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The conversation centers on Iran, its 47-year regime, and how to think about protest, reform, and potential change from the perspective of an Iranian-American who has lived in the United States most of his life. The speakers discuss the severity of the regime, the nature of the opposition, and the calculus involved in any push for change. - Freedom and the cost of change: Freedom is described as nasty and the regime as “nasty.” The speakers assert that the regime, including the IRGC, is not likely to give up Iran in a peaceful way. They emphasize that protests and resistance have been ongoing, and that the regime has a track record of destroying opposition. They use the imagery of public executions and a ruthless approach to suppression, comparing the regime’s behavior to a brutal, game-of-thrones-like motto. - Personal history and perspective: The guest notes his life trajectory—born during the 1978 revolution, living through the Shah’s era briefly, and then the Khomeini years—giving him a long historical frame for evaluating leadership and revolution. He remarks that he has no moral authority to tell Iranians how to protest or whether to risk their families, acknowledging the severe personal stakes for those on the ground. He stresses the bravery and resilience of the Iranian people and explains the immense pressures that drive ordinary citizens to protest. - The strategic challenge of regime change: The guest asserts that the regime wants to stretch negotiations and extend days to avoid losing resources, implying a protracted endurance tactic. He insists that replacing or reforming the regime would be extremely difficult, given the depth of the regime’s networks and its long tenure. - Reza Pahlavi and leadership dynamics: The discussion revisits Reza Pahlavi, the former shah’s son, noting his recent high-profile activity, meetings in Washington, and televised statements. The guest acknowledges both praise and criticism of Reza Pahlavi, arguing that leadership in Iran would require clear, tough decisions and that those who criticize him must provide constructive counterarguments rather than ad hominem attacks. He discusses the complexity of leadership in exile and the challenges of returning to Iran to lead, including loyalty issues within the military and the risk of betrayal. - The US and foreign policy angle: The hosts debate what role the United States should play, including the consideration of strikes or sanctions. The guest uses a parable about a local offense (a killer in Miami) to illustrate how a country should commit to eliminating a threat without broad interference in other regions’ problems. He argues for public support of a targeted objective but cautions against broad, nation-building wars that could trigger larger conflicts. He also notes the influence of other actors, including Israel, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Russia, China, and European nations, on the Iran situation, suggesting a multi-layered and opaque calculus in any action. - The question of strikes and objectives: The speakers discuss whether strikes should aim to completely destroy the regime or merely pressure it, emphasizing that the intention behind any military action matters more than the action itself. They consider the risk of a dangerous power vacuum, comparing potential outcomes to Libya or Iraq, and discuss the possibility of negotiating with a different leadership that could concede to protesters’ demands while minimizing harm to the broader population. They acknowledge the difficulty of achieving a favorable outcome without risking unintended consequences. - The role of sanctions and diplomacy: The sanctions are described as byproducts of the regime’s leadership and its lack of diplomacy, with the argument that sanctions affect the Iranian people more than the ruling elite. The dialogue touches on questions of accountability for the regime’s behavior and the broader regional dynamics, including public sentiment in Iran and international responses. - Mossad and external involvement: The guest asserts that Mossad and Israel are heavily involved in Iran’s internal dynamics and protests, given the existential stakes and the perception of threats against Iranian leadership. He contends that foreign intelligence communities are active in shaping events and information, including potential misdirection and propaganda. - The broader takeaway: The discussion ends by underscoring the need for multiple options and credible leadership in Iran, the difficulty of changing a deeply entrenched regime, and the reality that any transition would be complex, potentially dangerous, and require careful, strategic consideration of long-term impacts rather than quick, sweeping actions. The host reflects on the remarkable intensity and busyness of US politics and foreign policy under a dynamic administration, noting that such a convergence of domestic and international pressures makes this period historically singular.

Glenn: Welcome back. We’re joined by professor Syed Mohammed Marandi, from Tehran University and former adviser to Iran’s nuclear negotiation team. Thank you for coming back. Marandi: Hi, Glenn. Thank you. It shows how much I like your show because I went through a lot of trouble to get online. Glenn: I appreciate it. Regarding the riots in Iran, Tehran included, it seems every time there’s a buildup to regime change or invasion, the script follows a pattern: first destabilize with sanctions and an information war, then build on public grievances and instigate violent protests. You announce the intention to help locals in their aspirations for freedom, with rhetoric reduced to a binary: either you don’t care about the protesters or you support sanctions or intervention. After a coup or invasion, the US and its allies have a zero-sum geopolitical interest and power interest, not altruism. The result, from the Arab Spring onward, is that the country to be liberated is destroyed. Iranian protests are an internal issue, but once international, geopolitics intrudes. How do you assess the situation on the ground in Tehran, domestic grievances, and the geopolitical component? Marandi: Western media and think tanks periodically declare Iran on the verge of collapse, but the state has popular support and a strong constitutional adherence. Currency suddenly fell—perhaps 30–50% in a brief period—and was managed from abroad, with pressure from the US and Western allies on currency-exchange places. Peaceful protests in Tehran and other cities followed mainly by business people whose shops were threatened by rising prices; if the currency isn’t stabilized, they’d go out of business. Protests continued into day two, with larger crowds in some cities. Then infiltration occurred: small, well-disciplined groups began to riot. Over the past days, over 100 officers were murdered, some beheaded or burned alive, some police faces smashed. A nurse in a clinic was burned alive in the top floor; ambulances and fire engines were burned; a Red Crescent worker was killed. Western media claims “protesters” and ignores footage. Across the country today, demonstrations in support of the Islamic Republic and the constitution were large—city by city like Isfahan, Tabriz, Ahvaz, Mashhad, Tehran. The crowd in Tehran was among the largest ever. Despite rioters, millions showed up in demonstrations across the country. The Iranian state’s media is outspent by a global Persian-language media empire in the West, with billions spent on online campaigns, bot armies, and networks. Yet millions demonstrated in support of the state. People can see the footage themselves. The internet was shut down to coordinate rioters across groups including ISIS-related elements, monarchists, and Kurdish groups. The rioters’ coordination collapsed when the internet went down. The regime’s supporters remain, and demonstrations in Tehran and across Iran show broad, diverse perspectives, all affirming support for the constitution and the state. Glenn: I’ve seen pro-government marches here as well; they’re huge, though not always covered in Europe. Marandi: There’s a narrative control to label the government illegitimate to topple it. The rhetoric claims Iranians are freedom-loving, yet those who claim to support them have bombs and blood. Pompeo’s tweet suggesting Mossad agents among protesters, and Mossad’s Persian-language statements, indicate foreign interference. The internet blackout aimed to prevent coordination among rioters; footage shows violent acts—two men burned in a mosque, a nurse burned in a clinic, ambulances and public buses destroyed. The “millions on the streets” claim is contradicted by the actuality of coordination via foreign paymasters. Glenn: Trump claimed Iran had fallen and would negotiate; is this about a new nuclear deal, stalled or about missiles and Iran’s regional support? What are Washington’s aims? Marandi: No one contacted him; his claim about the second-largest city falling is baseless. His ignorance shows inchoate knowledge of ground realities. Trump’s past statements about surrendering Iran suggest aims aligned with the Israeli regime’s goals: a broken West Asia and North Africa, fragmentation of states, and meddling across the region. Erdogan’s miscalculation—allying with Israel and Qatar—empowered Israeli policy at the expense of Turkey, Syria, Egypt, and Iran. The “woman, life, freedom” protests were initially fueled by Western narratives; BBC Persian and other outlets spread misinformation about Massa Amini, which was later corrected, but the cycle repeats. The West uses propaganda to push riots; Iran’s endurance of sanctions and propaganda demonstrates broad legitimacy for the Islamic Republic even amid external pressure. The demonstrations today show support for the state, the constitution, and Iran’s policies while denouncing the US, the Israeli regime, and their supporters. AOC’s stance and Trump’s stance reflect a uniparty tendency toward empire preservation. Glenn: Regarding potential war, Lindsey Graham floated strikes; how likely is war? Marandi: The currency manipulation aimed to justify instability for war. The CIA, Mossad, and others would seek to justify strikes, but Iran is prepared for war. If the US attacks, Iran may strike back; the population that stood with the state could unite in the face of aggression. Iran’s capabilities include underground drone and missile bases, short- to medium-range missiles, more easily moved than long-range missiles. Iran could devastate US installations if attacked. If war occurs, Iran could retaliate in the Persian Gulf and beyond, potentially impacting global economies. If the US begins, Iran could respond decisively, targeting American interests abroad and in the region. The Zionists allegedly favor war for their regional aims, regardless of Western consequences. Glenn: Professor Malandy, thank you for traveling and for the discussion. Marandi: Always a pleasure, Glenn.

Speaker 0 and Speaker 1 discuss the unfolding conflict with Iran, focusing on miscalculations, strategy, and potential trajectories. - Speaker 1 says the war is a major miscalculation, identifiable before it began. Signs were evident: movement of military equipment, force postures, and statements suggested that absent an eleventh-hour change by Trump, the plan was to use prepositioned forces and enablers for sustained combat. He notes this pattern matches previous experiences in which the U.S. saw a buildup as a precursor to war, citing Russia’s 2022 invasion and his own observations of earlier prepositioning, logistics, air support, refueling, and large-scale aviation assets (C-17s, C-5s, fighter jets, aircraft carriers). - He argues Iran’s leadership intended to pursue war rather than negotiation, pointing to what he calls a central missed opportunity: the Oman foreign minister’s Friday-night submissions to the Iranian negotiator offering zero reprocessing, stockpile reductions, and at least preliminary talks on long-range missiles and proxies. He asserts that if the Trump administration had accepted those terms, a ceasefire or settlement might have been possible; instead, he claims the next morning’s attack signaled that negotiations were never the aim. - Regarding U.S. objectives, Speaker 1 says the stated aims from Trump were unattainable given Iran’s resolve and the regime’s calculations that fighting a war with the U.S. is less risky than submitting to U.S. demands. He cites a New York Times report indicating Iran believed war with the U.S. was a viable risk, yet he notes Iran’s leadership now appears to be consolidating support at home and regionally after the Ayatollah’s assassination and the subsequent martyrdom of Qasem Soleimani’s successor in Iran’s internal narrative. - On battlefield dynamics, he emphasizes that Iran’s force deployment is not merely pressure but designed for use, with extensive underground facilities capable of withstanding sustained pressure. He forecasts continued high-intensity operations for a period, but warns the U.S. faces a tightening window: if the Iranian side holds firm and the U.S. cannot sustain supplies and missiles, the U.S. could reach a crisis point. - He discusses possible ceasefire dynamics and political reaction: Trump’s suggestion of a ceasefire could be “complete BS” if the Ayatollah’s position remains solid; the martyrdom and regional protests strengthen Iran’s stance. He expects continued escalation and a hardening of Iran’s demands, including sanctions relief or designation changes, should the conflict drag on. - On regional response, Speaker 1 notes that Iran has drawn regional actors into the conflict, with protests supporting Iran across Iraq, Pakistan, Bahrain, Oman, Kuwait, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Israel. He says many Iranians—though opposed to the regime—are unlikely to embrace Israel or the United States as a path out of the crisis, given decades of antagonism and past betrayals by Western powers. - Regarding U.S. vulnerabilities, he says there are reports of U.S. casualties (three killed, five seriously wounded, others lightly wounded) though some figures are disputed; the public reporting may lag behind direct sources. He mentions possible gaps in air defense and the risk of shortages in interceptors as drones and missiles proliferate, warning that Iran could escalate if U.S. stocks are depleted. - Looking ahead, Speaker 1 argues the conflict is a battle of wills and a war of attrition. The U.S. attempted a “cheap” approach with naval and air power but no ground forces; Iran appears ready to continue long enough to force concessions. He warns the Iranian threat could extend to oil infrastructure and the broader economy if the United States or its regional partners target Iran’s energy sector, potentially broadening the conflict. - In sum, he characterizes Iran’s strategy as all-in, aiming to impose pain to compel a negotiated settlement unfavorable to the U.S., while the U.S. faces a narrowing margin to sustain supply chains, missiles, and air defenses as the conflict potentially drags on for weeks to months. He cautions that the escalation ladder remains with higher rungs available, including strikes on energy infrastructure, if the conflict widens.

- The discussion frames Iranian capabilities as the current biggest threat to the US Navy, noting that Iran’s position is now stronger, with significant new efforts in the last six months supported by China and Russia. The guest emphasizes that Iranian capabilities today are far more lethal than in 2020 and that Iran has benefited from Chinese and Russian involvement, including help with integrated air defenses. - On the protests in Iran, the guest contends that Mossad, with CIA and MI6, joined the efforts to provoke the regime into a brutal crackdown, aiming to trigger a stronger US response. He argues the protests were legitimate at their core (economic grievances and reformist aims) and that the attempt to exploit them for regime change failed. He explains that, after discovering 40,000 starlight terminals used to orchestrate regime-change efforts, the intelligence community judged the operation a failure, and President Trump was advised that a broader, more forceful campaign would be required, potentially including more firepower and assets. - Regarding Russia and China’s responses to potential regime collapse in Iran, the guest asserts that Russia would intervene only if the regime seemed in danger of collapsing, and China would respond similarly, considering strategic and financial consequences. - In the Maduro Venezuela operation, the guest recounts paying off many actors to enable the abduction of Maduro and his wife, noting air defenses largely stood down due to bribes, with one battery reportedly firing and damaging a helicopter. He suggests the operation accomplished regime alteration but not a change in leadership style, since the new president reportedly will not take instructions from Washington. He speculates that continued oil income from the captured Venezuelan oil could influence outcomes, and he notes skepticism about the profitability of Venezuelan drilling for major oil corporations, who may turn to private or mercenary groups. - The “secret weapon” comment (the discombobulator) is described as an exaggeration; the guest hints at undisclosed capabilities but declines further public discussion, citing high clearance and Pentagon confidentiality. - On Iran’s protests and possible US strikes, the guest reiterates that the initial protests were economically driven and that the Mossad-CIA-MI6 effort to provoke a harsher regime response stalled, leading to the decision for a larger potential strike. He outlines a plan for a prolonged air campaign with multiple carriers and a heavy emphasis on air power over naval action, suggesting a Kosovo-like approach with extensive air sorties to degrade Iran’s air and missile defenses, using surface ships as needed but relying on air power for sustained damage. He notes that the air campaign would require time and additional assets, possibly two to three more carrier groups, and would hinge on the ability to degrade defenses to enable broader bombing operations. - When discussing Iranian capabilities against the US Navy, the guest says Iran’s current capabilities are more dangerous, with Iran receiving about 500 missiles from China and improved Russian integrated air defenses. He notes concern about long-range missiles capable of reaching US bases and questions whether Iran’s Orion missiles could reach Diego Garcia. He asserts that Russian help could be more for deterrence or limited military support rather than supplying exotic missiles like Reshnik, and that the Chinese missiles could threaten ships at sea. - On the US mobilization (Lincoln, submarines, aircraft, drones, HIMARS, Patriot/THAAD), the guest says the response is a time-buying effort to pressure negotiations, with more assets likely and ongoing dialogue with Iran. He suggests the US may pursue enriched uranium settlements, acknowledging Netanyahu’s and Trump’s positions, while noting Iran’s insistence that missile development is not negotiable and that JCPOA prospects are unlikely. - About Iran’s possible escalation strategies, the guest analyzes several options: drone swarms could threaten bases; sea mines in the Strait of Hormuz would be a last resort but remain a hazard; a swarm of boats and diesel submarines pose challenges but are not existential threats to carriers; and long-range missiles (including those supplied by China) could target US bases or ships. He emphasizes that the navy can defend against many of these threats but highlights the difficulty of countering missiles and the threat submarines pose in shallow gulf waters. - On Russia and China’s potential responses if the regime falls: Russia would likely intervene militarily or economically to prevent regime disintegration, while China could leverage financial power (including debt leverage) and maintain strategic flexibility. The Turkish role is described as a wild card; Turkey could be motivated to counter Israeli hegemony in the region, potentially drawing NATO into conflict, despite NATO’s current limited capacity. - Finally, the guest touches on broader geopolitical implications: he suggests Europe is drifting towards greater autonomy from the US, NATO’s effectiveness is questionable, and the regime’s fall could trigger wider regional instability. He argues Taiwan is a separate, less feasible target for conflict, given distance and economic stakes, and calls for more cautious rhetoric regarding Taiwan. He closes by noting that Ukraine’s fate and Europe’s stance will influence how the US and its allies manage any Iran escalation.

The discussion centers on a tense moment over Iran, with President Trump issuing an ultimatum to Iran: come to the table for a new nuclear agreement or the United States will hit Iran again, with the next strike described as far worse than the last. An armada led by the aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln is reportedly moving toward Iran, framed as a ready-to-go force for a potential rapid strike if necessary. The hosts question whether this is genuine leverage for negotiations or a countdown to war. Former UN weapons inspector Scott Ritter joins to analyze the buildup. Ritter argues that Trump has backed down twice before in decisive engagement with Iran, citing the downing of a Global Hawk and the aborted bombing in support of protesters. He suggests that what is unfolding is part of a broader campaign strategy, including economic pressure that led to protests in Iran, which he attributes to Mossad and CIA-controlled agitators during a “shaking the tree” phase. He contends that Israel has signaled the next strike against Iran must be the last, and believes the planned attack would be a full-spectrum assault involving air strikes, cyberattacks, and support for CIA/Mossad-backed groups inside Iran to dismantle the government quickly. Ritter claims Iran will respond with cyber warfare and possibly shut down critical infrastructure and temporarily seize control of the Strait of Hormuz; he predicts the result would be severe consequences for the region and the United States, including economic fallout. He asserts that Iran will not back down on its nuclear program, characterizing negotiations as unacceptable to Iran and linking Iran’s enrichment program to national pride and existential survival. He also argues that the United States is acting in support of Israel, with Trump’s actions influenced by Israeli money and policy, and labels Iran as not pursuing a nuclear weapons program at this time—though 60% enrichment shortens timelines and complicates intelligence efforts. Ritter emphasizes that Congress should declare war, not the president, and warns that the United States could lose an aircraft carrier and suffer broader devastation if conflict escalates. He also critiques the characterizations of Iran as imminently threatening, arguing that the preemption narrative is not supported by imminent threat criteria and suggesting diplomacy and restraint are warranted. The conversation then shifts to US preemption rhetoric and the role of Congress. A speaker argues that the baseline presence of 30,000–40,000 American troops in the region, within range of Iranian missiles and UAVs, requires a credible defensive posture. They criticize Marco Rubio for framing preemption as legitimate self-defense, noting that Article 51 of the UN Charter allows preemption only for imminent threat and that such immediacy is not demonstrated. The discussion suggests a need for congressional scrutiny and potential impeachment if war is pursued without proper authorization. On nuclear questions, Ritter shares his intelligence assessment: Iran is not currently pursuing a nuclear weapons program and has not reconstituted a full enrichment program, though 60% uranium enrichment represents a concern. He asserts that while Iran is capable of cyber warfare, a broader strike against Iran would likely trigger significant retaliation, including against Israel, which he describes as vulnerable to Iranian missiles. The dialogue moves to Cuba, with Rubio and Trump signaling aggressive moves toward regime change. Ritter sees Cuba as more resilient than Libya and notes the long-standing US effort to topple the Cuban government, complicated by Cuba’s limited leverage and its trade relations with China, Russia, and Venezuela. The panel discusses the Monroe Doctrine reinterpretation and the broader geopolitical contest with China and Russia, suggesting that Cuba will be a tougher target than the US expects. In closing, Ritter reiterates that an attack on Iran is unlikely and would be disastrous, cautioning that internal political calculations, including midterm consequences, will influence presidents’ decisions. The show thanks Ritter for his analysis.

Mario: Do you think The US should attack Iran? Joel: He could do a large but limited strike designed to punish the Iranian regime, but not explicitly try to topple it. Clint (Glenn): Now it's in the national interest of Iran to acquire nuclear weapons as a deterrent. You think that Iran the authority enemy. Of Not America being responsible for killing thousands of Iranians. It's very strange that we don't recognize the security competition here. You're unbelievable. No legitimate security concerns for Iran. None of your rules. Mario: Gentlemen. Astonishing. Joel: Does Iran need to be an enemy of The US? Clint: I see that’s very dishonest. This idea that The United States and Israel are worried about the Iranian civilians. I think this is ludicrous. If anything, they're doing everything they can to fuel the violence. If we stop threatening them, perhaps we can get something in return. They stop the threat. No. Mario: Never tried we've never gone down this path at all. Joel: You’re just completely ignoring tens of billions of Iranian dollars that go funneling into terrorist organizations that kill Americans, kill our Arab allies, kill our Israeli allies. It doesn't seem to bother you. Mario: Joel, I’m gonna start with you. A pretty broad question. Do you think The US should attack Iran, and do you think they will? Joel: The president has set his own terms. He has three choices: do nothing and frame that as diplomacy; do a large but limited strike designed to punish the regime but not topple it; or go all in toward regime change. He hasn’t made regime change his explicit objective yet. I think he’ll pick option two, a large but limited strike, because negotiations aren’t designed to lead somewhere. The Iranians are not serious, in his view. Mario: Do you think Trump should go with option two, or seek regime change? Joel: He should go with number two. Regime change is something I would love to see, but it’s too big an objective with air power. If the regime is toppled by force, the risks are immense. Damaging the regime—ballistic missiles, some nuclear components—could be enough to protect citizens and allies, even if it doesn’t topple the regime. If a coup follows, that’s a risk. Mario: Glenn, you argued against regime change but acknowledged concerns about the regime’s brutality. Please respond to Joel and the broader points. Glenn: I don’t think Trump should attack. It’s very likely he will, and the objective will probably be a limited bloody nose attack that is going bombed for two or three days or, like last time, twelve, and then pull away, with an implicit understanding that if Iran retaliates, it could be a big war. There is no diplomatic solution because the Iranians reject multi-issue deals; they want nuclear issues to be separate. The Iran regime is existentially threatened, so they’ll respond. The aim should be to recognize key security concerns and pursue a broader security understanding, not just use force. Mario: Joel, respond to Glenn’s point about whether Iran must be considered an enemy and about potential diplomacy. Joel: Does Iran need to be an enemy of The US? No. But this regime is an enemy. The people of Iran do not have to be enemies. The supreme leader believes the United States and Israel are enemies, and for forty-seven years they say, death to America, death to Israel. The Iranian regime has decided they’re the enemy. The Iranian people largely despise the regime. Mario: If Iran agrees to stop the nuclear program, should The US accept such a deal? Is that enough? Joel: The nuclear program is almost 100% destroyed; you wouldn’t negotiate solely on that. If diplomacy exists, it would be to address threats beyond the nuclear issue—ballistic missiles, regional alliances, human rights, etc. The Iranians were willing to accept transparency around their nuclear program in JCPOA-era diplomacy, but the Americans pulled out. If a nuclear deal is possible, it would require mutual concessions; insisting on broader concessions risks collapse. Glenn: The problem is that Iran has legitimate security concerns too. The strategy after the Cold War linking security to global hegemony is problematic. There should be recognition of Iran’s legitimate security needs, not a complete defanging. We should explore a grand bargain—recognize a Palestinian state, get out of Syria, and pursue a path with Iran that reduces the threat without destroying Iran. Mario: There’s a debate about whether the Gulf states see Israel as a bigger threat than Iran now. Joel, what’s your take? Joel: Two countries—Qatar and Turkey—see Israel as an enemy. Turkey’s Erdogan has threatened Jerusalem; Qatar hosts anti-American and anti-Israel propaganda via Al Jazeera and has hosted Hamas leaders. Israel has the right to defend itself and has pursued peace deals with several Arab states, but the region remains dangerous. Israel should avoid destabilizing moves and pursue peace where possible, while recognizing the security challenges it faces. Glenn: Israel’s internal politics and policy flaws exist, but law in Israel provides equal rights to Arab citizens; policy can be improved, but not all claims of apartheid reflect law. Arabs have political rights, though issues with funding and policy remain. The West Bank is a flashpoint; Gaza is controlled by Hamas, complicating Palestinian governance. There’s a broader discussion about whether regime change in Iran is desirable given potential fragmentation and regional instability. Mario: Final question: where is Iran by year’s end? Glenn: If Trump attacks, Iran will perceive an existential threat and may strike back hard, possibly shutting the Strait of Hormuz. Russia and China may intervene to prevent complete destruction of Iran. Joel: I hope Glenn’s scenario doesn’t come true. Iran might pursue nuclear weapons as a deterrent. If the regime is weakened, the region’s stability could be jeopardized. The options remain: negotiate, strike, or regime-change—prefer a large but limited strike to deter further advancement without taking ownership of an unknown future. Mario: Thank you both. This was a vigorous, wide-ranging exchange. End of time.

Colonel Douglas MacGregor discusses the likelihood and dynamics of a potential new war involving Iran, the Middle East, and broader great-power competition. - On a possible Iran strike: MacGregor says there will be a resumption of the war, though he cannot predict timing. He cites Western attempts to destabilize Iran (Mossad, CIA, MI6-backed unrest) and argues Iran is more cohesive now than it was forty years ago, with demonstrations representing a small minority and not a broad collapse of support for the government. He contends that those who want to destroy Iran or empower Israel believe the regime can be toppled with Western support and Israeli action, but he asserts that such a regime change is unlikely and that Iran will respond forcefully if attacked. He notes that current deployments are heavy on airpower with limited naval presence, and he suggests Israel’s broader goals (Gaza, Lebanon, Syria) will not be achievable without addressing Iran. - Regional actors and incentives: Netanyahu’s regional aims require confronting Iran, and Turkish involvement with the Kurds could influence the balance. He describes a recent Kurdish incursion into northern Iran that Iran suppressed, aided by Turkish coordination. He frames BRICS as militarizing in reaction to Western actions, including in Venezuela, Russia, and Ukraine, and says disrupting the Persian Gulf oil flow would harm China, prompting cooperation with Azerbaijan and Turkey against Iran to undermine the One Belt, One Road project. He also argues that BRICS countries—Russia, China, India—will not easily align with U.S. plans if Washington proceeds toward war. - Russian and Chinese calculations: On Russia and China, MacGregor says they have supplied Iran with military tech and missile/radar capabilities and helped counteract efforts to disrupt Iran with Starlink. He believes many Iranians still oppose regime collapse and that a broader war would risk escalation with Russia and China backing Iran. He cites Moscow’s withdrawal of Russian personnel from Israel and the sense in Moscow that Trump is unreliable, leading Russia to hedge against U.S. actions. He notes Russians are concerned about Europe and envision potential conflicts with Europe, while he questions U.S. strategy and end states. - No first-use and nuclear considerations: MacGregor discusses the idea of no-first-use (NNU) as a potential framework to reduce the risk of nuclear escalation, suggesting a multilateral agreement among the major nuclear powers (US, Russia, China, India, Pakistan, Israel, North Korea, Britain, France). He posits that such an agreement could advance diplomacy, including on Korea, and reduce the likelihood of Armageddon. He mentions that Trump could leverage such a stance, though he notes Trump’s tendency to pursue more aggressive policies in other areas. - Europe and NATO: He argues Europe is unprepared for renewed large-scale conflict and has disarmed substantially over decades. He criticizes Britain and France for rhetoric and capability gaps and suggests the United States is fatigued with European demands, though he doubts Europe could sustain a conflict against Russia. - Venezuela and domestic budget: He emphasizes the futility of long wars in certain contexts (Venezuela) and the mismatch between spending and real capability gains. He references the defense budget as largely consumed by fixed costs like veterans’ medical care and pensions, arguing that simply increasing the budget does not guarantee meaningful strategic gains. He notes the role of special operations as valuable but not decisive in major wars. - Concluding view: MacGregor reiterates that war in the region is likely, with many overlapping alarms and uncertainties about timing, leadership decisions, and the risk of escalation. He stresses that both Russia and China have stakes in the outcome and that the Middle East conflict could influence global alignments and deterrence dynamics. He closes by underscoring the potential importance of no-first-use diplomacy and broader nuclear risk reduction as a path forward.

The discussion centers on whether Israel is driving a war against Iran and how the United States fits into that effort, with conflicting reporting from major outlets and a mosaic of intelligence interpretations. - The hosts outline two competing major-news stories. The New York Times reports that Netanyahu has asked Trump not to bomb Iran, arguing Israel is not prepared to withstand Iran’s retaliation. The Washington Post had reported a few weeks earlier that Israel sent a delegation to Russia to assure Iran that Israel does not intend to strike first, while Netanyahu in Washington was pressing Trump to strike Iran. The implication is that Israel is trying to avoid being seen as the aggressor while hoping the U.S. acts, effectively using the United States to carry out escalation. - The Post’s framing suggests Israel wants to escalate tensions but avoid the perception of initiating the conflict; Iran, according to the Post, responded positively to Israeli outreach but remains wary that the US could still carry out attacks as part of a joint campaign. - Iran’s perspective: they are wary and believe the U.S. and Israel are not to be trusted, even as they respond to outreach. There is a suggestion that Iran, with Russia and China, is prepared to counter, and that Tehran is not fully aligned with Western narratives about Iran as a terrorist state. - Larry Johnson (Speaker 2), a former CIA intelligence officer, joins to break down the behind-the-scenes dynamics. He references an alleged economic operation around Trump’s meeting with Zelensky that targeted Iran’s currency, triggering protests and destabilization, allegedly orchestrated with CIA/Mossad involvement. He lists various actors (Kurds, the MEK, Beluchis) and claims they were directed to inflame unrest, with the aim of manufacturing chaos to enable a military strike that could be stopped or degraded by outside intervention. He argues the plan failed as Iran’s security forces countered and electronic warfare helped by Russia and China blocked the destabilization. - Johnson emphasizes a broader geopolitical balance: Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Turkey told the United States they would not permit overflight for strikes; Russia and China bolster Iran, raising the cost and risk of Western action. He notes that 45% of global oil passes through the Persian Gulf and that Iran could close the Strait of Hormuz, which would massively impact oil prices and global economies, benefiting Russia. - On the potential next moves, the panel discusses whether Israel might consider nuclear options if faced with existential threats, and they acknowledge the difficulty of countering hypersonic missiles with current defenses. They reference reports of an earthquake or saber-rattling related to Dimona and mention that some in Israel fear escalation could be imminent, but there is no consensus on what comes next. - The conversation also touches on U.S. political voices, including Lindsey Graham’s reaction to Arab involvement, and questions whether there is any mainstream American call to accommodate Iran rather than confront it. Overall, the dialogue presents a complex, multi-layered picture: Israel seeking US-led action while trying to avoid direct attribution as aggressor; Iran resisting Western pressure but positioning to counter with support from Russia and China; and a regional and global economic dimension that could amplify or deter conflict depending on strategic choices and alliance dynamics.

Stanislav (Speaker 1) and Speaker 0 engage in a wide-ranging, combative analysis of the Iran-Israel-U.S. conflict and broader geopolitical implications. Key points and claims are as follows: - On Iran’s military activity: The volume of Iranian drone and rocket attacks has dropped by about 95% in the last few days, but Iran’s strategic goals appear to be advancing. The Strait of Hormuz remains closed, and Iran has not fallen from power, suggesting a durable regime in Iran despite reduced attack tempo. Israel is said to be taking a pounding with strikes on Haifa refinery, electrical plants, and other targets, while Iran is pursuing a long-haul campaign rather than a rapid blitz. - Terminology and legitimacy: Stanislav objects to labeling Iran’s leadership as a “regime,” arguing it’s a derogatory term and positing that the regime is a theocracy that is comparatively stable under pressure. He notes that air campaigns have never toppled governments and argues that people rally around governments when their families are being harmed, especially within Shia culture. - Information and truth in war: Both sides are accused of misrepresenting losses and capabilities; the Pentagon’s numbers on drones and rockets are treated with skepticism. There is emphasis on the difficulty of verifying battle damage in real time, and the reality that “the first sacrifice of any war is truth” in war reporting. - Military capabilities and constraints: Stanislav emphasizes that the U.S. and Israel have suffered damage to critical infrastructure, and the U.S. faces munitions shortages. He cites the first six days of conflict as consuming thousands of missiles (3,600 missiles across defensive and offensive systems). He argues U.S. industrial/munitions capacity is strained, with missiles being produced in small quantities and largely by hand, constraining rapid replacement. - Iran’s defense and offense: Iran is portrayed as possessing underground “missile cities” and being able to move and launch missiles from concealed locations. The use of decoy aircraft and other decoys is noted, complicating target acquisition. Iran is described as capable of sustaining a long campaign, with continued missile production and hidden launch capability, including launchers that can be moved and re-deployed quickly. - Sensor/shooter network: The discussion mentions a new U.S.-reported capability described as a “sensor shooter network” that uses satellites to spot a missile launcher as it emerges, relaying coordinates to fighters such as F-35s to intercept before launch. This is framed as making missile launches harder for Iran and easier to strike launchers for Israel and the U.S. - Strait of Hormuz as the central objective: The primary objective for Iran, per Speaker 0, is to close the Strait of Hormuz for as long as possible and disrupt Gulf states, with closing the strait potentially forcing an American exit due to economic pressure. Attacks that target Israel are framed as secondary (“bonus”) relative to the Hormuz objective. - Ground warfare and invasions: Both speakers argue that a U.S. or allied ground invasion of Iran would entail massive casualties and potential domestic political backlash, making it a less likely option. The difficulty of projecting power through Iran’s mountainous terrain and the risk of a popular uprising are highlighted. - Regime durability and external support: Iran’s government is described as a theocracy with deep cultural unity, making political collapse unlikely. Russia and China are discussed as critical backers: Russia provides MiG-29s, SU-35s, S-400s, and jamming capabilities, while China provides satellite connections and political cover, and both nations see Iran as an existential interest—Russia especially, given Central Asia and the Caucasus. Iran is portrayed as having backing from Russia and China that would prevent a wholesale collapse. - U.S. allies and credibility: The U.S. is portrayed as depleting its ability to defend Gulf allies, with discussions of allied air-defense systems being diverted elsewhere (to Israel) and questions about long-term U.S. willingness or capacity to sustain a commitment in the Gulf. - Ukraine comparison and broader geopolitics: The dialogue touches on Ukraine, NATO, and the differential treatment of Ukraine versus Iran, noting perceived manipulation by Western actors and the difficulty of achieving durable peace through negotiations when proxies and local actors have entrenched interests. Zelensky and Kyiv’s internal politics are referenced to illustrate broader critique of Western interventions. - Potential off-ramps and negotiations: There is debate about whether a political settlement could be engineered that would preserve the Iranian regime while offering concessions (e.g., limitations on ballistic missiles or nuclear ambitions) and provide Trump with a way to claim a diplomatic win. Stanislav suggests the unpredictable nature of the current leadership and that an off-ramp may be difficult to secure; Speaker 0 contends that a pragmatic, deal-oriented path could exist if a credible intermediary or concessions are arranged, perhaps involving a different leadership or mediator. - Final reflections on strategy and endurance: Stanislav stresses that drones, missiles, and human ground forces all have limits, and argues that real military victory rarely comes from air campaigns alone; the fundamental test remains whether ground forces can secure and hold territory. Speaker 0 adds that the regime’s resilience in Iran and the long-term strategic calculus—especially regarding Hormuz, energy, and allied alliances—will shape the conflict’s trajectory in the coming weeks. Both acknowledge the enormous complexities and the high stakes for regional and global stability.

Jeffrey Sachs and Glenn discuss the threat environment around Iran amid Trump-era tensions. - Observed mobilization: The United States has a massive military build-up in the region; allied transports appear en route to the Middle East. The impression, from Tehran’s view, is that an attack seems unavoidable, with Israel and Washington seemingly seeking regime change. - Threat framing and regime change: Sachs says Israel has pursued over thirty years to overthrow the Iranian government, with the United States broadly acting in lockstep with Israel. He notes that last summer’s effort aimed at regime change did not succeed, and that a carrier task group is now moving toward Iran, signaling imminent attack. He asserts that “the goal here has never been negotiation.” - JCPOA history and negotiations: A nuclear deal, JCPOA, was reached and ratified by UN Security Council resolution 2231 (2015). Trump ripped it up in his first term. Sachs argues there has never been genuine readiness by the United States or Israel for a negotiated settlement; when negotiations occurred, Israel resisted, and the attack on Iran two days before scheduled U.S.–Iran negotiations in June 2025 is cited as proof that the goal is regime change, not diplomacy. - Hybrid warfare and tactics: The plan is described as a regime change operation carried out through hybrid warfare—cyber, street unrest, economic strangulation, bombing, assassinations. Trump is characterized as blustering to pressure Iran to comply with demands that would amount to dismantling the regime. - UN Charter and legality: Sachs invokes UN Charter Article 2(4), stating that all members shall refrain from threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, and argues the current posture is a gross violation of the charter. - Venezuela comparison and propaganda accusation: He likens the current stance to the coercive U.S. approach seen in Venezuela, accusing the United States of invasion, kidnapping, oil seizures, and confiscation of oil profits, with Trump claiming the money goes to him. He alleges similar propaganda is present in major media regarding Iran, including misrepresentation of economic collapse as a sign of Iranian misgovernment. - Economic statecraft and its effects: Scott Bessent, the U.S. Treasury Secretary, is cited as stating that sanctions aimed to “collapse” Iran’s currency and provoke mass unrest, enabling a political outcome favorable to U.S. aims. Sachs claims sanctions caused a December economic collapse, bank failures, currency issues, and imports shortages, driving people into the streets. - Marketed outcomes and media treatment: Bessent is accused of describing a “positive” outcome from destabilization, with mainstream media avoiding coverage of this stance. The claim is that weaponized finance is a tactic to destabilize Iran without conventional warfare. - Containment risk and nuclear considerations: Sachs warns that if the situation deteriorates, Iran could decide to dash for nuclear weapons, particularly if existential threats mount. He emphasizes that a broader regional war could involve many countries and risk nuclear escalation, making prevention imperative. He argues the UN Security Council should convene immediately to stop escalation. - Prospects for Europe and regional actors: He criticizes European leaders for not resisting aggression, noting skepticism about who would oppose U.S. aggression. He suggests some regional players (Saudi Arabia, Qatar, UAE, Turkey) may not want a wider war, but questions whether they can prevent it given U.S. leadership and Israeli influence. - Final note: Sachs calls for a strong, principled international response to prevent an explosion in a highly volatile region, urging opposition to unilateral threats and actions.

Saeed Mohamed Marandi explains that Iranians view current events as an extension of the twelve-day war, where Israel and the Trump administration allegedly collaborated to undermine Iran and failed. He cites US Treasury remarks at Davos about manipulating Iranian currency to provoke protests, which he says led to peaceful demonstrations followed by highly trained groups that caused destruction and police casualties. He asserts that Israel claimed responsibility, with Mossad statements and Channel 14 reporting that weapons brought into Iran caused police deaths, and he notes Western media glossed over these facts. He argues this campaign aimed to push Trump toward confrontation with Iran, while messaging about Iran’s nuclear program and regional alliances shifted over time. Iran’s response, he says, has been that any attack will be treated as all-out war with an overwhelming Iranian retaliation. He contends Trump is boxed in: a larger strike would provoke a massive Iranian response across the region, affecting oil and gas flows through the Persian Gulf and potentially collapsing the global economy. He suggests the “smart” outcome would be to back off and end peacefully, potentially declaring victory without concessions, as Trump did in Yemen, though he believes Iran will not accept any deal that compromises sovereignty or core capabilities. Marandi lays out Iran’s view of the regional and strategic landscape: Iran’s counterstrike would target US interests across the region, not just bases, and would involve allies in Iraq, Yemen, and other areas. He argues the Persian Gulf is highly vulnerable because regional regimes hosting US bases are complicit, and a war would disrupt global energy supplies. He asserts Iran’s capabilities are primarily directed at the United States, given US threats since the Afghanistan and Iraq invasions, and that Iran has strengthened missiles and drones, along with air defenses. He contends Israel is vulnerable, and the aim of some in the US political circle is to sacrifice US interests for Israeli interests. He asserts that Iran’s real objective is to prevent a repeat of the “sword over Iran”—to avoid six-month cycles of provocations—and to end the possibility of ongoing CIA-backed unrest being used as pretext for further strikes. On the possibility of negotiation, Marandi says Iran will not give up nuclear enrichment, missile capabilities, or regional alliances. He notes there was a JCPOA, but Iran would not accept a repeat of that deal; any future agreement would need to be better for Iran. A deal could be discussed about the nuclear program, but not one that cedes sovereignty or enrichment rights. He suggests Trump could try to retreat by declaring victory or offering a hollow concession, but Iran is ready for all-out war if attacked. He emphasizes that if the US backs down, it would be a major defeat for Washington; if it engages in war, it would be a world tragedy and the US would be defeated, with global implications. He argues Iran’s stance is clear: they will respond massively to any attack, and the only viable path for the US would be to walk away and pretend it gained something it did not. Glenn notes that regional allies feel exposed as world power shifts toward multipolarity, and asks about whether Iran would treat this as an existential threat and how it would fight. Marandi responds that Iran views the objective as balkanization, supported by Israeli interests, and that Iran would confront attempts to seize control of the country. He reiterates that Iran will not compromise sovereignty or support for Palestine, and that a conflict would be devastating for the world, with Iran prepared to fight to defend its existence.

In the conversation, Syed Mohammed Marandi, a professor at Tehran University and former adviser to Iran’s nuclear negotiation team, addresses multiple interwoven geopolitical issues, centering on Iran, Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, and the broader strategic rivalry with the United States and its allies. Syria and ISIS release - Marandi asserts that the Damascus regime, described as al-Qaeda/ISIS-aligned factions, would not tolerate Kurdish forces backed by the United States. He notes prior violence against Alawites, Christians, and Druze as context for the current disturbing images from Syria. - He argues the United States is not a reliable partner for its allies, pointing to past episodes such as Obama’s refusal to support Arbil when ISIS threatened the Kurdish government, and Soleimani’s rapid military response to save the city. - He states that ISIS prisoners have been released in Syria, implying that thousands of ISIS members are now free and could destabilize Syria and possibly Iraq. He emphasizes that both Jolani (an ISIS-linked figure) and the Kurdish groups in northeast Syria are allied to the United States, making it unclear who released the prisoners but suggesting that those actors are aligned with the U.S. - The broader implication is that the release increases instability in Syria and potentially across the region. Border security and spillover fears - The discussion turns to Iraq’s border with Syria, with Marandi weighing whether U.S.-backed jihadist forces might spill into Iraq or Lebanon. He suggests a likelihood that ISIS/Al-Qaeda remnants could be used to pressure Lebanon and Iraq to prevent closer Iranian influence. - He notes that Iran’s potential responses could include its missile and drone capabilities, should security worsen on a front involving its allies in Lebanon and Iraq; however, Iran currently refrains from large-scale involvement in Syria but would consider action if threats to Iran or its allies escalate. Regime change, fragmentation, and U.S.-Israel aims - The conversation shifts to Iran post-riots, with questions about U.S./Israel strategies for regime change. Marandi contends the plan is to destabilize and fragment Iran, not to establish a unified post-regime scenario. - He cites alleged Israeli and Western involvement in organizing riots as evidence of a broader conspiracy to create chaos and justify military action. He claims Mossad and other intelligence agencies were on the ground, and public statements from former CIA officials acknowledged Israeli involvement. - He describes the riot phase as highly organized, with foreign funding (including Bitcoin), online recruitment, and careful targeting of police and infrastructure. He portrays the protests as initially legitimate grievances that devolved into violent chaos fueled by external coordination, with widespread destruction and deaths, including the killing of police officers. - In contrast, he highlights large pro-government demonstrations, especially a national day of demonstrations that he says showed widespread popular support for the Islamic Republic and condemnation of rioters. He points to extensive media coverage highlighting peaceful protests, while arguing that the riot narrative dominated Western coverage. Internal Iranian dynamics and public opinion - Marandi emphasizes the fragmentation among Iranian opposition groups: MEK, monarchists, Takfiri remnants near the Pakistan border, and Kurdish separatists, all of whom he asserts lack credible popular support. - He argues that even if the regime were at risk, fragmentation would prevent any single faction from stabilizing the country post-regime change. He suggests this aligns with his view of broader Israeli aims to weaken and fragment Iran and neighboring states, as seen in Syria and Iraq. Military capability and deterrence - He asserts Iran’s substantial missile and drone capabilities and asserts that Iran could defend allies in Lebanon and Iraq if needed. He notes Iran’s long-term preparedness against U.S. threats, including underground bases and extensive drone/missile stocks. - He contends that if war occurred, it would have wide regional and global economic consequences, potentially destabilizing oil markets and prompting broader geopolitical upheaval. He argues that U.S. restraint may be influenced by the risk of a global economic meltdown. Russia, China, and Starlink - Regarding technological assistance for countering communications, he mentions rumors of Russian or Chinese involvement in aiding Iran's internet disruption and Starlink-related issues, acknowledging uncertainty but highlighting a growing trilateral closeness among Iran, Russia, and China in the face of U.S. pressure. media narratives and leadership - He criticizes Western media for portraying protests as peaceful, while Israeli claims and cyber/disinformation around the events are presented as demonstrations of foreign involvement. He maintains that internal Iranian unity—visible in large-scale demonstrations—contrasts with the portrayal of a fractured nation. - He closes by suggesting that while some European leaders may align with U.S. policies, the overall strategic outlook remains uncertain, with a warning that Trump’s approach could escalate tensions rather than yield stability.

Host: Welcome back. We’re joined by Larry Johnson, a former CI analyst, to discuss what looks like a war with Iran coming sooner rather than later. The world is watching as the US mobilizes more military assets to the region. How should we read this? Is this preparation for war, or a show of strength during negotiations? Larry Johnson: I hoped it was intimidation, but people I trust in national security say this is far more serious. It’s described as one of two things: either a reprise of Midnight Hammer, when US and Iran coordinated two raids into northern Iran, or they’re preparing for an Israeli attack and to back Israel. It’s not just to force concessions at the negotiating table; it’s a warning indicator. Steve Bryan, a former undersecretary of defense, reacted emotionally to US–Iran negotiations, arguing that Iran is using a rope-a-dope strategy. This pressure toward attacking Iran is enormous, and Netanyahu’s visit suggests coordination. The issue has moved beyond nuclear weapons to ballistic missiles and support for Hamas and Hezbollah. The rhetoric around Hamas and Hezbollah is, in my view, a red herring; Israeli claims don’t match the facts. Trump is under heavy pressure from the Zionist lobby to act, and I think a violence outbreak in the next two weeks is plausible, though I hope I’m wrong. Host: The debate you referenced about motives is revealing. If the goal is to destabilize or create chaos to justify action, which past interventions show that hasn’t produced sustainable stability. If the aim is negotiation leverage, what can be achieved now? It seems the US insists on tying any nuclear deal to Iran abandoning its allies and deterrence. Johnson: Iran has built a formidable arsenal: 18 types of ballistic missiles, a recently reportedly successful intercontinental ballistic missile test, five types of cruise missiles, and over 15 types of drones. They’ve learned from decades of conflict with the US and see themselves as at war with the United States. The US narrative of Iran as the aggressor clashes with historical US actions that damaged Iran’s economy and civilian life. Iran’s patience has been tested; they’ve drawn a line in the sand and are prepared to defend themselves, retaliating massively if attacked. They now have support from China and Russia, including advanced radar and air defense, with Chinese and Russian ships headed to the Arabian Sea for a joint exercise. If conflict escalates, Iran could retaliate across the region, with regional actors potentially joining in. Host: You mentioned the tactical realities of the region. The US has deployed many F-35s to the region, including land-based F-35s for SEAD. There are reports of a large US presence in Armenia, and Iran’s potential to strike Haifa or Tel Aviv if attacked. The geopolitical picture is complex, with Russia and China providing support to Iran. The US carrier fleet in the Gulf would face Iranian, Russian, and Chinese air defenses and missiles, including hypersonics. The question is whether the US can sustain a prolonged, scalable war against Iran. Johnson: The US’s sea-based strength is being tested. In the Red Sea, the US faced difficulties against the Houthis with two carriers and a robust air-defense screen; in the current scenario, Iran’s capabilities—air defenses, missiles, drones, and support from Russia and China—make a quick, decisive victory unlikely. Moreover, Israel’s own readiness for a broader war is uncertain; Netanyahu’s visit to the US could signal coordination, but Israeli media note that they may join only if Iran is on the back foot. There’s concern about intelligence reliability: Mossad assets that aided last year’s operations in Iran may be compromised, while Iran benefits from new radar and integrated air defenses. Host: Regional reactions could be pivotal. Iran has contingency plans against regional targets, and Armenia/Azerbaijan might be used as launch pads. Saudi Arabia and Qatar may sit this out if possible, while Iraq has aligned with Iran. The broader question is whether diplomacy can prevail, or whether the cycle of treating conflicts with force will continue. There’s a critique of Western policy: the idea that Iran wants to destroy the US is simplistic, and the region’s dynamics are far more nuanced. Johnson: Iran’s potential to escalate, regional dynamics, and great-power backing mean this could be more than a localized conflict. The overarching point is that there are limits to military power; politics and diplomacy remain essential, and the West’s current posture underestimates the complexity of Iran’s deterrence and regional links. Host: Thanks, Larry. I’ll link to Sonar 21 for more of your writings.

Alastair Crook discusses with the host the evolving US strategy toward Iran, the credibility of Iran’s deterrence, the role of Israel and Gulf states, and what is known about Iran’s domestic unrest. - Trump’s strategy toward Iran has shifted. Initially, he sought a big, quick victory with minimal entanglement, including a possible attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities in June and assistance from Israel to identify a gap to exploit. Crook says Trump hoped for a toppling of the Iranian leadership via a “Maduro-style” operation that could be quickly achieved with outside support. Over time, outcomes did not align with those hopes, and the plan became far more complicated. - The naval armada near Iran was intended as a pressure point but, from the Pentagon’s view, is more of a liability. The armada is loaded with Tomahawk missiles rather than air defense missiles; estimates suggest 300-350 Tomahawks among two destroyers and one carrier. Iran has countermeasures: anti-ship missiles along the coast, submarines (including mini-submarines) with anti-ship missiles, and fast attack craft. Drones threaten the fleet, and the air defense burden would be high if a drone swarm attacked. Hormuz could be shut by Iran in the event of war, a long-term strategic lever that Iran has signaled. - Iran’s deterrence has matured: any attack by Israel or the US could trigger full-scale war and Hormuz closure. Symbolic exchanges were proposed by intermediaries (an empty IRGC building and an attack on a US base), but Iran rejected such symbolic moves, insisting on a broader, sustained response if attacked. - Israel’s posture and constraints: Israel has told the US it does not view the nuclear issue as the sole determinant, but instead urges action to destroy Iran’s ballistic missile system and deter future threats. Netanyahu, meeting with Whitlock, indicated opposition to any nuclear deal if the US does not secure certain Israeli demands, warning that without Israeli endorsement, a US deal would fail. Israel insists on conditions that make a broader deal nonviable for the US. - The Arabs’ restraint: Gulf states, especially Saudi Arabia and the UAE, do not want direct involvement in an attack on Iran, including airspace use or refueling. Several factors influence their position: fear of Iranian retaliation, concerns about broader regional instability, and shifts in regional alignments. Saudi Arabia has grown more anti-Israel, viewing Israel as destabilizing and expressing concerns about the region’s security order. There is also a fear that a major war could trigger an Arab Spring-like upheaval in Gulf monarchies. - Iran’s internal unrest: The insurrection in Iran involved trained insurgents (MEK operatives trained by the Americans in Armenia and Kurds trained in Northeastern Syria) and some Baluch participants. Corridors through Turkey and Kurdish groups facilitated their entry into Kermanshah Province. The strategy aimed at creating chaos to provoke a Western intervention, with reports that attackers were paid (roughly $5-$10) to inflame violence, burn buildings, attack ambulances, and kill. The Iranian government reports nearly 3,000 killed during the protests, with about 150 more unidentified; the majority of casualties were security forces due to exchange of fire. The narrative contrasts with outside accounts, noting the opposition did not lead to defections from key state institutions, and Israeli intelligence assessment reportedly concluded the unrest did not threaten the regime’s collapse. - Regional and great-power dynamics: Russia and China have signaled opposition to letting Iran be pressured by the United States, with discussions in Russia about offering a nuclear umbrella or naval support for Iran, though official policies are unclear.Originally planned joint exercises near Hormuz were paused; there are ongoing considerations of Chinese/Russian involvement that would complicate US options. A Chinese-Russian naval presence near Iran could limit US maneuvering. A recent drone shot down by the USS Lincoln reflects continued attempts at signaling and potential negotiation. - Overall assessment: Trump faces a dilemma between projecting strength and avoiding a costly escalation, with Israeli opposition complicating any potential US move. The US cannot easily sustain pressure without risking market turmoil and broad regional and great-power entanglements. The likely trajectory involves continued “negotiations about negotiations” rather than immediate, decisive action, while Iran’s deterrence and regional recalibrations constrain what any use of force might achieve.

The discussion covers Iran, its regional threats, and potential US actions, along with broader geopolitical implications. - Iranian capabilities and external support: The on-hand capabilities are said to be far more lethal and the Iranian position stronger, with enormous recent investment by Iran, notably with Chinese and Russian involvement over the last six months. Russia is aiding integrated air defenses and China has reportedly provided missiles; the exact mix and ranges are not fully disclosed. The panelists expect Iranian air and missile defenses to work much better with Russian and Chinese assistance this time. - Protests in Iran and US strike calculations: The protests were described as legitimate initially, driven by economic distress, with two groups present: reform-minded and more conservative elements. The Mossad, with CIA and MI6, allegedly joined to provoke brutality by the regime, aiming to push it toward a brutal crackdown and to exploit the protests as a regime-change opportunity. It was claimed that 40,000 starlight terminals were smuggled in to orchestrate protests but were discovered and eliminated, marking the operation as a failure. Consequently, strikes were deemed impractical unless more firepower and longer duration were available, leading to a predicted extended air campaign rather than a quick strike. - Maduro kidnapping and Venezuela: The operation involved paying off those in the way and exploiting air defenses; one air-defense battery fired, hitting a helicopter but not bringing it down. The new president in Venezuela reportedly refuses to take instructions from Washington, raising questions about regime-change outcomes. There is speculation about continued income from oil captured and sold illegally, and about who will protect Venezuelan oil interests as drilling resumes, including potential mercenaries and maverick oil groups. The oil leadership reportedly lacks interest in going down there unless it is highly profitable. - Secret weapon discussions: The “discombobulator” and other secret weapons mentioned by Trump are described as exaggerated; the speaker notes there are weapons kept secret for dire circumstances but declines to elaborate beyond public knowledge, given high-level clearance. - Iran-focused air campaign planning: The US would rely on a prolonged air campaign, potentially comparable to the Kosovo campaign in 1999, avoiding nuclear weapons and using extensive air power with support from bases in Europe and the region. The Navy would be complemented by the Air Force with a long campaign, while the Navy would need replenishment and time to rearm. - Missile and weapon capabilities: Iran’s capabilities have evolved, aided by Chinese missiles (allegedly hundreds) and Russian support. The range of missiles questions whether they can reach Diego Garcia, with concerns about more capable missiles hitting US bases in the region. Russia’s supply of Reshnik missiles (hypersonic, multiple warheads) is viewed as unlikely; the focus is on Iranian missiles that can threaten ships and bases in the Middle East. - US force posture and diplomacy: The force buildup (aircraft, submarines, drones, THAAD, Patriot) signals a “play for time” strategy while pursuing negotiations, including enriched uranium discussions. There is debate about what agreement might be possible on enriched uranium and JCPOA-related issues; Iran reportedly rejects several Netanyahu/Trump demand points, including missile constraints as a non-starter. - Russia, China, and Turkey as wild cards: Russia would likely intervene militarily only if Iran’s regime faces collapse; China would likely use economic means and some political leverage. Turkey is seen as a wild card; it could join a regional confrontation and potentially align against Israel or the US, with NATO’s response viewed as uncertain and largely lacking a unified, decisive stance. - Nuclear arms and START: The May suspension of START is mentioned; Russia claims willingness to extend, while the US has not responded, raising concerns about unconstrained Russian nuclear activity if treaties lapse. - Ukraine and Taiwan implications: European nerves and NATO dynamics are evolving; the Europeans are portrayed as vacillating between opposing and challenging Trump-era policies, with NATO potentially facing existential questions. A strike on Iran could shift focus away from Ukraine and Taiwan, empowering adversaries, or strengthen deterrence depending on actions and diplomacy. The speaker suggests that, pragmatically, Taiwan poses a far more difficult strategic challenge and that escalation there would be highly unrewarding, potentially increasing China’s incentives to avoid direct conflict.

Colonel Douglas MacGregor and Glenn discuss the current strategic picture across Ukraine, the Russia–China–Iran axis, and the broader Western political environment. On Russia and Ukraine: - MacGregor notes a major “Cauldron battles” situation in Southeastern Ukraine, with remaining Ukrainian forces being encircled and largely annihilated by precision strike weapons, and a Russian swarm anticipated to complete the encirclement. - He identifies two focal points of Russian activity: Odessa (where Russian special operations are reportedly active at night, Odessa largely undefended with air defenses degraded) and Kharkov, with ongoing pressure toward Kyiv. He emphasizes that none of these alone solves the core problem of removing Zelenskyy’s government in Kyiv, which he describes as a facade Europeans seek to preserve. - Russia has increased its force size, adding reservists and training new draftees; options for Moscow appear to be Odessa, Kharkov, and Kyiv. Putin is watching Western European political developments to gauge timing, potentially waiting for Western government changes to move decisively. - MacGregor argues NATO is effectively irrelevant to Russia’s calculus and asserts the United States does not want a war with Russia over Ukraine, giving Moscow more freedom of action than Western audiences realize. On Russia–China relations and Europe: - Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin are pursuing a bilateral strategy to mutually reinforce military and economic capabilities, forming a large continental fortress against the United States. The two powers seek to strengthen ties as they view the U.S. as increasingly belligerent. - MacGregor contends that European leaders, including Starmer, Macron, and Metz, are aligned with globalist and financial elites (referencing ties to BlackRock and others) and that personal relationships between leaders are not meaningful in the international arena; strategic interests drive policy. - He argues that many European elites’ rhetoric about Russia serves to deflect from domestic vulnerabilities and to mobilize anti-Russian sentiment as political cover. On the Middle East and Iran: - The talk about Iran is framed as not serious; MacGregor describes a plan to escalate toward regime change in Iran, driven by U.S., Israeli, and allied intelligence communities, despite Iranian resistance and regional risk. - He claims Mossad, MI6, and CIA influenced President Trump regarding Iran’s fragility, while Iran’s internal protests (economic grievances) were legitimate and quickly mischaracterized as attempts to overthrow the government. He asserts Chinese and Russian assistance helped Iran counter covert efforts, including providing satellite imagery and assisting integrated air and missile defenses. - The declared Western goal is to destroy Iran as a nation-state, with the Iranian leadership prepared to respond with full use of capabilities if attacked. He suggests a potential air and missile campaign could target the regime and strategic hubs, with the United States likely relying on high-altitude precision strikes and long-range missiles, while questioning the effectiveness and survivability of U.S. platforms like B-52s against Iranian defenses. - China and Russia are depicted as unlikely to allow Iran to be pulverized; they could intervene if Iran is near disintegration, possibly through non-nuclear actions such as a collision at sea, leveraging their submarine capabilities and influence. On European political legitimacy and future: - MacGregor connects the Epstein-related discourse in Europe to a broader critique of ruling elites, comparing the potential for political upheaval to late-18th-century France. He argues that as publics grow disillusioned with elites, there could be a crisis of political legitimacy and a shift toward more realistic leadership, with potential upheaval in Britain, France, and Germany. On Putin and future moves: - He suggests Putin views the possibility of reconciliation with Washington as unlikely, having reached somber conclusions about the prospects for meaningful agreement. He predicts Russia will act on its terms, potentially advancing toward the Dnieper River, Odessa, and perhaps Kyiv, while noting Russia does not intend to govern Western Ukraine long-term. He emphasizes that events will unfold on Russian terms, with European irrelevance in the decision-making process fading as Moscow executes its plans.

The conversation centers on Iran, potential U.S. action, and the wider strategic spillovers across the Middle East and beyond. The speakers discuss what prompted a delay in striking Iran, the likelihood of a broader attack, and how regional and great-power dynamics might unfold. - On why a strike against Iran was postponed, the consensus from the guest is that Netanyahu asked for more time to prepare for defending against Iranian missiles and to enable a larger attack footprint. The guest also cites public statements by U.S. figures supporting a bigger operation: Lindsey Graham emphatically said last Friday that the delay was so we can go bigger; General Jack Keane stated that military operations would target political and military leaders and destroy their military infrastructure to take the regime out. The guest emphasizes that the most likely scenario is an expanded target set and greater combat power in the region to defend bases and improve the attack’s effectiveness, rather than a symbolic strike. - Regarding whether Russia or China would become involved, the guest doubts active involvement by either country, but suggests indirect support or intelligence help could occur. The logic is that direct involvement would be costly for these powers, though they might assist Iran indirectly. - On the readiness and capability of Iran, the guest argues Iran is now far more prepared than in the twelve-day war. They note that insiders were purged after the prior conflict, defenses were strengthened, and missile production likely accelerated since June, with production areas shielded from prior attacks. Iran’s ability to respond quickly and with significant damage is viewed as higher, and the guest warns that if Iran experiences an existential threat, it could abandon restraint and retaliate in a way that makes a broader war more likely. - The discussion covers U.S. bases in the region, where the guest concedes that the U.S. air defense is not at the level of Israel’s Iron Dome and David Sling, THAAD, and other integrated systems. Some bases lack robust defense against ballistic missiles, drones, and other threats, and, while 30,000 U.S. troops remain in the area, the overall air-defense capability is described as insufficient to stop all Iranian missiles. - Would Iran strike Gulf nations directly to pressure them to push the U.S. to end the war? The guest says not likely, arguing that Iranian leadership has signaled a preference for good relations with Gulf states and that attacking Gulf bases or cities would create more enemies and complicate Iran’s strategic posture. - A decapitation strike targeting leadership is considered plausible by some but deemed risky. The guest notes Iran has continuity of government plans and could designate successors; even if leadership is removed, a power vacuum could ignite internal fighting. The possibility of an existential attack by Iran—coupled with a broader regional war—could be catastrophic and is something to avoid. - The discussion turns to Lebanon, Hezbollah, the Houthis, Hamas, and the broader spillover risk. The guest suggests that if Iran’s retaliation is strong and Hamas or Hezbollah see an opportunity, there could be escalations, including potential involvement by Turkey. However, Iran would likely avoid opening new fronts that would diffuse its capability to strike U.S. bases in the region. - The problem of Iran’s internal diversity is highlighted: Persians, Azeris, Kurds, Lurs, Arabs, Baluchs, and Turkmen, among others, complicate any post-regime-change scenario. The guest argues Iran could fragment, but emphasizes that a successful Western-backed regime change could still lead to civil strife rather than a stable replacement, warning of a “textbook failed regime change” akin to past Middle East interventions. - On NATO and Western unity, the guest asserts NATO is dead or in deep trouble, citing European leaders who doubt U.S. stability and reliability. He notes European politicians discuss building an autonomous European security architecture, implying growing European reluctance to rely on U.S. leadership for defense. - Greenland as a strategic issue: the guest argues there is no rational military need for Greenland for security, and that the notion of occupying or militarizing Greenland is driven more by Trump’s personal preferences than strategic necessity. He points out that even if Greenland were militarized, Russia and China would have little to gain, given logistical and strategic barriers. - Finally, the future trajectory: the guest predicts Iran will likely be pressed hard in a large strike but warns that the consequences could be severe, including regional destabilization, potential civil conflict inside Iran, and long-term strategic costs for the U.S. and its European partners. He suggests that as long as the U.S. overextends itself in multiple theaters (Iran, Greenland, Ukraine, Venezuela), global stability and the U.S. economic footing could be endangered. The guest closes by highlighting the uncertainty of Trump’s next moves, citing possible abrupt shifts and cognitive concerns that could influence decisions in unpredictable ways.

- The discussion centers on Iran amid weekend protests and a push by some Western figures for regime change, with emphasis on misinformation and “rage bait” clips online. The hosts claim much of the trending content is old, mislabeled, from other countries, or edited to look new. - It is alleged that Iran is deliberately conducting a nationwide digital blackout to close off information from inside the country and to hinder outside eyes. Reportedly, Iran is not only shutting down ordinary Internet traffic but also attempting to disrupt satellite connections (Starlink, Iridium, Inmarsat, Thuria). The claim is that foreign partners are aiding Iran in this blackout, with China and Russia specifically named as helping jam communications, including satellite phones and Internet links. SkyFreight flights are said to bring jamming equipment into Iran. The satellite and Internet disruptions are described as part of an unusually sophisticated communications clampdown. - Starlink and other satellite services are reportedly being jammed beyond basic GPS interference, with references to Starlink, Iridium, GlobalSat, Inmarsat, and Thuria. China is singled out as a key player in the jamming equipment. There are also mentions of health risks within the radius of the jamming equipment. - On casualty figures, Iranian media is cited as reporting 500 killed and 300 injured, but the hosts’ sources disagree with both the Iranian and Western figures. The hosts’ sources claim 2,150 dead, 480 injured, and 620 missing across 11 cities in Iran as of yesterday. - The broadcast introduces Doctor Miriam Asusli (online persona: Syrian Girl) who had just returned from Iran. She describes normal conditions on the ground during her visit, including using the metro, observing advanced infrastructure, and seeing women in higher educational attainment with some freedom in dress. She challenges the notion of widespread protests and asserts that the situation in Iran did not resemble the media’s depiction; she suggests Iran’s protests are about opening the economy and breaking Western influence, extending broader claims about global liberal order, Western-backed “color revolutions,” and control of oil and markets. - The guest asserts that the protests are connected to broader geopolitical aims, including Israeli and American efforts to change regimes, and argues that sanctions in Syria and Iran are designed to create instability. She alleges Western-backed groups and foreign entities push for regime change and profit from it, including claims about the CIA and Mossad’s involvement in supporting rebels in the region, and suggests that the regime change narrative serves Western interests. - There is a discussion about sanctions and their impact, with claims that sanctions cause starvation and destabilization to push for external influence or regime change. The guest mentions the idea of Iran pursuing peaceful nuclear power as a potential stabilizing factor, while also expressing controversial views about Iran acquiring nuclear weapons as a balance against Israel’s alleged nuclear capabilities. - The conversation connects the current events to broader regional dynamics, including Syria and Iraq, and asserts that Western powers seek to exploit Iran’s turmoil for strategic gains. The hosts acknowledge that there are multiple narratives and say that their sources in the Middle East indicate preparations for conflict by the end of the month, with specific timing debates around late January (the thirtieth or thirty-first). - The program closes with the hosts noting parallel reporting from Israeli sources about potential conflict timing and thanking the guest for on-the-ground insights, expressing a desire for peace.

Speaker 1 and Speaker 0 discuss the current wave of protests in Iran and how it differs from past unrest, with a focus on causes, dynamics, and potential outcomes. - The protests are described as the strongest since 2022, sparked by economic distress and currency collapse. The immediate trigger was the volatility of the rial and the impact on bazaar merchants, who closed shops in Tehran and took to the streets, followed by university campuses and other cities. Youth participation has increased, with some behaving more courageously on the streets. - A key new element is the explicit rejection of the Islamic government. For the first time, crowds are reportedly shouting that they do not want this Islamic government or the regime of the supreme leader, and they are calling for change rather than merely better elections. There is also increasing mention of Reza Pahlavi (the former Shah’s son) as a symbol in chants, though the speakers caution that this does not necessarily reflect broad support for his leadership or a viable path to democracy. - The discussion notes a sustained gap between the regime and the Iranian people that has widened over two decades. The regime has failed to narrow this divide, especially among the younger, educated generation. The political system’s structure—where the supreme leader appoints half the Guardian Council and thus shapes presidential candidates—has contributed to this rift. The trend toward questioning the regime’s legitimacy contrasts with earlier protests, where calls to overthrow the regime were less explicit. - Differences from previous protests (2007, 2009, 2019, 2022) are highlighted: - Past protests rarely called for overthrow; current protests openly reject the Islamic government and the supreme leader. - There is a notable Kurdish involvement this time, though the degree and regional participation vary, and some Kurdish communities may be wary due to positions taken by monarchist factions and the regime’s stance on minority rights. - The protests are spreading from major cities to smaller towns and include diverse regions of the country. - Foreign influence and potential intervention: - Trump’s warnings to the regime are considered to have had some impact on Iranian youth, though the extent is unclear and cannot be measured without data. - There is debate about potential US cyber or military actions; the guest believes it would be difficult and risky, especially if a broader confrontation with the US and Israel occurred. He warns that foreign intervention could feed regime propaganda that protests are foreign-instigated. - Israel’s involvement is likewise seen as dangerous and potentially counterproductive, risking the perception of foreign manipulation and nationalistic backlash. - Internal security dynamics: - The relationship between the IRGC and the regular army is discussed as potentially fragile. A split, internal defections, or civil conflict within security forces could become an “Achilles heel” for the regime, though such scenarios are described as extreme and not imminent. - There is concern about what would happen after a regime change. The speaker argues that there is currently no robust, organized opposition with a clear program for governance post-overthrow, and monarchist groups around Reza Pahlavi may not represent a democratic alternative. The risk of chaos without a viable plan is highlighted. - The host and guest discuss personal risk and motivations: - The professor recounts his history of arrests under both the Shah and the Islamic regime, including a sentence to 18 months for criticizing the nuclear program, followed by a two-month prison term due to health concerns. He describes a cancer diagnosis and his relief at advances in cancer treatment, while noting that his health remains a concern. - He emphasizes that he does not support Trump or Netanyahu's positions and that his willingness to speak publicly stems from concern about Iran’s future, not alignment with foreign powers. - Final themes: - The protests reflect long-standing grievances but reveal a new willingness to reject the regime itself. - Questions remain about leadership, governance after potential regime change, minority rights, and the risk of civil conflict if the regime collapses or is weakened. - The discussion closes with acknowledgments of the personal risk involved in speaking out and a nuanced stance toward foreign involvement.

The speaker claims there was a joint CIA-Mossad operation that began on December 28 during Volodymyr Zelensky’s meeting with Donald Trump, and twenty-four hours before Trump sat down with Benjamin Netanyahu. The intelligence agencies allegedly devised a plan to crash the Iranian currency to ignite protests against the government. The speaker asserts that this was not organic, citing George Soros as having done something similar to the UK a few years earlier, implying that the intelligence community with the backing of the US Treasury could do it to Iran as well. It is claimed that the Western narrative portrayed the protests as spontaneous and rooted in opposition to the regime, while the speaker asserts that prepositioned Starlink terminals, arranged through Elon Musk, were used to support the protests. These terminals, the speaker says, did not appear spontaneously; they were purchased through the intelligence community and distributed through intelligence networks to individuals inside Iran, including Kurds, the Mujahideen al Khal, Baluchis, Azeris, and others, who were opposed to the government. These actors allegedly received weapons, ammunition, and money, and coordinated attacks that continued until about late last Thursday or early Friday morning Iran time. According to the speaker, Russia’s electronic warfare helped disrupt the protests by tracking down and disrupting the Internet and shutting down the Starlink system, which eliminated the protesters’ ability to organize and coordinate. Iranian security services then moved in and began taking down protesters. The speaker asserts that all of this was planned to coincide with certain events, and implies that if the disruption had not occurred last Friday, it would have culminated on Tuesday with a US military strike believed to have brought about a collapse of the government, with stories that the MOLAs (mullahs) were going to flee to Moscow. The disruption, the speaker says, prevented the strike, and Trump reportedly called off the attack. The speaker concludes that the United States intends to strike Iran, and that the attack is expected to take place later in February or March.

The conversation centers on Iran’s current crisis and the likelihood, timing, and aims of potential U.S. and Israeli actions against Iran. The speakers discuss whether protests inside Iran are driving any attack plans or if those plans were made beforehand, and what the objectives might be if war occurs. Key points and claims, preserved as stated: - The Iranian regime is described as facing its worst crisis since 1979, with reports of thousands dead, and questions about whether the U.S. and possibly Israel will strike Iran, and what their objectives would be (regime change vs installing a new leader under the supreme leader). - The interviewer introduces Trita Parsi, noting his nuanced, non-dual position and his personal history of fleeing Iran around the revolution. - The analysts discuss whether a war plan against Iran existed before the protests; Speaker 1 (Parsi) argues the plan was made prior to the protests and that the protests did not cause the decision. He says the Israelis intended to provoke the U.S. into war, but the sequence shifted so the United States would lead with Israel in a supporting role. He notes Netanyahu’s unusual quiet and suggests a deliberate effort to present this as Trump’s war, not Israel’s, though he believes the plan originated in Washington in late December at the White House. - The protests are said to be organic and not instigated from abroad, with possible slight slowing of plans due to the protests. The rationale for striking Iran initially emphasized Israeli concerns about Iranian missile capabilities and their potential rebuilding of missiles and, ambiguously, nuclear ambitions; there was no credible media evidence presented to support new nuclear development claims, according to Speaker 1. - The justification for an attack is viewed as a pretext tied to “unfinished business,” with the broader aim of addressing Iran’s missile program and perceived threats, rather than the protests alone. The discussion notes that pro-Iran regime factions in the U.S. may find protests more persuasive among centrist Democrats, but less so among MAGA or core Trump supporters. - The origins of the protests are described as organic, driven by currency collapse and sanctions, which Speaker 1 connects to decades of sanctions and the economic crisis in Iran. He states sanctions were designed to produce desperation to create a window for outside intervention, though he emphasizes this does not mean the protests are purely externally driven. - The role of sanctions is elaborated: Pompeo’s “maximum pressure” statement is cited as intentional to create conditions for regime change, with Speaker 0 highlighting the destruction of Iran’s economy as a method to weaken the regime and empower opposition. Speaker 1 agrees the sanctions contributed to economic distress but stresses that the protests’ roots are broader than the economy alone. - The discussion considers whether the protests could be used to justify external action and whether a regional or global backlash could ensue, including refugee flows and regional instability affecting Turkey, Iraq, Pakistan, and GCC states. It’s noted that the U.S. and some regional actors would prefer to avoid a total collapse of Iran, while Israel would welcome greater upheaval if it constrains Iranian capabilities. - The question of a power vacuum inside Iran is addressed. Speaker 1 argues there is no obvious internal opposition strong enough to quickly replace the regime; MeK is excluded as a coalition partner in current Iran opposition movements. The Pahlavi (Reza Pallavi) faction is discussed as a possible figurehead outside Iran, with debate about his domestic support. The MEK is described as outside any coalition due to its history. - Pallavi’s potential role: Speaker 1 suggests Pallavi has gained closer ties with Israel and some pro-Israel circles in Washington, but emphasizes that domestic support inside Iran remains uncertain and difficult to gauge. Pallavi says he would seek a democratically elected leader if the regime falls; Speaker 1 cautions that words alone are insufficient without proven ability to secure loyalty from security forces and to persuade key societal sectors. - The Shah’s legacy and comparison: The Shah’s regime is described as highly repressive but comparatively more open socially and economically, though with a discredited political system. The current regime disperses power within a more complex system where the supreme leader is central but not incomparable to past autocrats. - The potential for separatism and regional spillover is discussed, including Kurdish separatism in western Iran. Speaker 1 clarifies that the Kurdish group is not part of the protests but a separate element taking advantage of the situation; the risk of civil war if the state collapses is acknowledged as a nightmare scenario. - The possibility of a Maduro-like approach (managed transition through elite elements) is considered. While channels of communication exist, Speaker 1 doubts the same dynamics as Venezuela; Iran lacks internal continuity in the security establishment, making a similar path unlikely. - Military retaliation dynamics are examined: Iran’s response to limited U.S. strikes could be symbolic or broader, including potential strikes on U.S. bases in the region. The possibility that Israel would push the United States to target Iran’s military capabilities rather than just decapitation is discussed, with notes about potential after-effects and regional reactions. - The 12-day war context and Iran’s current military capabilities: There is debate about whether Iran’s military could be a greater threat to U.S. bases than previously believed and about how easily Iranian missile launches could be located and neutralized. - The closing forecast: The likely trajectory depends on the next few days. A limited, negotiated strike could lead to negotiations and a transformed regime with lifted sanctions, perhaps avoiding a wholesale regime change; a more aggressive or decapitating approach could provoke substantial instability and regional repercussions. The conversation ends with a personal note of concern for Parsi’s family in Iran. - Final reflection: The interview ends with expressions of concern for family safety and a mutual appreciation for the discussion.

Clayton opens by claiming that CIA and Mossad-backed protests are taking place in Iran, noting that Mossad “openly admitted that they are inserting and agitating anti government protesters inside of Iran,” and that Israel has ordered the IDF to prepare for a potential war on all fronts, including Iran, Lebanon, and the West Bank, with reports of a dramatic military expansion and space-based weapons, and possible strikes on Tehran. He adds that Mossad is backing demonstrations and that President Trump is warning of military intervention. He asks how close we are to real war with Iran and introduces CIA whistleblower John Kiriakou to discuss potential false-flag events and the likelihood of more misdirection to rally support for action against Iran on behalf of Israel. John Kiriakou responds that false flags still work and that Israelis have been successful in recruiting Afghan refugees to report on Iranian targets, offering payments to disclose locations of Iranian leaders or nuclear scientists. He explains that many refugees were expelled or executed after admitting they took money from Israelis. He notes a long-term relationship between Israel and the MEK (Mujahedin e Khalq), describing the MEK as a group once listed as a terrorist organization and now supported in Washington, with financial backing from Mossad, and claims MEK is instigating anti-regime demonstrations in Iran. He adds anecdotal evidence from a friend who says Iranians simply want to be left alone to live and feed their families, implying that this sentiment is not aligned with Israeli interests. Clayton adds a parallel observation about American public sentiment, suggesting that many Americans want peace but implies that Israelis intend to achieve their goals despite that sentiment. Clayton asks what the CIA would be doing as groundwork ahead of potential actions against Iran. John explains that the CIA’s job is to recruit spies to steal secrets, emphasizing the importance of high-level sources. He shares two old cautions: first, to watch naval movements, since sending carrier groups signals real intent to invade; second, that a politician would not deploy large numbers of troops without intending to attack. He cites a recent example with Venezuela (the USS Gerald Ford) to illustrate how military movements indicate intent to strike, and warns that diverting carrier groups to the Eastern Mediterranean, Arabian Sea, or Persian Gulf could signal imminent hostilities. Kevin Ship joins and reinforces that Israel is likely to stage another attack on Iran, stating there’s no question about if but when, and that US and Israeli actions will be visible through carrier movements and other military signs. He notes that Iran’s regime has faced pressure and indicates that the regime might respond harshly to protests, potentially triggering a US/Israeli strike, likely from the air, in a Libya-like scenario aimed at toppling the leadership. John agrees, pointing to a Washington Post op-ed by the son of the Shah proposing democracy for Iran, describing the Shah as a dictator whose regime was financed by Israelis, and arguing that invading Iran would be impractical given its size. He contends that the real aim would be to kill Iranian leaders and create a power vacuum rather than a stable occupation, or to force leaders to flee. He criticizes Lindsey Graham’s framing of Iran as an existential threat to the United States and reiterates that Iran is a large country with 92 million people, making a successful invasion unlikely. Kevin remarks that the Washington Post has long functioned as a tool for CIA messaging, describing it as a “mockingbird” outlet that aligns with CIA interests, and notes the relationship between major media and the agency. John adds that the CIA’s fluency with media includes partnerships where the press is rewarded for favorable coverage and warned against critical reporting. The overall thread throughout the discussion centers on alleged CIA/Mossad orchestration of protests in Iran, a looming or impending strike, the role of the MEK and Afghan refugees in intelligence gathering, and media alignment with CIA interests to shape public perception.

The discussion centers on the Venezuelan operation that resulted in the capture of Maduro and the broader implications for global power dynamics. Larry asserts that many aspects of Maduro’s kidnapping were “odd,” noting that Caracas possessed significant air defense systems, most of which were not activated, and that one security service leader was a full cooperator with the United States, facilitating U.S. entry and avoiding return fire. He describes the operation as not replacing the Maduro government but “hold off Maduro, get US control of the oil, and get China and Russia and Iran out.” The plan, he states, was not regime change; the regime remained in power, but Maduro was removed temporarily to pursue strategic objectives. In recounting the operation, Larry explains that Delta Force operators from Task Force 160 carried out the mission in full moonlight, which he says reduced the usual advantage of nighttime execution. He compares the Caracas action to a pre-planned, staged exercise at Otis Air Force Base decades earlier, suggesting the Caracas operation was similarly staged, with the United States not facing ground fire. He notes conflicting casualty reports—“32 Cubans were killed” versus “80 Venezuelans”—and emphasizes the cooperation with Venezuelan forces, with no replacement of the government. A key point concerns a potential stand-down order. Larry indicates that the anti-air defenses bought from Russia—S-300s and Buk missiles—were not disabled; rather, they were not activated due to a stand-down order. He proposes that an insider within Maduro’s security apparatus cooperated with the U.S., and he names the possibility of a particular senior commander but declines to identify him publicly. He also discusses a theory that interim president Delcy Rodríguez might have been involved in providing intelligence or cooperation, but he regards such claims as a diversion from the real participants. The discussion then turns to the political and strategic objectives behind capturing Maduro. Mario asks about why capture was pursued if regime change was not intended, and Larry responds that the plan was to “get US control of the oil” and to push out rivals like China, Russia, and Iran from influence in Venezuela. They discuss potential future actions if Rodríguez or other internal leaders do not cooperate, including the possibility of escalating through force or covert operations that could provoke U.S. casualties and thus justify greater U.S. troop involvement. They compare this to the Iraq 2003 invasion planning, noting a lack of long-term stabilization plans. The Monroe Doctrine is invoked and contrasted with a Dunno/“Dunrold” framing. Larry argues that the Monroe Doctrine was misinterpreted as a unilateral U.S. claim to the Western Hemisphere, calling current U.S. actions a blend of Polk and Teddy Roosevelt’s doctrine rather than a strict, modern application of Monroe. He asserts that Russia and China are building a new international order with India and Brazil, and that Trump’s rhetoric may accelerate multipolar alignment, particularly with BRICS members like Brazil. They discuss how U.S. actions could push countries toward cooperating with China and Russia, potentially eroding U.S. hegemony. Turning to Iran, the analysts discuss protests and foreign involvement. They contend that Iranian protests are largely manufactured or supported by Western intelligence, including Mossad and the CIA, highlighting sources like the NCIR/Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK) as part of Western intelligence influence. They note that Iran has strengthened ties with Russia and China since September, reducing sanctions pressure and improving economic options. They contend that Iran’s leadership—Pozheskin’s regime—has shown signs of adapting to internal pressures, including firing an economic minister, while maintaining a posture of resilience against Western demands. They discuss the twelve-day war with Israel, arguing Iran recovered quickly and maintained a strong stance, with deep hypersonic capabilities and robust air defense. The speakers conclude by debating whether the U.S. could replicate Maduro’s capture in Iran or whether a regime change attempt there is feasible. They contend there are no existing U.S. networks in Iran comparable to those in Venezuela, making a similar operation unlikely. They reflect on U.S. leverage, the role of foreign backing for Iran, and the potential for Iran to leverage its growing ties with Russia and China to resist Western pressure. The conversation ends with mutual appreciation and a New Year closing note.