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Speaker 0 references an email exchange between Jeffrey Leeds and former Secretary of State Colin Powell in which Powell allegedly acknowledges that Israel “has 200 nuclear weapons” and that “the nuclear non proliferation treaty has not been signed by Israel,” and asks whether under US law the United States should cut off support to Israel because it is a nuclear power that has not signed the nuclear nonproliferation treaty. Speaker 1 declines to engage: “Shouldn't you ask Colin Powell that? I I'm not gonna speak to this particular traffic, and I'm certainly not discuss doesn't have nuclear weapons? I'm certainly not going to discuss matters of intelligence from the from the podium, and I'm not I have no I have no comment.” Speaker 0 reiterates: “the email says the boys in Tehran know Israel has 200. All we targeted on Tehran, and we have thousands. I mean, that that seems to indicate that that there's a knowledge of an Israeli nuclear program, which would make USA to Israel illegal.” Speaker 1 responds: “I think I've answered your question.” Speaker 0 asks again whether the understanding is correct: “am I do I have the correct understanding of US law that that we are we are not allowed to support a nuclear power that has not signed the nuclear nonproliferation treaty?” Speaker 1 says: “Look, we obviously support the nuclear nonproliferation treaty. I'm not a I'm not a legal expert on all the tenets of it, and I'm certainly not going to speak about the the details that you've revealed here in this email traffic. That would be inappropriate for me to discuss one way or the other. I'm not gonna There do” Speaker 0 notes that sanctions have been imposed on North Korea and Iran for nuclear proliferation, and asks why Israel is not facing any consequences in light of Powell’s alleged email. Speaker 1 reframes: “That's a very colorful way of getting back to the same question you just asked me, but I'm going to refer you back to the transcript when you see it this afternoon to what I said before to your question. So you're familiar with this email. Right? I'm not. Oh. I have not seen it. I'm not I can't speak to the email. Frankly, even if I'd seen it, Zurich, I wouldn't engage in that kind of a discussion from the podium.”

The speakers discuss the idea of using nuclear weapons. Speaker 2 believes it would solve problems, but Speaker 0 points out the negative consequences of radiation. Speaker 2 suggests that those who support nuking should go live with them. Speaker 1 emphasizes the desire for peace. Speaker 2 acknowledges a difference between the leadership of Hamas and innocent civilians. Speaker 0 mentions resources in the video description. Speaker 2 warns that using nuclear weapons would make the world hate Israel. Speaker 0 questions the need to deal with them when Israel is already stronger.

The region is currently facing its greatest danger in years. There is a credible threat of an attack by Hezbollah and other Iranian allies, potentially leading to a nuclear war. Israel, in response, could defend itself using all available weapons, including nuclear capabilities. This situation is extremely perilous.

If Israel faces annihilation, they might use their nukes. Iran and Hezbollah need to understand they cannot wipe out the Israeli people. If Israel is about to be totally destroyed, they need to be thinking about all their options. The US military being stretched is not Israel's fault. The US should fund its military and not treat it like a secondary agency. This country has a lot of problems, but that's not on the head of the Israeli people who are trying to survive. When the US looks weak, violence and threats increase. Israel's gotta do what it's gotta do.

Mario: Do you think The US should attack Iran? Joel: He could do a large but limited strike designed to punish the Iranian regime, but not explicitly try to topple it. Clint (Glenn): Now it's in the national interest of Iran to acquire nuclear weapons as a deterrent. You think that Iran the authority enemy. Of Not America being responsible for killing thousands of Iranians. It's very strange that we don't recognize the security competition here. You're unbelievable. No legitimate security concerns for Iran. None of your rules. Mario: Gentlemen. Astonishing. Joel: Does Iran need to be an enemy of The US? Clint: I see that’s very dishonest. This idea that The United States and Israel are worried about the Iranian civilians. I think this is ludicrous. If anything, they're doing everything they can to fuel the violence. If we stop threatening them, perhaps we can get something in return. They stop the threat. No. Mario: Never tried we've never gone down this path at all. Joel: You’re just completely ignoring tens of billions of Iranian dollars that go funneling into terrorist organizations that kill Americans, kill our Arab allies, kill our Israeli allies. It doesn't seem to bother you. Mario: Joel, I’m gonna start with you. A pretty broad question. Do you think The US should attack Iran, and do you think they will? Joel: The president has set his own terms. He has three choices: do nothing and frame that as diplomacy; do a large but limited strike designed to punish the regime but not topple it; or go all in toward regime change. He hasn’t made regime change his explicit objective yet. I think he’ll pick option two, a large but limited strike, because negotiations aren’t designed to lead somewhere. The Iranians are not serious, in his view. Mario: Do you think Trump should go with option two, or seek regime change? Joel: He should go with number two. Regime change is something I would love to see, but it’s too big an objective with air power. If the regime is toppled by force, the risks are immense. Damaging the regime—ballistic missiles, some nuclear components—could be enough to protect citizens and allies, even if it doesn’t topple the regime. If a coup follows, that’s a risk. Mario: Glenn, you argued against regime change but acknowledged concerns about the regime’s brutality. Please respond to Joel and the broader points. Glenn: I don’t think Trump should attack. It’s very likely he will, and the objective will probably be a limited bloody nose attack that is going bombed for two or three days or, like last time, twelve, and then pull away, with an implicit understanding that if Iran retaliates, it could be a big war. There is no diplomatic solution because the Iranians reject multi-issue deals; they want nuclear issues to be separate. The Iran regime is existentially threatened, so they’ll respond. The aim should be to recognize key security concerns and pursue a broader security understanding, not just use force. Mario: Joel, respond to Glenn’s point about whether Iran must be considered an enemy and about potential diplomacy. Joel: Does Iran need to be an enemy of The US? No. But this regime is an enemy. The people of Iran do not have to be enemies. The supreme leader believes the United States and Israel are enemies, and for forty-seven years they say, death to America, death to Israel. The Iranian regime has decided they’re the enemy. The Iranian people largely despise the regime. Mario: If Iran agrees to stop the nuclear program, should The US accept such a deal? Is that enough? Joel: The nuclear program is almost 100% destroyed; you wouldn’t negotiate solely on that. If diplomacy exists, it would be to address threats beyond the nuclear issue—ballistic missiles, regional alliances, human rights, etc. The Iranians were willing to accept transparency around their nuclear program in JCPOA-era diplomacy, but the Americans pulled out. If a nuclear deal is possible, it would require mutual concessions; insisting on broader concessions risks collapse. Glenn: The problem is that Iran has legitimate security concerns too. The strategy after the Cold War linking security to global hegemony is problematic. There should be recognition of Iran’s legitimate security needs, not a complete defanging. We should explore a grand bargain—recognize a Palestinian state, get out of Syria, and pursue a path with Iran that reduces the threat without destroying Iran. Mario: There’s a debate about whether the Gulf states see Israel as a bigger threat than Iran now. Joel, what’s your take? Joel: Two countries—Qatar and Turkey—see Israel as an enemy. Turkey’s Erdogan has threatened Jerusalem; Qatar hosts anti-American and anti-Israel propaganda via Al Jazeera and has hosted Hamas leaders. Israel has the right to defend itself and has pursued peace deals with several Arab states, but the region remains dangerous. Israel should avoid destabilizing moves and pursue peace where possible, while recognizing the security challenges it faces. Glenn: Israel’s internal politics and policy flaws exist, but law in Israel provides equal rights to Arab citizens; policy can be improved, but not all claims of apartheid reflect law. Arabs have political rights, though issues with funding and policy remain. The West Bank is a flashpoint; Gaza is controlled by Hamas, complicating Palestinian governance. There’s a broader discussion about whether regime change in Iran is desirable given potential fragmentation and regional instability. Mario: Final question: where is Iran by year’s end? Glenn: If Trump attacks, Iran will perceive an existential threat and may strike back hard, possibly shutting the Strait of Hormuz. Russia and China may intervene to prevent complete destruction of Iran. Joel: I hope Glenn’s scenario doesn’t come true. Iran might pursue nuclear weapons as a deterrent. If the regime is weakened, the region’s stability could be jeopardized. The options remain: negotiate, strike, or regime-change—prefer a large but limited strike to deter further advancement without taking ownership of an unknown future. Mario: Thank you both. This was a vigorous, wide-ranging exchange. End of time.

The biggest threat is not Iran, but Israel with its 200-400 nuclear weapons and the Samson option. The Samson option means Israel will destroy the world with its nukes if its existence is threatened. High-level Talmudic Jewish supremacist thinkers in Israel are ready to launch nukes and destroy Europe and the rest of the world if they feel their existence is threatened. Israel is living on borrowed time. The question is posed: Is Israel going to exercise the Samson option and blow up the world because the world refuses to accept this psychopathic criminal state? The real threat is Israel and the traders inside The United States.

The speakers discuss the concept of the Samson option, which refers to Israel potentially using nuclear weapons if threatened. They debate whether this approach is necessary for maintaining global stability or if it would result in mass destruction. One speaker questions the other about their willingness to accept the extinction of billions of people to protect a specific group. The conversation becomes heated, with one speaker expressing a desire for the world to cease to exist if they are not accepted.

Speaker 0: And so, I mean, it sounds to me like that that it's leaving Iran with this choice of either rolling over, literally given everything we want, the, you know, the the nuclear enrichment, the the missiles, the proxies, etcetera, And that would buy you a little time, but then leave you utterly powerless. And the next day Speaker 1: That's right. Speaker 0: Either Israel or anybody else can come in, you would literally be helpless. And and, I mean, so we're correct me if I'm wrong, but we're offering Iran the option of either lay down and die by death later or stand firm and maybe die shortly now, but at least this way, you're gonna have some missiles to shoot back. I mean, do you see it differently? Speaker 1: No. I think you're exactly right. And, basically, we're we're inviting them to to become Qaddafi. You remember Qaddafi basically gave us a nuclear program. They basically said, fine. You know, I saw what you did in Iraq. I don't wanna end up up like that. I'll meet your terms, and we'll come to an agreement. We'll all be out. And we said, great. Now that you're defenseless, let's destroy you. Stick a bayonet up your rear rear end and shoot you in the head. Now if you're if you're the Iranian leadership, do you wanna end up like that? Look. I've always said the Iranians basically have a choice. They could be North Korea or they can be Libya. Which would you rather be? Speaker 0: That's not a choice for anybody to have to make. Speaker 1: Yeah. But that's that's the position we're putting them in. And frankly, I'm a little surprised they haven't gone for a nuclear breakout up till now. Because if they if they're looking for real security, say, okay. Fine. None no more of this nonsense. We don't wanna be Libya. We're North Korea now. Back off. Yeah. That that would make that would make sense from their point of view, wouldn't it?

Speaker 0 asks why President Trump unleashed Prime Minister Netanyahu to resume genocide in Gaza, resulting in the intentional killing of 400 civilians. Speaker 1 believes Trump has no choice, due to agreements with major donors beyond Miriam Adelson, obliging him to underwrite Netanyahu's actions. Speaker 1 notes Netanyahu arranged a meeting between the U.S. and Azerbaijan, not the State Department, indicating the Israel lobby's grip. Speaker 1 believes Trump is obliged to comply and won't diverge. Speaker 0 asks if Trump has no choice but to militarily back Israel if it attacks Iran. Speaker 1 thinks so, noting the possibility of Israel precipitating a war with Iran. The expectation is the U.S. will reinforce Israeli actions, with joint strike planning and intelligence sharing already in place. Speaker 1 believes it's a foregone conclusion, though the timing is uncertain.

The speaker argues that pushing for war with Iran is a dangerous delusion. They claim: “That’s all you gotta do is just push a button, give an order, and bam. Iran will be blown up.” They challenge the audience to understand how combat power works and to see that many war advocates are “singing from the same sheet of music.” The speaker names several individuals as examples of this chorus: Rebecca Hendrix, Victoria Coates, Rebecca Grant, Mike Pompeo, General Jack Keane, and Senator Lindsey Graham, indicating that all of these figures promote a similar line of thinking about provoking a war with Iran. The central claim is that these hawkish voices believe one can “do this massive armada” and that Iran cannot respond effectively. The speaker insists that such views are incorrect, stating that Iran can and would “make life incredibly difficult and kill many Israelis.” They note the explicit claims by Iran that they would attack and kill targets and people in Israel, and attack Americans and kill Americans through bases throughout the region. The speaker emphasizes that if the advocacy for war succeeds in provoking Iran, “you’re gonna get a lot of Israelis killed and a lot of Americans killed.” The speaker also acknowledges uncertainty about Iran’s precise calculations, noting that Iran’s claims about what they would do may be posturing or may reflect a real intent to respond, but that the speaker cannot predict which. They argue that Iran may choose not to act if it believes retaliation would be excessive or counterproductive, but if Iran does move as it has said it would, the consequences would be severe for Israelis and Americans. In summary, the speaker condemns the assumption that a war with Iran can be conducted unilaterally or without severe retaliatory consequences, warning that the consequences could include significant loss of life among Israelis and Americans if Iran follows through on its stated intentions. The dialogue frames the issue as a critique of a pervasive pro-war chorus and underscores the potential human cost of such policy.

The transcript centers on a loud, multi-voiced discussion about the prospect of war with Iran, U.S. policy dynamics, and the influence of allied actors—especially Israel—on Washington’s decisions. - The opening segment features sharp, provocative claims about President Trump’s stance toward Iran. One speaker asserts that Trump gave Iran seven days to comply or “we will unleash hell on that country,” including strikes on desalinization plants and energy infrastructure. This is framed as part of a broader, catastrophic escalation in Iran under heavy pressure on Trump to commit U.S. forces to Israel’s war. - Joe Kent, a former director of the National Counterterrorism Center who resigned from the administration, presents the central prognosis. He warns that Trump will face immense pressure to commit ground troops in Iran, calling such a move a “catastrophic escalation” that would increase bloodshed. Kent urges the public to contact the White House and members of Congress to oppose boots on the ground in Iran, advocating for peaceful resolution and public pressure for peace. - The discussion shifts to Israeli involvement. The panel notes that Israeli media report Israel will not commit ground troops if the U.S. invades Iran, and some assert Israel has never, in any conflict, committed troops to support the U.S. The conversation questions this claim, noting counterpoints from analyst Brandon Weichert that Israel has undermined American forces in certain areas. - The debate then returns to Trump’s diplomacy and strategy. The host asks whether Trump’s stated approach toward Iran—potentially including a peace plan—is credible or “fake news.” Kent responds that Iran will not take diplomacy seriously unless U.S. actions demonstrate credibility, such as restraining Israel. He suggests that a more restrained Israeli posture would signal to Iran that the U.S. is serious about negotiations. - The program examines whether the MAGA movement has shifted on the issue. There is testimony that figures like Mark Levin have advocated for some form of ground action, though Levin reportedly denies calls for large-scale deployment. Kent explains that while he believes certain special operations capabilities exist—units trained to seize enriched uranium—the broader question is whether boots on the ground are necessary or wise. He emphasizes that a successful, limited operation could paradoxically encourage further action by Israel if it appears easy, potentially dragging the U.S. deeper into conflict. - A recurring theme is the perceived dominance of the Israeli lobby over U.S. foreign policy. Several participants contend that Israeli influence drives the war timeline, with Israeli action sometimes undermining U.S. diplomacy. They argue that despite public differences, the United States has not meaningfully restrained Israel, and that Israeli strategic goals could be pushing Washington toward conflict. - The conversation also covers domestic political dynamics and civil liberties. Kent argues that the intelligence community’s influence—infused with foreign policy aims—risks eroding civil liberties, including discussions around domestic terrorism and surveillance. The group notes pushback within the administration and among some members of the intelligence community about surveillance proposals tied to Palantir and broader counterterrorism practices. - Kent addresses questions about the internal decision-making process that led to the Iran policy shift, denying he was offered a central role in any pre-crime or AI-driven surveillance agenda. He acknowledges pushback within the administration against aggressive domestic surveillance measures while noting that the debate over civil liberties remains contentious. - The program touches on broader conspiracy-like theories and questions about whether individuals such as Kent are “controlled opposition” or pawns in a larger plan involving tech elites like Peter Thiel and Palantir. Kent insists his campaign funding was modest and transparent, and he stresses the need for accountability and oversight to prevent misuse of powerful tools. - In closing, the speakers converge on a common refrain: no U.S. boots on the ground in Iran. They stress that the priority should be preventing another ground war, avoiding American casualties, and pressing for diplomacy rather than expansion of hostilities. The show highlights public involvement—urging viewers to contact representatives, stay vigilant about foreign influence, and oppose a march toward war. - Across the exchange, the underlying tension is clear: competing visions of American sovereignty, the balance between counterterrorism and civil liberties, and the extent to which foreign actors (notably Israel) shape U.S. policy toward Iran. The participants repeatedly return to the need for accountability, restraint, and a peaceful path forward, even as they recognize the high stakes and the intense political pressure surrounding any potential intervention.

Speaker 0 believes that if Israel faces annihilation, it may use its nuclear arsenal, which they never admit to having. Speaker 0 states that Iran and Hezbollah need to understand that they cannot wipe out the Israeli people. Speaker 0 denies encouraging the use of nuclear weapons but suggests that Israel needs to consider all options if faced with total destruction. Speaker 0 believes that the US military being stretched is not Israel's fault and that the US should fund its military better. Speaker 1 expresses concern about the potential involvement of the United States in the conflict and the possibility of a wider war, given the situation in Ukraine and China. Speaker 0 dismisses these concerns, stating that the focus should be on Israel's survival.

Colonel Lawrence Wilkerson joins the program with host Glenn to discuss the escalating tensions around Iran, the U.S. leadership, and the broader geopolitical and economic implications. The conversation centers on what is driving recent White House actions, the potential paths forward, and the risks of cascading consequences. Key points and insights: - Trump’s countdown to strike Iran: Wilkerson interprets Trump’s 48-hour, then 5-, then 10-day countdowns on Iran’s energy facilities as an attempt to buy time rather than a clear plan for escalation. He suggests Trump is trying to stall and manage narratives while lacking a credible path out of the crisis. - Reasons Trump is escalating: Wilkerson argues Trump is “buying time to be buying time,” unable to articulate a feasible exit strategy. He posits that the main driver of the escalation is a realization by Trump that he’s deeply entangled, with Bibi Netanyahu as the principal ally who would abandon him in a crisis. - Global force posture and limits: The administration is assembling various special operations forces (e.g., 1st SOG, rangers from multiple locations) and delivery/ extraction capabilities, but Wilkerson believes a full invasion is not feasible and would risk impeachment. He notes the use of dispersed forces and high-end delivery systems akin to operations in Venezuela, stressing the operational and strategic implausibility of a large-scale invasion of Iran. - Iranian diplomacy and leadership: Wilkerson cites Iranian diplomacy as sidelined by U.S. actions. He highlights a UN emergency meeting where Iraqi officials criticized the U.S. and Israel for “two bullying nuclear weapons regimes” and condemned the “torpedoing of diplomacy,” pointing to the broader frustration with the international handling of the Palestinian-Israeli situation. He criticizes Witkoff and Kushner as ineffective in negotiating with Iran and notes a strong Iranian stance emphasizing an end to what they view as aggression. - Domestic political dynamics: Wilkerson criticizes both U.S. parties for their current leadership, accusing figures like Keane, Hagel, and Trump of mismanaging the crisis. He rails against the influence of evangelical and political figures who advocate Old Testament-style rhetoric in modern policy, arguing it contributes to destructive escalation. - Economic and global ripple effects: The war threatens the global economy, with consequences such as disruptions to the Strait of Hormuz impacting helium, urea, and broader trade. Wilkerson warns that the world could experience a global recession, potentially spiraling into a depression, due to shipping bottlenecks and energy-price shocks. - Strait of Hormuz and strategic chokepoints: A recurring theme is the vulnerability created by critical chokepoints. Wilkerson references his naval analysis of global straits and identifies Hormuz as a significant vulnerability, though not necessarily the most critical, with Bab el-Mandeb potentially more serious. - Israel’s situation and nuclear considerations: Discussion turns to Israel’s military situation in Gaza and Lebanon, Netanyahu’s political decisions, and the potential for Israel to face internal collapse or drastic shifts. Wilkerson raises the hypothetical that Iran could seek a nuclear deterrent if faced with existential threats and notes concerns about how the U.S. and Israel might respond to an Iranian nuclear capability. - Possible exit routes and diplomacy: When pressed for a pathway out, Wilkerson suggests a drastic but unlikely option: declare victory and leave, lifting sanctions and pressuring allies to do the same, including pressuring Europe to support rebuilding Iran. He emphasizes this as a potentially politically expedient exit for Trump, though he doubts it will happen. - Nuclear entanglements and further escalation: The conversation turns to the risk of nuclear exchange if Iran develops a deterrent and if Israel or the U.S. decide to escalate further. Wilkerson outlines a scenario in which limited U.S. forces strike Gulf targets, provoking Iranian retaliation that could escalate into a broader regional conflict with nuclear implications, given multiple nuclear powers’ capabilities. - Long-term outlook: Wilkerson references the broader implications for the global order, noting the dangers of imperial hubris post-Cold War, and warns that multiple dimensions—military, economic, and diplomatic—are converging toward a dangerous crossroads. He asserts that the current trajectory could threaten global stability and the viability of traditional alliance structures. In sum, Wilkerson presents a troubling synthesis: Trump’s incremental escalation appears aimed at time-buying without a credible exit; Iran’s leadership responds with strategic diplomacy and potential deterrence considerations; Israel faces internal and regional pressures; and the global economy and critical chokepoints amplify the risk that the conflict could spiral into a larger, harder-to-control crisis. He emphasizes the dangerous mix of leadership missteps, strategic miscalculations, and existential stakes that could reshuffle the regional and global order.

In 2002, before the Iraq invasion, Netanyahu testified to US Congress, stating Saddam Hussein was developing nuclear weapons and hiding facilities underground. This was allegedly false and led to war. Netanyahu also stated he wanted regime change in Iran and questioned how to achieve it. Speaker 0 asks: How can we trust someone who goaded the US into war in Iraq based on falsehoods? Given recent events, why are we confident Netanyahu won't do the same with Iran, given his 20-year call for regime change? Speaker 1 says the President and Secretary have close working relationships with Netanyahu. The US commitment to Israel's security transcends any government. The US condemns Iran's attacks. Speaker 0 notes Netanyahu heads the Israeli government and there's a difference between condemning actions and the US getting into a war with Iran. Speaker 1 says the US is not interested in an all-out conflict with Iran, but is committed to Israel's security.

Speaker 0 and Speaker 1 discuss a sequence of war-related scenarios, making provocative comparisons and extreme claims about Israel, Hamas, and broader conflicts. Speaker 0 asserts that if Mexico occupied their land and then decided to cut off electricity and control inputs, it would be akin to Israel’s actions against Palestinians; he imagines a scenario where an occupying force could slaughter people for allegedly throwing rocks. Speaker 1 counters by noting Israel has nuclear weapons and that the world’s military power backs Israel. Speaker 0 asserts that Israel has nuclear weapons and that they do not use them, while Speaker 1 suggests Hamas would use a nuclear weapon in seconds if they had one, stating three seconds as the answer because it’s in Hamas’s charter. Speaker 0 asks how anyone could know that, and Speaker 1 cites the charter as justification. Speaker 0 argues that Hamas would be martyrs if they used a nuclear weapon against Israel, describing Hamas as having a death-cult view and noting that they strap suicide vests sometimes on children. He says people cannot see the moral difference between Hamas and Israel. Speaker 1 pushes back, saying they are not talking about extermination and notes that Basilel Smotrich and Ben Gavir have talked about exterminating the entire population of Gaza, while Speaker 0 claims the West Bank is another example and states that despite the West Bank having nothing to do with October 7, it is being annexed and that terror is being rained on innocent Palestinians, driving them from their homes. Speaker 0 acknowledges that what Hamas did on October 7 was a “fucking atrocity,” killing innocent people. He says he is willing to admit that atrocity, but he emphasizes his belief that the atrocities against civilians in Gaza are also significant. Speaker 1 concedes that the IDF and all armies commit war crimes in war and that “all wars are going to have atrocity.” Speaker 0 asks for acknowledgment of a double tap on a hospital; Speaker 1 describes the hospital incident as an old terrorist trick and confirms that such acts occur in war, but he emphasizes that all wars involve atrocities. The exchange references first responders and a vague memory of the event, with Speaker 0 asserting that first responders’ deaths and hospital strikes are part of the ongoing discussion, while Speaker 1 frames them within the broader context of war crimes by all sides. Overall, the dialogue juxtaposes occupation, nuclear deterrence, and moral atrocity claims on both sides, with explicit references to statements by Israeli political figures, Hamas, and the general conduct of war by all parties.

Speaker 0 and Speaker 1 discuss the possibility of striking Iran to eliminate its nuclear program and the broader implications of regime change. - Speaker 0 acknowledges arguments that Israel has wanted to dismantle Iran’s nuclear program, and that American involvement with B-52s and large bombs might be needed to finish the job. He notes the idea of a strike that proceeds quickly with minimal American casualties, under a Trump-era frame that Iran will not get a nuclear bomb. - He observes a shift among Washington’s neoconservative and Republican circles from opposing Iran’s nuclear capability to opposing Ayatollah rule itself, suggesting a subtle change in objectives while maintaining the theme of intervention. He concedes cautious support if Trump executes it prudently, but warns of a “switcheroo” toward regime change rather than purely disabling the nuclear program. - Speaker 0 criticizes the record of neocons on foreign policy (Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Syria, the Arab Spring) and argues that the entire Middle East bears their failures. He emphasizes a potential regime-change drive and questions what would come after removing the Ayatollah, including possible US troop deployments and financial support for a new regime. - He highlights the size of Iran (about 92,000,000 people, two and a half times the size of Texas) and warns that regime change could trigger a bloody civil war and a large refugee crisis, possibly drawing tens or hundreds of thousands of deaths and destabilizing Europe. - Speaker 1 presents a more vocal stance: he would like to see the regime fall and leaves to the president the timing and method, insisting that if the nuclear program isn’t eliminated now, “we’ll all regret it” and urging to “be all in” to help Israel finish the job. - In cuts 3:43, Speaker 1 argues that removing the Ayatollah’s regime would be beneficial because staying in power would continue to threaten Israel, foment terrorism, and pursue a bomb; he characterizes the regime as aiming to destroy Jews and Sunni Islam, calling them “fanatical religious Nazis.” - Speaker 0 responds that such a forceful call for regime change is immature, shallow, and reckless, warning that certainty about outcomes in foreign interventions is impossible. He asserts that the first rule of foreign policy is humility, noting that prior interventions led to prolonged conflict and mass displacement. He cautions against beating the drums for regime change in another Middle Eastern country, especially the largest, and reiterates that the issue is not simply removing the nuclear program but opposing Western-led regime change. - The discussion frames a tension between supporting efforts to deny Iran a nuclear weapon and resisting Western-led regime change, with a strong emphasis on potential humanitarian and geopolitical consequences. The speakers reference public opinion (citing 86% of Americans not wanting Iran to have a bomb) and critique interventions as historically destabilizing.

Moss plans to execute hostages and share videos of Israeli airstrikes. Speaker 1 suggests retaliating by targeting an Iranian oil refinery for every executed hostage. They believe that holding Iran accountable is crucial to prevent further escalation. Speaker 1 accuses Hamas of being funded and planned by Iran, calling them animals. They advocate for Israel to take this opportunity to dismantle Hamas and confront Iran. They warn Iran against harming Americans or Israelis, threatening to destroy their oil refineries. It is emphasized that the time has come to wage war.

Speaker 0 argues that feeding their enemy is unprecedented in history and rejects the notion that it is consistent with Jewish morality, saying, “that isn’t” Jewish morality. He recalls October 1973 during the Yom Kippur War, when Henry Kissinger instituted an arms embargo against them, and explains that “an a four Skyhawk was parked at Telenorf Air Base with some interesting weapons under its wings,” and that they told the Americans to “take your eye in the sky and take a good look at the airplane that’s on that runway.” He continues that the next day “the airlift started to the to Israel,” describing an arms airlift, and notes that they “threatened their We threatened to use unconventional weapons,” and that they indicated, “So in other words, we threatened their We threatened to use unconventional weapons. I’ll leave it at that.” He asserts a policy stance: “is this what you’re want us to threaten now?,” and responds, “I said, absolutely. Except this time, I want us to go forward with it if necessary. If they think we’re bluffing, we go forward with it.” He states that, regarding existential threats, “as far as I’m concerned, when we are faced with an existential threat, we have the right to use any and all weapons in our disposal to eliminate that existential threat.” The speaker then contends that many people “don’t know anything about nuclear weapons at all. What they are, how they can be used,” and expresses fatigue with euphemisms, declaring, “I’m tired of using euphemisms. I’m tired of saying, well, we have something, you know, in the basement, but we won’t be the first to introduce, nuclear weapons in The Middle East. It’s enough already.” In sum, Speaker 0 highlights a historical precedent of threatening and delivering arms to counter existential threats, asserts the right to use any and all weapons if needed, and calls out the lack of public understanding and reluctance to acknowledge the potential introduction of nuclear weapons in the Middle East.

Chas Freeman and Glenn discuss the broader geopolitical implications of the ongoing war with Iran, focusing on perspectives from China, Russia, and the United States, and then turning to regional dynamics involving Israel, Japan, Brazil, South Africa, and others. Freeman argues that China does not have a unified view on the Iran war. He notes that some in the Chinese People’s Liberation Army are pleased to see the United States seemingly disarmed by its own stalemate and by depleting weapons stockpiles, including the pivot away from stationing intermediate-range missiles in the Pacific. Geopolitical thinkers fear the war destabilizes a central region for global commerce and energy, with the Hormuz Strait now effectively impassable. He asserts that Azerbaijan has become a primary route for Asia-to-Europe transit, while Iran’s control of the strait and safe passage for Chinese tankers complicate sanctions regimes. China, he says, is also recalibrating its economy toward renewables and away from fossil fuels due to the war’s effects. Freeman highlights how Asia-Pacific dynamics are affected: Japan is highly dependent on oil and gas imports and is stressed; Taiwan faces limits due to its own energy constraints; South Korea is economically hurt by the strait closure; Southeast Asia suffers from reduced petroleum exports; and the war pushes China closer to Russia, with Russia’s planned Siberia gas project gaining traction as a diversified supply route away from maritime routes. He also mentions Brazil and South Africa increasing military cooperation, noting potential Brazilian-Japanese collaborations and rising defense spending in Japan, with implications for US influence and global supply chains. Freeman then discusses Russia, noting Trump’s call with Putin and the possibility that Russia is seeking to influence or assist in ending the war with Iran. He asserts Iran seeks to deter or destroy Israel and to decolonize West Asia, including removing American forces from the Gulf. He emphasizes that Russia and China do not want Iran subjugated and abstained on a Security Council resolution condemning Iran, aiming to avoid offending Gulf Arabs while not endorsing the war. The war has drawn Iran closer to Russia, with Iranian drones and technology transfers now in Russian use, and Russia increasing influence in Iran as Gulf reconstruction becomes necessary. Freeman also points out that Iran has demanded reparations and sanctions relief, and that sanctions have deeply distressed the Iranian population. He argues that Russia benefits from higher oil and gas prices and European energy dependence on Russian supply, while the conflict complicates Western weapon stockpiles and European defense needs. He contends Putin benefits from divisions within the US and diminished American global leadership, while the war is not advantageous for the United States overall. Freeman emphasizes a broader moral and strategic dimension, criticizing what he sees as a departure from international law and ethical norms, including the suspension of targeting guidelines and collateral-damage assessments in certain operations. He cites concerns about human rights and humanitarian law, warning that the erosion of a universal moral order could have long-term consequences for Western diplomacy. He invokes historical and religious ethical frameworks (Kant, Grotius, and others) to argue for a return to principled conduct in war and postwar reconciliation. The conversation turns to Israel, with Freeman suggesting that Netanyahu’s long-standing aim to reshape Israel’s security and borders faces a difficult reckoning as Iran becomes a tangible military threat. Freeman contends that Israel’s plan for regime change in Iran is failing, and he questions what Plan B might be if Israel cannot secure its strategic goals. He warns that Israel could contemplate extreme options, including nuclear considerations, if it feels existentially threatened, while noting the potential for Israel’s positions to undermine American public support for Israel and complicate US domestic civil liberties and freedom of inquiry. Glenn and Freeman close by acknowledging that the situation has created a shifting web of alliances and rivalries, with European willingness to appease Trump waning and broader questions about coexistence in the Middle East. They stress the need for a more sustainable approach to regional security and a reconsideration of diplomatic norms to avoid escalating toward broader conflict.

The speakers discuss Iran's nuclear capabilities and Israel's potential response. Netanyahu claimed in 2012 that Iran was months away from a nuclear bomb. In 2015, he stated Iran was weeks away from having the fissile material for an arsenal. In 2018, Israel revealed Iran's secret nuclear files, including alleged warhead designs. A hot war between Israel and Iran could threaten the United States, but one speaker suggests the U.S. should stay out of it. Marco Rubio stated Israel took unilateral action against Iran and the U.S. was not involved. However, Trump acknowledged he was aware and gave a green light. Israel used American equipment during the strikes.

Speaker 0 explains that Netanyahu evokes Jewish history in his religious text and sentiment to rally support for attacks, and that Nurode explains this increases right-wing sentiment in Israel. Speaker 1 notes that when Netanyahu announced the offensive against Iran, he did not just discuss threats but invoked Jewish history, drawing parallels with Jews rising up against Persian enslavement more than two thousand years ago. Speaker 2 adds: “My brothers and sisters, in two days, we celebrate the holiday of Purim. Two thousand five hundred years ago in ancient Persia, an enemy rose against us with the exact same goal of destroying our people.” Speaker 1 continues: “A day later, Netanyahu invoked scripture describing the government in Tehran as Amalek, the ultimate enemy in the Old Testament, the enemy whose memory and existence must be erased.” Speaker 2: “We read in this week's Torah portions. Remember what Amalek did to you. We remember and we act.” Speaker 1 remarks that this is not the first time Netanyahu has used the Amalek reference to justify violence against an adversary. In fact, his reference to Palestinians as Amalek was cited during hearings in the genocide case against Israel at the International Court of Justice. Speaker 0 states that inciting religious fervor is not unique to Netanyahu; it’s a popular tactic among right-wing and populist leaders to rally support, and it often pays off. She cites opinion polls to illustrate how widespread these sentiments are: a Hebrew University poll on Israel’s war on Gaza found 75% of Jewish Israelis believe there are no innocence in Gaza; a survey by the Institute for National Security released last month shows 78% of Israelis consider Iran a serious threat. Speaker 1 adds that mixing scripture with mainstream politics is playing with fire and has led to talk of a greater Israel spanning from the Euphrates to the Nile River and erasing existing Arab countries in the process, an ambition referenced not only by Netanyahu but also by the head of the opposition in Israel. Speaker 0 concludes with the attribution: Jahan Bin.

The speaker suggests bombing Iran's oil infrastructure as a response to their alleged financing of terrorism. They believe it is time for Iran to face consequences for supporting chaos. They clarify that if war escalates, they will come after Iran. Speaker 1 seeks clarification, asking if the speaker wants the US and Israel to bomb Iran without direct evidence of their involvement in the attack. The speaker confirms this.

Speaker 0 asserts that Donald Trump decided to bomb Iran because Israelis said, for the first time, that if Trump did not bomb Iran to take out deep bunkers, Israel would use nuclear weapons; they had never threatened that before, and bombing Iran might save them from the start of World War III by preventing Israeli nuclear use. Speaker 1 asks for clarification, restating that Israelis told the U.S. president to use military power to bomb Iran’s nuclear facilities, or Israel, acting on its own, would use nuclear weapons. They note the problem with that statement, since Israel has never admitted having them. Speaker 0 concurs, and Speaker 1 points out the contradiction: they are saying Israel just admitted to having nuclear weapons, yet the U.S. does not have them in the IAEA treaty. Speaker 0 adds that, if Israeli nuclear whistleblowers are to be believed, Israel has had nuclear weapons, and began working on them in the 1950s.

- The discussion opens with claims that President Trump says “we’ve won the war against Iran,” but Israel allegedly wants the war to destroy Iran’s entire government structure, requiring boots on the ground for regime change. It’s argued that air strikes cannot achieve regime change and that Israel’s relatively small army would need U.S. ground forces, given Iran’s larger conventional force, to accomplish its objectives. - Senator Richard Blumenthal is cited as warning about American lives potentially being at risk from deploying ground troops in Iran, following a private White House briefing. - The new National Defense Authorization Act is described as renewing the involuntary draft; by year’s end, an involuntary draft could take place in the United States, pending full congressional approval. Dan McAdams of the Ron Paul Institute is described as expressing strong concern, arguing the draft would treat the government as owning citizens’ bodies, a stance attributed to him as supporting a view that “presumption is that the government owns you.” - The conversation contrasts Trump’s public desire to end the war quickly with Netanyahu’s government, which reportedly envisions a much larger military objective in the region, including a demilitarized zone in southern Lebanon akin to Gaza, and a broader aim to remove Hezbollah. The implication is that the United States and Israel may not share the same endgame. - Tucker Carlson is introduced as a guest to discuss these issues and offer predictions about consequences for the American people, including energy disruption, economic impacts, and shifts in U.S. influence in the Persian Gulf. - Carlson responds that he would not credit himself with prescience, but notes predictable consequences: disruption to global energy supplies, effects on the U.S. economy, potential loss of U.S. bases in the Gulf, and a shrinking American empire. He suggests that the war’s true goal may be to weaken the United States and withdraw from the Middle East; he questions whether diplomacy remains viable given the current trajectory. - Carlson discusses Iran’s new supreme leader Khomeini’s communique, highlighting threats to shut Hormuz “forever,” vows to avenge martyrs, and calls for all U.S. bases in the region to be closed. He notes that Tehran asserts it will target American bases while claiming it is not an enemy of surrounding countries, though bombs affect neighbors as well. - The exchange notes Trump’s remarks about possibly using nuclear weapons, and Carlson explains Iran’s internal factions, suggesting some seek negotiated settlements while others push for sustained conflict. Carlson emphasizes that Israel’s leadership may be pushing escalation in ways that diverge from U.S. interests and warns about the dangers of a joint operation with Israel, which would blur U.S. sovereignty in war decisions. - A discussion on the use of a term Amalek is explored: Carlson’s guest explains Amalek from the Old Testament as enemies of the Jewish people, with a historical biblical command to annihilate Amalek, including women and children, which the guest notes Christianity rejects; Netanyahu has used the term repeatedly in the conflict context, which Carlson characterizes as alarming and barbaric. - The guests debate how much influence is exerted in the White House, with Carlson noting limited direct advocacy for war among principal policymakers and attributing decisive pressure largely to Netanyahu’s threats. They question why Israel, a client state of the U.S., is allowed to dictate war steps, especially given the strategic importance of Hormuz and American assets in the region. - They discuss the ethical drift in U.S. policy, likening it to adopting the ethics of the Israeli government, and criticize the idea of targeting family members or civilians as a military strategy. They contrast Western civilization’s emphasis on individual moral responsibility with perceived tribal rationales. - The conversation touches on the potential rise of AI-assisted targeting or autonomous weapons: Carlson’s guest confirms that in some conflicts, targeting decisions have been made by machines with no human sign-off, though in the discussed case a human did press play on the attack. The coordinates and data sources for strikes are scrutinized, with suspicion cast on whether Israel supplied SIGINT or coordinates. - The guests warn about the broader societal impact of war on civil liberties, mentioning the increasing surveillance and the risk that technology could be used to suppress dissent or control the population. They discuss how war accelerates social change and potentially normalizes drastic actions or internal coercion. - The media’s role in selling the war is criticized as “propaganda,” with examples of government messaging and pop culture campaigns (including a White House-supported video game-like portrayal of U.S. military power). They debate whether propaganda can be effective without a clear, articulated rationale for war and without public buy-in. - They question the behavior of mainstream outlets and “access journalism,” arguing that reporters often avoid tough questions about how the war ends, the timetable, and the off-ramps, instead reinforcing government narratives. - In closing, Carlson and his co-hosts reflect on the political division surrounding the war, the erosion of trust in media, and the possibility of rebuilding a coalition of ordinary Americans who want effective governance without perpetual conflict or degradation of civil liberties. Carlson emphasizes a longing for a politics centered on improving lives rather than escalating war. - The segment ends with Carlson’s continued critique of media dynamics, the moral implications of the war, and a call for more transparent discussion about the true aims and consequences of extended military engagement in the region.