of Lebanon or seek coexistence with Lebanese authorities and Hezbollah. Rula argues that Israel historically aimed to push toward annexation or subjugation of Lebanon, driven by a broader Greater Israel agenda, while Mario suggests Israel may prefer coexisting arrangements similar to Egypt and Jordan, though she counters that such coexistence would still come with coercive power dynamics and that Israeli policy has repeatedly demonstrated willingness to decimate Lebanon’s infrastructure and Hezbollah targets when framed as security operations. - The discussion covers ceasefires and ceasefire violations. They note that Hezbollah reportedly agreed to disarm and withdraw from certain areas, but ceasefire breaches occurred on both sides, including Hezbollah rocket fire and Israeli strikes. They debate who has honored or violated agreements, with Rula asserting that Israel breached ceasefires multiple times and Mario emphasizing parallel violations by Hezbollah. - They touch on the humanitarian and civilian toll, highlighting Lebanese displacement, destruction in Lebanon similar to Gaza, and the long-term risk of further fragmentation in the Middle East. Mario and Rula acknowledge Lebanon’s multi-sectarian society and express a lament for its potential loss of stability and coexistence. - Towards the end, they reflect on Israeli societal attitudes, referencing nationalist and supremacist sentiments inside Israel, including debates over Palestinian and Arab citizens, and they discuss the relative popularity of hardline policies among Israelis, contrasted with poll data that vary by source about two-state solutions or diplomatic options. - The exchange closes with mutual appreciation for the dialogue, a hint of residual mistrust in negotiated outcomes, and a light aside about a potential inquiry to an Israeli spokesperson about unpaid propaganda work, signaling ongoing attempts to scrutinize public messaging. Key points reiterated: - The war seen as part of a broader Greater Israel project, with occupation central to the conflict. - Iran and regional powers are pivotal in expanding the war beyond the Middle East. - Israeli internal politics, donor influence, and demographic shifts shape policy and willingness to pursue or resist further conflict. - Hezbollah and Lebanon are central but contested elements in debates about annexation versus coexistence. - Ceasefire dynamics reflect mutual distrust and ongoing violence on both sides. - There is a strong emphasis on the need to address underlying crises and the danger of perpetuating permanent warfare, with appeals to listen to diverse Israeli voices and to consider the humanitarian consequences for Lebanon and Palestinians.

The conversation focuses on developments around U.S.-Iran nuclear negotiations, the Israel–Lebanon war, and concerns that actions in the region could undermine or complicate a potential agreement. The discussion begins with a reported Israel–U.S. tension: the IDF was said to be abandoning plans to bomb Beirut after American pressure, driven by fears Iran might retaliate. The caller links this to U.S. opposition to Israeli plans to restart a large-scale war in Lebanon, particularly mass bombing campaigns in Shia-majority districts of Beirut, and to concerns Iran might walk away from peace talks. The Iranians are described as being “very serious” about negotiations, even while the war between Iran and Hezbollah continues, including strikes and counterfire between Hezbollah and Israel. Attention then shifts to U.S.-Iran clashes at sea: the Americans said they shot down two boats laying mines, while the Iranians shot down one drone and posted video showing targeting of another fighter jet that was not shot down. The Americans also shut down one surface-to-air missile site on the Iranian side. The caller asks how worried the participants are that negotiations could break down, noting that Donald Trump had been unusually quiet the same day—no posts and no media leaks—creating an impression of behind-the-scenes activity, though the conversation treats the silence as out of the ordinary. The conversation then broadens into patterns of escalation: the caller says Israel often intensifies actions in Lebanon when negotiations approach an end or a solution seems possible, accelerating operations while not heeding the United States, despite periodic Trump statements. The caller argues that U.S. forces are not at “optimal capability” after prolonged deployments at sea, and suggests that if military action is planned, it could be preferable sooner rather than later. The discussion also reflects concern about timing after the Hajj and the possibility that strikes could occur after major public milestones, potentially undermining trust in the U.S. if negotiations were treated as a “facade.” A central topic is Iran’s demands and lack of compromise. The conversation states Iran is firm on what it requires, including unfreezing assets, and that this posture could indicate diplomacy moving in the right direction. However, the caller also suggests Trump would face opposition from Israelis and neocons if a deal advances. The discussion includes detailed domestic U.S. politics around a potential agreement: Rubio reportedly said a deal was possible within days, with holdup tied to specific nuclear-language and sanctions language in the initial document. Meanwhile, Ted Cruz called the announced deal an “MOU” a disastrous mistake; Roger Wicker warned it would be null/useless; Pompeo criticized it; and additional senators and figures piled on criticism. The caller describes a shift when Trump said the deal would be expanded to include the Abraham Accords, leading to conflicting reactions from figures like Senator Lindsey Graham. The conversation claims other countries (Qatar, Pakistan, Saudi) said no, while Iran also said no and positions were not changing. The caller argues the Abraham Accords have not helped Gulf signatories in practice and have been linked to broader issues involving Palestinian rights. The conversation then introduces a harsh statement by Mustafa Kamane during the “hush season,” describing a new order in which U.S. influence shrinks and framing Israel’s actions as a religious confrontation between Islam and what he calls the “Zionist regime.” The speakers express concern that Iran’s messaging is becoming more radical and anti-U.S. compared with earlier positions. They also discuss a purported power struggle between Netanyahu and Trump, emphasizing that the next steps will reveal who is directing events. Several reports about Israel–Lebanon dynamics are cited: the foreign minister calls Iranian actions and ceasefire violations blameworthy; Iran accuses the U.S. of maritime piracy and claims the strikes show suspicion justified. On the military side, Israeli commanders reportedly say the situation in southern Lebanon is “more unbearable by the day,” with footage described of drones hitting Israeli troops and trucks. Israel is said to have moved toward more nighttime operations, while Hezbollah reportedly uses FPV drones with night vision. Additional reports claim Israel is procuring more anti-drone nets from Europe due to drone threats, and an Israeli official says Israel cannot accept the current reality in Lebanon without ability to respond, constrained by understandings and agreements with both the U.S. and the Lebanese government. The Lebanese government is described as refusing to negotiate unless bombing stops before talks. A particular focal report states senior Israeli officials say Israel does not want to be seen as deliberately sabotaging Trump’s potential agreement with Iran. It claims Israel rejects random building bombings in Beirut at this stage due to fears of harming the ongoing Iran negotiations, while maintaining freedom of action in southern Lebanon. The conversation interprets this as evidence that strikes in Beirut are restricted compared with activity in the south. The speakers also analyze the region’s broader security shift: they describe regional countries seeking security architectures that replace U.S. bases and may not include Israel, referencing institutionalizing control of Persian Gulf straits under a Gulf security system by a “Gulf Strait Authority.” They also mention “Isaac Accords” as a similar Israel-centric concept applied to Latin America and Central America, involving trade/technology cooperation and countering Iranian influence. Finally, the conversation includes concerns about escalation risks if Trump uses military force, including the possibility of catastrophic retaliation affecting energy infrastructure, undersea cables, and the wider Gulf economy. They discuss information warfare and social media influence, including a claim that social media accounts of Colonel Aguilar may have been wiped out simultaneously with upscaling across pro-Palestinian platforms. The closing return to geopolitics includes discussion of a “new world order” and multipolarity, the Saudi–U.S. civilian nuclear track, and related regional missile developments attributed to North Korea. The conversation ends with acknowledgment of a technical glitch earlier in the show and a preview of upcoming guest interviews.

Glenn welcomes Seyyed Mohammad Marandi, a professor at Tehran University and former advisor to Iran’s nuclear negotiation team, to discuss the fast-escalating conflict involving Israel, Iran, Lebanon, and the region. Marandi says that while in Tehran—busy interviewing Ph.D. candidates—he did not hear airstrikes, though he understands several missile strikes occurred. Marandi frames the situation as unfavorable for the “Americans” and says Iranian missile strikes have been effective. He describes Iran’s retaliation as occurring after Israel’s attacks on Lebanon and Israel’s subsequent attacks on Iran, and claims Iran fired “five waves of missiles” and then large numbers afterward, with the total approaching “a hundred.” He also says Trump posted on Truth Social calling for action “to end this immediately,” while Marandi argues the United States had no intention of bringing about a ceasefire in Lebanon. Marandi contends that Lebanese leadership—including the president and prime minister—concluded negotiations against Lebanese law and received “death” in return, citing an Israeli bombing of a Lebanese military convoy soon after a CNN interview by Lebanon’s president attacking Iran. He adds that Lebanese authorities allegedly prevent refugees from moving within Lebanon, “corner” Shia-majority refugees, and try to make the situation sectarian, with Western NGOs and embassies encouraging restrictions in neighborhoods. He further alleges that proxies in Syria and Lebanon are working with Israel to keep borders closed and block assistance coming from Iran or Iraq, while claiming people nevertheless gather aid in Iran and Iraq that cannot be sent into Lebanon. He argues Iran and Hezbollah have continued striking effectively even during escalation, and suggests Iranian actions are tied to preventing Israeli plans to level areas of Beirut, describing a shift in Iran’s deterrence posture. Marandi says Iran warned that if Israel bombed Beirut, Iran would strike the Israeli regime, and that Israel refrained from striking Beirut for several days before resuming after the Pakistani interior minister delivered a message (Pakistan as mediator). He says the pattern mirrors earlier instances where U.S. attacks were met by larger Iranian counterstrikes. Discussing U.S. strategy, Marandi says the U.S. and allies appear to seek “low intensity” escalation to weaken and intimidate Iran while avoiding a “hot war,” but he claims Iran’s responses have instead sent signals that Iran is prepared to restart a more explosive war. He highlights that Iran has allegedly shut down the Strait of Hormuz and that, following Yemen’s announced disruption of Israel’s Red Sea access, Marandi says escalation stakes increase further. When asked about potential negotiations, Marandi says what matters to Iran is not Trump’s statements but what his regime does. He lists Iran’s stated terms: end to the war in Lebanon, regime retreat, end to the slaughter in Gaza, lifting siege, waiving sanctions on Iran’s oil/energy exports for the duration, and returning “stolen assets.” He argues Iran will not provide concessions that go beyond those conditions. On U.S.-Israel relations, Marandi addresses Axios reporting about differences between Trump and Netanyahu and says the publication itself matters because it portrays Netanyahu as despised and “crazy,” which he says damaged Netanyahu politically in Israel and also in the United States. He suggests a possible objective of weakening Netanyahu and emphasizes that Trump’s public disavowal (“I told him not to attack”) is undermining. Marandi then turns to what Iran may do next as escalation rises. He says Iran has changed the “rules of the game” by signaling that strikes on Lebanon trigger retaliation. He claims Iran will retaliate not only for attacks on itself but for attacks on Lebanon and, in further statements, for attacks on petrochemical and Persian Gulf energy-related installations affiliated with the United States or Israel. He asserts Iran threatens to strike Persian Gulf infrastructure and “the Americans too,” and says this extends Iran’s deterrence beyond Israel. He also says Hezbollah’s drones and ambush-style strikes harm the regime, while Iran’s deterrence against touching Beirut hampers offensive capability. Marandi concludes that he does not foresee a favorable outcome for the United States or Israel, and says the global economy remains close to a worsening point as the conflict intensifies. As a “footnote,” he says Iran carried out an operation on the Pakistan border against Wahhabi/Salafi militants, killing some and capturing others, portraying multiple extremist groups as attacking the same enemies rather than Israel.

The discussion centers on conflicting statements attributed to Benjamin Netanyahu and Donald Trump shortly after a call, with Netanyahu saying there would be no ceasefire and operations would continue as normal, while Trump allegedly claimed a full ceasefire would take effect. The speakers argue this contradiction is expected, and they suggest Netanyahu may pause for 24–48 hours but will likely resume operations, framing the conflict as continuing rather than stopping. They describe Netanyahu’s political survival as the key driver, arguing he cannot afford politically to end the war, and instead needs to maintain momentum to justify his leadership to the Israeli public and handle legal and political challenges that they expect to intensify after the war. They also claim Netanyahu would prefer “the man on top of a burning cinder” to losing position in a more stable environment. The speakers say Trump may use harsh language to pressure Netanyahu, but that Netanyahu has “experienced far worse” from other U.S. presidents, with Obama cited as particularly difficult due to resisting involvement and pursuing an attempted nuclear agreement with Iran. A separate point is raised about U.S. legislative constraints—specifically Section 224 of the Pending National Defense Authorization Act—described as ensuring future administrations cannot reverse aid to Israel and integrating Israel more fully into U.S. defense and industrial infrastructure, making it harder to disentangle. On escalation and de-escalation, the speakers say a real de-escalation is not happening, arguing that violence resumes quickly when ceasefire arrangements break down. They claim Israeli actions show they are not pulling back, including continued strikes and specific reference to Beirut. They argue that Israel could be slowing or “slow-walking” strikes temporarily, potentially to reposition, while Hezbollah prepares defenses and maintains contingency planning. The conversation also addresses an I24-reported assessment that Hezbollah has not resumed its core leadership or central command structure in southern Beirut’s Dahi district since the ceasefire, with Hezbollah reportedly relocating major parts of its command network to other Beirut areas. Israeli officials in the report are described as believing additional Israeli strikes on Dahi would have limited impact on Hezbollah’s operational capabilities, and that Israel’s push toward Beirut is partly to pressure Lebanese actors against Hezbollah. A broader strategic framing is offered: the speakers suggest Iran’s threats to strike Israel’s northern homeland could provide Netanyahu with political leverage to portray continued fighting as existential and necessary. They also discuss “red lines,” saying Iran drew a red line and that what comes next depends on which side dictates actions. Trump is described as wanting a peace deal, while the speakers claim Israel does not mind sabotaging it. Regarding Iran’s posture, the speakers say Iran escalated in a way that surprised them less than it might have otherwise, noting Iran threatened significant escalation against Israel and recommended citizen evacuations. They argue this looks more like calibrated retaliation than chaotic escalation, describing Iran as a “counter puncher” and suggesting the conflict could include off-ramps. They also criticize rhetoric that labels Iran “crazy,” arguing that ceasefire terms involving Lebanon were not implemented and Israel was breaching the ceasefire. The conversation extends to the broader question of U.S. involvement, debating arguments that the U.S. should walk away versus the idea that the U.S. owes allies an effort to stabilize—particularly stopping hostilities in Lebanon. One speaker argues the U.S. struggles with post-war stabilization and that pulling back could force regional actors to be more reasonable, describing this as reducing moral hazard. Finally, the speakers discuss press access and censorship, including reporting that the Pentagon restricted journalists by designating its press office as a classified area and barring journalists from entering to interact with public affairs staff. They argue this is inconsistent with claims of free speech, and they also mention bans or restrictions in the UK against controversial media figures in connection with Israel-related debates. The transcript closes with the host listing additional interviews and guests from the channel lineup and stating more interviews will follow.

Glenn welcomed Seyyed Muhammad Marandi, a Tehran University professor and former Iran nuclear negotiator adviser, and asked about the terms of the current ceasefire and why clarity is hard to get. Marandi explained the progression: the U.S. initially demanded unconditional surrender, then shifted to a “15 plan,” which Iran rejected. Iran developed its own plan, with the Supreme National Security Council sending a modified version to the leader, Ayatollah Bahamani, who finalized it and sent it to Pakistan. Trump ostensibly accepted Iran’s framework as the basis for negotiations, though “that doesn’t mean that we’re going to have peace” and there’s little faith in U.S. willingness to concede the 10 points Iran presented. He described the U.S. as an empire whose capitulation is unlikely, given internal and international pressure and the current closure of the Strait of Hormuz. He warned that the U.S. military footprint in the region would be hard to sustain and would face logistical and environmental strain, which could complicate any new war; nonetheless, Iran is preparing for the worst, having previously negotiated with the U.S. twice and seeing both efforts end in renewed conflict. He attributed recent Israeli actions against Lebanon as an effort to derail the ceasefire, noting that Israeli leadership (Netanyahu) appears motivated to induce more violence to gain leverage domestically, while Western media outlets largely abstain from criticizing these actions. Glenn pressed on how to interpret the two-week window for negotiations and whether Lebanon’s inclusion in the ceasefire remains valid. Marandi reiterated skepticism that the full Iran-focused 10-point plan would be accepted by the United States, calling Trump inconsistent and unpredictable. He suggested the two-week period might be extended if negotiations progress modestly, but doubted any comprehensive agreement would be reached given the U.S. tendency to resist rights-based terms and to change positions rapidly. The two discussed the possibility of renewed U.S.-Iran conflict, with Iran continuing to strike at Israeli targets and American assets in the Gulf if necessary. The conversation then moved to the question of who bears responsibility for the broader regional disruption. Marandi argued that Gulf regimes (the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Qatar) are not in a position to fight Iran; without electricity and infrastructure, they would suffer cataclysmic losses. He asserted that the U.S. could not unify the Gulf states in a new campaign and that Iran would control the Strait of Hormuz if attacked. The UAE’s rumored strike on petrochemical facilities was cited as an example of the ongoing broader conflict. He also suggested Lebanon’s fate is tied to whether Israel continues striking Lebanon or shifts its focus back to Iran, and warned that a failure to constrain Israel would undermine any peace talks. Marandi asserted that the ceasefire’s terms could be undermined by the “Epstein class” influence over Western media and governments, arguing that the global media’s support for Israel’s actions betrays a broader humanitarian and democratic legitimacy crisis in the West. He also noted that Oman’s cooperation around Hormuz might be part of a negotiated arrangement, given Oman’s more favorable relationship with Iran and its geographic position on the strait. He stressed that Iran’s apparent victory could reshape global power dynamics, weakening the U.S. and empowering Iran and other Global South actors, with implications for the petrodollar system and regional alignments. Towards the end, Glenn and Marandi touched on the potential long-term regional changes, including borders and governance in the Gulf, and the broader economic and political costs for Gulf monarchies. Marandi attributed the crisis to Zionist influence on U.S. policy and lamented missed opportunities to pursue normal relations with the United States, referencing authors Flint and Leverett and their book Going to Tehran, which he suggested could have altered current events if heeded. He concluded by reiterating that lessons were not learned and that the war’s consequences would be lasting.

Alex Kraner and Glenn discuss the evolving Iran crisis, U.S. strategy, and broader implications for Europe and the global order. - The Trump administration’s approach to the Iran confrontation is characterized as reactive and ad hoc. Alex suggests the administration has a “thoroughly thought through strategy of making it up as they go along,” operating in a reactive mode as ground conditions change and new opportunities arise. He asserts the conflict is one the U.S. went into that “created the problems that they're trying to solve now,” leaving the U.S. in a weak position. - On domestic optics and objectives, Trump appears to seek tangible, visible proof of success, needing to “humiliate Iran” or demonstrate a victory, but the complexity of the conflict makes a clean win difficult. Alex questions why the administration would proceed with such a path, given that Trump is due to visit China next week and may want to present stronger leverage at that meeting. - The strategic implications of controlling the Strait of Hormuz are highlighted. If Iran maintains control, it could pressure neighboring countries to decouple from the U.S., reduce American influence, and even threaten U.S. bases and the dollar’s dominance in the region. Conversely, the U.S. cannot easily “go home” without relinquishing strategic positioning, which would undermine Western dominance in the region. - The likely trajectory is escalation. The discussion notes a shift toward renewed or intensified violence, with potential further bombings and Iranian retaliation. There is a view that the U.S. is boxed into choosing between victory and defeat, with no middle ground if sanctions and regional pressure fail to resolve the crisis. - The broader political calculus: the conflict is seen as intersecting with Israel’s regional posture and broader Middle East dynamics. There is concern that Israel’s actions and the broader alliance structure complicate any possible ceasefire, and that the ceasefire may already be off the table due to continued hostilities in Gaza and Lebanon. - The economic and military balance is emphasized: the U.S. military is spread thin across multiple theaters, and analysts note that achievements on paper do not translate into decisive victory in the field against Iran, which is large, populous, and capable of sustained resistance. - There is widespread skepticism about the likelihood of a favorable outcome for U.S. or Western objectives. Alex argues that conventional military instruments are unlikely to compel regime change in Iran, and he contends the U.S. has already “painted itself into a corner” with no credible face-saving exit. - The discussion on Europe and NATO: Glenn and Alex discuss Europe’s response to the Iran conflict and its impact on Ukraine and Russia. They describe a new Joint Expeditionary Force (ten Northern European nations under British command) as a mechanism to confront Russia, signaling a potential shift toward a new European naval alliance aimed at harassing Russia’s northern maritime routes. This raises questions about why European NATO members would cledge their navies to a London-led command in a bloc that could escalate toward war with a nuclear power. - London’s role in shaping Western policy is repeatedly highlighted. The speakers suggest that “all roads always end up leading to London,” pointing to the British establishment’s influence on Middle East policy, Israel, and Europe’s strategic posture. They argue that powerful financial or banking interests (the “cabal” or “banking cartel”) may exert outsized influence over political leaders, including Trump, Netanyahu, and British officials, sustaining a long-standing push for Middle East hegemony. - The multipolar shift: both speakers emphasize that the world is moving away from unipolar American dominance toward a multipolar system with multiple power centers. They suggest that a sustainable peace would require acknowledging this distribution of power and adjusting strategies accordingly, rather than pursuing unilateral or hegemonic approaches. - Final reflection: if the West pursues a multipolar settlement, it could avert the calamity of a broader, potentially nuclear confrontation. However, the speakers warn that the global struggle over power—between unipolar and multipolar orders—may still unfold in blood, fire, and broader geopolitical clashes.

Channel 14 reports that Israel assesses Iran will carry out a missile attack on Israeli territory and respond in Beirut, with that expected to be a focus of the conversation. The guests discuss how the regional conflicts have affected Iran and its capabilities. Mark argues that the Islamic Republic has never been weaker in its 47-year history, citing severe degradation of nuclear programs, shattering of missile and defense industrial capabilities, decapitated leadership including Ali Khamenei, and a crippled economy, alongside a legitimacy crisis and major protests and repression in Iran. He says Iran has shifted to targeting the Gulf, with attacks described as involving thousands of missiles, rockets, and drones against multiple Gulf states. In contrast, Mara argues that while Iran is militarily weaker in the short term and Hezbollah is described as weak, she says Iran may be strategically stronger due to control of the Strait of Hormuz, and argues that US and Israeli bombing reportedly could not destroy significant underground and launcher-related facilities. She also highlights regional diplomatic engagement with Iran, including delegations and deals, and argues that the region may be moving toward coexistence and that a military solution is not the right approach. The discussion then turns to whether a military or diplomatic solution is preferable. Mark argues that without military action, and under the JCPOA trajectory, Iran would likely have produced nuclear weapons and long-range missile capabilities, including permanent leverage over Hormuz. He says the current situation reflects major damage, including claims such as reduced defense industrial base and missile inventory, degradation of nuclear enrichment and centrifuges, and that Hormuz leverage is limited and diminishing as alternatives and pipeline capacity increase. Mara responds by disputing specific confidence in statistics and states that there are disagreements in reported damage levels, while emphasizing that deterrence may also take new forms, including strike capabilities toward the Gulf and attempts to close Hormuz. A key part of the debate concerns claims about Iran’s defense industrial base destruction. Mark cites sworn testimony to the US Senate by Admiral Bradley Cooper, stating 85% of Iran’s defense industrial base was destroyed, while Mara argues that she cannot verify exact figures and points to broader concerns about prior reporting accuracy. They then discuss expectations of imminent attacks and the MOU. Mara raises questions about the IAEA view that Iran is more likely to build a nuclear weapon now, and mentions arguments about a 60-day period and potential concessions. Mark replies that will and capabilities must be distinguished, arguing Iran’s will to build nuclear weapons exists while capabilities have been severely degraded and that a missile shield needed to protect nuclear facilities has been degraded. Israel and Dahye (Beirut) are central in the Lebanon portion. Mark argues that Israel moved into southern Lebanon to push Hezbollah back from the borders and to address attacks into Israel, including Hezbollah’s use of anti-tank missiles affecting Israeli homes. He frames Israeli strikes as linked to Hezbollah actions and says Israel will strike Hezbollah strongholds in Dahye and Beirut. Mara argues that while Hezbollah started firing and dragged Lebanon into war, she worries about Israel’s actions escalating into village leveling and rhetoric about settling annexation of Lebanese territory, and she says the goal should be improving relations so Lebanon can normalize relations with Israel. Mark rejects normalization between Israel and Hezbollah/IRGC, arguing Hezbollah is an arm of the IRGC and dedicated to Israel’s destruction, and portrays the MOU as a mechanism intended to tie Iran and Hezbollah together and to pressure the US to accept Iran’s demands and prevent strikes on Hezbollah. Mara and Mark also debate whether Hezbollah and Israel can improve relations while Hezbollah remains in Lebanon, including the feasibility of Hezbollah disarming or merging with the Lebanese military. Mark says normalization is not possible given Hezbollah’s IRGC role and intent, while Mara argues for a path that avoids Lebanon being dragged into repeated wars and avoids outcomes like Syria or Libya. The transcript ends with Mara reading Donald Trump’s post stating that a Beirut attack should not have happened on a special day close to a peace deal with Iran, asserting Israel has the right to defend itself but should not disrupt an important process, calling for stand-down by all sides including Hezbollah, and describing it as a beginning to long peace. Mark responds that Trump wants the MOU and is trying to test Iran against his red lines over a 60-day timeline, suggesting that if Iran does not meet demands concerning nuclear and enriched uranium material, Trump would return to military action and severe economic pressure.