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Gorbachev has made various statements that seem contradictory. While he has quoted promises made by Americans regarding NATO not expanding beyond Germany after the Cold War, the reality is that many Central and Eastern European countries are now NATO members. This raises questions about trustworthiness. Gorbachev's comments suggest he acknowledges these broken promises, though he may not directly reference Baker’s quote. Ultimately, there are documented minutes from meetings that clarify what was discussed, providing a clearer understanding of the commitments made at that time.

**Original Summary (Deutsch):** Der Sprecher analysiert ein Gesprächsprotokoll von 1990 zwischen James Baker und Michael Gorbatschow bezüglich der NATO-Osterweiterung. Laut dem Protokoll, das aus dem National Security Archive stammt, sicherte Baker Gorbatschow zu, dass sich die NATO nicht ausdehnen würde. Baker argumentierte, dass die NATO die amerikanische Vorherrschaft über Europa sichern könne, was ohne die NATO gefährdet wäre. Wörtlich sagte Baker, man verstehe, dass es für Gorbatschow wichtig sei, dass sich die NATO nicht einen Zentimeter nach Osten ausdehnt, auch nicht im Zuge der deutschen Wiedervereinigung. Der Sprecher betont, dass es sich um Originalprotokolle handelt, die belegen, dass die USA den Sowjets versprochen hätten, die NATO nicht zu erweitern. **English Translation:** The speaker analyzes a 1990 conversation transcript between James Baker and Michael Gorbachev regarding NATO expansion. According to the transcript, sourced from the National Security Archive, Baker assured Gorbachev that NATO would not expand. Baker argued that NATO could secure American dominance over Europe, which would be jeopardized without NATO. Baker literally said that he understood it was important to Gorbachev that NATO not expand one inch eastward, not even in the course of German reunification. The speaker emphasizes that these are original protocols proving that the US promised the Soviets not to expand NATO.

Checklist: - Identify and extract core claims: NATO not moving east; no extension of defense area eastward; not absorbing the GDR; applies generally. - Translate to English while preserving meaning. - Present claims precisely as in the transcript; avoid added judgments. - Exclude filler and repetition; be concise. - Highlight any nuanced phrasing (e.g., “by the way” indicating emphasis). - Keep within a concise length given the brief source. In exchange for German reunification, the West promises not to push NATO further to the east. We were in agreement that there is no intention to extend NATO's defense area to the east. By the way, this does not apply only to the GDR, which we do not want to absorb there, but it applies generally.

If Putin attacks a NATO ally, we will defend every part of NATO as required by treaty. It's important to clarify that we do not seek American troops to engage in combat in Russia or against Russia.

The West promised not to expand NATO eastward in exchange for German reunification. The then Foreign Minister in Washington made significant commitments, stating that there was no intention to extend the defense area to the east, not just in relation to East Germany, but in general.

If Putin attacks a NATO ally, we will defend every part of NATO as required by treaty. It's important to clarify that we do not seek American troops to fight in Russia or against Russia.

Checklist: - Identify core claims: war in Ukraine not about NATO; Putin’s draft treaty; democracy vs. other motives; sphere of influence; West’s actions. - Remove repetition and filler; keep unique points. - Preserve key phrases and claims from the transcript where feasible. - Include notable comparisons (Hitler) and the Lindsey Graham reference. - Produce a concise, neutral summary within 378–473 words. Several speakers insist the war in Ukraine is not about NATO enlargement. Speaker 0 notes that President Putin sent a draft treaty to NATO promising no further enlargement as a precondition for not invading Ukraine; we rejected that, and he went to war to prevent NATO from closing near his borders. A flashback reinforces the point: “This is fundamentally not about NATO expansion,” with repeated lines such as “It’s not about NATO,” “Nothing to do with NATO,” and “NATO is not the reason.” Others push an alternative framing: the conflict is about democratic expansion rather than NATO. “This is not about NATO expansion,” one speaker repeats, followed by, “This is about democratic expansion” and “Ukraine is banning political parties… Ukraine restricts books and music… Ukraine won’t hold elections. It’s about democracy.” Still others insist the war has nothing to do with NATO, reiterating statements like “It has nothing to do with NATO” and “Nothing to do with NATO expansion,” while acknowledging that “security purposes” are claimed by some. A thread develops that Russia seeks a sphere of influence over Ukraine, and that the West’s challenges to Russian interests may have contributed to the conflict. “Hang on. I mean, the two are not mutually exclusive. Obviously, Russia has wished for a sphere of influence over Ukraine. But if the West had not challenged Russian interests so directly, I think that there there was a chance to avoid this war.” Putin’s demand for a binding pledge never to enlarge NATO is contrasted with the claim that the invasion is driven by broader ambitions. Moral condemnations appear: “The reason why Putin invaded Ukraine is because of his evil,” with references to “evil” and Putin’s goal to rebuild a Soviet empire, echoed by a comparison to Hitler. “Hitler… He’s a Hitler,” and “We’re back when the Nazis invaded Poland,” are invoked to describe Putin as a new Hitler, a butcher “trying to kill people everywhere in the world, just not Ukraine, Syria.” The discussion closes with thanks to Senator Lindsey Graham and a transition to the next segment: “Alright. Straight ahead.”

Der Westen versprach im Gegenzug zur deutschen Einheit, die NATO nicht weiter nach Osten auszudehnen. Der damalige Außenminister erklärte, dass es keine Absicht gebe, das Radioverteidigungsgebiet nach Osten zu erweitern, was auch die DDR betrifft. Dieses Versprechen hielt jedoch nicht lange. Bald nach der Einheit traten die ersten osteuropäischen Länder der NATO bei. Außenministerin Albright zeigte sich erfreut, als sie ihre Kollegen aus Polen, Tschechien und Ungarn umarmte. Dies wurde von Moskau als bedrohlich wahrgenommen, doch die Reaktion blieb aus, da Russland zu schwach war. --- In exchange for German reunification, the West promised not to expand NATO eastward. The then Secretary of State stated there was no intention to extend the defense area east, including the GDR. However, this promise was short-lived. Soon after reunification, the first Eastern European countries joined NATO. Secretary Albright was pleased to embrace her colleagues from Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary. Moscow viewed this as a threat, but was too weak to respond.

Professor Jeffrey Sachs discusses a second open letter to German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, republished in German media, explaining that he wrote it because the situation in Ukraine is worse than six months earlier. He contrasts the letter he wrote previously (December 2025), when he described war mongering and escalation and urged Germany to act diplomatically due to its power and historical responsibilities, with a period in January 2026 when he saw “glimmers of hope” after Merz publicly said Russia is part of Europe and that Europe must speak with Russia. He says that European leaders then began publicly considering a new envoy or diplomatic mediator, but that no process produced results, and he highlights that he views the proposed chief diplomat, Kaja Kallas, as unacceptable to both sides for what he describes as anti-Russian hostility. In recent weeks, Sachs says escalation has come through increased rhetoric and specific events. He points to the Ukrainian attack on a girls’ school in Starobilsk with many student deaths and claims Europe responded with denial or silence, rather than apology or explanation. He also describes Russia, through Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, warning in a call with U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio that Russia would attack Kyiv, targeting control centers and operational areas, and advising Western diplomats to take safety measures and evacuate. Sachs says the attack had not yet occurred at the time he spoke but that it was expected. He adds that he sees other contested and unexplained incidents—such as drones in Baltic airspace and a drone hitting near the Ukraine border in Romania—as raising tension. He also cites Baltic-state rhetoric about possibly attacking Kaliningrad or using it as a base for drone operations into northwest Russia and characterizes all of this as irresponsible behavior in a nuclear age. He says he places principal responsibility on Europe, arguing Europe shows minimal interest in diplomacy and only “whines” when the U.S. and Russia speak, while a union of 450 million should be able to find someone to talk to Russia. Sachs argues diplomacy is correct but emphasizes Germany’s particular responsibility tied to specific commitments from 1990 onward. He states that German reunification terms—approved by the Soviet Union and other occupying powers—required that Germany not take advantage of reunification by moving military forces eastward into Central and Eastern Europe, and he says Germany and the United States violated those commitments by moving NATO forces east, including toward Ukraine and Georgia. He claims this long-standing duplicity underlies rising tensions over more than 30 years, and he says his letter cites six episodes of Germany not following through honestly. He further urges Europe to express condolences or apologize for the Starobilsk girls’ school attack and calls for civility, honesty, humanity, and discussion rather than further war-mongering and hate speech. He says NATO countries have key responsibility in resolving the conflict because he links the security competition to NATO decisions and earlier actions affecting Ukraine’s neutrality. He references the 2008 Bucharest NATO summit, describing NATO’s commitment to enlarge to Ukraine and Georgia as reckless and as a declaration of war in how Russia would see it. He also recounts a 2021 proposal involving a draft security arrangement between Russia and the U.S., and he says that in his call with National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan, he pushed for the U.S. to commit to no further NATO enlargement, while he describes Sullivan’s response as saying it would not lead to war and would be handled diplomatically. Sachs then recounts events in 2014 and 2015: he says an agreement involving Germany, France, and Poland to prevent a coup was followed by a violent coup; he says Germany went along with the post-coup direction. He also says that in 2015, during the Minsk II process, Germany and France negotiated an autonomy-based arrangement for ethnic Russians in eastern Ukraine, Germany presented itself as a guarantor, but later reneged. He claims that the West did not want Ukraine’s unitary structure weakened and that the Minsk II endorsement by the UN Security Council was later ignored. He argues that Merz has a responsibility to know these histories and act by contacting President Putin before Europe is embroiled in another war. In response, Glenn emphasizes Germany as a guarantor in 2014 then walking back, says Minsk efforts were sabotaged for years, and claims multiple diplomatic paths were blocked, including possibilities for negotiation after 2021. Glenn says Russia now escalates directly against Europe given increased rhetoric and potential direct attacks. Sachs concludes that governments appear to avoid open discussion, diplomacy, and communication, and he says leadership and institutions are “hunkered down,” leaving falsehoods unresolved. He hopes to discuss positive developments in the future.

Speaker: Discussing the future of Ukraine, Putin requested written plans from the Americans, but Biden refused to negotiate. This should have sparked concern in Germany, as a potential war would involve them. If conflict arises as the Americans warned, Germany will be drawn into the issue.

Der Westen verspricht, die NATO nicht weiter nach Osten auszudehnen, im Gegenzug zur deutschen Einheit. In Washington erklärt der damalige Außenminister, dass es keine Absicht gibt, das Radioverteidigungsgebiet nach Osten auszudehnen. Dies betrifft nicht nur die DDR, die nicht einverleibt werden soll, sondern gilt allgemein. --- In exchange for German reunification, the West promises not to expand NATO further east. In Washington, the then Secretary of State states that there is no intention to extend the radio defense area eastward. This applies not only to the GDR, which is not to be incorporated, but is a general principle.

**German Summary:** Es wird die Frage behandelt, warum die Nicht-Osterweiterung der NATO nicht vertraglich fixiert wurde. Damals existierten NATO und Warschauer Pakt, wodurch sich die Frage einer solchen Fixierung nicht stellte. Es wird als Mythos bezeichnet, dass Russland bezüglich der NATO-Osterweiterung betrogen wurde, wobei die Presse eine Rolle gespielt habe. Moskau hätte im Zuge der deutschen Vereinigung Zusagen erhalten, dass sich die NATO nicht nach Osten ausdehnt. Ursprünglich bestand man darauf, dass Deutschland neutral bleibt, aber beim Gipfel in Camp David stimmte man einem vereinten Deutschland in der NATO zu. Mit der vollen staatlichen Souveränität Deutschlands war klar, dass es selbst über seine Bündniszugehörigkeit entscheidet. **English Translation:** The question of why NATO's non-eastern expansion was not contractually fixed is addressed. At that time, NATO and the Warsaw Pact existed, so the question of such a fixation did not arise. It is described as a myth that Russia was deceived regarding NATO's eastern expansion, with the press playing a role. Moscow is said to have received assurances during the German unification process that NATO would not expand eastward. Initially, it was insisted that Germany remain neutral, but at the Camp David summit, agreement was given to a united Germany in NATO. With Germany's full state sovereignty, it was clear that it would decide on its own alliance membership.

Der Westen verspricht im Zuge der deutschen Einheit, die NATO nicht weiter nach Osten vorrücken zu lassen. Der damalige Außenminister in Washington sagt zu, dass es keine Absicht gibt, das Verteidigungsgebiet nach Osten auszudehnen, weder in Bezug auf die DDR noch generell. Translation: In exchange for German reunification, the West promises not to expand NATO further east. The former Foreign Minister in Washington stated that there is no intention to extend the defense area to the east, not only concerning the GDR but in general.

There's debate over expanding NATO to Central European countries like Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia. Russia is against further expansion, warning of a potential "cold peace." While the US hasn't set a date, the understanding is that expansion will happen eventually. The issue isn't *if*, but *when*. Germany primarily advocates for expansion within NATO. While keeping the option open, expansion should only proceed if there's a real threat. The focus should be on encouraging Russia to cooperate peacefully. It's also more important for Eastern European countries to join the European Union for economic benefits. Expanding NATO to protect borders that aren't currently threatened doesn't make sense. Creating a buffer zone in Central Europe could lead to renewed tensions between Russia and Germany. We should aim for friendly relations with Russia.

The speaker expresses deep sadness about the current situation with Russia, noting extensive time spent in Russia in the 1980s and 1990s and connections with people who ran the government then. He argues that a fundamental error by the United States in the mid to late 1980s and early 1990s was the expansion of NATO. He emphasizes that after the Cold War was won, there was debate about NATO’s future, and the idea of expanding it arose despite it being a bureaucracy that “works.” The speaker recounts a key episode from the reunification negotiations with Germany. He says that during those talks, Gorbachev and Jim Baker discussed the treaty, which stated that there would be no NATO troops in East Germany, and Baker told Gorbachev that if Germany were reunified and NATO expanded beyond that, NATO would not expand “one inch further east.” The speaker states that Gorbachev told him and others that Baker had promised this interpretation, and that Gorbachev also told Coal (likely a reference to other Russian officials) the same thing, which he says was new information. He asserts that the first Bush administration kept this promise, or at least appeared to honor it, pursuing a partnership for peace that Russians somewhat liked. With the Clinton administration, the speaker asserts, the first thing done in his first term was to expand NATO. He questions the rationale, referencing Strobe Talbot’s Foreign Affairs article on why NATO was expanded, and implies the reasons were insufficient. In conversations with Russians who ran for president in 1996 and 2000, he recalls a question from the Urals about why the Americans were expanding NATO, noting that although NATO is a military alliance, Russians might not understand puts and calls but do understand tanks. He quotes a Russian politician who says, “Russians might not be able to understand puts and calls, but they certainly understand tanks.” The speaker uses a banking analogy: a friend or supporter goes bankrupt, and you call to offer encouragement; instead, the United States “kicked them when they were down” by expanding NATO. He contends that this expansion created the justification for authoritarianism’s return in Russia and characterizes it as a blunder of monumental proportions. He reflects that at Oxford he studied Cold War origins and believes the Russians were responsible for much of it, describing the expansion as born of bureaucratic inertia within NATO, or, in the worst case, a self-fulfilling prophecy among certain Clinton-era officials who believed Russia would forever be the enemy. Looking forward, the speaker suggests a missed opportunity for a strategic partnership built on common long-term threats and cooperation, noting that Russia would have been a significant partner given its oil and regional influence. He concludes with a sense of profound sadness, arguing that the United States created a problem that could have been avoided and lost an important long-term partner, especially on today’s most threatening issues.

Der Westen versprach im Gegenzug zur deutschen Einheit, NATO nicht weiter nach Osten vorrücken zu lassen; in Washington machte der damalige Außenminister weitreichende Zusagen. Sprecher 1: "Wir waren uns einig, dass nicht die Absicht besteht, das Nadio Verteidigungsgebiet auszudehnen nach Osten. Das gilt übrigens nicht nur in Bezug auf die DDR, die wir da nicht einverleiben wollen, sondern das gilt ganz generell." The West promised in exchange for German reunification not to advance NATO further to the east; in Washington, the then foreign minister made far-reaching commitments. Speaker 1: "We were agreed that there is no intention to extend the Nadio defense area to the east. This applies not only with regard to the GDR, which we do not want to incorporate there, but generally."

Jack Matlock, the former U.S. ambassador to the Soviet Union, argues that the end of the Cold War was not the Soviet Union’s collapse alone, but a process that was ideologically and practically over years before 1991. He says there were no winners and losers in the closing of the Cold War; the end was negotiated in the interests of both sides, with Gorbachev abandoning the communist ideology that had driven the conflict. The Soviet state’s monopoly in the economy and the shift away from a socialist system were central to the transformations, and the Soviet Union likely would not have collapsed if the Cold War had continued. He notes that in negotiations on German unification, Gorbachev was assured that NATO would not expand eastward, and that a Malta-style agreement had committed the U.S. and U.K. to not use force in Eastern Europe to preserve the system there and for the West not to take advantage—that commitment was written and reiterated in a letter delivered by him. He rejects the idea that the U.S. and the West defeated the Soviet Union; rather, internal pressures and changes within the Soviet system precipitated its dissolution. On NATO expansion, Matlock confirms that a promise was made but not codified in treaties. He recounts Secretary of State James Baker’s February 1990 discussions with Gorbachev about German unification under NATO, suggesting that while NATO expansion would be unacceptable, the U.S. recognized a stabilizing European military presence. He notes that Gorbachev understood the points, and later said expansion would be unacceptable, while acknowledging that some American legal interpretations limited East German sovereignty in the matter. He emphasizes that the expansion of NATO would turn it from a defensive alliance into an offensive one if used beyond Europe, especially in the broader context of post-Cold War security. He cites the Russian view that NATO’s eastward expansion threatened Russia and the later issue of missile defense bases in Romania and Poland as particularly provocative. Matlock argues that the West’s approach to Russia after the Cold War was a major misstep. He says the U.S. and Western Europeans treated Russia as a pariah and sought to shape Russia’s internal politics, including pressure on Ukraine and the 2014 coup context. He highlights the 1990s effort to broker a pan-European security structure and the danger of “unipolar” thinking after the Cold War, warning that a perception of Western moral superiority undermined sustainable diplomacy. He criticizes Western interventions in Serbia, Iraq, and Libya as examples of hubris and mismanagement, asserting that such actions worsened regional stability and produced blowback, including the rise of extremist forces. Regarding Ukraine, Matlock suggests that NATO’s insistence on eventual membership for Ukraine and Georgia was ill-advised, given popular resistance within Ukraine and the risk of provoking Moscow. He cites Minsk 2015 as an attempt to halt further conflict, noting that Russia agreed to certain conditions but that Western partners continued arms supplies, complicating ceasefires. He stresses that the Donbas and Crimea issues were deeply rooted in historical borders and language rights, and that external attempts to dictate internal politics were unhelpful. Looking forward, Matlock laments the erosion of diplomatic norms and argues that the U.S. and Europe are ceding leadership to China, which he sees as better at pursuing peace and developing new energy and technology sectors. He calls for a re-examination of security architecture and a renewed commitment to diplomacy and dialogue, noting Pope Francis’ recent calls for frank discussions on peace. He concludes by acknowledging the tragedy that no one is focusing on peace in current conflicts, including in Iran and Ukraine.

In 1990, Gorbachev made a deal to dismantle the Warsaw Pact in exchange for NATO not moving eastward. This deal was deeply discussed and negotiated, leading to the reunification of Germany. The speaker believed in this deal and in Gorbachev.

Speaker 1 denies being deceived by the West regarding NATO's eastward expansion. They explain that at the time, there was no need for a contractual agreement as the NATO and Warsaw Pact already existed. Speaker 1 dismisses the myth and suggests that the press played a role in spreading misinformation. Regarding Moscow's alleged assurances during German reunification, Speaker 1 states that Germany was expected to remain neutral but ultimately chose to join NATO after regaining full sovereignty. When asked about the topic, the former Soviet Defense Minister denies any discussions with Speaker 1 about Western guarantees. However, he is unsure if any agreements were made with the US.

Im Gegenzug zur deutschen Einheit verspricht der Westen, die NATO nicht weiter nach Osten vorrücken zu lassen. Der damalige Außenminister in Washington macht weitreichende Zusagen, dass das Verteidigungsgebiet nicht nach Osten ausgedehnt wird. Dies gilt nicht nur für die DDR, sondern allgemein. Translation: In exchange for German reunification, the West promises not to expand NATO further east. The former Foreign Minister in Washington makes extensive commitments that the defense area will not be extended to the east. This applies not only to the GDR, but in general.

In response to German reunification, the West promised not to expand NATO further east. The then Foreign Minister in Washington made significant commitments, stating that there was no intention to extend the defense area to the east. This applies not only to the DDR, which they do not want to incorporate, but also to the entire region.

Professor Jeffrey Sachs and Glenn unpack how European security architecture evolved and why current moves toward a Europe-centered NATO, possibly including Ukraine and excluding Russia, look so perilous. - Sachs recounts a historic 1990 opportunity offered by Mikhail Gorbachev: a “common European home” stretching from Rotterdam to Vladivostok, with internal Soviet reforms, demilitarization, and, crucially, an end to NATO expansion. The promise by Germany and the United States in pursuit of German reunification was that “NATO would not move one inch eastward.” This indivisible-security concept echoed the Helsinki final act: no country would join an alliance threatening others. Yet NATO expanded, despite that explicit commitment, and that expansion contributed to the current Ukraine conflict. - Two motives behind NATO enlargement are highlighted. First, to keep the United States in Europe as a security defender, especially for Central and Eastern European states emerging from Soviet domination, which wanted continued U.S. protection despite no evident external threat. Second, the United States used NATO enlargement as a tool for projecting American power in a unipolar world after the Soviet collapse, turning NATO into the military branch of U.S. overseas power and serving a broader hegemonic aim. - Brzezinski’s influence is emphasized: in The Grand Chessboard (1997), he argued Eurasia centered on Ukraine; “he who controls Ukraine controls Eurasia.” Brzezinski advocated expanding Europe and NATO to diminish Russia, envisioning a weakened or divided Russia. This framed Ukraine as a geopolitical prize, with Ukraine’s joining NATO seen as a strategy to prevent a revived Russian power. - The expansion waves are traced: 1999 brought Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic; 2004 added seven states including the Baltic states and Romania; 2008 and the Bucharest summit sparked a pledge that Ukraine and Georgia would join NATO, a timetable Merkel later resisted but ultimately yielded to U.S. pressure. The 2004 expansion followed the U.S. withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 2002, further destabilizing the nuclear balance and fueling Russian resentment. - The Maidan coup of 2014 in Ukraine, aided by Western support, brought to power a government that favored NATO alignment, intensifying Russian pushback and making Europe’s pro-NATO stance more central to policy, even as Russia resisted. The aim was to bring Ukraine into NATO, which Sachs argues was not defense-driven but an assertion of American hegemony. - Sachs contrasts two mindsets: Eastern Europe’s Russophobia, rooted in decades of Soviet domination, especially among the Baltic states and Poland, driving a hardline stance; and a German role that has shifted from a historic commitment to make peace with Russia (Austrian-style realpolitik) to endorsing NATO expansion for commercial investments, a shift he finds dangerous. He criticizes Merkel for acquiescing to U.S. pressure on enlargement and labels Scholz and Merkel’s posture as failures to maintain a balanced European peace. British Russophobia also colors policy, he adds, underscoring a transatlantic appetite for confrontation. - The broader risk is a security dilemma: Europe’s defensive steps may provoke offensive reactions, potentially leading toward war, especially if a “European NATO” is formed to deter or strike at Russia without credible allied protection. Sachs argues the current direction shows a lack of political and security imagination in Europe, with a remilitarization path that could be a march to war. - In closing, Sachs notes the paradox: European leaders recognize risk but still pursue a path that could escalate conflict with a nuclear power, while the debate continues about deterrence, defense, and the future of European security architecture.

russian_summary = Обсуждается возможность присоединения России к НАТО. Рассекреченная нота 1954 года: «Советское правительство выражает готовность рассмотреть совместно с заинтересованными правительствами вопрос об участии СССР в Североатлантическом договоре». Ответ: нет необходимости подчеркивать совершенно не реалистический характер такого предложения. Это ответ. Год назад я сказал: «почему бы и нет». Бывшая госсекретарь Олбарит: «Но это не обсуждается сейчас. Это военная организация или нет? Военная. Нас там видеть не хотят?» Затем: «Не хотят. Она двигается к нашим границам? Двигается.» «Зачем? Вот что лежит в основе нашей позиции.» english_translation = Discussion about Russia joining NATO. A declassified 1954 note: “The Soviet government expresses readiness to consider jointly with interested governments the question of the Soviet participation in the North Atlantic Treaty.” The reply: “there is no need to emphasize the completely unrealistic character of such a proposal. This is the answer.” A year ago I said: “why not.” Albright: “But this is not discussed now. Is it a military organization or not? Military. They do not want to see us there?” Then: “No. It moves toward our borders?” “Why? Here is what lies at the core of our position.”

Speaker 1 argues that the United States has repeatedly engaged in illegal military actions and regime changes in multiple countries, starting with the bombing of Belgrade for 78 days to change borders of a European state, with the aim of breaking Serbia and installing Bondsteel, a large NATO base in the Balkans, under Clinton. They claim this was done without UN authority and described as a NATO mission. Speaker 1 continues, alleging that the US has subsequently waged war in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria, where, according to them, the Obama administration and Hillary Clinton tasked the CIA with overthrowing Bashar al-Assad. They also claim NATO illegally bombed Libya to topple Muammar Gaddafi, and that in Kyiv in February 2014 the US overthrew Yanukovych together with right-wing Ukrainian military forces, noting that the overthrow happened the day after EU representatives had reached an agreement with Yanukovych for early elections, a government of national unity, and a stand-down of both sides. They assert that the US supported the new government immediately afterward, despite that agreement and without addressing it as unconstitutional. Speaker 1 asserts that Russia, the United States, and the EU were parties to the 2015 Minsk two agreement, which was unanimously voted on by the UN Security Council, signed by the government of Ukraine, and guaranteed explicitly by Germany and France. They contend that Minsk II was dismissed as a holding pattern by inside-US government circles, despite the UN Security Council approval. They claim Angela Merkel later said Minsk II was a holding pattern to allow Ukraine time to build its strength, countering the assertion that Minsk II was meant to end the war. The speaker emphasizes distrust of the United States government and calls for all sides to sit down publicly to agree on terms, with both the United States and Russia committing to specific boundaries, and for NATO not to enlarge, so that a written, global judgment can be made. Speaker 2 adds that there has been an ongoing effort to create an anti-Russian platform in Ukraine, describing it as an enclave, and accusing the US and its allies of lying about not expanding NATO multiple times. Speaker 3 states that President Putin sent a draft treaty asking NATO to promise no more enlargement as a precondition for not invading Ukraine, and notes that this draft was not signed.

NATO denies responsibility for Russian army's proximity, citing NATO's defensive nature. Russia's actions in Ukraine and Georgia are questioned. NATO's eastward expansion is acknowledged but not seen as hostile. The debate centers on perceived threats and territorial integrity. Other countries also feel threatened. Translation: NATO denies blame for Russian army's closeness, emphasizing defense. Actions in Ukraine and Georgia are disputed. Expansion eastward is noted but not seen as hostile. Debate focuses on threats and territorial integrity. Other countries also feel threatened.