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- New footage from Tel Aviv is shown, including videos outside windows of what sources say they are seeing, with a claim that Fox News is not covering this damage in Tel Aviv. The discussion centers on the reality of buildings being hit near City Hall, and questions why it isn’t being widely covered by Fox News. - The conversation shifts to missile stocks and interceptors. A comment references Keith Kellogg on Fox News discussing a Wall Street Journal report about running out of interceptor missiles within four to five weeks, and a claim that there is no problem because orders were placed and allies could supply missiles. The speaker notes that UAE reportedly has about a week left of interceptor missiles and says missiles from Iran are getting through “like a sieve.” - It is argued that the U.S. has a limited stockpile because many missiles have been transferred to Israel and Ukraine over the past years, leaving the U.S. inventory low. The claim is made that continuing the war with depleted missiles would heighten national security risk and vulnerability globally. - The transcript discusses potential international responses. The speaker contends that Europe’s mobilization rhetoric (France, Greece) should not be expected to deter Iran, noting that Greece does not have a major army and that NATO-funded contingents are involved rather than independent power. The assertion is made that Iran’s strikes in Tel Aviv, Tehran, Qom, and other cities show that Iran believes it can strike back effectively, signaling a preference to fight the United States and Israel rather than submit again. - The central point is that the conflict is described as 100% about missiles and air-defense missiles, not ground forces. The speaker argues Iran likely has enough offensive missiles to prolong the conflict for months, possibly longer than U.S. capacity to sustain it, especially with Hormuz potentially shut or partially shut, which could hurt the western economy. - Admiral James Stavridis is cited by Speaker 0, noting that as the U.S. and Israel expend hundreds of precision weapons, the focus should shift to logistics and stockpiles. The discussion emphasizes the need for inventory clarity, planning, and alignment between political objectives and military capabilities. - Speaker 1 asserts that the planning should have assessed inventories, timeframes, and whether the means match the objectives. The argument states that risking all resources without sufficient offensive or defensive capacity is a dangerous gamble, suggesting the current course could be a “huge blunder.” - The conversation touches on General Dan Kane, who reportedly told the president two weeks earlier that there were not enough ammunition and it would not be pretty to win. A reference is made to Trump’s Truth Social claiming Kane’s assessment was incorrect, with talk of whether Kane did or did not say the president’s characterization was accurate. The claim is made that there are concerns about integrity and whether senior leaders would publicly contradict the administration’s framing if necessary. - A follow-up question is raised about whether admitting a ground invasion would imply insufficient missiles to sustain the mission, with Speaker 1 acknowledging that admitting ground troops would signal a lack of missiles for sustained action. - The segment then shifts to a sponsorship note about depression treatment options, promoting Ataybekli and its lead program BPL-003 (a nasal spray psychedelic-based therapy) developed for treatment-resistant depression, with background on the company, its investors, and the roadmap toward Phase 3 in 2026. It emphasizes the potential for faster, more scalable treatment sessions and invites viewers to learn more at a website, with disclaimers about not providing medical or financial advice.

Speaker 0 and Speaker 1 discuss the unfolding conflict with Iran, focusing on miscalculations, strategy, and potential trajectories. - Speaker 1 says the war is a major miscalculation, identifiable before it began. Signs were evident: movement of military equipment, force postures, and statements suggested that absent an eleventh-hour change by Trump, the plan was to use prepositioned forces and enablers for sustained combat. He notes this pattern matches previous experiences in which the U.S. saw a buildup as a precursor to war, citing Russia’s 2022 invasion and his own observations of earlier prepositioning, logistics, air support, refueling, and large-scale aviation assets (C-17s, C-5s, fighter jets, aircraft carriers). - He argues Iran’s leadership intended to pursue war rather than negotiation, pointing to what he calls a central missed opportunity: the Oman foreign minister’s Friday-night submissions to the Iranian negotiator offering zero reprocessing, stockpile reductions, and at least preliminary talks on long-range missiles and proxies. He asserts that if the Trump administration had accepted those terms, a ceasefire or settlement might have been possible; instead, he claims the next morning’s attack signaled that negotiations were never the aim. - Regarding U.S. objectives, Speaker 1 says the stated aims from Trump were unattainable given Iran’s resolve and the regime’s calculations that fighting a war with the U.S. is less risky than submitting to U.S. demands. He cites a New York Times report indicating Iran believed war with the U.S. was a viable risk, yet he notes Iran’s leadership now appears to be consolidating support at home and regionally after the Ayatollah’s assassination and the subsequent martyrdom of Qasem Soleimani’s successor in Iran’s internal narrative. - On battlefield dynamics, he emphasizes that Iran’s force deployment is not merely pressure but designed for use, with extensive underground facilities capable of withstanding sustained pressure. He forecasts continued high-intensity operations for a period, but warns the U.S. faces a tightening window: if the Iranian side holds firm and the U.S. cannot sustain supplies and missiles, the U.S. could reach a crisis point. - He discusses possible ceasefire dynamics and political reaction: Trump’s suggestion of a ceasefire could be “complete BS” if the Ayatollah’s position remains solid; the martyrdom and regional protests strengthen Iran’s stance. He expects continued escalation and a hardening of Iran’s demands, including sanctions relief or designation changes, should the conflict drag on. - On regional response, Speaker 1 notes that Iran has drawn regional actors into the conflict, with protests supporting Iran across Iraq, Pakistan, Bahrain, Oman, Kuwait, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Israel. He says many Iranians—though opposed to the regime—are unlikely to embrace Israel or the United States as a path out of the crisis, given decades of antagonism and past betrayals by Western powers. - Regarding U.S. vulnerabilities, he says there are reports of U.S. casualties (three killed, five seriously wounded, others lightly wounded) though some figures are disputed; the public reporting may lag behind direct sources. He mentions possible gaps in air defense and the risk of shortages in interceptors as drones and missiles proliferate, warning that Iran could escalate if U.S. stocks are depleted. - Looking ahead, Speaker 1 argues the conflict is a battle of wills and a war of attrition. The U.S. attempted a “cheap” approach with naval and air power but no ground forces; Iran appears ready to continue long enough to force concessions. He warns the Iranian threat could extend to oil infrastructure and the broader economy if the United States or its regional partners target Iran’s energy sector, potentially broadening the conflict. - In sum, he characterizes Iran’s strategy as all-in, aiming to impose pain to compel a negotiated settlement unfavorable to the U.S., while the U.S. faces a narrowing margin to sustain supply chains, missiles, and air defenses as the conflict potentially drags on for weeks to months. He cautions that the escalation ladder remains with higher rungs available, including strikes on energy infrastructure, if the conflict widens.

Chris Martinson, an economic researcher and futurist specializing in energy and resource depletion, argues the U.S. may be facing a large energy shock driven by the prolonged closure of the Strait of Hormuz. He disputes claims that a “peace agreement” will reopen oil flows, saying Iran has prepared for this for “forty years,” has leverage, and has repeatedly indicated it will not give up control of the Strait, its nuclear material, or its demands for reparations and sanctions relief. He says the floated “wish list” version of the deal appears to reflect everything the U.S. wants, not Iran’s stated conditions. Martinson describes what he says happened after the U.S. decapitation strike: the U.S. allegedly suffered some of its worst military losses since World War II, bases were targeted, satellite-image releases were restricted, and since March 2 the Strait has been “effectively closed.” He claims Iran’s strategy involved layered missiles, from simpler to more sophisticated, used in sequence, with “extreme precision.” He says Iran can “run off the clock,” and every day the Strait is closed means oil and oil products not reaching market. He argues that oil-market reactions to statements about a deal—particularly Trump’s tweets—suggest the narrative is driving prices more than supply fundamentals, with oil reportedly dropping after tweets despite the constriction of supply continuing. He cites multiple industry and energy figures saying the situation represents an unprecedented or worst energy shock, but argues the oil price does not respond accordingly. Using a price-quantity framework, he says prices have been kept at a level where demand remains high. He claims the U.S. has been using Strategic Petroleum Reserve withdrawals and commercial stocks—calling them “seed corn”—to mask the problem, including “below market rates” for political reasons. He estimates constraints in the SPR and Cushing, Oklahoma: Cushing reportedly has 25,000,000 barrels with an operational minimum of 20,000,000, leaving only about 5,000,000. He argues the SPR caverns are salt caverns that limit how much can be drawn without physical damage, making withdrawal capacity uncertain. His “best guess” is about “sixty days until we hit tank bottoms.” Martinson anticipates inflation impacts through a “double hump inflation” analogy from the 1970s, and says producer price index data at 6% implies consumer prices could rise to around that rate in coming months. He describes inflation as already underway and portrays the situation as a “ticking clock” in negotiations: he says time benefits Iran and increases the likelihood of a broader global economic depression. He warns that if the U.S. attacks again, Iran has stated it would target Gulf Cooperation Council energy infrastructure, including the East-West pipeline across Saudi Arabia (with the port at Yanbu), the Omani pipeline, and it would close the Bab El Mandeb Strait in the Red Sea. He says this could raise the missing oil impact from 13,000,000 barrels per day to 25,000,000 barrels per day and notes that fixing damaged infrastructure could take months or years. He concludes that U.S. choices are limited and the outcome could be “bad or worse.” For personal preparation, Martinson emphasizes Maslow’s hierarchy—food, shelter, safety, and warmth—citing steps like solar and lithium batteries, an electric car powered by solar, growing food, and building neighbor-focused local relationships. He frames the situation as broader than oil alone, affecting fertilizer (including urea), natural gas, and other industrial inputs, and says these interconnected disruptions can be “dizzying” and “paralyzing.”

In this conversation, Brian Berletic discusses the current collision between the United States’ global strategy and a rising multipolar world, arguing that U.S. policy is driven by corporate-financier interests and a desire to preserve unipolar primacy, regardless of the costs to others. - Structural dynamics and multipolar resistance - The host notes a shift from optimism about Trump’s “America First” rhetoric toward an assessment that U.S. strategy aims to restore hegemony and broad, repeated wars, even as a multipolar world emerges. - Berletic agrees that the crisis is structural: the U.S. system is driven by large corporate-financier interests prioritizing expansion of profit and power. He cites Brookings Institution’s 2009 policy papers, particularly The Path to Persia, as documenting a long-running plan to manage Iran via a sequence of options designed to be used in synergy to topple Iran, with Syria serving as a staging ground for broader conflict. - He argues the policy framework has guided decisions across administrations, turning policy papers into bills and war plans, with corporate media selling these as American interests. This, he says, leaves little room for genuine opposition because political power is financed by corporate interests. - Iran, Syria, and the Middle East as a springboard to a global confrontation - Berletic traces the current Iran crisis to the 2009 Brookings paper’s emphasis on air corridors and using Israel to provoke a war, placing blame on Israel as a proxy mechanism while the U.S. cleanses the region of access points for striking Iran directly. - He asserts the Arab Spring (2011) was designed to encircle Iran and move toward Moscow and Beijing, with Iran as the final target. The U.S. and its allies allegedly used policy papers to push tactical steps—weakening Russia via Ukraine, exploiting Syria, and leveraging Iran as a fulcrum for broader restraint against Eurasian powers. - The aim, he argues, is to prevent a rising China by destabilizing Iran and, simultaneously, strangling energy exports that feed China’s growth. He claims the United States has imposed a global maritime oil blockade on China through coordinated strikes and pressure on oil-rich states, while China pursues energy independence via Belt and Road, coal-to-liquids, and growing imports from Russia. - The role of diplomacy, escalation, and Netanyahu’s proxy - On diplomacy, Berletic says the U.S. has no genuine interest in peace; diplomacy is used to pretext war, creating appearances of reasonable engagement while advancing the continuity of a warlike agenda. He references the Witch Path to Persia as describing diplomacy as a pretext for regime change. - He emphasizes that Russia and China are not credibly negotiating with the U.S., viewing Western diplomacy as theater designed to degrade multipolar powers. Iran, he adds, may be buying time but also reacting to U.S. pressure, while Arab states and Israel are portrayed as proxies with limited autonomy. - The discussion also covers how Israel serves as a disposable proxy to advance U.S. goals, including potential use of nuclear weapons, with Trump allegedly signaling a post-facto defense of Israel in any such scenario. - The Iran conflict, its dynamics, and potential trajectory - The war in Iran is described as a phased aggression, beginning with the consulate attack and escalating into economic and missile-strike campaigns. Berletic notes Iran’s resilient command-and-control and ongoing missile launches, suggesting the U.S. and its allies are attempting to bankrupt Iran while degrading its military capabilities. - He highlights the strain on U.S. munitions inventories, particularly anti-missile interceptors and long-range weapons, due to simultaneous operations in Ukraine, the Middle East, and potential confrontations with China. He warns that the war’s logistics are being stretched to the breaking point, risking a broader blowback. - The discussion points to potential escalation vectors: shutting Hormuz, targeting civilian infrastructure, and possibly using proxies (including within the Gulf states and Yemen) to choke off energy flows. Berletic cautions that the U.S. could resort to more drastic steps, including leveraging Israel for off-world actions, while maintaining that multipolar actors (Russia, China, Iran) would resist. - Capabilities, resources, and the potential duration - The host notes China’s energy-mobility strategies and the Western dependency on rare earth minerals (e.g., gallium) mostly produced in China, emphasizing how U.S. war aims rely on leveraging allies and global supply chains that are not easily sustained. - Berletic argues the U.S. does not plan for permanent victory but for control, and that multipolar powers are growing faster than the United States can destroy them. He suggests an inflection point will come when multipolarism outruns U.S. capacity, though the outcome remains precarious due to nuclear risk and global economic shocks. - Outlook and final reflections - The interlocutors reiterate that the war is part of a broader structural battle between unipolar U.S. dominance and a rising multipolar order anchored by Eurasian powers. They stress the need to awaken broader publics to the reality of multipolarism and to pursue a more balanced world order, warning that the current trajectory risks global economic harm and dangerous escalation.

Larry Johnson discusses with Glenn about the Iran conflict, focusing on narrative control, economic warfare, and the feasibility of different strategic options. Key points across the conversation: - The reality vs. narrative: Johnson argues that the current sea of propaganda makes it hard to unpack reality, especially the claim that the U.S. blockade can cripple Iran. He contends the blockade is impractical in multiple ways and that political theater surrounds ship seizures. - Blockade viability and limitations: - Iran’s oil trading: Iran loads oil and ships it within 75 miles of its coast; the U.S. Navy will not approach closer than about 200 miles. Iran can threaten ships with short-range missiles, cruise missiles, and drones if the U.S. comes closer. - Moving beyond Iranian waters: If Iran uses a convoy of 20 tankers 75–100 miles off its coast into the Indian Ocean, the U.S. lacks enough ships to stop and seize every vessel; seizing ships requires keeping ships tied to port, reducing impact. - Imports and border routes: Iran can bring in goods via routes into Bandar Abbas and Chabahar and through Pakistan; Pakistan reportedly has six different routes into Iran. This dilutes the blockade’s effectiveness and undermines the “total cut-off” narrative championed by supporters of economic warfare. - Statements from Trump and Iran’s response: Johnson notes Trump’s statements about Iran’s leadership being chaotic and the possibility of lifting the blockade as a potential setup for a different narrative. He emphasizes that Iran’s leadership, according to his sources, remains cohesive and prepared. - Iranian leadership and past experience: Johnson highlights that Iran’s top leaders (Pazeshkin, Oraci, Golubov, and IRGC figures) were shaped by combat and share a history of fighting a US-funded adversary. This background, he argues, makes them better prepared to handle current threats than some US figures. - U.S. domestic political dynamics: The discussion touches on U.S. politicalConstraints and the difficulty of selling any deal domestically, particularly given lobbying (APAC, etc.) and internal political risks for those who sign a controversial agreement. - Russian role and diplomacy: - Araki’s weekend actions: Araki starts in Pakistan with a hardline Iranian position (rejecting a U.S. return to talks unless the blockade ends and uranium enrichment remains within a treaty framework), then moves to Oman to coordinate Hormuz management, then to Russia for talks with Putin and Lavrov, and finally back to Pakistan to relay messages. - Putin’s support: Putin publicly backs Iran, signaling readiness to coordinate, with Russia providing security guarantees potentially akin to its North Korea approach. Russia also offers intelligence and technical assistance to Iran’s military and economy, signaling a broader strategic alignment against Western sanctions. - BRICS and sanctions: Russia and China are moving away from enforcing Western-style sanctions on Iran, signaling a pivot to economic integration (including currency diversification and gold). This shifts Iran’s position relative to Western pressure. - Economic and strategic implications: - Rare earth supply and missiles: Johnson notes that the U.S. cannot easily replenish precision missiles (Patriot, THAAD, Tomahawk) because critical rare earth minerals (like samarium, neodymium, dysprosium) are controlled by China, which withholds them as leverage. - Energy diplomacy and China: Iran’s oil shipments to China and the risk to Western interests in East Asia complicate U.S. aims. Johnson argues China can keep receiving oil via convoys, limiting U.S. ability to fully disrupt Iranian trade. - Strait of Hormuz and strategic leverage: Iran’s stance suggests it can pressure Gulf states and deter foreign bases if it secures a more favorable arrangement, potentially using Hormuz as leverage in global trade and currency arrangements. - Possible paths forward and timing: - The discussion questions how long the economic warfare can persist and what would cause either side to blink. Johnson suggests that if Iran’s economy doesn’t collapse in the anticipated three weeks, the U.S. will face a choice between declaring victory or pursuing a more protracted negotiation. - There is skepticism about a decisive, lasting American victory; Johnson emphasizes that there is no viable ground option, and air and maritime options face significant constraints. - Historical lessons and perspective: The hosts draw parallels to past U.S. conflicts and emphasize learning from history (e.g., not underestimating adversaries, recognizing costs of war) and suggest that current leadership may be underestimating Iran’s resolve and capability. The conversation concludes with reflections on the need for informed diplomacy and the value of historical insights from figures like ambassador Jack Matlock, acknowledging that strategic miscalculations have repeated patterns across eras.

The discussion centers on how an Iran war would affect global economies, and why energy-price dynamics may not be a sustainable path to stability. The professor says that even without a war, energy prices are expected to remain very high through the rest of the year due to existing delays. He argues the situation would worsen because a war is “breaking out very soon,” possibly by Sunday or Monday, with “no real negotiations” so any negotiation could not affect the military or peace situation. He describes conditions for preconditions to negotiations as impossible to meet. He says one requirement is that Iran be given back confiscated Iranian funds, including “many billions of dollars” intervened by the United States and references stablecoin. He states the United States cannot return any money because Congress has set positions including “Not one penny for Iran,” characterizing Iran as a terrorist country. He also says the United States has repeatedly reneged on prior commitments, giving an example that Trump annulled an Obama administration atomic weapons contract, so Iran would not concede without return in advance. According to the professor, market expectations are being driven by announcements and the belief that a peaceful negotiation might be reached, citing stocks and bonds rising and a perceived chance to profit when markets open Monday or Tuesday. He claims the announcements are aimed at creating that expectation rather than producing a durable settlement. He describes alleged U.S. messaging to Netanyahu about allowing attacks, and says the war secretary Hegseth spoke with Oman and Qatar. He states that if Oman did not agree not to join Iran in imposing tariffs (presented as Iran’s effort to obtain reparations for illegal attacks), the U.S. would “let Netanyahu kill you,” and that this reportedly ended negotiations. He predicts Iran is not ready and that the peak of the war will come as the build-up since Trump took office. He argues the conflict would create shortages of oil, fertilizer, sulfur, chemicals, and helium, plunging the world into a depression “worse than the nineteen thirties.” He cites ExxonMobil’s estimates of pushing oil prices to “over the hundred fifty, hundred sixty dollar a barrel range,” causing chemical industry shutdowns throughout Asia and the global South and Europe, blocking fertilizer exports, and reducing agricultural yields amid extreme-weather conditions. He says fertilizer blockades and agricultural disruption would drive food price increases and industry closures. He then describes an economic mechanism: chemical-industry closures reduce demand for oil, so oil prices might fall to “maybe a hundred twenty, a hundred thirty dollars a barrel,” but he expects “large scale defaults and bankruptcy.” He says debt leverage across economies would turn an industrial depression into a financial crisis because companies depend on lending and credit, and that collateralized debt obligations have created patterns resembling the 2008 bank crisis. He states central banks cannot “simply create more credit” because banks would avoid lending to prevent turning economies into a “Ponzi scheme.” He also argues U.S. negotiation demands are designed to prevent serious talks, describing Trump’s stated premise that nothing will happen until Iran transfers all atomic weapons as a “red herring” and likening it to a deal-breaker. He says sanctions aimed to starve Iran have not worked since they were first put in place in 1979, and that the U.S. intends to provoke Iran into a defensive response. The professor expands from economics to international law and institutions. He claims U.S. attacks would treat civilian activity as military, referencing alleged attacks on fishermen in other regions and arguing similar logic would apply in the Strait of Hormuz. He says the UN is a “casualty” because it has been unable to enforce its charter, blocked through U.S. veto power, and says the alternative would require “a new United Nations” independent of the United States, with China, Russia, and Iran as leading members. He proposes a broader strategy focused on control of the global oil trade, stating the U.S. aims to prevent other countries from using alternative supplies by destroying oil facilities and weaponizing the oil trade. He links this to actions involving Nord Stream, sanctions, and scenarios involving Venezuela and grain trade. He states Venezuela oil revenue is paid into a Florida bank account under Donald Trump’s direction and says the same approach is sought for Iran. He further claims the U.S. would aim to restrict alternative energy (wind and solar), portray it as rival to oil, and maintain dependence on U.S. LNG and oil exports. He concludes that chaos is used to lock in foreign dependency and that a U.S.-centered outcome would involve closed European industry, subsidies or market opening demands, and client political alignments. He predicts Europe would relocate industry outside Europe but not necessarily to the U.S., while still facing political revulsion and seeking an alternative system as the depression deepens. He also says future wars would be air wars with missiles, bombs, and drones rather than invasions.

Speaker 0 notes that, “if you listen to our leaders, it seems like everything is fine,” with a war “barreling towards a close,” markets “exploding,” and Trump praising the stock market. He says Pam Bondi reminded us about why we can’t have the Epstein files because “the Dow is over 50,000.” He reports Trump said Israel and Lebanon have agreed to begin a ten day ceasefire, starting at 4 PM Eastern, and claims they “haven’t spoken in thirty four years” but now are at a ten day ceasefire, while Israel is carrying out “last minute terrorist attacks, blowing up civilian homes in Inatah, centuries old village in South Lebanon,” and “blowing up a school” in Marwan, South Lebanon. He also says Trump spoke an hour earlier that Iran and the United States are close to an agreement to end this war. He closes with a tongue-in-cheek jab about a “ten days to regroup” from Tony in the chat. Speaker 1 emphasizes the priority: “The big thing we have to do is we have to make sure that Iran does not have a nuclear weapon,” stating that Iran “agreed to that” and that Iran has agreed to give back the nuclear dust “way underground because of the attack we made with the b two bombers.” Tony Garrett in the chat is cited again confirming “ten days to regroup, restock, and reassess.” Speaker 0 then introduces Colonel Daniel Davis as host of Deep Dive, noting a bombshell from his sources and that despite positive rhetoric, military movement suggests otherwise. Speaker 2 asserts that, even without his sources, President Trump was asked if there’s no deal, “we’ll definitely do that,” and that Secretary Hagstads (Hagstad) briefing said, “we are locked and loaded and we are ready to get right back into this.” He says there has been “lots of ammunition and fuel and restocks” moved into the region during the ceasefire to be used, and cautions that “until an order is given, it doesn’t matter what you’ve prepared for,” but that “militarily, all the pieces are in place to restart this thing.” He concludes the pause is a pause to reload, not a true end to hostilities. Speaker 3 asks about ten days’ viability to replenish ammunition, and about a Wall Street Journal report that the Pentagon is pushing Ford and GM to shift factory capacity toward weapons production. Speaker 2 says such conversions are possible (World War II precedent) but would be expensive and time-consuming; more likely, the U.S. “can take them out of our stockpiles” and deplete them, possibly for months or years to replenish, with Iran possibly calculating they can outlast U.S. firepower. He notes the risk that a protracted war could outstrip American stockpiles, whereas Iran could endure longer. Speaker 0 shifts to gold and silver promotions, then returns to the strategic issue, describing that Mossad head’s claim that Iran war ends only with regime change, and Russian intelligence’s counterclaim that the ceasefire is a mask. He asks the chat if the ceasefire is real; Speaker 2 confirms it is real in a technical sense (no missiles fired) but calls it a pause to reload, not a negotiated settlement. Speaker 4 (Secretary of War remarks) says, “Iran can choose a prosperous future…we will maintain this blockade,” and “if Iran chooses poorly, then they will be a blockade and bombs dropping on infrastructure, power, and energy,” while Treasury is launching “Operation economic fury.” Speaker 2 responds that such measures are physically feasible but question their effectiveness in achieving supply and demand balance or restoring fertilizer, helium, and chip supply chains, arguing Iran will endure and that the war is militarily unwinnable. Speaker 2 reiterates concerns about escalating consequences in the Strait of Hormuz and the Red Sea, noting the USS Ford’s voyage around Africa to avoid the Houthis, and arguing continued aggression risks destroying global supply chains, with the war demanding a quick exit. Speaker 0 and Speaker 3 thank Colonel Davis and close.

Speaker 0: The GCC allies are largely blockaded and not getting anything through; only UAE or Oman might be getting a few shipments due to being on the Gulf of Oman side. This is driving higher oil prices. We can’t simply bluff or "play a game of chicken" because it affects the entire world—Asia, Africa, Europe, and the United States. The shortage extends beyond oil to things like helium, and it’s impacting chip manufacturing and broader economic activity. These are medium-term issues already baked in and in short supply, so we’re facing real problems and a question of how long we can endure this. Speaker 1: As energy becomes more expensive—oil at $110, then $120, $130, $140, $150, rising until this crisis ends globally—the risk is a financial collapse worse than 2007–2008, potentially a depression in much of the world. Economists predict a serious recession, possibly a depression, and these dynamics are what Putin was trying to convey to Trump because Americans are perceived as potentially catastrophic. China is dependent on energy but is expanding nuclear power, has substantial coal, and is investing in renewables; China will survive this. Japan and Korea are on the edge; India is affected; Egypt is trying to feed 100,000,000 and facing famine; Turkey is involved. These states are being pushed toward war not just with Israel but with the United States, since without Israel none of this would be happening, and they know it. Russia, China, Egypt, Turkey, India, and possibly others may join a coalition to force the United States to stop. The speaker would prefer not to go there and believes President Trump should end the blockade, which was adopted because it was the only measure short of returning to war, but the blockade won’t work because the world won’t tolerate it. The president of the Republic of Korea (South Korea) has publicly said it’s time for Korea to defend itself. It’s been time for Korea to take control of its own armed forces for a long time, but the U.S. currently controls all their armed forces and Koreans have not liked that for at least twenty years. Now they want control of their own armed forces. The speaker expects the dissolution of the United States’ unofficial overseas imperial holdings, predicting the Koreans will expel the U.S., with Japan likely following. In the Pacific, trilateral efforts among Korea, the Philippines, and Japan are forming to cooperate with the U.S. in a future war with China—not in our lifetimes or on the planet, as no one wants war with China. Nobody wants war with China; China is increasingly seen as a safer place for cash and investments in the U.S. This shift began when the U.S. began telling Russians they would not allow them to access billions of rubles and may seize funds, possibly giving cash to Ukrainians. People are watching and asking whether they want to depend on the U.S. financial system or face interference with bank accounts. There are many bad developments right now, and the last thing the American people need is a war, certainly not one involving China, Russia, or any other powers along with Iran, yet that seems to the direction in which things are headed.

- The discussion begins with concern about the quality of Speaker 1’s internet connection for recorded YouTube work. Speaker 1 explains that their neighborhood has a monopolist limiting updates to local software/hardware, and says their own Starlink setup is going up, with 20+ or ~30 satellites already online and deploying quickly. Speaker 1 then jokes about sponsoring revolutions abroad, noting France and the UK should be ready. - The conversation shifts to international developments, focusing on the “Iran war” and later Ukraine/Russia, and then on Trump’s visit to China. - Speaker 1 describes alleged details from Trump’s China visit: Tajikistan’s president was visiting the same day, and during Trump’s arrival only part of the route’s flags were reportedly changed from Tajik to US flags. Speaker 1 frames this as a “soft insult.” - On Xi Jinping meeting Kim Jong Un and Vladimir Putin at airports/tarmacs, Speaker 1 says some claims are not true and emphasizes protocol and past examples: in prior meetings (Xi and Putin; Trump arriving previously), Xi reportedly met Putin at the tarmac, sat down with the top down, and drove into the city. Speaker 1 also says that in Trump’s last China arrival, Trump reportedly had Xi waiting. - Speaker 1 assesses the Xi–Trump meeting as unprepared compared with highly structured US-style or adversarial-country meetings. They describe how security teams, working diplomats, document preparation, possible joint statements, and agenda negotiation are typically handled before leaders meet. Speaker 1 compares this to earlier dynamics seen in Anchorage (with Trump allegedly seeking speed for a PR/picture moment). - The thread links the China visit to energy leverage involving Iran and Venezuela. Speaker 1 says Venezuela’s capacity is limited (around 800,000 barrels/day) and that significantly expanding it takes time and large investment. Speaker 1 argues US refining limitations matter: US refineries were set up for heavier sour crude (described as “viscous” and “sour” due to sulfur) and the US has not built a new refinery in over 30 years, citing bureaucracy and environmental laws as reasons companies left. - Speaker 1 elaborates on why the US cannot easily expand refining quickly, citing high insurance costs for factory work and related regulatory burdens, leading factories to move elsewhere. - Speaker 0 asks whether Trump intended a different sequence: Speaker 1 says the initial idea was to seek earlier wins and use Venezuela and Iran concessions to gain leverage, but the meeting reportedly came with Trump facing weaker leverage and needing help on Iran. - Taiwan discussions: Speaker 1 says reunification preferences exist among the Taiwanese opposition party that met Xi in China, with Taiwan described as the “Republic of China” and some groups categorized as seeking reconquest/reunification. Speaker 1 discusses why supplying Taiwan for conflict is difficult across open water and notes past US War College war-game conclusions that China would win if the US fleet intervened between China and Taiwan, while US strategy (as described) aims to make invasion costly rather than “winning.” - Proxy-war framing: Speaker 1 describes Ukraine and Iran/Yemen conflict patterns as proxy dynamics, referencing Marco Rubio’s admission that one war is a proxy war. - Iran supply/blockade claims: Speaker 1 says Iran is supplied via multiple routes—ports on the Caspian connected through Russian ports, and a rail line through Pakistan to China—plus other smaller export/storage options. Speaker 1 argues Iran’s weakness has historically included refining and diesel shortages, comparing it to the US importing refined product because it cannot refine enough to meet demand. - Venezuela capacity and US-advantaged/refinery/infrastructure problems are revisited, including discussion of reserves being held in gold in the US, social spending reductions of reinvestment, and US confiscation/export restrictions on equipment replacement, leading to worn-out infrastructure and the lack of “quick fixes.” - Straits of Hormuz and alleged “fee” idea: Speaker 0 cites a White House statement that China agreed to buy American oil to diversify from Hormuz and that Iran should not charge a fee for the Straits of Hormuz. Speaker 1 responds that Iran does not charge China fees (as stated by Speaker 1), then argues China’s commitments would only be clear if China confirms them, and compares this to past statements where purchases were claimed without matching agreements. - Speaker 1 argues sanctions can be moved/bypassed by the US government, not lifted by it, and says only US Congress can remove sanctions. Speaker 1 also claims the US continues buying sanctioned Russian products, while Europeans are criticized for accepting costly resell markups. - Speaker 1 also argues Hormuz isn’t treated as international waters in their view, and that Oman involvement matters, including claims about Oman not installing tollbooths and Iran striking ships—contrasted with the idea that a long-term/perpetual fee would open global choke-point “can of worms.” - Broader geopolitical framing: Speaker 1 says the “global system” is effectively gone, arguing the US helped build it and then killed it when it no longer served US interest, citing examples like the WTO and the strategic focus on controlling key choke points. Speaker 1 contrasts sea routes with Eurasia land connectivity and high-speed rail, linking this to belt-and-road connectivity. - Back to Iran: Speaker 0 asks whether China is pressuring Iran to concede or offering Trump political support with words. Speaker 1 says China prefers status quo and would prefer an end to war without weakening American stockpiles; Speaker 1 also says Iran’s ceasefire is not a full ceasefire and that both sides continue actions. - US military capacity and escalation: Speaker 1 argues that if Trump restarts the war, missile production is “null and void” at scale, and US manufacturing/industrial ramp-up would take years, citing the “missile production is null and void” point and the difficulty of rapid industry re-shoring due to state regulations. Speaker 1 discusses rare earths as a limiting factor in a different way—refining/processing capacity rather than shortage of elements—then argues chemical/electrolysis processing is expensive, energy intensive, and environmentally complex, often causing multi-year delays similar to refineries. - Soft-power indicators from Xi’s alleged absence and flag changes are used to explain Chinese behavior toward Trump, contrasted with prior high-level airport greetings and seating/handshake optics. Speaker 1 compares seating arrangements and perceived humiliation in European/Serbia contexts as a recurring pattern of power display. - Iran-war outcome speculation: Speaker 0 proposes a 50/50 scenario: continuation of conflict with Israeli strikes (and Iran mirroring strikes in the Gulf) versus Trump walking away. Speaker 1 says Israelis are driving outcomes and that APAC donors and money make turning away difficult, arguing Trump wants out but is constrained. Speaker 1 also says Iran and even Saudis/Kuwaitis reportedly would prefer US withdrawal from the Persian Gulf. - US military withdrawal and logistics: Speaker 1 says the US fifth fleet has left, its forward headquarters is moving to Israel, and damage estimates/repair costs are discussed. Speaker 1 argues the US is drawn into a genocide-perception dynamic once bases/equipment and US involvement are present. - Historical Iraq/Kuwait/Persian Gulf narrative: Speaker 0 asks why the US wanted Saddam to invade Kuwait. Speaker 1 asserts the US wanted Iraq to enter the Persian Gulf and become positioned for broader US presence, describing US backing for conflicts involving Iran and chemical weapons channels, and claiming Kuwait engaged in slant drilling stealing Iraqi oil. Speaker 1 says the US/Soviet coalition dynamics allowed the Gulf buildup and entry point into the region. - Final escalation discussion and regional future: Speaker 0 asks whether Trump will walk away or get trapped into escalation for a “win.” Speaker 1 says Israel’s influence over the US is expected to decline, claims generational shifts among American Jews/Christians and anti-Israel demonstrations, and argues Iran and the Gulf could reshape into new blocks with improved Gulf-Iran relations if stability is prioritized. - The conversation ends with debate over perceived misconceptions about Iran’s treatment of minorities and religious/political representation, plus discussion contrasting Iran with Saudi Arabia in terms of women’s legal status and religious policing, followed by a plan to do a future live recording using appropriate software.

The discussion centers on how Donald Trump is said to have “transformed” from describing himself as being under blackmail or duress to portraying himself as someone who can control Netanyahu and Israel—framed as a rationalizing process meant to avoid cognitive dissonance. The speaker argues that, if a person is pressured into actions, the mind may later reframe the situation so the person believes they “chose this” rather than being forced, ultimately convincing themselves that they are in control. This is illustrated through historical examples and analogies, including claims that Stockholm-syndrome-like processes occur when captives are compelled to adapt psychologically and socially to survive. To support the explanation, the speaker cites Texas frontier accounts and rereads Herman Lehman’s *Nine Years Among the Indians, 1870 to 1879*, describing cases in which boys captured by Comanches and Apaches could be brought over into the captors’ mindset over time. The speaker also references *Indian Depredations in Texas* (1889) and films such as *The Searchers* (including the story of a kidnapped girl who does not want to return), as well as Burt Lancaster’s *Ulzanas Raid*. The core claim is that these captives underwent prolonged hardship and social pressure—adaptation through survival, conditioning, and eventual identity change—so that the captive’s mind becomes “in their mind” part of the group. The speaker then ties the framework to contemporary politics by returning to remarks attributed to Trump about Israel and Netanyahu. The speaker says that earlier, Rubio and Trump supposedly said they conducted an attack (after February 28) because Israel said it would attack Israel, but that later Trump’s mindset shifts to believing Netanyahu will do whatever he says and that Trump may even joke about becoming “the next prime minister of Israel.” The speaker adds that Trump reportedly dismisses unfavorable polls as “fake news” and cites a poll Trump mentioned claiming extremely high Israeli favorability, arguing that such favorability does not translate to broad global acceptance. A large portion shifts to a geopolitical and energy argument focused on Iran, the Strait of Hormuz, and the global economy. The speaker claims that U.S.-linked actions have increasingly been associated with heightened risk, noting U.S.-provided munitions and support and asserting that extending Israel’s range with refuelers helps Israel “leapfrog” beyond Israel’s defensive perimeter. The speaker argues that assassination tactics and “sneak attack” approaches undermine negotiation, using historical comparisons (including Pearl Harbor) to argue that starting or escalating conflict produces long-term distrust and consequences. The speaker argues that the conflict is not sustainable as a prolonged “stalemate” because world fuel levels are declining and the global system is described as being “just in time,” with tankers serving as moving inventory. The speaker proposes a “tank bottom” concept—when reserve fuel buffers abroad become so depleted that supply chains and infrastructure cannot handle remaining fractions—leading to global cascading effects. They claim that even if ships head to the U.S. to refuel, it inflates U.S. prices, damages perceptions of the U.S. internationally, and does not solve the global shortfall. From there, the speaker forecasts knock-on impacts: acute energy problems followed by food crisis conditions, and they link agriculture outcomes to fertilizer, diesel, irrigation, and supply constraints. They also argue that psychological and social preparedness matters—asserting that Americans may collapse faster due to expectations of constant electricity, water, and supermarket access, while people with lived hardship may adapt more readily. The transcript also includes an extended interlude promoting and discussing products and fundraising tied to the show, including supplements, iodine products, wallets, and an RFID/Faraday-shield theme. It describes sales, pricing, and claims about how shielding protects against card scanning and data theft.

Speaker 0 outlines that the United States is struggling to supply Ukraine with missiles, Israel with air defense systems, and other allies as well, including Taiwan which has paid the US for billions of military equipment that has not yet been delivered. All of these needs rely on rare earths and magnets, noting that China manufactures about 90–92% of the magnets. He asks what the impact would be on the US military, the US economy, and the European economy, as well as the rest of the world, with the expectation that the effects would primarily target the US. He emphasizes focusing on what would happen to the US if China proceeds with those restrictions. Speaker 1 responds that it would amount to a sudden stop in the production of equipment, machinery, devices, and gadgets. He stresses that rare earths are used universally in electronic production and are not easily separated into defense-related versus civilian uses. He compares rare earths to electricity in that sense. He notes that the phones and computers people use rely on rare earths, underscoring that the impact would be a global, broad economic disruption rather than a narrowly targeted strategy.

First speaker: Iran doesn’t really need to attack American ships or force the strait to open because it could actually be advantageous for the strait to remain closed. There are floating oil reserves and cargo ships in the Indian Ocean and Arabian Sea that Iran could rely on. In fact, Iran has a substantial stockpile: 160,000,000 barrels of Iranian crude already floating at sea, outside the Persian Gulf, past the Strait of Hormuz into the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean. That amount could fuel a country like Germany for over two months, and most of it is headed to Chinese independent refiners. Exports remain high, and the blockade is real, even if the timing is late. Do you agree that Iran is prepped for this day? Second speaker: I do agree. I think this is not harming the Iranians as much as it is harming the United States and the rest of the world. First speaker: What is Trump’s thought process? He has spoken with secretary Besant and other advisers, so he’s already sought advice. What alternative could work in Trump’s favor? Second speaker: Whenever the first round of negotiations ended, the president believed that his style of brinksmanship would produce immediate capitulation and agreement by the Iranians. The Iranians have never negotiated like that. Even the first treaty in the late 2000s took a long time to negotiate, not one and done. This administration wants short-term gains, and that isn’t possible with the Iranians. In the short term, the Iranians are in the driver’s seat. Negotiating and diplomacy are very difficult work; you don’t bully your way through. There is no unconditional surrender. There is none of that except in the president’s mind, unfortunately.

Syed Mohamed Marandi discusses the collapse of the Islamabad negotiations and the wider implications of the current U.S.-Iran confrontation. - On what happened in Islamabad: Iran participated despite low expectations, aiming to show willingness to resolve the crisis if Americans are reasonable and to ensure the world sees Iran’s efforts. The Iranians believed the United States lacked will to make progress. During talks there was some progress on various issues, but near the end the United States shifted to a hard line on the nuclear program and the status of the Strait of Hormuz. Vance claimed Iran wanted to build a nuclear weapon, a claim Marandi notes was contradicted by former counterintelligence official Joe Kent’s resignation letter. Netanyahu reportedly maintains direct influence, with Vance reporting to Netanyahu daily, which Iran views as undermining an agreement. Netanyahu’s insistence on control and “being the boss” is presented as a central obstacle to any deal. The ceasefire in Lebanon was touted as failing, with Netanyahu and Trump accused of conspiring to wreck it, and Iran’s actions after the ceasefire aligned with this view. The Iranian delegation flew back by land after the flight to Tehran was diverted, reflecting the perceived danger and the Washington Post piece calling for the murder of negotiators. Iran’s approach is framed as attempting to resolve the problem while signaling willingness to negotiate if U.S. policy becomes reasonable. - On the blockade and its consequences: The U.S. blockade on Iranian ports has just begun and will likely worsen the global economic crisis, pushing more countries to oppose the United States. China is angry as Washington dictates terms against oil and trade in the region. The blockade could be used to strangle China’s energy supplies, creating a double-edged impact by simultaneously worsening the global crisis and pressuring U.S. allies. Iran says it may respond by striking ships in the Red Sea and blocking the Red Sea and the Gulf of Oman if the blockade continues. Iran notes it has substantial financial resilience from oil sales at higher prices without middlemen, with about 100 million barrels left to sell after selling half of its declared oil stock, and it views energy shortages as likely to trigger broader economic disruption, including shortages of helium, LNG, and fertilizers. - On war readiness and possible outcomes: Iran anticipates a major assault and is preparing defenses and offensive capabilities. Iran argues negotiations were not taken seriously by the United States and believes the U.S. is buying time. Iran would view victories as having the United States back down, preserving Iran’s rights, and protecting its regional allies, with a long-term ceasefire. Iran contends it should control the Strait of Hormuz to prevent future aggression and seeks compensation for damages caused by the conflict, emphasizing sovereignty over Hormuz and peace for Lebanon, Gaza, Iraq, and Yemen. Iran states that if the U.S. and its regional proxies strike, Iran would respond by targeting energy and infrastructure in the Persian Gulf. - On broader geopolitical shifts and regional dynamics: Marandi argues the current crisis accelerates a move toward a multipolar world, with the United States’ hegemonic position eroding. The UAE is portrayed as pushing for war, while other Gulf states are increasingly wary. He predicts a possible land invasion of Iran, but emphasizes Iran’s long-term preparedness and resilience. Weather and terrain are cited as factors likely to complicate a potential U.S. invasion, particularly in the hot summer conditions of the region. - On potential definitions of “victory”: Iran’s victory would involve U.S. backing down, Iran preserving its rights, a long-term ceasefire, and sovereignty over the Strait of Hormuz. A broader victory would see the end of supremacism in Palestine and the end of genocidal actions in Lebanon, with peace across the region as a key objective. The discussion ends with the notion that a shift toward an American focus on its republic, rather than empire, would benefit global stability.

Speaker 0: In a few days, America is already running out of weapons against Iran, despite spending about $1,000,000,000,000 a year on defense. The administration is meeting with top defense contractors at the White House because strikes on Iran are diminishing US stockpiles, especially long-range munitions like Tomahawk missiles. Interceptor missiles are being exhausted by Iranian attacks. This is not getting wide play in the mainstream media; there is a blackout. CNN reported that Israel told them they are not allowed to show incoming rocket attacks. Speaker 1: One go up there. We're not showing you that because we're not gonna show. The Israeli government does not allow us or want us to show where that may have come up, that interceptor. Speaker 0: The most powerful military machine in history is not calling a meeting because it's winning too hard. It’s calling a meeting because the shelves are getting bare. Axios and The Wall Street Journal report that the reality contradicts slogans of unlimited munitions. War is fought with inventory and magazine depth, not slogans. The White House is seeking more supply as munitions run low. Speaker 0: The dirty little secret is that war isn’t fought with slogans; it’s fought with inventory. The Iran fight is the worst kind of war for stockpiles because it’s strike targets and defense of everything you own at the same time. A CIA station house in Riyadh was hit; Iran could strike a CIA station, and telemetry data may have come from China or Russia. Iran doesn’t need to beat the US head-to-head in aircraft carriers to bleed us dry. Speaker 0: Aircraft carriers are relics of the post-World War II era and are vulnerable to hypersonic weapons. France is sending a carrier; it’s not about carriers but about forcing us to burn high-end interceptors faster than we can replace them. It comes down to math: a $50,000 drone versus a $4,000,000 interceptor or a naval missile defense shot. We’re bleeding resources. Speaker 0: Tomahawks are expensive long-range munitions. The Pentagon plans to buy only 72 Tomahawks in fiscal year 2025 and 57 in fiscal year 2026, while operations have consumed hundreds. Each missile is around $1,300,000. Raytheon and others are ramping Tomahawk production from roughly 60 per year to eventually 1,000 per year. How long will that take? The defense supply chain is strained. Speaker 0: The entire defensive layer is under strain: Patriot PAC-3 MSE interceptors, costing about $4,000,000 each; Lockheed is moving to more than triple capacity, roughly from 600 per year to roughly 2,000 per year. Interceptors are expensive, and ramping production cannot fix the immediate shortfall. Speaker 0: Ukraine aid is enormous in dollar terms—State Department reporting puts military assistance since 2022 at over or close to $70,000,000,000, likely higher. Ukraine has been a grinding logistics war; Iran is turning into a high-end missile and air defense consumption war. Boots on the ground are being considered as necessary; air campaigns alone cannot achieve regime change. 155-millimeter shells production is around 40,150 rounds per month as of 2024–2025, but Ukraine’s consumption is far higher. Mineral shortages also constrain production, prompting the White House to convene the defense industry. Speaker 0: The war plan may be to destroy enough of Iran’s launch capability before magazines run shallow—a brutal last-call scenario. The US is fighting on two tracks: attack and defense, using Tomahawks, B-2 bombers, and 2,000-pound bombs, along with low-cost drones around $35,000 each. The message to Middle East allies is that the US cannot fully protect them as stocks thin. Putin and China are watching, waiting to see if the US can prevent a massive Russian advance or another major theater’s strain. The White House meeting with CEOs reads like a panic flare, not victory, as munitions are consumed faster than they can be replenished. The speaker notes the high death toll on Iran’s side and asks for more transparency on American casualties, while reiterating the commitment to anti-war principles.

Speaker 0, Speaker 1, and Speaker 2 discuss the evolving confrontation between the United States and Iran and its broader economic and strategic implications. Speaker 0 highlights three predictions: (1) Trump would win, (2) he would start a war with Iran, and (3) the US would lose that war, asking if these predictions are still valid. Speaker 1 characterizes the current phase as a war of attrition between the United States and Iran, noting that Iranians have been preparing for twenty years and now possess “a pretty good strategy of how to weaken and ultimately destroy the American empire.” He asserts that Iran is waging war against the global economy by striking Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries and targeting critical energy infrastructure and waterways such as the Baghdad channel and the Hormuz Strait, and eventually water desalination plants, which are vital to Gulf nations. He emphasizes that the Gulf States are the linchpin of the American economy because they sell petrodollars, which are recycled into the American economy through investments, including in the stock market. He claims the American economy is sustained by AI investments in data centers, much of which come from the Gulf States. If the Gulf States cease oil sales and finance AI, he predicts the AI bubble in the United States would burst, collapsing the broader American economy, described as a financial “ponzi scheme.” Speaker 2 notes a concrete example: an Amazon data center was hit in the UAE. He also mentions the United States racing to complete its Iran mission before munitions run out. Speaker 1 expands on the military dynamic, arguing that the United States military is not designed for a twenty-first-century war. He attributes this to the post–World War II military-industrial complex, which was built for the Cold War and its goals of technological superiority. He explains that American military strategy relies on highly sophisticated, expensive technology—the air defense system—leading to an asymmetry in the current conflict: million-dollar missiles attempting to shoot down $50,000 drones. He suggests this gap is unsustainable in the long term and describes it as the puncturing of the aura of invincibility that has sustained American hegemony for the past twenty years.

Professor Michael Hudson and Glenn discuss how the war against Iran is reshaping the global economy and international order. Hudson contends this is World War III in the sense that energy, fertilizer, and oil exports are fundamental to the world economy, and the conflict targets these choke points. He notes a recent US stock market rally of about a thousand points, driven by hopes of reversibility, while insisting the war’s effects extend far beyond Iran and are irreversible. He asserts the US is waging a war to maintain control over the world oil economy by preventing any sovereignty that could export oil outside US influence. This includes sanctions on Iran and Russia, and earlier sanctions on Venezuela, with the aim of ensuring oil proceeds flow to US-controlled channels. He argues the US sought to control the Strait of Hormuz to decide who gets Gulf oil, but Trump’s advisers warned that attempting to seize Hormuz would leave troops as “sitting ducks,” yet the underlying goal remains “grab the oil.” He claims Iran’s objective is to guarantee security by removing all US bases in the Middle East and by relief of sanctions imposed by US allies; without that, Iran claims the world will not return to the previous order. Hudson emphasizes that the war disrupts key supply chains: oil, fertilizer, helium, sulfur, and related inputs. Although Iran allows oil exports via Hormuz for payments, it does not permit fertilizer exports, impacting the upcoming planting season. He forecasts the world entering the most serious depression since the 1930s due to these interruptions and the consequent financial ripples. On the financial system, Hudson explains that since the 2008 crisis, the US pursued zero or near-zero interest rates to rescue banks, enabling asset price inflation in real estate, stocks, and bonds. He describes a shift where non-bank lenders and private equity could borrow cheaply and buy up assets, creating a debt-led, Ponzi-like dynamic that depended on continued access to credit and rising asset prices. As long as rates stayed low, this system could keep rolling; now, with 10-year treasuries around 4.5 percent and 30-year mortgages above 5 percent, the cost of rolling over debt intensifies. The war-induced disruptions to energy and inputs threaten defaults and a feedback loop of debt collapse, catalyzing a depression. Regarding the broader international system, Hudson argues Europe is following sanctions on Russia at great economic cost, with Germany already experiencing GDP declines after energy sanctions in 2022. Europe’s shift away from Russian energy, the Ukraine-Hungary/gas dynamics, and the broader energy choke points threaten the cohesion of NATO and the EU. He predicts Europe may suffer consumer price increases and living standard cuts as deficits expand to subsidize heating and energy, leading to a reordering of alliances and economic blocs. He characterizes Asia–Russia–China as increasingly separate from Western systems, with a shift toward Asia as the growth center and Europe/US lagging. He asserts the West’s operational vocabulary frames the conflict as a clash of civilizations, but the underlying dynamic is a clash of classes, where the US seeks to subordinate others through energy and trade controls. Hudson argues the current trajectory signals not simply a decline but an abrupt systemic change: the end of the postwar Western-led order. He calls for rethinking international institutions and law, including a new framework to replace a discredited United Nations and to organize economic and military arrangements that protect sovereignty outside US-dominated systems. He highlights the need for energy and food self-sufficiency to resist weaponized foreign trade and to avoid being drawn into US-imposed economic chaos. In closing, Hudson points to Britain’s looming non-viability under deindustrialization and limited energy resources, illustrating how advanced economies may struggle to adapt to a new multipolar order.

Professor Richard Wolff discusses the US-Iran situation framed as a memorandum of understanding rather than a peace agreement, arguing that it represents a tactical retreat by Washington after misjudging its capabilities and overreaching. He says the underlying drive toward overreach will persist and that the Middle East/Western Asia remains an open arena—especially if Israeli leadership shifts in Lebanon or if Bennett’s approach to Turkey continues, with implications for Turkey’s ties to NATO, Russia, and the United States. Wolff also argues that American media and centrist Democrats would not reduce support for Israel or European stances on Ukraine if Democrats win in November, and that international alignments already reflect that pattern. On economic consequences, Wolff argues Iran “won” regardless of what the memorandum says, while emphasizing uncertainty in oil and gas markets, strategic petroleum reserve depletion, and how long prices might remain lower even if they fall. He frames these outcomes as evidence of a declining American empire whose deterioration shapes where and when overreach happens, producing devastating consequences. He adds that many voices do not yet connect declining-empire dynamics to current events. A major “momentous consequence,” Wolff says, is the Strait of Hormuz shifting from US authority to Iranian management via a fee rather than a toll, with the fee described as covering costs such as navigation assistance, safety infrastructure, safe and rescue, and environmental issues. He characterizes this as a validation of “declining empire” logic and a change of management from the United States as the authority in fact to Iran as the authority in fact, with Iranian oversight and missile deterrence described as extending throughout the strait. Wolff says US control can still be challenged through actions such as reimposing blockades or bombing again, and he notes that headlines about potential renewed bombing exist. He links the result to broader security turmoil for Israel, Gulf states, and Europe. Wolff further argues that European Russophobia functions politically to deflect anxieties and justify political and economic adjustments, describing an internal European squeeze between the United States and China. He characterizes European political leadership as using Russia as a “usual suspect” while responding to urgent demands for government support from business, including energy-cost relief and shifts in welfare-state spending. He suggests the United States is “throwing up disasters” as it crashes downward in its historical trajectory, including misjudging Iran and distancing from allies. In discussing global ramifications, Wolff shifts to an economic lens: he portrays China as a “bemused spectator” focused on growth, avoiding being bombed, building military capacity, and benefiting from BRICS alignment. He says Iran’s BRICS membership contributed to support from Russia and China and changes the balance between BRICS and the G7, predicting that Gulf and Asian states that hesitated about BRICS will hesitate less. He describes the event as another indication that countries like Iran and Saudi Arabia are already in BRICS, Turkey may join, and questions remain about Turkey’s relationship to NATO. Wolff also argues that within the United States, support for Israel has shifted: he claims Israel lost the majority of American people, citing lobbying power and political alignment as weaker than during his lifetime. He gives an example from New York City, where a Muslim socialist mayoral candidate reportedly said he would arrest Benjamin Netanyahu if Netanyahu comes to New York, and where, Wolff says, the majority voted for him. He connects this to broader questioning of capitalism and the decline of the empire pulling down the economic system expressed through it. When asked “where this is all going,” Wolff says China will likely be the major player deciding whether the next phase becomes a Chinese empire or some form of genuine multilateral order beyond empire logic. He compares the risk to how empires provoke revolutions against them, and he calls for domestic economic arrangements that can support multilateral working-out rather than war-driven national-state competition. He argues capitalism’s dynamics and internal wealth concentration drive great-power conflict outcomes, linking imperial overreach and decline to economic structure. As a final thought, Wolff ties the empire question to democratic legitimacy and wealth concentration, citing Felix Frankfurter’s statement that great concentrations of wealth cannot coexist with democracy. He describes the United States as having extreme inequality and a government “bought and paid for,” and he uses Israel as an example: he claims US funding for Israel, Israel funding AIPAC, and AIPAC buying the government that funds Israel. He concludes that handling capitalism’s dynamic is central to how the world’s great-power trajectory—especially China’s—turns out, suggesting internal economic management will determine whether China avoids the “evolutionary dead end” he attributes to the United States.

Larry Johnson, a former CIA analyst and State Department counterterrorism official, discusses the ceasefire and the possibility of renewed war between the United States and Iran, arguing that U.S. military options are constrained while Iran’s readiness and ability to disrupt regional logistics have increased. Johnson says the United States has been prepared to launch strikes for about six weeks since the ceasefire declaration around April 15, but that its remaining operational flexibility is limited by Gulf state access. He emphasizes that Saudi Arabia has not allowed U.S. air operations from Saudi territory. He describes an episode in which, after Trump announced “project freedom” to open the Strait of Hormuz, Saudi leadership shut down the ability to conduct air operations from its territory, even after Trump spoke with Mohammed bin Salman. With Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Kuwait affected, Johnson leaves Bahrain out due to its size and says it has been “decimated” by Iranian airstrikes. He also links timing to major religious and diplomatic periods, saying that with the Hajj beginning on Sunday and Eid occurring about next Wednesday or Thursday, Saudi Arabia does not want to be positioned as a target during those activities. He argues that Iran has rearmed faster than U.S. intelligence expected and that Iran can use multilayered air defense and missile capabilities to threaten any entering ships. Johnson highlights a U.S. constraint: U.S. air refueling operations have been largely confined to Iraq airspace, which he says creates additional risk and also forces attacks through narrower routes rather than across wider fronts. He suggests this narrowed channel makes it easier for Iran’s air defense to concentrate. He also cites testimony by Admiral Daryl Caudle, who said the U.S. lacks the capability to open the Strait of Hormuz due to cost and risk, and says Iran’s arsenal can be brought to bear against ships that enter the strait. He further claims the CIA briefings to Congress align more closely with Iran’s increased capabilities since the ceasefire than with Trump administration claims. Johnson connects this situation to negotiations. He says reported negotiations are taking place in Tehran and Islamabad and that Pakistan has stepped up with backing from China and Russia. He suggests a possible deal may not necessarily involve the United States if Gulf states and Iran agree, potentially including Turkey and possibly Egypt, in a broader security arrangement. He argues that if Gulf states shut down U.S. operations on their territory, the United States would have limited options, including for sustained air campaigns. Johnson also proposes a possible window before the World Cup begins, saying he does not see renewed action before the first two weeks of June, with international pressure expected once the World Cup starts. On the substance of talks, Johnson portrays Iran’s negotiating positions as: sanctions relief “up front,” return of frozen assets, and continuing to charge ships entering or leaving the Persian Gulf to comply with rules implemented by the Persian Gulf Strait Authority (PGSA). He says nuclear issues are being framed by Iran as a “red herring,” and he cites a claim attributed to Moshe Saba Khamenei (the new Ayatollah) that nuclear material is not even on the table. Johnson also asserts Iran has signed the NPT and allowed IAEA inspections, and he describes Iran as having faced persistent attacks including the “murdering of nuclear scientists,” using this to explain why Iran would assert sovereignty rather than comply with demands he says are being made. In response to a question about how war could happen if the Strait of Hormuz cannot be opened, Johnson reiterates U.S. capability concerns and says Iran’s ability to disrupt logistics remains a central factor. He also argues that markets are reacting in a way he describes as abnormal: over day 84 since the war began and day 22 of a “complete cutoff,” he lists reductions affecting “20% of the world’s oil,” “10% of the world’s access to liquid natural gas,” “35% of the world’s urea,” “30% of the world’s sulfur,” and “44% of the world’s helium.” He claims the U.S. is emptying its strategic reserves and selling them overseas, calling it a “charade,” and says economic effects are likely delayed and could translate into recession or depression, with shortages becoming more apparent later. Johnson argues that Russia and China are pushing an inclusive Persian Gulf security architecture rather than an alliance system aimed at containing Iran, and he says Iran could be pragmatic and flexible on concessions with Gulf states for ship passage in exchange for broader security guarantees. He suggests the most likely outcome is ongoing negotiations producing partial progress rather than an abrupt halt, especially if Saudi refusal to allow unfettered U.S. air operations continues to limit U.S. sustainment. Finally, Johnson ties the likelihood of further U.S. strikes to economic constraints, saying he cannot conceive of strikes strengthening the world economy or the U.S. financial position, and that further escalation would have the opposite effect. He also predicts that by around the end of June the United States will suffer greater economic consequences. He ends by saying the economic situation will ultimately determine whether military strikes continue, and that there are real obstacles preventing a straightforward transition back to major attacks, while pressures for renewed action remain.

Colonel Douglas MacGregor discusses the escalating tensions over Iran and the possibility of drastic military action. He notes that President Trump says the deadline for Iran to open the Strait of Hormuz and negotiate a ceasefire is tomorrow, and that if they don’t, “the entire country will be taken out in one night,” raising questions about whether a nuclear weapon is at the ready. The discussion suggests that Trump’s line may be hyperbolic, with Speaker 1 positing that a nuclear weapon is unlikely and that conventional methods or power-grid disruption could be used to “take out the entire country” without permanently ending the war. He invokes George Kennan’s view on nuclear weapons and argues the goal is not to wage a nuclear exchange but to disrupt Iran’s energy infrastructure; he questions whether such measures would be permanent or decisive. The conversation shifts to censorship and satellite imagery. Speaker 2 reports that Planet Labs received a U.S. request to blackout images in and around Iran dating back to March 6, possibly earlier, with threats of sanctions if companies don’t comply. The panel discusses how to verify reality amid conflicting signals. The panel turns to a tactical assessment of potential actions around the Strait of Hormuz. Speaker 1 predicts Trump would pursue a coordinated air force and naval air strikes aimed at destroying petrochemical plants and energy infrastructure to deprive the government of power, though he doubts this would alter the strategic outcome given Iran’s continental capacity and ISR (intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance) capabilities. He explains Iran’s ability to use satellites and strike systems to counter, and notes Iran’s large force structure within the country. He warns that even if power is disrupted, Iran can respond and that the Gulf states would be affected due to a loss of energy and desalination capacity, potentially threatening regional stability and the Gulf’s populations. The discussion broadens to regional dynamics and Israel. Speaker 2 cites Trump’s remark about scrapping the Obama-era Iran nuclear deal to prioritize Israel, suggesting this shift contributed to the current conflict. Speaker 1 argues the global economy could enter a depression, highlighting how energy, plastics, fertilizer, and feedstock shortages would ripple through the Global South, Japan, Korea, and Europe as energy prices rise and supply chains falter. He asserts that oil is a global commodity and that a price rise worldwide is likely; he predicts a stock market crash and a long-term energy system rebuild. The hosts pivot to financial consequences and media appeals, with Speaker 0 promoting gold and silver investments through Lear Capital, citing Ed Dowd’s view on panic buying and shortages of fertilizer and energy, and predicting higher prices. The discussion notes a claim that about $42 billion has been spent on the conflict so far, with spending accelerating. On leadership and assessment of U.S. strategy, Speaker 1 raises concerns about President Trump’s current mental acuity and notes that some U.S. leaders are calling for a 60-day limit on hostilities without a formal declaration of war. He argues that Israel’s aims dominate the U.S. stance, complicating potential compromises with Iran and wider regional settlements. He asserts Israel seeks to expand its influence and dominance in the region, which undermines potential settlements and constrains U.S. options. In Israel, Speaker 1 explains that Hezbollah is not out of action and has launched rockets into Northern Israel; Israeli public unrest and evacuation patterns hint at severe internal strain. He contends that Israel relies heavily on U.S. support, which could be leveraged for broader regional aims, but may be unsustainable given regional opposition to Israel’s expansion. He suggests Arab populations and governing elites in the Gulf and Egypt grow discontent with Western-backed leadership. Finally, the panel probes the potential use of ground forces and the plausibility of a doomsday scenario, with Speaker 1 arguing that a large, sustained ground operation in the Gulf is unlikely to change the outcome without comprehensive disruption of Iranian strike systems and satellite networks. He emphasizes that a nuclear option would be catastrophic, and expresses concern about Israeli actions and regional reactions, including possible involvement by Russia, China, and other powers. Colonel MacGregor closes by pointing readers to his Substack for ongoing strategic analysis and reiterates the anticipated economic and geopolitical upheaval from the conflict.

Speaker 0: We also saw a US battleship today that had to be turned around because of the Houthis essentially, and had to be redirected out of that range to go all the way around out of the Red Sea. Like, we can't even deal with the Houthis, and we think we're gonna somehow puncture through the Strait Of Hormuz. Anyway, what do you see happening next after this pause? Speaker 1: Yeah. That that was the the George W. Bush, which is coming to replace the the the Right. Ford, the USS Ford. And instead of just going through the normal, I think it's the Suez Canal down into the Red Sea like the normal shorter path, we went all the way around Africa because we were worried that the Houthis may take it under attack. And if you get in the Red Sea there, I mean, could be like a shooting gallery as would be the case if we actually went into the Strait Of Hormuz with our ships not during a ceasefire. They would be at risk of being hit by any number of different, ammunition and weapon systems that the Iranians have. So that does show that we are despite what words we use, we're aware of the limits of our power, and we don't wanna put ourselves in a position to get into having some of our, especially flagships sunk or or flames and getting burned up in, you know, in the waterways there. But that also tells you that there's a reason why the Strait Of Hormuz is still closed and is still controlled by the uranium side of any oil we want to get out because we can't compel them to do it. And so if you start firing back again, it's not gonna change that. So the straight will stay closed, and the the the fertilizers will still not be able to get out. The helium will not be able to get out. So that means the chip making in Asia is gonna start to really suffer. And the whole supply chain issue all around the world with our whole global economy is gonna start falling apart. All this because we will not exceed to reality and that this is a war that is militarily unwinnable. It should never have been fought and needs to be gotten off the table quickly, but because president Trump has too much pride and can't accept that he can't do something, and he's been surrounded by people like Stephen Miller yesterday who just keeps saying, yeah. We can do everything just like in Venezuela even though there's no comparison between the two situations here. But they think there is, and they're telling president Trump it's similar because we can do whatever we wanna do. That's what Stephen Miller said. And if Trump is listening to that, he may believe it and be making policy decisions based on it, but it's not true no matter how much Stephen Miller says that it is, and we're gonna find out if we keep going down this path.

Speaker 0 outlines two impending “economic superstorms” and argues that the ordinary American is unprepared for either. First, an energy crisis framed as a supply chain collapse driven by shortages of helium, sulfur, polyethylene, hydrocarbons, and natural gas, all tied to what he characterizes as a “war of choice against Iran.” He predicts this will not be the end of the world but will imperil wealth, savings, and assets, as people face dramatically higher costs for food, fuel, and transportation, potentially pushing many into bankruptcy and homelessness. He describes this as an economic mass casualty event for Western civilization. Second, he identifies an AI-driven employment crisis. He asserts AI “works amazingly well” when using Chinese open-source models, citing personal examples of building a complex applications stack with AI and claiming that many people are misled by narratives that AI is ineffective. He argues globalists are purposely nerfing U.S. AI models, while Chinese models (notably DeepSeek version four) are advancing, along with others like Kemi K2 2.6 and Quen’s various models, including a small 27 billion-dense model that performs well on modest hardware. He contends US corporations are relying on Chinese open-source models for job replacement, including customer service roles. According to him, automation is already displacing thousands to hundreds of thousands of jobs, including coding work, with major tech employers like Oracle and Amazon reportedly laying off tens of thousands. He claims recent graduates, even from Harvard, Stanford, or MIT, struggle to find employment, with only a fraction of graduates landing jobs by graduation. He describes a future in which many high-paying jobs vanish due to AI, and where people must contend with rising costs (oil at over $120 per barrel, with expectations of further increases due to ongoing tensions) while incomes fall. He argues this convergence of energy/cost shocks and AI-driven unemployment will hit in tandem, collapsing living standards for many “middle class” Americans and creating a broader social and economic squeeze. He suggests that this is being engineered to push people toward poverty and a government CBDC (potentially linked to universal basic income) in exchange for biometrics and privacy concessions, framed as a step toward depopulation and control, rather than a mere economic adjustment. He claims the narratives of inflation and calm are designed to keep people passive while they are targeted for extermination. For preparation, he advocates decentralization and mentions general mitigation strategies, contrasting his view with conventional assurances. He emphasizes that AI represents a new form of control for governments and that robots, unlike humans, do not protest or demand free speech, suggesting a shift toward an automated governance framework. Throughout, he juxtaposes impending energy and AI-driven disruptions with a broad distrust of governmental and globalist motives, portraying the situation as both imminent and deliberate. He closes by promoting the importance of being prepared and aware of what he frames as the engineered nature of current narratives and obstacles.

Larry Johnson, a former CIA analyst, joins the program to discuss the dramatic developments in the war against Iran. The conversation centers on the strike on Karg Island, the strategic choke point for Iran’s oil exports, and the broader implications of escalating U.S. actions. - Karg Island and the oil threat: The host notes that Karg Island handles 90% of Iran’s oil exports and asks why Trump isn’t targeting this area. Johnson argues the attack on Karg Island makes little strategic sense and points out that Iran has five oil terminals; destroying one would not end Iran’s potential revenue. He emphasizes that the U.S. bombed the runway of the major airport on the island, which he says remains irrelevant to Iran’s overall capacity to generate revenue. He notes the runway damage would not support U.S. objectives for invading the island, given runway length constraints (6,000 feet measured vs. need for 3,500–3,700 feet for certain aircraft) and the limited air force in Iran. Johnson asserts that Iran has indicated it would retaliate against oil terminals and Gulf neighbors if oil resources or energy infrastructure are attacked. - Economic and strategic consequences of closing the Strait of Hormuz: Johnson states that the action effectively shut the Strait of Hormuz, cutting off 20% of the world’s oil supply, 25% of global LNG, and 35% of the world’s urea for fertilizer. He explains fertilizer’s criticality to global agriculture and notes that rising gas and diesel prices in the United States would impact consumer costs, given many Americans live paycheck to paycheck. He suggests the price hikes contribute to inflationary pressure and could trigger a global recession, especially since Persian Gulf countries are pivotal energy suppliers. He also points out that the U.S. cannot easily reopen Hormuz without unacceptable losses and that Iran has prepared for contingencies for thirty years, with robust defenses including tunnels and coastal fortifications. - Military feasibility and strategy: The discussion covers the impracticality of a U.S. ground invasion of Iran, given the size of Iran’s army and the modern battlefield’s drone and missile threats. Johnson notes the U.S. Army and Marine numbers, the logistical challenges of sustaining an amphibious or airborne assault, and the vulnerability of American ships and troops to drones and missiles. He highlights that a mass deployment would be highly costly and dangerous, with historical evidence showing air power alone cannot win wars. The hosts discuss limited U.S. options and the possible futility of attempts to seize or occupy Iran’s territory. - Internal U.S. decision-making and DC dynamics: The program mentions a split inside Washington between anti-war voices and those pressing toward Tehran, with leaks suggesting that top officials warned Trump about major obstacles and potential losses. Johnson cites a leak from the National Intelligence Council indicating regime change in Tehran is unlikely, even with significant U.S. effort. He asserts the Pentagon’s credibility has been questioned after disputed reports (e.g., the KC-135 shootdown) and notes that Trump’s advisors who counsel restraint are being sidelined. - Iranian retaliation and targets: The discussion covers Iran’s targeting of air defenses and critical infrastructure, including radars at embassies and bases in the region, and the destruction of five Saudi air refueling tankers, which Trump later dismissed as fake news. Johnson says Iran aims to degrade Israel economically and militarily, while carefully avoiding mass civilian casualties in some instances. He observes Iran’s restraint in striking desalination plants, which would have caused a humanitarian catastrophe, suggesting a deliberate choice to keep certain targets within bounds. - Global realignments and the role of Russia, China, and India: The conversation touches on broader geopolitical shifts. Johnson argues that Russia and China are offering alternatives to the dollar-dominated order, strengthening ties with Gulf states and BRICS members. He suggests Gulf allies may be considering decoupling from U.S. security guarantees, seeking to diversify away from the petrodollar system. The discussion includes India’s position, noting Modi’s visit to Israel and India’s balancing act amid U.S. pressure and Iran relations; Iran’s ultimatum to allow passage for flag vessels and its diplomacy toward India is highlighted as a measured approach, even as India’s stance has attracted scrutiny. - Israel, casualties, and the broader landscape: The speakers discuss Israeli casualties and infrastructure under sustained Iranian strikes, noting limited information from within Israel due to media constraints and possible censorship. Johnson presents a game-theory view: if Israel threatens a nuclear option, Iran might be compelled to develop a nuclear capability as a deterrent, altering calculations for both Israel and the United States. - Terrorism narrative and historical context: The speakers challenge the U.S. portrayal of Iran as the world’s top sponsor of terrorism, arguing that ISIS and the Taliban have caused far more deaths in recent years, and that Iran’s responses to threats have historically prioritized restraint. They emphasize Iran’s chemical weapons restraint during the Iran-Iraq war, contrasting it with U.S. and Iraqi actions in the 1980s. - Final reflections: The discussion emphasizes the cascade effects of the conflict, including potential impacts on Taiwan’s energy and semiconductor production, multiplied by China’s leverage, and Russia’s increasing global influence. Johnson warns that the war’s end will likely be achieved through shifting alignments and economic realignments rather than a conventional battlefield victory, with the goal of U.S. withdrawal from the region as part of any settlement. The conversation closes with mutual thanks and a reaffirmation of ongoing analysis of these evolving dynamics.