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Last week, the China Select Committee and I urged the FBI to update Congress on its investigation into TikTok's Chinese parent company, ByteDance. Forbes revealed that ByteDance gave Chinese government regulators access to sensitive TikTok data. This means that the Chinese government can spy on and influence Americans through the app. ByteDance's own investigators admitted to tracking American journalists and accessing their data. Public data analysis also suggests that TikTok allows anti-Semitic bias while censoring content sensitive to the Chinese Communist Party. The State Department reported that ByteDance kept a list of users likely blocked for supporting Uyghur Muslims. The FBI needs to share its findings on ByteDance and TikTok with Congress promptly. Time is running out.

There are weapons being developed to target specific individuals by using their DNA and medical profiles. This raises concerns about privacy, especially in terms of commercial data protection. Over the past 20 years, expectations of privacy have diminished, particularly among younger generations. People willingly provide their DNA to companies like 23andMe, which then own and can potentially sell this data without sufficient intellectual property or privacy safeguards. The lack of legal and regulatory frameworks to address these issues is a problem. It is crucial to have an open and public political discussion about how to protect healthcare information, DNA data, and personal data, as adversaries may exploit this information for developing such weapon systems.

23andMe is mentioned, prompting a warning against using their services due to data selling practices. It is claimed that 23andMe sells user data to other entities, including Russia. Nathaniel Johnson, a policy advisor for the U.S. Department of the Treasury, is introduced. The claim is made that 23andMe's contract contains a clause allowing them to share information with shareholders, some of whom are pharmaceutical companies based in other countries. These foreign pharmaceutical companies are allegedly owned by entities such as the Ministry of Defense in Russia or are based in China.

A senator questions a 23andMe representative about their data privacy policies, specifically regarding the sale of consumer data. The senator claims the company's privacy statement says they cannot share information without consent, yet they are selling it. The representative states customers can delete their data anytime, even after the sale. The senator points out that the deletion page went down after the sale announcement. The representative claims the issue was fixed and customers can now delete their data. However, the senator reads from 23andMe's privacy policy, which states the company retains genetic information, date of birth, and sex even after account deletion. The representative initially denies retaining genetic information, but then admits to retaining name, email address, and other data. The senator accuses the company of not allowing consumers to permanently delete their data and lying to them. The senator concludes that 23andMe controls consumer data and is violating its promises.

DNA companies are issuing warnings that your personal information can be sold and weaponized against you. It is claimed that someone's DNA and medical profile can be used to target a biological weapon that will kill that person. People are sending their DNA to companies like 23 and Me to get data about their background, but their DNA is now owned by a private company and can be sold off. There needs to be a public discussion about protecting healthcare and DNA information because this data will be collected by adversaries to develop these systems.

A committee hearing is addressing privacy and national security concerns surrounding 23andMe's bankruptcy. 23andMe, a direct-to-consumer genetic testing company, filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy, raising concerns about who will gain access to sensitive customer data. Regeneron Pharmaceuticals initially entered an agreement to acquire 23andMe, but the auction was reopened. Concerns exist regarding the storage, usage, and potential access by foreign adversaries to this private information, especially given 23andMe's past funding from investors linked to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Regeneron's partnership with a Chinese company also raises questions. The CCP's history of mass surveillance, bioweapon activities, and misuse of genetic data, including the hacking of 23andMe in 2023, are highlighted. In 2019, the Department of Defense warned military members against using consumer DNA kits due to security risks. Potential harm includes misuse by foreign actors, higher insurance premiums, credit restrictions, and targeted advertising. The committee seeks to understand how 23andMe will ensure the safety of Americans' genetic data and is hearing from 23andMe representatives.

The speaker discusses how the CIA uses Google to gather personal and biometric information, including DNA data from organizations like 23andme and ancestry.com. They warn against providing DNA information as it can be accessed by the CIA and Department of Defense. They mention the ARPA H program, an offshoot of the DOD's total information awareness program, which aims to collect medical information for both the CIA and DOD. The speaker emphasizes that we are now in the surveillance age and nothing we do is private.

TikTok poses a significant threat as it can access private data on your phone, including keystrokes. This means sensitive information like usernames and passwords for banking can be obtained. Unlike other social media platforms, TikTok goes beyond collecting data for advertising purposes. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has ulterior motives, aiming to harm the American people. In the event of a conflict, the data collected from American consumers will be used against them and their communities.

DNA companies are under scrutiny for potentially selling and weaponizing personal DNA information. It is claimed that a person's DNA and medical profile could be used to target them with a biological weapon. Concerns are raised about individuals willingly submitting their DNA to companies like 23 and Me, resulting in private companies owning and potentially selling that data. It is argued that open discussions are needed regarding the protection of healthcare and DNA information. The speaker asserts that adversaries could procure and collect this data to develop harmful systems.

A speaker discusses India's nationwide digital ID system, Aadhaar, and chip away at the assurances given by officials who praised its rollout. The speaker notes that about a week or so earlier, Kirstjarma met with Prime Minister Modi and top officials in India to extol the benefits of digital ID, highlighting Aadhaar and claiming a fabulous nationwide rollout. The speaker then presents a troubling counterpoint: cybercriminals are claiming they have stolen the entire Aadhaar database—describing it as the database of 815,000,000 people with details such as names, addresses, identity confirmations, bank details, and more. According to these claims, the criminals are currently selling the entire database for $80,000 at a time. The speaker acknowledges uncertainty about verification but states that this story is circulating and raises questions about security. The core concern is about how secure the system will be when every facet of a person’s life could be held in one place: passport, driving license, NHS records, criminal records, bank details, every transaction, gas and electricity bills, travel records, flight records, car tax, council tax, and any arrest or hospital appointment information. The speaker asks whether we can trust the people running these systems to keep data secure, given the frequency of data breaches and data thefts, including several large incidents in the past year in the country. The concern is framed as a general warning about the viability of a centralized digital ID system that aggregates extensive personal information, and how well it would function in practice if it were compromised. A specific anecdotal point is raised: India’s example is cited as a real-world instance of the system’s security challenges, with the speaker encouraging listeners to look up the incident. The speaker notes that Star Lord was out in India holding up India as an example of how well the system could work, referencing a perceived contrast between the praise and the security breach claim. The segment closes with a skeptical modulo—“Right, Kia. We believe you.”—casting doubt on official assurances. In summary, the speaker highlights a purported massive data breach claim against India’s Aadhaar system, questions the security of a centralized digital identity that consolidates extensive personal data, and contrasts official praise with concerns about data vulnerability and trust in those who manage such systems.

Retired FBI Agent discusses the privacy concerns surrounding home DNA test kits. He highlights a case where a detective obtained a court order to search over a million records in a DNA database. He questions whether health insurance companies would use this information to make coverage decisions. Even if privacy measures are in place, the risk of hacking or acquisition by a company with different values remains. While acknowledging the desire to find birth parents, the speaker personally opts out of using these kits.

Cell phones are constantly sending data back to companies, even in the middle of the night. This information is used to create profiles on users and can be sold to other companies. Big tech companies like Facebook and Google are major offenders in this data collection. This poses a threat to privacy and security, as the data can be used for manipulation and control. It is crucial for Congress, state attorney generals, and the public to be educated about this issue and take action to regulate and prevent this invasion of privacy. Visit doctorjonesnaturals.com to support the broadcast and access quality products.

New details have emerged about a major cyber hack attributed to Chinese government-affiliated hackers, who compromised multiple US communications companies. The FBI reports that these hackers accessed sensitive records, intercepted voice calls, and even infiltrated the Justice Department's wiretap system. Most intercepted communications involved government or political figures, raising concerns about the vulnerability of nearly all Americans' communications. Officials advise using encrypted messaging apps like Signal, WhatsApp, or iMessage for secure communication. The hacking group, known as Salt Typhoon, is linked to previous attacks on political campaigns. Understanding the risks of digital connectivity is crucial, as it can be exploited against us. China has denied these hacking claims and accused the US of spreading disinformation.

23andMe is mentioned, prompting a warning against using their services due to data selling practices. It is claimed that 23andMe sells user data to other entities, including Russia. Nathaniel Johnson, a policy advisor for the U.S. Department of the Treasury, is introduced. The claim is made that 23andMe's contract includes a clause allowing them to share information with shareholders, some of whom are pharmaceutical companies based in other countries. These foreign pharmaceutical companies are allegedly owned by entities like the Ministry of Defense in Russia or are based in China.

Some people are concerned about data mining and privacy issues, particularly with ChoicePoint, a company created by Republicans. ChoicePoint has access to vast amounts of personal data, including phone numbers, medical records, DNA, and more. They have been involved in controversial activities, such as providing inaccurate voter lists in Florida and falsifying DNA evidence in rape cases. This privatized spy function raises constitutional concerns and blurs the line between government and private surveillance. George Orwell would find this situation concerning.

Leaked audio reveals that ByteDance employees in China accessed American user data in 2021 after Project Texas began. This raises concerns because if ByteDance, which is subject to CCP control, can access American user data, they can potentially hand it over to the CCP, regardless of what TikTok claims.

Goshen, a CCP-affiliated company, plans to build an electric vehicle battery factory in Speaker 0's district. The company has received a large sum of money from federal, state, and local taxes. Goshen intends to bring Chinese nationals to Michigan, raising concerns about potential espionage. Speaker 1 explains that the issue stems from the blurred line between the Chinese government and its private sector. The Chinese government's authority and access could be used to undermine national security.

23andMe filed for bankruptcy, and CEO Ann Wajiki is resigning. Shares dropped over 50% after the bankruptcy filing. 23andMe's database of human genetic information may be sold in bankruptcy proceedings. According to 23andMe's privacy statement, in the event of bankruptcy, merger, acquisition, reorganization, or sale of assets, personal information may be accessed, sold, or transferred. This means your DNA could be used in unforeseen ways, such as cloning or being sold to malicious actors who could use it to implicate you in crimes. Bioweapons are a possibility, as is insurance companies using DNA data to deny coverage. Instructions are provided on how to delete your data from 23andMe.

China has obtained the genomic sequence of every person in the US who has undergone gene typing. They are using this information to develop bioweapons that specifically target Caucasians. Chinese companies, such as BGI, dominate the genomic sequencing industry in the US. There is evidence suggesting that the COVID-19 virus originated from a lab in Wuhan, China, and was created through gene splicing and gain of function research. China has publicly discussed their interest in using advanced pathogenetic capabilities for warfare. The export of American genetic information to China is a significant concern, as it could be used to develop genetic weapons that target specific populations based on their genetic variations.

Weapons are being developed to target specific individuals using their DNA and medical profiles. This raises privacy concerns, especially with the degradation of privacy expectations over the last twenty years. People willingly submit their DNA to companies like 23 and Me, resulting in private companies owning and potentially selling their DNA with minimal privacy protection. Current legal and regulatory systems are inadequate to address this. An open, public, and political discussion is necessary to determine how to protect healthcare information, DNA, and personal data, as adversaries will collect this data to develop these targeted weapon systems.

Speaker 1 advises against using 23andMe because they allegedly sell user information. Speaker 1 claims this data is sold not only to the US but also potentially to other countries, including Russia. Speaker 1 suggests some pharmaceutical companies that purchase this data are based in countries like Russia and may be owned by entities such as the Ministry of Defense.

A member of the House Intelligence Committee, Congressman Jason Crow, has warned against using DNA testing services, stating that private companies could potentially use the collected material to develop bioweapons targeting individuals. While this may sound like something out of a James Bond movie, it is a concern due to the CRISPR gene editing technology, which makes it easier to create targeted bioweapons. One such company, 23andMe, is an American-owned California company that trades on the Nasdaq but has a Chinese investor. There are concerns about the transparency of data sharing with China. US officials worry about the lack of regulation and transparency surrounding the movement of medical data, as well as China's strategy of gathering biological data for various purposes.

The discussion centers on Palantir Technologies and a proposed March 2025 executive order that would require federal agencies to share and control data, aiming to centralize government data using Palantir’s Foundry platform. It is claimed that Palantir has already deployed Foundry in at least four agencies, including the Department of Homeland Security and Health and Human Services, and that the company has received over $113 million in federal contracts since Trump took office, with a recent $795 million Department of Defense contract. The speakers allege that the initiative could enable a comprehensive database on all Americans—“light years beyond Real ID, the Patriot Act, and Prism”—and that those who control it seek “complete power over you and everyone else.” They warn of mass surveillance and privacy violations, lack of oversight, and potential political abuse. Key concerns include the breadth of data that Palantir’s system could merge, such as bank accounts, medical records, driving records, student debt, disability status, political affiliation, credit card expenditures, online purchases, tax filings, and travel and phone records, creating “detailed profiles on every single American.” The speakers argue this centralization would enable unchecked monitoring with “zero oversight,” increasing data security risks and the potential for breaches, leaks, or mismanagement. They emphasize a history of opaqueness in Palantir’s operations and tie the company’s AI tools to predictive policing and military applications lacking public accountability. They cite Palantir’s CEO Alex Karp as having controversial views and describe the firm as aligned with a profit-driven push for technomilitarism. The talk links Palantir to broader power dynamics, including ties to Elon Musk’s and Peter Thiel’s spheres, and suggests a technocratic oligarchy could emerge that prioritizes corporate and political agendas over public interest. While acknowledging stated goals like fraud detection and national security, the speakers assert the lack of checks and balances, and fear that the surveillance infrastructure would be embedded to be expanded by future governments. The “kill chain” terminology is discussed both in military and cyber contexts, with Palantir’s Gotham platform described as designed to shorten the kill chain by fusing large datasets into actionable intelligence, enabling faster targeting decisions. They provide examples like the use of Palantir to improve the accuracy and speed of Ukraine’s artillery strikes and, publicly, the Israeli Defense Forces’ use for striking targets in Gaza. The segment also mentions Palantir’s use in predictive policing, including tools used by the Los Angeles Police Department, and argues that Palantir aims to track “everybody, not just immigrants.” The speakers conclude that this centralized system is “light years beyond Real ID, the Patriot Act, or Prism” and advocate resisting it and “thinking of ways we can break the links in the kill chain.”

We're addressing the data breach issue, which has spawned several legal cases, including one by the California Students Association. Our case targets Treasury, OPM, and Ed, with a focus on the Education Department's role, because millions are affected, including Social Security recipients and taxpayers. It's ironic that Elon Musk, with access to vast amounts of American data, refuses to disclose his interests as a government contractor benefiting from potentially billions of dollars. Our primary goal is to halt the data breach. We're also pushing for congressional accountability, but we're turning to the courts to interpret the law and stop this privacy invasion.