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The discussion centered on NATO summit claims about the US returning to a more direct war posture against Iran while also deepening involvement in the Russia-Ukraine war, and how abrupt escalation could unfold. On Iran, Lieutenant Colonel Daniel Davis said President Trump is “trapped” in a position he “can’t get out of,” and that during an Air Force One interview he was asked whether the US was going back to full-scale war and answered “I don’t know,” then said that if it happened it would be “easy” and “blooder.” Davis argued that prior coercive and military approaches are “fizzling out” and that Trump lacks a clear idea of what military power is supposed to accomplish when it does not produce the expected compliance. Davis compared this to earlier performative or expectation-driven strikes, but said the current situation is not “following the script.” Davis then described how the US-Iran memorandum of understanding and ceasefire ended, focusing on Point 5 regarding administration of the Strait of Hormuz. He said the wording left room for interpretation: it stated the Iranian side would determine “safe passage” and “not charge a fee” for 60 days, with a shift afterward in which “Iran and Oman would determine the future course,” while Iran maintained that on day 61 it would resume fees and govern administrative rules. Davis said the Iranian side interpreted the paragraph as granting Iran authority to set rules, including enforcement if ships did not comply with Iran’s prescribed course and paperwork procedures. He said the US, lacking authority in the MOU to determine how things happened in the strait, nevertheless attempted to set a southern corridor path “nearly in Omani waters,” after which Iran warned ships for about two days, then hit ships on the third day. Davis said CENTCOM’s ex post assessment on July 7 characterized the action as response to Iran violating the ceasefire and MOU, and that US strikes continued under that interpretation. Davis argued the ambiguity and differing readings of the same paragraph created a friction point, and questioned the “20 to 1” rationale as large-scale strikes that did not change Iranian behavior and risked driving escalation. He said Iran responded by indicating possible withdrawal from the non-proliferation treaty and changing nuclear doctrine, and by continuing to fire back. Davis also referenced Iran’s stated claim that it shot 10 missiles at an air base in Jordan, with Jordan claiming it shot everything down. He said Trump has suggested further measures such as seizing Karg Island and targeting desalination plants and oil, and warned this could push the conflict toward action against Gulf states. Davis argued the Iranian approach is not likely to be submissive and that Iranian leadership has previously specified responses if the US targets certain sites. He also said US statements described potential strikes that might expand from military targets to Iranian cities, calling this a punitive raid against civilian populations and describing it as a war crime. He linked such escalation risks to a collapse of “guardrails,” including separation of powers and the War Powers Act, and said he expects retaliation against Israel, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the UAE, and further refusal to yield on nuclear proliferation constraints. The conversation expanded to wider NATO dynamics. Davis argued that Western leaders have abandoned moral or rule-of-law “guardrails” and replaced them with “pure power politics,” using language to steer public perception and keep populations controlled. He specifically cited Mark Rutte’s comments portraying US actions against Iran as understandable because Iran was not following the ceasefire, while condemning Russian actions as “evil,” describing the contradiction as part of a power-based narrative. On the Russia-Ukraine war, Davis said Trump’s position is unclear and that Trump, like with Iran, “doesn’t know” what to do because he faces no “rational way out” without political or strategic loss. Davis described a “least destructive” option as winding down support for Ukraine over time, giving time for a negotiated deal with Moscow to end the war and stop the killing, potentially requiring changes including acceptance of that outcome not including Volodymyr Zelensky. He argued Trump is unlikely to do this and instead may “kick the can down the road.” Finally, Davis addressed Dmitry Peskov’s assertion that the “special military operation” has become a war because of NATO involvement. Davis said this language opens the door to a broader framework where Russia’s public and leadership begin preparing for wider consequences, including gradual escalation, since war changes what Russia can mobilize. The discussion concluded that public admissions about NATO involvement could pressure governments to respond and that the speakers feared the world is “sleepwalking” toward wider conflict.

Colonel Douglas MacGregor discussed escalating conflicts involving Iran and Europe, arguing that renewed fighting is likely and that current ceasefire dynamics favor increased damage on both sides. He said the United States is “loaded to the gills” with air and naval munitions and aircraft and that there appears to be a similar amount of ammunition in reserve, which would allow an intense campaign to last “five to seven days” rather than a shorter, first-wave bombardment. He argued targeting would be an attempt to determine which air and naval target sets could compel Iran to collapse or surrender, while noting CIA-linked reporting that Iran emerged from the last round with “virtually 90%” intact, implying further Iranian readiness. MacGregor said both sides also appear to have added capabilities: claims included Russian additional radars and Chinese additional missiles, including a new cruise missile designed to sink ships at sea out to 300 kilometers, with some Russian and Chinese technicians allegedly operating systems on the ground. He stated he expected major damage this time, especially that Iran would “finish off the oil infrastructure on the West Side Of The Persian Gulf,” and that Iran might also attack desalination plants critical to Saudi Arabia, arguing that destroying the Al Shaba’il facility could force Riyadh to evacuate the capital due to lack of drinking water. He described the moment as one reflecting “a certain level of desperation” tied to Donald Trump and Benjamin Netanyahu, and said “every conceivable form of attack” would be used with far more intensity, short of a nuclear weapon. On reported differences between Trump and Netanyahu, MacGregor said he believes there is likely a split but also portrayed Trump as constrained with “no easy exit.” He compared Trump to “Hotel California,” asserting he wants to check out but cannot. He said Trump’s obligations to Israeli interests and donors, plus the lack of maneuver room, create pressure to restart war if pause outcomes don’t lead to a favorable path. He also outlined potential constraints on any prolonged campaign, including low strategic petroleum reserve levels by “the end of June, the beginning of July,” limits on crude exports needed to support U.S. refining, issues with exporting shale oil due to refinery mismatch, and broader financial stress if long-term bond yields rise toward “the 5% ceiling.” He argued gold replacing the dollar and “battle between bricks and The US dominated Western financial system” could undermine the ability to sustain war, framing this as a squeeze on Trump if the conflict continues. MacGregor then shifted to Ukraine and long-range drone strikes. He said flight paths and targeting for long-range Ukrainian drone strikes have been provided by American military capability and that U.S. surveillance aircraft and satellites have mapped refineries, oil derricks, airfields, and other strategic installations in Russia. He argued Russia has limited options besides “revenge strikes” because Ukrainians lack ground offensive capability and described Russian patience running out as public pressure grows to “crush this or declare war or both.” He tied Western escalation risk to European political and social dynamics, saying Europe’s policies have become economically and culturally destructive and that Germany is “on the edge of exploding,” which could drive a shift in European stance. He also argued the Baltic states facilitate or tolerate drone-strike operations and that European decisions aiding long-range drone construction are dangerous, with potential escalation if Russia believes it must strike directly. When asked whether the U.S. would come to the rescue if Article 5 were invoked, he said the United States would not use nuclear weapons and that missile inventories could be largely depleted, arguing attrition would likely favor Russia and China because they can produce more. In concluding, MacGregor returned to the Persian Gulf and U.S. posture, saying Americans are “finished in the Middle East” if the U.S. cannot break Iran’s grip on the Persian Gulf and force a return. He reiterated his long-held view that forward military presence is obsolete because bases are target arrays vulnerable to ballistic missiles and cruise missiles, and he argued defense is superior to offense under current conditions. He compared the danger of renewed conflict to needing to choose between Persian Gulf realities and financial-system pressures, ending with the question of “which one is gonna break first.”

Colonel Douglas McGregor, a decorated combat veteran and former advisor to the US Secretary of Defense, discussed what he sees as a new expanded stage of the war after President Putin’s recent interview. He said Putin has repeatedly claimed Kharkov and Odessa are historically Russian-speaking cities, and that many Russians believed from the beginning that if Kharkov and Odessa were pursued, they would have to end up in Russian hands. McGregor argued Putin is also reacting to the perceived need for a security zone larger than originally planned because Ukraine has become “a much more dangerous irritant,” with a “facade” government supported by “hardcore supporters,” thousands of mercenaries and foreigners, and periodic missile and drone attacks meant to sustain the appearance of power and influence. McGregor linked Putin’s rhetoric about Novorossiya to a broader security logic, saying Novorossiya “was always” in the back of peoples’ minds and is going to become a reality. He also addressed the reference to buffer zones in Sumy, Kharkov, and related developments around Kursk, saying it is not necessarily “a punishment,” but a realistic appraisal that Russia cannot be secure without controlling the territory. On NATO and European involvement, McGregor said Putin recognizes a point where actions can no longer be taken “in stride,” particularly as strikes have reached areas near Moscow and St. Petersburg and have killed Russian civilians and damaged civilian infrastructure. He described a possible military approach focused on Odessa, including targeting drone assembly and materials pipelines connected to Europe, and asserted Russia has a large stockpile of Oreshniks. He then argued that if Odessa falls and Ukraine becomes landlocked, Russia could “reach out” to the Russian population in Moldova, and he said Europeans are “not capable of doing much” compared to Russia. He further argued European leaders’ remarks about Germany building into a “giant military power” and other statements about defeating Russia could lead Russians to conclude that “it’s 1941 again” and that Europeans plan another invasion, which he described as eliciting a dangerous response from Russia. McGregor discussed questions about whether Putin would escalate by striking European countries or focus on defeating Ukraine, saying he thinks Odessa is going to be seized and that additional steps may include reaching Kiev. He outlined three potential moves: seizing Odessa, crossing to Kiev from the north (including from Byelorussia), and another down-from-Byelorussia movement toward Kiev. He claimed Russia has tens of thousands of troops in Byelorussia, including “something between 20 and 30,000 North Koreans” not yet committed, and he said forces in Sumy and central “fortress cities” were about to fall, allowing Russia to reorganize and reconcentrate. On Zelensky and possible further attacks, McGregor said Zelensky is “the captain of a sinking ship,” and argued Ukraine would not pursue peace. He described Western Ukraine as a “disaster” and said many Ukrainians are “sick to death of this war,” while likening Ukraine’s behavior to Israel’s strategy when failing, including digging in, building strong points, and “strike back with whatever you’ve got left.” He said Zelensky suggesting attacks on Belarus would change the war’s dynamic and could be part of a survival effort. Regarding diplomacy, McGregor argued there is no end state or coherent strategy, making diplomacy difficult. He claimed Europeans are “crying wolf,” warning that Russia will strike back, and said optics dominate decision-making. He said that if foreign forces are at Russia’s gates, negotiation may follow, but that “boy who cried wolf” dynamics and the lack of a clear diplomatic goal prevent real resolution. He also stated that if the process does not change, the likely outcome is violent and decisive Russian strikes. When asked about Europe’s ability to sustain the war, McGregor argued economic constraints will eventually shift priorities. He cited US treasury rollover costs and interest burden, asserted the US is “absolutely broke,” and claimed low levels in the Strategic Petroleum Reserve could create risk. He said European governments are similarly constrained, suggesting unrest could occur if pension or governmental payments are disrupted. On nuclear weapons in Finland, McGregor called it reckless and said Finland had benefited from decades of cross-border trade with Russia, then shut it down. He argued Russia would respond by stationing nuclear-capable forces nearby to neutralize Finland. He connected this to broader claims about European “globalists” and described Western governance as losing democratic control over the people who govern. For how the war ends, McGregor said it ends when the United States “pack[s] up” and “go[es] home,” “butt[s] out,” leaving Europe to handle security through its own capabilities and alliances. He claimed the CIA has influenced elections in Europe and said compromised leaders in NATO must be removed. He argued military action could come soon to force Europe into talks, and he said Putin likely understands that disengagement by the US is central to ending the conflict.

Donald Trump started the war in Ukraine, not Joe Biden, and Russia is aware of this. Despite Trump's unpredictability, Russia will engage in diplomacy with the U.S. Trump's alleged leaked 2024 campaign statement, where he threatened to bomb Moscow if Putin moved into Kyiv, was never made, portraying Trump as a liar in the eyes of the Russians. Sanctions are not a credible threat because Russia doesn't care about them, and its major partners won't yield. Trump's claim of providing 17 weapon batteries to Ukraine is unrealistic, as countries like Germany, Spain, and the Netherlands cannot readily supply that many. Germany won't provide transit support until they receive replacements, and the U.S. is prioritizing Israel and replenishing its own stocks. Trump's proposition to Mark Rutte involves the Netherlands giving up its weapons to Ukraine and then buying them from the U.S. at no cost to America. Rutte should instead tell Trump to leave NATO because he is useless. This is not a serious proposal, but posturing to appease the Republican base who oppose aid to Ukraine.

Glenn: Welcome back. Stanislav Krappivnik, a former US military officer, born in Dolbaz and recently returned, joins us again. Stanislav: Always a pleasure, Glenn. Glenn: In the last two days, Russians entered the strategic city of Orekhov in the Saporiyansko region, which may indicate that if this falls, the whole region might begin to collapse. In Slaviansk, the last Donetsk conglomeration, there are real advances that, if successful in circling the region, could mean the entirety of Donbas falls. Is the Russian spring offensive already begun? Stanislav: It’s hard to say, partly because mud season is ongoing in those areas. The South is still mud-prone; the terrain there is different from Haryakov and Sudirmy, where ground is firmer, forested. In the South, there’s black earth with fewer trees, causing severe mud this time of year. If the melt is fast, flooding can occur; if slow, the ground acts like a sponge and mud persists as water seeps down. Nightly freezes persist while daytime temperatures rise above zero. Weather affects movement and logistics. He notes that the briefings from the Russian command vary from independent mappers, suggesting either undisclosed advances or battlefield confusion. The Russian high command’s reports and geolocations may not always align with independent assessments. If credible, Russia’s forces from the South may have entered Ariakhov, with two parallel rows advancing toward Ariyakara and a long urban sprawl to the south. There is a gray zone because Ukrainian claims differ from Russian assertions. Ukrainians often withhold confirmations for long periods; e.g., Gudaiipoya/Gulyaporiya discrepancies show how contested reports can be. Stanislav says it’s not clear that this is a bold, continuous offensive up and down the lines. A big push would require enough armored vehicles, artillery, and aviation, which he has not seen yet, though it could be developing. Ukrainians have conducted desperate counteractions not just to retake territory but to disrupt Russian preparation for a potential spring offensive. If he were in command, he would launch a big spring offensive, at least partially toward Sumy, which is about 14 kilometers from Kharkiv. Sumy would be a key logistics hub and could cut off Kharkiv from the west, accelerating the fall of the region. He explains that Kharkiv could be surrounded by blowing bridges from the south and encircling through Sumy to the west and the east along the Russian line toward Bianka and the Big Water Reserve. He mentions continuing Russian movement in the north and the city of Kasatirivka, which has been split by a river; all bridges were blown about a month ago, complicating approaches. North of Slaviansk, the gates of Krasnyomar require closing first. There are contested claims about Yaman, with Russians saying around 50% controlled vs. Ukrainians claiming 10–15%. The central concern is the Russian push in the south, where Yemen sits in a triangle formed by the Oka and the Sri Bianca rivers, and Russian forces are closing in from the north as well. Crossing Yamana is expected to fall; it’s a matter of time, though how long remains uncertain. Glenn: Ukraine does not withdraw after encirclement. There’s a rational explanation tied to PR wars: if the US and Europeans lose interest in Ukraine, weapons and money dry up, and Zelensky appears addicted to PR victories to keep support. Do you think the war in the headlines affects Western support? How does the Iran conflict influence Ukraine, given weapon and money dynamics? Stanislav: There’s additional pressure on Western governments from the military and certain military societies not to rush into direct NATO engagement or a large-scale conflict with Iran. He notes Iran’s demonstrated ability to strike American bases and key targets, and that Iran’s actions have shown the US and its allies that American power isn’t unlimited. He argues Iran’s strikes and the broader Middle East conflict complicate Western calculations, as American bases and interests face increased threats. He asserts that Iran has shown it can strike at American bases and that American casualties would be far higher than reported. He claims Iran’s actions press Western governments to reconsider involvement in the region and to reassess commitments to allies such as the Saudis, who reportedly told American bases to stand down. He also discusses how Russia’s deterrence posture could shift in response to ongoing Iran–US tensions, and suggests that if Russia sees an opportunity to restore deterrence, it might be tempted to push back more forcefully. Glenn: Russia’s approach to diplomacy with Europe and the US is complex. Macron’s bid to join a Russia–US–Ukraine format could spoil negotiations. Belgium’s stance on Russian assets and broader EU politics complicate any settlement. Stanislav: He explains distrust in European leadership, questioning whom to trust in Europe. He suggests that a broader reform in European leadership and doctrine is unlikely soon. He notes that among European politicians, there’s disagreement and strategic posturing, with some populist voices but institutional leadership often failing to present a coherent strategy. Glenn: What about China and Russia’s support for Iran? How might that evolve? Stanislav: Russia previously explored a mutual defense pact with Iran; the document lacks substance, and real support has been practical, including MiG-29s, Su-30s, and S-400s, along with jamming systems enabling Iran to counter US satellites and missiles. He describes Iran’s military buildup and how Russia’s support has extended to drone technology and air defenses. He predicts Syria could reemerge as a battleground, especially if Iran’s militancy expands and if the US and Israel are drawn into broader conflict. He suggests China may reassess its stance and consider leveraging its position as US capabilities wane, potentially viewing Taiwan’s reunification as a strategic opportunity. Glenn: Any final thoughts? Stanislav: He emphasizes the high level of risk and unpredictability in the current international security environment, with multiple actors pursuing aggressive strategies and the potential for rapid shifts in alliances and deterrence calculations. He notes Iran’s broader influence and the risks to regional stability, hinting at a world where war remains a possible, though increasingly costly, option for major powers.

Colonel Douglas MacGregor discusses the likelihood and dynamics of a potential new war involving Iran, the Middle East, and broader great-power competition. - On a possible Iran strike: MacGregor says there will be a resumption of the war, though he cannot predict timing. He cites Western attempts to destabilize Iran (Mossad, CIA, MI6-backed unrest) and argues Iran is more cohesive now than it was forty years ago, with demonstrations representing a small minority and not a broad collapse of support for the government. He contends that those who want to destroy Iran or empower Israel believe the regime can be toppled with Western support and Israeli action, but he asserts that such a regime change is unlikely and that Iran will respond forcefully if attacked. He notes that current deployments are heavy on airpower with limited naval presence, and he suggests Israel’s broader goals (Gaza, Lebanon, Syria) will not be achievable without addressing Iran. - Regional actors and incentives: Netanyahu’s regional aims require confronting Iran, and Turkish involvement with the Kurds could influence the balance. He describes a recent Kurdish incursion into northern Iran that Iran suppressed, aided by Turkish coordination. He frames BRICS as militarizing in reaction to Western actions, including in Venezuela, Russia, and Ukraine, and says disrupting the Persian Gulf oil flow would harm China, prompting cooperation with Azerbaijan and Turkey against Iran to undermine the One Belt, One Road project. He also argues that BRICS countries—Russia, China, India—will not easily align with U.S. plans if Washington proceeds toward war. - Russian and Chinese calculations: On Russia and China, MacGregor says they have supplied Iran with military tech and missile/radar capabilities and helped counteract efforts to disrupt Iran with Starlink. He believes many Iranians still oppose regime collapse and that a broader war would risk escalation with Russia and China backing Iran. He cites Moscow’s withdrawal of Russian personnel from Israel and the sense in Moscow that Trump is unreliable, leading Russia to hedge against U.S. actions. He notes Russians are concerned about Europe and envision potential conflicts with Europe, while he questions U.S. strategy and end states. - No first-use and nuclear considerations: MacGregor discusses the idea of no-first-use (NNU) as a potential framework to reduce the risk of nuclear escalation, suggesting a multilateral agreement among the major nuclear powers (US, Russia, China, India, Pakistan, Israel, North Korea, Britain, France). He posits that such an agreement could advance diplomacy, including on Korea, and reduce the likelihood of Armageddon. He mentions that Trump could leverage such a stance, though he notes Trump’s tendency to pursue more aggressive policies in other areas. - Europe and NATO: He argues Europe is unprepared for renewed large-scale conflict and has disarmed substantially over decades. He criticizes Britain and France for rhetoric and capability gaps and suggests the United States is fatigued with European demands, though he doubts Europe could sustain a conflict against Russia. - Venezuela and domestic budget: He emphasizes the futility of long wars in certain contexts (Venezuela) and the mismatch between spending and real capability gains. He references the defense budget as largely consumed by fixed costs like veterans’ medical care and pensions, arguing that simply increasing the budget does not guarantee meaningful strategic gains. He notes the role of special operations as valuable but not decisive in major wars. - Concluding view: MacGregor reiterates that war in the region is likely, with many overlapping alarms and uncertainties about timing, leadership decisions, and the risk of escalation. He stresses that both Russia and China have stakes in the outcome and that the Middle East conflict could influence global alignments and deterrence dynamics. He closes by underscoring the potential importance of no-first-use diplomacy and broader nuclear risk reduction as a path forward.

Colonel Douglas MacGregor and the host discuss rising tensions around Venezuela and the broader implications for U.S. strategy and global balance of power. MacGregor argues the Navy’s buildup off Venezuela signals more than intimidation: there is a willingness to intervene in Venezuela, with plans to intervene having been “on the shelf for years.” He notes Hugo Chavez’s legacy and Venezuela’s potential ties to China and Russia make it a longstanding potential target, but he questions the practicality and aims of any proposed operation given Venezuela’s size and population (about 30 million, many along the coast). The host presses on objective clarity, asking what political-military goal is sought and whether it is attainable, warning that war is unpredictable and that the president has not articulated a specific objective. MacGregor expands on the ambiguity, pointing out that there is no expressed U.S. objective from the president, and he likens the situation to LBJ’s Vietnam-era ambiguity—“we’re going to support the legitimate government and fight communism” as a slogan, not a military objective. He underscores a concern that there is no workable exit strategy or realistic plan, and he cautions about the risk of unintended consequences. He highlights the Beltway chatter about narcoterrorism, but notes that bombing Venezuela without a clear, attainable objective invites failure. He then outlines possible wider consequences: CIA operatives, potential involvement of MI6, and mercenary forces could be drawn in if a conflict escalates. He observes two Russian destroyers off the coast of Venezuela as a signaling move, framing it as Moscow signaling that Washington’s actions push Moscow to respond. The conversation moves to how Russian actions in Ukraine shape a multipolar world order—“the post rules-based liberal order”—and how Russia could respond if U.S. actions trigger a clash near Venezuela, risking a broader confrontation. MacGregor stresses Russia’s capability to threaten a broad swath of Europe and the potential for Latin American states to realign with Russia if Washington presses too hard. On objectives tied to resources, MacGregor contends that Washington believes it “owns the entire Western Hemisphere” and that Venezuela’s resources (oil, gas, lithium, rare earths) are a tempting collateral. He argues this ignores the limits of U.S. ground forces and the illegitimacy of unilateral resource exploitation, comparing potential actions to Cortez’s arrival in the Americas. He asserts there is no solid strategy, no coherent plan to substitute for the current leadership’s approach, and notes the long-standing history of failed interventions. The Ukrainian conflict is invoked to illustrate the dangers of escalation and misperception. MacGregor criticizes Zelensky for actions that he says could constitute war crimes and notes that if a broader U.S.–Russia clash develops due to Venezuela, the “slow boil” in Ukraine could intensify. He contends Moscow has restrained itself to some degree, but questions whether American restraint will be interpreted as weakness. He argues Europe should recognize Russia’s legitimate security interests and that Europe’s leadership is vulnerable to internal pressures, migration, and political shifts. He predicts changes in leadership in France and Britain that could alter the trajectory of European policy toward Russia, while noting Poland’s precarious position and Hungary/Slovakia’s peace-oriented stances. Regarding U.S. leadership, MacGregor criticizes Trump’s strategy as unpredictable and focused on optics, suggesting the president could offload some conflicts to Europe but is surrounded by advisers pushing adversarial postures on Korea, Taiwan, and the South China Sea. He contrasts this with the need for a sober, calculated approach that recognizes limits and emphasizes long-term strategic priorities over short-term “greatness” theater. He laments a lack of a coherent scientific, industrial, and economic strategy in Washington, describing an economy driven by short-term profits and financial capitalists, with limited productive investment outside of a few exceptions like Elon Musk. He uses the analogy of a locomotive running out of steam, arguing that without a real plan, debt and multipolar realignments will push the U.S. toward crisis. In closing, MacGregor reiterates that the current approach risks triggering a costly, destabilizing conflict and that the United States would benefit from stepping back, acknowledging limits, and pursuing a more organized path to a multipolar order rather than ad hoc interventions and prestige-driven military commitments.

Colonel Douglas MacGregor and Glenn discussed the trajectory of NATO and Western policy, focusing on Ukraine, Russia, and the broader shift in global power. MacGregor argued that NATO would not survive a Ukrainian crisis and that Russia would intervene, a view he had held publicly in January 2022 before the invasion. He traced his assessment to his extensive experience with NATO and the Warsaw Pact, noting three core conclusions from his career: the Warsaw Pact was unlikely to attack; NATO was a coalition of largely unprepared, limited-liability partners; and Germany was the only major power with the capability to fight effectively against the Soviets, while other Western militaries were fragmented and insufficiently integrated. MacGregor emphasized that Ukraine, being small and lacking the industrial base and manpower needed to outlast Russia, was not in a position to prevail. He highlighted Russia’s unity of command and language, contrasting it with the internal power dynamics and competing national agendas within NATO. He acknowledged that the Russian army at the start of the conflict was designed for territorial defense, not the mission it faced, and noted that it took about a year to build up into a force capable of sustained operations. He also criticized “wishful thinking” in Washington and European capitals about NATO and the European Union, describing a pervasive failure to acknowledge the realities on the ground. Discussion turned to European strategy and American politics. MacGregor argued that Europe has subscribed to an outdated notion of hegemonic peace delivered by NATO, while the United States has grown more powerful, pursuing interests beyond Europe. He attributed much of the Beltway’s stance to the money and power of think tanks and donors who benefit from ongoing confrontation with Russia, China, and Iran, and to a lack of a cohesive national strategy in the Trump administration. He criticized the Beltway for rewarding adherence to a fixed narrative rather than encouraging strategic recalibration, suggesting that President Trump’s instincts might favor ending costly engagements in Europe, though he criticized the administration for lacking a clear strategy and for being surrounded by insiders resistant to change. On Greenland and broader leverage, MacGregor argued that Trump’s approach reflected a view of Greenland as a near-term real estate decision within the security framework, while noting that the broader pivot to Asia had not materialized. He contended that Obama’s pivot to Asia implied a much larger, expensive expansion in Asia that did not materialize after the political will and funding did not align. He insisted there was no real strategy to manage the global balance of power, and asserted that Europe’s fragmentation would intensify unless larger political entities emerged to subsume the smaller nations. Turning to the Russia-Ukraine war, MacGregor warned against the optimism of a ceasefire as a lasting solution, arguing that Russia’s ultimate objective is a security architecture preventing future Ukrainian offensives and reducing threats to southern and northern Russia. He suggested possible outcomes for Odessa—either a forceful capture, or administration as a neutral, free port to prevent its use for military purposes—and stressed that Western negotiations were unlikely to yield productive terms under current conditions. He recalled historical lessons, such as the Brest-Litovsk negotiation in 1918, to illustrate that intractable conflicts could end only through decisive action. MacGregor concluded by arguing that Zelensky’s leadership and the Western push to escalate support for Ukraine contribute to a self-perpetuating conflict, while asserting that a stabilizing change would require a capable, decisive power to alter the current dynamic. He asserted that Trump, while sincere, is a prisoner of powerful domestic and foreign interests and could be unable to deliver a strategic reset without significant structural changes in Washington. He closed with a stark assessment: without decisive action, the conflict risks prolonging and deepening, and the West remains locked in a paralysis regarding Ukraine.

Colonel Douglas MacGregor and Glenn discuss the unfolding Iran war three days in, arguing that the conflict has become a regional war with global economic and strategic reverberations. Key points and allegations: - Iran has targeted at least 27 bases and port facilities across the region, from Kirlik Airbase to Dubai, effectively regionalizing the war. Oil markets anticipate disruption; Europe’s open price rose about 20% on expectations of supply cuts, with a potential rise above $100 per barrel. - In the Gulf, inexpensive drones have breached what appear to be expensive air and missile defenses, affecting airstrips and airports. A large expatriate workforce in the UAE (about 4.6 million Indians and many Europeans and Americans) is stranded, highlighting economic disruption. Oil infrastructure damage is just beginning, with some Saudi refineries struck; more damage anticipated. - The war’s consequences extend beyond Iran and Israel, potentially affecting India, Northeast Asia, Turkey, and Europe. The conflict did not begin with a joint US-Israeli attack; it began with an Israeli attack, with Rubio (Secretary of State-like comment) indicating that Israel started it, which the US later joined due to perceived insufficient posture. - Reports indicate three F-15s were downed; casualties include American sailors and Marines, though the exact numbers are unclear. - The rhetoric from Secretary Hagel (likely Hagerty) and Trump about Iran as a state sponsor tied to Israel is criticized as incautious. MacGregor argues the focus should be on Pakistan and Syria (where remnants of ISIS/Al Qaeda reside), noting Pakistan’s long-standing role as an incubator of radical Islam. He views the war as primarily about Israel’s aim to destroy Iran to enable greater Israeli regional hegemony, with the US fully committed. - He predicts a long regional war and warns that logistics will be decisive: missiles are finite, and the US may exhaust its stock; many missiles used in Ukraine reduce available stock for Iran-related defense. He notes Hypersonic missiles and decoys complicate defense capabilities. - European involvement is uncertain; Britain’s rapid response is unclear, and the broader European willingness to intervene remains doubtful. China and Russia are viewed as potentially pivotal if they decide to intervene; India is suggested as a potential mediator, given cultural ties and BRICS interests. - The US’s strategic credibility and military power are questioned. MacGregor contends the US has shown unreliability, damaging its legitimacy and triggering broader regional and global realignments. He emphasizes that the world is moving toward a new order, with the end of Sykes-Picot-era maps and shifting alliances; Gulf monarchies may seek US withdrawal. - Iran’s resilience is stressed: even if the supreme leader was killed, unity of command remains, and Iran’s dispersed military network complicates US efforts. Iran’s survival could enhance its regional influence; the longer the conflict lasts, the weaker the US and Israel appear, and the stronger Iran, Turkey, and others may become. - The possibility of an escalation to nuclear warfare is raised: if Israel uses a tactical nuclear weapon to stop Iran’s missiles, Russia and China might intervene; this could force a broader confrontation. MacGregor doubts Israel’s ability to sustain a large front and warns this could lead to a strategic pivot by major powers. - On outcomes and endgames: Iran seeks US withdrawal from the region; the US’s presence is likely to be forced out as Gulf states demand it. The interview suggests a collapse of US influence and a reshaping of the Middle East, with Persia re-emerging stronger. Israel’s survival is uncertain; extended fronts and exhaustion are anticipated. - Trump’s role is described as constrained by Netanyahu: Trump is not a free agent, and there is little expectation of near-term strategic change in Washington. The potential for a negotiated end is deemed unlikely so long as Iran remains intact and steadfast. Overall, the conversation frames the conflict as a turning point: a regional war with profound economic and geopolitical ripple effects, signaling the decline of US military hegemony in the Middle East and the possible reconfiguration of global power blocs, with Iran poised to gain relative strength if the conflict persists.

Apparently, the strategy is to weaken Russia, which is essentially a state of war. The aim is to remove Putin, replace his administration, and potentially divide Russia. This stems from the neoconservative movement, which has always been anti-Soviet and anti-Russian, pushing for a strong, challenging America. However, America can't challenge Russia, especially since the U.S. military isn't ready for war. The U.S. is using the Ukrainian military as cannon fodder, fighting over pride and fear of a Russian/Chinese economic takeover. America shouldn't go to war for trade, even if it means becoming number two or three economically. The world is multipolar, but the U.S. hasn't accepted this. People don't realize how destructive even a limited war would be. The situation is much more dangerous than people realize because America is too prideful and arrogant and will be nasty when it doesn't get its way in Ukraine.

Speaker 0: Decision on whether to supply Tomahawk missiles to Ukraine or sell them to NATO and let them sell them to Ukraine. Speaker 1: Yeah. I've sort of made a decision pretty much if if if you consider. Yeah. I I think I wanna find out what they're doing with them. Yes. Speaker 0: Yes. Speaker 2: Donald Trump's recent statement to the press about mulling over sending Tomahawk cruise missiles to Ukraine has elicited a response from the Kremlin today. Putin announced that the peace process with the Trump administration to end the Ukraine war is officially, quote, unquote, exhausted. Trump and Putin have had a very, you know, strange relationship, a little touch and go since Trump returned to the presidency. At first, to end the Ukraine war on his very first day in office, Trump has meandered a bit on the issue and is now apparently settling on the Biden administration's policy of arming Ukraine and NATO to the hilt. But can Tomahawk cruise missiles even make much of a difference given that the Russian military has achieved supremacy on the battlefield and maintained that dominance for at least the last year and a half, maybe even longer, if you will. We're now joined by, and we're so pleased he's with us, retired US Army colonel Douglas MacGregor. He's the author of I'm sorry. We also have Brandon Weichert with us, the author of Ukraine. Go cross wires there, a disaster of their own making, how the West lost to Ukraine. Thank you both for being with us. Speaker 3: Sure. Speaker 4: Thank you for having me. Speaker 2: Colonel McGregor, welcome to the show. We're so glad to especially have your perspective on this. And what we're gonna kinda do is a tour, if you will, around the globe because there's several, ongoing and pending conflicts. Right? So let's start with this breaking news out of Russia where Putin says that these talks, these negotiations are exhausted. Are they, as a matter of fact, exhausted, colonel? Speaker 3: Well, I think he was referring specifically to what happened in Alaska. And I think president Trump showed up, you know, in grandiose fashion with the goal of overwhelming, president Putin and his team with his charm and grace and power, and it all failed miserably. President Trump never really listened carefully to anything the Russians said to him. He didn't read any of the material that was pertinent to the discussion. He came completely unprepared, and that was the the message that came out after the meeting. So the Russians were very disappointed. If you don't read their proposals, you don't read what they're doing and what they're trying to accomplish, then you're not gonna get very far. So now, president Trump has completed his transformation into Joe Biden. He's become another version of Joe Biden. Speaker 2: What it is so unexpected. And, you know, it's hard for a lot of a lot of Trump voters to hear because specifically part of voting for him and the mandate that he had going into this term was in these conflicts. Right? Specifically, the one in Ukraine. He didn't start any new conflicts while in office in the first term. Why this version of Trump this term? I know you, like I, look into the hiring, the administration, the pressures from the outside on the president. What is influencing where he is now on Ukraine, colonel MacGregor? Speaker 3: Well, that's a that's a difficult question. I mean, first of all, he grossly underestimated the complexity of the of the war. If you don't understand the foundations for the conflict, how this conflict came about, I mean, I I was standing around listening to someone like Brzezinski in the nineteen nineties trying to tell president Clinton that it was critical to address Ukraine's borders because Eastern Ukraine was, quote, unquote, Russified and effectively not Ukrainian. Nobody would listen to Brzezinski, and so we walked away from that very problem. And in the run up to this thing back in 2014, I was on several different programs, and I pointed to the electoral map, And it showed you who voted for what where. It was very obvious that the East and the Northeast voted to stay with the Russian pro Russian candidate, and everybody else voted against the pro Russian candidate. So none of this should come as a surprise, but I don't think president Trump is aware of any of that. I don't think he studied any of that. And so he's got a lot of people around him pushing him in the direction of the status quo. He went through this during his first term, disappointed all of us because he could never quite escape from the Washington status quo. So he simply returned to it, and I don't see anything positive occurring in the near future. Speaker 2: That's sort of the same as well, with other agencies like the the DOJ, which I wanna get into a little bit later. Brandon, you've been writing about this as a national interest. So what what do you make of it? Speaker 4: Well, I think that right now, this is a lot of vamping from Trump. I think the colonel is a 100% correct when he says Trump really didn't come prepared to the Alaska meeting. I think ultimately Trump's default is to still try to get a deal with Putin on things like rare earth mineral development and trade. I think it's very important to note, I believe it was Friday or Thursday of last week, Putin was on a stage at an event and he reiterated his desire to reopen trade relations with The United States and he wants to do a deal with Trump on multiple other fronts. So that's a positive thing. But ultimately, I think that people need to realize that Trump says a lot of stuff in the moment. The follow through is the question. I am very skeptical that he's actually going to follow through on the Tomahawk transfer if only because logistically, it's not practical. Ukraine lacks the launchers. They lack the training. The the targeting data has to come exclusively and be approved exclusively by the Pentagon, which means that Trump will be on the hook even more for Joe Biden's war, which runs against what he says he wants to get done, which is peace. Regardless of whether it's been exhausted or not that process, Trump I think default wants peace. So I think this is a lot of bluster and I think ultimately it will not lead to the Tomahawk transfer. Last of all because we don't have enough of these Tomahawks. Right? I mean, that that is a a finite amount. I think we have about 3,500 left in our arsenal. We have 400 we're sending to the Japanese Navy, and we're gonna need these systems for any other potential contingency in South America or God forbid another Middle East contingency or certainly in the Indo Pacific. So I think that at some point, the reality will hit, you know, hit the cameras and Trump will not actually follow through on this. Speaker 2: So speaking of South America, let's head that way. Colonel McGregor, I I don't know if you know. I've been covering this pretty extensively what's been going on with the Trump administration's actions on Venezuela. So a bit of breaking news. Today, the US State Department claims that Venezuela is planning to attack their embassy, which has a small maintenance and security board other than, you know, diplomatic staff. Meanwhile, Maduro's regime argues they're just foiled a right wing terrorist plot that's that was planning to stage a false flag against the US embassy to give the US Navy fleet. There's a lot off in Venezuela's coast the impetus to attack Maduro. I've been getting some pushback, you know, on this reporting related to Venezuela, because, you know, Trump's base largely doesn't want any new conflicts. They're afraid this is sort of foreign influence wanting wanting him to go there. Are we justified in what Trump is doing as far as the buildup and what we are hearing is an impending invasion? Is it is the Trump administration justified in this action, colonel MacGregor, in Venezuela? Speaker 3: No. I I don't think there's any, pressing pressing need for us to invade or attack Venezuela at all. But we have to go back and look at his actions to this point. He's just suspended diplomatic relations with Venezuela, which is usually a signal of some sort of impending military action. I don't know what he's being told. I don't know what sort of briefing he's received, what sort of planning has been discussed, but we need to keep a few things in mind. First of all, the Venezuelan people, whether they love or do not love Maduro, are very proud of their country, and they have a long history of rebelling against foreign influence, particularly against Spain. And they're not likely to take, an invasion or an intervention of any kind from The United States lately. Secondly, they've got about 400,000 people in the militias, but they can expect, at least a 100,000 or more paramilitaries to come in from Brazil and Colombia and other Latin American states. It's why the whole thing could result in a Latin American crusade against The United States. And finally, we ought to keep in mind that the coastline is 1,700 miles long. That's almost as long as the border between The United States and Mexico. The border with Brazil and with Colombia is each of them are about 1,380 kilometers long. You start running the math and you're dealing with an area the size of Germany and and France combined. This is not something that one should sink one's teeth in without carefully considering the consequences. So I don't know what the underlying assumptions are, but my own experience is that they're usually a series of what we call rosy scenarios and assume things that just aren't true. So I I'm very concerned we'll get into it. We'll waste a lot of time and money. We'll poison the well down there. If we really want access to the oil and and gas, I think we can get it without invading the place. And they also have emerald mines and gold mines. So I think they'd be happy to do business with us. But this obsession with regime change is very dangerous, and I think it's unnecessary. Speaker 2: That is definitely what it seems they're going for. When I talk to my sources, ChromaGregor, and then I'll get your take on it, Brandon, they say it's a four pronged issue. Right? That it's the drug that, of course, the drugs that come through Venezuela into The United States, Trend Aragua, which we know the ODNI and Tulsi Gabbard, DNI, Tulsi Gabbard was briefed on specifically, that the right of trend in Aragua and how they were flooded into the country, counterintelligence issues, a Venezuelan influence in, you know, in some of our intelligence operations, and, just the narco terrorist state that it is. But you feel that given even if all of that is true and the Venezuela oh, excuse me, in the election fraud. Right? The election interference via the Smartmatic software. Given all that, you still feel it's not best to invade, colonel. You how do we handle it? How do we counter these threats coming from Venezuela? Speaker 3: Well, first of all, you secure your borders. You secure your coastal waters. You get control of the people who are inside The United States. We have an estimated 50,000,000 illegals. Somewhere between twenty five and thirty million of them poured into the country, thanks to president Biden's betrayal of the American people and his decision to open the borders with the help of mister Mayorkas that facilitated this massive invasion. I would start at home. The drug problem is not down in Venezuela. The drug problem is here in The United States. If you're serious, anybody who deals in drugs or is involved in human trafficking, particularly child trafficking, should face, the death penalty. Unless you do those kinds of things, you're not gonna fundamentally change the problem here. Now as the narco state title, I think, is a lot of nonsense. The drugs overwhelmingly come out of Colombia. They don't come out of Venezuela. A very small amount goes through Venezuela. I'm sure there are generals in the Venezuelan army that are skimming off the top and putting extra cash in their banks, but it's not a big it's not a big source from our standpoint. We have a much more serious problem in Mexico right now. Mexico is effectively an organized crime state, and I don't think, what Maduro is doing is is really, in that same category. On the other hand, I think Maduro is courting the Chinese and the Russians. And I think he's doing that because he feels threatened by us, and he's looking for whatever assistance or support he can get. And right now, given our behavior towards the Russians in Ukraine, it makes infinite sense for the Russians to cultivate a proxy against us in Central And South America. This is the way things are done, unfortunately. We there are consequences for our actions. I don't think we've thought any of them through. Speaker 2: Well, in in in talking about turning this into a broader conflict or a bigger problem, I I I I know, Brandon, you had heard that that Russia basically told Maduro, don't look to us. Don't come to us. But now this was a couple weeks ago. Yep. Yep. Like you just said, colonel MacGregor, things have changed a little bit. Right? Especially looking at what Putin said today. So will Russia now come to Venezuela's aid, to Maduro's aid? Speaker 3: I think it's distinctly possible, but it's not going to be overt. It'll be clandestine. It'll be behind the scenes. The Chinese are also gonna do business with Maduro. They have an interest in the largest known vindicated oil reserves in the world. The bottom line is and this you go back to this tomahawk thing, which I think Brandon talked about. It's very, very important. The tomahawk is a devastating weapon. Can they be shot down? Absolutely. The Serbs shot them down back in 1999 during this Kosovo air campaign. However, it carries a pretty substantial warhead, roughly a thousand pounds. It has a range of roughly a thousand miles. And I think president Trump has finally been briefed on that, and he has said, yeah. I I wanna know where they're going to fire them, whom they're going to target. Well, the Ukrainians have targeted almost exclusively whatever they could in terms of Russian civilian infrastructure and Russian civilians. They've killed them as often and as much as they could. So the notion if you're gonna give these things to these people or you're gonna shoot for them, you can expect the worst, and that would precipitate a terrible response from the Russians. I don't think we understand how seriously attacks on Russian cities is gonna be taken by the Russians. So I would say, they will provide the Venezuelans with enough to do damage to us if if it's required, but I don't think they expect the Venezuelans to overwhelm us or march into America. That's Mexico's job right now with organized crime. That's where I think we have a much more serious problem. Speaker 4: I I agree with the colonel on that. I think also there's an issue. Now I happen to think we we because of the election fraud that you talk a lot about, Emerald, I think there is a threat in Maduro, and I I do think that that there is a more serious threat than we realize coming out of that sort of left wing miasma in Latin America. And I I think the colonel's correct though in saying that we're we're making it worse with some of our actions. I will point out on the technical side. I broke this story last week. The Venezuelan government, the military Padrino, the the defense minister there, claimed that his radar systems actually detected a tranche of US Marine Corps f 35 b's using these Russian made radars that they have. This is not the first time, by the way, a Russian made radar system using these really and I'm not going get into the technical details here, but using really innovative ways of detecting American stealth planes. It's not the first time a Russian system has been able to do this. And so we are now deploying large relatively large number of f 35 b's into the region. Obviously, it's a build up for some kind of strike package. And there are other countermeasures that the f 35 b has in the event it's detected. But I will point out that this plane is supposed to be basically invisible, and we think the Venezuelans are so technologically inferior, we do need to be preparing our forces for the fact that the Venezuelans will be using innovative tactics, in order to stymie our advances over their territory. It's not to say we can't defeat them, but we are not prepared, I don't think, for for having these systems, seen on radar by the Venezuelans, and that is something the Russians have helped the Venezuelans do. Speaker 2: Very complex. Before we run out of time, do wanna get your thoughts, colonel MacGregor, on, the expectation that Israel will strike Iran again. Will we again come to their aid? And do you think we should? Speaker 3: Well, first of all, stealth can delay detection but cannot resist it. Yeah. I think the stealth is grossly exaggerated in terms of its value. It causes an enormous price tag Yeah. When you buy the damn plane. And the f 35, from a readiness standpoint, is a disaster anyway. So, you know, I I think we have to understand that, yes, mister Netanyahu has to fight Iran. Iran has to be balkanized and reduced to rubble the way the Israelis with help from us and the British have reduced Syria to chaos, broken up into different parts. This is an Israeli strategy for the region. It's always been there. If you can balkanize your neighbors, your neighbors don't threaten you. Now I don't subscribe to the Israeli view that Iran is this permanent existential threat that has to be destroyed, but it doesn't matter what I think. What matters is what they think. They think Iran is a permanent existential threat and therefore must be destroyed. Your question is, will they find a way to attack Iran? The answer is yes. Sooner rather than later. The longer they wait, the more robust and capable Iran becomes. And, I think that's in the near term that we'll see we'll see some trigger. Somehow, there'll be a trigger and Iran will strike. And will we support them? Absolutely. We're already moving assets into the region along with large quantities of missiles and ammunition, but our inventories, as I'm sure you're aware, are limited. We fired a lot of missiles. We don't have a surge capacity in the industrial base. We need one. Our factories are not operating twenty four hours a day, seven days a week. The Russian factories are. Their manufacturing base can keep up. And by the way, the Chinese are right there with them. They have the largest manufacturing base in the world. So if it comes down to who could produce and fire the most missiles, well, we're gonna lose that game, and Israel is gonna lose with us. But right now, I don't see any evidence that anyone's worried about that. Speaker 4: Yeah. Speaker 2: You know what? Colonel McGregor, I I I don't know if I feel any safer after you joined us today. It is very concerning. It's it's a concerning situation we find ourselves in, and I feel like so many people because they feel the election turned out the way they wanted to wanted it to, are not concerned anymore. Right? But we are in Speaker 1: a finite amount of time and there's still great pressures upon the president. There are many voices whispering in his ear. And so we constantly have to be calling out what we Speaker 2: see and explaining to people why it matters. Speaker 3: Remember, this president has said this. Everybody dealing with the administration has said this. It's a very transactional administration. Yep. Follow the money. Who has poured billions into his campaign and bought the White House and Congress for him? When you understand those facts in, you can explain the policy positions. Speaker 1: And I think that's also why we're, the leading conversation we're seeing on acts and social media. Right now, Colonel McGregor, thank you so much for joining us today. We hope you'll come back soon. Speaker 3: Sure. Thank you. Speaker 2: And, Brandon, as always, good to see you, my friend. Thank you. Speaker 4: See you again. Nice to meet you, colonel. Speaker 3: Very nice to see you. Bye bye.

John Mearsheimer and Glenn discuss the trajectory of the United States’ foreign policy under Donald Trump, focusing on the shift from an anticipated pivot to Asia and a reduction of “forever wars” to the current Iran confrontation and its global implications. - Initial optimism about Trump: Glenn notes a widespread belief that Trump could break with established narratives, recognize the post–Cold War power distribution, pivot to the Western Hemisphere and East Asia, end the “forever wars,” and move away from Europe and the Middle East. Mearsheimer agrees there was early optimism on Judging Freedom that Trump would reduce militarized policy and possibly shut down the Ukraine–Russia war, unlike other presidents. - Drift into Iran and the current quagmire: The conversation then centers on how Trump’s approach to Iran evolved. Mearsheimer argues Trump often vacillates between claims of victory and deep desperation, and he characterizes Trump’s current stance as demanding “unconditional surrender” from Iran, with a 15-point plan that looks like capitulation. He describes Trump as sometimes declaring a “great victory” and other times recognizing the need for an exit strategy but being unable to find one. - The escalation ladder and strategic danger: A core point is that the United States and its allies initially sought a quick, decisive victory using shock and awe to topple the regime, but the effort has become a protracted war in which Iran holds many cards. Iran can threaten the global economy and Gulf state stability, undermine oil infrastructure, and harm Israel. The lack of a credible exit ramp for Trump, combined with the risk of escalation, creates catastrophic potential for the world economy and energy security. - Economic and strategic leverage for Iran: The discussion emphasizes that Iran can disrupt global markets via the Strait of Hormuz, potentially shut down the Red Sea with Houthis participation, and target Gulf desalination and energy infrastructure. The U.S. should maintain oil flow to avoid devastating economic consequences; sanctions on Iran and Russia were strategically relaxed to keep oil moving. The longer the war drags on, the more leverage Iran gains, especially as Trump’s options to harm Iran’s energy sector shrink due to the global economy’s needs. - Exit possibilities and the limits of escalation: Glenn asks how Trump might avoid the iceberg of economic catastrophe. Mearsheimer contends that a deal on Iran’s terms would entail acknowledging Iranian victory and a humiliating US defeat, which is politically challenging—especially given Israeli opposition and the lobby. The Iranians have incentive to string out negotiations, knowing they could extract concessions as time passes and as U.S. desperation grows. - Ground forces and military options: The possibility of a U.S. ground invasion is deemed impractical. Mearsheimer highlights that Desert Storm and the 2003 invasion involved hundreds of thousands of troops; proposed plans for “a few thousand” light infantry would be unable to secure strategic objectives or prevent Iranian counterattacks across the Gulf, Red Sea, and Persian Gulf, with Iran capable of inflicting significant damage on bases and ships. The discussion stresses that even small-scale operations could provoke heavy Iranian defense and strategic backlash. - European and NATO dynamics: The Europeans are portrayed as reluctant to sign onto a risky campaign in support of U.S. objectives, and the episode warns that a broader economic crisis could alter European alignment. The potential breaching of NATO unity and the risk of diminished transatlantic trust are underscored, with Trump’s stance framed as blaming Europeans for strategic failures. - Israel and the lobby: The influence of the Israel lobby and its potential consequences if the war deteriorates are discussed. Mearsheimer notes the danger of rising antisemitism if the war goes catastrophically wrong and Israel’s role in pressuring continued conflict. He also observes that a future shift in U.S. strategy could, in extreme circumstances, diverge from traditional Israeli priorities if the global economy is at stake. - Deep state and decision-making: The final exchange centers on the role of expertise and institutions. Mearsheimer argues that Trump’s distrust of the deep state and reliance on a small circle (Kushner, Whitkoff, Lindsey Graham, media figures) deprived him of necessary strategic deliberation. He contends that a robust deep-state apparatus provides essential expertise for complex wars, offering a counterpoint to Trump’s preferred approach. He contends the deep state was not fully consulted, and that reliance on a limited network contributed to the strategic miscalculations. - Concluding tone: Both acknowledge the grave, uncertain state of affairs and the high risk of escalation and miscalculation. They express a desire for an optimistic resolution but emphasize that the current trajectory is precarious, with signs pointing toward a dangerous escalation that could have wide-ranging geopolitical and economic consequences. They close with a note of concern about the potential for rash actions and the importance of considering responsible exits and credible diplomatic channels.

In a wide-ranging interview, Professor Sergei Karaganov, a prominent Russian foreign policy scholar, provides his perspective on the current security crisis, Russia’s strategic posture, and possible futures for Europe and the world. On the trajectory of the conflict and world order - Karaganov argues that the conflict signifies a broader systemic shift, describing it as a “fourth world war” that began in Ukraine with American efforts to undermine Russia and European participation, spreading now to the Middle East and South Asia. - He frames the wider struggle as a gradual replacement of a unipolar Western order with multipolar dynamics, warning that diplomacy has been insufficient and that the European elites are leading their states toward a major war. - He emphasizes the need to prevent horizontal escalation and to stop the war in Europe, extending concerns to destabilization across a vast swath of the globe. On NATO, Ukraine, and escalation - He notes unprecedented Western support for actions on Russian soil, including missile attacks and political backing for operations on territory Russia considers vital, including aspects of its nuclear triad and early warning systems. - He criticizes Western decision-makers for misjudging the scope of the conflict, arguing that the war is not only about Ukraine but about a broader confrontation with the Old West. Russia’s strategic aims and deterrence - A central theme is the need to “win” this war to halt the bloodletting in Ukraine and to prevent further escalation and casualties on both sides. - He calls for escalating to deter and punish Western elites, arguing for a reevaluation and expansion of Russia’s nuclear doctrine to threaten European elites and bunkers with limited, targeted nuclear strikes if necessary. - He advocates shifting from a doctrine that assumes no victories in nuclear war to one in which “there will be victories” and where Russia would reserve the right to use nuclear weapons against European adversaries if deterrence fails. - He also suggests delegating some command authority for European theater to a dedicated commander who could authorize such actions, including nuclear use, if necessary. On arms control, diplomacy, and prospects for peace - Karaganov argues for moving away from arms-control constraints as part of a broader strategic realignment and emphasizes the need to deter and potentially punish adversaries with credible force. - He dismisses the “Spirit of Alaska” as a trap and warns that peace would only be possible if European elites are removed or replaced, implying that diplomacy would be possible only after such changes. - He maintains that a truce could be possible, but not a peace, unless European elites are replaced by more restrained governance and a rethink of Western strategic posture. - He asserts that Minsk was a mistake and criticizes attempts to extend deterrence to European allies, labeling such proposals as disastrous for Russia and European stability. On Europe, modernization, and Russia’s future - He contends that Europe has historically been a source of conflict and that Europe must be kept at a distance; Europe should not determine Russia’s future course. - He rejects European integration as Russia’s path, arguing that Europe remains valuable culturally but cannot dictate Russia’s strategic choices. - He positions Russia as inherently Eurasian, with external cultural roots in the Byzantine, Muslim, and Buddhist worlds, and deems Europe as a historical phase that should be left behind for Russia’s future development. On diplomacy and concrete steps - He notes that diplomacy could still have a chance, but the endgame would involve the elimination of the Kyiv regime, restoration of Russian-controlled lands in the south and east of Ukraine, and breaking the will of European elites to pursue aggression. - He reiterates a preference for avoiding a direct European invasion and expresses a desire to avoid a full-scale nuclear exchange, while insisting that Russia must be prepared to act decisively if Western adversaries continue their aggression.

Colonel Douglas MacGregor discusses the evolving and unclear state of the U.S. war posture in the Persian Gulf, challenging the repeated claim that “we’ve already won.” He notes that each time President Trump makes lines about victory, Iran responds with substantial missile and drone attacks, calling into question whether Tehran’s defeat is real. He says inside sources suggest Iran’s ballistic-missile capability may have been reduced from 100% to around 70%, and their air defenses have been effective against unmanned surveillance aircraft, but Iran “has always been willing to absorb the strikes,” believing the payoff justifies the damage. MacGregor questions why the campaign, which has involved significant air and missile strikes, would move to ground troops when such a shift would require overcoming robust Iranian air defenses, a deep intelligence-surveillance network, and potential shoulder-fired missiles. He argues the administration’s narrative lacks a truthful assessment from the U.S. side and suggests the president is desperate, facing domestic and international humiliation if he admits the truth. He criticizes the unilateral pressure on Iran and the Europeans, noting commercial traffic through the Strait of Hormuz has plunged (15 million barrels of oil a day offline) and Lloyds of London won’t insure ships through the Strait, highlighting how the economic and logistical costs of war already bite far beyond Iran. The host, Glenn, and MacGregor discuss the broader strategic context: Israel’s pressure and neocon aims to remove Iran as a threat, and the possibility that the war’s aftershocks would realign regional power. MacGregor asserts that the war’s sold premise—“short campaign, Iran off the board, Israel safe”—was never credible, and that Gulf Arab states have discovered they cannot rely on the U.S. to guarantee their security indefinitely. He notes the Chinese mediation offer via Pakistan has not been seriously engaged by the U.S., while Russia remains opposed to the Ukrainian war and skeptical about Western aims. He predicts Iran would seek to end Western involvement by moving to a negotiated settlement if possible, but believes the U.S. is not prepared to walk away, given domestic and pro-Israel pressures. On the regional and global implications, MacGregor emphasizes that NATO’s relevance has faded in the post–Cold War era and that European publics are largely indifferent to long-term U.S. troop deployments abroad, especially if they threaten domestic economies. He foresees a possible shift toward a “petro-yuan” backed by gold as an alternative to the dollar, noting China’s gold hoarding and new energy-finance dynamics. He argues the Gulf Emirates have bet on the U.S. staying engaged, but their security dependence is fading as the U.S. signals a potential withdrawal. Regarding Russia and Europe, MacGregor says Russia understands how the U.S. government operates less than Americans do, blaming “Zionist billionaires” and financial capitalists who control much of Western policy. He contends Russia and China will back Iran, and that NATO is effectively finished, having “died on the battlefields of Ukraine.” He suggests Europe must rethink its strategy toward Russia, abandon the weaponization of relationships with Moscow, and foster cooperation with their powerful neighbor rather than treating Russia as an existential threat. In closing, MacGregor contends there are two possible paths: (1) Trump announces unilateral end to U.S. involvement and opens negotiations with Iran, which he believes is unlikely due to the Israel connection; or (2) the U.S. escalates with ground operations in the Gulf, which MacGregor views as impractical given the need to neutralize Iran’s comprehensive strike networks and the terrain of key islands. He predicts the Iranians hold the strategic initiative and that the administration faces a “train to hell” scenario if it pushes forward. The discussion repeatedly returns to the central tension: can Washington disengage and accept settlement, or will it double down in a costly, potentially unsustainable confrontation that reshapes regional and global power dynamics?

Colonel Douglas MacGregor discusses the Persian Gulf, arguing that Donald Trump is caught between declaring war is over and warning of severe weapons and renewed conflict. He says Trump wanted to avoid war with Iran, pointing to the aftermath of a “12-day war” when Israel suffered missile attacks from Iran and Trump launched B2s and announced the war was over. MacGregor claims Netanyahu and campaign donors dragged Trump into the war, that “we have lost the war, militarily,” because the U.S. lacks the right weapons, is not organized for it, and faces a “fundamentally new way of war” Iran has mastered. He adds that there are no peace negotiations underway—only a “memorandum of understanding” that codifies the loss—and he believes agreement is impossible because Israel will not allow disengagement, framing it as an existential threat to Israel and tied to Israel’s “greater Israel project.” George questions whether the likely outcome could be neither war nor peace—constant low-level conflict with periodic flashes of violence. MacGregor responds that this would damage the global economy through supply chain destruction, higher food and fuel inflation, slower growth, and shortages of petroleum products. He argues the situation can’t be resolved quickly even if oil ships are loaded and sent, and notes only a trickle is moving through the Gulf due to lack of trust. He says the only solution to end the war and exit is military disengagement—pulling out—because staying in the region keeps the U.S. at risk of being drawn back in, potentially “much, much worse,” with Iran stronger than ever and U.S. capabilities largely unchanged after sacrificing an arsenal for Israel. He argues Trump must tell Israelis to continue “on your own,” but says Trump cannot do so effectively because Israel’s political influence controls Congress and essentially the White House. He also claims that more than 70% of Americans want nothing to do with the war, but “the government is totally unresponsive” to that. MacGregor adds that constraints make a full walk-away unlikely. He cites Israeli Defense Minister Katz saying Israel will not withdraw from southern Lebanon and that hundreds of thousands of Lebanese will not be allowed to return home regardless of American instruction. He warns that if Trump “wallows in the middle” or sits on the fence—likened to Ukraine—global economic effects will intensify: impacts on liquefied natural gas, residential heating and industrial manufacturing; blocking export of about 30% of global ammonia-based nitrogen fertilizer; halting production of 30% of the world’s helium used in semiconductors and medical imaging; unchecked inflation; and eventual collapse in bond markets, with timing suggesting it could occur in fall. Turning to Europe and Russia, MacGregor says citizens of Great Britain would prefer the British Army stay home rather than fight in Ukraine. He claims there is no evidence of support for war against Russia among contacts in Germany and says Putin’s recent speech was directed at Germany but aligned with broader European agreement. He argues European countries face the same problem as the U.S.: governments must be replaced, describing them as living in an old “First Republic” and needing a “Second Republic.” He connects unrest to social cohesion, mass immigration, and governmental failure to provide shelter, food, and security. He says Western civilization is about to undergo an overhaul “on the scale of the revolutions of 1848,” with the trigger likened to people in France being unable to afford bread. Later, he says the breakdown in U.S. policymaking comes from the people controlling it in Washington—billionaires behind the Israel lobby—who he says do not need to lobby and instead invest in politicians’ careers. He argues that over 30–40 years this has ensured politicians won’t fail them, while concern for Palestinians and casualties once seemed to matter less but now has grown broader. He says Americans will not get angry enough to act until gasoline is prohibitively expensive, food disappears from shelves, and familiar conditions vanish, concluding that this is his prognosis. He also says his involvement with the “National Conversation” aims to build a foundation for a new political party, but says “things have to get worse” before change.

The Ukrainian drone attack on Moscow is alarming. The Russians are surprised that the US hasn't intervened to stop Ukraine, who they see as a rogue organization. The Russians want an end to this conflict and have several options, including securing more territory or crushing Ukraine entirely. Putin, a judicious leader, faces a decision point: how far to go to guarantee Russia's security? He doesn't want to rule Ukrainians, but some advisors are pushing for a complete takeover. The Ukrainian government is evil and has needlessly sacrificed its own people, leading to a strategic inflection point in the history of Europe. The key is for Trump to follow his instincts and disengage, as any war will expand and the US is overstretched.

Professor Jeffrey Sachs and Glenn (Speaker 2) discuss the NATO summit in Ankara, portraying it as marked by heightened militarism, hostility toward NATO’s “enemies,” internal tensions, and a lack of serious strategy. Sachs says the summit amounted to “Trump isms” and “two days of” behavior he describes as bizarre, with leaders treating escalation as normal and joking about serious realities. He cites examples including statements about Spain and Greenland, and argues that NATO is not functioning as a serious alliance. They also discuss rhetoric and policy toward Russia and Iran. Sachs says European leaders call for deeper strikes into Russia using their own weapons and intelligence with the objective of forcing Russia to the negotiation table, while European leaders continue to boycott diplomacy. Glenn references statements including Marco Rubio arguing that attacking Russia helps advance peace, Trump’s casual reference to imposing a no-fly zone, and licensing Patriot missile manufacturing in Ukraine, raising the question of whether the United States is getting deeper into the war again. Sachs responds that Trump campaigned on ending “useless wars,” but that U.S. wars are driven by the military-industrial-digital complex, with big tech and platforms making profits and using wartime conditions to test systems and upgrade weapons. He argues Trump does not have the strategic capacity to change underlying dynamics, and that U.S. policy returns to sanctions, deadlines, and threats rather than a sustained diplomatic course. Mark Rutte’s stance is also discussed. Glenn says Rutte “threw NATO’s weight” behind the U.S. war against Iran, sending a signal that NATO is focused on war rather than peace. Glenn asks Sachs how to interpret Russian statements, including Dmitry Peskov’s claim that the “special military operation” has become a war due to NATO involvement. Sachs says Russian leadership does not expect U.S. diplomacy to play a decisive role, does not give heed to U.S. diplomatic efforts, and has largely given up after earlier hopes. He attributes Russia’s position to the enduring influence of the U.S. security state and military-industrial-digital complex, and says Russia has largely moved toward a Eurasian future aligned with views he associates with China and Iran. Sachs claims Western governments’ strategy leads to escalation rather than resolution, emphasizing that the war kills vast numbers of Ukrainians, solves nothing, and that Russia will not surrender to strikes into deep Russia—escalating toward nuclear war if pushed. He argues public opinion in the U.S. and Europe does not want escalation: a Gallup poll he cites says Ukrainians want the war to end even with concessions. He suggests the political class is out of step with its publics and lays out three possible outcomes: Russia achieves its military objectives; escalation to nuclear war; or war-mongering leaders are thrown out by publics. He also highlights political dissatisfaction, citing low approval for Merz and Macron, and says U.S. electoral outcomes could provide a check on the “political class.” Glenn adds that worsening war conditions may lead leaders to rely on militarism for economic and technological aims and to suppress dissent by labeling opposition as pro-Kremlin. Sachs agrees but says public resistance could become more decisive through political defeat driven by outside parties tapping into public opinion, citing examples he mentions in France, Russia, and the United States. Glenn then asks about objectives of Americans versus Europeans toward Russia and whether the logic is to pull the U.S. deeper into the war. Sachs argues the long-running intention since 1945 and especially since 1991 has been to weaken Russia through sanctions, NATO enlargement, unrest tools, and support for insurgencies on Russia’s periphery, and he says these motivations remain rooted in agencies and contractors that do not “count lives” and seek to sell goods.

President Trump tells reporters in the White House that he has called off strikes against Iran because a deal is close, with multiple parties involved and the agreement potentially finalized within the next two to three days. Speaker 2 compares this to a repeating pattern attributed to Trump and Benjamin Netanyahu since February 28: declarations of victory, claims that the other side is begging to surrender, orders to announce an imminent deal, bombing again, and repetition. Speaker 2 says the cycle has happened “over 38 times,” arguing that a weekend bombing follows the claim of an imminent deal. Glenn Greenwald is referenced as having posted that the same pattern repeats weekly. Speaker 2 connects the discussion to earlier commentary by Tucker Carlson about Trump’s alleged dealmaking, then shifts to claims about sovereignty. In Speaker 1’s monologue, the United States is described as lacking sovereignty in decisions that “change the course of history,” with the war in Iran said to be decided by the prime minister of Israel, Benjamin Netanyahu, rather than the president of the United States. Speaker 1 argues that this challenges the premise that people control outcomes through voting, claiming that on major questions elected officials are not in charge. Speaker 2 asks who is driving any potential peace agreement, stating that Iran has said there is no agreement and that Speaker 2 calls that claim a “total lie,” adding that negotiations had not yet involved speaking with Iran. Speaker 2 brings in Colonel Douglas McGregor to interpret Trump’s statements alongside reports of overnight attacks involving Gulf states, U.S. infrastructure, U.S. bases, and F-35s, with deaths inside Iran. Colonel McGregor says he asked someone in Wall Street what was going on and was told “there’s no truth” to the deal claims. He frames Trump’s behavior as persuasive like Bernie Madoff, saying Trump creates “the illusion of control.” McGregor describes possible outcomes: leaving and pretending nothing happened (described as unlikely), leaving without acting with Israel (said to risk Israeli use of a nuclear weapon), freezing everything into a prolonged “hot-cold war,” and continued escalation he believes Trump cannot control fully. Speaker 0 shifts to consequences, saying the stock market can respond to illusions, that continuous threats to kill people as national policy damage the psyche, and that there should be consequences for the repeated pattern. McGregor also argues that Gulf states are seeking security arrangements beyond the U.S., referencing Russia’s foreign minister, Sergey Lavrov, and saying Arab states and the Arabian Peninsula are discussing security with Russia because the U.S. cannot protect what it promised. He suggests this marks the start of an end to what he calls the “American military empire,” with Koreans, Japanese, Persian Gulf states, and Europeans possibly asking the U.S. to leave. Speaker 2 reports “from insider sources” that Iran denies a deal Trump is bragging about, including the “new Ayatollah,” and claims negotiating teams are frustrated because Trump and his team allegedly sabotage negotiations by preemptively announcing “bullshit” online. Speaker 2 calls the situation “total theater.” McGregor explains constraints he believes apply to Trump regarding Israel: he says Israel would not stop attacking without destruction of Iran, while Trump would not want an agreement that prevents him from declaring victory. He warns that if Israel becomes a rogue actor, other states could seek nuclear access for protection. Speaker 0 mentions a morning claim about taking “Karg Island” and other oil infrastructure in a way he associates with Venezuela, then asks whether it is bluster and whether such action is feasible. McGregor responds that taking the island would involve “terrible risks,” questions what would be done with it afterward, and argues Iranians have more routes for oil than cargo islands. He adds that destroying facilities could affect China, Japan, and others with strategic petroleum reserves, while the U.S. reserve is said to be dropping. Speaker 2 asks what happens next and questions U.S. Central Command posts about the Strait of Hormuz remaining open while reports say commercial shipping is severely restricted. McGregor says the “open” message conflicts with reality, describes possible queuing and payment-for-priority claims in the Gulf, and says oil is being moved because Iran permits it, whether through regulation or bribery. He emphasizes that Trump would not admit limited control, warning against blockading indefinitely and against a prolonged shadow war involving troops facing ballistic missiles and armed drones. In closing, McGregor says he worries that resuming attacks could produce more losses, including credibility and prestige with the world, and that intervening in the Gulf with air mobile infantry would be a “disaster waiting to happen.” He says he cannot answer whether Americans have suffered unrevealed base losses but believes more losses are likely if attacks continue.

Russian president Vladimir Putin faces domestic criticism for not ending the war in Ukraine and is being pressed to act on Iran as well. On Russian talk shows, officials suggest Putin is dependent on his relationship with Donald Trump, which critics say stalls peace negotiations, raising questions about what Russia can do in Iran while entangled at home. Russia signals potential actions, such as stopping energy flow to those supporting the war, with Sergei Lavrov saying Russia will “do everything to create an atmosphere that will make this operation impossible” in cooperation with partners and in international forums. Putin also floated the idea of stopping energy flows to Europe, suggesting Europe could be drawn into the conflict since many NATO members are reluctant to be drawn in, though some like Italy and Spain reportedly oppose direct involvement. Iranian foreign minister comments: when asked whether Russia and China are helping Iran, the minister said they are supporting Iran politically and otherwise, and that military cooperation with Asia and Russia is not a secret. He did not give specifics on whether Iran is actively receiving military assistance in the current war, stating he would not disclose details of cooperation in the middle of the war. Discussion with guests focuses on the Ukraine and Iran theaters, the Russia-China-Iran triangle, and the potential for Russia to change its approach. Jim Jatris, a former State Department official, emphasizes that Putin’s view of Trump shapes Russia’s strategy, noting Russian engagement with two Americans described as “New York flim flam artists” around ceasefire discussions. Jatris argues the Russians may have been interested in a deal via Trump’s intermediaries but now see the negotiations as “treachery” and question whether there is any real chance to decapitate or leverage Kyiv, comparing this to Israeli and U.S. tactics against Iran and other groups. He suggests Moscow’s pressure points include whether Russia will shift its Ukrainian strategy and what happens if the U.S. declares a victory and withdraws, leaving Iran and Russia to decide whether to press their advantage or pause. Doug McGregor comments on Russian restraint, arguing Moscow has pressed for minimal terms since June 2024 and views Western capitals as cutthroat, making negotiation unlikely. He notes internal Russian debate among figures like Nabiulina and others about maintaining restraint and keeping negotiation channels open, while acknowledging that Russia might eventually decide to end the war by destroying the Kyiv regime, though it is unclear what they will do. The conversation also touches on the complexity of Russia-Iran-Israel relations and the potential for direct Russian involvement, including possible shadowing of Israeli submarines or deploying Russian personnel in Iran, while recognizing that Russia would likely avoid direct combat if possible. The overall tone considers how a pending Xi–Trump meeting in Beijing could be affected by the war’s progression, with speculation that the meeting may be canceled or postponed depending on developments.

Colonel Douglas MacGregor and Glenn discuss the current strategic picture across Ukraine, the Russia–China–Iran axis, and the broader Western political environment. On Russia and Ukraine: - MacGregor notes a major “Cauldron battles” situation in Southeastern Ukraine, with remaining Ukrainian forces being encircled and largely annihilated by precision strike weapons, and a Russian swarm anticipated to complete the encirclement. - He identifies two focal points of Russian activity: Odessa (where Russian special operations are reportedly active at night, Odessa largely undefended with air defenses degraded) and Kharkov, with ongoing pressure toward Kyiv. He emphasizes that none of these alone solves the core problem of removing Zelenskyy’s government in Kyiv, which he describes as a facade Europeans seek to preserve. - Russia has increased its force size, adding reservists and training new draftees; options for Moscow appear to be Odessa, Kharkov, and Kyiv. Putin is watching Western European political developments to gauge timing, potentially waiting for Western government changes to move decisively. - MacGregor argues NATO is effectively irrelevant to Russia’s calculus and asserts the United States does not want a war with Russia over Ukraine, giving Moscow more freedom of action than Western audiences realize. On Russia–China relations and Europe: - Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin are pursuing a bilateral strategy to mutually reinforce military and economic capabilities, forming a large continental fortress against the United States. The two powers seek to strengthen ties as they view the U.S. as increasingly belligerent. - MacGregor contends that European leaders, including Starmer, Macron, and Metz, are aligned with globalist and financial elites (referencing ties to BlackRock and others) and that personal relationships between leaders are not meaningful in the international arena; strategic interests drive policy. - He argues that many European elites’ rhetoric about Russia serves to deflect from domestic vulnerabilities and to mobilize anti-Russian sentiment as political cover. On the Middle East and Iran: - The talk about Iran is framed as not serious; MacGregor describes a plan to escalate toward regime change in Iran, driven by U.S., Israeli, and allied intelligence communities, despite Iranian resistance and regional risk. - He claims Mossad, MI6, and CIA influenced President Trump regarding Iran’s fragility, while Iran’s internal protests (economic grievances) were legitimate and quickly mischaracterized as attempts to overthrow the government. He asserts Chinese and Russian assistance helped Iran counter covert efforts, including providing satellite imagery and assisting integrated air and missile defenses. - The declared Western goal is to destroy Iran as a nation-state, with the Iranian leadership prepared to respond with full use of capabilities if attacked. He suggests a potential air and missile campaign could target the regime and strategic hubs, with the United States likely relying on high-altitude precision strikes and long-range missiles, while questioning the effectiveness and survivability of U.S. platforms like B-52s against Iranian defenses. - China and Russia are depicted as unlikely to allow Iran to be pulverized; they could intervene if Iran is near disintegration, possibly through non-nuclear actions such as a collision at sea, leveraging their submarine capabilities and influence. On European political legitimacy and future: - MacGregor connects the Epstein-related discourse in Europe to a broader critique of ruling elites, comparing the potential for political upheaval to late-18th-century France. He argues that as publics grow disillusioned with elites, there could be a crisis of political legitimacy and a shift toward more realistic leadership, with potential upheaval in Britain, France, and Germany. On Putin and future moves: - He suggests Putin views the possibility of reconciliation with Washington as unlikely, having reached somber conclusions about the prospects for meaningful agreement. He predicts Russia will act on its terms, potentially advancing toward the Dnieper River, Odessa, and perhaps Kyiv, while noting Russia does not intend to govern Western Ukraine long-term. He emphasizes that events will unfold on Russian terms, with European irrelevance in the decision-making process fading as Moscow executes its plans.

Robert and another guest discuss whether Trump is pursuing a “grand plan” or simply escalating in a way that is politically and economically destabilizing. They argue there is no coherent strategy and describe the actions as a repeated pattern of “rug pulls,” including sabotaging or undermining the memorandum of understanding (MOU) on Iran and abandoning peace efforts tied to Russia-Ukraine. They claim the oil-market manipulation explanation is more compelling than supply glut or demand destruction, pointing to Russia turning off diesel exports and China increasing refining capacity, and say a spike in oil prices could trigger an economic crash. They also cite Iran statements about withdrawing from the nuclear nonproliferation treaty, shutting down the Strait of Hormuz, terminating the MOU, and possibly closing other straits through the Houthis in Yemen—arguing Iran’s “true leverage” is economic rather than purely military. A key theme is that insurers and shipping companies cannot be convinced there is no risk in the Strait of Hormuz (mining, underwater drones, automated boats, drone or missile threats), so the strait would remain effectively closed as long as the risk cannot be guaranteed. They argue Trump’s approach—bombarding, blocking, and “poison pill” attempts—cannot change that reality, and that it increases escalatory risk for global markets, security, domestic politics, and the global economy. They further warn of possible consequences such as Iran cutting undersea cables that support internet infrastructure in the region, and of broader attacks that could threaten gulf infrastructure. The conversation highlights timing and retaliation risk. They claim strikes targeting Iran are ongoing across the same southern locations, and that press reporting suggests attacks are expected to be bigger than the previous day’s. They discuss Iran’s stated deterrence logic: escalating pain threshold to “educate” Trump, with Iran allegedly treating coercion as something to answer with increased force rather than backing down. They also emphasize danger from escalation traps: one mistake during strikes or retaliation could lead to a “collapse” dynamic and nonstop unraveling. They note Iran allegedly shot down a U.S. drone and continue to describe repeated targeting of the same areas. Another major concern is Iran’s broader potential escalation beyond the Strait of Hormuz. They reference Trump’s threat to attack desalination plants and argue desalination would affect the Gulf more than Iran, potentially producing a refugee crisis. They also connect regional instability to economic disruptions including fuel, fertilizer, helium supplies for semiconductor production (linked to AI boom constraints), and downstream effects on consumer electronics prices. On possible “bigger operation” motives, the guests argue there are practical constraints: they say the U.S. doesn’t have troop size to invade Iran, and fear hostages could create a “Jimmy Carter” style crisis. They claim resources have not been moved for a large operation, and that if Iran is pushed it could retaliate by striking gulf oil architecture, isolating and closing both straits, and potentially cutting undersea cables, with cover enabled by China and Russia. They also point to the allegedly unprecedented human gathering during funeral commemorations as “bad timing,” saying it encourages hardline elements and martyrdom-focused psychology. Regarding negotiation possibilities and market behavior, one guest raises the idea that oil futures being relatively quiet could mean markets believe Trump wants to avoid war and is striking to prevent Iran from closing the Strait of Hormuz further while easing the market and ensuring Iran cannot charge fees. Robert responds that he doubts any method to the madness, arguing that sticking with the early-April deal would have already flooded markets, and that sabotage removed incentives for Iran to open routes. He also argues kinetic conflict contradicts Trump’s earlier statements and that Iran would be motivated to lengthen conflict to maintain leverage and deterrence. They further argue Iran cannot trust U.S. promises on sanctions relief and that the U.S. repeatedly fails to deliver. There is also discussion of evidence for escalation messaging: Robert and the other guest mention open-source activity where Trump reportedly quote-tweeted or posted an image from Shabahar claiming “retribution” for yesterday’s bombing of ships and threatening worse if it happens again. They also note reports that Bahrain participated in the strikes. The group briefly shifts to Turkey and the Ankara meeting. Robert says he initially hoped for concessions like removing sanctions and supplying Turkey with F-35s, but that this offends Israel. They discuss potential decoupling between U.S. and Israel, but emphasize Trump’s mindset: prioritizing ego, wanting to be “the head macho guy,” and seeking deference, which they say leads to escalatory risk rather than stable outcomes. They also describe Trump’s praise for Erdogan despite criticisms elsewhere in NATO. Finally, they discuss Russia-Ukraine strategy, with one guest suggesting Trump is supporting a plan of strikes deep into Russia targeting oil refineries to pressure negotiations. Robert argues Trump’s actions are inconsistent and rooted in hubris, claiming Russia may respond by escalating further, including potential strikes against Europe and potentially limited nuclear escalation discussions. He argues pinpricks enrage Russia and that leadership will treat Trump as an adversary rather than someone who can be negotiated with. They conclude by returning to Iran’s likely next steps: imminent withdrawal from the nuclear nonproliferation treaty and likely steps to close the Straits of Hormuz, potentially while seeking China’s permission regarding Strait closure and Houthis activation. They state their focus should be on whether Iran withdraws from the treaty next, and they anticipate retaliation tonight, potentially expanding beyond Bahrain or Kuwait.

MacGregor says Putin’s speech signals Russia aims to partner with Asia economically and is pessimistic about Europe. He says Trump’s talk of arming Ukrainians with Tomahawks prompted a rethink; he warns the weapon’s broad reach could widen war, calling the idea "stupid" and likely to vanish. He criticizes Europe as guided by "globalist leadership" from France, Germany and Great Britain, citing "Starmer, Macron, and Mats" as graduates of the Soros School of Globalism. He warns the high-tech defenses are a "huge waste of money" and says there is "no evidence that the Russians want desperately to overwhelm and destroy Europe." He says Ukraine’s forces have deteriorated for months with terrible losses. He dismisses any "eternal peace agreement" as unlikely, notes Moscow’s support for Iran's defenses, and warns that a strike on Venezuela would be counterproductive, urging border control at home.