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CBDCs (Central Bank Digital Currencies) differ greatly from cash. Unlike cash, CBDCs provide central banks with complete control over regulations and usage. This control is enforced through advanced technology, making a significant distinction from cash.

The main difference with a Central Bank Digital Currency (CBDC) is that the central bank will have complete control over the rules and regulations governing its use. They will also have the technology to enforce these rules. This is significant because it sets CBDCs apart from cash.

Speaker 0 argues that there is a shift toward bankers increasingly controlling both monetary and fiscal policy, describing it as a "financial coup d'etat." They claim that for centuries there has been a balance of power between the people's representatives who control fiscal policy (taxation) and bankers who control monetary policy. According to Speaker 0, bankers have decided to use digital technology to assert control over both sides of government policy, leveraging CBDCs (central bank digital currencies), stablecoins, and asset tokens as programmable money. They assert that this move is underway and cite Davos as evidence, noting that Larry Fink, the acting co-chair of the World Economic Forum, is aggressively promoting the idea of moving the entire financial system into a digital control grid. The speaker contends that the descriptions of the bankers’ intentions are becoming very open and explicit, and that the result would be the abolition or collapse of the republic in favor of a system where bankers control both monetary and fiscal policy. The speaker questions whether legislative representatives would remain in any executive or ceremonial role, describing the future as fluid and capable of many directions. They emphasize that the transition has been very incremental for decades, facilitated by the federal government not running its financial statements and operations in accordance with the law and not disclosing them properly. This, they claim, has allowed the shift to occur with the public largely unaware or complacent. Speaker 0 notes that many Americans have accepted the current system because they benefit from it in the short term—“as long as I get my check, I’m okay with the system as it is.” They frame this acceptance as part of the reason the changes have progressed with limited public pushback. In sum, the speaker contends that the bankers are moving to extend control from monetary policy into fiscal policy through digital technologies and programmable money, a process they describe as a quiet, long-running coup that could redefine the balance of power in government.

Digital money offers significant benefits, beyond just being a digital version of physical currency. It allows for programmability, such as central bank currency with expiry dates. In my book, I discuss the potential for a world where the government can restrict the use of central bank money for certain purchases it deems undesirable, like ammunition, drugs, or pornography. This concept has the potential to be both better and darker, but it highlights the power of a central bank digital currency (CBDC).

There is a significant difference between cash and Central Bank Digital Currency (CBDC). With cash, we don't know who is using specific bills, but with CBDC, the Central Bank will have complete control over the rules and regulations governing its use. They will also have the technology to enforce these rules. These differences make CBDC distinct from cash.

Volgens Speaker 1 zijn veel mensen ervan overtuigd dat de CBDC onlosmakelijk verbonden is met een digital ID, maar dat is volgens hem niet zo. Speaker 2 legt uit dat de “digital currency” een wallet voor geld betreft, terwijl de EUDI (het digitale paspoort van Europa) een wallet is voor credentials: bewijzen. Met die EUDI kan je inloggen en jezelf bewijzen aan een andere partij, bijvoorbeeld dat je ouder dan 18 bent of dat je een geldig rijbewijs hebt, zonder dat die partij de informatie hoeft te kennen. De uitkomst is een cryptografisch bewijs voor authenticatie/identificatie, zoals bij inloggen op een website. Over het technisch ontwerp zegt Speaker 2 dat het als architect een prachtig systeem is en “helemaal goed in elkaar zit.” In het gesprek wordt ook benadrukt dat er “geen geld” in de EUDI zit: het is een wallet waar geen centrale koppeling met geld of met de CBDC per se in zit. Er wordt een vergelijking gemaakt met een fysieke portefeuille: Speaker 2 beschrijft dat hij zijn EUDI-wallet gebruikte om bijvoorbeeld te betalen via zijn ING-rekening, terwijl er in elk geval identiteits- en bewijsdocumenten zoals rijbewijs in zitten. Speaker 0 stipt aan dat “wallet” voor hem betekent dat er echt geld in zit. De discussie gaat daardoor over betekenis: er wordt herhaald dat een wallet een plek is waar je dingen bewaart/verwerkt, en dat de EUDI-wallet vooral credentials bevat. Speaker 2 noemt dat je met die credentials kunt bewijzen wie je bent, dat je een diploma hebt, en dat je ingelogd bent, zonder dat er een centraal punt tussen zit dat kan volgen. Volgens Speaker 2 is dit een oplossing tegen surveillance die voortkomt uit bestaande inlogmethoden via partijen als Google en big data, waarbij wordt gevolgd waar je inlogt en hoe lang. Speaker 2 vergelijkt de werking met cash: net zoals geld van hand naar hand wordt overgegeven, worden credentials van hand naar hand of van app naar app overgedragen, met “geen centrale database” ertussen. Hij noemt het daarom “cash identificatie.” Op de vraag of de CBDC in de wallet ligt, antwoordt Speaker 2 dat de CBDC niet erin ligt zoals bedoeld, en dat het gaat om wat de wallet “pakt” uit de verzameling die je hebt (zoals een fysieke wallet met passen en cash). Tot slot illustreert Speaker 2 dat “wallet” ook kan betekenen dat het simpelweg een plek is waar je zaken bewaart of verwerkt, bijvoorbeeld een “reiswallet” waarin reispapieren en EHBO-papieren voor een reiziger werden verzameld.

The speaker expresses skepticism towards central bank digital currency (CBDC) and questions its purpose. They highlight that existing platforms like Venmo can already perform transactions efficiently. The speaker challenges the notion that CBDC would improve financial inclusion or cross-border remittances, and questions the lack of evidence supporting these claims. They also mention that CBDC could enable monitoring of transactions, imposition of negative interest rates, and direct taxation of customer accounts, which is why China might be interested. However, the speaker questions why the American people would support such measures.

Digital money offers significant benefits, including programmability and the ability to set expiry dates for central bank currency. In my book, I discuss the potential for a world where the government can restrict the use of central bank money for certain purchases it deems undesirable. This could lead to a better or darker future, depending on one's perspective.

Digital money offers significant benefits, including programmability and the ability to set expiry dates for central bank currency. In my book, I explore the potential for a world where the government can restrict the use of central bank money for certain purchases it deems less desirable. This could lead to a better or darker future, depending on one's perspective.

The speaker expresses skepticism about the need for a Central Bank Digital Currency (CBDC). They question what problem a CBDC solves, as they can easily send money with Venmo. They dismiss the arguments of financial inclusion and cross-border remittances, asking for evidence to support these claims. The speaker acknowledges that China may have reasons to implement a CBDC, such as monitoring transactions, imposing negative interest rates, and directly taxing customer accounts. However, they question why the American people would be interested in a CBDC.

The speaker expresses skepticism towards central bank digital currency (CBDC) and questions its purpose. They highlight that existing platforms like Venmo can already perform financial transactions efficiently. The speaker challenges the notion that CBDC would improve financial inclusion or cross-border remittances, as there is no evidence to support these claims. They suggest that CBDC could be used by governments to monitor transactions, impose negative interest rates, or directly tax customer accounts, which is why China may be interested. However, the speaker questions why the American people would need CBDC.

The speaker explains that understanding the digital control grid requires grasping three parts: programmable money, digital IDs, and a supporting hardware infrastructure. First, programmable money is presented as the most important element. The speaker argues that guardrails are needed to prevent programmable money from interfering with “financial freedom.” Second, programmable money is said to depend on a digital ID. The speaker claims they fought against digital IDs and lists excuses used to justify them, including online safety, vaccinations, election fraud, and immigration. The speaker says tight borders existed before digital technology and asserts there is no need for digital IDs. According to the speaker, proponents want a high-quality, globally interoperable digital ID in order to implement a “third lock,” and that digital IDs are required for that third lock. Third, the speaker says the final requirement is hardware infrastructure. They describe this as increasingly visible in America, citing FLAC cameras, drones overhead, and large data centers. The speaker references an approval of a data center in Utah described as 63 miles wide or long, with an estimate that full capacity would use three times more energy than the entire state of Utah currently uses. They add that the United States has approximately 4,500 data centers, while China has about 368, claiming the U.S. has more than ten times as many despite having a much smaller population. The speaker connects these data centers to collecting data and implementing the “third lock,” not only on American citizens but also on people worldwide who have stable coins or trade digital tokens. The speaker concludes that as hardware becomes more present and visible, more people—especially young people—start objecting and pushing back, saying they do not want to be part of it.

"We tend to establish the equivalence with cash, and there is a huge difference there." "For example, in cash, don't know, for example, who's using a $100 bill today." "We don't know who is using a 1,000 peso bill today." "A key difference in with the CBDC is that central bank will have absolute control on the rules and regulations that will determine the use of that expression of central bank liability." "And also, we will have the technology to enforce that." "Those are those two issues are extremely important, and that makes a huge difference with respect to what to what cash is."

Digital money offers significant benefits like programmability and the potential for central bank currency with specific characteristics. However, there are concerns about governments restricting what can be purchased with this digital money, which could impact the integrity and independence of central banks. While there are exciting possibilities with digital money, there is also a risk of technology leading us down a negative path.

If we were to pursue a CBDC, it would have four key characteristics. First, it would be intermediated. Second, privacy would be protected. Third, identity verification would be required, meaning it wouldn't be anonymous. Fourth, it would be transferable or interoperable. We aim to strike a balance between privacy protection and identity verification, as is done in traditional banking today.

There is a significant difference between cash and central bank digital currency (CBDC). With cash, we don't know who is using specific bills, but with CBDC, the central bank has complete control over the rules and regulations governing its use. Additionally, the central bank has the technology to enforce these rules. These differences make CBDC distinct from cash.

There is a significant difference between cash and central bank digital currency (CBDC). With cash, we don't know who is using specific bills, but with CBDC, the central bank has complete control over the rules and regulations governing its use. Additionally, the central bank has the technology to enforce these rules. These differences make CBDC distinct from cash.

The speaker discusses Central Bank Digital Currency (CBDC), specifically the digital euro, and its upcoming introduction planned for 2029, noting that the European Parliament has some resistance. Rapporteur Naharete Rogas opposes the plan, arguing that the current design adds nothing for ordinary people, i.e., ordinary citizens like you and me. The speaker counters a common claim that CBDC is not a replacement for cash and that the digital euro is not programmable. The speaker argues that, by definition, central bank money can be programmable. The explanation focuses on how the central bank’s balance sheet works when money is spent. When the central bank issues money (spends), it increases its balance sheet. Cash sits on the right side of the balance sheet. To keep the balance, on the asset side there are government bonds (and potentially other bonds) that earn interest, which means the central bank collects money from society. The Dutch central bank has written in a report about design choices for a digital euro that the central bank can influence society by increasing the money supply, because it earns interest, a process often referred to as seigniorage. The speaker emphasizes that if cash exists in a given quantity and the central bank issues CBDC in addition to that cash, the central bank’s balance sheet grows. To prevent this imbalance, the only way to keep the totals equal is implied: every time you issue 1 euro of CBDC or even a 10-euro note in digital form, you would need to keep the physical cash in ATMs from being replenished or refreshed. Under the digital euro scenario labeled “scenario 4,” CBDC would thus be the replacement of cash, with the overall sum being kept in balance through this mechanism. The speaker concludes with “Dus dut,” underscoring that the outcome depends on how the total money supply is managed and whether CBDC is deployed in a way that maintains or replaces cash.

All the great work that you have done in health and all the great work you have done in food to preserve food and health freedoms, the minute they get financial transaction control, they will delete all of it. Financial control and controlling the financial transaction train tracks is the meta control that they will use to control food and health. if these guys get a 100% digital system with a digital ID and programmable money, guess what? They're going to dictate, you don't get your vaccine this month, they're going to turn off your money. And when I read it I couldn't understand how do they think they're going to market this, and that's when I realized, oh, programmable money is how they're going to market.

The speaker begins by noting that digital money offers substantial potential gains beyond merely digitizing physical currency. He highlights that digital money can introduce programmability, enabling features such as units of central bank currency with expiry dates. He references his book to illustrate a scenario in which central bank money could be programmed in ways that influence what can be purchased with it. The speaker describes a potentially better future, but also acknowledges a darker possibility. In a less favorable scenario, the government could decide that units of central bank money may be used to buy certain items while restricting others that it deems less desirable, such as ammunition, drugs, or pornography. He underscores that such capabilities would be very powerful in terms of how central bank money is used. He then emphasizes the implications for central banks themselves. The speaker argues that if central bank money takes on different characteristics across various units, or if central bank money becomes a conduit for targeted economic policies or broader social policies, this could threaten the integrity of central bank money. He extends the concern to the independence of central banks, implying that targeted or constrained use of central bank money could compromise their neutral status. The speaker reiterates that digital money holds wonderful possibilities, suggesting enhancements to monetary systems and policy implementation. However, he cautions that technology also carries a significant risk of steering outcomes toward a less desirable or more constricted use of money, potentially undermining core monetary principles or the perceived neutrality of central banking. In summary, the speaker presents a dual view: digital money can enable innovative features, flexibility, and new policy tools, yet it can also enable highly centralized or targeted controls over purchases and behavior. This duality raises concerns about the potential benefits versus the dangers, particularly regarding the integrity and independence of central banks if their money is used to enforce selective or restricted consumer choices. The overall message is a call to recognize both the transformative promise of digital money and the serious risks that could accompany its deployment.

First speaker asks what happens if the government issues digital currency. Second speaker responds that they’re talking about central bank digital currencies (CBDCs) and acknowledges their appeal due to ease, but believes a lot will happen as this develops. Second speaker explains that with digital currency, transactions are easy, and it will be similar to money market funds in terms of practical use. A key question is whether CBDCs can offer interest. There is a debate on this; if CBDCs cannot offer interest, they may be less effective as a hold-in vehicle, since depreciation could make alternatives like money market funds or bonds more attractive. There will be no privacy with CBDCs, making them a very effective government controlling mechanism: all transactions would be known. This close surveillance could be beneficial for countering illegal activity but would also give the government substantial control. Examples include tax collection, the ability to take money, and the establishment of foreign exchange controls. These controls could be particularly challenging for international holders of CBDCs; for instance, sanctions could enable authorities to seize funds held by individuals in other countries. Privacy concerns relate to the possibility that politically disfavored individuals could be shut off. Second speaker reiterates that these privacy and control issues are part of the broader picture. He suggests that, for those reasons, CBDCs will not become a magnitude that changes everything; development will occur, but he does not expect CBDCs to be a huge deal in scale, even though growth is likely.

The speaker explains that there is a significant difference between cash and Central Bank Digital Currency (CBDC). With cash, it is unknown who is using specific bills. However, with CBDC, the Central Bank will have complete control over the rules and regulations governing its use, and the technology to enforce them. This distinction is crucial and sets CBDC apart from cash.

Many people are a little worried about what will happen to them with the digital euro. Can you encourage them? Why is the digital euro good for people like you and me? The digital currency, where it has been piloted, and there is only one which is clearly now launched in in a very small country, but it is piloted on a fairly large scale in in China, is of use and of service to all citizens. So it is not something that is good for the elite or is good for the young or is good for some versus others. If it is well done and if it is well implemented, it would be of service to all citizens.

The speaker discusses the analysis of Central Bank Digital Currency (CBDC) and its comparison to cash. They highlight a significant difference between the two: while cash transactions are anonymous, CBDC allows the central bank to have complete control over the rules and regulations governing its use. Additionally, the speaker emphasizes that the central bank will possess the necessary technology to enforce these regulations. These factors distinguish CBDC from cash and make it a unique form of central bank liability.

"We move into this digital currency era where the banks are issuing these stable coins, these deposit tokens that are programmable money." "They're going to be sharing this data in the same database that the CIA and any other intelligence agency can access whenever they want without a warrant." "No more secret FISA courts or you don't need any of that infrastructure anymore. It is the new system." "Retail CBDC is not nearly as common today as wholesale CBDC." "Wholesale CBDC works as this two tier system." "the CBDC really only serves as a means of interbank settlement and isn't public facing at all." "FedNow, for example, of the Federal Reserve, that was launched solely as a means of interbank settlement, really." "When you have people like Trump and Ron DeSantis say no CBDC, they mean no public facing CBDC. They don't mean no wholesale CBDC."