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I'm aligned with the USA and the world, and I want this conflict resolved. It's tough to deal with the hatred involved, but I want to see a deal done in Europe. I can be tough, but that won't get us a deal. For four years, tough talk didn't stop Putin. Diplomacy is the path. During Obama, Trump and Biden's terms, nobody stopped Putin from occupying parts of Ukraine. We signed ceasefire and gas contracts, but he broke them. What kind of diplomacy are we talking about? It is disrespectful to come into the Oval Office and litigate this in front of the American media. Everyone has problems during war. You are gambling with World War Three and disrespecting a country that has backed you. Have you said thank you? You are running low on soldiers. We gave you $350 billion and military equipment. Without us, this war would have been over in two weeks. If you can get a ceasefire right now, I tell you you take it so the bullets stop flying and you meant stop getting. I gave you javelins. Obama gave sheets. He didn't break deals with me. If Russia breaks a ceasefire, what if a bomb drops on your head right now? I've empowered you to be a tough guy, and I don't think you'd be a tough guy without The United States. You're either gonna make a deal, or we're out.

I claimed that I could end the war in Ukraine within 24 hours. I have a good relationship with Zelensky and Putin, and I believe I can use that to negotiate a deal. Zelensky denied any knowledge of the controversial phone call, which I found honorable. However, I clarified that simply feeling threatened would not be enough to stop Putin from bombing Ukraine. My plan is to tell Zelensky to make a deal and warn Putin that if he doesn't, we will provide more support to Ukraine than ever before.

I met with Zelensky this morning and advised him to remain grateful and positive, promising to discuss security guarantees later. However, the meeting was a complete disaster, and I question whether Americans will still see him favorably. Based on what I witnessed, most Americans, including myself, wouldn't want Zelenskyy as a business partner. I spoke with President Trump last night, and he was optimistic about reaching a ceasefire and ending the war. I am proud of President Trump for showing the world not to trifle with him. However, Zelenskyy seemed to try and bait Trump in the Oval Office. JD was awesome.

Zelensky needs to act swiftly, as the war isn't progressing favorably for Ukraine. I believe I can successfully negotiate an end to the war with Russia, something others have failed to do. Putin may even agree. Zelensky seems unwilling or unable to pursue peace, evident by his frustration over not being invited to Saudi Arabia, and the fact that there have been no productive talks to end the war in three years. The war has resulted in devastating casualties for both sides, with countless lives lost. Ukraine is shattered under his leadership. To end this, you must talk to both sides, which hasn't happened. My hope is to see a ceasefire soon and restore stability in Europe.

So, we just had a very intense meeting between President Trump, Vice President Vance, and Zelensky. Vance suggested diplomacy for peace, but Zelensky quickly shot that down, bringing up a past broken deal with Putin, and questioned what kind of diplomacy Vance was even talking about. Vance responded by mentioning that Zelensky was being disrespectful. Trump then intervened, telling Zelensky not to dictate how they should feel, pointing out Ukraine's weak position and the risk of gambling with World War III. I made it clear that my alignment is with the United States and the world's well-being. I need to be able to negotiate without the kind of hatred Zelensky has for Putin, which makes reaching a deal difficult. I reminded everyone that without the United States, Ukraine has no leverage.

I was part of the Ukrainian negotiators trying to reach a peaceful settlement with Russia. We were close to finalizing an agreement in April, but it was postponed. In my opinion, Putin realized his mistake and quickly tried to make a deal with Ukraine. He personally accepted the Istanbul communique, which was a compromise compared to Russia's initial ultimatum proposal. It's important to remember that Putin genuinely wanted a peaceful resolution with Ukraine.

The speaker argues that Russia is winning the war in Ukraine due to superior weaponry and manpower, and Ukraine's dependence on Western support. He claims Trump will likely end the "Biden pipeline" of weaponry. A negotiated settlement is unlikely because Russia's demands—Ukraine's neutrality, demilitarization, and acceptance of Russian annexation of Crimea and four oblasts—are unacceptable to Ukraine and the West. The speaker believes Ukraine is losing and should cut a deal now to minimize losses, but nationalism and Western Russophobia prevent this. He dismisses the idea that Russia threatens to dominate Europe, calling it a "ridiculous argument" given their struggles in Eastern Ukraine. He says Putin wants to restore the Soviet empire, but Putin has stated that recreating the Soviet Union makes no sense. He views NATO expansion into Ukraine as the "taproot" of the war, analogous to the US Monroe Doctrine. He argues that the US foreign policy establishment is incompetent and has driven Russia into China's arms, undermining US strategic interests. He says the decision to bring NATO to Ukraine was made in 2008, and backing off is unacceptable to the US and the West. He claims the US has a special relationship with Israel that has no parallel in recorded history, and the Israel lobby has awesome power and profoundly influences US foreign policy in the Middle East. He says the Israelis are executing a genocide in Gaza, and the goal is ethnic cleansing. He believes the world will be dominated by the US, China, and Russia in the next 10 years.

The speaker argues that Russia is winning the war in Ukraine due to superior weaponry and manpower, and Ukraine's dependence on Western support. He claims that Trump won't refill the "Biden pipeline" of weaponry. He says Ukraine's defenses are collapsing and a diplomatic settlement is impossible because Russia's demands are unacceptable to Ukraine and the West. These demands include Ukraine becoming a neutral state, demilitarizing, and accepting Russia's annexation of Crimea and four oblasts. He believes Ukraine should cut a deal now to minimize losses, but nationalism prevents it. He dismisses the idea of Russia dominating Europe as ridiculous, stating Russia struggles to conquer eastern Ukraine. He says Putin pines for the Soviet era but understands recreating the Soviet empire is impossible. He views NATO expansion into Ukraine as the taproot of the war, analogous to America's Monroe Doctrine. He says the decision in 2008 to bring Ukraine into NATO was made despite recognizing Ukraine as a special case and a potential source of trouble. He attributes this decision to the belief that the US could "shove it down their throat," underestimating Russia's security concerns. He says the US has driven Russia into China's arms, which is against American interests. He says the Israel lobby has awesome power and influences US foreign policy in the Middle East, even when it conflicts with American interests. He says Israel is executing a genocide in Gaza to ethnically cleanse Palestinians from Greater Israel. He says the US has a special relationship with Israel that has no parallel in recorded history.

In 2022, during the last contact with the previous administration, I tried to convince my former American colleague that the situation should not be brought to the point of no return regarding hostilities, and to accept it back then. That's a big mistake. Today, Trump says that if he was the president back then, there would be no war, and I am quite sure that it would indeed be so. I can confirm that. I believe that me and President Trump have built a very good, business-like and trustworthy contact, and I have every reason to believe that moving down this path, we can reach the end of the conflict sooner.

In Ukraine, we are engaged in a proxy war that could have been avoided if we had honored the promise made to Gorbachev regarding NATO expansion. Moving eastward would infringe on Russia's borders, similar to their missile placement in Cuba. In the past, leaders communicated effectively to prevent escalation, but that seems lacking now. Instead, there is a focus on competition and military might, leading to increased tensions in both Ukraine and Israel.

The United States also wants to end this conflict. And before Putin launched his full invasion, we used every tool we could to try to prevent it. We used every tool diplomatically to prevent this war from starting. Did we really? Nope. The exact opposite is the case. The Russians were desperate to avoid a war. All you have to do is go back and look at the 12/17/2021 letter that Putin sent to both he and Stoltenberg, the head of NATO, and to president Biden, suggesting a deal and talking about getting together to figure out how to shut this conflict down and avoid a war. And we basically in fact, it was Tony Blinken who gave the Russians the high sign. We told them we're not interested, and we continued to push and push and push. And then when the Russians invaded on 02/24/2022, the Russians immediately thereafter sent a signal to the Ukrainians that they wanted to start peace negotiations. They wanted to end the war. This is right after they started it. Why? Because the Russians had no interest in a war. And, the peace negotiations were moving along quite well. There was no final agreement for sure, and one can never be certain that an agreement would have been worked out. But they were making major progress for sure, throughout March and early April. And lo and behold, The United States and the British basically tell the Ukrainians that they should walk away from the negotiations.

On February 24, 2022, Russia invaded Ukraine after sabotaging the Minsk agreements for seven years. The video argues that the primary purpose of the United States and United Kingdom was to sabotage the Istanbul negotiations in April 2022 in order to keep a long war going, using Ukrainians as a proxy to weaken Russia as a strategic rival. The author asserts that a US hegemonic strategy relies on perpetual dominance and NATO expansion, and that US aims include preserving global primacy by weakening rivals like Russia. The video emphasizes that this view is controversial, but presents evidence of Western actions that allegedly undermined peace talks. Before Istanbul, Zelensky had signaled openness to discussing Ukraine’s neutral status immediately after the invasion (February 25–26, 2022). By February 27, Moscow and Kyiv agreed to peace talks without preconditions. Meanwhile, US and UK officials signaled opposition to peace without preconditions and framed diplomacy as contingent on Russia’s withdrawal and a de-escalation, framing Moscow’s proposals as negotiation under the barrel of a gun. Ned Price of the US State Department stated that Moscow was proposing diplomacy at the barrel of a gun and urged Russia to halt its bombing and withdraw. UK comments by James Heappey on February 26 framed regime change as the objective, asserting Putin’s days as president would be numbered and that Ukrainian sovereignty must be restored. The EU’s €450 million in military aid approved on February 27 was said to reduce incentives to negotiate with Moscow. UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson on February 28 framed measures as bringing down the Putin regime. In March 2022, US officials framed the war as broader than Russia or Ukraine, emphasizing world order and rules to uphold, with Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin stating the aim to weaken Russia so it could not quickly reproduce aggression. Former CIA Director Leon Panetta described the conflict as a proxy war with Russia, advocating direct actions to “kill Russians.” Bloomberg reports by Neil Ferguson in March 2022 suggested a preference for extending the conflict to bleed Putin, with the endgame being the end of the Putin regime. Zelensky’s March 27, 2022 interview with The Economist noted that “everyone has varied interests,” including some Western factions preferring a long war to exhaust Russia, even at Ukraine’s expense. Despite this, negotiations proceeded in Istanbul, where progress was reported as substantial and a deal near. Ukrainian media (Ukrainian Pravda) quoted Boris Johnson as telling Kyiv that Putin is a war criminal and that even if Ukraine were ready to sign guarantees, the UK and US would not support it. Johnson would later advocate “strategic endurance” and a long war, while Zelensky’s party leader Andriy Arakhamiya indicated Johnson had told Kyiv not to sign any deal at all, opting to continue the war. Turkey and Israel played mediator roles; Naftali Bennett argued that Russia wanted to end NATO expansion and make huge concessions, and that Zelensky accepted neutrality, but the West blocked a peace agreement to keep pressuring Putin. Turkish officials suggested Zelensky was ready to sign a peace agreement before US/UK intervention, and implied the war is not simply Russia–Ukraine but a war between Russia and the West, with the West prolonging the conflict to weaken Russia. In later years, Western leaders publicly praised using Ukraine to weaken Russia and pivot focus to China, framing continued arms support as essential. By 2024, as negotiations stalled and Ukraine’s situation worsened, Johnson warned that Ukraine’s fall would threaten Western hegemony, while European diplomacy was downplayed in favor of weapon aid as the path to peace. The speaker concludes that recognizing the Istanbul negotiations’ sabotage matters for seeking the best possible deal today, rather than pursuing a protracted proxy war that harms Ukraine and prolongs the conflict.

Let me just say that all the major conflicts can be ended straightforwardly. The Ukraine war the causes of the Ukraine war is NATO enlargement, US coup, CIA operations all over Ukraine, even the New York Times reported that one a couple of months ago. We've got to stop being in Russia's face. They know all of it. They know who paid for the Maidan demonstrators. They've got everything. We've got to stop the provocations. And yes, by the way, there was no Russian demand for territory of any kind. Crimea, they wanted a twenty five year lease, which they negotiated, president Putin, and president Yanukovych. Not territory, not a claim. No NATO, you're not getting that base. In 2021, the war could have been avoided easily by president Biden saying to president Putin, NATO will not expand to Ukraine, and I will say so. I called Jake Sullivan. He teaches at Harvard. It's all consistent, after you fail in Washington, and I said, Jake, avoid a war. There’s not gonna be a war. Open door policy for NATO. Ukraine can be stopped when the president of The United States says publicly NATO will not enlarge.

Ehud Olmert discusses the October 7, 2023 Hamas attack and its domestic implications for Israel, arguing the attack was a brutal, civilian-targeted assault in homes, not against soldiers or military sites, with over 1,200 civilians killed. He emphasizes that the immediate Israeli impulse was to pursue all killers, and he distinguishes between the real security threat in the south and the actual events of that day. He contends that the danger to Israel’s security in the south was not realistic if Israel had fully deployed defense systems and manpower; the catastrophe resulted from arrogance, complacency, and overconfidence, leading to a total absence of defense when Hamas crossed the border. On Prime Minister Netanyahu’s leadership, Olmert says the counteroffensive was inevitable but criticizes the government for years of mishandling engagement with the Palestinian Authority and for tacitly enabling Hamas by channeling funds to Hamas via Qatar. He argues that Netanyahu became “the greatest ally of Hamas” by providing military and financial support that allowed Hamas to build tunnels and rockets. The major mistake, according to Olmert, was not pursuing meaningful negotiations with the Palestinian Authority, which would have served Israel’s strategic interests more than tacit arrangements with Hamas. He questions the strategy of the military response, noting that the day-after plan was absent and that international patience frayed as a result of continued Israeli attacks without a clear horizon for Gaza’s future. Olmert notes that the war’s continuation raised concerns about its legitimacy, citing a 2025 moment when senior former military leaders, including the former commander in chief and heads of intelligence services, signed a petition opposing further expansion of the war. He says this contributed to widespread international opposition, with riots and protests harming Israel’s global reputation. Domestically, he highlights a polarized society and a battle over democracy, citing protests that predated October 7 due to Netanyahu’s attempts to reform the judiciary and other democratic institutions. He claims more than 60% of Israelis do not trust the prime minister and doubt that his government serves Israel’s true national interests. Olmert weighs Israel’s international position, arguing that U.S. influence in the region has actually grown, while Israel’s military superiority has increased. He points to Hezbollah’s decline and Syria’s realignment as indicators, and argues that Israel is in a better place to tolerate risk for a meaningful peace process leading toward a two-state solution. He contends the rhetoric from Netanyahu’s government is out of step with real needs. Regarding diplomacy with Iran, Olmert says he would have tried to engage Iran directly, suggesting that Iran might respond to candid dialogue about mutual destruction and proxies. He recounts his own attempts to reach out to Iran during his tenure and contends it could be worth trying again. On Russia and shifting alliances, Olmert recalls his 2018 view that Russia-Israel ties were important, noting recent tensions due to Ukraine and Iran. He says Kazakhstan’s President’s interest in joining the Abraham Accords is ironic given long-standing Israeli relations, and asserts Israel has opportunities to pursue different policies from the current government. He argues that replacing the government could allow renewed strategic talks with the United States, Saudi Arabia, the Emirates, and a reestablishment of trust with Russia and China. Olmert concludes by reiterating that the path to better security and a sustainable future lies in changing the Israeli government to enable renewed diplomacy, peace talks with the Palestinian Authority, and a comprehensive two-state framework.

Naftali Bennett said that Boris Johnson interfered and prevented Ukrainians from signing a deal at the end of negotiations. Ukrainian representative Karakami confirmed that Johnson advised stopping negotiations to win the war militarily. According to Speaker 1, the Ukrainians began asking for advice and it became clear that Putin's main condition was in an annex. This condition included limits on the weapons systems Ukraine could have, which would have neutralized them as a military force. Russia would not have similar constraints, such as pulling back or having a buffer zone. People inside and outside Ukraine questioned whether it was a good deal, and that's when it fell apart.

The speakers discuss the possibility of a two-state solution and the former president's involvement in Ukraine negotiations. Speaker 1 asks Speaker 0 about reconsidering conditions on Israel, to which Speaker 0 responds that they believe they can find a solution. Speaker 1 mentions different types of two-state solutions, including countries without their own military and states with limitations. Speaker 0 mentions that BBS opposes the two-state solution but doesn't specify what he is open to. The conversation ends with Speaker 1 asking if they discussed it that morning.

Naftali Bennett said that Boris Johnson interfered and prevented Ukrainians from signing a deal with Russia. Ukrainian representative Karakami confirmed that Johnson advised stopping negotiations to win the war militarily. According to Speaker 1, the Ukrainians began asking for advice late in the negotiation process. It became clear that Putin's main condition, buried in an annex, would limit the kinds of weapons systems Ukraine could have, effectively neutering it militarily. Russia would face no similar constraints, such as pulling back or creating a buffer zone. Questions arose about whether this was a good deal, at which point the deal fell apart.

Checklist for summary approach: - Identify and order the core claims and chronology of events. - Preserve the speaker’s key assertions and specific examples, including quoted phrases where appears in the transcript. - Highlight unique or surprising points (e.g., alleged coups, Minsk II interpretation). - Exclude repetition, filler, and off-topic content. - Avoid commentary on truthfulness; present claims as stated. - Translate only if needed (not needed here); keep the summary within 380–476 words. The speaker argues that the United States has repeatedly acted to redraw borders and topple governments without UN authorization, and that Western powers have treated international agreements as tools to serve their interests. He cites the Belgrade bombing for seventy-eight days as the first post-World War II European war that aimed to break Serbia, create Kosovo as an enclave, and install a NATO base in the Balkans, describing it as a NATO mission without UN authority. He lists additional interventions: Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria, with the assertion that the Obama and Hillary Clinton era tasked the CIA to overthrow Bashar al-Assad, and that NATO illegally bombed Libya to topple Muammar Gaddafi. He also recounts Kyiv in February 2014, stating that the United States overthrew Yanukovych together with right-wing Ukrainian forces, noting that this occurred after the EU had reached an agreement for early elections, a government of national unity, and a stand-down by both sides. He emphasizes that the next day the opposition asserted disagreement, and the United States immediately backed the new government, ignoring the prior constitutional agreement. In 2015, he contends the Russians did not seek Donbas restoration but peace through negotiations. Minsk II, a UN Security Council unanimously adopted treaty, was signed by the Ukrainian government and guaranteed explicitly by Germany and France. He states that it was laughed at inside the US government, despite the UN endorsement. He cites Angela Merkel’s later remark in a desight-era interview after the 2022 escalation, claiming she said Minsk II was “a holding pattern to give Ukraine time to build its strength.” He counters that Minsk II was a UN Security Council unanimously adopted treaty meant to end the war. He asserts familiarity with the United States government and urges distrust, arguing that both sides should sit down publicly and present their terms “in front of the whole world” for judgment. He calls for clear terms: “We’re not going to overthrow governments anymore,” and asks the United States to say “We accept this agreement,” and Russia to say “We’re not stepping one foot farther than whatever the boundary is actually reached,” with NATO not enlarging. He envisions putting the terms on paper for the world to see, asserting that “once in a while, treaties actually hold.”

And one of the things at the table was one of the gentlemen who's a great guy, but he said, I said I I hope I didn't insult him. 'let's meet in another month or two, and let's see if we can start, you know, making some what.' 'He that a month or two? You're gonna have another 40,000 people dead in a month or two. You have to do it tonight.' 'And I did, actually. I called, president Putin, and we're trying to work out a meeting with president Zelensky. We'll see what happens there.' 'And then if that works out if it works out, then I'll go to the trilap and close it up.'

In April 2022, an agreement was signed between President Putin and President Zelensky, facilitated by the leaders of Israel and Turkey. This agreement was favorable for the American people, primarily addressing Putin's demand to keep NATO out of Ukraine. Following the signing, Putin began withdrawing troops. However, President Biden intervened, sending Boris Johnson to pressure Zelensky into abandoning the treaty. As a result, the conflict escalated, leading to the tragic loss of 600,000 Ukrainian children and bringing the world closer to nuclear confrontation.

Ray McGovern, a former CIA officer who chaired the National Intelligence Estimate and prepared daily briefs for the president, discusses the newly released US national security strategy and its implications for the war in Ukraine, as well as broader US-Russia and US-Europe dynamics. - McGovern notes a dramatic shift in the national security strategy’s emphasis. He observes it prioritizes the Western Hemisphere, Asia, Europe, and the Middle East, with Russia treated as part of Europe. He contrasts this with past eras, recalling Paul Wolfowitz’s post–Gulf War doctrine, which asserted US primacy and the ability to act that Russia could not stop, and he emphasizes the stark difference between that era and the current document. - He recounts a historical anecdote from 1991–1992: Wolfowitz’s belief that the US could win where others could not, followed by a warning to General Wesley Clark that Russia would challenge US primacy as times changed. He points to subsequent US actions in Iraq (2003) and Syria (2015) as evidence of a shift in capability to project power, and he argues that in 2022 Russia halted US plans by preventing NATO expansion into Ukraine. - McGovern interprets the current strategy as signaling a recalibration: the US may be acknowledging a changing balance of power, with a focus on deterring Russia and stabilizing relations with Moscow, while recognizing that Europe is central to strategic calculations. He stresses that Russia’s core principle, in its view, is to prevent Ukraine from joining NATO, and he underscores that the strategy doc frames core interests as seeking strategic stability with Russia and a negotiated modus vivendi, though he notes these appear as a “castaway” in the Europe section. - He discusses ongoing high-level discussions in Berlin involving Witkoff (Wittkop) and Jared Kushner, and Zelenskyy’s positions on NATO membership and security assurances. He recalls past European reactions, including Rubio’s role in watering down European talking points and US–Russian negotiations, suggesting a pattern of European concessions followed by US–Russian engagement that sidelines European voices. - McGovern argues that Russia has “won the war” on the battlefield and that Moscow’s tactic is gradual, minimizing Ukrainian casualties while consolidating control over parts of Donetsk and other territorial objectives. He asserts Putin’s priority is to maintain a workable relationship with the United States, with Ukraine as a secondary concern. He also notes Trump’s stated interest in improving US-Russia relations, including a willingness to consider extending New START, and he highlights that Moscow would react to whether Trump commits to the treaty’s limits for another year, which would influence Moscow’s strategic calculations. - The discussion covers the internal US debate over how to handle Ukraine and whether to pursue negotiations with Russia. McGovern argues that the reality of Russia’s position and Ukraine’s losses complicate any simple “win” scenario for Ukraine, and he suggests that a negotiated settlement might eventually emerge if a durable US–Russia relationship can be pursued, given Russia’s advances on the battlefield and its leverage in European security. - They discuss John Mearsheimer’s realist perspective, arguing that Western expansion toward Ukraine contributed to the conflict, and that voices emphasizing NATO enlargement as the sole cause are contested. McGovern mentions Obama’s warnings not to give Ukraine illusions of prevailing against Russia and to avoid escalation, and he contrasts this with Stoltenberg’s statements about Russia’s preconditions for peace. - They also critique EU moves to seize Russian assets to fund Ukraine, suggesting that European leaders may be acting to preserve political power rather than align with the public’s long-term interests, and question whether such measures will endure or provoke wider political backlash. - In closing, McGovern reiterates that Russia has the upper hand for now, with the war’s outcome dependent on political decisions in Washington and Moscow, particularly whether Trump can extend New START, and whether European and US policymakers can sustain a realistic approach to security guarantees and the balance of power in Europe. The conversation ends with a cautious note about the potential for a settlement but ongoing uncertainties about the strategic environment and transatlantic politics.

Naftali Bennett said that Boris Johnson interfered and prevented Ukrainians from signing a deal at the end of negotiations. Ukrainian representative Karakami confirmed that Johnson advised stopping negotiations to win the war militarily. According to Speaker 1, the Ukrainians began asking for advice late in the process. It became clear that Putin's main condition, buried in an annex, would limit the kinds of weapons systems Ukraine could have, effectively neutering it as a military force. Russia would face no similar constraints, such as pulling back or creating a buffer zone. Questions arose about whether it was a good deal, and the deal fell apart.

They were ready to end the war if we took a neutral stance like Finland and promised not to join NATO. When we returned to Istanbul, Boris Johnson came to Kyiv and said we wouldn't sign anything with them and let's just fight. But as soon as we called on them to sit down, the next day they would already be sitting, waiting with a delegation.

The speaker asserts that Russia is winning the war in Ukraine, and Ukraine is doomed due to a lack of weaponry, manpower, and Western support. A negotiated settlement is impossible because Russia's demands—Ukraine's neutrality, demilitarization, and acceptance of Russian annexation of Crimea and four oblasts—are unacceptable to Ukraine and the West. The speaker believes Ukraine should cut a deal now to minimize losses, but nationalism and Russophobia prevent this. The speaker argues that NATO expansion into Ukraine is the taproot of the war, analogous to America's Monroe Doctrine. He believes the West mistakenly thinks Russia is a mortal threat to dominate Europe. Putin pines for the Soviet era and wants to restore it. The speaker says that during the Cold War, he thought that the Soviets were not ten feet tall. He also says that the decision to bring Ukraine into NATO was made in 2008. The speaker thinks that the US believed that they could shove it down their throat. The speaker believes that the US has driven the Russians into the arms of the Chinese. He says that the American foreign policy establishment is incompetent. The speaker says that the US has a special relationship with Israel that has no parallel in recorded history. He also says that the Israel lobby is an incredibly powerful interest group. The speaker defines the Israeli actions in Gaza as genocide. He says that the Israelis have long been interested in expelling the Palestinian population from Greater Israel. The speaker believes that the international system will continue to be dominated by the United States, China, and Russia. He thinks that the US and China will remain the two most powerful countries on the planet.