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Glenn: Welcome back with professor Richard Wolff to discuss economic fury, the economic weaponization of the US campaign against Iran. How do you assess this effort, given the mix of oil sanctions, open markets for oil, and port blockades? Wolff: I’ll be blunt: I don’t know how to answer cleanly because the statements keep flipping on/off and have become “herky jerky.” The steps are inconsistent, sometimes increasing supply of oil and pushing down prices, other times constraining it. It’s not clear which way any given move will go, and the sequence is hard to parse. He notes that Gulf states are pressing for dollar swaps—foreign central banks can access dollars via swaps rather than buying them on markets. These swaps have shifted from weekly to daily, signaling worry about dollar access. The Gulf states—UAE and others—allege they depend on dollar-denominated oil revenues to service debts incurred through investments abroad. If dollars tighten due to strait closures and sanctions, they may be forced to sell assets in the US, including Treasury securities, which would lower bond prices and raise interest rates, potentially triggering a US recession. They could also sell holdings in the American stock market, affecting prices. Wolff emphasizes this as a surface manifestation of a broader global liquidity and debt dilemma tied to the Persian Gulf and the dollar’s role in the world economy. Glenn: So essentially the petrodollar is being unraveled because if Gulf states price and sell oil in dollars, but if they’re not exporting and not receiving dollars, they can’t pay debts or roll them over. They might sell treasuries or assets to cover shortfalls. How far can the US hold this position? Wolff: I don’t have a crystal ball, but I think the likely scenario is a political and economic squeeze. Trump has lost parts of his base—issues like the Epstein file and the economy’s inflation and job market. He relies on a narrative of victory; his base may be shrinking, while the wealthier 10% who own stock might be more supportive as the stock market stays buoyant. If the Gulf states must exchange dollars for debt relief or to cover losses, the government may have to grant more dollar swaps to prevent a spike in interest rates and a stock sell-off. Steven Bannon has warned that war could cost Trump the election, so the administration may shore up swaps to protect markets. Wolff suggests this is a desperate regime trying to exit a bad position with minimal damage. Glenn: You describe a broader pattern: the petrodollar’s decline, and the US dollar’s dwindling centrality in global reserves. How does this fit into the larger arc of American empire and capitalism? Wolff: It fits as part of the decline of the American empire and the corresponding decline of American capitalism. BRICS, China’s rise, and the shift away from dollar-dominated trade illuminate a trend toward reduced dollar dominance. Sanctions in Ukraine exposed the limits of that model, and there’s growing acceptance of payments outside the dollar for oil. The United States remains influential, but the dollar’s dominance is waning, and there’s no clear strategy to reverse that trend. Manufacturing has moved to other countries, notably China, which maintains low inflation and large-scale production. The world is moving toward multipolar arrangements, and the dollar’s preeminence is no longer assured. Glenn: Given this trajectory, is there any viable way to salvage the petrodollar, or is it beyond rescue? Wolff: I don’t predict the future with certainty, but I view the larger context as a decline in American hegemony and an erosion of dollar dominance. The war in Iran, like the war in Ukraine, demonstrates the limits of sanctions and the unintended consequences of aggressive confrontation. The dollar’s global reserve role is shrinking, and other powers are willing to transact outside it. He emphasizes this as a systemic shift, not a temporary setback. Glenn: Any final thoughts on how history and memory shape current policy? Wolff: History often gets reframed to fit current aims. There’s a tendency to present “victories” regardless of outcome, especially in wartime rhetoric. The dialogue in Europe and the US reflects a mix of nostalgia for past dominance and struggle to adapt to a changing global order. The conversation ends with questions about how Europe and the US should reorient foreign policy toward a multipolar world, where old assumptions no longer hold.

Glenn welcomes back Professor Michael Hudson to discuss the direction of civilization and how to assess civilizational decline through economic lenses. Hudson says he won’t remake his previous work The Destiny of Finance but will offer a sequel that revisits classical political economy and why it framed industrial capitalism. He emphasizes a distinction between the decline of an economy and the decline of an entire civilization. He describes a civilizational conflict between finance-led rentier capitalism in the West and the industrial capitalism with Chinese characteristics, noting that the latter mirrors early British, American, and German forms in its own way. The takeaway of industrial capitalism, he says, was to free the economy from feudal legacies—most notably hereditary landlord power—and to reduce three central rent-seeking blocks: landlords, monopolists, and bankers. Hudson recounts Ricardo’s 1817 warning that Britain’s industrial takeoff depended on cheap labor and the cost of subsistence, which was tied to food prices under the corn laws. Tariffs on food imports kept wages high, hindering investment by keeping costs high for employers. The landlords sought to protect rents; the fight for free trade (1815–1846) aimed to overcome landlord power and move toward a rent-reducing, production-focused economy. Ricardo’s labor theory of value held that value is produced by labor, but prices reflected rent and not true value; excess of price over value constituted economic rent, an unearned income. John Stuart Mill described rent as income earned in sleep. Classical economists saw economies as divided into a production sector and a rentier sector—where rent and credit relations acted as an overhead on the productive economy. The industrial project, they argued, was to align prices with real costs and minimize rents. Hudson argues that modern economies have shifted from industrial capitalism to finance capitalism, where rentier interests—banking, land rents, real estate, monopolies—back the financial sector and monopolies. Real estate endures as a transfer of wealth via debt-financed housing and commercial property; mortgage interest and fees become a form of rent. GDP growth increasingly reflects economic overhead and financial profits rather than productive output. The classical economists were opposed by late 19th-century rent-seeking forces: in the U.S., John Bates Clark; in Europe, Austrian School and utilitarian economists; all arguing against government intervention. Neoliberal reforms from Thatcher and Reagan onward privatized public infrastructure, supposedly increasing efficiency, but Hudson contends this raised costs (energy, water, rail) and deepened rentier power. Hudson contrasts the West’s rentier model with China and Russia, which pursue mixed economies with substantial public subsidies and government credit to support industry, wind energy, and infrastructure. He argues that China treats money as a public utility and uses credit to finance real construction rather than corporate takeovers, enabling broader growth. He asserts that Europe’s elites have pushed privatization and energy dependence on the United States, undermining European industry and security. He claims the U.S. uses NATO to constrain Europe and allies with sanctions and energy dependence, while Russia and China diversify from Western finance and technology to strengthen their own systems. The discussion then turns to ancient precedents: debt cancellation and land redistribution in Hammurabi’s Babylon, Egypt, and Judea’s Levitical laws, as examples of civilizations resetting rent and debt to maintain public legitimacy. Hudson argues that civilizations tend to polarize as wealth concentrates, and debt cancellation was a recurring tool to prevent oligarchic domination. He links this to modern-day neoliberalism, which denies rent and unearned income, presenting rentier gains as productive growth. He concludes that China’s approach—public-directed money and credit, mixed with private enterprise—reflects the civilization he believes resilient, whereas Western neoliberalism allows rentier control to dominate policy. Glenn thanks Hudson for the thorough, provocative explanation and notes the value of understanding rent seeking. Hudson highlights his works on rent, including an audiobook version of Super Imperialism, and contends that economics today often uses a deceptive vocabulary that obscures rentier dynamics. Glenn concludes, praising the discussion and noting links to Hudson’s books and website.

In this discussion, Zhang Shuay Shin and Speaker 1 analyze the evolving U.S.-Iran confrontation through the lens of global power dynamics, the petrodollar, and the shifting balance among major powers. - The war is framed as primarily about preserving the petrodollar. Speaker 1 argues the United States, burdened by enormous debt, seeks to maintain the dollar’s dominance by controlling energy trade through naval power and strategic choke points. The belief is that the U.S. can weaponize the dollar against rivals, as seen when it froze Russian assets and then moved to stabilize oil markets. BRICS and others are moving toward alternatives, including a gold corridor, challenging the petrodollar’s centrality. The aim is to keep Europe and East Asia dependent on U.S. energy, reinforcing American hegemony, even as historical hubris risks a global backlash turning growing powers against Washington. - The sequence of escalation over six weeks is outlined: after the American attack on Tehran and the Iranian move to close the Strait of Hormuz, the U.S. eased sanctions on Russian and Iranian oil to maintain global stability, according to Treasury statements. Escalations targeted civilian infrastructure and strategic chokepoints, with discussions of striking GCC energy infrastructure and desalination plants. A U.S. threat to “bomb Iran back to the stone age” was countered by Iran proposing a ten-point framework—encompassing uranium enrichment rights, lifting sanctions, and security guarantees for Iran and its proxies. The Americans reportedly suggested the framework was workable, but negotiations in Islamabad stalled when U.S. officials did not engage seriously. - The broader objective is posited as not simply a tactical war but a strategic move to ensure U.S. imperial supremacy by shaping energy flows. Speaker 1 speculates Trump’s motive centers on keeping the petrodollar intact, potentially forcing China and other partners to buy energy with dollars. Iran’s willingness to negotiate in Islamabad is linked to pressure from China amid China’s economic strains, particularly as energy needs and Belt and Road investments create vulnerabilities for China if Middle East energy becomes unreliable. - The proposed naval blockade is discussed as difficult to implement directly against Iran due to ballistic missiles; instead, the plan may aim to choke off alternative routes like the Strait of Malacca, leveraging trusted regional partners and allies. Iran could respond via the Red Sea (Bab al-Mandab) or other leverage, including the Houthis, challenging Western control of energy corridors. The overarching aim would be to force a global energy reorientation toward North America, though it risks long-term hostility toward the United States. - The roles of great powers are analyzed: the U.S. strategy is described as exploiting Middle East disruption to preserve the petrodollar, with short-term gains but long-term risks of a broader alliance against U.S. hegemony. Europe and Asia are pressured to adapt, with China’s energy needs especially salient as sanctions tighten Middle East supply. Russia is identified as the principal challenger to U.S. maritime hegemony, while China remains economically entangled, facing strategic incentives to cooperate with the United States if required by economic pressures. - The dialogue considers NATO and Europe, arguing that the real contest is between globalists and nationalists in the United States, with Trump viewed as an agent of empire who may threaten the existing globalist framework. The speakers discuss whether this competition will redefine alliances, the future of NATO, and the possibility that a more Eurasian-led order could emerge if Western powers fail to maintain their maritime advantages. - Finally, Russia’s role is emphasized: Moscow is seen as the key counterweight capable of challenging American maritime dominance, with the war in Iran serving, in part, to counter Russian actions in Ukraine and to incentivize alignment with Russia, China, and Iran against U.S. leadership over the next two decades.

In this conversation, Brian Berletic discusses the current collision between the United States’ global strategy and a rising multipolar world, arguing that U.S. policy is driven by corporate-financier interests and a desire to preserve unipolar primacy, regardless of the costs to others. - Structural dynamics and multipolar resistance - The host notes a shift from optimism about Trump’s “America First” rhetoric toward an assessment that U.S. strategy aims to restore hegemony and broad, repeated wars, even as a multipolar world emerges. - Berletic agrees that the crisis is structural: the U.S. system is driven by large corporate-financier interests prioritizing expansion of profit and power. He cites Brookings Institution’s 2009 policy papers, particularly The Path to Persia, as documenting a long-running plan to manage Iran via a sequence of options designed to be used in synergy to topple Iran, with Syria serving as a staging ground for broader conflict. - He argues the policy framework has guided decisions across administrations, turning policy papers into bills and war plans, with corporate media selling these as American interests. This, he says, leaves little room for genuine opposition because political power is financed by corporate interests. - Iran, Syria, and the Middle East as a springboard to a global confrontation - Berletic traces the current Iran crisis to the 2009 Brookings paper’s emphasis on air corridors and using Israel to provoke a war, placing blame on Israel as a proxy mechanism while the U.S. cleanses the region of access points for striking Iran directly. - He asserts the Arab Spring (2011) was designed to encircle Iran and move toward Moscow and Beijing, with Iran as the final target. The U.S. and its allies allegedly used policy papers to push tactical steps—weakening Russia via Ukraine, exploiting Syria, and leveraging Iran as a fulcrum for broader restraint against Eurasian powers. - The aim, he argues, is to prevent a rising China by destabilizing Iran and, simultaneously, strangling energy exports that feed China’s growth. He claims the United States has imposed a global maritime oil blockade on China through coordinated strikes and pressure on oil-rich states, while China pursues energy independence via Belt and Road, coal-to-liquids, and growing imports from Russia. - The role of diplomacy, escalation, and Netanyahu’s proxy - On diplomacy, Berletic says the U.S. has no genuine interest in peace; diplomacy is used to pretext war, creating appearances of reasonable engagement while advancing the continuity of a warlike agenda. He references the Witch Path to Persia as describing diplomacy as a pretext for regime change. - He emphasizes that Russia and China are not credibly negotiating with the U.S., viewing Western diplomacy as theater designed to degrade multipolar powers. Iran, he adds, may be buying time but also reacting to U.S. pressure, while Arab states and Israel are portrayed as proxies with limited autonomy. - The discussion also covers how Israel serves as a disposable proxy to advance U.S. goals, including potential use of nuclear weapons, with Trump allegedly signaling a post-facto defense of Israel in any such scenario. - The Iran conflict, its dynamics, and potential trajectory - The war in Iran is described as a phased aggression, beginning with the consulate attack and escalating into economic and missile-strike campaigns. Berletic notes Iran’s resilient command-and-control and ongoing missile launches, suggesting the U.S. and its allies are attempting to bankrupt Iran while degrading its military capabilities. - He highlights the strain on U.S. munitions inventories, particularly anti-missile interceptors and long-range weapons, due to simultaneous operations in Ukraine, the Middle East, and potential confrontations with China. He warns that the war’s logistics are being stretched to the breaking point, risking a broader blowback. - The discussion points to potential escalation vectors: shutting Hormuz, targeting civilian infrastructure, and possibly using proxies (including within the Gulf states and Yemen) to choke off energy flows. Berletic cautions that the U.S. could resort to more drastic steps, including leveraging Israel for off-world actions, while maintaining that multipolar actors (Russia, China, Iran) would resist. - Capabilities, resources, and the potential duration - The host notes China’s energy-mobility strategies and the Western dependency on rare earth minerals (e.g., gallium) mostly produced in China, emphasizing how U.S. war aims rely on leveraging allies and global supply chains that are not easily sustained. - Berletic argues the U.S. does not plan for permanent victory but for control, and that multipolar powers are growing faster than the United States can destroy them. He suggests an inflection point will come when multipolarism outruns U.S. capacity, though the outcome remains precarious due to nuclear risk and global economic shocks. - Outlook and final reflections - The interlocutors reiterate that the war is part of a broader structural battle between unipolar U.S. dominance and a rising multipolar order anchored by Eurasian powers. They stress the need to awaken broader publics to the reality of multipolarism and to pursue a more balanced world order, warning that the current trajectory risks global economic harm and dangerous escalation.

Jeffrey Sachs argues that we are witnessing the limits of Western power, including the limits of U.S. power, and that this is part of a long-term trend toward the waning dominance of the Western world as Asia rises. He frames the broader arc as follows: - After World War II, Europe lost its colonies and the United States emerged to replace European empires, competing with the Soviet Union as the two major imperial powers. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, the United States appeared to be the sole superpower, leading to an era some called the unipolar moment. Sachs contends this moment was largely an illusion economically: for about a century and a half leading up to 1950, the West dominated, but the long-term trend was the narrowing of the gap between the West and Asia. - From the end of World War II onward, Asia began a sustained process of catching up in literacy, education, infrastructure, and industrialization. While Western economic and military dominance remained evident, Asia’s rise gradually altered the balance of power. By the 1990s and into the 2000s, Asia’s relative power had grown substantially, with China emerging as a major economic and technological force. - The “unipolar moment” faded as reality: Asia has been rising since the mid-20th century, and the post-1991 euphoria in the United States about unipolarity was economically questionable. Sachs notes that even at the height of U.S. power, the U.S. could not defeat Vietnam or sustain European empires, and that China’s rise began well before 2010, becoming evident in manufacturing and heavy industry led by China. - He highlights the Ukraine war as another demonstration of the limits of American expansion and NATO’s enlargement, arguing that the war marks the end of NATO enlargement and challenges the notion that the U.S. could redraw power on Eurasia at will. He recalls Zbigniew Brzezinski’s idea of U.S. dominance over Eurasia and argues that Putin’s stance showed that such dominance would not be realized. - Sachs emphasizes that technology and economic growth diffuse over time, making monopolies unsustainable. He cites historical examples: Britain’s early industrial edge, Germany and the United States catching up, and even the limited lasting power of nuclear monopoly due to espionage and scientific advances. He argues that “choke points” are a recurring meme that eventually fail to prevent rising challengers. - He discusses realist theories: offensive realism (John Mearsheimer) arguing that great powers cannot find stable balance and constantly seek advantage, versus defensive realism (and Kissinger’s Concert of Europe-inspired view) suggesting some stability through negotiation and norms. He notes that U.S. strategists often view China and Russia as destabilizing and dangerous, though he himself advocates cooperative accommodation with China, avoiding confrontations over red lines and arms sales to Taiwan. - Sachs connects these ideas to ideology, noting that dominant powers often rationalize dominance through imperialist or civilizing ideologies. He references Robert Kagan’s liberal imperialism concept and traces it back to European imperial thought, suggesting that Western mentalities persist even as formal empires fade. He argues that imperial mindsets continue in Britain and the United States, with imperial ideologies shaping how power is exercised and justified. In sum, Sachs frames the current era as a gradual but undeniable shift away from Western, particularly American, dominance toward a more multipolar order led by Asia, with the Ukraine war and Iran as illustrating events showing the limits of unipolarity and the enduring, complex dynamics of great-power competition.

The speaker argues that the war in Iran and associated U.S. and Israeli actions are presented as a complex, intractable crisis, but in reality follow a simple pattern of a “controlled collapse” already underway. The collapse is said to be visible in everyday life, such as rising gas prices after the Strait of Hormuz being effectively closed and tensions around the conflict; the war is described as having caused thousands of deaths and sending energy markets into upheaval, with oil at a four-year high and inflation fears resurging as the Fed is expected to raise rates. Key events cited include the February 28 to March 1 strikes launched by the United States and Israel, the 48-hour ultimatum from President Trump demanding Iran reopen the Strait of Hormuz, and the deployment of thousands of Marines to the Middle East. The speaker asserts Iran’s threat to respond by closing the Strait of Hormuz and targeting U.S. linked energy infrastructure and IT networks, including desalinization plants and data centers, stating that this represents not de-escalation but the architecture of a broader war. The narrative challenges conventional claims that Iran is degraded or cornered, noting that Iran has fired long-range missiles toward the U.S. base on Diego Garcia and conducted strikes near Israel’s Demona nuclear facilities, contradicting the idea that Iranian military capability has collapsed. The speaker argues that war messaging routinely declares the enemy weakened while the conflict expands, and asks why thousands of Marines are being deployed if victory is close and missiles are supposedly diminishing. The broader thesis is that this is part of a larger, premeditated shift toward centralized control. War and energy shocks are said to destabilize prices and justify intervention, with examples of strategic petroleum reserve releases and sanctions easing to calm markets. The speaker links this to a longer-running plan to install emergency governance and digital control systems: surveillance, mobility restrictions, and a move toward digital money, identity, and movement management. They point to developments such as China’s digital yuan expansion, Europe’s digital euro, and the push toward “15-minute cities,” arguing that these are precursors to a digitized, programmable money system. The speech asserts COVID-19 demonstrated how governments can impose sustained fear and centralized control, with digital gatekeeping and state-corporate coordination seen as a live test. It is argued that the “rollout” is not about a temporary crisis but a permanent, durable control grid, with airports adopting faster digital processing and biometric scanning, and the public gradually accepting reduced freedoms and increased dependence as a solution to emergencies. The speaker concludes that the conflict is not as complex as claimed; it is about control and the expansion of a surveillance, monetary, and movement-management system under the guise of crisis management, and invites audience feedback on this perspective.

President Putin spent nearly two hours on the phone with President Trump, delivering a forceful warning that if the United States and Israel restart a war against Iran, there would be “dire, extremely dire” consequences for the region. The show then shifts to the wordplay about Taco Tuesday and a new word: nacho, standing for “not a chance” or “Hormuz opens,” with Axios reporting that Trump rejected Iran’s proposal to open the Strait of Hormuz and that the U.S. has prepared a plan for a short, powerful wave of strikes on Iran. Trump reportedly met with energy CEOs, informing them that the blockade of the Strait could go on for a long time with no end in sight. Trump posted on Truth Social claiming Iran is “in a state of collapse” and that they want the Hormuz Strait opened as they figure out their leadership. The panel notes this may be delusional or not true, referencing a Moon of Alabama post arguing that bombing would not alter Iran’s decision making and that the U.S. has lost its war on Iran, with Iran delivering “the checkmate” by controlling Hormuz. Secretary of War nominee discussions and testimony are recapped, highlighting contradictions: the claim that Iran was destroyed, but that Iran still controls Hormuz, and that Iran was not close to nuclear weapons, yet bombing occurred due to ambitions. Speaker 2’s remarks emphasize that Iran’s nuclear program was said to be “completely obliterated,” but ambitions remained, leaving the situation in a stalemate. The hosts and guests debate what constitutes “winning” in the context of Iran closing Hormuz, with instances of the blockade becoming a reciprocal constraint, and a comparison to “tag” or “double stamp” dynamics. Colonel Daniel Davis and Colonel Douglas McGregor join to unpack the day’s events. Davis notes Putin’s warning implies global implications beyond Iran. He cites fertilizer shortages and rising energy prices, noting the Department of Agriculture’s letter about risks to U.S. farmers, rising bankruptcies, and the potential for a different outcome if war resumes. He questions whether the blockade will produce a different result than prior attempts and points to a potential long-term economic impact. Colonel McGregor adds that Israel’s demands, particularly Netanyahu’s, drive the policy: no more nuclear enrichment, dismantling missiles, and regional coercion, which he argues Iran will not accept. He warns that the U.S. economy hinges on cheap energy and cheap credit, and as energy prices rise, liquidity problems could cascade through private equity and financial markets, potentially resembling or surpassing the 2007-2008 crisis. He posits that Putin’s warning signals fear of global economic consequences and possible coalition formation against U.S. actions, including China and others who could hedge their dependence on energy, and argues that allies in the Gulf face mounting costs and possible strategic realignments. The discussion extends to regional shifts: UAE leaving OPEC, potential breakdown of alliances with the United States and Israel, and fears of broader regional instability. McGregor suggests five of six GCC states are near storage limits, threatening supply flows, and that allied states might ultimately align more with alternative partnerships, such as with China as a safer economic and financial hub. Davis emphasizes the human and civilian toll in Lebanon, Gaza, and Syria, noting destructive actions and questioning the moral and strategic justification. The panel concludes with a warning that the blockade could provoke broader escalations, including potential responses from Iran or other regional powers, and that domestic economic pressures could intensify if the situation remains unresolved. The hosts and guests express concern that cooler heads must prevail, acknowledging the serious risks of a wider conflict and global economic collapse.

Professor Zhang returns to discuss the Iran war and geopolitics through historical patterns and game theory. He argues that Trump has failed to articulate a clear purpose or strategy for the war. Initially, the narrative centered on preventing Iran’s nuclear uranium enrichment, but the Oman foreign minister reportedly told observers that Iranians had already agreed to zero uranium enrichment even for civilian purposes, calling the nuclear weapon pretext into question. He notes that Rubio proposed preempting Israel’s anticipated attack, suggesting the U.S. acted to defend itself. After initial strikes, Iran bombarded U.S. bases in the GCC and closed the Strait of Hormuz, causing significant global economic disruption as oil prices rose toward around $120 a barrel. Iran’s aim, Zhang says, is to pressure global economies and the GCC to push Trump to end the war, while the United States and its allies pursue a destructive approach, including strikes on desalination and oil facilities, which he characterizes as civilian targets that would jeopardize civilians’ access to water and fuel. He cites a 170 schoolgirls’ deaths in a Tomahawk strike as an example of the civilian toll and argues the war’s conduct suggests a focus on destroying Iran rather than regime change. Glenn observes the narrative’s inconsistency and compares it with other wars, where a single organizing narrative typically emerges. Zhang expands the view: the war is a war of attrition for Iran, pressuring global energy supplies and GCC partners to influence Washington to end the conflict, whereas the United States and Israel pursue a path of destruction. He emphasizes Iran’s vulnerability of Gulf States, arguing their dependence on U.S. protection—despite their vulnerability when Hormuz closes and their desalination capacity is threatened. He explains that Gulf economies depend on oil revenue and import food and water; closing Hormuz and attacking desalination plants could collapse the GCC’s economic and physical stability. He contends that the Gulf’s petrodollar system ties the region to the U.S. economy, and destroying that link would threaten both American debt and the AI/flood of investment in the United States from Gulf capital. Zhang further argues that the war’s broader global impact could unsettle the current liberal international order. Iran seeks to push the U.S. out of the Middle East, gain control of Hormuz, and finance rebuilding domestically, while the U.S. and its allies resist recognizing the limits of empire. He asserts that the petrodollar system ties Gulf investments to the U.S. economy; if Gulf States stop funding American growth, an AI-driven financial bubble could burst, triggering a severe downturn reminiscent of a Great Depression. He counters a belief that the United States could gracefully withdraw from the region, labeling such thinking as wishful and attributing the U.S. position to imperial hubris. Glenn asks about the war’s potential global spread and how the conflict might draw in other powers, including Russia, China, Turkey, and Pakistan. Zhang contends there is likely no off-ramp; Israel intends to widen the conflict to achieve its Greater Israel project, while Iran would strike GCC targets more than Israel. He notes Turkey’s weakness and predicts possible broad regional engagement, with Pakistan obligated to defend Saudi Arabia and potentially becoming a participant due to mutual defense pacts. He suggests a multi-vector expansion: from Pakistan, Iraq, and Azerbaijan to secure the Shatt al-Arab and Hormuz, leading to broader regional escalation and eventual intervention by Southeast Asian economies reliant on Hormuz oil. Discussing Russia, Zhang argues that Vladimir Putin has a grand strategy. He believes Putin is waiting for a U.S. ground invasion of Iran; once U.S. forces commit ground troops, Russia could exploit the distraction to advance objectives, notably Odessa, potentially triggering a European defense and a prolonged, draining conflict. This, he says, would exhaust Europe and push for a political realignment favorable to Russia, potentially replacing the current order with a new balance of power. Towards the end, Zhang forecasts three major post-war trends: deindustrialization due to energy scarcity, mercantilism with localized supply networks, and remilitarization as Pax Americana ends and Pax Judaica or similar regional orders emerge. He suggests Japan might lead East Asia in deindustrialization and remilitarization, while China remains tied to the old global order. He predicts a potential rapprochement between the United States and China but maintains the global order will not be saved. He also notes that Europe is in a dire condition, facing demographic and economic strain, refugee integration challenges, and political fragmentation, which undercuts Western liberal hegemonies. In closing, Zhang reiterates that his earlier prediction from two years prior—that the United States would invade Iran—has been fulfilled with shock, and he expresses sympathy with the unsettling realization of the unfolding dynamics.

Speaker 0: The GCC allies are largely blockaded and not getting anything through; only UAE or Oman might be getting a few shipments due to being on the Gulf of Oman side. This is driving higher oil prices. We can’t simply bluff or "play a game of chicken" because it affects the entire world—Asia, Africa, Europe, and the United States. The shortage extends beyond oil to things like helium, and it’s impacting chip manufacturing and broader economic activity. These are medium-term issues already baked in and in short supply, so we’re facing real problems and a question of how long we can endure this. Speaker 1: As energy becomes more expensive—oil at $110, then $120, $130, $140, $150, rising until this crisis ends globally—the risk is a financial collapse worse than 2007–2008, potentially a depression in much of the world. Economists predict a serious recession, possibly a depression, and these dynamics are what Putin was trying to convey to Trump because Americans are perceived as potentially catastrophic. China is dependent on energy but is expanding nuclear power, has substantial coal, and is investing in renewables; China will survive this. Japan and Korea are on the edge; India is affected; Egypt is trying to feed 100,000,000 and facing famine; Turkey is involved. These states are being pushed toward war not just with Israel but with the United States, since without Israel none of this would be happening, and they know it. Russia, China, Egypt, Turkey, India, and possibly others may join a coalition to force the United States to stop. The speaker would prefer not to go there and believes President Trump should end the blockade, which was adopted because it was the only measure short of returning to war, but the blockade won’t work because the world won’t tolerate it. The president of the Republic of Korea (South Korea) has publicly said it’s time for Korea to defend itself. It’s been time for Korea to take control of its own armed forces for a long time, but the U.S. currently controls all their armed forces and Koreans have not liked that for at least twenty years. Now they want control of their own armed forces. The speaker expects the dissolution of the United States’ unofficial overseas imperial holdings, predicting the Koreans will expel the U.S., with Japan likely following. In the Pacific, trilateral efforts among Korea, the Philippines, and Japan are forming to cooperate with the U.S. in a future war with China—not in our lifetimes or on the planet, as no one wants war with China. Nobody wants war with China; China is increasingly seen as a safer place for cash and investments in the U.S. This shift began when the U.S. began telling Russians they would not allow them to access billions of rubles and may seize funds, possibly giving cash to Ukrainians. People are watching and asking whether they want to depend on the U.S. financial system or face interference with bank accounts. There are many bad developments right now, and the last thing the American people need is a war, certainly not one involving China, Russia, or any other powers along with Iran, yet that seems to the direction in which things are headed.

Wang Wen, professor and dean of the Changyang Institute of Financial Studies and the School of Global Leadership at Renmin University of China, discusses Beijing’s view on the Iran war and its broader implications for China and the international order. - China’s position on the Iran conflict: Beijing emphasizes a resolution through political negotiation and opposes unilateral military action not authorized by the UN. China calls for a ceasefire, an end to hostility, respect for sovereignty and development rights, and opposes the maximum pressure campaign and long-term sanctions. This stance reflects adherence to international law, multilateralism, and safeguarding global peace, while aligning with China’s strategic interests as a major energy importer and advocate of multilateral solutions. - Context of a shifting world order: The justifications for a multipolar world are growing. The U.S. and Germany are viewed as nearing the end of their post–Cold War order, with the world entering a multipolar era. Two features cited: the U.S. has largely lost the capacity to dominate globally and may retreat to regional influence, while emerging powers (China, Russia, India, Brazil, and others) rise and constrain U.S. ability to contain them. Iran is seen as part of this broader transition, with the possibility of greater regional and systemic shifts over the coming decade. - China’s cautious but steady approach: China maintains a low-profile stance and continues normal trade with all sides (including the U.S., Israel, and Iran) while urging ceasefires and political resolution. US sanctions targeting Chinese banks and Iran are deemed unreasonable threats; Beijing signals it will counter such measures if pressed. - Belt and Road and Middle East investments: China’s Middle East investments and the Belt and Road Initiative (BI) face disruption due to the war. Oil imports via the Strait of Hormuz (about 35% of China’s oil) and China’s broader energy security are affected. China’s approach emphasizes diversification: expanding overland corridors (e.g., North–South routes, Eurasian Railway Express, Trans-C-Cascadia paths, Central Asia Land Corridor) and increasing energy sourcing from non-Middle Eastern suppliers (Russia, Central Asia, Africa, South America) to reduce reliance on maritime routes. Investment in Iran (about $5 billion, with projects across the region) has slowed as the war continues, with evacuations and impeded progress, though China’s strategic emphasis on diversified transport and energy remains central. - Taiwan issue and potential conflict: Wang argues that if China intends to resolve Taiwan by force, the U.S. would have already lost the capacity to stop it; a peaceful resolution is increasingly likely. He states that any use of force would target independence rather than the general public in Taiwan, and reiterates China’s long-standing preference for peaceful unification. - US–China–Russia triangle: The conflict reshapes this triangle. The U.S. is constrained by Iran, becoming more erratic, and signaling toward China and Russia. Russia benefits from higher oil prices and the Ukraine situation, while China faces oil-import pressures and market volatility. Overall, the U.S. strategy appears less capable of containing both China and Russia; both Beijing and Moscow gain strategic leverage in this environment. - Risks and opportunities for China if the war continues: Energy security risks rise due to higher oil costs and potential disruption to Middle East trade, complicating BI projects and regional diplomacy. The situation increases the appeal of diversification of energy sources and transport corridors. However, China typically prefers peace and stability as the best path for growth. - The new book and strategic opportunity: Wang promotes his book, New Strategic Opportunity: China and the World toward 2035, arguing that the world’s turbulence highlights China’s peace, stability, and prosperity as valuable. He contends that no matter the adverse environment, China can seize new strategic opportunities by focusing on domestic development, reinforcing that the longer the U.S. seeks conflict, the more China upholds peace and rises. - Closing observations: The interviewer notes the broader perception of China’s growing influence and responsibility in shaping a responsible international system, with Wang affirming a peaceful, opportunity-driven path for China’s rise.

Glenn Deeson frames the Iran war as fundamentally about regime change, noting that this regime change could entail destruction or balkanization of Iran rather than a simple replacement government. He argues that irredentist fear and existential threats would drive Iran to respond aggressively, including closing the Strait of Hormuz and attacking American bases in the region, if attacked. He emphasizes that this is about the survival of the regime and the country’s unity, suggesting that the conflict could escalate toward greater regional chaos, including potential actions around Kharg Island. On the broader geopolitical implications, Deeson discusses how four years of efforts to curb Russia failed and how European and American efforts have continued to try to sustain pressure on Russia. He explains that the Ukraine war has faced manpower and weapons shortages, and that economic strains in Europe—especially energy prices—compound the difficulty of maintaining support for prolonged conflict. He asserts that with the Iran war, there are even fewer weapons available from the US, worsening European energy and economic outlooks. He argues that Europeans’ and some policymakers’ failure to recognize Russia’s security concerns has contributed to escalatory dynamics. Regarding China, Deeson notes that China imports oil from Iran but would not welcome disruptions. He suggests that if the United States succeeds in regime-changing Iran, China would be adversely affected, whereas failure could push Iran to align more closely with Russia and China. He discusses potential shifts in global resource control and the petrodollar system, and he frames the conflict as part of a broader great-power competition where the United States seeks to preserve energy flows to allies. He highlights the possibility that successful US or Western pressure could backfire, as Iranian outcomes might push regional actors toward deeper cooperation with Russia and China. He also ties these dynamics to a broader transition from a unipolar liberal hegemon to a multipolar order, with BRICS-like groupings seeking to balance US influence. Deeson broadens the discussion to the potential death of American hegemony, arguing this would be a longer transition rather than a sudden collapse. He explains that after the Cold War the US promoted a liberal hegemonic framework with one center of power, but over time this leads other centers to balance against the US. He identifies the emergence of multipolar dynamics and institutions like BRICS as indicators of shifting power. He suggests that attempts to break China or Iran could backfire, since enemies may realign with Russia or China, and the US might eventually recalibrate to a more restrained role in Eurasia to rebuild domestic strength. He envisions a scenario where the US reduces its European and Middle Eastern footprint, potentially strengthening East Asia. On Israel’s perspective, Deeson says Israelis and Europeans similarly believe US capabilities can be leveraged to defeat adversaries, and Israel sees the opportunity to use US involvement to topple Iran and possibly Balkanize the country. He argues that this clashes with the United States’ need to prioritize its own strategic interests in a multipolar world, which would require pivoting toward East Asia and away from Europe and the Middle East. He cites strategic misalignment in Trump-era policy, noting that continuing engagement in Europe and the Middle East may divert resources from East Asia. He suggests that tolerance of prolonged conflict could exacerbate divergences between the US and Israel as American strategic priorities shift. The discussion ends with appreciation for Glenn Deeson and a plug for his channel.

Larry Johnson and Glenn discuss the shifting dynamics of the US dollar, the international financial system, and the rise of competing powers. - Johnson recalls the 1965 term exorbitant privilege describing the US dollar’s reserve-currency advantages. In 1971, the US closed the gold window, ending fixed gold value for the dollar; the dollar later became backed by “our promise,” enabling the petrodollar system as oil purchases were conducted in dollars. The dollar’s dominance rested on predictability, a stable legal system, and non-abusive use of the dollar as an economic tool rather than a political weapon. - Trump-era sanctions expanded broadly, impacting friends and adversaries alike, and BRICS nations began moving away from the dollar. Russia’s disconnection from SWIFT after its 2022 actions is noted as a turning point that encouraged the BRICS’ development of alternative financial infrastructure, including China’s cross-border interbank payment system (CIPS). This shift accelerates the decline of the dollar’s dominance. - Nations like Russia and China (and India, Brazil) are unloading US Treasuries and increasing gold and silver holdings. This is tied to concerns about the dollar’s reliability and the reduced faith in paper promises. The BRICS countries reportedly plan a currency tied to gold, with components of their reserves backing individual BRICS currencies, signaling a structural move away from the dollar. - The paper-gold issue is central: for every ounce of real gold, there is a range of 20-to-1 to 100-to-1 in paper gold. This disparity can undermine trust in the paper promise and create a run on physical gold. The price gap between New York (lower) and Shanghai (higher) for gold demonstrates a market dislocation and growing demand for physical metal. - Glenn emphasizes that a unipolar dollar system allows the US to run large deficits via inflation, which acts as a hidden tax on global dollar holders. Weaponizing the dollar through sanctions challenges trust and accelerates decoupling, prompting other nations to seek alternatives to reduce exposure. - Johnson argues that the US is confronting a historic realignment: the Bretton Woods order is dissolving, the dollar’s international dominance is waning, and sanctions and coercive policies are provoking pushback. He highlights Japan as a major remaining dollar treasuries holder that is now offloading, further increasing dollar supply and depressing its value. - The geopolitical implications are significant. Johnson warns that potential US actions against Iran—given their strategic position and the Gulf oil supply—could trigger a severe global disruption, including a price surge in oil. He notes that such actions would complicate global stability and magnify inflationary pressures. - The discussion also covers NATO’s cohesion, Western attempts to shape global alignments, and how rapidly shifting leverage could undermine existing alliances. Johnson suggests that Russia’s strategic gains in the war in Ukraine, combined with Western missteps, may prompt a rapid reevaluation of settlements and borders, while also noting that Russia’s position has hardened. - On Venezuela, Johnson argues that the stated pretexts (drug trafficking, oil control) were questionable and points to economic motives, including revenue opportunities for political allies like Paul Singer, and to Greenland’s strategic interests as possible motivators for US actions. - Looking ahead, Johnson predicts hyperinflation for the United States as the dollar loses value globally, while gold and silver retain value. He asserts that the ruble and yuan may hold value better, and that a mass shift toward de-dollarization is likely to continue, potentially culminating in a new multipolar financial order. - Both speakers agree that trust and predictability are crucial; the current trajectory—threats, sanctions, and unilateral actions—undermines trust and accelerates the move toward alternative currencies and stronger physical-commodity holdings. The overall tone is that a pivotal, watershed moment is unfolding in the global monetary system.

The discussion centers on the cascading economic and geopolitical consequences of the unfolding West Asia conflict, with an emphasis on energy markets, food production, and the potential reconfiguration of global power relations. Key points and insights: - The Iran-related war is described as an “absolutely massive disruption” not only to oil but also to natural gas markets. Speaker 1 notes that gas is the main feedstock for nitrogen fertilizers, so disruptions could choke fertilizer production if Gulf shipments are blocked or LNG tankers are trapped, amplifying downstream effects across industries. - The fallout is unlikely to be immediate, but rather a protracted process. Authorities and markets may react with forecasts of various scenarios, yet the overall path is highly uncertain, given the scale of disruption and the exposure of Western food systems to energy costs and inputs. - Pre-war conditions already showed fragility in Western food supplies and agriculture. The speaker cites visible declines in produce variety and quality in France, including eggs shortages and reduced meat cuts, even before the current shock, tied to earlier policies and disruptions. - Historical price dynamics are invoked: oil prices have spiked from around $60 to just over $100 a barrel in a short period, suggesting that large-scale price moves tend to unfold over months to years. The speaker points to past predictions of extreme oil shortages (e.g., to $380–$500/barrel) as illustrative of potential but uncertain outcomes, including possible long-term shifts in energy markets and prices. - Gold as a barometer: gold prices surged in 2023 after a long period of stagnation, suggesting that the environment could produce substantial moves in safe-haven assets, with potential volatility up to very high levels (even speculative ranges like $5,000 to $10,000/oz or more discussed). - Structural vulnerabilities: over decades, redundancy has been removed from food and energy systems, making them more fragile. Large agribusinesses dominate, while smallholder farming has been eroded by policy incentives. If input costs surge (oil, gas, fertilizer), there may be insufficient production capacity to rebound quickly, risking famine-like conditions. - Policy paralysis and governance: the speaker laments that policymakers remain focused on Russia, Ukraine, and net-zero policies, failing to address immediate shocks. This could necessitate private resilience: stocking nonperishables, growing food, and strengthening neighborhood networks. - Broader systemic critique: the discussion expands beyond energy to global supply chains and the “neoliberal” model of outsourcing, just-in-time logistics, and dependence on a few critical minerals (e.g., gallium) concentrated in a single country (China). The argument is that absorption of shocks requires strategic autonomy and a rethinking of wealth extraction mechanisms in Western economies. - Conspiracy and risk framing: the speakers touch on the idea that ruling elites use wars and engineered shocks to suppress populations, citing medical, environmental, and demographic trends (e.g., concerns about toxins and vaccines, chronic disease trends, CBDCs, digital IDs, 15-minute cities). These points are presented as part of a larger pattern of deliberate disruption, though no definitive causality is asserted. - Multipolar transition: a core theme is that the Western-led liberal order is collapsing or in serious flux. The BRICS and Belt and Road frameworks, along with East–West energy and technology leadership (notably China in nuclear tech and batteries), are shaping a move toward multipolar integration. The speaker anticipates that Europe’s future may involve engagement with multipolar economies and a shift away from exclusive Western hegemony. - European trajectory: Europe is portrayed as unsustainable under current models, potentially sliding toward an austerity-driven, iron-curtain-like system if it cannot compete or recalibrate. The conversation envisions a gradual, possibly painful transition driven by democratic politics and public pressure, with a risk of civil unrest if elites resist reform. - NATO and European security: there is speculation about how the Middle East turmoil could draw Europe into broader conflict, especially if Russia leverages the situation to complicate European decisions. A cautious approach is suggested: Russia has shown a willingness to create friction without provoking Article 5, but could exploit Middle East tensions to pressure European governments while avoiding a full European war. - Outlook: the speakers foresee no easy return to the pre-war status quo. The path forward could involve a reordering of international trade, energy, and security architectures, with a possible pivot toward multipolar alliances and a greater emphasis on grassroots resilience and regional cooperation. Overall, the dialogue emphasizes the profound interconnectedness of energy, agriculture, finance, and geopolitics, arguing that the current crisis could catalyze a permanent reordering of the global system toward multipolarism, while underscoring the fragility of Western economic and political models in absorbing such shocks.

Richard Wolff and Glenn discuss the future of the West, NATO, Europe, and the international economic system. - The central dynamic, according to Wolff, is the rise of China and the West’s unpreparedness. He argues that the West, after a long era of Cold War dominance, is encountering a China that grows two to three times faster than the United States, with no sign of slowing. China’s ascent has transformed global power relations and exposed that prior strategies to stop or slow China have failed. - The United States, having defeated various historical rivals, pursued a unipolar, neoliberal globalization project after the Cold War. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of that era left the U.S. with a sense of “manifest destiny” to shape the world order. But now time is on China’s side, and the short-term fix for the U.S. is to extract value from its allies rather than invest in long-run geopolitics. Wolff contends the U.S. is engaging in a transactional, extractive approach toward Europe and other partners, pressuring them to concede significant economic and strategic concessions. - Europe is seen by Wolff as increasingly subordinated to U.S. interests, with its leadership willing to accept terrible trade terms and militarization demands to maintain alignment with Washington. He cites the possibility of Europe accepting LNG imports and investments to the U.S. economy at the expense of its own social welfare, suggesting that Europe’s social protections could be jeopardized by this “divorce settlement” with the United States. - Russia’s role is reinterpreted: while U.S. and European actors have pursued expanding NATO and a Western-led security architecture, Russia’s move toward Greater Eurasia and its pivot to the East, particularly under Putin, complicates Western plans. Wolff argues that the West’s emphasis on demonizing Russia as the unifying threat ignores the broader strategic competition with China and risks pushing Europe toward greater autonomy or alignment with Russia and China. - The rise of BRICS and China’s Belt and Road Initiative are framed as major competitive challenges to Western economic primacy. The West’s failure to integrate and adapt to these shifts is seen as a strategic misstep, especially given Russia’s earlier openness to a pan-European security framework that was rejected in favor of a U.S.-led order. - Within the United States, there is a debate about the proper response to these shifts. One faction desires aggressive actions, including potential wars (e.g., Iran) to deter adversaries, while another emphasizes the dangers of escalation in a nuclear age. Wolff notes that Vietnam and Afghanistan illustrate the limits of muscular interventions, and he points to domestic economic discontent—rising inequality, labor unrest, and a growing desire for systemic change—as factors that could press the United States to rethink its approach to global leadership. - Economically, Wolff challenges the dichotomy of public versus private dominance. He highlights China’s pragmatic hybrid model—roughly 50/50 private and state enterprise, with openness to foreign participation yet strong state direction. He argues that the fixation on choosing between private-market and public-control models is misguided and that outcomes matter more than orthodox ideological labels. - Looking ahead, Wolff is optimistic that Western economies could reframe development by learning from China’s approach, embracing a more integrated strategy that blends public and private efforts, and reducing ideological rigidity. He suggests Europe could reposition itself by deepening ties with China and leveraging its own market size to negotiate from a position of strength, potentially even joining or aligning with BRICS in some form. - For Europe, a potential path to resilience would involve shifting away from a mindset of subordination to the United States, pursuing energy diversification (including engaging with Russia for cheaper energy), and forming broader partnerships with China to balance relations with the United States and Russia. This would require political renewal in Europe and a willingness to depart from a “World War II–reboot” mentality toward a more pragmatic, multipolar strategy. - In closing, Wolff stresses that the West’s current trajectory is not inevitable. He envisions a Europe capable of redefining its alliances, reconsidering economic models, and seeking a more autonomous, multipolar future that reduces dependency on U.S. leadership. He ends with a provocative suggestion: Europe might consider a realignment toward Russia and China as a way to reshape global power balances, rather than defaulting to a perpetual U.S.-led order.

Speaker 0, Speaker 1, and Speaker 2 discuss the evolving confrontation between the United States and Iran and its broader economic and strategic implications. Speaker 0 highlights three predictions: (1) Trump would win, (2) he would start a war with Iran, and (3) the US would lose that war, asking if these predictions are still valid. Speaker 1 characterizes the current phase as a war of attrition between the United States and Iran, noting that Iranians have been preparing for twenty years and now possess “a pretty good strategy of how to weaken and ultimately destroy the American empire.” He asserts that Iran is waging war against the global economy by striking Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries and targeting critical energy infrastructure and waterways such as the Baghdad channel and the Hormuz Strait, and eventually water desalination plants, which are vital to Gulf nations. He emphasizes that the Gulf States are the linchpin of the American economy because they sell petrodollars, which are recycled into the American economy through investments, including in the stock market. He claims the American economy is sustained by AI investments in data centers, much of which come from the Gulf States. If the Gulf States cease oil sales and finance AI, he predicts the AI bubble in the United States would burst, collapsing the broader American economy, described as a financial “ponzi scheme.” Speaker 2 notes a concrete example: an Amazon data center was hit in the UAE. He also mentions the United States racing to complete its Iran mission before munitions run out. Speaker 1 expands on the military dynamic, arguing that the United States military is not designed for a twenty-first-century war. He attributes this to the post–World War II military-industrial complex, which was built for the Cold War and its goals of technological superiority. He explains that American military strategy relies on highly sophisticated, expensive technology—the air defense system—leading to an asymmetry in the current conflict: million-dollar missiles attempting to shoot down $50,000 drones. He suggests this gap is unsustainable in the long term and describes it as the puncturing of the aura of invincibility that has sustained American hegemony for the past twenty years.

The speakers argue that a coordinated, engineered strategy is unfolding to destroy global energy and food systems, with catastrophic humanitarian consequences. They claim the plan involves triggering and exploiting energy infrastructure attacks, fostering mass migrations, and provoking global famines to reshape geopolitics. Key assertions and timelines: - A broader war design is being executed to destabilize the Middle East and other core energy regions. The speakers contend the Middle East is being “disassembled” and that global famines and depopulation are deliberate outcomes of this strategy. - They link energy disruptions to food insecurity, fertilizer shortages (urea, sulfuric acid), and fertilizer-related price shocks, arguing that a closed Strait of Hormuz and attacks on LNG facilities will cascade into global shortages and mass hunger. - Specific choke points emphasized as leverage points include the Strait of Hormuz, Strait of Malacca, Bosphorus (Turkish Strait), Suez, Bab al-Mandeb, Panama Canal, Danish Strait, and the Strait of Gibraltar. Closing any of these routes, they say, could trigger widespread disruptions in Europe, Asia, and beyond. Recent developments they highlight: - Israel reportedly struck Iran’s gas fields, with Iran retaliating by striking Qatar Energy facilities. Two of Qatar Energy’s 14 cryogenic LNG trains have been destroyed, with a repair time of three to five years for those two trains, per a Reuters interview with the Qatar Energy CEO. This means 17% of Qatar Energy’s annual production is offline, with potential to reach higher percentages if more trains or related infrastructure are attacked. - Force majeure has been declared by Qatar Energy for several major buyers (Italy, Belgium, South Korea, China, Taiwan, Japan) due to the reduced capacity to meet long-term contractual obligations. - The destruction of LNG trains could, if extended to all 14, create a ten-year or longer global famine with estimates ranging from two to four billion deaths over the next decade, according to AI-assisted projections cited by the speakers. - They suggest that continued escalation could devastate LNG supply chains, resulting in widespread economic collapse, rolling blackouts, and mass social upheaval, including potential collapses of allied states and severe shifts in global power dynamics. - They argue the petrodollar system is under pressure as Iran asserts control of Strait of Hormuz through its actions, threatening the flow of energy priced in dollars. Broader geopolitical implications: - The speakers contend that the US is losing influence in the Middle East and that Gulf states may rethink alliances if the US cannot guarantee energy security. They forecast Taiwan and Japan, among others, could be deeply endangered due to supply-chain and energy pressures, with Taiwan potentially facing a forced realignment with China as a result of famine-induced coercion. - They predict other regional disruptions (e.g., to Thai and Indian food security) and warn that food production is increasingly vulnerable to energy constraints and to strategic moves by powerful actors who want to alter the global order. - They connect these energy and food dynamics to a larger narrative about AI-driven economic restructuring and population replacement, arguing that governments may seek to depopulate or reengineer labor markets to accommodate AI, while relying on the digital grid to control populations in the aftermath of shortages. Cast of participants and perspectives: - The main speaker (Speaker 0) asserts that these outcomes are deliberate and predictable, citing repeated warnings over years about energy and food-security chokepoints. He argues that the predicted escalations are aligned with a longer-term plan to depopulate and to redraw global influence. - Speaker 1 and Michael Yon (a war correspondent) participate in reinforcing the predicted trajectory, discussing the strategic significance of LNG energy infrastructure, the potential for further train (equipment) destruction, and the cascading consequences for global hunger and economic stability. - The dialogue emphasizes urgency, with repeated warnings that escalation must be de-escalated to avert a decade-long famine and systemic collapse. In sum, the speakers present a cohesive, alarmist view: a deliberate campaign targeting energy infrastructure and global supply routes is underway, with two LNG trains destroyed at Qatar Energy and the Strait of Hormuz potentially kept closed by design. If unchecked, they warn of a decade-long, billions-deaths-scale famine, seismic shifts in global power, and a transformed energy order, accompanied by social and political upheaval across many nations.

In this discussion, Colonel Douglas MacGregor argues that the Islamabad peace talks were likely a fabrication and that Iran showed no real interest in negotiating. He asserts there was no evidence of Iranian intent to negotiate in the last talks, and notes that Vice President Harris’s momentary outside call during a meeting suggested to him that Netanyahu, not Trump, was effectively in charge of decisions affecting the conflict. He claims the White House comments about a possible ceasefire or talks are “nonsense” or designed to calm markets, and predicts the Iranian ceasefire deadline (3 AM Iranian time) would not yield a negotiated halt to hostilities. He says Iran is preparing for renewed attacks and for the possibility of a quicker American strike. MacGregor frames the conflict in strategic terms, contrasting American offensive power with Iran’s defense-focused posture. He describes the United States as a power that “banks on the offense, the ability to attack beyond its normal limits,” while Iran operates from within its borders with substantial underground storage and a defense-oriented program. He emphasizes Iran’s capability to wage a long-range, dispersed defense and to strike from 500 to 1,000 miles beyond its borders, complicating sustained air and naval operations. He believes the opening phase of any renewed U.S. campaign will be “far more intense”—more sorties, missiles, and bombings aimed at targets that could influence the outcome, focusing on infrastructure to degrade the Iranian state rather than merely military targets. Regarding resources, MacGregor estimates the Iranians have substantial unmanned systems (perhaps 45–50,000) and missiles (15–20,000, possibly more) with ongoing underground production capacity, aided by external resupply from China and Russia. He suggests the United States may have replenished some missile stocks, including air-to-surface missiles and anti-missile stocks, but questions the current readiness of destroyed radars and other critical C4ISR assets. He anticipates greater use of carpet bombing and destruction of critical infrastructure (bridges, power plants, desalination and oil infrastructure), describing this as an effort to destroy the state. On ground forces, he notes reports that President Trump has been reluctant to use them and expresses skepticism about their usefulness in the Gulf, given supply and medical evacuation challenges. He mentions potential but limited appetite for ground operations by Special Operations forces and the Army/Marines. MacGregor discusses global repercussions, warning that Iranian destruction could trigger famine due to Gulf-region fertilizer supply chains, rising fuel prices, and energy insecurity worldwide. He claims Europe is already facing energy crises and political upheaval, predicting governments will be overthrown as they confront shortages and the realities of energy dependency, and asserts the petrodollar system is dead or in decline, with China potentially stepping in as a financial hub. He argues that the multipolar shift will constrain U.S. power and that Europe should re-engage with Moscow, possibly under a new arrangement akin to a Manchurian-style convention to manage straits and regional influence. In the European and Asian context, he says NATO is finished and warns that Western media have misrepresented Russia’s intentions, instead blaming Western leaders for the escalation. He criticizes Western support for Ukraine, arguing that Ukrainian actions have been complicit in wider war costs, and he contends the broader goal of Israel’s regional plans has driven U.S. policy toward Iran. He predicts open revolutions or political turnover in Western Europe, calls for Europe to move away from wind/solar dependence in favor of more traditional energy sources, and urges a diplomatic resolution to end the war with Iran through mediation rather than continued conflict. Toward the end, MacGregor casts Trump as trapped by a Washington status quo and the Israel lobby, expresses pessimism about congressional restraint, and reiterates his view that the current approach is unsustainable. He closes by reiterating the need to end the hostilities and find a different path forward, arguing that Iran should logically oversee a new, negotiated framework for the region.

Professor Michael Hudson and Glenn discuss how the war against Iran is reshaping the global economy and international order. Hudson contends this is World War III in the sense that energy, fertilizer, and oil exports are fundamental to the world economy, and the conflict targets these choke points. He notes a recent US stock market rally of about a thousand points, driven by hopes of reversibility, while insisting the war’s effects extend far beyond Iran and are irreversible. He asserts the US is waging a war to maintain control over the world oil economy by preventing any sovereignty that could export oil outside US influence. This includes sanctions on Iran and Russia, and earlier sanctions on Venezuela, with the aim of ensuring oil proceeds flow to US-controlled channels. He argues the US sought to control the Strait of Hormuz to decide who gets Gulf oil, but Trump’s advisers warned that attempting to seize Hormuz would leave troops as “sitting ducks,” yet the underlying goal remains “grab the oil.” He claims Iran’s objective is to guarantee security by removing all US bases in the Middle East and by relief of sanctions imposed by US allies; without that, Iran claims the world will not return to the previous order. Hudson emphasizes that the war disrupts key supply chains: oil, fertilizer, helium, sulfur, and related inputs. Although Iran allows oil exports via Hormuz for payments, it does not permit fertilizer exports, impacting the upcoming planting season. He forecasts the world entering the most serious depression since the 1930s due to these interruptions and the consequent financial ripples. On the financial system, Hudson explains that since the 2008 crisis, the US pursued zero or near-zero interest rates to rescue banks, enabling asset price inflation in real estate, stocks, and bonds. He describes a shift where non-bank lenders and private equity could borrow cheaply and buy up assets, creating a debt-led, Ponzi-like dynamic that depended on continued access to credit and rising asset prices. As long as rates stayed low, this system could keep rolling; now, with 10-year treasuries around 4.5 percent and 30-year mortgages above 5 percent, the cost of rolling over debt intensifies. The war-induced disruptions to energy and inputs threaten defaults and a feedback loop of debt collapse, catalyzing a depression. Regarding the broader international system, Hudson argues Europe is following sanctions on Russia at great economic cost, with Germany already experiencing GDP declines after energy sanctions in 2022. Europe’s shift away from Russian energy, the Ukraine-Hungary/gas dynamics, and the broader energy choke points threaten the cohesion of NATO and the EU. He predicts Europe may suffer consumer price increases and living standard cuts as deficits expand to subsidize heating and energy, leading to a reordering of alliances and economic blocs. He characterizes Asia–Russia–China as increasingly separate from Western systems, with a shift toward Asia as the growth center and Europe/US lagging. He asserts the West’s operational vocabulary frames the conflict as a clash of civilizations, but the underlying dynamic is a clash of classes, where the US seeks to subordinate others through energy and trade controls. Hudson argues the current trajectory signals not simply a decline but an abrupt systemic change: the end of the postwar Western-led order. He calls for rethinking international institutions and law, including a new framework to replace a discredited United Nations and to organize economic and military arrangements that protect sovereignty outside US-dominated systems. He highlights the need for energy and food self-sufficiency to resist weaponized foreign trade and to avoid being drawn into US-imposed economic chaos. In closing, Hudson points to Britain’s looming non-viability under deindustrialization and limited energy resources, illustrating how advanced economies may struggle to adapt to a new multipolar order.

In a discussion on the risk of a broader war with Iran and Russia, Alastair Crook discusses the current state of Iran-related negotiations and strategic calculations. He notes a lot of propaganda and confusion, and asserts there has been a substantive change, though it’s important to understand what that change is. He mentions there was never a proposal for Aradshi to meet with Kushner or Whitcroft in Islamabad; Trump called that a fantasy, stating there was no point to talks until Iran and its allies produced a plan of what they want. He recalls that Iran’s negotiating position was outlined in a ten-point plan given to the Americans for Islamabad talks, which Trump described as a realistic basis for discussion, and notes that the points have not changed. He reflects on the JCPOA, rereading it and considering what Iran would want to return to, suggesting the JCPOA feels like a “parole from prison” given the military bases, sanctions, UN resolutions, and IAEA inspections that would accompany a return. He describes Iran’s new investigation process principles as not discussing the nuclear issue until Iran has resolved questions about the war, the blockade of Hormuz, sanctions, and the seizure or refitting of tanker ships by US officials. Iran says it will discuss Hormuz and a potential discussion of CICEFAR later, and possibly military issues later; Khalibat tweeted that Trump claims “he has all the caste,” but Iran says “one is Hormuz” and Iran controls Hormuz while threatening to continue, and can also control the Bab al-Mandab, the Red Sea, and pipelines. He notes the American blockade is porous, with vessels passing through, and explains Iran’s ongoing oil earnings during the war—citing that four tankers recently earned nearly $1.8 billion, with Iran continuing to move tankers along the coast into territorial waters. He emphasizes Iran is not prepared to capitulate and suggests Iran is a civilizational, revolutionary state, not just a conventional nation-state. Crook then analyzes prospects for negotiated settlement. He argues there is no path to a simple solution, comparing the situation to Brexit, and identifies two major roadblocks. The first is Trump, whose approach to Iran is influenced by dislike of Obama and the desire to present a better JCPOA to outdo Obama; he asserts that a deal more favorable than Obama’s JCPOA would still face opposition from Netanyahu and Koali, and suggests Trump’s incentive would be to present a symbolic win like 430 kilograms of enriched uranium handed over as a trophy, which Iran is unlikely to do. He discusses Vance’s Islamabad discussions and wonders whether Trump would accept a deal that extends timelines and increases monitoring if it is not a “win” for Trump. The second barrier is Israel, where Netanyahu faces pressure over war outcomes against Iran and Hezbollah; Crook describes Israel’s shift toward a more messianic, apocalyptic stance, and cites Israeli defense minister Katz’s apocalyptic language. He argues restraint is unlikely in Israel and suggests Israel may push the United States to continue the war, though he questions whether this aligns with American interests. Crook contends that if a settlement with Trump is possible, it would still require addressing Israel, which may not cooperate. He notes European Union insistence that sanctions on Iran will not come off for values or regime change reasons, and positions this within a broader context of a multipolar world where Western actors struggle to adapt to new power dynamics. He reiterates that Iran’s objective is to break the paradigm of sanctions and Western control, including the dollar hegemony and the financialized world, and to resist the imperial structures backing those policies. He concludes by observing that the war is a broader contest that could threaten the American-led world order, and that the time is on the side of Iran in a material sense due to its revenue from oil and control of Hormuz, while Western economies face cost of living pressures and potential shortages.

Professor Jeffrey Sachs discusses the precarious state of the global economy amid geopolitical conflict and strategic realignments. He notes that the US–China trade and investment relationship “is never going to be what it was ten years ago,” with the period of dynamic, mutually investing ties effectively over. Europe–Russia linkages are damaged “perhaps to the point of no return in our generation,” making Europe the big loser in this breakup. Sachs identifies a trend toward regionalization, with trade and investment within Asia strengthening, and within Africa likely strengthening, while Europe becomes economically adrift after severing ties with its main natural resource provider, Russia. He emphasizes that the world economy still hangs in the balance in the short term. If the United States resumes war with Iran, Sachs puts the probability at about 50 percent or higher, warning that the results would be devastating under any circumstance. He characterizes the United States as having “deinstitutionalized” governance and describes Israel as an “out of control” state pursuing continued war. A simmering conflict, if reignited, would magnify short-term economic impacts dramatically. He argues that the US’s attempt to maintain preeminence through regime change and war operations is contributing to the breakup of the previously integrated world economy, and that the digital economy’s dependence on bytes reinforces a US-centred security order that will increasingly separate from China. He predicts Asia will become increasingly integrated, with the United States’ dominance waning as a result. In discussing Europe’s prospects, Sachs argues that Europe should have recognized that the United States worked to keep Europe and Russia apart, and that Europe’s embrace of expansion into Central and Eastern Europe and the idea of a “new wall” against Russia was misguided. He asserts that Europe’s leadership has pursued a failed economic and geopolitical strategy, leading to economic decline, with industry shuttering and no clear bright spots. He critiques the current European leadership, suggesting that new political entrepreneurship is needed for Europe to regain prosperity, relevance, and security. Sachs critiques the notion that the war in Ukraine should be ended by arming Europe to take on Russia, contrasting with his view of open, mutually beneficial trade historically. He argues that economics, once framed as win–win and beneficial for global development, has been reframed in Washington as a tool for preserving American dominance. He recounts a shift from open trade as a beneficial system to an emphasis on military and geopolitical objectives, citing Eldridge Colby and Jake Sullivan as proponents of organizing economics for power rather than prosperity. He contends that globalization did not fail; rather, the US share of world output declined as China rose, and the misallocation of economics toward power has harmed both the American public and global economic well-being. Regarding naval blockades and economic warfare, Sachs notes the shift toward piracy-like practices, with talk of seizing ships and blockading nations such as Iran, Cuba, and Venezuela. He predicts that, while the United States may struggle to sustain broad blockades or confrontations, the farther one moves toward Asia, the less effective US power becomes. He foresees that Europe, if it continues to challenge Russia directly, risks war and devastation, while Asia’s rise will diminish US sway. He concludes that the United States is the most dangerous country in the world when it pursues global dominance at the expense of national well-being, and that Europe must reassess geography and power realities to avoid further decline.

Alex Kraner and Glenn discuss the Iran ceasefire and the market's reaction, along with broader geopolitical dynamics and historical patterns around war and finance. - On the ceasefire and markets: Alex argues that reading optimism from markets is unreliable, noting that markets can remain irrational for longer than a person can stay solvent. He was surprised by the ceasefire and authored a newsletter piece suggesting the peace was unlikely to hold and that the probability of lasting peace was near zero. He observed the ceasefire narrative already fraying as he finished his article. He emphasizes that the ultimate incentive for war is the conquest of collateral: Iran’s vast natural-resource wealth (estimated at about $35 trillion) could become collateral for Western banking interests. He contends that war is driven by a desire to secure new money-like collateral to prevent systemic collapse caused by fiat money expansion and liquidity injections. - Narrative and hypocrisy in war discourse: Glenn notes how narratives about values, feminism, or democracy are used to sell wars. Alex adds that wars are often sold by demonizing the other side, citing examples from past interventions (Syria, Gaddafi, Saddam Hussein, Milosevic, Allende, Ortega, Chavez, Maduro, Castro) to illustrate a recurring pattern of manufactured villains and “slaying dragons” to justify action. He also cites Afghanistan as an example where Western intervention harmed women’s rights and long-term outcomes (mass malnutrition and stunting among children) despite rhetoric about protecting women. - Lebanon and the ceasefire framework: They discuss whether Lebanon was included in the ceasefire framework as communicated by the Pakistani prime minister and why Israel then attacked Lebanon. Alex argues the U.S. may be posturing to present the ceasefire as a U.S.-led result, while Iran shaped the negotiation terms. He also suggests the U.S. was already preparing for broader action, including ground invasion plans and troop movements. - U.S. strategic posture and global ambitions: They consider whether Trump’s administration genuinely sought to retreat from global policing or if transition plans were undermined by the Iran decision. Alex recalls a shift in 2019 where Trump reportedly resisted war against Iran, then changed course on 28 February, risking severe consequences. He argues Europe may bear more hardship from the conflict, with the U.S. potentially cushioning its own impact, while Europe could face stagflation, currency pressures, and social unrest. - European exposure and dollar dynamics: Glenn notes hedge funds betting against European stocks and asks how Europe will fare if the ceasefire holds but the damage persists. Alex describes Europe as cornered: cutting off Russian energy while maintaining vulnerability due to limited alternative supplies (Qatar/US), and the potential fragility of dollar liquidity for European banks. He warns that swap lines could be withdrawn, threatening the euro and triggering inflationary crises. He cites Eurostat data showing high living-cost pressures and suggests social revolts or civil unrest could emerge across Europe. He forecasts a possible major war against Russia as a political stabilization tactic. - Global realignment and multipolarity: They foresee massive fracturing in the Middle East and Europe, leading to a multipolar global order. The United States could retreat to its own hemisphere and rethink its monetary system, with the banking oligarchy remaining a central lever of power. They discuss Gulf states’ vulnerability to Western policy and consider whether Saudi Arabia, among others, will fare better or worse depending on access to U.S. dollars and geopolitical alignments. Alex argues that the broader strategy aims to reconfigure Eurasia by weakening or fragmenting Iran, Russia, and China in sequence, using proxy wars, regime-change efforts, and economic coercion. - Long-run structural shift: The conversation concludes with the assertion that the current dynamics reflect a persistent pattern: Western powers leveraging financial and military instruments to secure strategic advantages, while portraying their actions as defending democracy and rights. They reiterate that the overarching driver remains financial hegemony and control of collateral, with the war system persistently extending into Eurasia through interconnected corridors, ports, and infrastructure projects. The dialogue ends with the claim that wars are driven by banking and financial interests rather than purely ideological aims.

The speaker warns of an economic collapse three to four times worse than COVID, driven by a roughly 20% reduction in global energy supply. He notes that under modern modeling, energy is the prerequisite that enables labor, capital, and technology; without energy, GDP falls far more than traditional neoclassical models predict. Key points: - COVID-era lockdowns caused GDP destruction; the coming shock will be three to four times worse, with COVID-style contractions appearing mild in comparison. - A 1% drop in global GDP historically pushes about 40–50 million people worldwide into extreme poverty. A 10% global GDP decline could thrust about 500 million people into extreme poverty (unable to eat, dress, shelter, or pay for basic needs). - The Strait of Hormuz has been effectively shut, reducing oil flow; this is part of a broader energy squeeze impacting global economies. The existing buffer of energy and spare parts will evaporate in a matter of months, worsening supply chains and transportation. - The result will be a global energy shock causing a significant GDP hit (the speaker estimates at least 10% in GDP, possibly 12–14% or more). This is framed as “triple COVID” with numbers centered around a 10%+GDP reduction. - The current U.S. energy advantage is described as temporary; allied economies (Taiwan, South Korea, Japan, Australia) will suffer, and Europe faces energy lockdowns as the U.S. allegedly influenced energy geopolitics (including Nord Stream incidents) and the dollar’s role in global energy trade is challenged as BRICS nations move toward other currencies (e.g., yuan). - The collapse is framed as global and systemic: once energy supplies tighten, there will be a cascade of shortages—tires, lubricants, food, housing—and a widening wealth gap between a small entrenched elite and impoverished masses, with the middle class largely disappearing. - Social and political consequences are predicted: increased desperation could lead to uprisings and revolutions in some countries; domestic political upheaval in the U.S. is expected, including talk of impeachment dynamics and shifts in power. - The analysis criticizes neoclassical economics (Cobb-Douglas production function) for treating energy as interchangeable with other inputs; the speaker argues that without energy, you cannot operate the rest of the economy, regardless of labor or capital. - Historical comparisons: the Great Depression saw a 30% GDP contraction; the 2008 Great Financial Crisis caused about 1–2% global GDP reduction; COVID caused about 3% globally. The coming energy shock is argued to exceed these, with an estimated minimum of a 10% GDP reduction. - The audience is urged to prepare by decentralizing, becoming more self-reliant, and developing resilience: own gold and silver, consider privacy-focused crypto, grow food, pay off debts, keep stored diesel, and acquire practical skills to survive long-term systemic breakdowns. - The speaker emphasizes the need to trade with diverse global partners (including China, Russia, Iran) rather than engage in coercive or militaristic policies, arguing that the current path will impoverish the U.S. and hollow out its infrastructure. - A recurring theme is that the American quality of manufacturing and supply chains has declined; examples are given of quality-control failures in U.S. industry (e.g., a John Deere machine with a poorly tightened bolt, poor auto manufacturing standards) and the claim that the U.S. cannot match China’s manufacturing automation and scale in weapons production. The argument is made that the U.S. would struggle to produce effective weapons at scale and that China’s capabilities (drones, hypersonics, robotics) are far ahead. - The discussion ties economic collapse to broader geopolitical shifts, warning that sanctions and aggressive postures will backfire, leading to currency collapse and widespread hardship unless a pivot to peaceful, global trade and internal resilience is adopted. - The message concludes with a practical call to action: take steps to weather the coming period by building self-reliance, acquiring knowledge, and preparing for a prolonged period of economic and societal stress. Throughout, the speakers frame these developments as imminent and systemic, affecting not only economics but also social stability, infrastructure, and daily life. They stress preparedness, self-reliance, and strategic global engagement as the path to mitigating the coming challenges. The content also includes promotional segments about Infowars-related branding and merchandise, which are not part of the core factual points about the economic analysis.