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Glenn and Scott Ritter discuss the rapid-onset crisis in the Persian Gulf after the United States announced it would “open up the Strait Of Hormuz” by force, with reports of American warships being struck and Iran countering with drones and missiles. Ritter asserts that the Strait of Hormuz is not being opened by the U.S.; he cites claims of two American warships and two U.S.-flagged container ships transiting, while notes that ships attempting transit have been struck by Iranians. He says Iran has been striking targets in the United Arab Emirates, and the U.S. has claimed to sink at least six small Iranian boats. He calls it war, not a skirmish or ceasefire, and says the ceasefire is over. He adds Bahrain has declared a state of emergency and Kuwait is “on the cusp” of declaring one. He mentions Iran’s indirect communications and a one-and-a-half-hour call from Vladimir Putin to Donald Trump, indicating that continued U.S. action against Iran would be devastating for the U.S., the region, and everyone. Ritter assesses the situation as containable but requires the United States to back down. He notes extraordinary UAE measures, including Israel sending air defense missiles and troops to the UAE, signaling a key strategic shift toward the Abrams Accords and a broader Israeli project. He argues the UAE faces an existential gamble, tied to the notion that a failure would undo this new alliance structure. He hopes the U.S. avoids escalation but doubts it aligns with Donald Trump’s temperament. Glenn asks about the objectives behind U.S. actions, suggesting the possibility of probing Iran to see if it would permit ships to transit under threat, or provoking European engagement, and asks why the U.S. went forward. Ritter responds by criticizing Trump’s inner circle and policy origins: he claims the policy is shaped not by the CIA or DIA but by the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies (FDD), an Israeli-adjacent think tank, and by Scott Bessent, with economic strategies drawn from FDD papers. He contends there is no Iranian pressure and disputes claims about Iranian oil storage and revenue, pointing to a flourishing Iranian oil trade with Pakistan and arguing the blockade is propaganda. He asserts that three U.S. objectives—regime change in Iran, termination of ballistic missiles, and elimination of Iran’s nuclear program—have not been met: Iran’s regime remains in place, missiles are firing, and the nuclear program is not on the table; Iran would destroy regional oil infrastructure if the U.S. resumes military action. Ritter decries what he calls a culture of propaganda and says the president surrounds himself with “stupid people,” not smart ones, leaving the U.S. without a truthful understanding of reality. He claims Iran’s response to U.S. actions has been decisive and that the U.S. is losing credibility, with the broader geopolitical risk including potential disruption to global economies. He uses strong language about the president’s mental state and asserts that the current trajectory is a desperate gamble driven by narcissism, lack of integrity, and a distorted perception of power. Towards the end, Glenn notes the possibility of escalation continuing, while Ritter argues for a decisive Iranian response to signal that the U.S. cannot win, urging a forced political and strategic recalibration to prevent further degradation of regional stability. The conversation closes with mutual acknowledgment of the volatility and a sense of pessimism about near-term de-escalation.

John Mersheimer argues that the war against Iran is not proceeding as the United States hoped and that there is no plausible off-ramp or decisive pathway to victory. He contends that Washington cannot narrate a decisive end to the conflict the way it could have against Nazi Germany or Imperial Japan, because the war has not produced a decisive Iranian collapse. Instead, Iran has an incentive to convert the fight into a protracted war of attrition and possesses the means to do so, including a broad set of missiles and drones and the ability to retaliate across the region. The result, he says, is a stalemate in which Iran would drive a hard bargain to secure sanctions relief or other concessions, and escalation by the U.S. and Israel will simply provoke Iran to escalate further. On why Iran will not settle on American terms, Mersheimer emphasizes that Iran has a strong hand and time on its side. He notes that the more time passes, the more desperate the U.S. will be to settle, which strengthens Iran’s position. He argues that even heavy bombardment would not compel Iran to quit; rather, Iran could strike back against Gulf states, Israel, and American assets with significant effect. The Gulf States are particularly vulnerable due to a small number of petroleum sites, short-range missiles, drones, and, crucially, desalination plants that provide most of their fresh water. He cites Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Oman as heavily dependent on desalination, implying that destroying such infrastructure would have catastrophic humanitarian and economic consequences. Iran could also target energy infrastructure, and even if the Strait of Hormuz remains open, widespread damage to Gulf energy infrastructure would devastate the regional and global economy. He warns that Israel could suffer increasing Iranian pressure as time goes on, especially as interceptors become depleted. Regarding energy and the Strait of Hormuz, Mersheimer stresses that 20% of the world’s oil and gas passes through the Persian Gulf, making the energy dimension the war’s most consequential aspect. He argues that opening the Strait of Hormuz would be exceedingly difficult, and destroying desalination and petroleum infrastructure in the Gulf States would negate any advantage of keeping the straits open. He suggests that escalation without a viable endgame will have grave economic repercussions for the world, pushing the U.S. toward a coerced end that would not be a victory. Mersheimer contends that strategic bombing or air power alone cannot win such wars. He contrasts World War II and Korea/Vietnam with the present, where there are no boots on the ground and no clear path to victory via air power alone. He notes that the deterrent value of air power is limited, and a regime change strategy is notoriously difficult without ground forces. He argues that the decapitation strategy and ongoing escalations are unlikely to produce a decisive American/Israeli victory, and could instead lead to a stalemate or American concession under economic strain. On leadership and credibility, Mersheimer critiques U.S. leadership, particularly President Trump, for ignoring warning from generals and the National Intelligence Council that regime change was unlikely to succeed. He cites General James Mattis-era warnings that there was no viable military option and notes the pre-war intelligence that suggested limited prospects for quick regime change. He points to Trump’s sometimes contradictory and inaccurate statements about Iranian capabilities, including claims that Iran possessed Tomahawk missiles and that U.S. strikes had erased Iran’s nuclear capability. He argues that such statements undermine U.S. credibility, though he distinguishes between outright lies and genuine mistaken beliefs by leaders. The discussion also covers Russia’s involvement, with Russia believed to be providing intelligence to Iran and possibly supplying matériel and oil if needed. Mersheimer asserts that the war benefits Russia strategically: it diverts U.S. resources from Europe and Ukraine, potentially worsens Ukraine’s trajectory, and could raise global energy prices that benefit Russian revenue. He suggests that Russia, and possibly China, have strong incentives to aid Iran to counter American power. Europe’s role is analyzed as largely symbolic or marginal in determining the war’s outcome. Mersheimer argues that European elites are aligned with the U.S., prioritizing NATO continuity and the maintenance of American military presence, despite the damaging consequences for Europe. He suggests a radical approach for Europe: adopt a hardball stance toward the U.S., diversify its economic and strategic relations (including with China, Russia, and India), and resist being economically manipulated or coerced by Washington. He emphasizes that Europe’s interests would be better served by reducing overreliance on the United States and pursuing a more balanced set of strategic partners. Towards the end, the hosts revisit the idea that leaders lie and that liberal democracies tend to rely more on public persuasion and propaganda, with Trump’s statements illustrating the complexities of truth in international politics. The conversation ends with a reflection on whether Europe should recalibrate its posture toward the United States and broaden its strategic hedges to protect its own interests, rather than assuming continued U.S. leadership in a costly and protracted confrontation with Iran.

Glenn discusses growing fears that the Russia-Ukraine conflict is approaching a “third world war,” citing weekend attacks on Moscow, claims of Western assistance to Ukraine, and attacks “coming from NATO territory” without permission from Baltic states and Finland. He notes Europe mass-producing or intending to mass-produce long-range strike weapons to strike deep inside Russia, and asks Professor John Mearsheimer how events may develop, what options Russia has, and what futures lie ahead. Mearsheimer says Ukrainians are escalating against the Russian homeland. Earlier in the war they relied mainly on missiles under limits from Europeans and Americans; now they have turned to drones and developed a significant drone force capable of striking into Russia. He argues drone damage is not enough to affect the war’s outcome meaningfully, but warns the danger is continued escalation: drone attacks rising over time, and later missiles being added, resulting in combined missile-and-drone attacks on Russia. He says the key question is what Russia will do in response. He reports that Sergei Karaganov argues Russia should strike European targets to send a signal that actions are unacceptable, starting with conventional weapons and then—if necessary—nuclear weapons. Mearsheimer says Karaganov claims that while the idea was previously a minority view, now most Russians Mearsheimer speaks to agree, arguing Russia is “fed up” and that escalating attacks on the Russian homeland are unacceptable. Glenn suggests further escalation may occur beyond retaliation, including more brutal attacks on Ukraine and conventional attacks against countries such as Germany or Estonia, and raises discussions about Ukraine possibly “liberating Moldova” from Transnistria, where thousands of Russian troops are present, as another escalation pathway. Mearsheimer frames the conflicts as lacking bargaining space—comparing them to the Iran conflict between Iran and the United States/Israel. He says both sides see the other as an existential threat, leaving no room for negotiation, and that desperation drives risky behavior. Regarding diplomacy, Glenn questions how diplomacy can fail repeatedly. Mearsheimer says there is “zero bargaining space” because Russia sees Ukraine and European positions as existential threats, while Europe and Ukraine increasingly view Russia’s success in Ukraine as an existential threat. He adds that the United States does not view Russia as an existential threat, implying Trump is willing to bargain, but Europeans and Ukrainians do not want to negotiate the deal Trump proposes. He says Trump may have “washed his hands” of a diplomatic settlement and believes the war must be settled on the battlefield. Glenn then asks whether the United States would join if Russia struck Estonia. Mearsheimer says Karaganov’s framework involves attacking NATO countries with conventional weapons, which in the past would almost guarantee U.S. involvement. He says it is unclear what Trump would do, but emphasizes that once escalation begins, nuclear weapons are in the background. He describes the escalation ladder as being “felt in the dark,” where nuclear use is a rung that everyone wants to avoid, giving nuclear threats “huge deterrent value.” Glenn returns to deterrence and escalation dynamics, suggesting NATO is overly confident Russia is deterred, while Russia waits and then takes bigger steps. Mearsheimer says even limited conventional missile strikes into NATO countries—killing hardly anyone—would be a huge step because they would strike NATO members. He also argues Russia is winning the war and that drones have slowed Russian territory gains, making progress incremental. He concludes that slow battlefield progress, no bargaining space, and rising homeland attacks make serious escalation likely, and that Russia may only need a major conventional step to trigger a “gigantic leap forward.” He further argues narrative incentives increase the risk: if the West believes Russians are losing momentum, Europeans and Ukrainians may increase attacks on Russian homeland. He says rebranding in the West could also shape decisions, including how people describe the Iran war’s objectives. Glenn pivots to Iran, saying it may be “hours away” or within 20–48 hours, and asks how it may develop. Mearsheimer says Iranian and American settlement proposals are “light years apart,” with no public evidence of behind-closed-doors concessions. He describes the sequence as a 40-day bombing campaign failing, followed by a ceasefire and a blockade strategy that also is not working; he says time is something Trump does not have because of economic consequences. He argues Trump’s choices appear to be restart bombing or cut a deal on Iran’s terms, and that returning to bombing would not cause Iranian surrender, while increasing incentives for Iran to escalate attacks across the Gulf, including threats to shut down the Red Sea and damage key infrastructure. When Glenn asks about strengthening the blockade by moving it (e.g., toward the Strait of Malacca), Mearsheimer says the location does not matter much; the blockade is not inflicting sufficient punishment to get Iran to surrender, and if the Strait of Hormuz is closed, economic damage worsens over time. He says Iran and Gulf countries are working on ways to beat the blockade, complicating any attempt to inflict punishment strong enough to force surrender. Glenn asks about the broader U.S. strategy amid multipolarity claims and the sense that diplomacy is failing. Mearsheimer says the U.S. is shifting the burden of Ukraine onto Europeans, is working to prevent crises or war in East Asia involving the U.S., and is deeply involved in fighting in the Middle East—specifically the Iran war. He concludes that the U.S. is unlikely to accept defeat in a war once involved, tying it to lessons from Vietnam: entering wars is easier than getting out, and the U.S. searches for ways to win even when defeat is recognized. He says there is reason to believe Trump may return to a massive bombing campaign driven by desperation, but that it still would not work. He adds that a “meltdown” may be overstated, drawing on historical comparison between Johnson in Vietnam and Trump’s potential political fate, while arguing Trump has “no good option.” Glenn asks about additional “cards” the U.S. could play through regional actors or proxies. Mearsheimer says no comparable proxy force exists to match what Ukraine represented, and argues that if the U.S. and Israel together could not defeat Iran, then other actors like the UAE by themselves are not positioned to take on Iran. In closing, Glenn notes fears of more escalation in both Ukraine and Iran and says the situation ahead may be “very troubling.” Mearsheimer agrees and calls the escalation ladder framing “very depressing,” ending with the theme that once conflicts begin, escalation and difficulty exiting are persistent.

John Mearsheimer and Glenn discuss the trajectory of the United States’ foreign policy under Donald Trump, focusing on the shift from an anticipated pivot to Asia and a reduction of “forever wars” to the current Iran confrontation and its global implications. - Initial optimism about Trump: Glenn notes a widespread belief that Trump could break with established narratives, recognize the post–Cold War power distribution, pivot to the Western Hemisphere and East Asia, end the “forever wars,” and move away from Europe and the Middle East. Mearsheimer agrees there was early optimism on Judging Freedom that Trump would reduce militarized policy and possibly shut down the Ukraine–Russia war, unlike other presidents. - Drift into Iran and the current quagmire: The conversation then centers on how Trump’s approach to Iran evolved. Mearsheimer argues Trump often vacillates between claims of victory and deep desperation, and he characterizes Trump’s current stance as demanding “unconditional surrender” from Iran, with a 15-point plan that looks like capitulation. He describes Trump as sometimes declaring a “great victory” and other times recognizing the need for an exit strategy but being unable to find one. - The escalation ladder and strategic danger: A core point is that the United States and its allies initially sought a quick, decisive victory using shock and awe to topple the regime, but the effort has become a protracted war in which Iran holds many cards. Iran can threaten the global economy and Gulf state stability, undermine oil infrastructure, and harm Israel. The lack of a credible exit ramp for Trump, combined with the risk of escalation, creates catastrophic potential for the world economy and energy security. - Economic and strategic leverage for Iran: The discussion emphasizes that Iran can disrupt global markets via the Strait of Hormuz, potentially shut down the Red Sea with Houthis participation, and target Gulf desalination and energy infrastructure. The U.S. should maintain oil flow to avoid devastating economic consequences; sanctions on Iran and Russia were strategically relaxed to keep oil moving. The longer the war drags on, the more leverage Iran gains, especially as Trump’s options to harm Iran’s energy sector shrink due to the global economy’s needs. - Exit possibilities and the limits of escalation: Glenn asks how Trump might avoid the iceberg of economic catastrophe. Mearsheimer contends that a deal on Iran’s terms would entail acknowledging Iranian victory and a humiliating US defeat, which is politically challenging—especially given Israeli opposition and the lobby. The Iranians have incentive to string out negotiations, knowing they could extract concessions as time passes and as U.S. desperation grows. - Ground forces and military options: The possibility of a U.S. ground invasion is deemed impractical. Mearsheimer highlights that Desert Storm and the 2003 invasion involved hundreds of thousands of troops; proposed plans for “a few thousand” light infantry would be unable to secure strategic objectives or prevent Iranian counterattacks across the Gulf, Red Sea, and Persian Gulf, with Iran capable of inflicting significant damage on bases and ships. The discussion stresses that even small-scale operations could provoke heavy Iranian defense and strategic backlash. - European and NATO dynamics: The Europeans are portrayed as reluctant to sign onto a risky campaign in support of U.S. objectives, and the episode warns that a broader economic crisis could alter European alignment. The potential breaching of NATO unity and the risk of diminished transatlantic trust are underscored, with Trump’s stance framed as blaming Europeans for strategic failures. - Israel and the lobby: The influence of the Israel lobby and its potential consequences if the war deteriorates are discussed. Mearsheimer notes the danger of rising antisemitism if the war goes catastrophically wrong and Israel’s role in pressuring continued conflict. He also observes that a future shift in U.S. strategy could, in extreme circumstances, diverge from traditional Israeli priorities if the global economy is at stake. - Deep state and decision-making: The final exchange centers on the role of expertise and institutions. Mearsheimer argues that Trump’s distrust of the deep state and reliance on a small circle (Kushner, Whitkoff, Lindsey Graham, media figures) deprived him of necessary strategic deliberation. He contends that a robust deep-state apparatus provides essential expertise for complex wars, offering a counterpoint to Trump’s preferred approach. He contends the deep state was not fully consulted, and that reliance on a limited network contributed to the strategic miscalculations. - Concluding tone: Both acknowledge the grave, uncertain state of affairs and the high risk of escalation and miscalculation. They express a desire for an optimistic resolution but emphasize that the current trajectory is precarious, with signs pointing toward a dangerous escalation that could have wide-ranging geopolitical and economic consequences. They close with a note of concern about the potential for rash actions and the importance of considering responsible exits and credible diplomatic channels.

In a discussion with Glenn (Speaker 0) and Professor Jeffrey Sachs (Speaker 1), the speakers analyze the current Iran war in the context of a shifting world order. Sachs argues that two things are unfolding simultaneously: the erratic behavior of the United States (personalized in Donald Trump) and the broader question of American hegemony, alongside battlefield realities that challenge the claims of “shock and awe” and irreversible American victory. Key points raised: - The US, under Trump, exhibits “brazenness, lawlessness, the viciousness” in rhetoric and actions, including a statement about sending Iran back to the stone age. Netanyahu’s speech is described as equally shocking, with Netanyahu portraying himself in a biblical, godlike framing and extending “10 plagues” to Iran. - On the battlefield, the idea that American power guarantees victory is questioned. Counterattacks in Israel and the Gulf region have occurred, downing American jets and showing Iranian retaliatory capability and waning missile defense. This challenges the notion that US military supremacy is unassailable. - Sachs notes a stark contrast in public opinion: in the United States, there is widespread opposition to the war; in Israel, the public appears to largely support the war and the associated violence. - He characterizes the conflict as one driven by a “war of whim” with unclear aims, and asserts that the claimed U.S. “shock and awe” does not align with the observed battlefield and morale realities. - Beyond Iraq/Iran, Sachs discusses broader structural factors: American hegemony is pursued as a policy objective but often unfulfillable; the military-industrial complex and figures like Trump contribute to the propulsion of war; personal traits of leaders (described as psychologically unstable by some forensic psychiatrists) influence decision-making. - A possible path toward de-escalation, according to Sachs, hinges on dialogue among global peers. He suggests that Trump listens to leaders he regards as peers (Putin, Xi, Modi) and that these leaders need to tell him to stop, though he remains skeptical whether this would be sufficient. - Sachs emphasizes a multipolar world as the reality: countries should avoid hosting US bases, which he argues undermine sovereignty and security. He advocates neighbors engaging with one another, cooperation with major powers (China, Russia, India), and reducing dependence on the United States. - He critiques Western and European reliance on US leadership, noting that Europe’s internal politics still echo imperial mindsets and that NATO’s expansion and anti-Russia policies have complicated security. He argues that European and Gulf leaders often pursue “peace through strength” rather than genuine diplomacy. - Specific regional advice includes: be wary of US hegemonic guarantees; avoid dividing lines that empower a hegemon; pursue regional engagement (GCC-Iran dialogue) and view China, Russia, and India as potential partners rather than adversaries; understand that technologies (AI, data centers, chips) are not substitutes for credible security. Towards the end, Sachs reiterates that the current approach is producing insecurity and economic crisis, urging readers to adjust to a multipolar reality and to seek regional cooperation over reliance on US dominance. He closes by expressing the hope that governments will embrace reason and adapt to current realities.

Speaker 0 and Speaker 1 discuss the possibility of striking Iran to eliminate its nuclear program and the broader implications of regime change. - Speaker 0 acknowledges arguments that Israel has wanted to dismantle Iran’s nuclear program, and that American involvement with B-52s and large bombs might be needed to finish the job. He notes the idea of a strike that proceeds quickly with minimal American casualties, under a Trump-era frame that Iran will not get a nuclear bomb. - He observes a shift among Washington’s neoconservative and Republican circles from opposing Iran’s nuclear capability to opposing Ayatollah rule itself, suggesting a subtle change in objectives while maintaining the theme of intervention. He concedes cautious support if Trump executes it prudently, but warns of a “switcheroo” toward regime change rather than purely disabling the nuclear program. - Speaker 0 criticizes the record of neocons on foreign policy (Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Syria, the Arab Spring) and argues that the entire Middle East bears their failures. He emphasizes a potential regime-change drive and questions what would come after removing the Ayatollah, including possible US troop deployments and financial support for a new regime. - He highlights the size of Iran (about 92,000,000 people, two and a half times the size of Texas) and warns that regime change could trigger a bloody civil war and a large refugee crisis, possibly drawing tens or hundreds of thousands of deaths and destabilizing Europe. - Speaker 1 presents a more vocal stance: he would like to see the regime fall and leaves to the president the timing and method, insisting that if the nuclear program isn’t eliminated now, “we’ll all regret it” and urging to “be all in” to help Israel finish the job. - In cuts 3:43, Speaker 1 argues that removing the Ayatollah’s regime would be beneficial because staying in power would continue to threaten Israel, foment terrorism, and pursue a bomb; he characterizes the regime as aiming to destroy Jews and Sunni Islam, calling them “fanatical religious Nazis.” - Speaker 0 responds that such a forceful call for regime change is immature, shallow, and reckless, warning that certainty about outcomes in foreign interventions is impossible. He asserts that the first rule of foreign policy is humility, noting that prior interventions led to prolonged conflict and mass displacement. He cautions against beating the drums for regime change in another Middle Eastern country, especially the largest, and reiterates that the issue is not simply removing the nuclear program but opposing Western-led regime change. - The discussion frames a tension between supporting efforts to deny Iran a nuclear weapon and resisting Western-led regime change, with a strong emphasis on potential humanitarian and geopolitical consequences. The speakers reference public opinion (citing 86% of Americans not wanting Iran to have a bomb) and critique interventions as historically destabilizing.

Mario and the Professor discuss the scale and spread of the current oil and energy shock and its broad economic and geopolitical ripple effects. - Severity and scope: The Professor calls the crisis “pretty catastrophic,” possibly the biggest oil crisis experienced, potentially surpassing the 1970s shocks. He notes a gap between Washington rhetoric and underlying economic reality and emphasizes the war’s effects beyond oil, including fertilizer and helium, all of which pass through the Strait of Hormuz or related chokepoints. - U.S. economic backdrop (before the war): The Professor provides a pre-war table: - U.S. GDP growth in 2024 was 2.3%, 2025 about the same after a dip in 2024 to 2.2%. - Jobs: 2024 added 2.2 million; 2025 added 185,000, with tariffs contributing to a manufacturing job loss of 108,000. - Productivity declined from 3% to 2.1% in 2025. - He argues the U.S. economy was already slowing and that the war exacerbates existing weaknesses rather than creating a boom. - Immediate physical and downstream effects: - The closure of the Strait of Hormuz affects more than oil: up to 20% of world oil, a third of fertilizer, and helium used in chip manufacturing (notably in Taiwan) pass through the strait. - The closure’s ripple effects include fertilizer shortages and higher prices (fertilizer up about 50%), and broader supply chain dislocations as related infrastructure and inventories (oil, fertilizers, helium) become depleted and must be rebuilt. - Relative impact by region: The U.S. is more insulated from physical shocks than many others, but financial markets (stocks and bonds) are hit, with higher interest rates and a rising 10- and 30-year bond yield. Europe and Asia face larger direct physical disruptions; India, Taiwan, and others bear notable hits due to fertilizer and helium supply constraints. - Global energy and political dynamics: - The U.S. remains a net importer of oil, though it is a net exporter of petroleum products; fertilizer reliance and pricing reflect broader global constraints. - The professor highlights the political costs: protectionism (tariffs), militarism (increased defense spending and involvement), and interventionism (policy actions). He notes polling is negative on these directions, suggesting policy headwinds for the administration. - The escalation and motivations for war: - A theory discussed is that the war was driven by a belief in decapitating Iran’s leadership to force regime change, a strategy the professor says many experts have warned against. He cites New York Times reporting that Mossad and Netanyahu supported decapitation, but that former Mossad leadership and U.S. intelligence warned it would not work; the escalation suggests a divergence between theory and outcome. - He acknowledges another view that controlling Hormuz could economically benefit the U.S., but ranks it as a lesser driver than regime-change objectives. - Possible outcomes and scenarios: - If the Houthis control the Red Sea and the Strait of Hormuz remains closed, and the Beber/Mendeb is blocked, the consequences would intensify; the professor describes a “freeway turned into a toll road” scenario in Hormuz and greater disruption in the Gulf, including potential attacks on desalination plants. - The economic signaling would likely worsen: downward revisions to growth, higher import prices, and increased financial market strain; a prolonged closure would intensify these effects. - The escalation ladder and endgame: - The professor warns that escalating with boots on the ground would favor Iran and could trigger widespread disruption of Gulf infrastructure, desalination, and regional stability. He suggests Russia would be a clear beneficiary in such a scenario. - He concludes with a stark warning: if Hormuz and the Beber/Mendeb remain closed, and desalination and critical infrastructure are attacked, the situation could resemble or exceed the scale of the 2008 financial crisis—“look like a birthday party” compared with what could unfold. - Overall takeaway: The crisis is multi-faceted, with immediate physical shortages (oil, fertilizer, helium) and cascading financial and political costs. The duration and depth depend on how long chokepoints stay closed and whether escalation occurs, with the potential for severe global economic and geopolitical consequences.

The conversation centers on competing analyses of how the current Iran-US risk escalates and what might drive Trump’s decisions. - Robert Pape’s framework is invoked: the escalation trap guarantees a ground operation. Speaker 0 asks Speaker 1 for his view after having seen Pape’s remarks; Speaker 1 acknowledges Pape’s expertise on escalation, noting he laid out an escalation ladder and taught at senior military colleges. He still questions whether Pape adequately accounts for Donald Trump’s psychology. - Trump’s mindset and advisers: Speaker 1 suggests Trump wants out and might be constrained by hard-right advisers like Pete Hegseth and Stephen Miller, with Lindsey Graham also urging “epic” moves. He argues there has been no decisive operation giving Trump a victory arc, noting the war has involved destroying outdated Iraqi/F-5 fighter jets rather than a clear strategic win. - The Iran situation and off-ramps: The debate touches on whether Iran can or will offer Trump an off-ramp. Speaker 1 says Trump will make or take his own off-ramp, citing the blockade as an example. They discuss a recent movement toward the Western Strait of Hormuz, with ships turning to Iran’s EZ Pass toll-booth route; one cruise ship chose a shallow, non-regular path, suggesting a calculated bypass of typical traffic schemes. - Official statements on the Strait of Hormuz: The discussion quotes Iran’s foreign minister, Sayyid Abbas, who stated that passage for all commercial vessels through the Strait of Hormuz is open for the remaining period of a four-day ceasefire, on the coordinated IRGC EZ Pass route, with inspection and authorization by the IRGC. Trump claimed the Strait of Hormuz is open, which Speaker 1 terms a desperate interpretation, noting that Iran is effectively charging a toll and that the situation is tied to the Lebanon ceasefire, though Trump claims it is not. - Potential outcomes and strategic interpretations: The speakers weigh whether this is the beginning of broader acceptance of Iran’s conditions, with Iran potentially accepting a World Liberty Financial-backed US stable coin in exchange for keeping enriched uranium. They describe Iran’s tactic as the “cup of chai” strategy—effectively allowing the other side to reveal concessions gradually. - War planning and escalation scenarios: The group discusses possible futures, including a fifth-day US bombing campaign or a renewed air operation, but neither speaker sees an imminent air campaign as likely. They consider the risk of US actions that would violate the ceasefire, such as sinking IRGC boats in the Strait, which would restart full-scale war and imperil the global economy. They also reflect on Trump’s personal incentives to seek a legacy through a dramatic victory, fueled by advisers who push for dramatic moves, versus the financial and political costs for Gulf states. - Concluding viewpoint: There is skepticism about a decisive, orchestrated victory for Trump in the near term and tension between the possibility of limited military actions and a broader, open-ended confrontation.

The conversation highlights that, beyond the nuclear enrichment issue, there are numerous unresolved questions that must be addressed to reach a meaningful agreement. Key topics include who controls the Strait, the future of US military bases in the region, what security architecture would reassure Iran that it won’t be attacked again, and how to handle reparations and sanctions. The participants note interconnected problems involving Hezbollah, Hamas, the Houthis, and Iran’s relations with them. Speaker 1 points out that the president has described force as the greatest cudgel, using bombs and the threat of bombs to compel a unified proposal and bring adversaries to the table, but Speaker 1 questions how viable this approach is given current fractures. Speaker 0 agrees it’s a repeated pattern of insisting on force, and emphasizes the irony of proponents claiming that bombing will produce a unified outcome when negotiations seem unlikely. Speaker 0 reinforces that the war was started and heavily bombed for a long period without achieving goals, arguing that the result so far is a loss of the war. They criticize President Trump’s belief that resuming bombing would yield the desired outcomes not achieved earlier, calling that line of reasoning foolish. Speaker 0 emphasizes there is no military option that will succeed and warns that escalation could benefit Iran. Speaker 0 further argues from an Iranian strategic perspective, suggesting that if they were playing Iran’s hand, they would not go to Islamabad soon but instead would urge the United States to escalate and see how the international economy would be affected—likening it to a Titanic approaching an iceberg—thereby increasing Iran’s leverage for a better deal than presently available. Speaker 1 notes that Israelis do not want the war ended and prefer continued escalation, implying a disconnect between U.S. strategy and Israeli preferences. They reiterate that Trump seems to be holding a weak hand, unable to secure a war-winning outcome, while the broader situation remains fragmented and complex with multiple regional actors and strategic considerations to resolve.

The conversation centers on Iran, potential U.S. action, and the wider strategic spillovers across the Middle East and beyond. The speakers discuss what prompted a delay in striking Iran, the likelihood of a broader attack, and how regional and great-power dynamics might unfold. - On why a strike against Iran was postponed, the consensus from the guest is that Netanyahu asked for more time to prepare for defending against Iranian missiles and to enable a larger attack footprint. The guest also cites public statements by U.S. figures supporting a bigger operation: Lindsey Graham emphatically said last Friday that the delay was so we can go bigger; General Jack Keane stated that military operations would target political and military leaders and destroy their military infrastructure to take the regime out. The guest emphasizes that the most likely scenario is an expanded target set and greater combat power in the region to defend bases and improve the attack’s effectiveness, rather than a symbolic strike. - Regarding whether Russia or China would become involved, the guest doubts active involvement by either country, but suggests indirect support or intelligence help could occur. The logic is that direct involvement would be costly for these powers, though they might assist Iran indirectly. - On the readiness and capability of Iran, the guest argues Iran is now far more prepared than in the twelve-day war. They note that insiders were purged after the prior conflict, defenses were strengthened, and missile production likely accelerated since June, with production areas shielded from prior attacks. Iran’s ability to respond quickly and with significant damage is viewed as higher, and the guest warns that if Iran experiences an existential threat, it could abandon restraint and retaliate in a way that makes a broader war more likely. - The discussion covers U.S. bases in the region, where the guest concedes that the U.S. air defense is not at the level of Israel’s Iron Dome and David Sling, THAAD, and other integrated systems. Some bases lack robust defense against ballistic missiles, drones, and other threats, and, while 30,000 U.S. troops remain in the area, the overall air-defense capability is described as insufficient to stop all Iranian missiles. - Would Iran strike Gulf nations directly to pressure them to push the U.S. to end the war? The guest says not likely, arguing that Iranian leadership has signaled a preference for good relations with Gulf states and that attacking Gulf bases or cities would create more enemies and complicate Iran’s strategic posture. - A decapitation strike targeting leadership is considered plausible by some but deemed risky. The guest notes Iran has continuity of government plans and could designate successors; even if leadership is removed, a power vacuum could ignite internal fighting. The possibility of an existential attack by Iran—coupled with a broader regional war—could be catastrophic and is something to avoid. - The discussion turns to Lebanon, Hezbollah, the Houthis, Hamas, and the broader spillover risk. The guest suggests that if Iran’s retaliation is strong and Hamas or Hezbollah see an opportunity, there could be escalations, including potential involvement by Turkey. However, Iran would likely avoid opening new fronts that would diffuse its capability to strike U.S. bases in the region. - The problem of Iran’s internal diversity is highlighted: Persians, Azeris, Kurds, Lurs, Arabs, Baluchs, and Turkmen, among others, complicate any post-regime-change scenario. The guest argues Iran could fragment, but emphasizes that a successful Western-backed regime change could still lead to civil strife rather than a stable replacement, warning of a “textbook failed regime change” akin to past Middle East interventions. - On NATO and Western unity, the guest asserts NATO is dead or in deep trouble, citing European leaders who doubt U.S. stability and reliability. He notes European politicians discuss building an autonomous European security architecture, implying growing European reluctance to rely on U.S. leadership for defense. - Greenland as a strategic issue: the guest argues there is no rational military need for Greenland for security, and that the notion of occupying or militarizing Greenland is driven more by Trump’s personal preferences than strategic necessity. He points out that even if Greenland were militarized, Russia and China would have little to gain, given logistical and strategic barriers. - Finally, the future trajectory: the guest predicts Iran will likely be pressed hard in a large strike but warns that the consequences could be severe, including regional destabilization, potential civil conflict inside Iran, and long-term strategic costs for the U.S. and its European partners. He suggests that as long as the U.S. overextends itself in multiple theaters (Iran, Greenland, Ukraine, Venezuela), global stability and the U.S. economic footing could be endangered. The guest closes by highlighting the uncertainty of Trump’s next moves, citing possible abrupt shifts and cognitive concerns that could influence decisions in unpredictable ways.

In a discussion about the Iran confrontation and its wider implications, Glenn and John Mearsheimer analyze the sequence of events and underlying dynamics behind President Donald Trump’s statements and policy shifts. - Trump’s two Monday tweets frame the episode: an initial threat to “wipe Iran off the face of the earth” to force concession, followed by a reversal to announce a ceasefire based on Iran’s 10-point plan. Mersheimer emphasizes that this sequence reveals Trump’s desperation to end the war and to secure a ceasefire quickly, then to shift to negotiations with Iran’s plan as the basis. - The framework of the negotiations is contrasted with the US’s prior maximalist aims. The United States had demanded four core goals: regime change, Iran’s nuclear enrichment cessation, elimination of long-range missiles, and cessation of support for groups like the Houthis, Hezbollah, and Hamas. Mersheimer notes none of these have been realized, while Iran reportedly gains leverage through control of the Strait of Hormuz. - The Iranian 10-point plan is presented as a basis for negotiations that would, in effect, concede the big US demands. Trump’s evening tweet signaling acceptance of the 10-point plan is read as a defeat for the US position and a shift toward Iranian maximalism on its own terms. The claim is that the ceasefire, if it occurs, would involve concessions that Iran had already proposed. - The feasibility of a ceasefire is questioned. Iran’s open Strait of Hormuz depends on Israel halting attacks in Lebanon (on Hezbollah), which has not happened. Therefore, a true ceasefire is not in place, and the Israelis’ actions are seen as undermining any potential halt to hostilities. - The broader strategic picture is outlined. Iran’s leverage includes allied groups (Houthis, Hezbollah, Hamas) and the ability to close chokepoints like the Strait of Hormuz or the Bab el-Mandab strait via the Houthis. The discussion notes Iran’s large missile/drone arsenal and potential to threaten American bases, though Mersheimer stresses that sanctions and the prolonged war have devastated Iran’s economy, which complicates assessments of its strength. - The role of external powers and economies is highlighted. Mersheimer argues that the global economy—especially oil and fertilizers—drives the push to end the conflict. He suggests China and Pakistan, with Russian input, pressured Iran to negotiate, given the global economic risks of a prolonged war. He also notes that the New York Times reported that all 13 US bases in the Gulf were damaged or destroyed, undermining U.S. presence there. - Domestic political concerns are discussed. Trump’s ability to declare victory while acknowledging defeat creates a political hazard. Vance is presented as a potentially capable negotiator who could press for a ceasefire, but there is concern about internal political blowback if he concedes too much. - Israel’s position is considered crucial. Netanyahu’s government is described as having promoted the war, and the war’s outcome is said to damage U.S.-Israel relations. There is speculation that Israel may consider drastic options, including nuclear consideration against Iran, given the perceived failure of conventional means. - The Ukraine war and its relation to the Iran conflict are explored. If Iran’s war ends or is perceived as winding down, European capacity and willingness to support Ukraine become central questions. The U.S. may shift blame to Europe for Ukraine’s defeat if Russia advances, while withholding weapons to Ukraine to avoid further strain on U.S. stockpiles. - The discussion on rationality in international relations emphasizes that states act rationally when their decisions align with a plausible theory of international politics and a sound decision-making process. Mersheimer argues Europe’s behavior toward the U.S. is not irrational, though he criticizes its liberal-theory basis (NATO expansion) as potentially misguided but not irrational. He contrasts this with Trump’s Iran attack in February 2029, which he deems irrational due to a lack of a plausible theory of victory. - The multipolar world dynamic is reinforced. The war’s outcomes are viewed as weakening U.S. ability to project power, diminishing transatlantic cohesion, and boosting Russia and China’s relative position. The loss of Gulf bases and diminished American influence are expected to push Europe toward greater strategic autonomy, with NATO potentially becoming less meaningful by 2029, depending on future leadership. - Final notes include concerns about the political risk for Vance as a negotiator, the likelihood of a difficult peace process, and the possibility that misperceptions and propaganda—analyzed through historical parallels like the Vietnam War and Walter Lippmann’s ideas—have locked leaders into an “evil enemy” narrative that complicates peacemaking. Overall, the conversation portrays Trump’s messaging as a sign of desperation to end a costly conflict, the ceasefire as a fragile construct dependent on Iranian terms, Iran’s expanding leverage in the region, the fragility of U.S.-Israel and transatlantic bonds, and a shifting global order moving toward multipolarity with lasting economic and strategic consequences.

The discussion centers on Iran’s response to the latest US peace terms and the broader trajectory of the conflict. Iran publicly rejected the terms, calling them “completely unrealistic” and signaling that they would not open the Strait of Hormuz. At the same time, the claim is made that the rumblings from US outlets and the president’s rhetoric suggested closeness to a deal, but those impressions are challenged as inconsistent with Iran’s stance. Project Freedom is said to have been shelved after Saudi Arabia reportedly refused to allow US forces to use its airspace and a key regional airbase, making the Trump administration’s stated option to advance that plan unworkable. The host asks where things stand on the escalation ladder. Professor Robert Pape, director of the Chicago Project on Security and Threats, describes the situation as a trap. He argues that the fundamental issues in play have not changed since the bombs began falling about seventy days ago. He praises the US military’s tactical performance—air, naval, and leadership-target strikes—but criticizes the strategy as fundamentally flawed. According to Pape, tactical successes do not yield meaningful strategic results, and Iran’s power is growing due to geography and cheap technologies like drones and mines. He notes that even after sinking Iran’s navy, the impact was negligible because Iran’s power persists and expands, especially given a Gulf-wide vulnerability to Hormuz. A critical development discussed is Iran’s action near the UAE, striking a pipeline that bypassed Hormuz and moved nearly 2,000,000 barrels of oil per day. This demonstrated Iran’s capacity to inflict damage despite a naval blockade, contributing to Gulf states’ reluctance to participate in or support US actions. The implication is that US punitive measures—hitting energy infrastructure or power grids—are unlikely to force Iran to kneel and may instead provoke greater retaliation. Pape warns that the escalation could drag on for months, with consequences such as rising gasoline prices in the US, potentially reaching about $6 in May or higher in some places like Chicago. The conversation turns to more immediate developments: fresh drone attacks around Kishem Island with Iran claiming air defenses intercepted the assaults; Iranian officials reportedly require compensation for damages and the withdrawal of all US forces from the Gulf as preconditions for ending the war. Pape reframes these attacks as part of Iran’s effort to keep the United States off balance and off leadership leverage, suggesting that Trump’s approach—driven by civilian leadership and charisma—misses the realities of great-power politics. He discusses the broader risk of increased Gulf infrastructure targeting if the US escalates, including the potential for higher gas prices and substantial infrastructure repair costs. The interview ends with reflections on the limits of punishment as a strategy, the enduring influence of Iran’s geopolitical position, and the likelihood that even if further force is used, it may not yield the desired strategic outcome. The speakers acknowledge the difficulty of predicting exact moves but emphasize the persistence of the escalation trap and the real-world consequences for energy markets and regional stability.

Professor Jeffrey Sachs argues that the current moment represents dramatic and dangerous upheaval, with the war against Iran in its second week and a “regime change operation” not going as planned. He says there is tremendous confusion about war aims and the ground situation, describing Washington as “fogged” and characterizing Donald Trump’s public messaging as “ravings” from a “madman.” He contends that escalation control is illusory and that the world is sliding toward a broader and more dangerous conflict. Sachs asserts that the war is not limited to Iran: Iran has claimed to strike U.S. bases in several countries while denying attacks on Saudi Arabia, Azerbaijan, and Turkey. He suggests the U.S. and Israel are pulling in proxies, including Kurdish fighters, and that Russia may be supplying Iran with intelligence while the U.S. supplies Ukraine. He contends that after decapitation strikes on Iran, Moscow faces pressure to deter NATO attacks, while Europe contemplates increasing nuclear weapons. He views the conflict as part of a wider global struggle, with fighting across the world and potential linkages to energy markets, indicating that an energy crisis is likely to be severe and poorly priced in by markets. He argues that if China and Russia support Iran, it underscores a broader strategic dynamic, given China’s oil interests and the U.S.’s efforts to cut off oil supplies to China from Venezuela, Russia, and Iran. On international law, Sachs reiterates his argument that the U.S.-Israel attack on Iran is also an attack on the United Nations. He asserts that the U.S. under Trump “despises the UN” and seeks to kill it “through a thousand cuts and through a devastating blow,” pointing to the U.S. withdrawal from UN agencies and rejection of key treaties. He emphasizes that Europe is complicit, with European leaders and ambassadors at the UN Security Council focusing critiques on Iran rather than on the U.S.-Israel strike. He invokes Article 2(4) of the UN Charter as the essence of the UN’s purpose to stop the use of force, contrasting this with the belief that the U.S. “rules the world” and uses violence to impose demands, including the call for “unconditional surrender” in Iran. Sachs describes the U.S. foreign policy machinery as dominated by the CIA and a network of “off the books militaries” that pursue regime change and hegemony. He recalls historical episodes: the 1953 coup in Iran, the Kennedy and Eisenhower era, and the long-standing pattern of U.S. interference in other countries’ leadership. He asserts that performance of checks and balances is deteriorating, with democracy weakening under threat and dissent punished, both in the U.S. and in Europe. He likens Trump’s rhetoric to a hyperbolic assertion that he would determine Iran’s next leader, calling this symptomatic of a broader U.S. imperial project. In discussing European responses, Sachs criticizes Germany for showing subservience to the U.S. stance, with European leaders at times prioritizing confrontation with Iran over engagement with Russia or seeking peace. He laments the decline of European strategic autonomy and the EU as a whole, noting the Danish ambassador’s focus on Iran while ignoring U.S.-Israeli actions. He argues that Europe’s leadership has failed to act in the spirit of postwar peace, contrasting current leadership with figures like de Gaulle, Mitterrand, Kohl, or Schroeder. Toward multipolarity, Sachs traces the idea back to Roosevelt’s vision for a United Nations-centered postwar order and contrasts it with the post-1990s U.S. unilateralism. He argues that the United States, Britain, Russia, and China would need to cooperate to avert catastrophe, and that the current trajectory—led by an obsession with global dominance—risks war, economic crisis, and widespread destabilization. He suggests that China and Russia are the most likely to push back against U.S. hegemony, with India possibly playing a role, though its alignment remains ambivalent. Sachs closes by noting that a move toward peaceful multipolar cooperation would require different leadership and a rejection of the Leviathan-style dominance mindset.