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China is on the far side of the moon, potentially mining helium-3, and the U.S. doesn't know the extent of their activities due to a lack of monitoring infrastructure. Helium-3 could power the globe for thousands of years and is crucial for cooling quantum computers. If China masters quantum computing first, they could break all encryption and dominate the information market. The speaker believes a superior strategy trumps better technology and that China is building a space strategy focused on logistics and infrastructure, while the U.S. is focused on building better satellites. Understanding China's cultural mindset is crucial to avoid being victimized. The speaker asserts that truth and free will are essential, but truth is being manipulated in the information domain. The speaker believes President Trump understood the importance of space and created the Space Force. If China can cool their quantum computers with helium three before the U.S. can, "the jig is up."

Speaker 0 argues that for many years, dating back to the 1990s, looking at China today reveals what might be planned for the West tomorrow. In particular, China has millions of cameras in the cities equipped with facial recognition technology, enabling them to locate you in minutes wherever you are. This system operates alongside a social credit framework: people earn points for behaviors that align with the government’s preferences and lose points for actions that don’t. If you lose enough credits, you are excluded from mainstream society. The speaker notes that during the COVID-19 period, people who refused to get the jab or to wear masks were excluded from mainstream society, describing that as a pre-run or preview of where society could be headed. The argument is that, in China, losing enough credits means you cannot board trains or planes and you cannot function within mainstream society. The speaker contends that this social credit system is rapidly moving into the West, facilitated by digital identity, digital currency, and AI-driven control over many aspects of life. The transcript highlights examples of ongoing surveillance- and control-related measures in Western contexts, such as supermarkets that require a QR code for entry. It questions what happens to those who do not want to participate in such a system, asking what if someone doesn’t have a smartphone. It notes that in some cases, entry to places like supermarkets could be denied if you lack the required digital credentials. The speaker also points out that payments might be made with a fingerprint, indicating that this is part of a broader shift toward pervasive digital and biometric controls. Overall, the speaker presents a narrative in which China’s social credit and pervasive surveillance serve as a template for Western adoption, suggesting a future where digital IDs, digital currencies, AI governance, and biometric verification create a tightly controlled social order, with access to everyday activities and services contingent on compliance with the system.

Since 2018, China has been operating against an AI master plan, with Xi Jinping stating the winner of the AI race will achieve global domination. China is ahead in power generation and data, with over two million people working in data factories compared to approximately 100,000 in the US. They are on par in algorithms due to large-scale espionage. A Google engineer stole AI chip designs and started a company in China by copying code into Apple Notes. Stanford University is reportedly infiltrated by CCP operatives, and Chinese citizens, including students on CCP-sponsored scholarships, are allegedly required to report information back to China. China allegedly locked down DeepSeek researchers, preventing them from leaving the country or contacting foreigners. The US was deeply penetrated by Chinese intelligence, while US espionage capabilities in China are comparatively weaker. China is catching up on chips, with Huawei chips nearing NVIDIA's capabilities. China is also reportedly using AI to understand human psychology for information warfare. To combat this, the US needs its own information operations and must improve its AI efforts.

China did not build, operate, or intend to weaponize the Panama Canal. The speaker intends to reclaim the Panama Canal from Chinese influence. This reclamation will be undertaken with capable allies and partners.

Microsoft has a partnership with China's central propaganda department, which involves using their software to spy on users. Microsoft has been doing business in China for over 30 years and has sold the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) over a dozen AI products, supporting their high-tech industry. The CCP's long-term plan, called Made in China 2024, aims to surpass America in the high-tech industry, and Microsoft has played a significant role in helping them achieve this. Microsoft is also collaborating with CCP mouthpieces, the People's Daily and China Daily, further raising concerns about national security.

The conversation centers on escalating US-China tensions, with a focus on trade restrictions, rare earths, Taiwan, and the broader economic and political systems of the two powers. Professor Yasheng Huang, born in China and now a US-based academic, provides a framework for understanding how these moves fit into longer-term strategic aims and implications. Key points about rare earths and export controls - The Chinese Ministry of Commerce described the move as an export control rather than a pure export ban: those who use the Chinese rare earth processing must submit applications, with civilian usages allowed and defense-related usage scrutinized or prohibited. Huang notes the definition of civilian versus defense usage is unclear. - He emphasizes that rare earths are ubiquitous in electronics (phones, computers) and that magnets produced in China are essential for US missiles, air defense, and other military equipment. If China fully implements the controls, it would “send shock waves globally” and amount to a sudden stop in production of equipment and devices, with a broad, non-targeted impact on the global economy. - Huang argues that the policy is not well targeted as a bargaining chip against the US; it would affect any user of the Chinese rare earth processing. He suggests the move may have been intended to pressure for a summit with Xi Jinping and Trump but notes China may have overplayed its hand, especially given weaknesses in US agricultural exports and domestic farming pressure. Timeline and strategic context - The dialogue traces recent US-Chinese trade steps: fentanyl tariffs by the US; subsequent broad tariffs; a Geneva truce; halting five-nanometer chip exports; then relaxing some restrictions to seven-nanometer chips with revenue caps on Chinese sales. The rare earth move is positioned as a broader leverage tactic around a forthcoming summit in South Korea. - Huang highlights a mid-September US docking-fee announcement on Chinese ships and a China retaliatory “stocking fee” on US ships, underscoring asymmetry in leverage. He views the rare earth restriction as potentially aiming to strengthen bargaining ahead of the Xi-Trump meeting but notes it may not be well calibrated. Implications for the US and the global economy - The rare earth restrictions would create a global shock given their role in electronics and defense tech, with a diffuse target that affects multiple sectors across nations. - In the short run, the move gives China substantial bargaining leverage over the US and over allied economic planning; in the long run, it could spur other countries to build processing capacity and reduce dependence on China. - Huang compares this to Apple’s 2022 diversification away from China after COVID-19 controls, suggesting that strategic shifts toward diversification take time, even if motivated by short-term shocks. Economic outlook for China - Huang distinguishes between China’s impressive infrastructure and manufacturing prowess and underlying macroeconomic fundamentals. He notes debt-to-GDP has risen since 2008, with productivity trends trending downward, and widespread inefficiencies—that is, “net” productivity is negative when counting unseen inefficiencies. - He describes overbuilding in real estate (empty cities and warehouses) that increases debt while not translating into enduring demand, contributing to strains even as headline growth remains around 5%. He argues that the perceived efficiency from visible factories does not capture systemic inefficiencies. - The distinction is drawn between hard assets (like infrastructure) and “soft” financial advantages (dollar-based financial power). He asserts that while hard assets like rare earth resources and manufacturing capacity are real, the long-run relyability of autocratic efficiency is not guaranteed; personal income growth in China has historically been higher when the political system was more open, such as in the 1980s. Taiwan and the future of cross-strait relations - Regarding Taiwan, Huang notes that the day China invades Taiwan would mark the end of the Chinese economy because wartime adjustments would disrupt the export-driven model and debt-financed growth. He stresses the importance of delaying a potential conflict to preserve the status quo. - He also points out that the Taiwanese leadership’s push for formal recognition of independence, alongside US rhetoric, creates risk, while acknowledging China’s strategic aim of reunification but calling the timing and rationale crucially tied to economic and geopolitical calculations. Democracy vs. autocracy - The discussion turns to governance models. Huang argues that the US system is flawed in ways—such as gerrymandering and the electoral college—that undermine democratic ideals, though he cautions against oversimplifying comparisons with China. - He contends that China’s autocracy has enabled rapid growth but that long-run household income growth in China has not kept pace with GDP growth, especially under more autocratic leadership like Xi Jinping’s. He highlights that openness correlated with higher personal income growth in China’s history, suggesting that “open autocracies” or relatively less autocratic regimes may yield stronger household outcomes than outright autocracy. Trump’s China strategy and Europe - Huang suggests Trump’s approach has elevated autocratic leaders’ legitimacy globally, including Xi’s. He notes that Europe could move closer to China if China repositions on Ukraine, but that the rare earth move complicates that alignment. European reliance on Western security and American leadership remains a factor. Overall, the conversation frames rare earth controls as a high-stakes, potentially destabilizing move with mixed long-term consequences, while exploring the connected dynamics of China’s economy, cross-strait tensions, and the comparative advantages and vulnerabilities of democratic versus autocratic governance in shaping future geopolitics.

Dan Farrah, director and producer of The Age of Disclosure, discusses his new documentary, which he says reveals an eighty-year cover-up of nonhuman intelligent life and a secret race among major nations to reverse engineer advanced technology of nonhuman origin. The film opens in select theaters in New York, Washington, and Los Angeles on November 21 and is available worldwide to purchase or rent on Prime Video. Farrah notes that he interviewed 34 extremely high-level military, government, and intelligence officials who have direct knowledge of the issue. Much of what they know is classified, but in the film they break their silence on what they can lawfully disclose. He states that every interviewee makes it clear that it is no longer a question of whether this is real; it is a very real situation and humanity is not the only intelligence in the universe. Nonhuman intelligence exists, UAPs are real, and they are not human. The film explores questions about who is controlling these UAPs, where they come from, and what their intention might be. Farrah explains that a long time ago the topic was moved away from congressional oversight and even away from presidential oversight, with certain elements within the government and defense contractors gatekeeping knowledge about the topic. Some officials in the film claim to have seen craft and recovered nonhuman bodies, and there are claims of crashed craft and nonhuman bodies within them. He emphasizes that having 34 credible people willing to put their name and reputation on the line constitutes strong evidence in a time when videos and photos can be created or manipulated. A major reveal in the film is that elements of the US government are in a high-stakes secret cold war with adversarial nations like China and Russia to reverse engineer technology of nonhuman origin. The discussion highlights that the first country to crack this technology could lead for years to come. China is said to have established its own UAV task force, signaling a strategic race akin to the Manhattan Project, but on “the atomic weapon on steroids.” The fear is that if another nation wins this race, it could significantly alter global power dynamics. Regarding public reception, Farrah acknowledges skepticism and stigma around the topic. For a long period, the public, Congress, and even the president were kept out of the loop, but in recent years senior Congress members and administration officials, aided by whistleblowers, have begun pursuing the truth for the American people. He suggests that it is only a matter of time before a sitting president steps forward to tell humanity that we are not alone and that the United States intends to lead the way.

The CCP's Hongqi missile system, which relies on the Bay du navigation satellite, is intended for export. It will be deployed in Serbia, Middle Eastern countries, the Balkans, and neighboring small countries. The CCP has already sent 56 platoons of Hongqi missiles to Saudi Arabia and nearly 50 platoons to Iran. Indonesia and Djibouti will also receive these missiles, posing a threat to American aircraft. NATO and the United States are likely to target the CCP's BeiDou satellite. The Hongqi missile is a cheaper and accurate version of the American Stinger missile, developed through copying and stealing American technology. It poses a significant threat to the United States and Europe.

Speaker 0 notes that owned groups have been buying up schools across the United States, including Spring Education Group which owns 240 schools in 19 states, funded by a Chinese investment firm whose CEO has been described as an ardent Chinese nationalist. Xi Van Fleet, who was born in China and lived through the Cultural Revolution, joins the discussion. Speaker 1 explains that the CCP has long viewed America as its arch enemy and has continually aimed to weaken and undermine the United States in order to replace it as the world’s superpower. Education is identified as a key battleground. Since the early 2000s, CCP efforts began with higher education through Confucius Institutes, then expanded to public schools via donation and exchange programs such as sister school programs, and are now moving into private schools by purchasing many of them. She asserts that in 2015 the CCP bought the high school New York Military Academy, a school that President Donald Trump attended, arguing that the intent is not to make money but to take over American education and turn classrooms into the “little red classroom” and education into “American education with CCP characteristics.” The overarching goal, she claims, is generations of people who align with CCP messaging, referencing influencer Hassan Piker who allegedly visited China and told followers that China offered a solution for America, asserting that communism is the solution to problems created by capitalism in America. This, she says, is very dangerous. Speaker 0 adds that the NY Military Academy purchase connects to efforts to influence elites by targeting private schools where wealthy families send their children, who then go on to hold high positions in society. She notes that there has been chatter about Chinese ownership of farmlands as well, but argues that the influence through these private schools is even more effective.

This is an attempt to provide Chinese options in crisis or conflict. We need to remove them from critical infrastructures and remain vigilant. This is a persistent threat that requires daily operation, offensive and defensive capabilities.

Joe Mokira’s Nobel Prize-winning work provides a stark framework for why centralized planning struggles to sustain genuine innovation, and that framework helps explain why Beijing quietly scrubbed Made in China 2025 from official discourse. Mokira isn’t just an economist; he’s an economic historian who asks why the Industrial Revolution happened in Europe and not in China. His core answer, in A Culture of Growth, is that Europe succeeded not because of geography or resources but because it built a culture of progress. That culture rests on three pillars: 1) Belief in knowledge as power—the conviction that discovery could improve human life and that individuals have both the freedom and the duty to pursue it; 2) Competition of ideas—Europe’s messiness with hundreds of rival states, universities, and thinkers allowed ideas to compete, be funded, and evolve; 3) Institutional Tolerance—over time Europe let thinkers leave and challenge authority (the Republic of Letters), rewarding descent and discovery. This cultural software underpinned Europe’s technological hardware. The framework, applied to Xi Jinping’s China, highlights a contrast. First, the absence of a culture of descent: in Xi’s world, disagreement is a threat to stability; scientists memorize slogans, and entrepreneurs recite pledges rather than pitch ideas. Jack Ma’s experience—being sidelined after questioning regulators—illustrates this. Second, centralized orthodoxy versus decentralized competition: Europe’s fragmentation fostered self-sustaining competition of ideas; China resembles the world’s largest monopoly—one party, one ideology, one narrative. Beijing can build chips but not a Galileo, because Galileo would not survive CCP ideological review. Third, intellectual fear versus intellectual freedom: progress requires optimism and the belief that knowledge can improve lives, while China’s system passes ideas through political filters, leading to censorship disguised as patriotism and innovation replaced by imitation. The result is a generation of scientists who code with caution. The transcript also warns of the return of the bureaucratic scholar: human capital without heterodoxy—competence without curiosity. China may fund innovation and build labs, but you cannot command curiosity or create a culture of growth. A country full of brilliant people may wait for permission to think. As a result, Beijing’s attempt to replicate the hardware of the West ignores the software—the Republic of Silence versus Europe’s Republic of Letters. Mokira’s conclusion: technological revolutions don’t come from five-year plans; they come from permission—to argue, to fail, to offend authority. Europe, the US, Japan, and Taiwan exemplify this. Therefore, Made in China 2025 died not primarily from sanctions or chip wars but from the Chinese system itself, which is allergic to free thought. Talent leaves when intellectual oxygen is scarce, and progress stalls when fear replaces exploration. The “ghost slogan” of Made in China 2025 embodies the collapse of a promised leap that depended on a culture of growth rather than on centralized control.

An Intel source mentioned that a Chinese satellite, visible to the naked eye, went down. Reports indicated it burned up, but this source claimed it was taken down by the US government. This satellite was reportedly a command and control unit for drones. The implication was that the Chinese government was signaling its intentions regarding Taiwan and possibly other actions, suggesting that the US could not intervene.

Speaker: The CCP builds influence in democratic societies through overseas United Front work, a system the party uses to expand control and influence without force. The United Front is the party’s weapon to shape political, social, and economic environments to serve its goal of becoming the dominant global power and advancing claims such as the annexation of Taiwan. Through ongoing, long-term relationship building, the Party has created a global network of individuals and organizations inside open societies. In Canada, organizations connected to the United Front are substantial: Canada has at least 575 United Front–linked organizations, making it the second largest network among the four countries studied and with the highest per-capita presence. Much of the United Front work operates through informal ties—personal relationships, invitations to China, honorary titles, and privileged access. The 575 United Front–linked organizations identified in Canada represent only a visible layer of a much larger system operating quietly underneath. Canada is important to the CCP because it has strong institutions, vibrant civil society, and large diaspora communities. To the Party, shaping thinking, networks, and decisions in countries like Canada yields accommodation rather than confrontation. Alongside the United States, Canada has become one of the key environments where overseas United Front work is actively developed. From the research, three things stand out. First, the Chinese Communist Party politicizes everything: activities that appear social, cultural, or economic are treated by the CCP as political resources. Second, most United Front activities are not illegal; they operate through relationships. Influence is built through access, invitations, titles, and personal ties, not necessarily through breaking rules. For example, individuals with strong United Front ties have accompanied multiple Canadian prime ministers from both political parties to visit the PRC and have also participated in policy consultations ahead of those trips. Third, once this network is embedded, it can be mobilized. With the network in place, the Party gains the ability to make requests for political influence, narrative shaping, talent recruitment, and even voter mobilization on Beijing’s behalf.

China has been developing laser weapons for over 60 years, with a focus on anti-satellite capabilities. They have ground-based laser systems that can target objects in space and have been caught using laser weapons to probe foreign satellites. China has also developed a directed energy weapon called the relativistic klystron amplifier (RKA), which can be mounted on satellites to destroy their electronics. The US is aware of the threat and has responded by prioritizing laser weapons in its defense budget. The Army has the IFPC HEL and the DEM SHORAD, the Air Force has the SHIELD program, and the Navy has the Helios laser weapon. The battle between the US and China extends across all domains and services.

Speaker believes that China and the United States are competing at more than a peer level in AI. They argue China isn’t pursuing crazy AGI strategies, partly due to hardware limitations and partly because the depth of their capital markets doesn’t exist; they can’t raise funds to build massive data centers. As a result, China is very focused on taking AI and applying it to everything, and the concern is that while the US pursues AGI, everyone will be affected and we should also compete with the Chinese in day-to-day applications—consumer apps, robots, etc. The speaker notes the Shanghai robotics scene as evidence: Chinese robotics companies are attempting to replicate the success seen with electric vehicles, with incredible work ethic and solid funding, but without the same valuations seen in America. While they can’t raise capital at the same scale, they can win in these applied areas. A major geopolitical point is emphasized: the mismatch in openness between the two countries. The speaker’s background is in open source, defined as open code and weights and open training data. China is competing with open weights and open training data, whereas the US is largely focused on closed weights and closed data. This dynamic means a large portion of the world, akin to the Belt and Road Initiative, is likely to use Chinese models rather than American ones. The speaker expresses a preference for the West and democracies, arguing they should support the proliferation of large language models learned with Western values. They underline that the path China is taking—open weights and data—poses a significant strategic and competitive challenge, especially given the global tilt toward Chinese models if openness remains constrained in the US.

Solar panels were invented in America in 1954, but China has been better able to capitalize on the technology. China commercialized solar panels at a large scale and now controls over 80% of the global solar panel supply chain. The United States manufactures virtually none of the required components for solar panel production. The US is prioritizing building up its supply chain from scratch to compete with China. The US has less than half of China's solar capacity, and nearly four out of five solar panels installed in the US are from Chinese companies. China dominates the entire global supply chain and has spent almost 10 times as much on solar manufacturing than the US and the EU combined. Of the world's top 10 largest solar manufacturers, seven are Chinese, and only one is American.

Speaker 0 reports that while attention was on US aircraft carriers, China quietly broke the air blockade in Asia over the past forty-eight hours. The claim is that 16 Chinese Y-20 military cargo planes took off, then vanished from radar, turning their transponders off and flying completely dark. Their destination is stated as Iran. According to multiple intel sources cited in the transcript, what these planes carried was not food or humanitarian aid but advanced electronic warfare systems. The systems are described as the kind built to blind US carrier-based F-35 jets. The assertion is that China may have provided Iran with technology to jam American aircraft right in the middle of the Persian Gulf standoff. The sequence is summarized as: 16 aircraft, zero radio signals, and a full airborne supply chain delivered under America’s nose. The transcript emphasizes the supposed significance of this development, suggesting that if true, the balance of power over the Middle East could have shifted without widespread notice. The final framing centers on the potential implications: the real question posed is what action the United States will take next, given the alleged delivery of electronic warfare capability to Iran and the covert nature of the operation. The account stresses that this development allegedly occurred while global attention was focused on US aircraft carriers, implying it represents a strategic surprise with potentially far-reaching consequences for regional and global security dynamics.

China is positioning itself to replace the US as the world hegemon by hosting a summit attended by 130 countries, including Vladimir Putin. The summit celebrated the 10th anniversary of China's belt and road initiative, which has invested $1 trillion in infrastructure in 70 countries. This serves to make China's exports cheaper and buy countries out of the US orbit. China offers a menu of infrastructure projects, such as ports, trains, power plants, and telecom networks, in exchange for influence. Chinese companies also gain control over the infrastructure they build. China is selling US treasuries and cracking down on US firms in China, suggesting it sees conflict with the US as likely and potentially beneficial.

According to the official version, the US government is concerned that advanced semiconductors and chip making tools could be used by the Chinese military or surveillance. Technologies like AI, high performance computing, and advanced semiconductors have both civilian and military applications. So in other words, they are dual use items, so Washington considers controlling their spread to be a strategic move. The United States placed trade restrictions on chip exports to China primarily due to national security concerns. So it cited national security concerns as the basis for those restrictions and also to maintain its technological edge particularly in areas like artificial intelligence and advanced military systems. By restricting access to high end chips and the equipment to manufacture them, The United States claims that it aims to hamper China's ability to develop next generation military technologies such as hypersonic weapons, autonomous drones, and surveillance and cyber capabilities.

Professor Wang Wen discusses China’s de Americanization as a strategic response to shifts in global power and U.S. policy, not as an outright anti-American project. He outlines six fields of de Americanization that have evolved over seven to eight years: de Americanization of trade, de Americanization of finance, de Americanization of security, demarization of IT knowledge, demarization of high-tech, and demarization of education. He argues the strategy was not China’s initiative but was forced by the United States. Key motivations and timeline - Since China’s reform and opening, China sought a friendly relationship with the U.S., inviting American investment, expanding trade, and learning from American management and financial markets. By 2002–2016, about 20% of China’s trade depended on the United States. The U.S. containment policy, including the Trump administration’s trade war, Huawei actions, and sanctions on Chinese firms, prompted China to respond with countermeasures and adjustments. - A 2022 New York Times piece, cited by Wang, notes that Chinese people have awakened about U.S. hypocrisy and the dangers of relying on the United States. He even states that Trump’s actions educated Chinese perspectives on necessary countermeasures to defend core interests, framing de Americanization as a protective response rather than hostility. Global and economic consequences - Diversification of trade: since the 2013 Belt and Road Initiative, China has deepened cooperation with the Global South. Trade with Russia, Central Asia, Latin America, Africa, and Southeast Asia has grown faster than with the United States. Five years ago, China–Russia trade was just over $100 billion; now it’s around $250 billion and could exceed $300 billion in five years. China–Latin America trade has surpassed $500 billion and may overtake the China–U.S. trade in the next five years. The U.S.–China trade volume is around $500 billion this year. - The result is a more balanced and secure global trade structure, with the U.S. remaining important but declining in China’s overall trade landscape. China views its “international price revolution” as raising the quality and affordability of goods for the Global South, such as EVs and solar energy products, enabling developing countries to access better products at similar prices. - The U.S. trade war is seen as less successful from China’s perspective because America’s share of China’s trade has fallen from about 20% to roughly 9%. Financial and monetary dimensions - In finance, China has faced over 2,000 U.S. sanctions on Chinese firms in the past seven years, which has spurred dedollarization and efforts to reform international payment systems. Wang argues that dollar hegemony harms the global system and predicts dedollarization and RMB internationalization will expand, with the dollar’s dominance continuing to wane by 2035 as more countries reduce dependence on U.S. currency. Technological rivalry - China’s rise as a technology power is framed as a normal, market-based competition. The U.S. should not weaponize financial or policy instruments to curb China’s development, nor should it fear fair competition. He notes that many foundational technologies (papermaking, the compass, gunpowder) originated in China, and today China builds on existing technologies, including AI and high-speed rail, while denying accusations of coercive theft. - The future of tech competition could benefit humanity if managed rationally, with multiple centers of innovation rather than a single hegemon. The U.S. concern about losing its lead is framed as a driver of misallocations and “malinvestments” in AI funding. Education and culture - Education is a key battleground in de Americanization. China aims to shift from dependence on U.S.-dominated knowledge systems to a normal, China-centered educational ecosystem with autonomous textbooks and disciplinary systems. Many Chinese students studied abroad, especially in the U.S., but a growing number now stay home or return after training. Wang highlights that more than 30% of Silicon Valley AI scientists hold undergraduate degrees from China, illustrating the reverse brain drain benefiting China. - The aim is not decoupling but a normal relationship with the U.S.—one in which China maintains its own knowledge system while continuing constructive cooperation where appropriate. Concluding metaphor - Wang uses the “normal neighbors” metaphor: the U.S. and China should avoid military conflict and embrace a functional, non-dependence-oriented, neighborly relationship rather than an unbalanced marriage, recognizing that diversification and multipolarity can strengthen global resilience. He also warns against color revolutions and NGO-driven civil-society manipulation, advocating for a Japan-like, balanced approach to democracy and civil society that respects national contexts.

In 2023, strategists in Washington DC spotted a worrying problem in Asia: A small nation, Nepal, wanted Internet independence like China had. China having its own Internet meant that the country could develop its own entire web ecosystem for commerce and information and everything else, and they did it really well. By 2023, the Nepalese realized they would be smart to follow China's model. The US was horrified. “What if other countries started to want the same thing?” and NED began circulating reports, organizing round table discussions, and briefings all with one message: “China is the enemy. US is your friend.” The NED theme was countering corruption and authoritarian influence. It circulated a long report, “Data Centric Authoritarianism,” which purported to show how China’s frontier technologies could globalize repression. Nepal asked social media to register; TikTok, WeTalk, and Viber complied; Facebook, WhatsApp, LinkedIn refused and were halted. Protests by Gen z followed, framed as exposing corruption and abuse of authority—the theme the NED had suggested. The root: Nepalese wanted an Internet system of their own to develop apps and keep out foreign interference, but they ended up in a US-dominated model. The New York Times piece, “the forces behind Nepal's explosive Gen z protests,” omits these elements. Remember to think for yourself. Peace.