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There are weapons being developed to target specific individuals by using their DNA and medical profiles. This raises concerns about privacy, especially in terms of commercial data protection. Over the past 20 years, expectations of privacy have diminished, particularly among younger generations. People willingly provide their DNA to companies like 23andMe, which then own and can potentially sell this data without sufficient intellectual property or privacy safeguards. The lack of legal and regulatory frameworks to address these issues is a problem. It is crucial to have an open and public political discussion about how to protect healthcare information, DNA data, and personal data, as adversaries may exploit this information for developing such weapon systems.

The transcript asserts that the Moderna technology used in COVID shots is described in a 248-page patent filed in 2020, which lists several embodiments or variations of the technology. It states that although it is unknown which embodiment each batch used, several different batch numbers were deployed, and some were far deadlier than others. According to the Moderna patent, the technology contains self-assembled nanoparticles, and in certain variations these nanoparticles can be used for the controlled release of compounds once they are in the human body. The lipid nanoparticles are encapsulated into a polymer hydrogel, a controlled release coating that includes polyvinyls. This has been verified by Anna Mielchia and Clifford Karnikom's research. In a 2013 TEDMED talk, Doctor Ito Bachelet says that these nanorobots have already been successfully developed in Israel and that they can be injected into the human body with a basic syringe. He shows an image of what they look like, and they appear to be the same structures that the fifth column found in their research and claimed was powered by five g, which was confirmed by doctor Bachelet. Speaker 1 adds that developed nanorobots carry antennas made from metal nanoparticles, and the antenna enable the nanobots to respond to externally applied electromagnetic fields, so these versions of nanobots can actually be activated with a press of a button on a joystick. The transcript further cites work by Todd Callender's team at Vaxchoice dot com, which has concluded that these shots contain a variety of synthetic pathogens that can be released with external five g frequencies. It states that the Moderna patent describes these nanoparticle mimics, which mimic the delivery of a variety of pathogens and lists over a hundred of them within the patent. According to the work at Vaxchoice, these synthetic pathogens each have an IP address. They are cataloged by the Department of Energy, and they use cesium-137, which the transcript claims we have been contaminated with from the environment, as a building block for their construction within our bodies using external frequency. The research allegedly shows that the Microsoft patent filed in 2020-06-06 060606 cryptocurrency system using body activity data is now in effect and that this technology is turning the human body into an antenna, which can output energy, meaning that humans are being turned into batteries to fuel the digital AI prison that is being built around us. And it is claimed that if you choose not to comply, the technology includes a built-in kill switch. The transcript closes by noting that independent researchers and scientists are uncovering this agenda, but they continue to walk freely among us, unrestrained by any justice whatsoever.

Congress is considering a pilot program allowing state, local, tribal, and territorial law enforcement to use CUAS Technologies. This expansion requires careful consideration, as it involves waiving wiretapping protections and other critical privacy and civil liberties safeguards. It is essential to ensure that the operation of these technologies by numerous law enforcement agencies is closely coordinated and overseen by federal authorities.

Speaker 0 said they downloaded all the open weights of GLM 5.2 and intend to run it one day, noting they currently lack hardware. They also argued that the U.S. banning Anthropic models effectively hands AI implementation’s future to China. Speaker 1 referenced a Reuters story on June 17 stating the Trump administration decided not to ban DeepSeek R1 “yet,” implying a ban may come later, similar to actions taken with TikTok. They said models such as Anthropic’s “fable opus 4.8” are very expensive, while Chinese models including DeepSeek R1, GLM, Qwen, and Minimax M3 are available at a fraction of the price. They argued these Chinese models have improved and are now almost at the level of what the U.S. frontier can produce. Speaker 0 agreed on the cost gap, stating that in some cases it is “50 times less” and sometimes even higher. Speaker 1 then questioned why companies pay more via employee salaries or token usage when Chinese models can perform similar tasks for much less. Speaker 1 cited an Nvidia CEO claim that if a $500,000 employee is not spending $250,000 in tokens, they need to be fired, adding that $250,000 exceeds what many engineers make as salary. They argued that if similar performance can be achieved far cheaper, spending at the higher level becomes harder to justify. Speaker 1 proposed the U.S. will respond with an import ban and controls akin to “the Great Wall” and “the Great Firewall of America.” They said it would begin with a blacklist blocking access to certain services or websites, progress to whitelists allowing access only to government-approved entities, and then declare open models “problematic and unsafe.” They said the U.S. would require entities to prove open models can “naturally run within the borders of the United States,” and if not, would remove them from open-source repositories such as Hugging Face. Speaker 0 challenged whether this would include stripping models from Hugging Face, controlling GitHub, and criminalizing downloading open weights from China; Speaker 1 replied that this is exactly what they believe would happen in stages. Speaker 1 argued that it would be difficult to determine what models do when only the model weights are available, describing models as “black boxes” and noting concerns about malicious intent embedded in weights. They added that even OpenAI and Google do not fully know what their models are capable of and said static analysis for model forensics is an unresolved “frontier question.” They concluded that Chinese companies or the Chinese government proving open models are harmless and contain no malicious intent is “virtually impossible” given this problem.

I oppose Senate Bill 18/19 because it's unnecessary. 3D printing firearms is not an effective way for criminals to get guns. This bill violates the First Amendment rights of law-abiding hobbyists and gun enthusiasts who want to share information about unique or antique firearms. The real issue is not the devices, but the people using them. This bill is just another attempt to add more regulations to an already heavily regulated industry, based on fear and misunderstanding.

Speaker 1 outlines concerns about Bill C-22, the Lawful Access Act of 2026, asserting that if it becomes law, the Government of Canada will be able to secretly order Apple to build in a capability into its infrastructure to allow Canadian law enforcement and national security authorities to track every iPhone, iPad, Apple Watch, AirPod, and AirTag in real time. This capability would enable authorities to require Apple to confirm whether it provides any services to a user, and to obtain device identifiers for all devices used with those services. The process could involve going to a justice of the peace and obtaining an order without any requirement that a crime has been or will be committed, effectively mandating Apple to hand over moment-by-moment locations for all user devices. The speaker further notes that with that secret order, Apple would be compelled to provide the moment-by-moment locations of all devices associated with a user, based on the digital ID tied to iPhone, iPad, Apple Watch, AirPod, Apple TV, and AirTag. In addition, the order would require Apple to maintain location history for a full year, enabling cops to access that historical data as well. The overarching concern highlighted is whether such expansive powers—secret orders, real-time tracking, access to device identifiers and services, and a year-long location history—are desirable for Canadian police and law enforcement. Speaker 0 interjects with a prompting remark, inviting the audience to consider the implications and framing the discussion as a best attempt to evaluate the issue. The dialogue centers on the potential reach of government surveillance powers under the proposed act, the mechanisms by which these powers could be exercised (secret orders and judiciary involvement), and the practical consequences of requiring a tech company to reveal comprehensive location data and device identifiers without demonstrating a crime or imminent wrongdoing. The core issue presented is whether granting law enforcement such pervasive, real-time, and historical access to users’ device data aligns with acceptable governance and privacy standards in Canada.

US drones face restrictions that limit their operation, such as needing to stay within line of sight or requiring pilots to have licenses. In contrast, Chinese drones can be purchased and used freely in the US, leading to compliance issues for users, which are often overlooked. This situation has resulted in Chinese manufacturers dominating the drone market, with 90% of drones used by the US military and police being Chinese-made. This reliance on Chinese drones poses significant security risks, as they can serve as both surveillance tools and potential weapons.

California's new gun registration law, Senate bill 1160, requires annual registration of all guns with increasing fees based on the number owned. All guns must be registered by 2025, with law enforcement access to the registry. Failure to register results in fines of $1,000 per gun, with confiscation and destruction for non-compliance. The law starts on July 1, 2025.

The FAA has significantly hindered the U.S. drone industry by enforcing regulations that make it illegal to fly drones beyond line of sight without a pilot's license. This forces U.S. manufacturers to create drones that comply with these restrictions, limiting their capabilities. In contrast, Chinese manufacturers face no such limitations, allowing their drones to be sold and used freely in the U.S., despite potential legal violations by users. As a result, 90% of drones used by the U.S. military and police are made in China, raising serious security concerns since these drones could serve as surveillance tools or weapons.

The transcript explains ITAR (International Traffic in Arms Regulations), a strict set of US rules created in 1976 under the Arms Export Control Act to protect advanced American military technology. It describes the central principle as requiring US government written permission for others to “touch it, see it, or even be in a position where they could theoretically access it.” ITAR is managed by the US State Department, and the transcript states that violations can lead to major fines, prison, and cites examples including a person named Chi Mak who served 24 years. A key point is ITAR’s “strict liability”: unlike most laws that require proof of intent, ITAR does not. The transcript claims that ignorance or good faith provides no legal protection and that even “theoretical access” can be enough for a violation. It also emphasizes that ITAR coverage extends beyond hardware to includes documents such as schematics and maintenance guidelines; for example, the transcript says the F-35 maintenance manual is included, not just the aircraft itself. Canada is described as having a special privileged position under ITAR since 1954, rooted in a defence production sharing relationship that the transcript says created a specific exemption referenced as “22 CFR section 1.26.5” (the “Canadian exemption”). The transcript claims this allows most American military technology to flow to Canada without requiring individual export licenses, and argues that this exemption underpins the Canadian Armed Forces: virtually all CAF equipment, systems, and platforms contain American military technology. It also states the exemption is conditional, applying to Canadian nationals and permanent residents who do not have ties to countries the US considers threats (such as China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, etc.). The transcript then describes what Canada is doing to address personnel shortages: in 2022 it opened CAF recruitment to permanent residents, and in 2026 it launched a dedicated immigration pathway targeting skilled foreign military recruitment members (including pilots, cyber specialists, and technical trades). It claims that roughly one in five new CAF recruits are now permanent residents (about 1,400 people in about the last year). It states that while NATO-origin recruits are preferred, the program extends broadly to recognized foreign militaries, including countries that are not US allies. It further claims recruits may begin basic training on “reliability status” with full security clearances processed afterward—meaning foreign nationals enter operational environments before clearance is fully resolved. The discussion argues this creates risk under ITAR, particularly because permanent residents are being recruited from abroad. Night vision is highlighted via an example: the transcript says a company (IT&T) was fined $100 million for exporting night vision technology to China, and it reiterates that under strict liability intent does not matter. A personal anecdote is included about a posting to Ottawa in 2017 requiring an above top secret security clearance, where the person said they were not allowed in a building for almost a year. The transcript connects this to broader concerns that, if ITAR access restrictions apply, Canada would need to segregate personnel to prevent unauthorized presence around ITAR-covered equipment or documentation, including encrypted communications involving both Canadian and American components. Participants speculate about why the issue is happening quickly (contrasting a claimed 3-month recruitment process with a described 1.5–2-year process for the speaker as a Canadian national) and whether immigration processes were not adequately questioned. It also contrasts Canada’s approach with US practice, noting that the US reportedly has about 40,000 non-US citizens on active duty, and argues that the difference is whether each individual is controlled for access to ITAR-covered technology by the US. Finally, the transcript concludes that if US restrictions were tightened, it claims Canadian operations would be severely impacted, because much of Canadian training, deployments, and operational support is described as enabled by the US.

California Democrats are accused of wanting to ban self-defense with a new bill proposed by lawmaker Rick Zieber. The bill would allegedly ban fighting back during violent home invasions. This is presented as a continuation of efforts against law-abiding citizens, following restrictions on the right to bear arms, police budget cuts, and appointments of soft-on-crime judges. The speaker asserts that these actions collectively aim to remove the right to defend oneself and family in one's own home.

A discussion centers on a new proposed law, HR 8250, which would require operating system providers to verify the age of any user of an operating system and for other purposes, covering Windows, macOS, iOS, and Android, with open-source Linux considered in the debate. The claim is that this could serve as a Trojan horse to control people through a digital ID system, rather than being merely safety-focused. Speaker 1 references Catherine Austin Fitz, who says that if global elites deploy digital ID systems, they will control all aspects, including health freedoms and financial transactions. She argues that once financial transaction control is in place, all protections in health and food freedoms could be negated, and a 100% digital system with a digital ID and programmable money would allow authorities to dictate health decisions, vaccine status, gender-transition decisions for children, and other policies by turning off funds. Speaker 0 notes that Fitz is not hyperbolic and mentions Austin Steinbart, founder of the Quantum Party of America, who is joined by Speaker 0 to discuss the issue further. Speaker 2 (Austin Steinbart) asserts that the HR 8250 proposal is a disaster and goes beyond a digital ID concept by embedding age verification into the core of every device. He says the bill is six pages long and delegates enforcement to the FTC, creating ambiguity about whether biometrics, ID cards, or face scans would be used, leaving the mechanism up to the executive branch. He points out that the proposal could coordinate with companies like Apple (potentially via Face ID) and Microsoft to embed verification, while raising questions about how open-source Linux distributions would be forced to comply. He notes that Linux is open-source and typically users have root access, enabling workarounds or removal of such core files, and questions how a retrospective integration would work on devices like POS systems or hotel front-desk computers. Speaker 0 asks how the implementation would occur and whether the digital ID is the core objective beyond age verification. Speaker 2 confirms that the core goal is a universal digital ID across platforms, tying to privacy and cybersecurity concerns by requiring every service to interact with core OS files to verify age, with California already moving toward age verification that apps and websites would rely on. Speaker 0 links this to a broader move toward a central bank digital currency (CBDC) and a digital ID, quoting a sound bite from Catherine Austin Fitz about health identifiers affecting travel and other activities. Speaker 3 (a figure from the World Economic Forum) is cited, emphasizing tokenization of financial assets and the rapid rollout of a digital wallet and digitized currencies globally, with a critique that many countries are unprepared for such changes. Speaker 2 clarifies that blockchain or tokenization per se isn’t inherently bad, but concerns arise when centralized actors with anti-freedom aims design and control the system, shaping speech and policy. They discuss the potential benefits of tokenized assets in theory, while warning that centralized control could enable censorship and restricted financial activity. Speaker 0 ends by urging viewers to contact members of Congress to oppose HR 8250, urging them to “burn this thing down,” and thanks Speaker 2 for the analysis.

Smuggled guns are rarely used to harm police officers, women, or in mass shootings, suicides, or unintentional injury.

California Democrats are attempting to ban self-defense. A radical California lawmaker, Rick Zieber, proposed a bill that would ban fighting back during violent home invasions. First, they attacked our right to bear arms. Then, they cut police budgets and filled the courts with soft-on-crime judges. Now they are trying to remove our right to defend our families and ourselves in our own homes. California's war against law-abiding citizens needs to stop.

Participants argue Bill C-22 is being rushed and contend it contains provisions that pose major risks to Canadian privacy. One view says the process is “quite rushed,” noting the committee has had only three sitting days to hear witnesses, which is not enough for legislation of that complexity. A participant describes Bill C-22 as the “most dangerous surveillance bill” they have seen in more than 10 years in Canada, and even in other democracies. They say the Public Safety Minister should not be trusted to claim limited amendments will fix C-22, stating that nothing short of striking the majority of Part 2 would protect Canadian privacy. Multiple speakers focus on Part 2 as the key problem. They argue Part 2 is incompatible with the fundamental human right to privacy and could ultimately make Canadians less safe, not more. Concerns include a blanket secrecy provision that would prevent them from explaining to users what changes were made or, if discovered, why they were made. Speakers also say C-22 would let the government compel organizations to build surveillance capabilities to log who is talking to whom, when, and from where for up to a year. One participant states this would affect Canadians who rely on secure private communications to bank, access healthcare, run a business, or talk to family, emphasizing it is not a hypothetical risk. Google is cited as having significant concerns with several elements of Part 2 as currently drafted, particularly the potential for the law—without stronger definitions—to force dismantling critical privacy protections. Examples given include breaking encryption, overriding users’ data deletion controls, and building remote access capability, which the speakers say could facilitate foreign interference and weaken global user privacy. One speaker characterizes a “backdoor built for the good guys” as “simply a vulnerability,” waiting for bad actors. In closing, a speaker urges taking more time to receive and review all public evidence and to thoroughly reform or abandon Part 2 of C-22 before it moves forward, describing the process as under-researched given the “massive stakes.”

Mike Adams says the White House is “effectively demanding” it can control licensing of who is allowed to use AI models. Adams claims Reuters, Axios, Bloomberg, and CNBC reported that the Trump administration demanded OpenAI limit the release of an upcoming GPT “5.6” to only a small set of partners approved by the government, restricting it from the public and from corporations and others. He says this is being done “without any law whatsoever,” without public vote, without permission from OpenAI, and through a “murky black box” security decision process where the White House alone determines release eligibility. Adams states OpenAI CEO Sam Altman is not happy but says OpenAI will go along with it, hoping it is temporary and not guaranteed. Adams frames this as a second frontier model in the U.S. being targeted and restricted. He contrasts it with an earlier case involving Anthropic’s “Mythos,” also called “Fable 5,” which Adams says was restricted by Anthropic after “government pressure and government concerns about cybersecurity.” He adds context that he says involves a relationship between the Trump administration and Anthropic, including Pentagon labeling of Anthropic models as a cybersecurity threat under “Hegseth,” and says this contributed to government pressure. Adams argues that the OpenAI demand amounts to de facto government licensing with “no published rules” and “no due process.” He says OpenAI’s compliance is expected because defying the federal government would likely lead to force. He also describes the “upshot” as catastrophic for the U.S. AI race, asserting it would push AI development toward China because Americans would not build their future on models that could be removed based on new government security concerns. Adams says his interview with Zach Voorhees (on brightvideos.com and decentralized.tv) will address concerns that the federal government could go further to ban or outlaw Chinese open-source AI models, “label” them as contraband or illegal, and “build” a “giant firewall” around the U.S. He also claims this could lead to criminalization for running models from Chinese providers. Adams advises viewers to download AI models immediately from Hugging Face and store them locally, including large model weights even if they cannot be run yet. He suggests preparing for big downloads (hundreds of gigabytes) and mentions downloading small (7B–9B parameter) and medium models, specifically calling out “QEN 3.6 27B” as a recommended medium option. He also mentions downloading weights for “DeepSeek version 4,” “GLM,” and “Kimmy K2,” even without local hardware. He emphasizes that if the administration later declares such models “contraband” or illegal, individuals would decide whether to delete files or keep them. He says he expects “a flurry of lawsuits” against the federal government. Adams repeatedly urges resistance: download models, run AI locally using owned hardware and GPUs to avoid permission-based control, and push back politically by contacting representatives and senators. He adds that he expects efforts to restrict access to open-source models from other countries as well, and describes a future scenario in which the government would require biometric and digital identification to use approved AI models.

Right now, in Canada, there are some people with bad intentions who have in their house prohibited or restricted weapons without fair licensing. But the policeman is not knocking at every door to check what is in the end of each Canadian. They are seized when they are moved, when there's an event. So it will be the same. But all of the people in possession of one of the weapon that has been banned since 2020 and will not participate in the compensation program will have an illegal gun in its position. And that's a criminal act. All right. Thank you very much, everyone.

The speaker discusses assault weapons and shows a device that emits radiation. They argue that this device is an assault weapon because it exceeds the acceptable radiation level. The speaker suggests that instead of focusing on banning traditional assault weapons, efforts should be made to ban devices that emit harmful radiation. They mention going to a business to give them the device as a way to make the community safer.

Congress did not pass a law giving the ATF authority to criminalize 10 million Americans. The ATF's rule, not a law, is being questioned for overreach. The ATF's regulation of gun accessories and the Biden administration's involvement are criticized for potentially turning law-abiding citizens into felons. The discussion also touches on the ATF's regulation of short-barreled rifles and the perceived attack on the Second Amendment. The focus is on the perceived inconsistency in addressing gun control versus disarmament.

The discussion centers on why data centers are expanding so rapidly despite the claim that existing phone and television usage already relies on server storage. Participants cite large-scale developments such as Loudoun County, Virginia’s “never-ending” complexes and a proposed 40,000-acre AI data center campus in Utah described as “two and a half times larger than Manhattan,” with claims that Utah lacks water and that the data center would require more than double the current energy consumption of the entire state of Utah. The question raised is what is really happening behind this scale and where the collected information goes. One participant links the projects to “intel” involvement, pointing to companies said to include Palantir, Nvidia, and Abraxas, and to allegations that some of these firms received CIA investments to start, including staffing by retired senior CIA officers. This leads to questions about whether “the CIA [is] spying on our own people,” referencing Edward Snowden’s revelations and mentioning NSA’s and CIA’s surveillance of Americans. The conversation states that NSA’s charter includes a restriction that it may not spy on Americans, and notes that Snowden’s disclosures are described as the reason people “wouldn’t have any idea” without them. The Utah compound is described with a claim that it has enough memory storage for every phone call, every email, and every text message from every American for the next 500 years, prompting questions about why that amount of storage exists and why such facilities are “everywhere,” and what information they are collecting. The conversation shifts to personal protection, with a suggestion that it is “almost impossible now” and a recommendation that the only way to protect yourself is to “own no technology at all,” referencing Eric Rudolph or the Unabomber as examples. The participant further claims that governments and intelligence agencies are “scooping up” data and holding it, and contrasts earlier post-9/11 practices—where obtaining information required federal judges to approve warrants—with newer methods. The transcript claims that instead of warrants, the government can use “national security letters” to require providers to turn over all information on a named person, or can query the data centers directly by inputting a name so that information “pops up,” describing a lack of legal protections and stating that these actions are “legal now.” It concludes by naming the National Defense Authorization Act of 2016 (and National Defense Act of 2016 as referenced in the transcript) as the change that made this legal.

The US has over 500 million civilian-owned firearms, 10% of which are assault rifles, posing a challenge to the state monopoly on small arms. Mexico is suing US gun manufacturers, attempting to circumvent corruption and cartel issues. The internet has changed the game, ushering in an age of free men with arms who circumvent controls. People are printing firearms at home, using them to resist oppression. Dictators disarm citizens before enforcing tyranny, but those days are over. Governments don't disarm citizens to keep them safe, but because they fear their reaction when they step out of line. Those in power are either in league with criminals or are the oppressors themselves. Armed individuals should defend their ability to resist, while the unarmed should fight to secure arms. Arms can light the path toward a better world.

Speaker 0 and Speaker 1 discuss what they call the TikTok ban bill, claiming it does more than just ban TikTok. They assert that foreign adversaries can change definitions at any time, listing a few already, but saying these definitions can change, enabling broader control. They warn that a group could be labeled as foreign adversaries, including doctors, by loosely defined terms. They claim the bill covers hardware technology such as modems, routers, home cameras, and virtual tech like VPNs, and bans them if they are manufactured by or used to contact and deal with foreign adversaries. They explain that a VPN is a virtual private network that allows users to search on Google while revealing data about them, and that using VPNs to bypass banned apps like TikTok becomes a criminal act under the bill, with penalties of a minimum imprisonment of twenty years and a minimum fine of $250,000 or $1,000,000 depending on whether the act was knowingly done to access banned content. The bill allegedly grants the federal government power to monitor any activity used by these suspected devices, whether virtual or not, effectively enabling twenty-four-seven monitoring of home activity without informing users. They list examples including routers, video games, streaming apps, smart thermostats, Ring cameras, and essentially anything that uses the internet, noting that cell phones and Alexa are included and that conversations could be used against individuals in court. They emphasize a particularly terrifying aspect: the bill would have the president appoint a secretary of communication, who then forms a group independently, without voter input, with meetings behind closed doors. This group could ban and deem anything inappropriate or a security risk at any moment, and could censor via access to instant messages, emails, texts, and anything that uses the internet. The speakers warn that if this passes, videos like theirs could disappear as apps like Telegram, which enable them to speak freely, might be removed. They question who in the government would decide what content is banned versus allowed content. They urge viewers to consider this deeply. In summary, they contend the bill could effectively ban anything the government deems inappropriate very quickly without warning, with ramifications including disrupting mass communication methods and enabling spying on home devices and cameras. They assert the bill is “that bad,” insisting they are not using hyperbole. Speaker 0 adds a metaphor about banning books from libraries and facing jail for accessing banned books, suggesting the bill represents a push for complete control and urging people to wake up and investigate further.

Weapons are being developed to target specific individuals using their DNA and medical profiles. This raises privacy concerns, especially with the degradation of privacy expectations over the last twenty years. People willingly submit their DNA to companies like 23 and Me, resulting in private companies owning and potentially selling their DNA with minimal privacy protection. Current legal and regulatory systems are inadequate to address this. An open, public, and political discussion is necessary to determine how to protect healthcare information, DNA, and personal data, as adversaries will collect this data to develop these targeted weapon systems.

The government is prohibiting an additional 324 unique makes and models of assault-style firearms in Canada, effective immediately. These firearms can no longer be legally used, sold, or imported, and their transfer or transport is allowed only under very limited conditions. Additionally, the Canadian government has committed to exploring the possibility of donating some of these firearms to support Ukraine in its fight for democracy.