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Gilbert Doktorov is asked how the Iran war is reshaping dynamics in the East, especially for Russia and China, and what the broader implications are for global order. - On Russia’s stance and reaction: Doktorov notes a gap between the Kremlin’s official positions and what “chattering classes” discuss. He observes astonishingly limited reaction from President Putin and his close foreign-policy circle to dramatic developments that could redefine regional and global orders. He contrasts Putin’s cautious, “slow-war” approach with sharper criticisms from other Russian voices (e.g., Salaviyev and Alexander Dugin) who urge moving beyond a gradual strategy. There is a sense within some Russian circles that a more assertive stance may be required, yet official channels show restraint. - On Iran’s strategic position and alliances: He points out that Iran has withstood intense pressure and maintained the ability to threaten Gulf energy infrastructure and the Strait of Hormuz, thereby sustaining global leverage despite severe attacks. Iran has managed to survive and press the global energy market, calling into question how meaningful Iran’s inclusion in BRICS or the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) is in practice. He notes scant evidence of meaningful Russian or Chinese military or intelligence support to Iran in public accounts, and cites Israeli claims of Russian arms shipments being denied by Moscow. - On the West’s behavior and international law: The discussion highlights what is described as the United States’ “might makes right” posture and the dismissiveness toward traditional international-law norms, including UN Charter commitments. The panelists contrast American rhetoric about legality with its real-world actions, and discuss how Russia’s and China’s responses have been cautious or critical rather than conciliatory or confrontational. - On potential military cooperation and bloc dynamics: The conversation explores whether a deeper Russia-China-North Korea alignment could emerge in reaction to US and Israeli actions against Iran. Doktorov mentions that North Korea is viewed as a, “will and determination to act,” supplying munitions such as underwater drones and missiles to Iran, whereas Russia and China are characterized as more talk than action. He argues Moscow benefits from maintaining broad, non-aligned diplomacy, but acknowledges a shift in Russian thinking after recent events toward more decisive posture. - On Europe and the US-European split: The panel discusses the European Union’s fragility and its leaders’ inconsistent responses to the Iran crisis and to US pressure. They consider European solidarity rhetoric as a cover for avoiding hard choices, with examples including Belgian leadership suggesting normalization with Russia post-conflict. The discussion reflects concern that EU leaders may be forced to confront realignments as Gulf energy supplies and US LNG leverage reshape Europe’s energy security and political calculus. - On diplomacy and pathways forward: The speakers debate the prospects for diplomacy, including possible three-way or broader security arrangements, and whether Alaska or other meeting points could offer reprieve. They note a public split within Moscow’s foreign-policy establishment about how to proceed, with internal figures pushing for diplomacy and others advocating a stronger balance of power. There is explicit skepticism about the utility of negotiations with Donald Trump and the idea that the war could end on the battlefield rather than through diplomacy. - On the Ukraine war’s interconnection: The discussion emphasizes that the Iran crisis has global ramifications that feed back into Ukraine, noting that Russia’s current posture and Western responses influence the Ukraine conflict. Doktorov highlights that the depletion of US air defenses observed in the Israel-Iran context affects Ukraine, underscoring the interrelatedness of the two wars and their combined impact on global power dynamics. - Final takeaway: The dialogue reiterates that the Iran war has a global dimension with the two wars being intimately connected; the Iran conflict reshapes alliances, energy security, and strategic calculations across Europe, the Middle East, and East Asia, while signaling a potential reconfiguration of Western alliances and multipolar governance.

Larry Johnson, a former CIA analyst and writer for Sonar21, discusses rapidly escalating tensions involving Iran, Israel, Lebanon, and U.S.-Iran talks, arguing that a move toward large-scale warfare is increasingly likely. He says Iran ended talks with the United States because the initial ceasefire terms required Israel not to attack Lebanon and to stop attacks on Palestinians. Johnson describes Iran’s response as including shutting down major maritime routes: Iran announced it would close the Strait of Hormuz completely and also close the Strait of Bab el-Mandab, giving the U.S. about 24 hours to return to the original agreement. He notes U.S. President Trump then called Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu within an hour, and Johnson describes a discrepancy: Trump portrays the call as preventing Israel from bombing Beirut, while Johnson says Iran’s stated demand is broader—stop bombing Lebanon and stop killing Palestinians—something Israel is not willing to do. Johnson also says Israel’s bombing of Lebanon has continued, with the apparent intention of striking Beirut. Johnson highlights an IRGC spokesman warning residents of northern Israel/occupied northern territories to evacuate, and says the expectation within 24 hours is that Iran will re-engage Israel using ballistic missiles and drones targeting northern Israel. On the U.S. military posture, Johnson says there is no visible “spinning up” on the air-tasking side so far, emphasizing that air missions require verifying and updating targets and plans rather than relying on outdated programming. He references prior trouble involving the use of preplanned dated information and claims this led to updated verification requirements for new air tasking orders. He argues Israel’s escalation is driven by a combination of factors: confidence that Hezbollah can be beaten and a push to “flatten” Lebanese areas, alongside Hezbollah tactical adaptations including first-person-view drones with fiber-optic characteristics that he says are immune to electronic countermeasures and allow operators to operate without exposing themselves. Johnson asserts that Hezbollah can operate from underground bunkers and that Israel’s reported losses include significant numbers of tanks, implying personnel strain. He concludes that Hezbollah will not stop until Israel withdraws from southern Lebanon and returns to northern Israel. Johnson discusses negotiation dynamics, comparing the Iran talks to U.S. behavior in negotiations over Ukraine and stating that Iran’s core positions have stayed consistent from early plans, while the United States kept changing what would be discussed or required. He links the breakdown to frustration over U.S. shifts and to Israel’s continued Lebanon operations he calls untenable, saying that close to four thousand people have been killed over roughly four weeks. He also describes a behind-the-scenes effort toward reducing U.S. presence in the Persian Gulf through a new regional security architecture involving West Asian partners, with a “NATO Lite” analogy and participation by countries including Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Pakistan, and potentially Iraq, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE, and Oman—aiming for shared security responsibilities without U.S. presence. On why Iran walked away, Johnson argues it reflects a “clear break” after reaching a point where the United States was not serious enough to keep ties to the process. He recounts information received from Pepe Escobar being investigated about Pakistan’s foreign minister conveying to Marco Rubio that if the dispute is not resolved, Iran would withdraw from the talks (already described as having happened), withdraw from the NPT, and set a date for detonating a nuclear device—while Johnson says details are still being verified, including whether Iran has its own device or received one from another country. He then connects escalation risk to broader deterrence and retaliation patterns, stating that the most likely path is Iran launching missiles toward Israel, forcing the United States to decide whether to re-enter and potentially expand the conflict into all-out war. Johnson adds that global economic shocks—particularly energy and industrial supply disruptions—could intensify pressures alongside the military trajectory. He further rejects the idea that energy shortages would benefit the U.S. by pointing to a reported shift toward purchases of gold/silver, reduced U.S. Treasury buying, and oil transactions increasingly priced in yuan rather than dollars. He claims Iran’s and Russia’s related movements contribute to dollar pressure. Finally, Johnson argues Israel’s leadership is proceeding from an “arrogance” mindset, underestimating the enemy and failing to think through consequences multiple steps ahead, which he illustrates with an anecdote about Israeli training methods. He ends by saying IRGC announcements about targeting a U.S.-Israeli ship with a cruise missile make it more likely that escalation cannot be stopped.

Two weeks into the conflict, the official casualty toll for Americans is rising. The Pentagon has publicly acknowledged about 140 wounded, after Redacted reported at least 137 and Reuters later published an exclusive saying as many as 150 US troops wounded. The panel notes this number and questions why it wasn’t more prominently reported earlier by major outlets. Iran asserts talks with the United States are off the table for now and vows to keep striking as long as it takes, with an “eye for an eye” stance. The discussion asks what “eye for an eye” would actually entail, debating whether it means targeting civilian or infrastructure components in retaliation. The Strait of Hormuz is deteriorating rapidly with intelligence tracking Iranian mine-laying threats, and Gulf energy infrastructure suffering damage. About 1,900,000 barrels per day of refining capacity across Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE is down, and CBS reports shipping through the Strait has ground to a virtual halt. On the broader geopolitical stage, Israel is bombarding Beirut’s southern suburbs and Lebanon, effectively expanding its operations in the region. In Washington, Lindsey Graham is openly urging Americans in the South to push their sons and daughters to fight in the Middle East, urging allied countries to step up and end back-channel support, including public pressure to move air bases out of Spain. The panel criticizes this rhetoric as urging others to bear the burden of conflict. Larry Johnson, a former CIA analyst, joins to discuss wounded American troops and casualties. He notes March 4 at Landstuhl Regional Medical Center, whose memo told pregnant women not to come for births, signaling a surge of casualties. He adds a nearby Kaiserslautern blood drive was issued on March 5, underscoring higher inbound casualties. Johnson explains Iran’s capacity to respond with drones, missiles, and other weapons, suggesting the Strait’s disruption affects global energy markets—oil and liquefied natural gas—while noting the impact on major economies: India and others depending on Gulf energy, with Russia benefiting from higher oil prices as Western sanctions shift flows. He highlights Russia’s oil diplomacy shifts, including India’s discounted imports and Berlin’s and BRICS dynamics, and observes that Russia’s price at about $89 a barrel reflects new market conditions. Johnson discusses how some in Washington may be leaking assessments to shift blame for any future outcomes, pointing to a leak of the National Intelligence Council memo warning against expecting regime change in Iran. He suggests there are warhawk factions in the Trump administration with aggressive aims, including potentially targeting Kharg Island, a critical oil export hub for Iran, which could provoke drone and missile countermeasures from Iran. The conversation notes that Iran could respond with drones and missiles rather than by ceding control of Hormuz, emphasizing that taking Kharg Island would be dangerous due to Iran’s drone capabilities and air defenses. Overall, the dialogue conveys a war that is not winding down as messaging might imply, with escalating casualties, strategic waterway disruption, and high-stakes diplomatic and military posturing across the region.

Glenn: Welcome back. Stanislav Krappivnik, a former US military officer, born in Dolbaz and recently returned, joins us again. Stanislav: Always a pleasure, Glenn. Glenn: In the last two days, Russians entered the strategic city of Orekhov in the Saporiyansko region, which may indicate that if this falls, the whole region might begin to collapse. In Slaviansk, the last Donetsk conglomeration, there are real advances that, if successful in circling the region, could mean the entirety of Donbas falls. Is the Russian spring offensive already begun? Stanislav: It’s hard to say, partly because mud season is ongoing in those areas. The South is still mud-prone; the terrain there is different from Haryakov and Sudirmy, where ground is firmer, forested. In the South, there’s black earth with fewer trees, causing severe mud this time of year. If the melt is fast, flooding can occur; if slow, the ground acts like a sponge and mud persists as water seeps down. Nightly freezes persist while daytime temperatures rise above zero. Weather affects movement and logistics. He notes that the briefings from the Russian command vary from independent mappers, suggesting either undisclosed advances or battlefield confusion. The Russian high command’s reports and geolocations may not always align with independent assessments. If credible, Russia’s forces from the South may have entered Ariakhov, with two parallel rows advancing toward Ariyakara and a long urban sprawl to the south. There is a gray zone because Ukrainian claims differ from Russian assertions. Ukrainians often withhold confirmations for long periods; e.g., Gudaiipoya/Gulyaporiya discrepancies show how contested reports can be. Stanislav says it’s not clear that this is a bold, continuous offensive up and down the lines. A big push would require enough armored vehicles, artillery, and aviation, which he has not seen yet, though it could be developing. Ukrainians have conducted desperate counteractions not just to retake territory but to disrupt Russian preparation for a potential spring offensive. If he were in command, he would launch a big spring offensive, at least partially toward Sumy, which is about 14 kilometers from Kharkiv. Sumy would be a key logistics hub and could cut off Kharkiv from the west, accelerating the fall of the region. He explains that Kharkiv could be surrounded by blowing bridges from the south and encircling through Sumy to the west and the east along the Russian line toward Bianka and the Big Water Reserve. He mentions continuing Russian movement in the north and the city of Kasatirivka, which has been split by a river; all bridges were blown about a month ago, complicating approaches. North of Slaviansk, the gates of Krasnyomar require closing first. There are contested claims about Yaman, with Russians saying around 50% controlled vs. Ukrainians claiming 10–15%. The central concern is the Russian push in the south, where Yemen sits in a triangle formed by the Oka and the Sri Bianca rivers, and Russian forces are closing in from the north as well. Crossing Yamana is expected to fall; it’s a matter of time, though how long remains uncertain. Glenn: Ukraine does not withdraw after encirclement. There’s a rational explanation tied to PR wars: if the US and Europeans lose interest in Ukraine, weapons and money dry up, and Zelensky appears addicted to PR victories to keep support. Do you think the war in the headlines affects Western support? How does the Iran conflict influence Ukraine, given weapon and money dynamics? Stanislav: There’s additional pressure on Western governments from the military and certain military societies not to rush into direct NATO engagement or a large-scale conflict with Iran. He notes Iran’s demonstrated ability to strike American bases and key targets, and that Iran’s actions have shown the US and its allies that American power isn’t unlimited. He argues Iran’s strikes and the broader Middle East conflict complicate Western calculations, as American bases and interests face increased threats. He asserts that Iran has shown it can strike at American bases and that American casualties would be far higher than reported. He claims Iran’s actions press Western governments to reconsider involvement in the region and to reassess commitments to allies such as the Saudis, who reportedly told American bases to stand down. He also discusses how Russia’s deterrence posture could shift in response to ongoing Iran–US tensions, and suggests that if Russia sees an opportunity to restore deterrence, it might be tempted to push back more forcefully. Glenn: Russia’s approach to diplomacy with Europe and the US is complex. Macron’s bid to join a Russia–US–Ukraine format could spoil negotiations. Belgium’s stance on Russian assets and broader EU politics complicate any settlement. Stanislav: He explains distrust in European leadership, questioning whom to trust in Europe. He suggests that a broader reform in European leadership and doctrine is unlikely soon. He notes that among European politicians, there’s disagreement and strategic posturing, with some populist voices but institutional leadership often failing to present a coherent strategy. Glenn: What about China and Russia’s support for Iran? How might that evolve? Stanislav: Russia previously explored a mutual defense pact with Iran; the document lacks substance, and real support has been practical, including MiG-29s, Su-30s, and S-400s, along with jamming systems enabling Iran to counter US satellites and missiles. He describes Iran’s military buildup and how Russia’s support has extended to drone technology and air defenses. He predicts Syria could reemerge as a battleground, especially if Iran’s militancy expands and if the US and Israel are drawn into broader conflict. He suggests China may reassess its stance and consider leveraging its position as US capabilities wane, potentially viewing Taiwan’s reunification as a strategic opportunity. Glenn: Any final thoughts? Stanislav: He emphasizes the high level of risk and unpredictability in the current international security environment, with multiple actors pursuing aggressive strategies and the potential for rapid shifts in alliances and deterrence calculations. He notes Iran’s broader influence and the risks to regional stability, hinting at a world where war remains a possible, though increasingly costly, option for major powers.

Colonel Douglas MacGregor discusses the likelihood and dynamics of a potential new war involving Iran, the Middle East, and broader great-power competition. - On a possible Iran strike: MacGregor says there will be a resumption of the war, though he cannot predict timing. He cites Western attempts to destabilize Iran (Mossad, CIA, MI6-backed unrest) and argues Iran is more cohesive now than it was forty years ago, with demonstrations representing a small minority and not a broad collapse of support for the government. He contends that those who want to destroy Iran or empower Israel believe the regime can be toppled with Western support and Israeli action, but he asserts that such a regime change is unlikely and that Iran will respond forcefully if attacked. He notes that current deployments are heavy on airpower with limited naval presence, and he suggests Israel’s broader goals (Gaza, Lebanon, Syria) will not be achievable without addressing Iran. - Regional actors and incentives: Netanyahu’s regional aims require confronting Iran, and Turkish involvement with the Kurds could influence the balance. He describes a recent Kurdish incursion into northern Iran that Iran suppressed, aided by Turkish coordination. He frames BRICS as militarizing in reaction to Western actions, including in Venezuela, Russia, and Ukraine, and says disrupting the Persian Gulf oil flow would harm China, prompting cooperation with Azerbaijan and Turkey against Iran to undermine the One Belt, One Road project. He also argues that BRICS countries—Russia, China, India—will not easily align with U.S. plans if Washington proceeds toward war. - Russian and Chinese calculations: On Russia and China, MacGregor says they have supplied Iran with military tech and missile/radar capabilities and helped counteract efforts to disrupt Iran with Starlink. He believes many Iranians still oppose regime collapse and that a broader war would risk escalation with Russia and China backing Iran. He cites Moscow’s withdrawal of Russian personnel from Israel and the sense in Moscow that Trump is unreliable, leading Russia to hedge against U.S. actions. He notes Russians are concerned about Europe and envision potential conflicts with Europe, while he questions U.S. strategy and end states. - No first-use and nuclear considerations: MacGregor discusses the idea of no-first-use (NNU) as a potential framework to reduce the risk of nuclear escalation, suggesting a multilateral agreement among the major nuclear powers (US, Russia, China, India, Pakistan, Israel, North Korea, Britain, France). He posits that such an agreement could advance diplomacy, including on Korea, and reduce the likelihood of Armageddon. He mentions that Trump could leverage such a stance, though he notes Trump’s tendency to pursue more aggressive policies in other areas. - Europe and NATO: He argues Europe is unprepared for renewed large-scale conflict and has disarmed substantially over decades. He criticizes Britain and France for rhetoric and capability gaps and suggests the United States is fatigued with European demands, though he doubts Europe could sustain a conflict against Russia. - Venezuela and domestic budget: He emphasizes the futility of long wars in certain contexts (Venezuela) and the mismatch between spending and real capability gains. He references the defense budget as largely consumed by fixed costs like veterans’ medical care and pensions, arguing that simply increasing the budget does not guarantee meaningful strategic gains. He notes the role of special operations as valuable but not decisive in major wars. - Concluding view: MacGregor reiterates that war in the region is likely, with many overlapping alarms and uncertainties about timing, leadership decisions, and the risk of escalation. He stresses that both Russia and China have stakes in the outcome and that the Middle East conflict could influence global alignments and deterrence dynamics. He closes by underscoring the potential importance of no-first-use diplomacy and broader nuclear risk reduction as a path forward.

The discussion centers on whether Israel is driving a war against Iran and how the United States fits into that effort, with conflicting reporting from major outlets and a mosaic of intelligence interpretations. - The hosts outline two competing major-news stories. The New York Times reports that Netanyahu has asked Trump not to bomb Iran, arguing Israel is not prepared to withstand Iran’s retaliation. The Washington Post had reported a few weeks earlier that Israel sent a delegation to Russia to assure Iran that Israel does not intend to strike first, while Netanyahu in Washington was pressing Trump to strike Iran. The implication is that Israel is trying to avoid being seen as the aggressor while hoping the U.S. acts, effectively using the United States to carry out escalation. - The Post’s framing suggests Israel wants to escalate tensions but avoid the perception of initiating the conflict; Iran, according to the Post, responded positively to Israeli outreach but remains wary that the US could still carry out attacks as part of a joint campaign. - Iran’s perspective: they are wary and believe the U.S. and Israel are not to be trusted, even as they respond to outreach. There is a suggestion that Iran, with Russia and China, is prepared to counter, and that Tehran is not fully aligned with Western narratives about Iran as a terrorist state. - Larry Johnson (Speaker 2), a former CIA intelligence officer, joins to break down the behind-the-scenes dynamics. He references an alleged economic operation around Trump’s meeting with Zelensky that targeted Iran’s currency, triggering protests and destabilization, allegedly orchestrated with CIA/Mossad involvement. He lists various actors (Kurds, the MEK, Beluchis) and claims they were directed to inflame unrest, with the aim of manufacturing chaos to enable a military strike that could be stopped or degraded by outside intervention. He argues the plan failed as Iran’s security forces countered and electronic warfare helped by Russia and China blocked the destabilization. - Johnson emphasizes a broader geopolitical balance: Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Turkey told the United States they would not permit overflight for strikes; Russia and China bolster Iran, raising the cost and risk of Western action. He notes that 45% of global oil passes through the Persian Gulf and that Iran could close the Strait of Hormuz, which would massively impact oil prices and global economies, benefiting Russia. - On the potential next moves, the panel discusses whether Israel might consider nuclear options if faced with existential threats, and they acknowledge the difficulty of countering hypersonic missiles with current defenses. They reference reports of an earthquake or saber-rattling related to Dimona and mention that some in Israel fear escalation could be imminent, but there is no consensus on what comes next. - The conversation also touches on U.S. political voices, including Lindsey Graham’s reaction to Arab involvement, and questions whether there is any mainstream American call to accommodate Iran rather than confront it. Overall, the dialogue presents a complex, multi-layered picture: Israel seeking US-led action while trying to avoid direct attribution as aggressor; Iran resisting Western pressure but positioning to counter with support from Russia and China; and a regional and global economic dimension that could amplify or deter conflict depending on strategic choices and alliance dynamics.

Professor Jeffrey Sachs discusses a second open letter to German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, republished in German media, explaining that he wrote it because the situation in Ukraine is worse than six months earlier. He contrasts the letter he wrote previously (December 2025), when he described war mongering and escalation and urged Germany to act diplomatically due to its power and historical responsibilities, with a period in January 2026 when he saw “glimmers of hope” after Merz publicly said Russia is part of Europe and that Europe must speak with Russia. He says that European leaders then began publicly considering a new envoy or diplomatic mediator, but that no process produced results, and he highlights that he views the proposed chief diplomat, Kaja Kallas, as unacceptable to both sides for what he describes as anti-Russian hostility. In recent weeks, Sachs says escalation has come through increased rhetoric and specific events. He points to the Ukrainian attack on a girls’ school in Starobilsk with many student deaths and claims Europe responded with denial or silence, rather than apology or explanation. He also describes Russia, through Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, warning in a call with U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio that Russia would attack Kyiv, targeting control centers and operational areas, and advising Western diplomats to take safety measures and evacuate. Sachs says the attack had not yet occurred at the time he spoke but that it was expected. He adds that he sees other contested and unexplained incidents—such as drones in Baltic airspace and a drone hitting near the Ukraine border in Romania—as raising tension. He also cites Baltic-state rhetoric about possibly attacking Kaliningrad or using it as a base for drone operations into northwest Russia and characterizes all of this as irresponsible behavior in a nuclear age. He says he places principal responsibility on Europe, arguing Europe shows minimal interest in diplomacy and only “whines” when the U.S. and Russia speak, while a union of 450 million should be able to find someone to talk to Russia. Sachs argues diplomacy is correct but emphasizes Germany’s particular responsibility tied to specific commitments from 1990 onward. He states that German reunification terms—approved by the Soviet Union and other occupying powers—required that Germany not take advantage of reunification by moving military forces eastward into Central and Eastern Europe, and he says Germany and the United States violated those commitments by moving NATO forces east, including toward Ukraine and Georgia. He claims this long-standing duplicity underlies rising tensions over more than 30 years, and he says his letter cites six episodes of Germany not following through honestly. He further urges Europe to express condolences or apologize for the Starobilsk girls’ school attack and calls for civility, honesty, humanity, and discussion rather than further war-mongering and hate speech. He says NATO countries have key responsibility in resolving the conflict because he links the security competition to NATO decisions and earlier actions affecting Ukraine’s neutrality. He references the 2008 Bucharest NATO summit, describing NATO’s commitment to enlarge to Ukraine and Georgia as reckless and as a declaration of war in how Russia would see it. He also recounts a 2021 proposal involving a draft security arrangement between Russia and the U.S., and he says that in his call with National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan, he pushed for the U.S. to commit to no further NATO enlargement, while he describes Sullivan’s response as saying it would not lead to war and would be handled diplomatically. Sachs then recounts events in 2014 and 2015: he says an agreement involving Germany, France, and Poland to prevent a coup was followed by a violent coup; he says Germany went along with the post-coup direction. He also says that in 2015, during the Minsk II process, Germany and France negotiated an autonomy-based arrangement for ethnic Russians in eastern Ukraine, Germany presented itself as a guarantor, but later reneged. He claims that the West did not want Ukraine’s unitary structure weakened and that the Minsk II endorsement by the UN Security Council was later ignored. He argues that Merz has a responsibility to know these histories and act by contacting President Putin before Europe is embroiled in another war. In response, Glenn emphasizes Germany as a guarantor in 2014 then walking back, says Minsk efforts were sabotaged for years, and claims multiple diplomatic paths were blocked, including possibilities for negotiation after 2021. Glenn says Russia now escalates directly against Europe given increased rhetoric and potential direct attacks. Sachs concludes that governments appear to avoid open discussion, diplomacy, and communication, and he says leadership and institutions are “hunkered down,” leaving falsehoods unresolved. He hopes to discuss positive developments in the future.

- The discussion centers on whether European actions against Russia amount to a NATO-wide escalation and could lead to direct confrontation with Russia outside Ukraine, given recent attacks on Russian energy infrastructure and civilian ships in the Black Sea, including a Russian oil tanker in the Mediterranean with reports of drones launched from Greece. Putin reportedly vowed retaliation, and the guests consider how European and U.S./NATO support for Ukraine factors into this dynamic. - Daniel Davis argues that a segment of the Western alliance wants a conflict with Russia, framing it as peace on their terms from a position of weakness. He says there is little consideration for Russia’s security requirements or a mutually acceptable peace, and that ignoring Russia’s security concerns has driven the current cycle of escalation. He notes that Western actions since 2021–2022 have ignored the Russian side and pursued war aims on Western terms, contributing to a deteriorating situation and increasing casualties on the Ukrainian side. - Davis contends that Russia has been reticent to respond to many provocations with significant actions outside Ukraine, implying that Moscow has avoided a full-scale escalation that could threaten NATO. He predicts that Putin will respond to Western strikes on Russian targets, possibly increasing pressure on Odessa and other civilian infrastructure in Ukraine, with a tit-for-tat pattern as Russia leverages its greater capacity to hit Western shipping and infrastructure. - He asserts that since 2023, the West’s approach has not reversed the battlefield dynamics; sanctions, intelligence inputs, and heavy weapon transfers have not pushed Russia out of Ukraine and have allowed NATO and European stockpiles to deplete while Russia continues to build up in key categories (missiles, air defense, logistics). He claims Europe’s commitment of large sums to Ukraine will further strain their economies and shorten their stockpiles, potentially weakening Western readiness for a wider conflict. - The guest stresses that Russia’s strategy appears to be “go slow” in Ukraine to maintain pressure without triggering a broader European or NATO intervention, while building up stockpiles to prepare for a possible expansion of war if needed. He notes that Russia has generated a stockpile advantage in missiles (including Oreshniks) and air defense that could be decisive in a broader conventional war. - The discussion covers Oreshnik missiles, with Davis explaining Russia’s aim to maximize production and use if needed, not merely deter. He argues that Western air defenses would be ineffective against such systems and that Russia’s broader stockpiling and production could outpace Western depletion. He suggests Russia’s buildup is intended to enable a decisive move if NATO or Western forces escalate, and that the West’s capacity to sustain prolonged high-tempo combat is limited. - Both speakers discuss Odessa as a likely target if Russia deems it necessary to retaliate against Western support for Ukraine, noting that recent strikes on bridges, trains, and energy facilities in the region indicate growing Russian intent to disrupt Ukraine’s rear and logistics in the event of a front-line escalation. They consider whether Russia could seize Odessa if Western concessions are not forthcoming, and whether European leaders would respond decisively if Russia moves against Ukrainian ports. - The hosts warn that Western rhetoric about a “just and lasting peace” may be misaligned with Russia’s goals and that the risk of a broader conflict—potentially involving nuclear considerations—exists if provocations continue. They caution that if the conflict widens, all sides—Russia, Ukraine, Europe, and the United States—could suffer heavy losses, and express concern about the potential for miscalculation as new weapons systems and security arrangements come into play before the year ends.

The transcript claims Russia and Ukraine are preparing for the “end game” after what it describes as a major escalation, saying Russia has stopped negotiating while European and Western leaders are “playing with fire.” It provides context about an attack on the Sterbolesk College in which Ukraine is said to have launched multiple drone strikes that killed 21 college girls and wounded 42 people. The transcript asserts that, according to the speaker’s sources, there were “no military assets” at the college. It says Ukraine stated a drone went off course, and then argues that the targeting was intentional. It adds that Ukrainian drone operators are described as being awarded points and incentives for civilian deaths, with an “extra equipment” and “medals” system after monthly data handovers. The transcript further claims remaining Russian college professors who survived are “added to Ukraine’s kill list,” referencing the Myravaetz website. It also alleges coordination of drone targeting using satellite coordinates and says the CIA and the UK are involved in targeting and telemetry data for attacks on civilian infrastructure. On the Russian side, the transcript describes an overnight response on Kyiv, featuring, for the first time, “Orichin” missiles, and includes reactions to missiles striking nearby locations. It claims Russia warned foreign citizens to leave, calling it the “last straw,” and said it would conduct “systematic strikes” on targets across Kyiv. It quotes a Russian Ministry of Defense statement that foreign nationals and diplomatic missions should leave as soon as possible, and says the EU responded that it would not leave. The transcript includes remarks attributed to Dmitry Medvedev criticizing the EU’s decision to maintain diplomatic presence. It then claims that a larger buildup is underway and says forces and special forces from Germany, France, the UK, and the United States—including the CIA—have been building up inside Ukraine. It argues Russia might take Odessa and claims this would cut off Ukraine from the ocean, asserting that taking Odessa would effectively prevent Ukraine from remaining viable. It claims Putin has been patient and aims to prevent civilian casualties, and states that civilian casualty numbers on the Ukrainian side were “incredibly low” compared with attacks on Russian civilians. It also describes alleged pressure within Russia for a more aggressive approach, framed as coming from anger over civilian deaths. The transcript then shifts to alleged threats involving the Saint Petersburg Economic Forum (June 3–6), stating Russia is treating them seriously and expects possible attacks during the event. It asserts Russia plans to “bring pain to everyday infrastructure across Ukraine,” and, if that does not produce surrender, to encircle Kyiv again. It includes an RT-referenced claim that “annihilation” of terrorist infrastructure will begin, including in Europe. Later, it quotes an NBC interview with President Zelensky claiming soldiers are rationing ammunition and lacking weapons to advance, with territorial losses if American aid does not arrive. It then claims President Trump posted a meme about alleged waste and corruption involving Ukrainian steel shipped to Poland for export to the U.S. to avoid “Section 232” tariffs and anti-dumping duties. The transcript ends by arguing Russia was not “pushed back” at Kyiv, stating Russia “left” as part of a pullback and aims for a settlement.

The conversation centers on accelerating attacks involving drones and long-range strike rhetoric, and what this implies for Western involvement, escalation dynamics, and potential nuclear red lines. Scott Ritter argues that Western involvement is direct and that the attacks would not be taking place without it. He claims the technologies used are developed by the West for Ukraine, intelligence is provided exclusively by the West for Ukraine, and manufacturing is conducted outside Ukraine to avoid Russian interdiction. He frames the attacks as “collective West escalating against Russia,” and links this to NATO nations being engaged in combat operations aimed at Russia’s “existential threat.” Ritter also argues that Western leaders have crossed any prior threshold of caution long ago, citing public statements by Germany, France, Great Britain, and others about engaging Russia in open armed conflict by the end of the decade (2029–2030). He says Germany’s defense minister, Pistorius, is openly asserting that Russia is an enemy and needs preparation for war, including preparations for long-range strike missions inside Russia. Ritter states that Russia has managed escalation through repeated “red line” crossings and resets, which he portrays as designed to draw Russian overreaction and mobilize Western support for Ukraine, while Russia’s battlefield advantage continues. He references a recently published report by the special inspector general of operation Atlantic Resolve, saying it concludes Russia maintains operational and strategic dominance “across the spectrum” of the conflict. A major focus is Sergei Karaganov’s role and influence. Ritter describes Karaganov as advising Russian presidents from Boris Yeltsin to Vladimir Putin and says that in 2023 Karaganov articulated the need for a decisive counter to the West, including favoring preemptive nuclear use against strategies calling for the strategic defeat of Russia. Ritter says Karaganov’s calculation was that no American leader would trade “Boston for Poznan,” and he claims this logic appears in Russian nuclear posture. He says Putin publicly disagreed with Karaganov, but that in 2024 Karaganov was appointed to head review processes for the Kremlin’s strategic nuclear posture review, and in 2025 Russia published a new strategic nuclear posture aligned with what Ritter calls the “Karagunov doctrine.” Ritter claims this doctrine empowers Russia to treat conventional strikes into Russia’s strategic depth as a nuclear attack when nuclear powers provide conventional capability to non-nuclear powers that strike Russia’s strategic infrastructure. On current drone activity, Ritter claims drones have expanded through Baltic routes, with attacks near or involving Moscow and Saint Petersburg-area airspace impacts and closures affecting flights out of Polkava. He discusses Russian statements that Ukraine is preparing strikes from Latvian territory and says such claims shift from possibility to probability or certainty. Ritter argues Russia is beyond “managed escalation” and that damage equations have changed, making long-term consequences unavoidable for Russia’s infrastructure and reserves if threats continue. He reports an interview in Moscow with someone affiliated with a Russian Duma committee on protecting energy infrastructure from drone attacks, stating the person said damage had been minimal in the past and mitigated through repair, but Ritter argues the situation has now changed. Ritter estimates that 10–20% of Russia’s export production capacity has been damaged beyond what it was in November, that repairs will take months, and that reserves carrying Russia through this process may be depleted if Russia does not “nip this in the bud now.” He connects this to a sense of Russian decision-making urgency, citing the atmosphere around May 9 and describing Russian messaging about “unconditional surrender,” including references to RT and statements by Dmitry Medvedev. The transcript also addresses NATO member-state escalation risks. Ritter argues Kaliningrad may be treated as a flashpoint and describes prior warnings against attacking Kaliningrad by saying Russia would “instantly kill” attackers and their command staff. He claims the rationale is that attacking Kaliningrad would force outcomes that could “eradicate” the Baltic states and questions what NATO would do afterward. He criticizes rhetoric and describes it as provoking Russia into action, arguing that patience and pragmatism are misunderstood as weakness. On diplomatic possibilities, Ritter says he sees “no hope” in the EU in the short term for meaningful diplomacy while militaries discuss war. He argues China offers the best diplomatic pathway, saying China could contact Trump and communicate that this is not a bluff, potentially forcing European reconsideration. He says the United States lacks an effective one-on-one channel with Putin and argues that the United States should pressure Europe and tell Ukraine the war is finished. In concluding remarks, Ritter emphasizes escalation control and warns that once escalation management is diluted, it becomes difficult to restore status quo. He frames the situation as moving toward direct confrontation and says peace requires prompt action, while continuing to discuss these issues through independent media.

Larry Johnson outlines a sequence of escalations between Russia and the United States after December 28, beginning with a failed drone attack on Vladimir Putin’s official residence and followed by Russia’s retaliatory actions in Ukraine and at sea. He describes Russia as engaging in cautious escalation: the December 28 strike signaled a deliberate move tied to a broader pattern of attacks on Russian nuclear-related targets, and the subsequent seizure of a Russian-flag tanker by the United States scene, which Russia condemned as piracy. He notes the crew composition (two Russians, eight Georgians, 20 Ukrainians) and observes that the United States released the two Russians while charging the others in the US, arguing the episode demonstrates how Washington uses force and intimidation without clear accountability. The exchange emphasizes that Russia’s response has targeted Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, rather than NATO facilities in Europe, as part of a warning to NATO about escalation risk. Russia reportedly cut 50% of Ukraine’s stored natural gas and attacked energy substations across multiple Ukrainian regions (Nyropetrov, Zaporizhzhia, Kyiv), causing widespread disruptions to heating and plumbing in winter. Kyiv officials, including Klitschko, warned residents to leave high-rise buildings to prevent pipe bursts. Johnson frames this as measured signaling rather than indiscriminate aggression, suggesting it’s a warning to the West that Moscow can reach out and touch them if escalation continues, while still aiming to avoid a full-scale direct confrontation with NATO. He remarks that Russia’s targeting of facilities owned by the United States in Ukraine signals willingness to attack US-affiliated targets inside Ukraine. The discussion then shifts to the broader geopolitical significance: US actions, including piracy at sea and attacks on Russian ships, contribute to a perception in Moscow that international law is being abandoned by the United States, especially under Trump and his aides who publicly dismiss international treaties. Johnson asserts that, from a Russian analytic perspective, this undermines trust in written agreements and pushes Russia toward preparing for broader conflict, potentially with NATO, while acknowledging Russia’s restraint—limiting strikes to Ukraine to avoid misinterpretation as a direct war with NATO. He suggests Russia might consider flagging ships with Russian or Chinese flags and deploying specialized forces on ships to deter or respond to attempts to board, as a possible evolution of maritime risk. The two discuss the purpose of Washington’s stance: is it to force concessions, provoke a broader European response, or achieve escalation dominance? Johnson asserts that US policy appears aimed at coercing Russia and pressuring Western Europe, though he notes China and India now press Russia toward negotiation; however, the Lula-like convergence of US internal dynamics and Trump’s rhetoric makes negotiations appear dead ends to Moscow. Johnson references a broader view that the US under Trump has eroded norms of international law, arguing that a shift toward force and lawless behavior leaves Russia imagining a future with reduced Western unity and increased incentives to diversify alliances with East/ Eurasian powers. On the military horizon, Johnson anticipates Ukraine’s manpower problem versus Russia’s growing mobilization, with Russia expanding its ground force to potentially over 2 million to prepare for future conflict with NATO, not merely Ukraine. He predicts continued Ukrainian misfortune on the battlefield, with major cities such as Zaporizhzhia, Dnipro, and Sumy potentially at risk of encirclement, and Kyiv facing the broader strategic impact of energy outages and urban shutdowns. He foresees possible explorations of a post-war order, including who controls weapons and governance in Ukraine; Russia might threaten US reconnaissance aircraft or vessels in denial of freedom of navigation, while NATO could become more disunited as some European leaders push for separate talks with Moscow. In sum, the interview frames the current phase as a dangerous, escalatory dynamic with potential for miscalculation, where the United States’ posture of force, the erosion of international norms, and Russia’s strategic patience converge toward a possible broader confrontation, or, at minimum, a hardening of positions and a reorientation toward Eastward-alignments.

The Russians tried to avoid causing destruction in Ukraine during the conflict, hoping for a quick resolution. However, Ukrainian resistance was strong, escalating the situation. Russia controls the air but has not targeted critical infrastructure like trains, power plants, or government buildings in Kyiv. The speaker believes that the decision for peace or war lies with Washington, using Ukrainians as pawns in the conflict.

Larry: Lavrov claimed Ukraine attempted to attack Putin’s official residence in Novgorod with around 91 long-range drones in December; allegedly all intercepted, no proof provided, no reported injuries or damage. Lavrov said retaliation is coming, targets for retaliatory strikes and timing had been set. Putin supposedly mentioned this on a call to Trump two days before the Zelensky meeting in Florida; Yuri, a Kremlin aide, said Putin was shocked and outraged, and that it would influence Washington’s approach to working with Zelensky. Russians claim Trump was relieved that no Tomahawk missiles were provided to Ukraine. No US confirmation; Trump described the meeting with Putin as very productive, and discussions included the temporary ceasefire not being an option. Budanov had suggested it wouldn’t be the first assassination attempt on Putin, but the most consequential due to timing. The question posed: who is the target—Ukraine, Zelensky, Budanov—or a Russian false flag to justify attacks and derail negotiations. Speaker 1: Timelines. The attack allegedly began the night of the 28th and continued into the 29th. The Russians say it was an attack on one of Putin’s residences, described as terrorism. Putin hasn’t lived at his residences for three years, using the Kremlin instead, but this is not the first Ukrainian attempt to target Putin; there was a proposed attack when he flew into Kursk by helicopter. Russians are upset that this attack had no military objective, only potential assassination, and they know Putin wasn’t there. The Russians view it as real and plan to respond; Lavrov indicated that negotiations would be reexamined. Budanov claims Ukrainian intelligence has targeted Putin multiple times; the attack timing coincides with Zelensky in Florida, suggesting possible rifts or risk of undermining negotiations. The possibility of Western (American or British) intelligence involvement is raised, with speculation about CIA influence or European intelligence, particularly Britain’s MI6, given its Ukrainian roots. The question remains whether the attack was staged to derail negotiations or a genuine strike. Larry: If Ukraine did this, why would they? Ukraine might want to eliminate an obstacle to peace, though that could backfire; some argue Putin is more restrained than any immediate successor. If 91 drones were launched, Western intelligence would likely be involved, possibly undermining Trump’s approach. There is a sense of mixed messages from U.S. intelligence, with individuals like Susan Miller pushing claims of Russian interference that contradict other narratives. Zelensky stated no territory would be ceded as part of negotiations; Russia’s position is that Crimea, Zaporizhzhia, Kherson, Donetsk, and Luhansk must be permanently part of the Russian Federation, elections must occur in Ukraine before negotiations, NATO must be out of Ukraine, and demilitarization is non-negotiable. Russia suggests there will be no 800,000-man army; these conditions are not open for negotiation. Russia may be willing to discuss numbers of troops for Ukraine, but not to concede core territorial goals. Speaker 0: If CIA or other elements were behind this, could it be to undermine Trump or push for a peace deal by pressuring Putin? Putin showed up in uniform with the military leadership, signaling a hard stance on land/territory, stating that negotiations should proceed without ceasing. Some argue this would trigger a stronger Russian push, while others see this as undermining Trump’s efforts. Trump and Zelensky had discussed a peace plan with 90-95% agreement, with a few thorny issues, possibly territorial. Trump characterized their call as productive; Russia reportedly agreed to support Ukraine postwar with discounted energy and resources. Lavrov’s rapid response to the attack and the potential retaliation would affect ongoing negotiations, which some view as already derailed due to Ukraine’s intransigence on concessions. Speaker 1: Could European intelligence be involved? Britain’s MI6 is seen as critical; there is a suggestion that British intelligence could have acted without American consultation. This would strain relations with Trump, especially after new security strategy. The transcript also notes a broader shift in Western posture: some European leaders are pushing for stronger defense and a more independent European stance, which might influence the dynamic around negotiations and intelligence actions. Speaker 0: Zelensky’s Christmas remark, “may he perish,” followed by an attack on Putin’s residence, prompts questions about who’s pulling Zelensky’s strings. Zelensky is described as the “highest paid actor in the world” with large sums allegedly pilfered from Ukraine’s aid; Zelensky could be expendable to those steering Ukraine’s direction. The meeting in Mar-a-Lago between Zelensky, Trump, and others occurred while the Putin residence attack was underway, suggesting an attempt to undermine negotiations. Budanov’s connection to the CIA and potential independent actions by Ukrainian intelligence raise further concerns about internal Ukrainian divisions. Speaker 1: Russia’s potential retaliation could target Ukrainian intelligence assets like the SBU headquarters in Kyiv, or European assets inside Ukraine if evidence points to Western involvement. Russia’s current military actions include continuing strikes on power infrastructure, with movements in Zaporizhzhia and around Kherson, indicating an axis of attack. Independently, Russia claims significant ground progress; Ukraine counters with claims of selective advances by Russia and a favorable propaganda edge for Ukraine. The battlefield metrics show Russia increasing manpower and maintaining multiple axes of attack, with eight or more fronts, while Ukrainian recoveries of bodies show a ratio suggesting heavy Ukrainian losses. Speaker 0: The conversation ends with expectations for retaliation, possible new European involvement, and the enduring fear that negotiations remain unsettled. The next days could reveal more about who is behind the attack, how Russia responds, and whether a path to peace remains possible, given the conflicting narratives and competing strategic interests.

The speaker argues that Russia’s warning to Western diplomats and members of the Western diplomatic corps to leave Ukraine’s capital is not ambiguous and should be treated as a signal that strikes are about to occur. They cite Russian Security Council secretary Shoigu saying ambassadors were warned to leave Kiev because strikes could happen at any moment. The speaker claims the EU and the United States are not taking the warnings seriously and predicts intensified violence, tying it to events including “the killing of those twenty-one girls at that college.” They further argue that, under pressure, Putin is attempting to end the war and that the situation is entering an “endgame.” They criticize the United States for dispatching senators to Ukraine and say the purpose is to support continued funding and to “launder more money through Ukraine,” describing Ukraine as a “massive money laundering operation.” They reference Senator Blumenthal stating America is not leaving Ukraine and that U.S. diplomats are staying despite Russian threats, and they contrast this with what they portray as another side’s belief that threats imply imminent danger for anyone in Ukraine. The speaker asserts that major government infrastructure targets and buildings are expected to be hit and compares the current situation to a past account where Kiev was surrounded with a corridor for people to leave, alleging a NATO-backed deal to back off was a lie. They argue the “choke point is happening right now,” and they discuss reporting that the U.S. embassy in Ukraine was being evacuated while claiming others said the diplomats were not going anywhere. They question how long family members and other U.S.-connected personnel in Ukraine would survive an attack and note that Zelensky left Ukraine to fly to Sweden to secure weapons and funding. They claim Zelensky’s Sweden visit included a new package described as about “eighty to ninety billion dollars,” along with Gripen fighter jets, and they argue that Russia will destroy the aircraft once they enter the theater. They also discuss statements about pilots available in Ukraine and mock the idea that Ukrainian pilots would be flying the jets. The speaker quotes Swedish support rhetoric and claims the Gripen aircraft are for “all of our pilots, all of our aces that we have in Ukraine.” They also reference Ursula von der Leyen celebrating the ratification of documents for a ninety billion dollar loan tied to disbursements in June, and they accuse Ukraine and EU-related institutions of mortgaging Ukraine’s future and redirecting money to entities they name. They claim peace efforts are blocked, stating that Russia says Ukraine will not talk and citing Representative Paula Luna urging Zelensky to accept a peace agreement and criticizing refusal to hold elections. They further allege that money funneled to the United States is tied to U.S. election campaigns and that senators received defense-industry funds. The speaker shifts to portraying a “psychological operation” in mainstream media, claiming coverage frames Russia as losing and Ukraine as winning. They then argue the war of attrition has not worked and emphasize casualties, claiming about “two million” people have been killed. Finally, they discuss drone attacks associated with the killing of young girls at a college, asserting that the attacks were intentional and coordinated with satellite data. They claim Palantir has been integrated with Ukraine’s military operations for years, providing AI and intelligence-related capabilities, and that Palantir has agreements with the Pentagon. They conclude by arguing for keeping American and European diplomats in place while attacks occur, and they reference the senators’ presence as protective or reassuring.

Host: Welcome back. We’re joined by Larry Johnson, a former CI analyst, to discuss what looks like a war with Iran coming sooner rather than later. The world is watching as the US mobilizes more military assets to the region. How should we read this? Is this preparation for war, or a show of strength during negotiations? Larry Johnson: I hoped it was intimidation, but people I trust in national security say this is far more serious. It’s described as one of two things: either a reprise of Midnight Hammer, when US and Iran coordinated two raids into northern Iran, or they’re preparing for an Israeli attack and to back Israel. It’s not just to force concessions at the negotiating table; it’s a warning indicator. Steve Bryan, a former undersecretary of defense, reacted emotionally to US–Iran negotiations, arguing that Iran is using a rope-a-dope strategy. This pressure toward attacking Iran is enormous, and Netanyahu’s visit suggests coordination. The issue has moved beyond nuclear weapons to ballistic missiles and support for Hamas and Hezbollah. The rhetoric around Hamas and Hezbollah is, in my view, a red herring; Israeli claims don’t match the facts. Trump is under heavy pressure from the Zionist lobby to act, and I think a violence outbreak in the next two weeks is plausible, though I hope I’m wrong. Host: The debate you referenced about motives is revealing. If the goal is to destabilize or create chaos to justify action, which past interventions show that hasn’t produced sustainable stability. If the aim is negotiation leverage, what can be achieved now? It seems the US insists on tying any nuclear deal to Iran abandoning its allies and deterrence. Johnson: Iran has built a formidable arsenal: 18 types of ballistic missiles, a recently reportedly successful intercontinental ballistic missile test, five types of cruise missiles, and over 15 types of drones. They’ve learned from decades of conflict with the US and see themselves as at war with the United States. The US narrative of Iran as the aggressor clashes with historical US actions that damaged Iran’s economy and civilian life. Iran’s patience has been tested; they’ve drawn a line in the sand and are prepared to defend themselves, retaliating massively if attacked. They now have support from China and Russia, including advanced radar and air defense, with Chinese and Russian ships headed to the Arabian Sea for a joint exercise. If conflict escalates, Iran could retaliate across the region, with regional actors potentially joining in. Host: You mentioned the tactical realities of the region. The US has deployed many F-35s to the region, including land-based F-35s for SEAD. There are reports of a large US presence in Armenia, and Iran’s potential to strike Haifa or Tel Aviv if attacked. The geopolitical picture is complex, with Russia and China providing support to Iran. The US carrier fleet in the Gulf would face Iranian, Russian, and Chinese air defenses and missiles, including hypersonics. The question is whether the US can sustain a prolonged, scalable war against Iran. Johnson: The US’s sea-based strength is being tested. In the Red Sea, the US faced difficulties against the Houthis with two carriers and a robust air-defense screen; in the current scenario, Iran’s capabilities—air defenses, missiles, drones, and support from Russia and China—make a quick, decisive victory unlikely. Moreover, Israel’s own readiness for a broader war is uncertain; Netanyahu’s visit to the US could signal coordination, but Israeli media note that they may join only if Iran is on the back foot. There’s concern about intelligence reliability: Mossad assets that aided last year’s operations in Iran may be compromised, while Iran benefits from new radar and integrated air defenses. Host: Regional reactions could be pivotal. Iran has contingency plans against regional targets, and Armenia/Azerbaijan might be used as launch pads. Saudi Arabia and Qatar may sit this out if possible, while Iraq has aligned with Iran. The broader question is whether diplomacy can prevail, or whether the cycle of treating conflicts with force will continue. There’s a critique of Western policy: the idea that Iran wants to destroy the US is simplistic, and the region’s dynamics are far more nuanced. Johnson: Iran’s potential to escalate, regional dynamics, and great-power backing mean this could be more than a localized conflict. The overarching point is that there are limits to military power; politics and diplomacy remain essential, and the West’s current posture underestimates the complexity of Iran’s deterrence and regional links. Host: Thanks, Larry. I’ll link to Sonar 21 for more of your writings.

The Ukrainian drone attack on Moscow is alarming. The Russians are surprised that the US hasn't intervened to stop Ukraine, who they see as a rogue organization. The Russians want an end to this conflict and have several options, including securing more territory or crushing Ukraine entirely. Putin, a judicious leader, faces a decision point: how far to go to guarantee Russia's security? He doesn't want to rule Ukrainians, but some advisors are pushing for a complete takeover. The Ukrainian government is evil and has needlessly sacrificed its own people, leading to a strategic inflection point in the history of Europe. The key is for Trump to follow his instincts and disengage, as any war will expand and the US is overstretched.

Russian President Vladimir Putin issued a full-throated warning to the United States and Israel against attacking Iran, saying any attack would be a grave mistake with devastating consequences. Russia also cautioned that threats of new military strikes on Iran are categorically unacceptable and criticized Washington for external interference in Tehran’s internal politics. Amid these tensions, Putin’s anger over Israel’s handling of Syria was referenced, with reports that Russia sent multiple large freight flights into Tehran in recent days. There was discussion about whether this could be connected to comments from President Trump that killings in the region might be winding down, with a reporter noting that the killing has “now stopped” and a follow-up remark that it is “winding down” despite uncertainty. The program suggested that pro‑Zionist accounts and MAGA influencers are circulating propaganda—fake death numbers from Iran and videos of protests—while questioning the reliability of such footage and calling out what was described as propaganda used to push for war in Iran. Claims were made that “the number of people killed is far higher than the 12,000” from Mark Levin’s reporting, and that Iranian body bags and mass casualties were being publicized by certain viewers, though not all claims could be independently verified due to a media blackout. Laura Loomer was cited showing footage of body bags claiming nearly 20,000 Iranians had been murdered for protesting for their freedom, while noting Mossad’s heavy involvement in Iran’s protests, including arming protesters with live firearms per Israel’s Channel 14. The discussion raised the possibility that Reuters and other sources were reporting imminent U.S. bombing of Iran within 24 hours, while also noting Trump’s pattern of weekend bombings when markets are closed. Anya Parampil of the Grey Zone, who had recently been in Iran, joined to discuss on-the-ground realities. She explained that the initial demonstrations in Iran began around rising inflation and economic hardship, worsened by sanctions that the United States has openly admitted using as a weapon. She noted that early protests were largely by pro-government or conservative segments, with the government making concessions and the president, Hassan Rouhani’s successor, acknowledging responsibility for policy decisions. Violent elements subsequently appeared, and a blackout on information has followed, with Internet cuts, complicating independent reporting. Parampil suggested outside support and covert interventions could be destabilizing the country and providing a pretext for international intervention, comparing the current situation to Syria in 2011. Parampil described the escalation from peaceful economic demonstrations to violent street actions involving armed extras, questions about who is killing whom, and the risk of a Syria-style CIA or covert foreign-backed civil conflict in Iran. She emphasized sovereignty and the Iranian people’s own trajectory, arguing that sanctions and external pressure complicate genuine domestic grievances and can undermine authentic movements. The discussion also touched on the nature of domestic sentiment: some protests were pro-government, driven by sovereignty and economic concerns, while others involved calls for reform. The participants urged skepticism about casualty figures, questioning sources funded by Western organizations and the reliability of reported death tolls amid the information blackout. They warned against rushed military action and suggested that the window of opportunity for U.S.-Israeli action might be closing, given the political clock in the United States and Israel. The program closed with notes that the Israeli media reported Mossad’s involvement and arming on the Iranian side, while U.S. reporting remained less transparent, and that the situation remained highly uncertain with conflicting narratives about who is directing violence and protests on the ground.

The conversation centers on reports that Donald Trump allegedly called Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu an “effing idiot” during a tense phone call, cited by Axios and corroborated by an Israeli media outlet. The colonel argues that Trump can be volatile and that Netanyahu and Trump are both “indispensable” to each other, even if they do not particularly like one another. He says Netanyahu’s political vulnerability is increasing: the Knesset has passed the first step toward moving elections up, and Netanyahu is facing barbed criticism over actions in Lebanon, especially after a moment when he appeared to heed Trump’s reported advice to stop what he was doing in Lebanon but then reversed course and faced renewed attacks. A key theme is that Netanyahu is under pressure and that opponents are using his relationship with the U.S. president as leverage across multiple arenas—Gaza, the West Bank, Lebanon, and Iran—by accusing him of not doing what the U.S. needed in order to convince the U.S. to take stronger action. The colonel contends that, in practice, heated rhetoric does not translate into decisive action against Netanyahu, because Netanyahu will pursue what he wants for both political and national security reasons, particularly to protect his survival. The discussion also addresses how a tense call could follow Netanyahu taking steps beyond what Trump initially permitted. The colonel says it is possible for a world leader and an ally to “work the system” and obtain authority through other officials without direct approval for the final step, then be able to claim leeway later. He explains this through a historical example involving Colin Powell, Sam Nunn, and President George H. W. Bush, describing how early decisions on sanctions and later reversals created conflict between a chairman and Congress. The colonel then returns to Netanyahu’s use of “final solution” terminology regarding Iran, referencing Netanyahu saying “We must complete the mission in Iran in a way that constitutes a final solution,” and asks what it means. He says he hopes it is material for bluffing, calling it a “powerful bluff.” Broader regional dynamics are discussed, including claims that Pakistan has decided to align more with China and Iran, involving an arrangement described as connecting Pakistan’s nuclear capabilities to Iran. The colonel references A. Q. Khan’s “father of the Islamic bomb” network, saying it supplied components and programs across multiple countries, and he describes efforts to track shipping and intercept potential nuclear or radiological material, including mentions of intercept operations and concerns about dirty bombs. The conversation also argues that logistics and strategic connectivity make Iran’s position stronger, mentioning routes and rail lines associated with China’s infrastructure reaching Iran. It then claims that disruptions at the Strait of Hormuz and regional shipping patterns are affecting outcomes, arguing that contesting control can worsen global economic pressure and that Iran’s position improves when shipping pays tolls and continues rather than being fully blocked. On diplomacy, the colonel says the U.S. is not conducting “real diplomacy” with Iran, asserting that communications are third-party and mediated rather than direct talks. Regarding Iran’s response to threats to strike Beirut, the colonel says Iran is acting with greater aggressiveness—freezing talks, threatening to strike Israeli forces inside Lebanon, and issuing evacuation orders for northern Israel—suggesting Iran has gained “new weight” and is using ballistic missile capability to support its stance. The transcript also covers nuclear deterrence questions: it discusses claims that Iran could quickly match a warhead to a missile, and it raises the possibility of an Iranian nuclear test as a “warning shot” intended to deter the U.S. and Israel. The colonel says he thinks openly demonstrating a test could backfire by forcing Trump into an escalatory position, but also notes that escalation risk is a central concern. Finally, the conversation touches on broader geopolitical tensions, including discussion of whether Putin is considering striking NATO and remarks about how U.S. actions could affect escalation dynamics.

Russian president Vladimir Putin faces domestic criticism for not ending the war in Ukraine and is being pressed to act on Iran as well. On Russian talk shows, officials suggest Putin is dependent on his relationship with Donald Trump, which critics say stalls peace negotiations, raising questions about what Russia can do in Iran while entangled at home. Russia signals potential actions, such as stopping energy flow to those supporting the war, with Sergei Lavrov saying Russia will “do everything to create an atmosphere that will make this operation impossible” in cooperation with partners and in international forums. Putin also floated the idea of stopping energy flows to Europe, suggesting Europe could be drawn into the conflict since many NATO members are reluctant to be drawn in, though some like Italy and Spain reportedly oppose direct involvement. Iranian foreign minister comments: when asked whether Russia and China are helping Iran, the minister said they are supporting Iran politically and otherwise, and that military cooperation with Asia and Russia is not a secret. He did not give specifics on whether Iran is actively receiving military assistance in the current war, stating he would not disclose details of cooperation in the middle of the war. Discussion with guests focuses on the Ukraine and Iran theaters, the Russia-China-Iran triangle, and the potential for Russia to change its approach. Jim Jatris, a former State Department official, emphasizes that Putin’s view of Trump shapes Russia’s strategy, noting Russian engagement with two Americans described as “New York flim flam artists” around ceasefire discussions. Jatris argues the Russians may have been interested in a deal via Trump’s intermediaries but now see the negotiations as “treachery” and question whether there is any real chance to decapitate or leverage Kyiv, comparing this to Israeli and U.S. tactics against Iran and other groups. He suggests Moscow’s pressure points include whether Russia will shift its Ukrainian strategy and what happens if the U.S. declares a victory and withdraws, leaving Iran and Russia to decide whether to press their advantage or pause. Doug McGregor comments on Russian restraint, arguing Moscow has pressed for minimal terms since June 2024 and views Western capitals as cutthroat, making negotiation unlikely. He notes internal Russian debate among figures like Nabiulina and others about maintaining restraint and keeping negotiation channels open, while acknowledging that Russia might eventually decide to end the war by destroying the Kyiv regime, though it is unclear what they will do. The conversation also touches on the complexity of Russia-Iran-Israel relations and the potential for direct Russian involvement, including possible shadowing of Israeli submarines or deploying Russian personnel in Iran, while recognizing that Russia would likely avoid direct combat if possible. The overall tone considers how a pending Xi–Trump meeting in Beijing could be affected by the war’s progression, with speculation that the meeting may be canceled or postponed depending on developments.

The discussion centers on the rapid escalations in the Iran-Israel-US-Russia dynamic over the last 48 hours, with each side framing the situation differently. The hosts contrast the Trump administration’s claims of control and progress toward a ceasefire with Iranian statements about targeting Middle East bases and oil infrastructure. They also reference Sergei Lavrov’s assertion of a “new era” and a realignment of global actors as the conflict unfolds, asking who is in control: Iran, Israel, the United States, or Russia. Captain Matthew Ho, an Iraq war veteran and former state department officer, is brought on to analyze the situation. He is framed as anti-war and thoughtful about these issues. The hosts ask for a high-level assessment of the past 48 hours and the likely trajectory. Captain Ho argues that the conflict is proceeding as many had anticipated: after an initial American-Israeli shock-and-awe campaign, the Iranians demonstrated they can execute a strategy to achieve clear political objectives, both immediate (deterrence and protecting sovereignty) and long-term. He notes that while the Americans and Israelis can continue bombing, there is no clear pathway to success for them, whereas Iran has built a durable capability through missiles, drones, and naval forces, and has shown strategic patience. He points to economic signals, such as West Texas Intermediate crude around $105 per barrel, as evidence of Iranian deterrence taking shape. Ho emphasizes that the Americans are increasingly perceived as desperate and lacking initiative, with Iran in control of the war’s momentum. He cites examples of countries pushing back on American basing plans and airspace access (Spain, Italy), suggesting a broader erosion of Western unity and credibility as the conflict persists. He also notes the entrance of the Houthis (Ansar Allah) into the war, arguing that Iran’s axis of resistance—now including Yemen, Iraq, and Hezbollah—has captured the initiative and constrained American options, potentially making ground invasions a consideration rather than a plan that is likely to succeed. He warns that the idea of an imminent American ground invasion is driven by public-relations calculations to claim a victory and exit, rather than a coherent strategic objective. The conversation then turns to the potential ground campaign, including landings on islands like Karg Island and other objectives tied to controlling oil exports routed through Iranian territory. Ho argues that a credible administration would not reveal specific invasion plots, suggesting such disclosures are distractions or misstatements aimed at shaping perception. He questions whether Washington’s real aim is regime change or something else, but asserts that the United States lacks a clear, controllable narrative and initiative. Beyond the immediate battlefield, the discussion touches on how Iran’s strategy extends to economic and geopolitical disruption: deterring future conflicts by making them costly, leveraging energy routes through the Strait of Hormuz, and enabling a shift toward a multipolar world. Ho argues that Iran’s long-range vision may transform global power structures, potentially involving tolled passage in the strait and dedollarization implications, with economic consequences for the United States and its allies. The European response is analyzed as fracturing from the United States: countries like Italy and Spain resist unilateral American actions or airspace usage, and even Germany’s stance has cooled. The hosts explore how Europe’s alliance with the United States is fraying, with NATO’s future in question as European leadership grapples with economic and political hollowing and a rethinking of strategic dependencies. Ho concludes that the war’s trajectory could redefine the post-World War II order if it continues, marking a potential shift toward a multipolar world and altering US dominance. He emphasizes the importance of understanding Iran’s preparation, patience, and coordination with allied forces in the region, which together shape a war where US objectives—beyond regime change—are not clearly defined or likely to be achieved through traditional means.

Larry Johnson, a former CIA analyst and State Department counterterrorism official, discusses the ceasefire and the possibility of renewed war between the United States and Iran, arguing that U.S. military options are constrained while Iran’s readiness and ability to disrupt regional logistics have increased. Johnson says the United States has been prepared to launch strikes for about six weeks since the ceasefire declaration around April 15, but that its remaining operational flexibility is limited by Gulf state access. He emphasizes that Saudi Arabia has not allowed U.S. air operations from Saudi territory. He describes an episode in which, after Trump announced “project freedom” to open the Strait of Hormuz, Saudi leadership shut down the ability to conduct air operations from its territory, even after Trump spoke with Mohammed bin Salman. With Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Kuwait affected, Johnson leaves Bahrain out due to its size and says it has been “decimated” by Iranian airstrikes. He also links timing to major religious and diplomatic periods, saying that with the Hajj beginning on Sunday and Eid occurring about next Wednesday or Thursday, Saudi Arabia does not want to be positioned as a target during those activities. He argues that Iran has rearmed faster than U.S. intelligence expected and that Iran can use multilayered air defense and missile capabilities to threaten any entering ships. Johnson highlights a U.S. constraint: U.S. air refueling operations have been largely confined to Iraq airspace, which he says creates additional risk and also forces attacks through narrower routes rather than across wider fronts. He suggests this narrowed channel makes it easier for Iran’s air defense to concentrate. He also cites testimony by Admiral Daryl Caudle, who said the U.S. lacks the capability to open the Strait of Hormuz due to cost and risk, and says Iran’s arsenal can be brought to bear against ships that enter the strait. He further claims the CIA briefings to Congress align more closely with Iran’s increased capabilities since the ceasefire than with Trump administration claims. Johnson connects this situation to negotiations. He says reported negotiations are taking place in Tehran and Islamabad and that Pakistan has stepped up with backing from China and Russia. He suggests a possible deal may not necessarily involve the United States if Gulf states and Iran agree, potentially including Turkey and possibly Egypt, in a broader security arrangement. He argues that if Gulf states shut down U.S. operations on their territory, the United States would have limited options, including for sustained air campaigns. Johnson also proposes a possible window before the World Cup begins, saying he does not see renewed action before the first two weeks of June, with international pressure expected once the World Cup starts. On the substance of talks, Johnson portrays Iran’s negotiating positions as: sanctions relief “up front,” return of frozen assets, and continuing to charge ships entering or leaving the Persian Gulf to comply with rules implemented by the Persian Gulf Strait Authority (PGSA). He says nuclear issues are being framed by Iran as a “red herring,” and he cites a claim attributed to Moshe Saba Khamenei (the new Ayatollah) that nuclear material is not even on the table. Johnson also asserts Iran has signed the NPT and allowed IAEA inspections, and he describes Iran as having faced persistent attacks including the “murdering of nuclear scientists,” using this to explain why Iran would assert sovereignty rather than comply with demands he says are being made. In response to a question about how war could happen if the Strait of Hormuz cannot be opened, Johnson reiterates U.S. capability concerns and says Iran’s ability to disrupt logistics remains a central factor. He also argues that markets are reacting in a way he describes as abnormal: over day 84 since the war began and day 22 of a “complete cutoff,” he lists reductions affecting “20% of the world’s oil,” “10% of the world’s access to liquid natural gas,” “35% of the world’s urea,” “30% of the world’s sulfur,” and “44% of the world’s helium.” He claims the U.S. is emptying its strategic reserves and selling them overseas, calling it a “charade,” and says economic effects are likely delayed and could translate into recession or depression, with shortages becoming more apparent later. Johnson argues that Russia and China are pushing an inclusive Persian Gulf security architecture rather than an alliance system aimed at containing Iran, and he says Iran could be pragmatic and flexible on concessions with Gulf states for ship passage in exchange for broader security guarantees. He suggests the most likely outcome is ongoing negotiations producing partial progress rather than an abrupt halt, especially if Saudi refusal to allow unfettered U.S. air operations continues to limit U.S. sustainment. Finally, Johnson ties the likelihood of further U.S. strikes to economic constraints, saying he cannot conceive of strikes strengthening the world economy or the U.S. financial position, and that further escalation would have the opposite effect. He also predicts that by around the end of June the United States will suffer greater economic consequences. He ends by saying the economic situation will ultimately determine whether military strikes continue, and that there are real obstacles preventing a straightforward transition back to major attacks, while pressures for renewed action remain.

Glenn Deason hosts former CIA analyst Larry Johnson to discuss current developments in the war against Iran, noting that earlier Trump-era bombing cycles were followed by claims that the sides were close to a deal, only for renewed war talk to follow. Johnson says the current situation appears different: Iran and the U.S. are moving toward a “shared understanding” and a stepped memorandum of understanding (MOU), shepherded by Pakistan, with Qatar also involved. Johnson describes the MOU as based on “14-point documents” Iran introduced on April 8, alongside a memorandum of understanding on how the process will work. He says the arrangement does not mean agreement on every issue yet, but that “an act of good faith” has occurred through reported asset releases by the United Arab Emirates, including reportedly $3 billion first and later a report of $20 billion total. Johnson lists Iran’s red line demands: unfreeze assets; lifting sanctions; recognition of Iran’s control or sovereignty over the Strait of Hormuz; lifting the U.S. blockade; and a permanent ceasefire in Lebanon and Gaza, including calls for Israeli troops to withdraw from Lebanon and Gaza. He adds that Iran has not backed off those demands, leaving the question of timing. Deason says Iranian officials have indicated the MOU would be published in steps, with “first” step action tied to signing: once signed, all Iranian assets would be released and not frozen again, allowing movement to subsequent steps. He characterizes the asset release and sanctions unfreezing as a significant first move, which would also impose political and practical costs on the U.S. if it backtracks. Deason asks what else must be included. Johnson says sanctions lifting must include more than oil, with early gestures including lifting sanctions on oil. He argues the main stumbling block is Israel: Israel must leave Lebanon and Gaza. Johnson says Trump would have leverage through cutting off aid, but he doubts Trump would apply pressure as hard as possible. He says nuclear issues are “down the road,” and Israel’s complaints about ballistic missiles likely create friction because Iran is unlikely to allow ballistic missiles to be put on the agenda, treating them as a key strategic “ace in the hole” alongside Strait of Hormuz leverage. Johnson also discusses Hormuz operations, including a claim attributed to Iranian statements that charging for “services” is reserved because the Strait is treated as partly within national waters rather than international waters. The discussion then turns to ceasefire risks. Deason worries that Israel could disrupt any peace negotiation, citing the idea that Lebanon and Gaza could be used to veto terms at any time through massacres or provocations. Johnson says he has seen evidence suggesting Iran’s upgraded air defense system during recent U.S. strikes, including reports of Tomahawk missiles being taken down and Iranian systems engaging an aircraft. He adds that Iran’s retaliation reportedly focused on Bahrain, Jordan, Kuwait, and that upgraded capabilities reflect assistance via China and Russia. Johnson also says he is not seeing “signature activities” suggesting additional U.S. airstrikes, and interprets that as consistent with genuine negotiations. Johnson argues negotiations appear linked to diplomacy and regional calculations. He characterizes the UAE as an “obnoxious relative” and says its participation likely reflects economic incentives and business needs, including reopening and returning some frozen assets. He adds that Qatar stayed engaged during attacks and helped align with Pakistan on a document, while Pakistan is also negotiating with Qatar and Saudi Arabia to reduce U.S. military entanglement and separate them from hosting U.S. personnel. He says the 14-point Iranian document includes a point about U.S. military withdrawal from around Iran. He notes Saudi and Qatar reluctance to allow U.S. bases and specifically not allowing Israel to overfly their territory, limiting Israel’s options. He frames the broader effort as part of constructing a post-Western-pressure economic and security order connected to BRICS and a new international economic order. On secrecy and potential sabotage, Deason asks whether secrecy is meant to prevent wrong expectations and sabotage from “all sides,” including U.S. actors, Israelis, and Iranian hawks. Johnson says on the U.S. side there is an effort to prevent a further firestorm, including social media attacks on Trump, calls from prominent U.S. figures, and warnings from oil executives about imminent fuel disruption and economic chaos. As to what might break first, Johnson says Israel would refuse to leave Lebanon while Trump would refuse to use leverage to force withdrawal, citing historical precedents where U.S. pressure led Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon. He says Hezbollah would likely end attacks as part of the broader peace arrangement supporting Iran, but warns there are “pitfalls” and “booby traps” that could derail the process quickly. Johnson closes by arguing that U.S. military power has faced clear limits across other conflicts, and that weapons inventories and supply chains impose constraints. He says if the MOU process proceeds, it could boost prestige and reduce immediate risk in the Strait of Hormuz because opening it militarily would require Iran to guarantee no shooting while user fees continue, which would affect insurance and commercial confidence. He also warns that domestic and foreign Zionist pressures could push Trump to back out and return to war. Deason ends with “cautiously optimistic” framing, hopes that releasing Iranian funds could become sunk cost supporting continued compliance, and discusses possible impacts on China and Russia, with Johnson suggesting China would seek recovery given its BRICS exposure to Strait of Hormuz closure. The conversation concludes with Johnson’s final remark comparing “third time is the charm” to Trump’s repeated predicted “successes,” followed by off-topic remarks about “Russia Day” and the host’s continued commentary.

What Trump wants is a ceasefire. That's it. He wants a ceasefire. And if Putin can get convince him that the quickest route to a ceasefire is for Ukraine to leave mother Russia and say no to NATO, that's it. That's all that has to happen for a ceasefire. And what Putin is going to say is it won't matter in a month. In a month, we're going to own it all. If you want your ceasefire now, tell Ukraine to leave. If the Ukraine won't leave, we'll make them leave. There's nothing you can do to stop us. We're not afraid of your sanctions. We're not afraid of any of your threats. This is going to happen. We can either happen have it happen in a way that gets you the ceasefire you want, or it's just gonna happen. And I think Trump understands it.

In this discussion, Larry Johnson, a former CIA analyst, analyzes whether Donald Trump is seeking an off-ramp from the Iran war and what he might trade away to gain it. Glenn, the host, frames the conversation around the Strait of Hormuz as a potential barrier to an exit, given Trump’s recent tweet that the Strait is not America’s problem and that regional countries should handle it. Johnson emphasizes that Trump’s apparent objective is to declare victory, but he identifies several impediments and possible paths. Johnson contends that the United States has claimed a “100% victory,” asserting that “we've wiped out all of the Iranian army, the Iranian navy, the Iranian air force,” and asks rhetorically why more countries would be needed. He warns, however, that a victory would come with devastating worldwide consequences, including rising gas prices, shortages of fertilizer, and global distress from economic ripples. He notes that Iran began striking back within an hour of the attack on March 28, systematically targeting U.S. military installations, destroying radar systems, and forcing relocations of the Fifth Fleet’s Bahrain base and related assets. He describes the war as becoming a political burden for Trump, who also publicly boasted of military successes even as costs mount. Johnson links Trump’s rhetoric with Netanyahu, suggesting a coordination to present an exit pattern: claim success, then exit with a narrative that the objective was met, while implying Iran must accept a settlement. He asserts that Iran is not going to capitulate simply because the United States and Israel say so, and that Iran seeks a rock-solid guarantee that it will not be attacked again. He notes Russia’s involvement in mediation efforts and argues that Iran can endure a longer war than the United States, particularly as the 2024-2025 political cycle intensifies pressure on Trump. The discussion expands to strategic and economic dimensions. Johnson highlights the Kuwait-like vulnerability of the Strait of Hormuz, the potential for Iran to impose a separate corridor or “selective access” within Iranian waters, and the implications for the petrodollar system if Gulf states must pay Iran for safe passage. He argues that an Iranian victory could effectively expel the United States from the Middle East if the region no longer depends on American protection. He questions whether such a shift is feasible, given Iran’s capability and resolve and the West’s miscalculation of Iran’s endurance and strategy. They discuss the broader international-law questions and the West’s posture toward rules-based order. Glenn notes that the Netanyahu-Trump axis may be seeking an off ramp, while Johnson contends that Iran’s response is to demand a political settlement that would reverse U.S. presence and align with IAEA inspections or nonproliferation commitments—an outcome that Trump might try to package as a victory. Johnson stresses that Iran’s stance has shifted from “defeat Iran” to seeking outcomes like IAEA oversight and adherence to nonproliferation norms as conditions for strategic concessions. The conversation also critiques Washington’s military logistics and political optics. Johnson argues that boots-on-the-ground options in the Hormuz region are militarily impractical, given the geography (Normandy-scale landings in a cliff-lined, fortified zone) and Iran’s layered defense. He questions the plausibility of a successful river-to-sea offensive, given the risk to ships, drones, and supply lines, and points to potential escalatory cycles that could involve Russia and China more deeply. Towards the end, they touch on the idea of an exit built around a renewal of JCPOA-like constraints—without naming it as such—as a possible route for Trump to declare victory and withdraw. However, they remain skeptical about whether Iran would accept renewed constraints, given its current strategic posture and allies. The discussion closes with a candid recognition that, according to Johnson, there is a lack of a coherent, realizable strategy to end the conflict on favorable terms for Washington, and that Trump’s political vulnerability could further constrain any viable off-ramp.

Larry Johnson, a former CIA analyst, joins the program to discuss the dramatic developments in the war against Iran. The conversation centers on the strike on Karg Island, the strategic choke point for Iran’s oil exports, and the broader implications of escalating U.S. actions. - Karg Island and the oil threat: The host notes that Karg Island handles 90% of Iran’s oil exports and asks why Trump isn’t targeting this area. Johnson argues the attack on Karg Island makes little strategic sense and points out that Iran has five oil terminals; destroying one would not end Iran’s potential revenue. He emphasizes that the U.S. bombed the runway of the major airport on the island, which he says remains irrelevant to Iran’s overall capacity to generate revenue. He notes the runway damage would not support U.S. objectives for invading the island, given runway length constraints (6,000 feet measured vs. need for 3,500–3,700 feet for certain aircraft) and the limited air force in Iran. Johnson asserts that Iran has indicated it would retaliate against oil terminals and Gulf neighbors if oil resources or energy infrastructure are attacked. - Economic and strategic consequences of closing the Strait of Hormuz: Johnson states that the action effectively shut the Strait of Hormuz, cutting off 20% of the world’s oil supply, 25% of global LNG, and 35% of the world’s urea for fertilizer. He explains fertilizer’s criticality to global agriculture and notes that rising gas and diesel prices in the United States would impact consumer costs, given many Americans live paycheck to paycheck. He suggests the price hikes contribute to inflationary pressure and could trigger a global recession, especially since Persian Gulf countries are pivotal energy suppliers. He also points out that the U.S. cannot easily reopen Hormuz without unacceptable losses and that Iran has prepared for contingencies for thirty years, with robust defenses including tunnels and coastal fortifications. - Military feasibility and strategy: The discussion covers the impracticality of a U.S. ground invasion of Iran, given the size of Iran’s army and the modern battlefield’s drone and missile threats. Johnson notes the U.S. Army and Marine numbers, the logistical challenges of sustaining an amphibious or airborne assault, and the vulnerability of American ships and troops to drones and missiles. He highlights that a mass deployment would be highly costly and dangerous, with historical evidence showing air power alone cannot win wars. The hosts discuss limited U.S. options and the possible futility of attempts to seize or occupy Iran’s territory. - Internal U.S. decision-making and DC dynamics: The program mentions a split inside Washington between anti-war voices and those pressing toward Tehran, with leaks suggesting that top officials warned Trump about major obstacles and potential losses. Johnson cites a leak from the National Intelligence Council indicating regime change in Tehran is unlikely, even with significant U.S. effort. He asserts the Pentagon’s credibility has been questioned after disputed reports (e.g., the KC-135 shootdown) and notes that Trump’s advisors who counsel restraint are being sidelined. - Iranian retaliation and targets: The discussion covers Iran’s targeting of air defenses and critical infrastructure, including radars at embassies and bases in the region, and the destruction of five Saudi air refueling tankers, which Trump later dismissed as fake news. Johnson says Iran aims to degrade Israel economically and militarily, while carefully avoiding mass civilian casualties in some instances. He observes Iran’s restraint in striking desalination plants, which would have caused a humanitarian catastrophe, suggesting a deliberate choice to keep certain targets within bounds. - Global realignments and the role of Russia, China, and India: The conversation touches on broader geopolitical shifts. Johnson argues that Russia and China are offering alternatives to the dollar-dominated order, strengthening ties with Gulf states and BRICS members. He suggests Gulf allies may be considering decoupling from U.S. security guarantees, seeking to diversify away from the petrodollar system. The discussion includes India’s position, noting Modi’s visit to Israel and India’s balancing act amid U.S. pressure and Iran relations; Iran’s ultimatum to allow passage for flag vessels and its diplomacy toward India is highlighted as a measured approach, even as India’s stance has attracted scrutiny. - Israel, casualties, and the broader landscape: The speakers discuss Israeli casualties and infrastructure under sustained Iranian strikes, noting limited information from within Israel due to media constraints and possible censorship. Johnson presents a game-theory view: if Israel threatens a nuclear option, Iran might be compelled to develop a nuclear capability as a deterrent, altering calculations for both Israel and the United States. - Terrorism narrative and historical context: The speakers challenge the U.S. portrayal of Iran as the world’s top sponsor of terrorism, arguing that ISIS and the Taliban have caused far more deaths in recent years, and that Iran’s responses to threats have historically prioritized restraint. They emphasize Iran’s chemical weapons restraint during the Iran-Iraq war, contrasting it with U.S. and Iraqi actions in the 1980s. - Final reflections: The discussion emphasizes the cascade effects of the conflict, including potential impacts on Taiwan’s energy and semiconductor production, multiplied by China’s leverage, and Russia’s increasing global influence. Johnson warns that the war’s end will likely be achieved through shifting alignments and economic realignments rather than a conventional battlefield victory, with the goal of U.S. withdrawal from the region as part of any settlement. The conversation closes with mutual thanks and a reaffirmation of ongoing analysis of these evolving dynamics.