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The discussion centers on CNN’s report that the CIA is establishing a foothold in Venezuela, with the claim that the CIA has, for decades, enabled the Venezuelan drug trade. The speakers argue that the attack on Venezuela cannot be about drugs if the CIA itself facilitated drug trafficking. They cite CIA whistleblower Kevin Shipp, who said the CIA has been involved in Venezuela since at least the Cartel of the Sun, run by a general who was a CIA proxy and helped reconstitute Venezuela’s intelligence to penetrate the government; the general named Ramon Gulen allegedly ran narcotics and created the cartel of the sun. They claim the cartel is used by the Trump administration as a pretext to stage attacks on boats and in Venezuela and that the CIA, with its long history, was behind the Secret Service and the general in creating the drug trade and the cartel, with the Trump administration leveraging it to circumvent Congress. There is reference to a 60 Minutes piece from the 1990s reporting that the CIA collaborated with Venezuelan National Guard generals who moved tons of cocaine into the United States. The conversation then moves to John Kerry, who in the mid-1980s led the Contra Cocaine Investigation hearings into U.S. government complicity in the contra drug trade. The Reagan administration resisted the inquiry, attempted to discredit witnesses, and assigned the CIA to monitor the probe. Ten years later, the HITS report (the CIA Inspector General report authorized under Inspector General Frederick HITS) concluded that while the CIA did not officially participate in cocaine trafficking during the Contra War, it knowingly maintained relationships with and protected numerous contra-linked individuals and organizations involved in the drug trade when deemed operationally important, to keep the Contra War alive and to maintain U.S. objectives in Central America, even if it meant enabling and protecting drug lords; the CIA hid this from Congress, contributing to drug flow into the United States. The Iran-Contra framework is referenced as arms to Iran funding the Contras, with connections to cocaine trafficking, forming a single pipeline, allegedly placing the CIA at the center of these operations. The panel critiques CNN’s headline as suggesting the CIA’s new foothold is about establishing a presence, arguing the real aim is to block Russia and China’s influence, not democracy or drugs. Venezuela’s oil trade outside the petrodollar with BRICS nations is noted, with claims that the move away from the petrodollar spurred interference and invasion, and that Venezuela later returned to endorsing the petrodollar after a period of yuan transactions with China. The discourse asserts that the CIA’s purpose is to prevent free trade outside U.S. influence and to suppress alternative financial arrangements like BRICS or yuan-based oil transactions. The participants discuss the idea that the CIA has shifted from operating covertly to openly engaging in such activities, suggesting a normalization of “strategy of tension” and the notion that a third of the population would support the government’s actions, a third oppose, and a third are indifferent, thereby reducing public resistance. They connect these elements to broader media complicity, including Operation Mockingbird and the integration of former intelligence heads into media roles, implying entrenched deep-state influence.

Speaker 1 discusses the human cost of Venezuelan and regional instability, noting that Venezuelan people have suffered and that many Hondurans have migrated due to conditions in their own country. He argues that the opposition in Venezuela had been winning elections, but the regime led by Maduro “stole every election,” stating that they have a copy of poll results on the cloud and that the government did not want to see them because they knew they lost. He attributes a high death toll in Honduras to drug trafficking flowing through their country, largely coming from Venezuela, and asserts that the U.S. framework designating drug trafficking as terrorism is justified because the flow of drugs harms the United States and Honduras, causing bloodshed and economic damage. He claims that illegal drug flight and sea routes brought jobs to Honduras but also bloodshed, and that the highest number of lives lost in fifteen years in Honduras occurred due to these drugs. Speaker 0 asks about the stance on U.S. intervention, whether intervention is sometimes warranted, as with Maduro, or if there should be no U.S. intervention in Latin America regardless of administration. He notes that Maduro’s regime has involved U.S. military actions and leadership changes, with claims that the U.S. bombed Venezuela, captured Maduro, killed members of his government, and sent him to jail, a situation some view positively while others see as a breach of international law. Speaker 1 responds from a human perspective, emphasizing the suffering of Venezuelan and regional populations and the mass migration from these countries. He argues that Maduro’s regime stole elections and contrasts this with the citizens’ desire for democracy. He states that the Trump administration’s framework to label drug trafficking as terrorism has implications for Honduras and other neighboring countries affected by drug flows, corruption, and violence. He suggests that President Trump confronted a long-standing attempt by Venezuela and its allies to influence elections in the region, and he asserts that Maduro should be given a chance to defend himself in a trial. He acknowledges sovereignty concerns but argues that many people worldwide do not understand what has been happening in Venezuela and its impact on the region. He concludes that intervention decisions depend on whether there is another way to save Venezuela and notes the broader regional consequences of the Venezuelan crisis.

Speaker 0, Speaker 1, Speaker 2, Speaker 3 describe awave of alarming claims about the Trump administration and its opponents. They say multiple administration members are living on military bases, including Steven Miller, Kristi Noem, JD Vance, and others such as Chris Rubio and Pete Hegseth, with bunkers in Maryland–DC area and above-ground facilities connected to large underground bunker complexes. They assert these moves are not for nuclear war but to survive a broader threat, and they claim the Continuity of Government (COG) system has been activated, signaling a serious threat described as part of the Podesta Plan and related plots. They recount that Flynn contacted them with NSA intercepts provided to Central Command and Army Special Operations in Florida showing “globalists on the phones,” with names not disclosed by Flynn or other sources. They allege Democrat strategists talk about killing conservatives and using drug cartels to trigger violence, implying plans to deploy cartels and hit squads to eliminate Trump administration officials, law enforcement leaders, corporate leaders, and media and thought leaders. They claim the threat has escalated from six to a dozen to fifty and then to a hundred Trump administration officials and their families living in hardened bases. They state these bases include bunkers for the State Department and Pentagon officials and are connected to Sidar in Maryland and other sites that can survive a nuclear war. They argue the Podesta Plan and related “Hollywood propaganda” explain mass-media and entertainment content that fantasizes about violence against conservatives, white people, and Christians, and they reference current articles about an “assassination culture.” They recount Flynn’s March warnings about major bounties through drug cartels (notably Venezuelan) and MS-13 as muscle for the operation, and they claim subsequent arrests and indictments, with documents recovered from cell phones showing bounties of up to $50,000 for ICE and border patrol mid-level leaders. They state this evidence has been documented and corroborated by journalists and government sources, and they reference Kash Patel’s alleged efforts to quash investigations into foreign involvement or accomplices, which they say then became news. They claim dozens to hundreds of Trump administration officials and their families have moved to military bases, and they insist the U.S. military is actively targeting drug cartels on multiple fronts, including in Venezuela, Mexico, and within the United States, with ground operations and lethal actions against cartel members described as “on the ground.” They assert Trump has authorized actions against Maduro and drug boats, and they describe bounties on people (including Elon Musk) and say the military is hunting cartels and associated threats. They position themselves as being at the top of lists of targets, with Flynn reportedly near the top after the Trump family, and they claim they have credible sources and a broad view of national security that includes these ongoing, hidden confrontations. They reference MTG (Marjorie Taylor Greene) and Bill Maher discussions as connected to these developments, and they indicate a plan to have MTG on the show. They emphasize the severity of the threat and their role in reporting and interpreting these events, framing it as a necessity to inform the public about the ongoing, high-stakes conflict.

The discussion centers on claims that the CIA has long been involved in Venezuela, has enabled drug trafficking, and now seeks a visible foothold in the country to counter Russia and China. Speaker 0 argues CNN’s report that the CIA will establish a foothold in Venezuela is emblematic of a duplicative pattern: the CIA has supposedly enabled the drug trade for decades, so the attack on Venezuela cannot be about drugs if the CIA is involved. They cite Kevin Shipp, a CIA whistleblower, who said the CIA has been involved in Venezuela since at least the Cartel of the Sun, run by a general who was a CIA proxy and helped reconstruct Venezuela’s intelligence service to penetrate the government. The general cited is General Ramon Gulen, described as running narcotics and creating and running the Cartel of the Sun. The Cartel is portrayed as a pretext used by the Trump administration to stage attacks and operate around Congress, with the CIA behind past secret dealings tied to it. Speaker 0 then references a 60 Minutes piece from the 1990s reported on by mainstream media that allegedly showed the CIA collaborating with Venezuelan National Guard generals who moved tons of cocaine into the United States. The discussion moves to John Kerry, who led the Contra Cocaine Investigation in the mid-1980s, seeking to determine US government involvement in the contra drug trade. The Reagan administration resisted, stonewalled the Senate, and monitored the probe. The HITS report (the CIA inspector general report authorized under inspector general Frederick HITS) is described as concluding in the late 1990s that while the CIA did not officially participate in cocaine trafficking during the Contra War, it knowingly maintained relationships with and protected numerous contra-linked individuals and organizations involved in the drug trade when operationally useful, to keep the contra war alive and to maintain US objectives in Central America, even if it meant enabling and protecting drug lords. It also states the CIA hid this from Congress, contributing to drugs entering the United States. The Iran-Contra connection is summarized as arms to Iran generating cash to fund the Contras, with the same network tied to cocaine trafficking, implying a single pipeline of influence and criminal activity. The speakers discuss media coverage and relationships with locals in Venezuela, questioning the claimed “relationship-building” as a cover for coercive activities, given sanctions that harm locals. They criticize the notion that the CIA is simply building positive ties, suggesting instead a pattern of disruption and control. The dialogue then shifts to geopolitics: Venezuela reportedly traded oil with BRICS outside the petrodollar since at least 2017, which is framed as undermining US global oil hegemony. A recent move to settle oil transactions in yuan is mentioned, with a snide remark that the CIA’s presence in Venezuela aims to prevent any free-trade diversification away from the petrodollar. The claim is made that the CIA’s objective is to prevent alternative global trade arrangements and maintain US influence by blocking competition from Russia, China, and BRICS members. Speaker 3 adds that the CIA’s actions align with a long-standing pattern of intervention, suggesting that the agency’s open, unapologetic approach reflects a broader strategy of tension, where a third of the population would support such actions, a third would oppose, and a third remain indifferent. They reference Operation Mockingbird and the presence of CIA-linked figures in media, including Mike Pompeo as a Fox News contributor, arguing that mainstream outlets act as channels for the deep state’s messaging, with information often flowing from the CIA to outlets like the New York Times. In sum, the discussion argues that US intervention in Venezuela is less about drugs or democracy and more about strategic counteraction to Russian, Chinese, and BRICS influence, with a long history of CIA involvement in drug trafficking and media manipulation. The speakers invite audience reactions on these points.

Speaker 0: Decision on whether to supply Tomahawk missiles to Ukraine or sell them to NATO and let them sell them to Ukraine. Speaker 1: Yeah. I've sort of made a decision pretty much if if if you consider. Yeah. I I think I wanna find out what they're doing with them. Yes. Speaker 0: Yes. Speaker 2: Donald Trump's recent statement to the press about mulling over sending Tomahawk cruise missiles to Ukraine has elicited a response from the Kremlin today. Putin announced that the peace process with the Trump administration to end the Ukraine war is officially, quote, unquote, exhausted. Trump and Putin have had a very, you know, strange relationship, a little touch and go since Trump returned to the presidency. At first, to end the Ukraine war on his very first day in office, Trump has meandered a bit on the issue and is now apparently settling on the Biden administration's policy of arming Ukraine and NATO to the hilt. But can Tomahawk cruise missiles even make much of a difference given that the Russian military has achieved supremacy on the battlefield and maintained that dominance for at least the last year and a half, maybe even longer, if you will. We're now joined by, and we're so pleased he's with us, retired US Army colonel Douglas MacGregor. He's the author of I'm sorry. We also have Brandon Weichert with us, the author of Ukraine. Go cross wires there, a disaster of their own making, how the West lost to Ukraine. Thank you both for being with us. Speaker 3: Sure. Speaker 4: Thank you for having me. Speaker 2: Colonel McGregor, welcome to the show. We're so glad to especially have your perspective on this. And what we're gonna kinda do is a tour, if you will, around the globe because there's several, ongoing and pending conflicts. Right? So let's start with this breaking news out of Russia where Putin says that these talks, these negotiations are exhausted. Are they, as a matter of fact, exhausted, colonel? Speaker 3: Well, I think he was referring specifically to what happened in Alaska. And I think president Trump showed up, you know, in grandiose fashion with the goal of overwhelming, president Putin and his team with his charm and grace and power, and it all failed miserably. President Trump never really listened carefully to anything the Russians said to him. He didn't read any of the material that was pertinent to the discussion. He came completely unprepared, and that was the the message that came out after the meeting. So the Russians were very disappointed. If you don't read their proposals, you don't read what they're doing and what they're trying to accomplish, then you're not gonna get very far. So now, president Trump has completed his transformation into Joe Biden. He's become another version of Joe Biden. Speaker 2: What it is so unexpected. And, you know, it's hard for a lot of a lot of Trump voters to hear because specifically part of voting for him and the mandate that he had going into this term was in these conflicts. Right? Specifically, the one in Ukraine. He didn't start any new conflicts while in office in the first term. Why this version of Trump this term? I know you, like I, look into the hiring, the administration, the pressures from the outside on the president. What is influencing where he is now on Ukraine, colonel MacGregor? Speaker 3: Well, that's a that's a difficult question. I mean, first of all, he grossly underestimated the complexity of the of the war. If you don't understand the foundations for the conflict, how this conflict came about, I mean, I I was standing around listening to someone like Brzezinski in the nineteen nineties trying to tell president Clinton that it was critical to address Ukraine's borders because Eastern Ukraine was, quote, unquote, Russified and effectively not Ukrainian. Nobody would listen to Brzezinski, and so we walked away from that very problem. And in the run up to this thing back in 2014, I was on several different programs, and I pointed to the electoral map, And it showed you who voted for what where. It was very obvious that the East and the Northeast voted to stay with the Russian pro Russian candidate, and everybody else voted against the pro Russian candidate. So none of this should come as a surprise, but I don't think president Trump is aware of any of that. I don't think he studied any of that. And so he's got a lot of people around him pushing him in the direction of the status quo. He went through this during his first term, disappointed all of us because he could never quite escape from the Washington status quo. So he simply returned to it, and I don't see anything positive occurring in the near future. Speaker 2: That's sort of the same as well, with other agencies like the the DOJ, which I wanna get into a little bit later. Brandon, you've been writing about this as a national interest. So what what do you make of it? Speaker 4: Well, I think that right now, this is a lot of vamping from Trump. I think the colonel is a 100% correct when he says Trump really didn't come prepared to the Alaska meeting. I think ultimately Trump's default is to still try to get a deal with Putin on things like rare earth mineral development and trade. I think it's very important to note, I believe it was Friday or Thursday of last week, Putin was on a stage at an event and he reiterated his desire to reopen trade relations with The United States and he wants to do a deal with Trump on multiple other fronts. So that's a positive thing. But ultimately, I think that people need to realize that Trump says a lot of stuff in the moment. The follow through is the question. I am very skeptical that he's actually going to follow through on the Tomahawk transfer if only because logistically, it's not practical. Ukraine lacks the launchers. They lack the training. The the targeting data has to come exclusively and be approved exclusively by the Pentagon, which means that Trump will be on the hook even more for Joe Biden's war, which runs against what he says he wants to get done, which is peace. Regardless of whether it's been exhausted or not that process, Trump I think default wants peace. So I think this is a lot of bluster and I think ultimately it will not lead to the Tomahawk transfer. Last of all because we don't have enough of these Tomahawks. Right? I mean, that that is a a finite amount. I think we have about 3,500 left in our arsenal. We have 400 we're sending to the Japanese Navy, and we're gonna need these systems for any other potential contingency in South America or God forbid another Middle East contingency or certainly in the Indo Pacific. So I think that at some point, the reality will hit, you know, hit the cameras and Trump will not actually follow through on this. Speaker 2: So speaking of South America, let's head that way. Colonel McGregor, I I don't know if you know. I've been covering this pretty extensively what's been going on with the Trump administration's actions on Venezuela. So a bit of breaking news. Today, the US State Department claims that Venezuela is planning to attack their embassy, which has a small maintenance and security board other than, you know, diplomatic staff. Meanwhile, Maduro's regime argues they're just foiled a right wing terrorist plot that's that was planning to stage a false flag against the US embassy to give the US Navy fleet. There's a lot off in Venezuela's coast the impetus to attack Maduro. I've been getting some pushback, you know, on this reporting related to Venezuela, because, you know, Trump's base largely doesn't want any new conflicts. They're afraid this is sort of foreign influence wanting wanting him to go there. Are we justified in what Trump is doing as far as the buildup and what we are hearing is an impending invasion? Is it is the Trump administration justified in this action, colonel MacGregor, in Venezuela? Speaker 3: No. I I don't think there's any, pressing pressing need for us to invade or attack Venezuela at all. But we have to go back and look at his actions to this point. He's just suspended diplomatic relations with Venezuela, which is usually a signal of some sort of impending military action. I don't know what he's being told. I don't know what sort of briefing he's received, what sort of planning has been discussed, but we need to keep a few things in mind. First of all, the Venezuelan people, whether they love or do not love Maduro, are very proud of their country, and they have a long history of rebelling against foreign influence, particularly against Spain. And they're not likely to take, an invasion or an intervention of any kind from The United States lately. Secondly, they've got about 400,000 people in the militias, but they can expect, at least a 100,000 or more paramilitaries to come in from Brazil and Colombia and other Latin American states. It's why the whole thing could result in a Latin American crusade against The United States. And finally, we ought to keep in mind that the coastline is 1,700 miles long. That's almost as long as the border between The United States and Mexico. The border with Brazil and with Colombia is each of them are about 1,380 kilometers long. You start running the math and you're dealing with an area the size of Germany and and France combined. This is not something that one should sink one's teeth in without carefully considering the consequences. So I don't know what the underlying assumptions are, but my own experience is that they're usually a series of what we call rosy scenarios and assume things that just aren't true. So I I'm very concerned we'll get into it. We'll waste a lot of time and money. We'll poison the well down there. If we really want access to the oil and and gas, I think we can get it without invading the place. And they also have emerald mines and gold mines. So I think they'd be happy to do business with us. But this obsession with regime change is very dangerous, and I think it's unnecessary. Speaker 2: That is definitely what it seems they're going for. When I talk to my sources, ChromaGregor, and then I'll get your take on it, Brandon, they say it's a four pronged issue. Right? That it's the drug that, of course, the drugs that come through Venezuela into The United States, Trend Aragua, which we know the ODNI and Tulsi Gabbard, DNI, Tulsi Gabbard was briefed on specifically, that the right of trend in Aragua and how they were flooded into the country, counterintelligence issues, a Venezuelan influence in, you know, in some of our intelligence operations, and, just the narco terrorist state that it is. But you feel that given even if all of that is true and the Venezuela oh, excuse me, in the election fraud. Right? The election interference via the Smartmatic software. Given all that, you still feel it's not best to invade, colonel. You how do we handle it? How do we counter these threats coming from Venezuela? Speaker 3: Well, first of all, you secure your borders. You secure your coastal waters. You get control of the people who are inside The United States. We have an estimated 50,000,000 illegals. Somewhere between twenty five and thirty million of them poured into the country, thanks to president Biden's betrayal of the American people and his decision to open the borders with the help of mister Mayorkas that facilitated this massive invasion. I would start at home. The drug problem is not down in Venezuela. The drug problem is here in The United States. If you're serious, anybody who deals in drugs or is involved in human trafficking, particularly child trafficking, should face, the death penalty. Unless you do those kinds of things, you're not gonna fundamentally change the problem here. Now as the narco state title, I think, is a lot of nonsense. The drugs overwhelmingly come out of Colombia. They don't come out of Venezuela. A very small amount goes through Venezuela. I'm sure there are generals in the Venezuelan army that are skimming off the top and putting extra cash in their banks, but it's not a big it's not a big source from our standpoint. We have a much more serious problem in Mexico right now. Mexico is effectively an organized crime state, and I don't think, what Maduro is doing is is really, in that same category. On the other hand, I think Maduro is courting the Chinese and the Russians. And I think he's doing that because he feels threatened by us, and he's looking for whatever assistance or support he can get. And right now, given our behavior towards the Russians in Ukraine, it makes infinite sense for the Russians to cultivate a proxy against us in Central And South America. This is the way things are done, unfortunately. We there are consequences for our actions. I don't think we've thought any of them through. Speaker 2: Well, in in in talking about turning this into a broader conflict or a bigger problem, I I I I know, Brandon, you had heard that that Russia basically told Maduro, don't look to us. Don't come to us. But now this was a couple weeks ago. Yep. Yep. Like you just said, colonel MacGregor, things have changed a little bit. Right? Especially looking at what Putin said today. So will Russia now come to Venezuela's aid, to Maduro's aid? Speaker 3: I think it's distinctly possible, but it's not going to be overt. It'll be clandestine. It'll be behind the scenes. The Chinese are also gonna do business with Maduro. They have an interest in the largest known vindicated oil reserves in the world. The bottom line is and this you go back to this tomahawk thing, which I think Brandon talked about. It's very, very important. The tomahawk is a devastating weapon. Can they be shot down? Absolutely. The Serbs shot them down back in 1999 during this Kosovo air campaign. However, it carries a pretty substantial warhead, roughly a thousand pounds. It has a range of roughly a thousand miles. And I think president Trump has finally been briefed on that, and he has said, yeah. I I wanna know where they're going to fire them, whom they're going to target. Well, the Ukrainians have targeted almost exclusively whatever they could in terms of Russian civilian infrastructure and Russian civilians. They've killed them as often and as much as they could. So the notion if you're gonna give these things to these people or you're gonna shoot for them, you can expect the worst, and that would precipitate a terrible response from the Russians. I don't think we understand how seriously attacks on Russian cities is gonna be taken by the Russians. So I would say, they will provide the Venezuelans with enough to do damage to us if if it's required, but I don't think they expect the Venezuelans to overwhelm us or march into America. That's Mexico's job right now with organized crime. That's where I think we have a much more serious problem. Speaker 4: I I agree with the colonel on that. I think also there's an issue. Now I happen to think we we because of the election fraud that you talk a lot about, Emerald, I think there is a threat in Maduro, and I I do think that that there is a more serious threat than we realize coming out of that sort of left wing miasma in Latin America. And I I think the colonel's correct though in saying that we're we're making it worse with some of our actions. I will point out on the technical side. I broke this story last week. The Venezuelan government, the military Padrino, the the defense minister there, claimed that his radar systems actually detected a tranche of US Marine Corps f 35 b's using these Russian made radars that they have. This is not the first time, by the way, a Russian made radar system using these really and I'm not going get into the technical details here, but using really innovative ways of detecting American stealth planes. It's not the first time a Russian system has been able to do this. And so we are now deploying large relatively large number of f 35 b's into the region. Obviously, it's a build up for some kind of strike package. And there are other countermeasures that the f 35 b has in the event it's detected. But I will point out that this plane is supposed to be basically invisible, and we think the Venezuelans are so technologically inferior, we do need to be preparing our forces for the fact that the Venezuelans will be using innovative tactics, in order to stymie our advances over their territory. It's not to say we can't defeat them, but we are not prepared, I don't think, for for having these systems, seen on radar by the Venezuelans, and that is something the Russians have helped the Venezuelans do. Speaker 2: Very complex. Before we run out of time, do wanna get your thoughts, colonel MacGregor, on, the expectation that Israel will strike Iran again. Will we again come to their aid? And do you think we should? Speaker 3: Well, first of all, stealth can delay detection but cannot resist it. Yeah. I think the stealth is grossly exaggerated in terms of its value. It causes an enormous price tag Yeah. When you buy the damn plane. And the f 35, from a readiness standpoint, is a disaster anyway. So, you know, I I think we have to understand that, yes, mister Netanyahu has to fight Iran. Iran has to be balkanized and reduced to rubble the way the Israelis with help from us and the British have reduced Syria to chaos, broken up into different parts. This is an Israeli strategy for the region. It's always been there. If you can balkanize your neighbors, your neighbors don't threaten you. Now I don't subscribe to the Israeli view that Iran is this permanent existential threat that has to be destroyed, but it doesn't matter what I think. What matters is what they think. They think Iran is a permanent existential threat and therefore must be destroyed. Your question is, will they find a way to attack Iran? The answer is yes. Sooner rather than later. The longer they wait, the more robust and capable Iran becomes. And, I think that's in the near term that we'll see we'll see some trigger. Somehow, there'll be a trigger and Iran will strike. And will we support them? Absolutely. We're already moving assets into the region along with large quantities of missiles and ammunition, but our inventories, as I'm sure you're aware, are limited. We fired a lot of missiles. We don't have a surge capacity in the industrial base. We need one. Our factories are not operating twenty four hours a day, seven days a week. The Russian factories are. Their manufacturing base can keep up. And by the way, the Chinese are right there with them. They have the largest manufacturing base in the world. So if it comes down to who could produce and fire the most missiles, well, we're gonna lose that game, and Israel is gonna lose with us. But right now, I don't see any evidence that anyone's worried about that. Speaker 4: Yeah. Speaker 2: You know what? Colonel McGregor, I I I don't know if I feel any safer after you joined us today. It is very concerning. It's it's a concerning situation we find ourselves in, and I feel like so many people because they feel the election turned out the way they wanted to wanted it to, are not concerned anymore. Right? But we are in Speaker 1: a finite amount of time and there's still great pressures upon the president. There are many voices whispering in his ear. And so we constantly have to be calling out what we Speaker 2: see and explaining to people why it matters. Speaker 3: Remember, this president has said this. Everybody dealing with the administration has said this. It's a very transactional administration. Yep. Follow the money. Who has poured billions into his campaign and bought the White House and Congress for him? When you understand those facts in, you can explain the policy positions. Speaker 1: And I think that's also why we're, the leading conversation we're seeing on acts and social media. Right now, Colonel McGregor, thank you so much for joining us today. We hope you'll come back soon. Speaker 3: Sure. Thank you. Speaker 2: And, Brandon, as always, good to see you, my friend. Thank you. Speaker 4: See you again. Nice to meet you, colonel. Speaker 3: Very nice to see you. Bye bye.

The discussion centers on the Venezuelan political crisis, U.S. involvement, and historical precedents of regime change in the region. The speakers contrast current military buildup around Venezuela with past Latin American coups, and they assess domestic support, international dynamics, and potential outcomes. - Venezuela under Maduro: Speaker 0 notes a broader deployment of military infrastructure than in recent Latin American coups, implying heightened risk or intensity of any intervention. Speaker 1 counters that domestically there is a “rally around the flag” effect in response to U.S. threats, with about 20% of Venezuelans supporting U.S. military intervention and over 55% opposing it. - Regime-change calculus: The conversation asks for the value of regime change when Maduro is willing to open the Venezuelan market to the U.S. Speaker 1 responds that there is no clear political or economic value to regime change; the predicted consequences would include a massive migration wave, civil war, and higher oil prices. They discuss the implications of implementing a regime-change strategy in the Venezuelan context. - Cartel of the Suns: The Cartel of the Suns is discussed as a U.S.-designated terrorist group. Speaker 1 explains that the designation emerged from a DOJ/intelligence collaboration during the Trump era, with William Barr involved in pursuing Maduro. The term traces back to the Reagan era, when the CIA and DEA allegedly allowed drug trafficking through Venezuela to monitor routes, revealing a long history of U.S. involvement in narco-trafficking networks as a tool of influence. Ramon Guillen Davia is named as a Venezuelan National Guard contact, with broader exposure through media such as a 60 Minutes segment and a New York Times expose by Tim Weiner. The cartel’s earlier existence and its resurfacing in U.S. legal actions are tied to broader U.S. efforts to delegitimize Maduro’s government. - Venezuelan political history since Chavez: Speaker 1 outlines Chavez’s rise and popularity (e.g., reducing extreme poverty by 60% before sanctions), the 2002 coup attempt led by opposition figures including Leopoldo Lopez, and the subsequent public support for Chavez when the people protested to restore him. They describe “La Salida” in 2004–2014 as an opposition strategy funded by U.S. entities (NED, USAID) to depose Chavez, with various protests and riots that damaged the economy. After Chavez, Maduro faced U.S. sanctions and a narrative of illegitimacy framed by the opposition’s efforts to install Guaidó as a parallel government in 2019, enabling asset seizures and embargos on Venezuela’s Sitco assets. - 2019 events and aftermath: The 2019 U.S.-backed attempt to install Juan Guaido as interim president is described, including the staged “humanitarian aid” convoy at the Colombia border which failed; Guaidó’s association with Las Bratas (the Las Frastrojos cartel members) is cited as a public-relations embarrassment, corroborated by major outlets. Leopoldo Lopez is described as a persistent organizer of opposition efforts, connected to a broader U.S.-funded framework through the CIA’s ecosystem (Canvas, Einstein Institute), and by extension to regime-change policy. The possibility of Maduro arresting Guaido is discussed as strategically unwise for Maduro to avoid bolstering U.S. claims of repression. - Opposition fragmentation and polling: The panel debates whether the opposition has broad support. Speaker 1 says a November poll by Datanalysis shows Maria Carina Machado at roughly 14–15% and Maduro around 20%, with most voters undecided and younger voters leaning toward external media narratives. Older, rural, and poor Venezuelans—Chavista base—remain a significant portion of the population. Young people are described as more influenced by social media and potentially more susceptible to pro-U.S. messaging but not broadly supportive of the radical opposition. - External actors and drug-trafficking links: The dialogue links narco-trafficking networks to geopolitical strategy, arguing that the U.S. has used or tolerates narcotics channels to fund political aims in Latin America. The discussion covers broader examples, including Ecuador and the Balkans, and references to U.S. figures and policies (e.g., regime-change agendas, naval movements, sanctions, and strategic partnerships) to illustrate how narcotics intersects with geopolitics. - Geopolitical trajectory and outcomes: The speakers speculate on possible futures: (1) a negotiated deal between Trump and Maduro or U.S. diplomacy (with the oil sector’s re-entry and debt relief) being preferable to open intervention; (2) a decapitation strike leading to destabilization and civil war with severe humanitarian and migration consequences; (3) ongoing sanctions and coercive measures as a long-term strategy. They caution that a direct, large-scale military invasion seems unlikely due to political and logistical risks, including American public opinion and potential backlash if U.S. troops are lost. - Global context and strategy: The broader international framework is discussed, including the U.S. strategic doctrine shifting toward a multipolar world and hemispheric dominance concerns. The conversation touches on how U.S. policy toward Venezuela fits into wider ambitions regarding Russia, China, and regional partners, as well as potential domestic political changes in the U.S. that could influence future approaches to Venezuela and Latin America. - Concluding note: The discussion closes with reflections on the complexity of regime-change ambitions, the difficulty of predicting outcomes, and the possibility that diplomacy or limited, targeted pressure may emerge as more viable paths than broad invasion or decapitation strategies. The participants acknowledge the influence of regional personalities and U.S. domestic politics on policy direction.

Speaker 0 outlines a discussion on global threats and resources. The audience quickly names Russia as the major threat, with China and North Korea also suggested; Venezuela is mentioned by one participant as well. The speaker then pivots to a question about natural resources: which place has the largest oil deposit on the planet, more than Saudi Arabia or Iran? The answer highlighted is Venezuela, noted as arguably the single greatest source of oil and minerals on the planet. The focus shifts to Venezuela’s leadership: President Nicholas Reyes, who rose to power on nationalist pride and, in six years, has crippled the national economy by half and raised the poverty rate by almost 400%. Reyes is up for reelection. His opponent is Gloria Bonaldi, described as a history professor turned activist, running on a social justice platform. The speaker adds a claim about predictions for Venezuela’s future, stating that as of today the chances of total economic collapse are 87%. Media framing is contrasted: on the news, Venezuela would be called a crisis, but on the world stage it would be called a failed state. The speaker notes other examples of failed states in recent history—Yemen, Iraq, and Syria. A further point is made that Venezuela is the only one of these places within a thirty-minute range from the US of “next gen nuclear missiles.” The claim continues that you will not hear about any of this on the news because the biggest players on the world stage do not want you to; unstable governments are seen, in their view, as opportunities. The closing assertion is that Russia and China can never be the most major threat until countries like Venezuela leave the door open to the United States’ backyard.

Grant and Mike Benz discuss alleged U.S. and CIA involvement in drug trafficking connected to Venezuela and the implications for prosecuting Nicolas Maduro. - Maduro indictment history: The DOJ superseded its 2020 drug trafficking indictment of Nicolas Maduro in 2025. The conversation references the Bay of Piglets failed operation to capture Maduro in 2019 and the 2020 indictment linked to Jordan Goudreaux’s Silvercorp private mercenary firm. The discussion frames this within a broader Cold War context of U.S. actions in Latin America. - CIA and drug trafficking link: The speakers claim the “Cartel of the Suns” (Cartel of the Suns) was a CIA cartel. They state two Venezuelan military brigadier generals who started the Cartel of the Suns were on the CIA payroll. They reference a 1993 confrontation where the head of the DEA resigned in protest after the CIA allegedly greenlit the deliberate importation of 1,500 kilos of cocaine from Venezuela into the U.S. They allege the CIA and DOJ later granted immunity to Venezuelan military officials involved in the operation. This is presented as pre-Hugo Chávez era activity in the 1990s. - Broader historical pattern: The discussion situates these actions within a long-running pattern across the 20th century—U.S. support for pro-American groups (insurgent, rebel, or militia-type entities) funded by drug proceeds. They compare this to past episodes in Afghanistan (Mujahideen, warlords) and to narcotics and intelligence collaborations in South America (Colombia, Peru, Ecuador, Venezuela). The speakers draw a parallel to a Noriega-style “smash and grab,” noting Noriega’s trial revealed decades of CIA association and payroll. - Implications for Maduro prosecution: Mike Benz suggests the case could be complicated because many allegations about Maduro are “thinly sourced” and relate to minor Venezuelan officials rather than Maduro directly. He notes that many points of evidence are tangential and question whether Maduro’s leadership directly sanctioned drug operations, despite the indictment labeling him as head of the Cartel of the Suns multiple times. The Bush family connections and historic CIA involvement are mentioned to illustrate the complexity of attributing direct responsibility. - Stabilization and funding argument: Benz outlines a three-part stabilization plan for Venezuela—stabilization, privatization, and transition. He describes stabilization as “hearts and minds work,” which in practice involves paying off military, civil society, and business leaders with cash. He cites the CIA’s reported $70,000,000 in drug-money bribes used to influence such actors in stabilization campaigns in Afghanistan and analogous actions in Latin America. - Closing notes: Grant appreciates Benz’s insights and asks where to follow him. Benz directs listeners to X (Twitter) at @mikebencyber, and also mentions YouTube and Rumble. - Notable names: Nicolas Maduro, Jordan Goudreaux, the Silvercorp firm, the Cartel of the Suns, Noriega, the head of the DEA who resigned in 1993, and George H. W. Bush’s historical CIA involvement are referenced to frame claims.

Speaker 0 argued that Maduro was not democratically elected and was not cracking down on drug trafficking to the U.S. and other countries, contrasting this with Honduras’ crackdown on drug trafficking supported by agencies like the DEA and Southcom, which earned praise for the Honduran government. The discussion then turned to U.S. policy. Speaker 0 asked whether the interviewee supports what the Trump administration did, or believes there is a line that should not be crossed. They noted that the U.S. military action against Maduro—bombing the country, entering, capturing Maduro, killing members of his government, and taking him to jail—was seen by some as positive, with Maduro described as a criminal who destroyed the country and economy. Speaker 1 responded by focusing on the human impact in Venezuela and other Latin American countries. They stated that a large portion of the population has suffered, with a notable number of people migrating from Venezuela and Honduras. They asserted that elections in Venezuela were stolen by Maduro’s regime, stating that the opposition’s poll results were stored in the cloud and the government did not want to see them because they knew they would lose. They described this as not democracy. They added that, since Hondurans left the country due to trafficking, vessels by sea and illegal flights were bringing jobs to Honduras, but also causing deaths and bloodshed. They argued that if the Trump administration framed Drug Trafficking as terrorism, it was warranted because the drug flow to the United States harmed not only U.S. citizens but also Honduras, which faced the highest death toll in fifteen years due to drugs coming through its borders, largely from Venezuela, and that nothing was done about this by prior administrations. Speaker 0 then asked for the stance on U.S. intervention in general: should intervention be allowed only in certain cases (e.g., Maduro), or should there be no U.S. intervention in Latin America under any president? Speaker 1 shared a Venezuelan friend’s view that there are no options to change Venezuela and that intervention might be necessary if there is no other way to save Venezuela. From a Honduran perspective, they believed Trump’s actions helped not only Honduras but also other Central American and regional countries along the drug-trafficking routes, by reducing corruption, bloodshed, and deaths. They argued that the political machinery Chavez created and used to stall elections in other Latin American countries had previously gone unchecked by the U.S., and that Trump faced Maduro with a confrontation. They concluded that many people in the world do not know what has been happening in Venezuela and its impact on the region. They stated that Trump confronted Maduro, who now has a chance to defend himself in a trial, and emphasized the issue of sovereignty for every country.

- The discussion opens with the possibility of a coup in Venezuela, with Speaker 0 suggesting the first step would be to “take out Maduro.” Speaker 1 notes reports that Maduro sought amnesty from the US to step down, which Trump allegedly refused. - A recurring theme is the idea of watching naval movements to gauge US willingness to attack a country. Speaker 2 emphasizes that an aircraft carrier battle group signals seriousness, citing the USS Gerald R. Ford and 11 associated ships as the indicator that the US is “serious.” He also questions any upside for the US in regime change in Venezuela, noting the US has avoided buying or refining Venezuelan oil and arguing that the policy lacks a clear benefit. - On drugs, Speaker 2 asserts that the drugs in Venezuela are not Venezuelan but come from Colombia and Ecuador, transiting Venezuela to West Africa and then to Europe, with the claim that Europe is the primary market and the US a smaller one. He argues this reflects broader flaws in US foreign policy. - The speakers discuss the potential consequences if Maduro steps down, predicting chaos, and reflect on the broader narrative shift from Iran, Russia, and Ukraine to Venezuela. They discuss whether the military and regional powers would support intervention. Speaker 2 argues that regional powers (Colombia, Brazil, Mexico) are opposed to American intervention, complicating any possible regime-change effort. - The issue of amnesty is revisited. Speaker 2 speculates Trump might want a “scalp” as a symbol of seriousness on drugs, drawing a parallel to Manuel Noriega’s capture, while noting that a post-overthrow stability plan is often missing in US operations. - The conversation touches on China’s role. Speaker 2 suggests China’s refinery investments in the Caribbean represent a strategic shift away from US-dominated refining, arguing that this creates incentives for China and reduces the US’s influence, with Maduro’s regime survival as a central concern. - On whether Maduro would offer US full access to Venezuelan oil, Speaker 2 says he can’t see it changing the strategic calculus, and argues China’s expanding influence makes regime change less sensible for the US. - They discuss the plausibility of using naval movements as a bluff to force Maduro to depart, noting such tactics are used in the South China Sea. However, Speaker 2 cautions that removing Maduro would create a power vacuum, and the military’s stance remains uncertain since the region’s powers oppose intervention. - Regarding the opposition, Speaker 2 downplays Maria Machado’s prospects, suggesting she lacks military backing and that a senior military officer might be the likely successor if Maduro leaves. The Juan Guaido episode is cited to illustrate the fragility and divisiveness of Venezuelan opposition movements. - The feasibility of decapitation-style strikes against Maduro is debated. Speaker 2 stresses Maduro is the internationally recognized president and emphasizes that any coup would require ground forces and a day-two plan, which historically has been lacking in US interventions. - They compare potential outcomes to Libya’s post-overthrow chaos and caution that US-imposed peace rarely lasts. The risk of a renewed crisis in Venezuela, including possible Hezbollah or Iranian connections, is acknowledged as a troubling possibility. - The discussion ends with a somber note that even seasoned policymakers may overestimate the success of regime change, and a reminder of historical lessons about coup outcomes and long-term stability.

Speaker 0 asks about how common it is for the CIA to use drugs as a weapon or to create cartels for various purposes, and whether it sometimes works as a strategy. Speaker 1 responds that it continues to this day, with key US allies implicated in the drug trade. The Organization for Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project, funded by the State Department, is described as an investigative journalist outlet that has a new report about the Noboa family’s ties to the Balkan mafia. The Noboa family controls Ecuador; Daniel Noboa, born in Miami, is the president, and his family owns a Noboa shipping company. The shipping company is alleged to have been involved in sending bananas through the Noboa Bonita Fruit Company packed with cocaine to Europe via routes overseen by the Balkan Mafia. Ecuador is described as the largest drug export center to the United States, per the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, while Venezuela is claimed to be responsible for about 5% of drug transit. Kristi Noem, identified as the DHS secretary, is said to have visited Ecuador to meet with Daniel Noboa and campaign for a referendum to bring US military bases back to Ecuador, a referendum that was rejected by Ecuadorians. Noboa is portrayed as strategically valuable to the US, described as friendly with Marco Rubio, who has touted him as a partner in the war on drugs, yet the claim is made that the issue is about geostrategic interests. Noboa is said to have ended the legacy of social democrat Rafael Correa and is purportedly supporting US military bases on Ecuadorian soil, aligning with US interests even as Ecuador becomes a center of narco-trafficking and cartels destabilize parts of the country. In Mexico, the narrative references Vicente Fox and Felipe Calderón, noting Calderón as author of Plan Mérida, a US military-directed program to combat drugs in Mexico. Gennaro García Luna, head of Mexico’s equivalent of the FBI, is described as now in a US federal prison for life for involvement in a conspiracy with the Sinaloa cartel to ship drugs to the United States. The State Department is said to have acknowledged knowing about Luna’s activities while valuing him as a political partner. The Fast and Furious program is mentioned, alleging that the US armed Mexican cartels to track guns, and a 2011 federal court testimony by a Chapo Guzmán lieutenant claimed the US armed the Sinaloa cartel to defeat rivals like the Guadalajara cartel. A recent raid in Oakton, Northern Virginia, on Paul Campo, former director of the DEA’s financial division, is described. Campo was in charge of money laundering investigations and was associated with a CIA asset named Robert Sensi to launder $12,000,000 for the Jalisco New Generation Cartel. The speaker notes ongoing exploration of these connections. Historically, the CIA is said to have worked with narco cartels to fund black operations, funding proxy wars in Central America with off-the-books money. The Guadalajara cartel allegedly funded the Nicaraguan Contras through cartel profits. Enrique “Kiki” Camarena, a DEA agent, reportedly discovered the Guadalajara cartel’s involvement in black operations and was captured and tortured, with alleged monitoring by CIA operatives including Felix Rodríguez, who supervised the capture of Che Guevara. This is tied to a documentary on Amazon called The Last NARC.

Mario: Let's start with Venezuela. Do you think this is a strategy by Trump? Larry: I saw something similar back in 1988. The CIA was involved with trying to provoke Manuel Noriega into taking some action, so we could say we had to respond to set the stage for a military invasion, which I believe that in 2018, Donald Trump signed a finding authorizing a covert CIA action to get rid of Maduro. That attempt failed. And now the objective is to get control of the oil. That's the number one priority, with an eye toward the risk of a renewed Iran conflict and the prospect of shutdown of the Persian Gulf, and the need to have an alternative supplier. Ukraine defeating Russia was the plan, and Russia’s military is now around 1,500,000. Mario: What’s your initial reaction to Venezuela? I talked to John Kuriaki who said to read naval movements to gauge what the military plans. The buildup on the coast of Venezuela is significant. They’ve got 14, 12 warships, including the Gerald Ford. Do you think they are bluffing or this is a Trump strategy? Larry: It could be a bluff. I saw something similar in 1988. I was in the Central America branch, and the CIA’s analytical thrust was to provoke Noriega into taking action to justify a response and invasion. That happened in 1988. But that time there were US bases in Panama; Quarry Heights was full. Southern Command was there. Now Southern Command has moved to Miami, just near Southcom. Another issue: within the military, the concept of supported and supporting commands means the special operations command (SOCOM) would normally be the supporting commander, but here Southern Command would be subordinate to SOCOM, which is problematic because SOCOM cannot fight a conventional war. Delta Force, SEAL Team Six, and others are light infantry for raids, not mass warfare. So launching shells or sending ground forces won’t solve Venezuela; terrain is rugged and favors ambushes. If US troops ashore, body bags would likely exceed those from Iraq and Afghanistan. Venezuelans will fight, and insurgents from Brazil and Colombia could join. Decapitation strikes against Maduro could provoke an insurgency that the US would struggle to pacify. Mario: Could we see a decapitation strike like Israel against Hezbollah and Iran? Larry: Decapitating Maduro would still leave loyalists and other actors with weapons; an insurgency could erupt, and the US would be unable to pacify it. The real objective here is unclear. The State Department’s INL/INSCR programs have long documented Venezuela as a transit point for drugs; Trump claimed fentanyl is the issue, but most cocaine also goes to Europe. The 2018 Trump era mentioned the Trendy Aragua as a pretext to justify covert actions; I believe Trump signed a finding authorizing a CIA operation to remove Maduro, leading to Guaidó, but that failed. The broader agenda appears to be regaining oil influence and countering Russia, China, and Iran’s influence in Venezuela. Mario: Elaborate the agenda and strategy behind these strikes on boats out of Venezuela and Trump’s public acknowledgement of a CIA covert operation. What’s the strategy and intention? Larry: The objective is to restore oil control in Venezuela and reduce adversary influence. Maduro once aligned with the CIA, and Chavez/Maduro have maintained cordial relations with Moscow and Beijing. The US aims to curtail BRICS and reduce Venezuelan ties to Russia, China, and Iran, potentially moving Venezuela away from the dollar-based system. The theory that this is a message to Putin circulates, but if that were the aim, it’s a poor strategy given the broader geopolitical dynamics in Syria, Iran, and the Palestinian-Israeli arena. The US previously overpromised in the Red Sea and failed to secure freedom of navigation, signaling limited military capacity for large-scale campaigns. The objective of any Venezuela action must be concrete, otherwise it risks entanglement in an insurgency. Mario: Turning to general foreign policy under Trump. What about the national security strategy? Europe’s criticisms, and Trump’s approach to Ukraine—Witkoff and Kushner meeting Putin? Larry: The 2025 national security strategy signals change, but these documents are not blueprints; they’re guidelines. Europe is being asked to step up, while the US distances itself, arguing Europe’s resources and industrial capacity have diminished while Russia and China shift. Europe’s censorship and defense spending are under scrutiny. The US–UK intelligence relationship still lingers, but overall the West’s ability to project force is questioned. Russia and China’s relationship is deep and mutually reinforcing; the Rand Corporation’s earlier ideas that Ukraine would defeat Russia to force Moscow to join the West have not materialized. Ukraine’s fight has forced Russia to mobilize and shift front lines; casualty counts are contested, but Russia’s front has expanded with a larger force and higher attrition. Mario: What about Ukraine negotiations and Putin’s terms? Larry: Putin’s terms (as stated on 06/14/2024) are: Crimea, Zaporizhzhia, Kherson, Donetsk, and Luhansk permanently part of Russia; Ukraine must withdraw forces from those territories before negotiations begin. An election must be held in Ukraine with a legitimately elected president, potentially replacing Zelenskyy, and Russia would then talk to Ukraine. Russia’s stance treats these territories as non-negotiable; freezing lines is not acceptable to Russia. If negotiations fail, Russia is likely to maintain control over large parts of Donbas and southern Ukraine, potentially extending into Kharkiv and Odessa. Western military support is insufficient in scale to match Russia’s production; Russia’s oil revenue remains a significant portion of GDP, and the global south is pivoting toward BRICS, with Modi’s meeting signaling stronger ties with Russia and China. The strategic trend is a shift away from Western dominance toward a multipolar order. Mario: Larry, appreciate your time. Larry: Pleasure as always, Mario.

Venezuela is turned into a narco terrorist state that continues to work with the FARC, continues to work with ELN from Colombia to send record amounts of cocaine from Venezuela, from Colombia into the Mexican cartels that continue to come into The United States at record amounts. "We have seized more cocaine this year than past years." "The amount of methamphetamine coming into this country continues to be on the uptick, and we still see record amounts of fentanyl coming into our country." "But the Venezuelan corruption, the Venezuelan dictatorship, he is a narco terrorist." "They continue to send this poison to The United States killing hundreds of thousands of Americans, not to mention the TDA members that they send to our country to destroy the beautiful streets of The United States."

The speaker stated, “How about we’re buying oil from Venezuela? When I left, Venezuela was ready to collapse. We would have taken it over. We would have gotten all that oil. It would have been right next door.” The claim centers on the idea that external action could have enabled acquiring Venezuelan oil by seizing control as the country was described as near collapse.

The Venezuelan government has dispatched Trende Aragua, this gang, to come into The United States and commit mayhem. And one of the things that was leaked from someone in the intel community was that didn't happen. There is no official link between the Venezuelan government and Trendy Aragua. Therefore, it's not an incursion. It's not an invasion. The FBI very clearly is the intelligence element that is responsible for domestic security. The Maduro, Venezuelan government is supporting Trendy Aragua and their criminal activities here enabled by president Biden's four years of open borders where they very freely came in and out of our country and were able to to begin to control territory here in The United States.

Speaker 0: Have you considered talking to the president of Colombia who you called a drop leader? Speaker 1: No. I haven't really thought too much about him. He's been fairly hostile to The United States, and I haven't given him a lot of thought. He's he's gonna have himself some big problems if he doesn't wise up. Speaker 2: Did you say Colombia is producing a lot of drugs. Have cocaine factories that they make cocaine, as you know, and they sell it right into The United States. So he better wise up or he'll be next. He'll be next too. I hope he's listening. Speaker 0: So was this operation a message that you're sending to Mexico, to Claudia Scheinbaum, president there? Speaker 2: Well, it wasn't meant to be. We're very friendly with her. She's a good woman, but the cartels are running Mexico. She's not running Mexico. The cartels are running Mexico. We could be politically correct and be nice and say, oh, yes. Is no. No. She's very, you know, she's very frightened of the cartels that are running Mexico. And I've asked her numerous times, would you like us to take out the cartels? No. No. No, mister president. No. No, no, please. So we have to do something because we lost the real number is 300,000 people, in my opinion. You know, they like to say a 100,000. A 100,000 is a lot of people, but the real number is 300,000 people. And we lost it to drugs, and they come in through the southern border, mostly the southern border. A lot plenty come in through Canada too, by the way, in case you don't know. But but they come in through the southern border, and something's gonna have to be done with Mexico. Cuban government, the Trump administration's next target, mister secretary, very quickly. Speaker 3: Well, the Cuban government is a is a huge problem. Yeah. The the the the Cuban government is a huge problem for Speaker 2: some So is that a yes? Speaker 3: Cuba. But I don't think people fully appreciate. I think they're in a lot of trouble. Yes. I'm not gonna talk talk to you about what our future steps are gonna be and our policies are gonna be right now in this regard, but I don't think it's any mystery that we are not big fans of the Cuban regime, who, by the way, are the ones that were propping up Maduro. His entire, like, internal security force, his internal security opera apparatus is entirely controlled by Cubans. One of the untold stories here is how, in essence, you talk about colonization because I think you said Dulce Rodriguez mentioned that, the ones who have sort of colonized, at least inside the regime, are Cubans. It was Cubans that guarded Maduro. He was not guarded by Venezuelan bodyguards. He had Cuban bodyguards. In terms of their internal intelligence, who spies on who inside to make sure there are no traitors, those are all Cubans. Speaker 0: He felt very strongly. We we needed for nationals. We need Greenland for national security, not for minerals. We had some we have so many sites for minerals and oil and everything. We have more oil than any other country in the world. We need Greenland for national security.

The speaker invokes James Madison to emphasize that war and peace decisions belong to the legislature, calling it the “crown jewel of Congress,” and warns that concentrating war-making power in one person erodes liberty. If the president believes military action against Venezuela is justified, the case should be made to Congress and Congress should vote before American lives and treasure are spent on regime change in South America. The speaker questions the likelihood of Maduro being replaced by a modern-day George Washington, asking how past interventions fared in Cuba, Libya, Iraq, or Syria. He notes that previous presidents used weapons of mass destruction as a justification for war, referencing the WMD narrative and suggesting a parallel with today’s rhetoric about drugs as a supposed WMD. He asserts that if the objective were drugs, actions would have targeted Mexico, China, or Colombia, and highlights the pardon of Juan Orlando Hernandez as inconsistent with a drug-war narrative. He contends that the policy for regime change is driven by oil interests, and asserts that the United States has already pursued this path in Venezuela without success. The speaker recalls the 2019 recognition of Juan Guaido, the seizure of Venezuela’s embassy in Washington, and claims that regime change was promised but Maduro remains in power years later. He mentions contemporary exiled figures as hopes, specifically naming Edmundo Gonzalez and Maria Carina Machado, but warns that Congress should not provide a blank check for military escalation and American lives. A central contradiction highlighted is the administration’s labeling of the Maduro regime as narco terrorists while at the same time potentially causing countless refugees through escalation, alongside moves to end temporary protected status (TPS) for hundreds of thousands of Venezuelans and deport them to the regime it condemns. The speaker poses questions about whether the nation should absorb millions of Venezuelan refugees and spend billions to destroy and rebuild the country, or risk creating a “miniature Afghanistan in the Western Hemisphere.” If the cost is deemed acceptable by Congress, the speaker argues it should be decided through a vote, aligning with the Constitution. He clarifies that the current vote is not for declaring war or authorizing force, but for a war powers resolution that reaffirms Congress’s authority over war decisions. He urges support for the resolution and closes as time expires.

- Fox News-style segment declares judgment day for Maduro, describing him as a narco terrorist socialist dictator who took over for Hugo Chavez and flooding the U.S. with migrants, gangs, and cocaine. 11 US warships, including the USS Gerald R. Ford, are in the Caribbean; Venezuela is surrounded. The strike group awaits orders as the president’s White House meetings calculate the next move against the narco state. Trump is said to be giving Maduro an ultimatum: abdicate power or face force; after a phone call, the claim is that it’s a decisive moment. - The New York Times allegedly reported a phone call with Maduro; Trump confirms it happened but offers few details. Reports describe Maduro asking for global amnesty and elections, which Trump reportedly rejected. Maduro allegedly asked if stepping down would still allow him to control the military; the claim is Maduro was told to pack his bags. - It’s claimed Maduro, despite a $50 million bounty, remains in power through crony bribery tied to coke, oil, and gold rackets. The narrative asserts that this time, the narcos aren’t calling the shots; Uncle Sam is, with Trump tightening the noose. In the last 24 hours, airspace above Venezuela was closed, described as an escalation. - Questions are raised about ground troops in Venezuela, with officials saying there are many options on the table and that Maduro is a sitting duck who could be out before Christmas. Beijing and Moscow are cast as not supporting Maduro, while Trump supposedly engages in larger trade and diplomatic deals with them. Venezuelan gangs are said to have trafficked large quantities of cocaine to West Africa, fueling flows to Europe. - Chuck Schumer is described as previously backing military action in multiple countries; now under Trump, there are questions about plans in Venezuela. The segment emphasizes that drugs are framed as a national security issue, with a focus on destroying cartel finances by targeting cocaine boats, described as 40-foot speedboats carrying millions in contraband. - The CIA is asserted to be on the ground with authorized options for the president; Operation Southern Spear is said to defend the American homeland from drug warfare. A debate erupts over the legitimacy and legality of strikes in the Caribbean, with references to a Washington Post report of a second strike that reportedly killed survivors, which some call a war crime and others defend as lawful self-defense in international waters. - Critics are represented as arguing there’s no war with Venezuela, but rather murder; discussions surface about whether a second strike that killed survivors constitutes a war crime. Some participants warn against obeying unlawful orders, citing laws that prohibit interfering with military loyalty or discipline, and noting that some veterans would refuse illegal orders. - The View is invoked to question accountability for orders; a captain in the Navy is asked if he would carry out orders to strike drug boats. The segment accuses a “Seditious Six” and a CIA-backed propaganda effort of aiming to undermine Trump’s Latin American actions, suggesting factions within the government leak intelligence and oppose a successful Latin American operation. - The overall theme portrays a high-stakes U.S. intervention in Venezuela as a landmark confrontation with Maduro, framed by constitutional-law debates, alleged war-crimes concerns, and internal political maneuvering aimed at potential martial-law or insurrection scenarios, all while positioning the CIA, the Monroe Doctrine, and Operation Southern Spear as central to deterring narcotics and reasserting American deterrence.

Max Blumenthal explains that the January 3 operation in Caracas appeared to be a terrorist assault on Caracas, involving the kidnapping of Nicolas Maduro and his wife Celia Flores. He notes Maduro’s presidential guard was massacred, 32 Cuban officers were killed, and many civilians died, with no US casualties reported. He suggests the operation reflected a long-prepared plan by the US, with initials of a “hay a halo” style high-altitude entry into Miraflores Palace. He cites Venezuelan official Diosdado Cabello stating that Flores demanded to accompany Maduro and may have saved his life, and he questions whether there was a betrayal or widespread military collapse on the Venezuelan side. He interviewed former Venezuelan foreign minister Jorge Arreaza, who denied insider deals or betrayals and supported Maduro’s view, though Blumenthal notes there is backroom dealmaking with the US occurring under Maduro. Ariasso is said to have reported that communication systems were taken out, bases bombed, and key communication towers destroyed, with drones still in Venezuelan airspace; thus, Blumenthal questions whether an order not to scramble Sukhoi jets prevented an escalation. He describes the episode as a “staggering failure of intelligence, counterintelligence, military,” while observing the resilience of the Chavista movement: Delsy Rodriguez as acting president committed to sovereignty, and officials like Cabello and Vladimir Padrino López remaining in place, with collectivos in the streets. He argues Trump must contend with the Chavista movement because they control institutions. He notes Venezuela announced the release of “political prisoners,” arguing many were linked to US-backed opposition efforts, but he cannot provide names. Blumenthal cites Rick Grinnell, Trump’s envoy to Venezuela, who reportedly negotiated directly with Maduro for a deal involving Chevron’s drilling license in exchange for deported Venezuelan migrants; Grinnell implied the opposition, led by Maria Corina Machado, resisted allowing Maduro or Venezuela to strike a deal and instead aimed to delegitimize Maduro. He accuses Rubio of aiding移 deportations of Venezuelan migrants to Nayib Bukele’s El Salvador, where detainees were publicly humiliated and tortured; he claims these actions were designed to prevent deals that would allow Maduro to gain revenue or preserve ties. He argues Maduro was open to a deal, but not one controlled by Trump. Blumenthal asserts Trump’s larger aim is regime change to control Venezuela’s oil and cut ties with Russia and China, pressing Maduro to run Venezuela under US orders, potentially to funnel oil proceeds offshore to avoid US accountability. He claims Trump seeks a 30–50 million barrel oil deal, with revenue used to buy American products, but offshore holdings would enable plunder by Trump Incorporated, and the operation signals a broader Monroe Doctrine-esque strategy. He argues this has implications for multipolar states and regional stability, noting Russia and China’s positions, including Xi’s visit to Miraflores before Maduro’s kidnapping and possible retaliation against Venezuela’s Belt and Road interests. In discussing legality, Blumenthal says kidnapping a head of state and trying him in New York would violate international law; under ICJ precedent, a national court cannot try a head of state without an ICC indictment and transfer to The Hague. He contends the Maduro indictment’s narcoterrorism claim is a fraud; he traces its origins to CIA-linked drug networks from the Reagan era, including “cartel of the Suns.” He discusses Hugo Carvajal (El Pollo) and his cooperation with the US, including a secret plea deal and testimony alleging Maduro’s regime involvement, including a claim that Venezuela’s Smartmatic allegations could be used to convict Maduro. He notes a DOJ superseding indictment calling the cartel a “loose network” rather than a formal cartel, and mentions a DC-9 flight (Cocaine One) allegedly connected to CIA-backed operations, potentially exposing CIA involvement, which Judge Hellerstein did not allow in court. Blumenthal concludes by calling the operation a mafia-like show—“gangsterism”—and suggests the Maduro case could challenge international law; he references prior interviews where he argued the “Cartel de los Soles” was not a real organization, a point later echoed by Washington Post and France 24. He closes acknowledging time constraints.