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The discussion centers on the U.S. military buildup in the Middle East amid tensions with Iran and the broader regional dynamics driving the potential conflict. Key points include: - Military posture and numbers: The 82nd Airborne Division and 5,000 U.S. Marines are traveling to the region, with CENTCOM confirming roughly 50,000 U.S. troops already there. President Biden previously acknowledged that American forces were “sitting ducks” and that an attack was imminent. The hosts note that ground forces are arriving by Friday, with the Marine Expeditionary Unit from the Pacific on station soon, and reference a pattern of rapid escalation around Fridays into Saturdays in past conflicts. - Public reaction and political stance: Representative Nancy Mace says she will not support troops on the ground in Iran, even after briefing. The panel questions what powers she or others have to restrict presidential war powers, noting a perception that both parties are in lockstep on war funding. - Open-source intelligence on deployments: There is a reported flow of special operations elements—Delta Force, SEAL Team Six, Task Force 160, 75th Ranger Regiment—into or toward the Middle East, with multiple flights of SEACEs and C-17s observed in the last 48 hours. The discussion emphasizes the significance of such ground-force movements and their possible outcomes. - Iranian messaging and claims: An IRGC spokesman claimed that if the American public knew the true casualties, there would be outrage, and that “all American bases in the region have effectively been destroyed,” with American soldiers “hiding in locations adjacent to these locations and they are basically being hunted down.” - Expert analysis on negotiations and off-ramps: Doctor Trita Parsi of the Quincy Institute argues that an off-ramp would require behind-the-scenes talks and cautions that the 15-point plan reportedly leaked to the Israeli press is not a basis for serious negotiation. He suggests a diplomacy path could involve sanctions relief and restricted military actions, but warns the public leaks risk undermining negotiations. - Israel’s role and objectives: Parsi states that Israel has aimed to sabotage negotiations and that Netanyahu’s objectives differ from U.S. aims. He suggests Israel desires a prolonged war to degrade Iran, while Trump’s objective may be to declare victory and withdraw. The panel discusses how Israeli influence and regional actions (Gaza, West Bank, Lebanon) relate to U.S. strategy and regional stability. - Saudi Arabia and other regional players: New York Times reporting indicates Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman privately lobbied Trump to keep the conflict going and even push for boots on the ground. The Saudi position is described as complex, with the foreign ministry potentially opposing war tones while MBS may have privately supported escalating the conflict. The guests discuss whether Saudi wealth is tied to the petrodollar and how a potential Iranian escalation could impact the region economically and politically. - Iran’s potential targets and escalatory capacity: Iran could retaliate against UAE and Bahrain, which are closely linked to the Abraham Accords and Israel. Iran’s capacity to strike urban centers and critical infrastructures in the Gulf region is acknowledged, and the discussion underscores the risk of significant disruption to desalination plants and strategic assets. - Propaganda and public perception: Iran released a viral video portraying global victims of U.S. and Israeli actions; the panel notes the messaging is aimed at shaping U.S. domestic opinion and demonstrates the intensity of propaganda on both sides during war. - Two emphasized “truths” (from Parsi): first, there has been a misperception about the efficiency of Iran’s missiles due to media censorship and selective reporting; second, U.S. and Israeli interests in the region have diverged, calling for a reassessment of national interest over coalition pressures. - Additional context: The conversation touches on U.S. military readiness, enrollment trends, and the broader historical pattern of wars shaped by executive decisions and external influences, including pressure from regional powers. The discussion ends with thanks to Dr. Parsi and an invitation for future conversations.

Seyyed Mohammed Marandi, speaking from Islamabad where US-Iranian negotiations are taking place, says the talks have collapsed. He asserts that the United States behaved with arrogance, sought to dictate terms, and did not respect Iranian sovereignty or independence. He characterizes the Trump regime as having attempted to force Iran to lose and claims the United States is becoming an openly extremist regime, with media and think tanks reportedly naming negotiators as targets. He states that Iran is returning to its position after the collapse and that the situation remains open to future developments. The interviewer notes that Washington Post coverage and Western rhetoric have included calls to murder negotiators, and asks where the most difficult point in the negotiations was. Marandi responds that the United States does not accept Iranian sovereignty and wants control over the Strait of Hormuz; he says Iran views its nuclear program as legitimate and legal within international law, while the United States demands capitulation. He argues the US was not serious from the outset and suggests the talks may have been a ploy to gather more information about individuals, though Iran sought to engage publicly to demonstrate a search for solutions. He mentions that doctors Vandebaut and the speaker of parliament made the right move in engaging publicly but had long been skeptical about any meaningful outcome. Marandi notes significant regional context: the Israeli regime is reported to be slaughtering civilians in Lebanon and Gaza, while Western media and governments are said to overlook these actions. He predicts a high likelihood of renewed aggression against Iran and asserts that Iran has spent the 40-day war reorganizing and strengthening its defensive and offensive capabilities, having learned from prior conflicts. He emphasizes that Iran has not initiated wars since the revolution and that responses have followed Western escalations. He argues that there are no factions within the Trump regime that are distant from the Zionist lobby and asserts that the negotiations showed that Vance and his aides intended to push for capitulation, not a negotiation. The discussion then turns to possible mechanisms for peace, including US opposition to Iran’s control of the Strait of Hormuz and potential toll arrangements involving Iran and Oman. Marandi says he has not been briefed on the latest details but that the issue was discussed; he reiterates that Iran’s control of the Strait is in accordance with international law, even as he notes the law of the jungle prevailing in practice. He asserts that Iran did not carry out aggression and that US demands are unacceptable at multiple levels. Marandi expresses optimism about regional dynamics, arguing that Western narratives are unreliable and praising Iran’s stance and sacrifices by groups like Hezbollah in Syria and Palestine. He contends that the empire will be defeated and that the Islamic Republic will emerge as a power in Western Asia, opposing ethnosupremacism and genocide. Regarding potential US actions if negotiations end, Marandi warns that the US could attack, but Iran would retaliate by destroying oil and gas infrastructure in the Persian Gulf, potentially leading to a broader energy crisis. He contends that any blockade would further harm the global economy and asserts that Trump’s course could push the world toward a global economic depression. He attributes US incentives to the Israeli regime rather than American public interest, suggesting that certain US allies’ priorities align with Israel over global stability. He says he will seek to obtain a fuller picture on the ground upon returning from Islamabad and notes that Vance’s tone appeared more positive than Kushner or Wittkopf at times, though the situation remained fluid.

The transcript discusses renewed U.S.-Iran hostilities, framed around President Trump’s claims of destroying Iran’s defensive and offensive capabilities and CENTCOM’s message that the Strait of Hormuz is open for transit. Professor Morandi, joining from Iran, responds by citing community notes that claim Strait of Hormuz transit remains severely restricted, and asks what propaganda is being presented and what is actually happening inside Iran. Professor Morandi explains that he added a laughing emoji to Trump’s tweet because Iran has “been around for a few thousand years” and will “survive Trump’s presidency,” and because Trump’s behavior as an openly ambitious imperialist strengthens Iranian resolve and unites Iranians to protect their land and resources. He says Iranians believe they are attacked because they support the Palestinian cause and oppose ethnosupremacism and genocide in Palestine and Lebanon, and because Trump intends to steal Iranian resources. He also asserts that Trump’s actions anger the world and increasingly ordinary Americans. He addresses statements Trump made about stealing oil from Iran into the United States, saying the current U.S. president is “a serial liar” and more openly imperialist and ruthless. Morandi claims only ships that receive Iranian permission and pay a fee transit through the Strait of Hormuz, while other departing ships are later stopped by U.S. forces and oil is taken. He describes this as stealing oil already passing through with Iranian permission rather than increasing output from the Strait. On what another set of strikes would mean, Morandi describes civilian impact across Iran, including attacks reaching thousands of kilometers via missiles and drones. He recounts a nine-year-old girl from Karaj telling him her schoolmate was murdered in an attack by an American and Israeli coalition and that the entire family was murdered. He says civilians and civilian infrastructure have been targeted throughout the country and that Iranians recognize Trump’s threats to “obliterate” or “wipe out” Iran, while Western media is described as saying nothing or being indifferent. Regarding the economic and infrastructure situation, Morandi says U.S. aims are to starve ordinary Iranians into submission, similar to efforts he cites in Cuba and Syria. He claims the economy is worse than four months or three and a half months ago, and says strikes damaged steel plants, pharmaceutical factories, hospitals, schools, petrochemical plants, and an Iranian gas field. He adds that despite a siege preventing food from entering, Iran has borders with 15 countries and many friendly neighbors, and that inflation and job loss are occurring while Iranians “persevere.” On negotiations, the transcript says Trump claimed many “deals” were on the table. Morandi states there were “two deals”: (1) after the 39-day war, Trump accepted Iran’s 10-point proposal as a framework and a ceasefire was agreed that included ending genocidal attacks on Lebanon, which he says Netanyahu later violated, and the transcript says Trump then imposed a siege on Iranian ports; (2) a still-floated agreement framework where Iran would receive part of stolen assets and the U.S. would lift sanctions on Iranian energy exports for the duration, end the war in Lebanon, stop genocide in Gaza, lift the siege on Iranian ports, normalize movement of ships through the Strait of Hormuz, and Iran would declare it will not pursue nuclear weapons. Morandi says progress stalled because Trump would not return assets, remove sanctions, or lift the siege, making Trump the “deal-breaker,” while Israeli and Zionist pressure is described as contributing. The transcript also asks about attacks on U.S. or allied infrastructure in Gulf states. Morandi says U.S. jets based in regional bases were targeted, radar installations were targeted, and a very expensive radar installation in Bahrain was destroyed. He adds that he says Iran bombed bases in Jordan, Kuwait, and Bahrain early this morning in retaliation and claims Iran’s deterrent retaliation followed U.S. attacks and broken ceasefires. Finally, the transcript reports that Trump allegedly canceled scheduled strikes after discussions were approved at the highest Iranian leadership level. A posted statement says scheduled strikes and bombings were canceled this evening, discussions and final points were approved by parties including the U.S., Israel, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Qatar, Turkey, Pakistan, Bahrain, Kuwait, Jordan, Egypt, and others, and that the naval blockade would remain in full force until the transaction is finalized and signing time and place would be announced shortly. Morandi comments that people should expect Trump to bomb if he says he is not, and that U.S. uncertainty prevents trust and makes deals difficult.

Jiang Shuichin argues that rapid shifts in international power generally become highly disruptive and destabilizing, often coinciding with major world-order changes after major wars or state collapses. He says the Iran war could have wider ramifications beyond the Strait of Hormuz and the region, potentially dragging the broader world into escalating conflict. He explains that the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) has long been a major driver of the global economy by selling oil cheaply in US dollars and recycling revenue into the US economy. If GCC states were removed from the global economy, he says it would have “tremendous consequences.” He claims that within “a month or two” the world could run out of strategic fuel reserves, grounding airplanes. He also links the conflict to global food supply, stating that the Tigray War provides one third of the world’s fertilizer, and that during the global growing season widespread famine could occur within “five months” or “six months,” especially in Africa. On the Middle East’s reorientation, he argues that Iran can control the Strait of Hormuz de facto, collect tolls, and de facto use it to reconstruct its economy, industrialize, and build stronger trade relations with China and Russia. He says the US imposed a naval blockade to embargo Iranian oil exports to China, but that enforcement is difficult due to the Indian Ocean’s scale and US resource limitations. He asserts that the UAE is “most desperate for war” after losing control of trade through the region’s shipping and finance hub. He adds that Saudi Arabia faces long-term threat dynamics because Iranian influence and proxies affect both Hormuz/Straight security and the Red Sea. He claims Israel wants the war to continue to advance the “Greater Israel” project and warns it has discussed attacking Turkey and Egypt next. He frames the region as a “powder keg,” arguing it is hard for the status quo to persist and predicting possible future breakout regional hostilities, including possible US airstrikes against Tehran and possible Israeli false-flag escalation modeled on the Gulf of Tonkin incident. He suggests the status quo could last “the next three to five months,” arguing Trump would avoid being seen as a loser and might pursue a tentative agreement before shifting attention elsewhere. He presents Cuba as a potential “next global flash point,” arguing the US embargo blocks Cuba from accessing fuel, food, and water, and that Raúl Castro could be indicted, recalling a prior pattern involving Maduro and special forces. He says Russia is heavily invested in Cuba and that both Russia and China are trying to support it. He predicts the Middle East conflict could expand to other flashpoints worldwide, including the possibility of tensions involving North Korea and South Korea, and he claims the war in Europe will also escalate. In discussing Russia’s Ukraine war trajectory, he references an attack on a student dormitory in Luhansk that reportedly killed at least six students and says Putin promised swift retaliation, framing this as potential movement from a “special military operation” toward declaring war and switching to “total war.” He then argues that European elites are trapped in a self-reinforcing fantasy that Ukraine is winning, describing domestic and institutional dynamics that prevent acknowledgment of losses and sustain continued war support. Regarding China’s and Russia’s roles, he says Iranian Foreign Minister Araki visited both Russia and China and claims Putin told him Russia is supportive of the Iranian people and views the US and Israel as aggressors. He says if Iran faces difficulties, Russia would reinforce Iran through the Caspian Sea and describes Russia’s response to GCC complaints about Iran. He contrasts China’s approach as neutral and mediation-focused, arguing China seeks peace and ceasefire so the world can return to global trade and that China refuses a clear stance. He also claims China might sign an agreement with the US to buy more LNG to compensate for lost Middle East LNG, especially Qatar. He describes negotiations between the US and Iran as having “three sticking points.” The uranium issue, he says, could allow compromise through allowing international inspectors while keeping uranium. The Strait of Hormuz control, he says, is core to Iranian security and not something Iran would give up. The third sticking point is Lebanon and the requirement that any peace treaty with the US also applies to Lebanon, including Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon. He argues that Israel’s offensive in Lebanon makes lasting peace unlikely and suggests any settlement with Iran would be tentative and could resume within “at most six months.” He argues the US cannot retreat from the Iran war because US financing needs depend on the world continuing to buy US Treasuries and because continuous bombardment is limited by depleted munitions stocks after earlier sustained airstrikes. He states that to “fight this war effectively” the US would need ground troops, which he says would require a national draft and also a chain of events to justify the invasion, including a need for “justification” to rally Americans and create broader economic chaos that would make the invasion acceptable. On Israel’s “Greater Israel” project, he argues that Lebanon is part of the project and that even if the US and Iran reach tentative terms, Israel’s long-term objective would continue, preventing permanent peace. He also claims the Zionist lobby has significant political sway in the US and cites campaign spending aimed at defeating a Republican congressman to warn others. He further argues that conflict models in Europe and Asia are tied to a broader US grand strategy: shifting global conflict to sustain debt and delay economic constraints. He says the US would aim to retreat geographically while still financing and arming partners to prolong wars. For East Asia, he claims the US might allow Japan and South Korea to handle more while American forces and allied structures support containment dynamics. Finally, he argues that Taiwan’s status quo is not sustainable and points to a “grand bargain” after Trump’s China visit. He says Western reporting frames the visit as unproductive, while Chinese media and experts view it as a breakthrough that could end the trade war. He claims the bargain could involve US access to China’s financial market and China opposing Taiwan independence, with the US pausing or blocking a weapons shipment to Taiwan and considering onshoring semiconductors. He states he expects Taiwan to be a future flashpoint only near-term at minimum and argues the next major flashpoint could be North Korea rather than Taiwan. He closes by describing a Western “legitimacy crisis,” attributing it to demographic crisis, financialization, and moral decay, and arguing it will lead to a decline of Western society. He also argues immigration debates are framed as purely pro-immigrant versus racist, while culture and cultural cohesion are not addressed.

The discussion centered on whether Iran would retaliate to an Israeli strike on Beirut and how that could affect an expected U.S.-Israel-Iran memorandum of understanding (MOU). Iran was described as having made retaliation a “red line,” particularly because Israel had previously tested it and Iran launched a “pretty aggressive attack” about a week earlier. The strike on Beirut was also noted as occurring on the same day as the MOU was meant to be signed. Glenn argued that Iran faced a dilemma: retaliating would invite Israel’s full-force response against Iran, leading to a “high-intensity war” and derailing talks about peace; not retaliating would leave Iran to uphold a new deterrence reality while still facing the possibility Israel intended to sabotage the agreement. He suggested the bombing timing could be a trap set by Israel, with both options “unfavorable” and difficult for Iran’s “hawks” and leadership. He also emphasized that speculation about whether Israel had U.S. authorization (or only informed the U.S.) was complicated by limited transparency, but that the timing and wording in public statements pointed to attempts to shape escalation and the political narrative. Trump’s public messaging was a major focus. Trump was quoted urging “stand down,” blaming Netanyahu’s “fucking attack” and arguing it should not have happened on a special day close to peace, while also telling media outlets he believed the Iran agreement would still be signed that day. Trump also said he told Iran “not to respond” and warned that retaliation would “ruin everything,” and claimed Iran should not launch missiles. Glenn discussed how this rhetoric could be intended for multiple audiences—Iranians, Americans, and Israelis—potentially weakening U.S.-Israeli relations while simultaneously trying to pressure escalation. A video clip of the strike was discussed as showing a “precision strike” rather than buildings being leveled as in earlier examples. The channel guest also drew parallels to how ceasefires are framed alongside continued attacks, arguing that targeting choices under a “precision” label still raises concerns about what peace means in practice. He linked the lack of clarity to possible gaps in the MOU, especially sequencing and specificity about obligations—particularly from the Iranian side, which was described as skeptical that the U.S. would implement commitments. The guest cited concerns that Iran wanted either a complete peace or no peace, and that otherwise the U.S. and Israel might pause intense conflict while continuing incremental actions against Hezbollah and potentially later resume fighting Iran. There was also discussion of whether Israel would remain part of the Lebanese peace framework. Since Israel was said to be not part of the MOU, questions were raised about whether provisions for Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanon would be included, and whether Trump could force Israel to pull out given Israel’s actions on the day the agreement was supposed to be signed. Iranian political and military statements were highlighted as reinforcing the “red line” theme. The head of Iran’s National Security Commission was cited as saying the Beirut attack proved the U.S. was weak and that “a strong response is coming.” Iranian commanders were cited warning that the strike would not go unanswered. Another post by an Iranian official urging punishment of the “Zionist child killers” was mentioned as deleted after Trump’s comments, raising uncertainty about whether threats were being walked back. The secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council was also cited as saying violating Iran’s red lines “will not be tolerated,” with Lebanon framed as “our life.” As the conversation ended, they returned to the central uncertainty: whether Iran would retaliate and, if it did, whether Israel and Iran would repeat prior cycles of exchange in a limited de-escalation pattern or escalate significantly harder. The overarching theme was whether the strike was designed to provoke retaliation and derail the MOU, or whether Iran could decide to avoid escalation—both of which were described as heavily dependent on interpretation of intentions and the MOU’s specific terms.

Professor Seyyed Muhammad Marandi and Glenn discussed the widening of the war and what Yemen’s entry means for the escalation, as well as how Iran interprets attacks on it and its own targeting. - Yemen’s entry into the war is described as very important. Marandi notes the United States previously waged war on Yemen last year and withdrew, which he says demonstrates Yemen’s significance. With the US engaged against Iran, its ability to focus on Yemen is reduced, giving Yemen more room to maneuver. Iraq’s resistance has been striking US targets and could go further; Yemen’s capabilities have likely grown, and its current targets are limited but could expand to striking Saudi oil facilities or entering the Arabian Peninsula, including potentially closing the Red Sea or striking Israeli and US assets. - He recalls past dynamics of the Yemen conflict, including the seven-yearSaudi-led campaign backed by much of the world, the blockade on Yemen that blocked medicine and food, and Yemen’s eventual leverage via strikes on Saudi oil and gas installations that contributed to a ceasefire. Today, Yemen could “easily take out Saudi oil installations and cut Saudi imports from the Red Sea completely,” and could blockade the Red Sea or strike Israelis or US assets in the Indian Ocean. He asserts Yemen has been developing capabilities swiftly, similar to Iran and Hezbollah, and argues the West consistently underestimates such actors. - The escalation ladder remains high, and if the US or Israel escalates, Iran’s side will escalate too. Global energy, fertilizer, and petrochemical shortages are increasing, intensifying international pressure on Trump and anger toward Israel and Netanyahu. Marandi believes Iran’s escalation dominance is present, although they have not yet demonstrated their maximum capabilities. - He references a book, Going to Tehran, as a contrast to US policy: if the US had chosen a different route a decade ago, the current critical situation might be different. Instead, he says policymakers listened to Zionist influence and a small oligarchy, leading to the current climate of possible catastrophe from the Mediterranean to the Red Sea, Iraq, and Iran. - On the US-Israel coordination, Marandi suggests joint operation is likely, pointing to an Israeli strike on the South Pars gas installation as a test that led to Iranian retaliation, and argues President Trump’s stated deadlines to strike Iranian infrastructure were used to manage markets, notably oil prices. He asserts the pattern shows the US delaying or intensifying threats for market control, while Iran retaliates when threatened. - Ground forces and potential deployments: UAE signals strongest engagement among Gulf states, with islands claimed by the UAE that Iran took in 1971. Marandi argues that no Persian Gulf Arab regime is capable of fighting effectively; their role is to provide bases, airspace, and territorial access for the US. Iran, however, has prepared for potential ground operations for decades and believes it could counter any invasion with underground bases and a wide range of weapon systems that go beyond missiles and drones. He posits scenarios where Iraqi forces and Yemen could strike into Kuwait or Northern Saudi Arabia, complicating US options. - Regarding resilience, Marandi emphasizes Yemen’s and Iran’s enduring capacity to resist: Yemen “won the seven-year genocidal war” against the US-backed coalition and is now more prepared; Iran’s resilience is linked to its Islamic and Shia identity, symbols like martyrdom, and a population that remains mobilized despite leadership assassinations and external pressure. He cites public demonstrations in Tehran and widespread civilian backing, as well as ongoing strikes and bombings against Iranian targets, which he says continue to provoke Iranian retaliation rather than deter it. - In terms of outcomes and negotiations, Marandi says Iranian demands will have to be met, though the method is negotiable: reparations could be pursued from regional actors like the Emirates and Saudis rather than the US. Iran would require benefits for its regional allies (Hezbollah, Yemen, Palestinians, Iraqis). He warns that without concessions, further invasion remains a risk, implying that time is not on the side of the West because energy and petrochemical shortages will escalate. He also emphasizes that the real core issue is control over oil, LNG, petrochemicals, and fertilizer, and that the US would face severe economic and social disruption if those supplies are cut off. - The conversation ends with a note of hope that, despite the grim prospects, there is optimism for a better future, even if the days ahead look darker.

Professor Syed Mohammed Marandi, a professor at Tehran University and former adviser to Iran’s nuclear negotiation team, discussed the aftermath of Donald Trump’s meeting with Xi Jinping in Beijing, arguing that the trip and US requests to pressure Iran achieved nothing. He said Trump and his team were “detached from reality,” pointing to Trump having “expelled so many” Iran, Chinese, and Russian experts from national security structures, and claiming they entered negotiations “blinded.” Marandi referenced monitoring Iranian and Chinese signals during the Iranian foreign minister’s trip to China, suggesting US efforts should have been understood in advance as unlikely to produce results. Marandi predicted that after returning to the United States, the Trump regime would move toward renewed violence against Iran. He said the United States lacked the political will to implement a ceasefire, end the siege on Iranian ports, and bring about ceasefires in Lebanon and Gaza so ships associated with five countries could pass through the Strait of Hormuz. He attributed the absence of political will to the “Zionist lobby” and the Israeli regime, stating they would not accept a ceasefire or end hostilities due to Netanyahu’s personal agenda, elections ahead, his court case, and coalition partners. He also claimed war could be “quite soon,” involving Iran’s readiness for “a very, heavy assault” by Netanyahu and Trump regimes, and the mobilization of remnants of January armed insurrection fighters, Kurdish groups in Northern Iraq (about 5,000), and “Taqfiri, the Wahhabi Salafi” groups along the Pakistan border in “no man’s land” regions of Pakistan. He said Iran is preparing for this scenario and that Iranian armed forces are on “full alert.” Responding to media reporting that diplomacy has failed and Iran has rebuilt most missile bases, Marandi stated Iran’s response would be “very harsh,” “more decisive than even the thirty nine day war,” describing an environment he said is hostile for an American assault due to “hot season” conditions in the Persian Gulf and Arabian Peninsula. He argued that if the United States strikes Iran’s critical infrastructure, Iran would destroy the critical infrastructure of countries he listed as involved in the war against Iran: Jordan, Saudi Arabia, the Emirates, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and “all of these” that participate. He asserted that the most harmed would be the Emirates, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia, and claimed that if electricity and water supplies were struck, populations would have to empty or evacuate. He connected this to a likely deep, long-lasting economic depression. Marandi said Iran would not initiate retaliatory escalations only once, asserting that when Israel struck Iran’s South Pars gas field, Iran responded by heavily hitting Qatar’s and Emirati oil and gas installations. He further stated Trump posted dismissive claims during the war, and that Iran’s retaliation “won’t be pulling any punches.” On diplomacy, Marandi said the United States’ proposal depends on the American side, asserting that the ceasefire was a US defeat and that Iran would not change its stance. He said the US was under the illusion it could pressure Iran into accepting a watered-down version of US demands, and he argued the US and world were not “winning” siege warfare. He emphasized a route for the United States to accept agreed ceasefire conditions the US “failed to fulfill,” arguing that otherwise slaughter in Lebanon and Gaza and the inability of ships to pass would continue. Marandi said the decision for war is “not Trump’s” but “Netanyahu’s,” and said the Zionist lobby and Israeli regime control it. He described an Iranian goal as applying pressure so Washington’s political elites would conclude they must impose peace by telling Israel to “sit this one out,” claiming this had not yet happened. He also cited Tucker Carlson’s account of his discussion with Trump and Joe Kent’s resignation and interviews as supporting the idea of decision-making power behind continued war. When asked how fighting would differ, Marandi said Iran’s handling of proxies on the Pakistan border (Wahhabi and Salafi groups) would be “dealt with rather easily,” while Kurdish and accompanying terrorists would be more complicated due to their larger numbers. He claimed the Iraqi resistance would escalate “all out,” that Yemen is prepared for war, and that the Red Sea would be shut down, ending oil and other exports through the Red Sea. He said Israel would be “hammered very hard” and that the war would be more intense and quick to unfold. Regarding allies and outsourcing war-fighting, he said the Gulf states’ capacity to fight Iran was limited, describing the Emirates as lacking effective fighting forces and emphasizing that he expected Arab streets to respond differently than regime media during the prior war. On China and Russia, Marandi said Iran’s relations with China and Russia are “very good,” pointing to the Iranian foreign minister’s meetings with President Putin and in Beijing. He asserted that ultimately Iran “won the war based on its own capabilities,” while friends assisted. He claimed Iran’s missile and drone capabilities are more powerful now and that Iran has prepared underground missile and drone bases for decades, as well as plans for ground invasion readiness. He argued the US would be “foolish” to conduct a ground assault and said Iran would likely allow incursions and island-taking, then ambush and counterattack to wear forces out over months. He referenced communications during the earlier war, stating Iranians initially did not respond to messages to prolong fighting, and that after days they allowed communications and forced acceptance of an Iranian framework. He said Iran wants the war to last as long as possible now to deter future aggression. In reassessment of Iranian influence narratives, Marandi referenced Leon Panetta stating Iran holds a gun to the head of the United States, and Robert Kagan writing “checkmate” in The Atlantic, claiming “reality eventually catches up.” He said Robert Kagan was “on the payroll” and maintained that war would end poorly for Trump, the Israeli regime, and Zionism, while predicting a global economic depression if critical infrastructure is struck. He closed by repeating that Iran would fight decisively and not back down until the conflict ends.

Glenn: Welcome back. We’re joined again by Prof. Syed Muhammad Marandi of Tehran University and former adviser to Iran’s nuclear negotiation team. The latest news is a U.S. peace proposal for Iran, with expectations of Iran’s response. The deal reportedly doesn’t address nuclear issues or the Strait of Hormuz. What can we make of this, and what wider negotiations are taking place? Marandi: Regarding the American proposal, we’ll have to wait to see the content, but Iran’s position is clear and unlikely to shift from its current priorities. First, a ceasefire and end to the fighting. The United States and the Israeli regime are currently violating the ceasefire, and until they end the slaughter in Lebanon and Gaza and the siege, there will be no possibility to move forward. After that, it will be the 10 Plan that Iran put forward and Trump accepted. Iran is not going to move away from that. If the Americans think over time this is just internal consumption, they are mistaken. It’s a major miscalculation akin to the miscalculation of launching the war. The Americans are now insisting that Iran respond within a time frame; Iran will respond when ready, possibly a day or two or three later, to avoid being intimidated. The American proposal, if true, likely violates Iran’s sovereignty and seeks something it could not gain on the battlefield. Iran would be flexible on issues but not on principles. On nuclear program, enrichment, sovereignty over the Strait of Hormuz, these won’t be given up. Iran is willing to do a deal, like in 2015, but not the Obama-era version; it would need an upgraded agreement that Iran envisions, not one Trump thinks is upgraded. Any deal, if it occurs, would have to be far more favorable than the 2015 agreement. The war participants gambled and lost; an attack could still occur. There’s a strong possibility of an imminent attack, and Iranian preparations reflect that outlook. No ships have left the Strait of Hormuz; Iran’s response to previous U.S. actions has been robust, while avoiding heavy escalation. The Strait of Hormuz has not been closed by Iran; it remains open for friendly states and those who have not joined the war against Iran. Glenn: It does seem the U.S. is returning to potential all-out war against Iran, though the U.S. may have limitations in what it can actually achieve. You mentioned Lebanon and Israel; has the push to address Lebanon’s siege dropped out of talks, or is it still on the table from the American side? Marandi: Iran’s stance is that there must be a regional ceasefire that includes Gaza; Lebanon is part of that regional ceasefire condition. Iran will not remove that from the table. Washington and Netanyahu demanded unconditional surrender at the war’s start, but after 39 days they accepted Iran’s 10-Plan as the basis for negotiations. Iran will not accept a shift in the American position, nor the continued slaughter of Palestinians and Lebanese as a precondition for talking. Glenn: What about disruption in Gulf cooperation with the U.S.? Saudi airspace was limited then reversed; are there splits in the U.S.-led alliance, or was that transient? Marandi: It’s unclear; the Iranians know U.S. airpower is concentrated in Qatar, the Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Kuwait. The Iranians are prepared for attack and believe the U.S. has not yet achieved its aims. Western reporting suggests Iran’s missiles and drones have advanced beyond what was seen in the 39-day war, with new underground-produced systems demonstrating greater capability. Glenn: On China, Xi Jinping and Iran recently met; how will that affect talks with the U.S. President and Xi’s approach? Marandi: China and Iran held a good meeting; China is impressed by Iran’s performance in the war, as are Russia and many others. China recognizes that the U.S. is targeting China, Russia, and Iran simultaneously. Iran’s relations with China are strong, but Iran won the war largely on its own—resilience, leadership, and the people’s support. The Strait of Hormuz is controlled by Iran, and the U.S. cannot overturn that within any negotiation framework. Glenn: If the U.S. returns to full-scale war, what red lines would Iran consider triggers for a broader conflict? Marandi: The likelihood is a major assault combined with terrorist incursions from northern Iraq and Pakistan-based groups, with ground actions against Iran. Iran believes it could counter and destroy critical infrastructure, including in Gulf states, which would escalate and likely devastate regional and global markets. Iran would retaliate against infrastructure targets, maintaining restraint toward civilians, but would not refrain from destroying critical assets if Iran’s infrastructure is attacked. If a new war begins, Iran expects a comprehensive defeat of the invading forces and non-cooperation with further aggression. Glenn: Thank you for the insights. We’ll likely speak again as this situation evolves. Marandi: Thank you, I appreciate it.

Trita Parsi, executive vice president of the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft and an award-winning author, discussed developments around the Iran war and the prospect of a near-term diplomatic breakthrough. Parsi addressed whether the Trump administration is attempting to expel him personally after his criticisms. He said it is not simply “the Trump administration,” but that there are elements inside and outside the government attempting to escalate pressure toward deportation. He referenced pro-Israeli social media influencers pushing for it, including an AI video depicting his deportation. He said a recent investigation claim in the Free Press was denied within hours by the State Department, which he described as unusual. Parsi argued this is part of a long-term pattern: for 25 years he said neocons and warmongers in Washington have tried to cancel, silence, discredit, and accuse him of being an Iranian agent, but that this is the first moment he has seen a more public push toward deportation. He also said other elements inside the administration pushed back, making the situation more complicated than a single unified effort. He then discussed how discourse around wars has deteriorated, not only in the United States but also internationally, describing it as driven by team-slogan logic rather than explanation and context. Parsi argued that wars of choice require eliminating nuance and context, which he said leads to attacks on those who explain alternative perspectives. He emphasized that moralism can become counterproductive by preventing discussion of opponents’ security concerns and undermining compromise and peace. Parsi connected this to earlier U.S. policy toward Iran, saying decision-makers misread Iran’s behavior by assuming Iran is weaker and fears war more than surrender. He said he tried to communicate that Iran would not surrender, that it fears surrender more than war, and that it likely would absorb pain if it viewed the threat as existential. He argued the fundamentals of the approach were erroneous and that the resulting negotiation dynamics differ from the terms originally imagined. He also described how intelligence and evidence can be ignored when groupthink and only listening to certain voices, such as Israelis, leads to miscalculation—especially regarding options like closing or disrupting the Strait of Hormuz and striking Gulf Cooperation Council states. On strategy and propaganda, Parsi contrasted earlier public rational debate with more coercive moral framing. He cited examples from Afghanistan and broader great-power practice of selling war as peace, including using women’s rights narratives and prominent collaborations between political and celebrity figures. He said this moral framing functions to block strategic discussion and prevents evaluation of whether interventions serve stated objectives. In shifting to the current Iran talks, Parsi responded to the claim that a peace deal could be signed within 24 hours. He said he believes it is “different,” describing it as the “39th time,” but closer than ever based on conversations with “folks on both sides.” He said the proposal is back in Iran’s court and that delays stem from the internal need for buy-in across Iran’s dispersed power structure, particularly under a new Supreme Leader whose authority is not fully established. He said hardline elements that would never agree are part of the challenge, but that signals suggest the majority has already agreed in substance. Parsi said the Iranian foreign minister, U.S. President Donald Trump’s retweet of the Iranian foreign minister, and Pakistan’s prime minister’s messaging all point to momentum—while emphasizing the process is still a memorandum of understanding and a “pit stop” toward a final deal, not an end to the war. He warned sabotage could occur, including through attacks elsewhere such as Lebanon, which he said could destabilize the diplomatic process even without direct action against either party. Regarding what is in the MOU, Parsi said Iran’s position is that it needs U.S. buy-in through an exchange affecting leverage. He said Iran views opening the Strait of Hormuz—described as major leverage, more than a 60% enriched uranium stockpile—as part of what is being given up, and it argues the U.S. blockade (he called it counterproductive to the U.S.) is being removed. He said Iran is asking for 12 billion upfront, with an additional 12 billion at the end tied to the MOU. He also said some funds were previously supposed to be released in connection with a prisoner exchange in August 2022, but that the deal was reneged after the Mahsa Amini protests began, meaning Iran does not want to renegotiate those promised first amounts. He said the U.S. side has avoided direct release for reasons including avoiding comparison to Obama-era actions, so others proposed a workaround where a third party provides equivalent funds initially, followed by accounting later. Parsi said Iran appears to be moving toward accepting an approach that ensures it receives the money even if it is not unfreezing directly by the U.S. He added that ambiguity about key terms—like “open” regarding the Strait of Hormuz—could allow both sides to interpret commitments domestically, but that too much vagueness could make the agreement like “Swiss cheese.” On the Strait of Hormuz, Parsi distinguished between the idea of reopening while it is not closed—potentially involving fees/tolls or administrative management rather than full restoration of prior arrangements—and he said legal disputes about whether it is international waters or Iranian/Omani waters shape how the language can be framed. He said he does not expect Iran to give up control entirely and instead expects a change from the pre-existing status quo. Finally, Parsi discussed regional security after Iran’s direct attack on Israel following Israel’s bombing of Lebanon, which he described as an attempt to establish extended deterrence, or “the new equation,” backed by large-scale Iranian capability rather than limited attacks attributed to the Houthis. He said Israel’s subsequent actions—striking Iran and later Southern Lebanon rather than Beirut—do not prove the equation is fully established, though it could increase the perceived cost of further escalation. He said that if an MOU is agreed, it is unlikely Iran would do so without a region-wide ceasefire, especially because restarting war in Lebanon could spill over into Iran. He argued Iran’s priorities include shrinking U.S. military presence in the region, diversified security arrangements for GCC states, and deeper economic and security rehabilitation for Iran—moving away from a decades-long U.S. organizing principle of containment and isolation.

Saeed Mohamed Marandi explains that Iranians view current events as an extension of the twelve-day war, where Israel and the Trump administration allegedly collaborated to undermine Iran and failed. He cites US Treasury remarks at Davos about manipulating Iranian currency to provoke protests, which he says led to peaceful demonstrations followed by highly trained groups that caused destruction and police casualties. He asserts that Israel claimed responsibility, with Mossad statements and Channel 14 reporting that weapons brought into Iran caused police deaths, and he notes Western media glossed over these facts. He argues this campaign aimed to push Trump toward confrontation with Iran, while messaging about Iran’s nuclear program and regional alliances shifted over time. Iran’s response, he says, has been that any attack will be treated as all-out war with an overwhelming Iranian retaliation. He contends Trump is boxed in: a larger strike would provoke a massive Iranian response across the region, affecting oil and gas flows through the Persian Gulf and potentially collapsing the global economy. He suggests the “smart” outcome would be to back off and end peacefully, potentially declaring victory without concessions, as Trump did in Yemen, though he believes Iran will not accept any deal that compromises sovereignty or core capabilities. Marandi lays out Iran’s view of the regional and strategic landscape: Iran’s counterstrike would target US interests across the region, not just bases, and would involve allies in Iraq, Yemen, and other areas. He argues the Persian Gulf is highly vulnerable because regional regimes hosting US bases are complicit, and a war would disrupt global energy supplies. He asserts Iran’s capabilities are primarily directed at the United States, given US threats since the Afghanistan and Iraq invasions, and that Iran has strengthened missiles and drones, along with air defenses. He contends Israel is vulnerable, and the aim of some in the US political circle is to sacrifice US interests for Israeli interests. He asserts that Iran’s real objective is to prevent a repeat of the “sword over Iran”—to avoid six-month cycles of provocations—and to end the possibility of ongoing CIA-backed unrest being used as pretext for further strikes. On the possibility of negotiation, Marandi says Iran will not give up nuclear enrichment, missile capabilities, or regional alliances. He notes there was a JCPOA, but Iran would not accept a repeat of that deal; any future agreement would need to be better for Iran. A deal could be discussed about the nuclear program, but not one that cedes sovereignty or enrichment rights. He suggests Trump could try to retreat by declaring victory or offering a hollow concession, but Iran is ready for all-out war if attacked. He emphasizes that if the US backs down, it would be a major defeat for Washington; if it engages in war, it would be a world tragedy and the US would be defeated, with global implications. He argues Iran’s stance is clear: they will respond massively to any attack, and the only viable path for the US would be to walk away and pretend it gained something it did not. Glenn notes that regional allies feel exposed as world power shifts toward multipolarity, and asks about whether Iran would treat this as an existential threat and how it would fight. Marandi responds that Iran views the objective as balkanization, supported by Israeli interests, and that Iran would confront attempts to seize control of the country. He reiterates that Iran will not compromise sovereignty or support for Palestine, and that a conflict would be devastating for the world, with Iran prepared to fight to defend its existence.

The conversation focuses on developments around U.S.-Iran nuclear negotiations, the Israel–Lebanon war, and concerns that actions in the region could undermine or complicate a potential agreement. The discussion begins with a reported Israel–U.S. tension: the IDF was said to be abandoning plans to bomb Beirut after American pressure, driven by fears Iran might retaliate. The caller links this to U.S. opposition to Israeli plans to restart a large-scale war in Lebanon, particularly mass bombing campaigns in Shia-majority districts of Beirut, and to concerns Iran might walk away from peace talks. The Iranians are described as being “very serious” about negotiations, even while the war between Iran and Hezbollah continues, including strikes and counterfire between Hezbollah and Israel. Attention then shifts to U.S.-Iran clashes at sea: the Americans said they shot down two boats laying mines, while the Iranians shot down one drone and posted video showing targeting of another fighter jet that was not shot down. The Americans also shut down one surface-to-air missile site on the Iranian side. The caller asks how worried the participants are that negotiations could break down, noting that Donald Trump had been unusually quiet the same day—no posts and no media leaks—creating an impression of behind-the-scenes activity, though the conversation treats the silence as out of the ordinary. The conversation then broadens into patterns of escalation: the caller says Israel often intensifies actions in Lebanon when negotiations approach an end or a solution seems possible, accelerating operations while not heeding the United States, despite periodic Trump statements. The caller argues that U.S. forces are not at “optimal capability” after prolonged deployments at sea, and suggests that if military action is planned, it could be preferable sooner rather than later. The discussion also reflects concern about timing after the Hajj and the possibility that strikes could occur after major public milestones, potentially undermining trust in the U.S. if negotiations were treated as a “facade.” A central topic is Iran’s demands and lack of compromise. The conversation states Iran is firm on what it requires, including unfreezing assets, and that this posture could indicate diplomacy moving in the right direction. However, the caller also suggests Trump would face opposition from Israelis and neocons if a deal advances. The discussion includes detailed domestic U.S. politics around a potential agreement: Rubio reportedly said a deal was possible within days, with holdup tied to specific nuclear-language and sanctions language in the initial document. Meanwhile, Ted Cruz called the announced deal an “MOU” a disastrous mistake; Roger Wicker warned it would be null/useless; Pompeo criticized it; and additional senators and figures piled on criticism. The caller describes a shift when Trump said the deal would be expanded to include the Abraham Accords, leading to conflicting reactions from figures like Senator Lindsey Graham. The conversation claims other countries (Qatar, Pakistan, Saudi) said no, while Iran also said no and positions were not changing. The caller argues the Abraham Accords have not helped Gulf signatories in practice and have been linked to broader issues involving Palestinian rights. The conversation then introduces a harsh statement by Mustafa Kamane during the “hush season,” describing a new order in which U.S. influence shrinks and framing Israel’s actions as a religious confrontation between Islam and what he calls the “Zionist regime.” The speakers express concern that Iran’s messaging is becoming more radical and anti-U.S. compared with earlier positions. They also discuss a purported power struggle between Netanyahu and Trump, emphasizing that the next steps will reveal who is directing events. Several reports about Israel–Lebanon dynamics are cited: the foreign minister calls Iranian actions and ceasefire violations blameworthy; Iran accuses the U.S. of maritime piracy and claims the strikes show suspicion justified. On the military side, Israeli commanders reportedly say the situation in southern Lebanon is “more unbearable by the day,” with footage described of drones hitting Israeli troops and trucks. Israel is said to have moved toward more nighttime operations, while Hezbollah reportedly uses FPV drones with night vision. Additional reports claim Israel is procuring more anti-drone nets from Europe due to drone threats, and an Israeli official says Israel cannot accept the current reality in Lebanon without ability to respond, constrained by understandings and agreements with both the U.S. and the Lebanese government. The Lebanese government is described as refusing to negotiate unless bombing stops before talks. A particular focal report states senior Israeli officials say Israel does not want to be seen as deliberately sabotaging Trump’s potential agreement with Iran. It claims Israel rejects random building bombings in Beirut at this stage due to fears of harming the ongoing Iran negotiations, while maintaining freedom of action in southern Lebanon. The conversation interprets this as evidence that strikes in Beirut are restricted compared with activity in the south. The speakers also analyze the region’s broader security shift: they describe regional countries seeking security architectures that replace U.S. bases and may not include Israel, referencing institutionalizing control of Persian Gulf straits under a Gulf security system by a “Gulf Strait Authority.” They also mention “Isaac Accords” as a similar Israel-centric concept applied to Latin America and Central America, involving trade/technology cooperation and countering Iranian influence. Finally, the conversation includes concerns about escalation risks if Trump uses military force, including the possibility of catastrophic retaliation affecting energy infrastructure, undersea cables, and the wider Gulf economy. They discuss information warfare and social media influence, including a claim that social media accounts of Colonel Aguilar may have been wiped out simultaneously with upscaling across pro-Palestinian platforms. The closing return to geopolitics includes discussion of a “new world order” and multipolarity, the Saudi–U.S. civilian nuclear track, and related regional missile developments attributed to North Korea. The conversation ends with acknowledgment of a technical glitch earlier in the show and a preview of upcoming guest interviews.

Syed Mohamed Marandi discusses the collapse of the Islamabad negotiations and the wider implications of the current U.S.-Iran confrontation. - On what happened in Islamabad: Iran participated despite low expectations, aiming to show willingness to resolve the crisis if Americans are reasonable and to ensure the world sees Iran’s efforts. The Iranians believed the United States lacked will to make progress. During talks there was some progress on various issues, but near the end the United States shifted to a hard line on the nuclear program and the status of the Strait of Hormuz. Vance claimed Iran wanted to build a nuclear weapon, a claim Marandi notes was contradicted by former counterintelligence official Joe Kent’s resignation letter. Netanyahu reportedly maintains direct influence, with Vance reporting to Netanyahu daily, which Iran views as undermining an agreement. Netanyahu’s insistence on control and “being the boss” is presented as a central obstacle to any deal. The ceasefire in Lebanon was touted as failing, with Netanyahu and Trump accused of conspiring to wreck it, and Iran’s actions after the ceasefire aligned with this view. The Iranian delegation flew back by land after the flight to Tehran was diverted, reflecting the perceived danger and the Washington Post piece calling for the murder of negotiators. Iran’s approach is framed as attempting to resolve the problem while signaling willingness to negotiate if U.S. policy becomes reasonable. - On the blockade and its consequences: The U.S. blockade on Iranian ports has just begun and will likely worsen the global economic crisis, pushing more countries to oppose the United States. China is angry as Washington dictates terms against oil and trade in the region. The blockade could be used to strangle China’s energy supplies, creating a double-edged impact by simultaneously worsening the global crisis and pressuring U.S. allies. Iran says it may respond by striking ships in the Red Sea and blocking the Red Sea and the Gulf of Oman if the blockade continues. Iran notes it has substantial financial resilience from oil sales at higher prices without middlemen, with about 100 million barrels left to sell after selling half of its declared oil stock, and it views energy shortages as likely to trigger broader economic disruption, including shortages of helium, LNG, and fertilizers. - On war readiness and possible outcomes: Iran anticipates a major assault and is preparing defenses and offensive capabilities. Iran argues negotiations were not taken seriously by the United States and believes the U.S. is buying time. Iran would view victories as having the United States back down, preserving Iran’s rights, and protecting its regional allies, with a long-term ceasefire. Iran contends it should control the Strait of Hormuz to prevent future aggression and seeks compensation for damages caused by the conflict, emphasizing sovereignty over Hormuz and peace for Lebanon, Gaza, Iraq, and Yemen. Iran states that if the U.S. and its regional proxies strike, Iran would respond by targeting energy and infrastructure in the Persian Gulf. - On broader geopolitical shifts and regional dynamics: Marandi argues the current crisis accelerates a move toward a multipolar world, with the United States’ hegemonic position eroding. The UAE is portrayed as pushing for war, while other Gulf states are increasingly wary. He predicts a possible land invasion of Iran, but emphasizes Iran’s long-term preparedness and resilience. Weather and terrain are cited as factors likely to complicate a potential U.S. invasion, particularly in the hot summer conditions of the region. - On potential definitions of “victory”: Iran’s victory would involve U.S. backing down, Iran preserving its rights, a long-term ceasefire, and sovereignty over the Strait of Hormuz. A broader victory would see the end of supremacism in Palestine and the end of genocidal actions in Lebanon, with peace across the region as a key objective. The discussion ends with the notion that a shift toward an American focus on its republic, rather than empire, would benefit global stability.

Glenn welcomes Seyyed Mohammad Marandi, a professor at Tehran University and former advisor to Iran’s nuclear negotiation team, to discuss the fast-escalating conflict involving Israel, Iran, Lebanon, and the region. Marandi says that while in Tehran—busy interviewing Ph.D. candidates—he did not hear airstrikes, though he understands several missile strikes occurred. Marandi frames the situation as unfavorable for the “Americans” and says Iranian missile strikes have been effective. He describes Iran’s retaliation as occurring after Israel’s attacks on Lebanon and Israel’s subsequent attacks on Iran, and claims Iran fired “five waves of missiles” and then large numbers afterward, with the total approaching “a hundred.” He also says Trump posted on Truth Social calling for action “to end this immediately,” while Marandi argues the United States had no intention of bringing about a ceasefire in Lebanon. Marandi contends that Lebanese leadership—including the president and prime minister—concluded negotiations against Lebanese law and received “death” in return, citing an Israeli bombing of a Lebanese military convoy soon after a CNN interview by Lebanon’s president attacking Iran. He adds that Lebanese authorities allegedly prevent refugees from moving within Lebanon, “corner” Shia-majority refugees, and try to make the situation sectarian, with Western NGOs and embassies encouraging restrictions in neighborhoods. He further alleges that proxies in Syria and Lebanon are working with Israel to keep borders closed and block assistance coming from Iran or Iraq, while claiming people nevertheless gather aid in Iran and Iraq that cannot be sent into Lebanon. He argues Iran and Hezbollah have continued striking effectively even during escalation, and suggests Iranian actions are tied to preventing Israeli plans to level areas of Beirut, describing a shift in Iran’s deterrence posture. Marandi says Iran warned that if Israel bombed Beirut, Iran would strike the Israeli regime, and that Israel refrained from striking Beirut for several days before resuming after the Pakistani interior minister delivered a message (Pakistan as mediator). He says the pattern mirrors earlier instances where U.S. attacks were met by larger Iranian counterstrikes. Discussing U.S. strategy, Marandi says the U.S. and allies appear to seek “low intensity” escalation to weaken and intimidate Iran while avoiding a “hot war,” but he claims Iran’s responses have instead sent signals that Iran is prepared to restart a more explosive war. He highlights that Iran has allegedly shut down the Strait of Hormuz and that, following Yemen’s announced disruption of Israel’s Red Sea access, Marandi says escalation stakes increase further. When asked about potential negotiations, Marandi says what matters to Iran is not Trump’s statements but what his regime does. He lists Iran’s stated terms: end to the war in Lebanon, regime retreat, end to the slaughter in Gaza, lifting siege, waiving sanctions on Iran’s oil/energy exports for the duration, and returning “stolen assets.” He argues Iran will not provide concessions that go beyond those conditions. On U.S.-Israel relations, Marandi addresses Axios reporting about differences between Trump and Netanyahu and says the publication itself matters because it portrays Netanyahu as despised and “crazy,” which he says damaged Netanyahu politically in Israel and also in the United States. He suggests a possible objective of weakening Netanyahu and emphasizes that Trump’s public disavowal (“I told him not to attack”) is undermining. Marandi then turns to what Iran may do next as escalation rises. He says Iran has changed the “rules of the game” by signaling that strikes on Lebanon trigger retaliation. He claims Iran will retaliate not only for attacks on itself but for attacks on Lebanon and, in further statements, for attacks on petrochemical and Persian Gulf energy-related installations affiliated with the United States or Israel. He asserts Iran threatens to strike Persian Gulf infrastructure and “the Americans too,” and says this extends Iran’s deterrence beyond Israel. He also says Hezbollah’s drones and ambush-style strikes harm the regime, while Iran’s deterrence against touching Beirut hampers offensive capability. Marandi concludes that he does not foresee a favorable outcome for the United States or Israel, and says the global economy remains close to a worsening point as the conflict intensifies. As a “footnote,” he says Iran carried out an operation on the Pakistan border against Wahhabi/Salafi militants, killing some and capturing others, portraying multiple extremist groups as attacking the same enemies rather than Israel.

Syed Mohamed Marandi, a professor at Tehran University and former adviser to Iran’s nuclear negotiation team, discussed diplomacy and “information warfare” surrounding US-Iran negotiations during ongoing conflict. He said the Iranian version of events is “usually… much more accurate,” noting that in his view the West misses the truth in mainstream media, while Iran often does not “lie” but instead “won’t talk about” matters it does not want to address. He said his conversations with participants in diplomacy indicate “a wide gap” between the Iranian side and the Americans, with the Americans showing “a much greater sense of urgency” than Iran. Marandi argued that Iran believes the situation will be “tough” and that either US strikes or US “flexible” behavior could follow. He emphasized that Iran’s “working assumption… is that there will be war,” and that suspicion is reinforced by past US behavior, including Iran’s account that the US “betrayed” Iran during previous dialogues and agreements. He said no side should put faith in messages transmitted through mediators such as Pakistan. On Iranian “demands” and possible red lines, Marandi said Iran’s position is hardened while still allowing flexibility in certain areas. He said Iran’s demands are “much more reasonable than the American demands” and do not include demands that the US give up sovereignty or US military presence in the Persian Gulf. He argued that Iran’s strongest leverage is the Strait of Hormuz, describing it as central to the defensive and offensive military engagement during the war, including efforts to control and keep control of the strait. He said Iran “never closed the Strait Of Hormuz,” maintaining that it only restricted it to countries “with The US in its assault on Iran,” while friendly states’ ships continued to pass. Marandi also described a scenario where Iran and the Americans might agree to “open the Strait Of Hormuz” under conditions, with Iran still controlling it and receiving a fee from passage under reasons such as “global warming, environmental protection or security cost.” He said Iran would no longer allow the US to turn the Persian Gulf into a military zone, even if some aspects appear on paper and others do not. He linked Iran’s negotiating strength to perceived victimhood, ideological motivation, public resilience amid economic pressure, and confidence that Iran can outlast the waiting game. When asked about nuclear red lines and maneuvering, Marandi said he was “very careful” about requesting details and framed his remarks as understanding rather than direct knowledge. He asserted Iran is in a “much stronger position now than before” and that Iran’s need for flexibility is “much less.” He also addressed sanctions, saying the US has “stolen a significant amount of Iranian assets” worth “many billions of dollars,” which he said limits leverage from that source. He said leverage “is mostly the sanctions,” while the threat of war is not what he said the Iranians fear. He claimed Iran’s military capability is “significantly stronger than it was three months ago,” and that if war restarts it would be “worse for the Americans,” with Yemen expected to be “much more active” than in the earlier phase. He stated that at the negotiating table Iran’s main offer would be passage through the Strait of Hormuz and that US miscalculations include misunderstanding Iran and underestimating the value of imposing a siege early in the war. Marandi discussed regional actors as mostly message-passing rather than decision-makers. He said Qatar sent a delegation but had “not much input,” and that Pakistan mainly passes messages “back and forth,” with Iran preferring written communications to avoid “loopholes.” He said regional narratives about differences between Trump and Netanyahu or about opposition to war are not taken seriously because similar claims were used as disinformation before the previous conflict. He argued that the UAE aligns with the Israeli regime and suggested this stance justifies Iran’s position and increases regional support for Iran during retaliation. He said Turkey is constrained as a NATO member and has not taken actions against the US, though he described Turkey as indirectly affected. He concluded that the regional situation is “not really” decisive compared with the confrontation between Iran, the US, and the Israeli regime. On timing and high alert, Marandi said Iran has been on high alert “for at least three weeks,” with repeated reports that an attack “could be tonight” or “tomorrow,” while he said it is difficult to determine if an assault will occur. He described the weekend timing as potentially relevant and stated that, in his view, Iranians are “not panicked” and are confident due to experience and capabilities displayed during the conflict. The conversation ended with discussion that US messaging about being optimistic or “getting close to peace” is a concern, and that disputes between Trump and Netanyahu are viewed as potentially preceding an attack. Marandi responded by hoping for peace “for everyone” and expressing hope that “after the hardship” things will “get better.”

In the dialogue, Seyyed Mohammed Marandi, a Tehran University professor and former Iran nuclear negotiation adviser, discusses the prospect of renewed U.S. aggression against Iran and the stability of any ceasefire. He says that since the ceasefire began, preparations for war in Tehran have been ongoing “twenty four hours a day,” driven by the belief that Trump will not accept defeat and that the “Zionist lobbying” and the Israeli regime remain behind the war. He suggests that although it is not certain, a new round of conflict could erupt over a weekend or soon after markets close, noting that the U.S. and Netanyahu’s positions previously clashed with ceasefire terms. He recounts that Iran had insisted on an off-ramp when Netanyahu accepted the ceasefire, but Trump then claimed the Strait of Hormuz would remain open while maintaining a siege on Iranian ports, implying that an off-ramp was possible but not pursued. Marandi emphasizes that the Strait of Hormuz was never closed by Iran, except to ships linked to adversaries, and argues that the escalation followed Netanyahu’s actions despite Iranian signals. He asserts that even if a limited agreement allows more ships through, the broader pain from any renewed conflict will persist, potentially causing a global economic depression if critical infrastructure is destroyed or if negotiations on Hormuz or Gaza/ Lebanon ceasefires are delayed for weeks due to fighting. On the U.S. side, the host notes that the U.S. was in trouble and desperate, pointing to missile defenses and ammunition shortages as signs of strain, and remarks that Trump accepted Iran’s 10-point plan as a ceasefire framework but later abandoned it, while presenting an extended ceasefire as a favor. Marandi agrees that Trump’s actions have been inconsistent and that the Iranians might expect the U.S. to pursue assassinations and infrastructure strikes again, with Iran prepared to retaliate robustly. A key point is Iran’s stated willingness to escalate in response to attacks on its leadership and critical infrastructure. An Iranian MP, associated with the Islamabad delegation, reportedly warned that if any assassinations occur, Iran will target leaders of Arab regimes in the Persian Gulf (Kuwait, Bahrain, the Emirates, Qatar, Saudi Arabia) because they are complicit in the war. The discussion outlines that Iran would retaliate not only against Israeli targets but also within the Persian Gulf region, potentially striking infrastructure and power facilities, with implications for the region’s electricity and climate conditions during the hot season. Marandi argues that Iran has already demonstrated strategic restraint, saying that Iranian authorities aim to minimize civilian casualties and that Iranians would respond to attacks on critical Iranian infrastructure by striking broader targets in the Israeli regime and in regional partners. He contends that Iran does not initiate escalation but escalates in response, pointing to past cycles where Iran’s retaliation was effective without targeting civilians. He notes that Iran has assets across its mountainous interior, including deep underground factories and bases, which he claims the United States underestimates, leading to miscalculations about Iran’s missile and drone capabilities. Regarding the broader geopolitical landscape, Marandi notes rising Western and Israeli concerns about Iran’s expanding influence, while acknowledging growing sympathy for Iran in parts of the world, including some shifts in India and Latin America. He highlights the Putin-Trump dynamic, suggesting Putin’s meeting with Iran’s Foreign Minister and Russia’s praise for the Iranian people signal a strengthening axis of resistance against Western pressures. He also remarks that Iran’s resilience under sanctions and its ability to mobilize regional allies, such as Hezbollah, complicates Western expectations of quick regime change. Finally, Marandi suggests that Iran’s role on the global stage is shifting perceptions of Iran’s strength and legitimacy, and he foresees continued pressure, potential escalation, and a regional balance of power that narrows Western maneuvering space as the crisis evolves.

In a discussion about the Iran confrontation and its wider implications, Glenn and John Mearsheimer analyze the sequence of events and underlying dynamics behind President Donald Trump’s statements and policy shifts. - Trump’s two Monday tweets frame the episode: an initial threat to “wipe Iran off the face of the earth” to force concession, followed by a reversal to announce a ceasefire based on Iran’s 10-point plan. Mersheimer emphasizes that this sequence reveals Trump’s desperation to end the war and to secure a ceasefire quickly, then to shift to negotiations with Iran’s plan as the basis. - The framework of the negotiations is contrasted with the US’s prior maximalist aims. The United States had demanded four core goals: regime change, Iran’s nuclear enrichment cessation, elimination of long-range missiles, and cessation of support for groups like the Houthis, Hezbollah, and Hamas. Mersheimer notes none of these have been realized, while Iran reportedly gains leverage through control of the Strait of Hormuz. - The Iranian 10-point plan is presented as a basis for negotiations that would, in effect, concede the big US demands. Trump’s evening tweet signaling acceptance of the 10-point plan is read as a defeat for the US position and a shift toward Iranian maximalism on its own terms. The claim is that the ceasefire, if it occurs, would involve concessions that Iran had already proposed. - The feasibility of a ceasefire is questioned. Iran’s open Strait of Hormuz depends on Israel halting attacks in Lebanon (on Hezbollah), which has not happened. Therefore, a true ceasefire is not in place, and the Israelis’ actions are seen as undermining any potential halt to hostilities. - The broader strategic picture is outlined. Iran’s leverage includes allied groups (Houthis, Hezbollah, Hamas) and the ability to close chokepoints like the Strait of Hormuz or the Bab el-Mandab strait via the Houthis. The discussion notes Iran’s large missile/drone arsenal and potential to threaten American bases, though Mersheimer stresses that sanctions and the prolonged war have devastated Iran’s economy, which complicates assessments of its strength. - The role of external powers and economies is highlighted. Mersheimer argues that the global economy—especially oil and fertilizers—drives the push to end the conflict. He suggests China and Pakistan, with Russian input, pressured Iran to negotiate, given the global economic risks of a prolonged war. He also notes that the New York Times reported that all 13 US bases in the Gulf were damaged or destroyed, undermining U.S. presence there. - Domestic political concerns are discussed. Trump’s ability to declare victory while acknowledging defeat creates a political hazard. Vance is presented as a potentially capable negotiator who could press for a ceasefire, but there is concern about internal political blowback if he concedes too much. - Israel’s position is considered crucial. Netanyahu’s government is described as having promoted the war, and the war’s outcome is said to damage U.S.-Israel relations. There is speculation that Israel may consider drastic options, including nuclear consideration against Iran, given the perceived failure of conventional means. - The Ukraine war and its relation to the Iran conflict are explored. If Iran’s war ends or is perceived as winding down, European capacity and willingness to support Ukraine become central questions. The U.S. may shift blame to Europe for Ukraine’s defeat if Russia advances, while withholding weapons to Ukraine to avoid further strain on U.S. stockpiles. - The discussion on rationality in international relations emphasizes that states act rationally when their decisions align with a plausible theory of international politics and a sound decision-making process. Mersheimer argues Europe’s behavior toward the U.S. is not irrational, though he criticizes its liberal-theory basis (NATO expansion) as potentially misguided but not irrational. He contrasts this with Trump’s Iran attack in February 2029, which he deems irrational due to a lack of a plausible theory of victory. - The multipolar world dynamic is reinforced. The war’s outcomes are viewed as weakening U.S. ability to project power, diminishing transatlantic cohesion, and boosting Russia and China’s relative position. The loss of Gulf bases and diminished American influence are expected to push Europe toward greater strategic autonomy, with NATO potentially becoming less meaningful by 2029, depending on future leadership. - Final notes include concerns about the political risk for Vance as a negotiator, the likelihood of a difficult peace process, and the possibility that misperceptions and propaganda—analyzed through historical parallels like the Vietnam War and Walter Lippmann’s ideas—have locked leaders into an “evil enemy” narrative that complicates peacemaking. Overall, the conversation portrays Trump’s messaging as a sign of desperation to end a costly conflict, the ceasefire as a fragile construct dependent on Iranian terms, Iran’s expanding leverage in the region, the fragility of U.S.-Israel and transatlantic bonds, and a shifting global order moving toward multipolarity with lasting economic and strategic consequences.

- Speaker 0 recounts a conversation with vice president JD Vance, who called from his plane after returning from Washington. The discussion centered on the development—and what was described as an explosion—of negotiations, with the American side not willing to tolerate Iran’s alleged violation of the agreement by failing to open cross-border crossings and ceasefire commitments. The central issue for the United States, per JD Vance as relayed, is the removal of all enriched material and ensuring that there is no more enrichment in the coming years, potentially for decades. - Speaker 1 echoes and expands on this, asserting that the information confirms Joe Kent’s statements about Israel pushing the Trump administration to move the goalposts and demand harsher terms from Iran in order to prolong the war. They argue that Israel’s actions are driven by a need to prolong the conflict, implying it is not in the United States’ or Iran’s interest to continue the war, and suggesting that Israel’s interference undermines a potential settlement. - The speakers present Barak Ravid’s (the Israeli journalist) reporting as further corroboration, describing Netanyahu at a cabinet meeting as having discussed Vance’s call from the plane and reiterating the claim that the American side could not accept Iran’s alleged violations. The central issue remains removal of enriched material and preventing any future enrichment for decades, a shift they frame as a change from prior understandings. - The discussion references Joe Kent’s resignation letter, interpreting it as evidence of shifting goalposts imposed by Israel and reinforcing the claim that Iran’s enrichment levels were being framed as an existential threat requiring zero enrichment, a stance the speakers say Iran never agreed to. They argue that a deal could be reached about uranium enrichment levels and monitoring that would end the war and reopen the Strait of Hormuz if the United States subordinated Israeli demands to its own interests. - The speakers imply a pattern of influence where JD Vance’s statements and actions are contrasted with what they describe as pressure from Netanyahu and other Israeli figures to derail negotiations. They claim Jared Kushner publicly celebrated a Gaza-related policy outcome they view as aligning with long-standing plans that purportedly prioritize private Israeli interests over American policy, and they allege Kushner’s demeanor signals a lack of restraint despite negotiations failing to produce peace. - The speakers imply, without endorsing, that the ongoing actions and disclosures point toward a broader strategy by Western and allied actors to escalate toward a wider conflict, including World War III, with long-term aims of shaping global governance structures. They suggest that Western leaders are preparing for a major conventional war and acting without public consent or scrutiny, framing recent events as part of a deliberate trajectory toward broader confrontation. Note: Promotional content and advertising by Speaker 2 (yellowshrimpstore/alexandrapshore products) has been excluded from the summary.

More than 40 times, an agreement between the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran has been described as reached and merely pending the Iranian government’s signature, with details allegedly initialed and carved in various parchments and even stone—but there is still no peace agreement. The speaker says Iranian missiles will fly again “tonight.” They also claim Benjamin Netanyahu is “brazenly” assassinating and murdering people in Beirut while Donald Trump has stated that no further bombing of Beirut is permissible. The speaker presents two conclusions: either Trump cannot control Netanyahu, who is positioned as the prime minister of a country described as existing entirely through American largesse (financial, diplomatic, political, and military), or there is an inference that the relationship’s true nature allows continued actions despite U.S. instructions. The speaker argues there is no sense in which Trump is ordering Netanyahu to do things he refuses to do, framing an alternative “good cop, bad cop” dynamic. They reference a “Brian Berletek” school of thought and say people in Hong Kong have suggested the Trump-Netanyahu relationship is “organic,” though the speaker notes they currently take the other side of the argument. The speaker insists there are only two alternatives regarding Trump’s ability or willingness to curb Israel’s behavior, which they say has scuppered any possibility of even a memorandum of understanding (MOU), never mind a deal. They state Trump has filled airwaves and news for days claiming the war is over, but say it is not over and assert Iran will be attacking Israel “tonight.” The speaker asks what America will do about that, and says powerful forces in the American political system and the global political system will demand Trump come to the aid of the man Trump says he is “mightily pissed off with.” They conclude that Trump has not taken any action resembling kicking Netanyahu out despite apparent dependence.

Glenn welcomed Seyyed Muhammad Marandi, a Tehran University professor and former Iran nuclear negotiator adviser, and asked about the terms of the current ceasefire and why clarity is hard to get. Marandi explained the progression: the U.S. initially demanded unconditional surrender, then shifted to a “15 plan,” which Iran rejected. Iran developed its own plan, with the Supreme National Security Council sending a modified version to the leader, Ayatollah Bahamani, who finalized it and sent it to Pakistan. Trump ostensibly accepted Iran’s framework as the basis for negotiations, though “that doesn’t mean that we’re going to have peace” and there’s little faith in U.S. willingness to concede the 10 points Iran presented. He described the U.S. as an empire whose capitulation is unlikely, given internal and international pressure and the current closure of the Strait of Hormuz. He warned that the U.S. military footprint in the region would be hard to sustain and would face logistical and environmental strain, which could complicate any new war; nonetheless, Iran is preparing for the worst, having previously negotiated with the U.S. twice and seeing both efforts end in renewed conflict. He attributed recent Israeli actions against Lebanon as an effort to derail the ceasefire, noting that Israeli leadership (Netanyahu) appears motivated to induce more violence to gain leverage domestically, while Western media outlets largely abstain from criticizing these actions. Glenn pressed on how to interpret the two-week window for negotiations and whether Lebanon’s inclusion in the ceasefire remains valid. Marandi reiterated skepticism that the full Iran-focused 10-point plan would be accepted by the United States, calling Trump inconsistent and unpredictable. He suggested the two-week period might be extended if negotiations progress modestly, but doubted any comprehensive agreement would be reached given the U.S. tendency to resist rights-based terms and to change positions rapidly. The two discussed the possibility of renewed U.S.-Iran conflict, with Iran continuing to strike at Israeli targets and American assets in the Gulf if necessary. The conversation then moved to the question of who bears responsibility for the broader regional disruption. Marandi argued that Gulf regimes (the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Qatar) are not in a position to fight Iran; without electricity and infrastructure, they would suffer cataclysmic losses. He asserted that the U.S. could not unify the Gulf states in a new campaign and that Iran would control the Strait of Hormuz if attacked. The UAE’s rumored strike on petrochemical facilities was cited as an example of the ongoing broader conflict. He also suggested Lebanon’s fate is tied to whether Israel continues striking Lebanon or shifts its focus back to Iran, and warned that a failure to constrain Israel would undermine any peace talks. Marandi asserted that the ceasefire’s terms could be undermined by the “Epstein class” influence over Western media and governments, arguing that the global media’s support for Israel’s actions betrays a broader humanitarian and democratic legitimacy crisis in the West. He also noted that Oman’s cooperation around Hormuz might be part of a negotiated arrangement, given Oman’s more favorable relationship with Iran and its geographic position on the strait. He stressed that Iran’s apparent victory could reshape global power dynamics, weakening the U.S. and empowering Iran and other Global South actors, with implications for the petrodollar system and regional alignments. Towards the end, Glenn and Marandi touched on the potential long-term regional changes, including borders and governance in the Gulf, and the broader economic and political costs for Gulf monarchies. Marandi attributed the crisis to Zionist influence on U.S. policy and lamented missed opportunities to pursue normal relations with the United States, referencing authors Flint and Leverett and their book Going to Tehran, which he suggested could have altered current events if heeded. He concluded by reiterating that lessons were not learned and that the war’s consequences would be lasting.

Glenn: Welcome back. We’re joined again by Seyyed Mohamed Marandi, a professor at Tehran University and a former adviser to Iran’s nuclear negotiation team. There’s talk in the US of seizing Kharg Island, which would handle 80–90% of Iran’s oil shipments, effectively a nuclear option to shut down Iran’s economy. What would be Iran’s likely response if the US pursued this path? Marandi: It would be a major problem to access the island because the US would have to fly over Arab regimes in the Persian Gulf. Iran would retaliate if Iranian territory were occupied, taking the war toward a major escalation. The regimes hosting the island would have to pay a heavy price, far greater than now. For the United States, the island is well protected, with Iranian assets on the shore supporting the islanders, and it’s farther from the US Navy and closer to Iran’s shore. But more importantly, such an aggression would be futile: it would not change the Persian Gulf trade through Hormuz, which Iran has effectively controlled by requiring permission to pass. An invasion or occupation would lead to fierce combat and punishment of the regimes that enabled it—Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, the Emirates, Bahrain, Qatar—desert-based states with oil and gas but little water. If the US succeeds in taking the island, Iran’s retaliation would involve destroying assets of the cooperating countries. Long-term, Hormuz could be effectively closed, with upstream infrastructure damaged and no oil or gas able to move, making a later reopening contingent on a peace agreement. The operation would be logistically, militarily, and economically disastrous for global markets. Glenn: There are reports Iran is mining Hormuz. Do you know anything about that operation? Marandi: Iran hasn’t mined Hormuz, the Persian Gulf, or the Indian Ocean. The Iranian navy capable of wartime actions is largely in underground tunnels and includes speedboats, surface-to-sea missiles, and a network of underground bases. Iran has not moved to mine the Gulf. It does not want escalation. Iran has always negotiated; US claims that Iran wanted nuclear weapons at the negotiating table are rejected by Iran, the fatwa, and IAEA history. If negotiations had failed, the US invasion would be unjustified. Doha and Qatar are prepared to restart gas facilities and allow oil to flow if peace returns. If the US escalates to destroy key infrastructure, Iran will retaliate, and Iran can hurt US assets and its proxies more than the US can hurt Iran, with long-term global energy consequences. Iran has been striking bases in the region and says it is prepared to continue until after the midterm elections. Glenn: The US energy secretary says the US Navy is studying options to escort tankers through Hormuz. What are the main challenges? Marandi: It would be virtually impossible. Iran’s navy is largely underground, with mines, surface-to-sea missiles, and drones capable of targeting Hormuz from Iran. If open war begins, Iran would retaliate against regimes hosting US bases. Even if Hormuz were opened temporarily, without oil, gas, tankers, or production, there would be no purpose, and energy prices would spike permanently. The US would likely be forced to accept Iran’s terms for peace to allow oil to flow. Glenn: Trump has spoken of further destruction if needed, but says he’s run out of targets. What do you expect from the American side? Marandi: The US is already targeting nonmilitary sites and civilian targets in Iran. They slaughter civilians, including families and children, with premeditation. They could intensify attacks on oil, gas, electricity infrastructure, which would invite Iran to retaliate. Iran’s society is united, with people on the streets despite the bombardments. If the US destroys infrastructure, Iran would respond, but Iran does not want escalation; it would be catastrophic for the global economy. The media in the West is controlled, and there is little outrage at threats to destroy Iran. Glenn: Israeli and American aims now—what’s at stake, and how end this? Marandi: Since the Gaza genocide and Lebanon escalation, Zionism is increasingly viewed as evil, and public opinion against Zionism is growing in the US. The destruction of Israel’s credibility is the greatest defeat, not battlefield losses. End this war now would be prudent; as Iran strikes back, global sympathy for Iran grows and the empire weakens. If Israel were to use a nuclear weapon, that would be catastrophic and could prompt broader proliferation. Glenn: Any chance Iran could retaliate against Britain or European states? Marandi: Europe and the US will have diminished presence in the region; bases would be forced to leave. He notes the possibility of false-flag attacks in the West and asserts Zionist manipulation as a risk, but emphasizes Iran’s determination to defend sovereignty and support for Palestinians and others. Glenn: Just a final note—Iran had three negotiations, not two, including the JCPOA. Thank you for joining. Marandi: Thank you.