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Europe should have been negotiating with Russia, but now that Trump is, some are in an uproar. If the US stops sending arms and funding, the war will end. This all stems from American arrogance, going back decades to the US declaring itself the sole superpower and expanding NATO eastward, ignoring Russian concerns. The US participated in a violent coup in Ukraine in 2014, further escalating tensions. Europe needs a grown-up foreign policy, not one based on hate speech or Russophobia, but real diplomacy. NATO should have been disbanded in 1991. The US sees this as a game, but for Russia, it's about core national security.

The panelists discuss whether recent developments around Ukraine, NATO security guarantees, and Western support can produce a peace agreement acceptable to Russia and Ukraine, and what the war’s trajectory might look like by year-end and beyond. Initial reactions and sticking points - Speaker 1 sees potential in recent moves if true and reliable, arguing Ukraine is signaling goodwill to the United States, but remains skeptical that a peace deal will satisfy both sides given core demands over territory and Donbas control. He emphasizes the Donbas as the central unresolved issue. - Speaker 2 notes Putin’s need to show tangible gains to save face, arguing the war is being fought to achieve declared goals and that Russia will not sign a deal unless it secures substantial results. Security guarantees, no-fly zones, and peacekeeping - The discussion centers on two main proposed points: U.S. security guarantees (including possible no-fly zone enforcement) and a European-led peacekeeping force in Ukraine. There is debate about how binding such guarantees would be and whether Russia would accept them, with concerns about the Budapest Memorandum’s history of non-fulfillment versus what a new, more comprehensive, legally binding framework might look like. - Speaker 1 points out that even a robust security package would require Russian agreement, which he doubts will be forthcoming given Moscow’s current aims. He underscores that Europe’s and the U.S.’s support for Ukraine is contingent on political will, which could waver, but he notes Ukraine’s trust gap with U.S. guarantees given past experiences. - Speaker 2 stresses that Putin’s aims include defeating NATO and achieving a U.S.-level accommodation (a “Yalta 2.0” style deal) while keeping Western control over Europe at arm’s length. He argues Putin would accept U.S. and possibly some European troops but not a formal NATO presence on Ukrainian soil, especially in western Donbas or beyond. Budapest memorandum vs. new guarantees - Both sides discuss the difference between a nonbinding Budapest Memorandum and a more robust, legally binding security guarantee. Speaker 1 highlights Ukraine’s past trust in security assurances despite U.S. and European failures to honor them, suggesting skepticism about the enforceability of any new guarantees. Speaker 2 suggests that a stronger, more binding arrangement could be essential for Russia to accept any settlement, but that Moscow would still resist concessions over full Donbas control. On-the-ground realities and war dynamics - The panelists agree Russia is advancing on multiple fronts, though the pace and strategic significance of gains vary. They discuss Ukraine’s ability to sustain the fight through Western weapons flows and domestic production (including drones and shells). They acknowledge the risk of Western fatigue and the potential for a more protracted war, even as Ukraine builds its own capabilities to prolong the conflict. - The West’s long-term willingness to fund and arm Ukraine is debated: Speaker 1 argues Europe’s economy is strained but notes continued political support for Ukraine, which could outlast Russia’s economic stamina. Speaker 2 emphasizes that Russia’s economy is fragile mainly in the provinces, while Moscow and Saint Petersburg remain relatively insulated; he also points to BRICS support (China and India) as sustaining Moscow politically and economically. Economic and strategic pressures - The role of energy revenues and sanctions is debated. Speaker 1 suggests Russia can be pressured economically to seek a deal, while Speaker 2 counters that Russia’s economy is adapting, with China and India providing strategic support that helps Moscow resist Western coercion. They discuss shadow fleet strikes and global energy markets as tools to erode Russia’s war-finance capability. - There is disagreement about whether, over time, economic pressure alone could force regime change in Russia. Speaker 1 is skeptical that penalties will trigger a voluntary Russian withdrawal, while Speaker 2 argues that sustained economic and political pressure, combined with Western unity, could push toward a settlement. Strategies and potential outcomes - Putin’s internal calculus is described as existential: he seeks a win that he can publicly claim to legitimize his rule and justify the costs of the war to the Russian people and elites. This shapes his openness to concessions and to the kinds of guarantees he would accept. - Alexander posits that a near-term peace could emerge from a deal brokered at high levels (potentially involving Trump and Putin) that reshapes European security with U.S. leadership and BRICS engagement, while Paul emphasizes that any credible end to the conflict would require Ukraine and Russia to agree to a swap-like territorial arrangement and to accept a new security framework that deters renewed aggression. End-of-year and longer-term outlooks - By year-end, the panel agrees it is unlikely that a major peace agreement will be realized under the current conditions; any real breakthrough would depend on significant concessions, including Donbas arrangements, and a credible security guarantee framework. - By the end of next year, both expect a continuation of a contested balance: Ukraine likely to press for stronger Western guarantees and EU integration, Russia seeking to preserve Donbas gains while navigating internal and external pressures. Alexander envisions two “wins” emerging: the United States under Trump coordinating a broader peace framework, and China leveraging its economic influence to shape Europe’s response. Paul anticipates a gradual trajectory with ongoing military and economic pressures and a continued stalemate unless a major concession reshapes incentives on both sides.

John Mersheimer argues that the war against Iran is not proceeding as the United States hoped and that there is no plausible off-ramp or decisive pathway to victory. He contends that Washington cannot narrate a decisive end to the conflict the way it could have against Nazi Germany or Imperial Japan, because the war has not produced a decisive Iranian collapse. Instead, Iran has an incentive to convert the fight into a protracted war of attrition and possesses the means to do so, including a broad set of missiles and drones and the ability to retaliate across the region. The result, he says, is a stalemate in which Iran would drive a hard bargain to secure sanctions relief or other concessions, and escalation by the U.S. and Israel will simply provoke Iran to escalate further. On why Iran will not settle on American terms, Mersheimer emphasizes that Iran has a strong hand and time on its side. He notes that the more time passes, the more desperate the U.S. will be to settle, which strengthens Iran’s position. He argues that even heavy bombardment would not compel Iran to quit; rather, Iran could strike back against Gulf states, Israel, and American assets with significant effect. The Gulf States are particularly vulnerable due to a small number of petroleum sites, short-range missiles, drones, and, crucially, desalination plants that provide most of their fresh water. He cites Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Oman as heavily dependent on desalination, implying that destroying such infrastructure would have catastrophic humanitarian and economic consequences. Iran could also target energy infrastructure, and even if the Strait of Hormuz remains open, widespread damage to Gulf energy infrastructure would devastate the regional and global economy. He warns that Israel could suffer increasing Iranian pressure as time goes on, especially as interceptors become depleted. Regarding energy and the Strait of Hormuz, Mersheimer stresses that 20% of the world’s oil and gas passes through the Persian Gulf, making the energy dimension the war’s most consequential aspect. He argues that opening the Strait of Hormuz would be exceedingly difficult, and destroying desalination and petroleum infrastructure in the Gulf States would negate any advantage of keeping the straits open. He suggests that escalation without a viable endgame will have grave economic repercussions for the world, pushing the U.S. toward a coerced end that would not be a victory. Mersheimer contends that strategic bombing or air power alone cannot win such wars. He contrasts World War II and Korea/Vietnam with the present, where there are no boots on the ground and no clear path to victory via air power alone. He notes that the deterrent value of air power is limited, and a regime change strategy is notoriously difficult without ground forces. He argues that the decapitation strategy and ongoing escalations are unlikely to produce a decisive American/Israeli victory, and could instead lead to a stalemate or American concession under economic strain. On leadership and credibility, Mersheimer critiques U.S. leadership, particularly President Trump, for ignoring warning from generals and the National Intelligence Council that regime change was unlikely to succeed. He cites General James Mattis-era warnings that there was no viable military option and notes the pre-war intelligence that suggested limited prospects for quick regime change. He points to Trump’s sometimes contradictory and inaccurate statements about Iranian capabilities, including claims that Iran possessed Tomahawk missiles and that U.S. strikes had erased Iran’s nuclear capability. He argues that such statements undermine U.S. credibility, though he distinguishes between outright lies and genuine mistaken beliefs by leaders. The discussion also covers Russia’s involvement, with Russia believed to be providing intelligence to Iran and possibly supplying matériel and oil if needed. Mersheimer asserts that the war benefits Russia strategically: it diverts U.S. resources from Europe and Ukraine, potentially worsens Ukraine’s trajectory, and could raise global energy prices that benefit Russian revenue. He suggests that Russia, and possibly China, have strong incentives to aid Iran to counter American power. Europe’s role is analyzed as largely symbolic or marginal in determining the war’s outcome. Mersheimer argues that European elites are aligned with the U.S., prioritizing NATO continuity and the maintenance of American military presence, despite the damaging consequences for Europe. He suggests a radical approach for Europe: adopt a hardball stance toward the U.S., diversify its economic and strategic relations (including with China, Russia, and India), and resist being economically manipulated or coerced by Washington. He emphasizes that Europe’s interests would be better served by reducing overreliance on the United States and pursuing a more balanced set of strategic partners. Towards the end, the hosts revisit the idea that leaders lie and that liberal democracies tend to rely more on public persuasion and propaganda, with Trump’s statements illustrating the complexities of truth in international politics. The conversation ends with a reflection on whether Europe should recalibrate its posture toward the United States and broaden its strategic hedges to protect its own interests, rather than assuming continued U.S. leadership in a costly and protracted confrontation with Iran.

Ian Proud argues that while ending the war and accelerating Ukraine’s EU membership are important, there is a missing focus on the future relationship with Russia and a broader, Pan-European security framework. He notes that Europe is already experiencing economic decline as energy policy shifts away from cheap Russian energy toward more expensive sources, which he says contributes to factory closures and cost-of-living pressures. He warns that simply ending the war or admitting Ukraine into the EU could result in a hostile, “anti-Russia” posture within Europe, unless the long-term security architecture is reset. He emphasizes two key consequences of the Ukraine crisis since 2014: (1) Europe’s energy and economic policies are driving a decline, partly due to cutting off cheap energy from Russia; (2) focusing only on ending the war and integrating Ukraine into Europe risks creating a new, hostile dynamic with Russia if the relationship is not normalized. Without addressing the future Russia-Europe relationship, he suggests Europe could end up with a remilitarized Europe and higher defense spending, while postponing a durable settlement. Regarding peace negotiations, Proud argues for a treaty-based, comprehensive approach to pan-European security rather than only ceasefire promises. He contends that peace cannot be achieved by refusing to discuss Russia’s security concerns or by treating Ukraine’s EU accession as a standalone solution. He traces a long history of failed attempts at a broader European security architecture—from Helsinki Accords to the OSCE and the 2005 Common Space—showing that NATO expansion and Western reluctance to embrace a wider security framework undermined these efforts. He asserts that “the red line” on Ukraine’s status was drawn too late and that a durable peace requires a broader security settlement that includes Russia and the European Union, not just NATO. If advising Putin, Proud suggests pushing for a broader, treaty-based agreement on future pan-European security, rather than accepting merely tacit assurances or expanding NATO. He argues that Ukraine’s EU membership could become “NATO light,” potentially achieving the same military posture as a formal alliance but under EU institutions, thus reinforcing Moscow’s concerns. He calls for a comprehensive accord that reorganizes European security within a broader framework—reinstating indivisible security, sovereign equality, and an integrated approach to security that encompasses Russia, the EU, and potentially broader Eurasian arrangements. He warns that without such a deal, the conflict risks a prolonged stalemate and a dangerous re-escalation. Proud notes that the atmosphere around diplomacy is terribly toxic, with Western leaders and institutions increasingly sidelining Russia from formal talks. He criticizes the Munich Security Conference for excluding Russia from diplomacy and laments the overemphasis on military solutions and the symbolic, sometimes confrontational rhetoric by European leaders (for example, chancellor statements about arming Europe and projecting suffering onto Russia). He argues that Europe’s foreign policy today is driven by a single objective—defeating Russia—and that this approach has left Europe economically and strategically paralyzed. Towards the end, Proud cautions that post-war Europe will face a transition to a multipolar world, where the United States will shift priorities toward Asia and the Western Hemisphere. He questions Europe’s readiness to engage in a multipolar order and stresses the need for Europe to reestablish normal relations with Russia to avoid a new Berlin Wall-like division. He also critiques the perception of Ukraine’s resilience and Zelensky’s role, suggesting that Europe should develop its own foreign policy vision rather than being dominated by Kyiv’s stance. Overall, the dialogue centers on the necessity of a broad, treaty-based security framework for Europe that includes Russia and the EU, a genuine normalization of relations, and diplomacy that moves beyond ceasefires and symbolic gestures to a lasting peace architecture.

Scott Ritter discusses the widening role of European drones in the Ukraine conflict and the potential Russian response. He argues that Russia is aiming to elevate the conflict this year and may prepare a summer offensive, moving from shadow policy to official action. He contends Europe is acting as an active participant by supplying drones and intelligence to strike Russia’s depth, calling it an act of war and warning that there will be consequences if it continues. He believes a decisive Russian strike could deter Europe and force a reckoning about European military capability and funding, suggesting that a single, devastating blow to the identified target set could end Europe’s ability to support Ukraine’s drone war. The conversation then moves to potential targets for a Russian strike. Ritter rejects the idea of token “warning strikes,” arguing that Russia should strike decisively to obliterate the targeted systems and demonstrate that it can alter the strategic balance. He posits that a large strike against not only the Baltic states and Finland but also Germany could occur, and contemplates the U.S. response, noting that NATO’s Article 5 may not be triggered since the actions are by individual European nations rather than a collective NATO decision on drones. He predicts that under a Trump administration, the U.S. might withdraw support if Europe provokes a broader conflict, which could hasten NATO’s demise. He asserts that a decisive summer offensive by Russia could bring Donbas under its control and escalate implications for European security and U.S. commitment. On the Ukraine battlefield, Ritter cites indicators of a spring Russian offensive, with front preparation, control of critical terrain, and attrition of Ukrainian forces through well-planned cause-and-effect operations. He notes Ukraine has exhausted its reserves and that if Russia seizes Sloviansk and Popasna, much of Donbas could fall. He also comments on Hungary’s elections and their impact, dismissing the significance of Hungary’s influence on European or Ukrainian battlefield outcomes, arguing that the €90 billion aid package does not resolve Europe’s structural problems and may not significantly strengthen Ukraine. Ritter discusses the wider geopolitical consequences, including the Iran situation and its economic impact on Europe, arguing that European energy security has deteriorated and that NATO’s unity is strained. He claims the U.S. is abandoning NATO in practice, and Europe is left with insufficient defense capabilities. He also questions whether the U.S. would sustain a renewed conflict with Iran, arguing the risk of a large-scale war would be economically devastating for both continents and would likely push Europe toward peace negotiations with Russia and Iran. Regarding China, Ritter contends the U.S. rhetoric on sanctioning Chinese energy flows has had little practical effect, as China continues to source Iranian oil and resist U.S. pressure. He emphasizes that China views energy security as vital to its economy and will respond prudently, maintaining that American posturing has not restricted Chinese energy imports. Finally, Ritter suggests negotiations continue intermittently with Iran and Russia, with Islamabad’s technical teams working toward a final peace agreement and Trump seeking a narrative of victory through a peace deal. He asserts that Russia may have a strategic window to secure a settlement, with Trump wanting to present himself as pivotal in achieving peace. He concludes that the conflict could be moving toward a Russian advantage as Iran’s war and European economic strain ripple through.

Glenn: Welcome back. Stanislav Krappivnik, a former US military officer, born in Dolbaz and recently returned, joins us again. Stanislav: Always a pleasure, Glenn. Glenn: In the last two days, Russians entered the strategic city of Orekhov in the Saporiyansko region, which may indicate that if this falls, the whole region might begin to collapse. In Slaviansk, the last Donetsk conglomeration, there are real advances that, if successful in circling the region, could mean the entirety of Donbas falls. Is the Russian spring offensive already begun? Stanislav: It’s hard to say, partly because mud season is ongoing in those areas. The South is still mud-prone; the terrain there is different from Haryakov and Sudirmy, where ground is firmer, forested. In the South, there’s black earth with fewer trees, causing severe mud this time of year. If the melt is fast, flooding can occur; if slow, the ground acts like a sponge and mud persists as water seeps down. Nightly freezes persist while daytime temperatures rise above zero. Weather affects movement and logistics. He notes that the briefings from the Russian command vary from independent mappers, suggesting either undisclosed advances or battlefield confusion. The Russian high command’s reports and geolocations may not always align with independent assessments. If credible, Russia’s forces from the South may have entered Ariakhov, with two parallel rows advancing toward Ariyakara and a long urban sprawl to the south. There is a gray zone because Ukrainian claims differ from Russian assertions. Ukrainians often withhold confirmations for long periods; e.g., Gudaiipoya/Gulyaporiya discrepancies show how contested reports can be. Stanislav says it’s not clear that this is a bold, continuous offensive up and down the lines. A big push would require enough armored vehicles, artillery, and aviation, which he has not seen yet, though it could be developing. Ukrainians have conducted desperate counteractions not just to retake territory but to disrupt Russian preparation for a potential spring offensive. If he were in command, he would launch a big spring offensive, at least partially toward Sumy, which is about 14 kilometers from Kharkiv. Sumy would be a key logistics hub and could cut off Kharkiv from the west, accelerating the fall of the region. He explains that Kharkiv could be surrounded by blowing bridges from the south and encircling through Sumy to the west and the east along the Russian line toward Bianka and the Big Water Reserve. He mentions continuing Russian movement in the north and the city of Kasatirivka, which has been split by a river; all bridges were blown about a month ago, complicating approaches. North of Slaviansk, the gates of Krasnyomar require closing first. There are contested claims about Yaman, with Russians saying around 50% controlled vs. Ukrainians claiming 10–15%. The central concern is the Russian push in the south, where Yemen sits in a triangle formed by the Oka and the Sri Bianca rivers, and Russian forces are closing in from the north as well. Crossing Yamana is expected to fall; it’s a matter of time, though how long remains uncertain. Glenn: Ukraine does not withdraw after encirclement. There’s a rational explanation tied to PR wars: if the US and Europeans lose interest in Ukraine, weapons and money dry up, and Zelensky appears addicted to PR victories to keep support. Do you think the war in the headlines affects Western support? How does the Iran conflict influence Ukraine, given weapon and money dynamics? Stanislav: There’s additional pressure on Western governments from the military and certain military societies not to rush into direct NATO engagement or a large-scale conflict with Iran. He notes Iran’s demonstrated ability to strike American bases and key targets, and that Iran’s actions have shown the US and its allies that American power isn’t unlimited. He argues Iran’s strikes and the broader Middle East conflict complicate Western calculations, as American bases and interests face increased threats. He asserts that Iran has shown it can strike at American bases and that American casualties would be far higher than reported. He claims Iran’s actions press Western governments to reconsider involvement in the region and to reassess commitments to allies such as the Saudis, who reportedly told American bases to stand down. He also discusses how Russia’s deterrence posture could shift in response to ongoing Iran–US tensions, and suggests that if Russia sees an opportunity to restore deterrence, it might be tempted to push back more forcefully. Glenn: Russia’s approach to diplomacy with Europe and the US is complex. Macron’s bid to join a Russia–US–Ukraine format could spoil negotiations. Belgium’s stance on Russian assets and broader EU politics complicate any settlement. Stanislav: He explains distrust in European leadership, questioning whom to trust in Europe. He suggests that a broader reform in European leadership and doctrine is unlikely soon. He notes that among European politicians, there’s disagreement and strategic posturing, with some populist voices but institutional leadership often failing to present a coherent strategy. Glenn: What about China and Russia’s support for Iran? How might that evolve? Stanislav: Russia previously explored a mutual defense pact with Iran; the document lacks substance, and real support has been practical, including MiG-29s, Su-30s, and S-400s, along with jamming systems enabling Iran to counter US satellites and missiles. He describes Iran’s military buildup and how Russia’s support has extended to drone technology and air defenses. He predicts Syria could reemerge as a battleground, especially if Iran’s militancy expands and if the US and Israel are drawn into broader conflict. He suggests China may reassess its stance and consider leveraging its position as US capabilities wane, potentially viewing Taiwan’s reunification as a strategic opportunity. Glenn: Any final thoughts? Stanislav: He emphasizes the high level of risk and unpredictability in the current international security environment, with multiple actors pursuing aggressive strategies and the potential for rapid shifts in alliances and deterrence calculations. He notes Iran’s broader influence and the risks to regional stability, hinting at a world where war remains a possible, though increasingly costly, option for major powers.

The West is leading Ukraine down a path to destruction by encouraging them to play tough with Russia, with the expectation that the West will defeat Putin. This encourages Ukraine to be unwilling to compromise with Russia, which will wreck the country. A better policy would be to neutralize Ukraine, build up its economy, and remove it from the competition between Russia and NATO. Creating a neutral Ukraine would be in the interest of the West, Russia, and most importantly, Ukraine.

Colonel Douglas MacGregor and the host discuss rising tensions around Venezuela and the broader implications for U.S. strategy and global balance of power. MacGregor argues the Navy’s buildup off Venezuela signals more than intimidation: there is a willingness to intervene in Venezuela, with plans to intervene having been “on the shelf for years.” He notes Hugo Chavez’s legacy and Venezuela’s potential ties to China and Russia make it a longstanding potential target, but he questions the practicality and aims of any proposed operation given Venezuela’s size and population (about 30 million, many along the coast). The host presses on objective clarity, asking what political-military goal is sought and whether it is attainable, warning that war is unpredictable and that the president has not articulated a specific objective. MacGregor expands on the ambiguity, pointing out that there is no expressed U.S. objective from the president, and he likens the situation to LBJ’s Vietnam-era ambiguity—“we’re going to support the legitimate government and fight communism” as a slogan, not a military objective. He underscores a concern that there is no workable exit strategy or realistic plan, and he cautions about the risk of unintended consequences. He highlights the Beltway chatter about narcoterrorism, but notes that bombing Venezuela without a clear, attainable objective invites failure. He then outlines possible wider consequences: CIA operatives, potential involvement of MI6, and mercenary forces could be drawn in if a conflict escalates. He observes two Russian destroyers off the coast of Venezuela as a signaling move, framing it as Moscow signaling that Washington’s actions push Moscow to respond. The conversation moves to how Russian actions in Ukraine shape a multipolar world order—“the post rules-based liberal order”—and how Russia could respond if U.S. actions trigger a clash near Venezuela, risking a broader confrontation. MacGregor stresses Russia’s capability to threaten a broad swath of Europe and the potential for Latin American states to realign with Russia if Washington presses too hard. On objectives tied to resources, MacGregor contends that Washington believes it “owns the entire Western Hemisphere” and that Venezuela’s resources (oil, gas, lithium, rare earths) are a tempting collateral. He argues this ignores the limits of U.S. ground forces and the illegitimacy of unilateral resource exploitation, comparing potential actions to Cortez’s arrival in the Americas. He asserts there is no solid strategy, no coherent plan to substitute for the current leadership’s approach, and notes the long-standing history of failed interventions. The Ukrainian conflict is invoked to illustrate the dangers of escalation and misperception. MacGregor criticizes Zelensky for actions that he says could constitute war crimes and notes that if a broader U.S.–Russia clash develops due to Venezuela, the “slow boil” in Ukraine could intensify. He contends Moscow has restrained itself to some degree, but questions whether American restraint will be interpreted as weakness. He argues Europe should recognize Russia’s legitimate security interests and that Europe’s leadership is vulnerable to internal pressures, migration, and political shifts. He predicts changes in leadership in France and Britain that could alter the trajectory of European policy toward Russia, while noting Poland’s precarious position and Hungary/Slovakia’s peace-oriented stances. Regarding U.S. leadership, MacGregor criticizes Trump’s strategy as unpredictable and focused on optics, suggesting the president could offload some conflicts to Europe but is surrounded by advisers pushing adversarial postures on Korea, Taiwan, and the South China Sea. He contrasts this with the need for a sober, calculated approach that recognizes limits and emphasizes long-term strategic priorities over short-term “greatness” theater. He laments a lack of a coherent scientific, industrial, and economic strategy in Washington, describing an economy driven by short-term profits and financial capitalists, with limited productive investment outside of a few exceptions like Elon Musk. He uses the analogy of a locomotive running out of steam, arguing that without a real plan, debt and multipolar realignments will push the U.S. toward crisis. In closing, MacGregor reiterates that the current approach risks triggering a costly, destabilizing conflict and that the United States would benefit from stepping back, acknowledging limits, and pursuing a more organized path to a multipolar order rather than ad hoc interventions and prestige-driven military commitments.

Russia will remain a dangerous opponent for a long time, and we must include Ukraine in NATO. The only way to have trusting relations with Moscow is through a decisive defeat and a reset in Russia, where the Russian population and politics abandon their deeply rooted imperial, aggressive, and colonial ideas.

- The discussion centers on whether European actions against Russia amount to a NATO-wide escalation and could lead to direct confrontation with Russia outside Ukraine, given recent attacks on Russian energy infrastructure and civilian ships in the Black Sea, including a Russian oil tanker in the Mediterranean with reports of drones launched from Greece. Putin reportedly vowed retaliation, and the guests consider how European and U.S./NATO support for Ukraine factors into this dynamic. - Daniel Davis argues that a segment of the Western alliance wants a conflict with Russia, framing it as peace on their terms from a position of weakness. He says there is little consideration for Russia’s security requirements or a mutually acceptable peace, and that ignoring Russia’s security concerns has driven the current cycle of escalation. He notes that Western actions since 2021–2022 have ignored the Russian side and pursued war aims on Western terms, contributing to a deteriorating situation and increasing casualties on the Ukrainian side. - Davis contends that Russia has been reticent to respond to many provocations with significant actions outside Ukraine, implying that Moscow has avoided a full-scale escalation that could threaten NATO. He predicts that Putin will respond to Western strikes on Russian targets, possibly increasing pressure on Odessa and other civilian infrastructure in Ukraine, with a tit-for-tat pattern as Russia leverages its greater capacity to hit Western shipping and infrastructure. - He asserts that since 2023, the West’s approach has not reversed the battlefield dynamics; sanctions, intelligence inputs, and heavy weapon transfers have not pushed Russia out of Ukraine and have allowed NATO and European stockpiles to deplete while Russia continues to build up in key categories (missiles, air defense, logistics). He claims Europe’s commitment of large sums to Ukraine will further strain their economies and shorten their stockpiles, potentially weakening Western readiness for a wider conflict. - The guest stresses that Russia’s strategy appears to be “go slow” in Ukraine to maintain pressure without triggering a broader European or NATO intervention, while building up stockpiles to prepare for a possible expansion of war if needed. He notes that Russia has generated a stockpile advantage in missiles (including Oreshniks) and air defense that could be decisive in a broader conventional war. - The discussion covers Oreshnik missiles, with Davis explaining Russia’s aim to maximize production and use if needed, not merely deter. He argues that Western air defenses would be ineffective against such systems and that Russia’s broader stockpiling and production could outpace Western depletion. He suggests Russia’s buildup is intended to enable a decisive move if NATO or Western forces escalate, and that the West’s capacity to sustain prolonged high-tempo combat is limited. - Both speakers discuss Odessa as a likely target if Russia deems it necessary to retaliate against Western support for Ukraine, noting that recent strikes on bridges, trains, and energy facilities in the region indicate growing Russian intent to disrupt Ukraine’s rear and logistics in the event of a front-line escalation. They consider whether Russia could seize Odessa if Western concessions are not forthcoming, and whether European leaders would respond decisively if Russia moves against Ukrainian ports. - The hosts warn that Western rhetoric about a “just and lasting peace” may be misaligned with Russia’s goals and that the risk of a broader conflict—potentially involving nuclear considerations—exists if provocations continue. They caution that if the conflict widens, all sides—Russia, Ukraine, Europe, and the United States—could suffer heavy losses, and express concern about the potential for miscalculation as new weapons systems and security arrangements come into play before the year ends.

Apparently, the strategy is to weaken Russia, which is essentially a state of war. The aim is to remove Putin, replace his administration, and potentially divide Russia. This stems from the neoconservative movement, which has always been anti-Soviet and anti-Russian, pushing for a strong, challenging America. However, America can't challenge Russia, especially since the U.S. military isn't ready for war. The U.S. is using the Ukrainian military as cannon fodder, fighting over pride and fear of a Russian/Chinese economic takeover. America shouldn't go to war for trade, even if it means becoming number two or three economically. The world is multipolar, but the U.S. hasn't accepted this. People don't realize how destructive even a limited war would be. The situation is much more dangerous than people realize because America is too prideful and arrogant and will be nasty when it doesn't get its way in Ukraine.

Glenn opens by noting a year has passed since Jeffrey Sachs urged Europe to adopt a realistic foreign policy that understands Russia, Europe, and the United States, and to avoid being invaded by the U.S.—even suggesting Trump could land troops in Greenland. Glenn asks how to read the current situation, including Davos and Europe’s anger at U.S. hostility, and the revived emphasis on international law. Jeffrey Sachs responds with a version of the “ride on the back of a tiger” metaphor from Kennedy, arguing Europeans forgot that the United States is an imperial power that has acted brazenly and brutally for about twenty years. He lists U.S. actions: invasions, regime changes, and reckless interference in Ukraine, and U.S. complicity in Israel’s wars across Africa and the Middle East, along with involvement in overthrowing Ukraine’s Yanukovych and other interventions. He claims Europeans were silent or complicit as the United States bombed Iran, kidnapped its president, and pursued Greenland, calling the Greenland push a grotesque power grab by Trump. He asserts New York Times recognition of U.S. imperial tendencies and says Europe’s naivete and hypocrisy are evident. He states: “The United States is thuggish, imperialistic, reckless, and that The U. S. Has left a large swath of the world in misery. Europe has been mostly compliant or complicit.” He urges Europeans to understand what the United States is about, to stop Russophobia, and to keep lines of communication with Russia open; he argues Europe’s Russophobia made it boxed in with little diplomacy with Russia or the U.S. Glenn adds that Europe’s stance mirrors a Cold War-like unity against Russia, but that the current reality differs: the U.S. does not view Russia as its main adversary, and Russophobia deepens Europe’s dependence on the U.S. Glenn notes mixed reactions at Davos, including Canada’s Prime Minister Mark Carney signaling a shift away from a rules-based order that privileges the West, and Macron’s private message to Trump seeking a cooperative stance on Syria, Iran, and Greenland. He remarks that NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg praised NATO while Trump hinted that the real enemy is within NATO, highlighting the chaos. He asks if this signals a decline of the U.S. empire or NATO. Sachs discusses Carney's stance as significant: Carney’s trip to China and a dialogue with Beijing indicating diversification with China, including a Canadian-Chinese investment plan. He credits Carney with being a rare straightforward statesman and notes instability ahead. Trump’s Davos retreat from threats (notably Greenland) may have been influenced by stock-market declines, according to Sachs’ theory. He mentions a possible European concession about U.S. sovereignty over parts of Greenland, though he doubts any negotiation has been meaningful. He cites Scott Bessent’s Fox Business interview as revealing: sanctions on Iran are a form of economic statecraft designed to crush the Iranian economy, with Iran’s currency collapse and bank failures cited as evidence; Sachs condemns this as a violation of international law and UN Charter, and calls Bessent’s pride in wielding currency-destabilization as alarming. He points to sanctions against Cuba and a broader pattern of “thuggish gangster behavior” by the U.S., noting Europeans’ silence on Iran and other regimes until it backfires on them. Sachs argues Europe’s Russophobia is self-destructive, and he emphasizes that diplomacy remains possible if Germany, France, and Italy adopt a rational approach. He criticizes Germany for duplicity in NATO enlargement and Minsk II, blaming Merkel for dropped commitments, and notes that Italy shows less Russophobia and could shift toward diplomacy. He believes Central Europe and some leaders (e.g., Orban, Czech and Slovak figures) favor diplomacy, but German leadership has been weak. He stresses that Europe must avoid dismemberment and choose diplomacy with Russia, warning that continued war policy will leave Europe isolated. He closes with optimism that there remains a path forward if key European powers act differently. Glenn thanks Sachs for the discussion and ends.

The West is leading Ukraine down a path to destruction by encouraging them to play tough with Russia, with the expectation that the West will defeat Putin. This encourages Ukraine to be unwilling to compromise with Russia, which will wreck the country. A better policy would be to neutralize Ukraine, build up its economy, and remove it from the competition between Russia and NATO. Creating a neutral Ukraine would be in the interest of the West, Russia, and most importantly, Ukraine.

Glenn and John Mersheimer discuss US interests in Venezuela beyond democracy promotion and narco-terrorism. Mersheimer argues the Monroe Doctrine defines US Western Hemisphere aims: preventing distant great powers from forming military alliances with or basing forces in the Americas. He asserts the Venezuela operation is not about the Monroe Doctrine or great-power competition, but an imperialist or neocolonial effort by the US to control Venezuela’s politics and oil. He notes Trump’s emphasis on who controls Venezuelan oil reflects blunt imperialism, not classical doctrine. Glenn asks if this aligns with past patterns of intervention or if it’s more brazen. Mersheimer says the US has a long history of interfering in Western Hemisphere politics, targeting leftward movements, toppling regimes, and even hinting at broader regional actions under Trump. He emphasizes Trump’s blunt rhetoric and actions—saying the US can “run Venezuela” and that Venezuela’s oil is “our oil”—as evidence of a brazen approach that lacks typical liberal-justifying rhetoric and resembles a naked imperial project. The conversation shifts to international law and the liberal rules-based order. Glenn notes that liberal order sometimes legitimized force (as in Kosovo) and asks how the Venezuela episode fits. Mersheimer argues that during the unipolar moment the US adhered to international law more and created many rules, but Trump has shown contempt for international norms, trashing the rules-based system. He contends this shift harms US interests and shows that Trump cares primarily about the United States, not about international law or other countries. They discuss European reactions and the Nord Stream incident as a test of Western liberal rhetoric. Glenn notes perceived hypocrisy in European support for Israel’s actions in Gaza and questions whether Europe will push back against Trump. Mersheimer says Europeans fear losing the US security umbrella and NATO, so they appease Trump to maintain American presence in Europe, even as they recognize his bully tendencies. He suggests Europeans might criticize but avoid costly confrontations that would threaten NATO, though Greenland could test this dynamic. He predicts the possibility of a US move on Greenland given Trump’s willingness to use force “on the cheap,” and notes that such a move could fracture NATO and European unity. They discuss the broader West, arguing the concept of a homogeneous West is fading. The US pivot to East Asia due to China’s rise undermines traditional Europe-centered alliances. The deterioration of US-European relations, combined with Moscow’s efforts to exploit European fault lines, could produce a fractured West. The discussion highlights the erosion of liberal values as a coordinating narrative, with European dependence on the US as a pacifier intensifying appeasement dynamics. The Ukraine war remains central in assessing future alliances. Mersheimer asserts Trump’s strategy shifts burden to Europe, which cannot sustain Ukraine support, and predicts blame games if Ukraine loses, with European leaders and Washington trading accusations. Russia’s efforts to deepen European and Atlantic tensions will persist, potentially leaving Europe more divided and the US less able to serve as a stabilizing force. He concludes that the Venezuela episode, while notable, does not fundamentally alter the trajectory set by Ukraine and the pivot to Asia, though it underscores weakening Western cohesion and the fragility of NATO if US commitments wane. Glenn and Mersheimer close reflecting on the difficulty of maintaining a unified Western order amid shifting power and repeated demonstrations of Western frictions, expressing concern over future stability and the risk that major actions—such as potential Greenland intervention—could further destabilize the transatlantic alliance.

In a wide-ranging interview, Professor Sergei Karaganov, a prominent Russian foreign policy scholar, provides his perspective on the current security crisis, Russia’s strategic posture, and possible futures for Europe and the world. On the trajectory of the conflict and world order - Karaganov argues that the conflict signifies a broader systemic shift, describing it as a “fourth world war” that began in Ukraine with American efforts to undermine Russia and European participation, spreading now to the Middle East and South Asia. - He frames the wider struggle as a gradual replacement of a unipolar Western order with multipolar dynamics, warning that diplomacy has been insufficient and that the European elites are leading their states toward a major war. - He emphasizes the need to prevent horizontal escalation and to stop the war in Europe, extending concerns to destabilization across a vast swath of the globe. On NATO, Ukraine, and escalation - He notes unprecedented Western support for actions on Russian soil, including missile attacks and political backing for operations on territory Russia considers vital, including aspects of its nuclear triad and early warning systems. - He criticizes Western decision-makers for misjudging the scope of the conflict, arguing that the war is not only about Ukraine but about a broader confrontation with the Old West. Russia’s strategic aims and deterrence - A central theme is the need to “win” this war to halt the bloodletting in Ukraine and to prevent further escalation and casualties on both sides. - He calls for escalating to deter and punish Western elites, arguing for a reevaluation and expansion of Russia’s nuclear doctrine to threaten European elites and bunkers with limited, targeted nuclear strikes if necessary. - He advocates shifting from a doctrine that assumes no victories in nuclear war to one in which “there will be victories” and where Russia would reserve the right to use nuclear weapons against European adversaries if deterrence fails. - He also suggests delegating some command authority for European theater to a dedicated commander who could authorize such actions, including nuclear use, if necessary. On arms control, diplomacy, and prospects for peace - Karaganov argues for moving away from arms-control constraints as part of a broader strategic realignment and emphasizes the need to deter and potentially punish adversaries with credible force. - He dismisses the “Spirit of Alaska” as a trap and warns that peace would only be possible if European elites are removed or replaced, implying that diplomacy would be possible only after such changes. - He maintains that a truce could be possible, but not a peace, unless European elites are replaced by more restrained governance and a rethink of Western strategic posture. - He asserts that Minsk was a mistake and criticizes attempts to extend deterrence to European allies, labeling such proposals as disastrous for Russia and European stability. On Europe, modernization, and Russia’s future - He contends that Europe has historically been a source of conflict and that Europe must be kept at a distance; Europe should not determine Russia’s future course. - He rejects European integration as Russia’s path, arguing that Europe remains valuable culturally but cannot dictate Russia’s strategic choices. - He positions Russia as inherently Eurasian, with external cultural roots in the Byzantine, Muslim, and Buddhist worlds, and deems Europe as a historical phase that should be left behind for Russia’s future development. On diplomacy and concrete steps - He notes that diplomacy could still have a chance, but the endgame would involve the elimination of the Kyiv regime, restoration of Russian-controlled lands in the south and east of Ukraine, and breaking the will of European elites to pursue aggression. - He reiterates a preference for avoiding a direct European invasion and expresses a desire to avoid a full-scale nuclear exchange, while insisting that Russia must be prepared to act decisively if Western adversaries continue their aggression.

Moving NATO forces, including American troops, closer to Russia's borders would escalate tensions and increase the risk of war. It is crucial to understand that Russia will not back down, as this is a matter of existential importance due to past events. It is not just Putin who holds power, but a political class with their own opinions. The majority of the public supports Russian policy, making it unlikely for Putin to compromise or retreat if faced with military confrontation.

George Beebe discusses how NATO expansion and Western narratives changed from the 1990s to the present, focusing on concerns within the U.S. and Europe about how enlargement would affect relations with Russia. He explains that after the Cold War ended—after the Berlin Wall fell, the Warsaw Pact broke up, and the Soviet Union dissolved—the West faced the question of what foreign policy should be. He says Western judgment was that the Western community was successful and should be extended: transforming former Warsaw Pact members, Russia, and even the Middle East through liberalization and “globaliz[ing] the Western system.” He argues this involved “social engineering” that the West was “really not capable of” and that it failed to account for Russia’s reactions. Beebe says NATO enlargement was built on the idea that extending the NATO and EU “security umbrella” would foster Westernization and liberalization, while Russia viewed this as offering subordinate status rather than co-equal partnership. He describes Russian concerns as including the placement of NATO forces on Russia’s borders. He adds that many Russia experts in Washington and Europe—especially those with deep expertise from the Cold War—believed expansion would trigger increasingly intense reactions as NATO moved closer to Russian borders. He says that in the mid-1990s it was widely considered “crazy” to expand NATO, and that it was “unthinkable” to go beyond Warsaw Pact states and bring core elements of the former Soviet Union—specifically Ukraine—into NATO. In his view, what is now treated as conventional wisdom—that Ukraine can choose its military allies and host forces—is “almost a sacred principle” that is central to the root of the current conflict. Beebe emphasizes that understanding these dynamics is critical to finding an exit from the war, stating that arguing the conflict was “completely unprovoked” ignores history and shaping dynamics. He also addresses how initial disagreement became a narrative that NATO enlargement had “nothing whatsoever to do with this” even after warnings. He mentions William Burns’ “Nyet Means Nyet” cable and its argument that no matter Russia’s political spectrum, Ukrainian NATO membership would be intolerable and would provoke reaction. Beebe says that after enlargement decisions were made, some opponents accepted the “new situation on the ground,” in part because power brokers in Washington would not publicly admit they were wrong and because a “new generation of Russia experts” emerged who were trained during a period expecting transformation of Russia into liberal democracies through internal-system-focused reasoning, with geography and balance of power treated as less important. He argues the European Union’s post-Cold War evolution left it unable to act coherently as a geopolitical actor because it became a regulatory superpower focused on transmitting values and expanding a Western community. He says Russian objections force Europeans into an “existential question” about Europe’s purpose, which he links to difficulties settling the war. Beebe then outlines how he believes Russia interpreted events in Ukraine as not starting in 2014 but rooting back to early NATO enlargement steps, especially the Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary joining. He recounts Russia’s concern that NATO claimed to be defensive while intervening in Serbia without UN Security Council authorization, and how this led Russia to conclude that deterrence depended less on NATO’s stated nature than on Russia’s own ability to deter. He connects this to the 2008 Bucharest summit signaling Ukraine and Georgia could join NATO, describing Russia’s view that Ukraine was becoming “NATO-ized” through deepening military links. He says Russia believed a window was closing: Ukraine’s enmeshment would eventually remove Russia’s military option except war with NATO. He characterizes Putin’s action as “preemptive and illegally,” while also maintaining that there were causes beyond “Putin’s own imperialist desires.” In discussing current escalation, Beebe describes NATO involvement as something Ukrainians would like to see directly, believing it mitigates Russia’s advantages. He says Russia understands it is being baited into an overreaction, but that provocations have intensified, including attacks he references on Russian territory and nuclear-relevant capabilities. He says Russia’s messaging aims to pressure Washington and Europe to restrain Ukrainians, including Foreign Intelligence Service warnings about Latvian involvement in drone strikes and threats against Latvian facilities. He portrays a scenario where Article 5 could trigger a painful U.S. choice between fighting Russia—potentially nuclear—or hollowing out NATO, arguing that U.S. interest lies in diplomacy to avoid that decision. He also warns that Western fear of nuclear war has diminished, which he calls dangerous because nuclear deterrence relies on fear to bring sobriety. He cites Sergei Karganov’s view that fear of nuclear war must be restored and says restoring it could create a catastrophic escalatory spiral. On the “narrative war,” Beebe calls claims that Ukraine is winning “propaganda,” describing it as designed to buy time and allow opponents of settlement to avoid compromise. He argues the “stay the course” line seeks to avoid any need to compromise and that it is a fantasy, asserting that a compromise would require Russia giving up important things and the West and Ukraine also doing so. He compares the logic to the war on Iran analogy raised by the host: Western unwillingness to accept Russia’s existential threat perception prevents understanding why Moscow cannot accept capitulation terms. He closes by saying his optimism about compromise has fluctuated, becoming more hopeful after developments in the Israel-U.S.-Iran conflict that he connects to renewed prospects for negotiations in Ukraine. He adds that making Zelensky accept a settlement and getting Europeans to think about “the world as it is, not how they wish it was” would be complicated. He frames the struggle as between the Trump administration and a “deep state,” including links in Europe, and says the next weeks will show whether resistance can be overcome.

The Ukrainian drone attack on Moscow is alarming. The Russians are surprised that the US hasn't intervened to stop Ukraine, who they see as a rogue organization. The Russians want an end to this conflict and have several options, including securing more territory or crushing Ukraine entirely. Putin, a judicious leader, faces a decision point: how far to go to guarantee Russia's security? He doesn't want to rule Ukrainians, but some advisors are pushing for a complete takeover. The Ukrainian government is evil and has needlessly sacrificed its own people, leading to a strategic inflection point in the history of Europe. The key is for Trump to follow his instincts and disengage, as any war will expand and the US is overstretched.

Alistair Crook and Alistair Crook discuss two linked crises: Iran and the US/Israel framework for a ceasefire, and a Europe-coordinated escalation against Russia after a major strike on Moscow. Crook begins with Iran, referencing a memorandum of understanding that has allegedly already been signed but remains shrouded in secrecy. He asks whether the Americans will uphold it, how it will reshape the region, and how it affects US-Israeli dynamics. Crook notes that Netanyahu appears weaker and raises the possibility that his replacement could be more hawkish, questioning whether Arab-party support for Netanyahu has shifted. He suggests that regardless of whether the framework is implemented, it will have a major impact across the US, Israel, and the wider region. Alistair Crook responds that the arrangement is a “framework” rather than a treaty or ceasefire: it is the “easiest part,” while the hardest element is constructing a protective zone and managing disruption. He describes visible elements already approaching within this “framework.” He then breaks down three areas Crook raised. First, he says the agreement is controversial in the United States and also controversial in Iran. He describes tension rooted in Iran’s experience with the JCPOA not being upheld and Iran remaining constrained. He cites a statement by Iran’s Supreme Leader, saying the Supreme Leader opposed the framework but was persuaded by Tazashian and Kaleva that there would be no backsliding on the framework terms or Iranian interests, which predominantly center on Hormuz. He frames Hormuz as a pivot for Iran’s potential shift into a new geopolitical context. He adds that the Supreme Leader is putting on notice both Iran’s reformist wing and a skeptical public that Iran will not allow precedents that expand the meaning of the framework until it is emptied of its purpose. Second, he highlights Lebanon as crucial. He says Iran has changed its position because it previously did not intervene directly against Israel in the axis-of-resistance way until the last period. He describes this as the first time Iran threatened heavy missile strikes on northern Israel if Israel flattened Beirut’s Dahir, arguing that this threatened the border-to-Galilee “path.” He says Trump then intervened and the attacks were stopped, but now the “thing” is being tested again. He links this to a breach question: he says Iran refuses to attend negotiating sessions and that Lebanon would be seen as a breach of the ceasefire from Iran’s perspective. Third, he turns to Israel and US politics. He claims Israeli press coverage reflects “real turmoil,” portraying the situation as a huge defeat for the “victory narrative” involving American support to destroy Iran, destroy Hezbollah, and annex parts of Lebanon with proxy permission. He describes an incident near Bofor Castle where Hezbollah attacked with an anti-tank missile, resulting in four soldiers dead, including the commander of the 82nd Brigade. He says figures and polling pressure are intensifying for Netanyahu, arguing that if Netanyahu does nothing militarily in Lebanon, his election will be lost and that there is “wall-to-wall consensus” for action. He adds that Trump’s language is shocking to Israelis: he reports Trump criticized Israel’s handling in Beirut and implied that an ex-ISIS leader could manage Lebanon more “sophisticatedly,” describing it as an unparalleled slap. He says Israelis interpret this as a Middle East that has changed: they believe there is no way to destroy Iran without the United States, and therefore that regime change is not achievable. He characterizes the result as a psychological defeat for the “Gratial Israel” concept and an acceptance that the US may impose penalties on Israel if it retaliates or breaches the framework, particularly in ways that could undermine Trump’s achievement of opening Hormuz. He argues that the framework triggered a US shift, driven by Hormuz and an “economic cliff,” saying Trump said the US was “four weeks away from running out of oil,” with figures describing US strategic reserve levels down to about 20 million barrels. He describes the ensuing US domestic battle between pro-Israel Zionist groups and Trump supporters insisting on “America first.” He counters a simple prediction of Republican losses by suggesting the midterms are rotational, with about 20 Republican seats in contention, and that loyalty to Trump’s personality could reduce defection. He also suggests that if Netanyahu attacks Lebanon, the shift could frame it as “slapping America in the face,” potentially rebounding politically for Trump among some voters. Crook then shifts topics to Russia, focusing on what he presents as an unprecedented Western escalation: a massive strike on Moscow, with NATO footprints being “advertised almost.” He asks how such escalation could be controlled and prevent nuclear escalation. He also complains that Western participation is now openly visible despite earlier efforts to conceal or downplay it. Alistair Crook says the strike involved many drones and missiles into a refinery area in Moscow and was intended to put Russians “on edge.” He links it to coordination around EU and allied meetings, stating that Macron and Merz met in London beforehand and brought Zelensky to stage European ultimatums. He says the point was to change the narrative, with Europe trying to present that Ukraine is not on the back foot and to push for more defense resources. He describes Europe’s aim as a ceasefire framework and UK/France and other participation in peacekeeping, with Ukraine eventually aligned with Europe, and bringing America back into the process via stage-managed messaging. He argues that Europe is escalating toward a war with Russia but lacks practical clarity on what such a war would look like, questioning whether it would be conventional, asymmetrical, air, or nuclear. He recounts arguments by Russian figures at the St. Petersburg Conference about stopping the “ratchet” of escalation and says the debate is growing over more procurement, missiles, drones, and co-production—reassembling shipped systems in Ukraine for use against Russia. He says Europe’s assumption that Russia would capitulate is a misunderstanding of Russia’s consciousness and history with Europe, similar to what he earlier described as a misunderstanding of Iran. He concludes that the strategy is dangerous because there is no clear escalation control if Russia perceives the threat, and he links this to Russia’s history of restraint before retaliation. The discussion ends with Crook urging readers to consult Alistair Crook’s Substack, and Crook thanking him for his insights.

George Peavy (former CIA Director for Russia Analysis, Director of Grand Strategy at the Quincy Institute) discusses how the war in Iran intertwines with the Ukraine conflict and its broader strategic implications for Russia, NATO, and Europe. Key effects of the Iran war on Ukraine and the strategic balance - U.S. weapon availability for Ukraine is strained. The U.S. has supplied weapons to Ukraine via Europe, with Europeans purchasing American systems for transfer, but shortages persist, especially in air defense, which was already stressed by Russian missile, drone, and glide bomb attacks. - The Iran war exacerbates Ukraine’s air defense crisis, raising the risk of a longer battlefield disadvantage for Ukraine if the conflict continues, potentially pushing Ukraine toward seeking a negotiated settlement sooner. - The Iran war disrupts the strategy of squeezing Russia’s energy earnings to pressure Moscow into compromise. The international energy market faces a crisis, making it harder to keep Russian energy off the market. This undermines the leverage of Western sanctions and incentives meant to push Russia toward a favorable end to the war. - Short-term Russian economic strength is bolstered by higher oil prices due to the Iran conflict, enabling Moscow to sustain the war longer in the near term. - There is anticipation that European leaders, facing an energy crisis, are hoping for a political shift in the U.S. and a change in leadership (e.g., Trump’s political fortunes) to alter the peace process, potentially delaying hard compromises with Russia. European rationality and behavior - The European stance is described as largely irrational by Peavy, driven by wishful thinking and a fear that compromising on big geopolitical issues could undermine NATO enlargement, EU unity, and European security arrangements. The EU’s cohesion is seen as benefiting from a persistent threat perception of Russia, which keeps the U.S. presence in Europe and NATO intact. - Europeans are viewed as hoping to endure the next few months, believing U.S. political dynamics (especially Trump’s prospects) could shift in their favor, though this is described as a risky bet. Russia’s possible responses and strategic calculations - Moscow faces internal pressure to escalate, with some arguing the United States cannot be trusted and that a window of opportunity exists to seize gains while Washington and Europe are preoccupied with Iran and Ukraine. - Putin’s leadership is viewed as not yet fully committed to abandoning the possibility of detente with the U.S. and pursuing negotiations over European security. A normalization of U.S.-Russian relations would give Russia more strategic room, including balancing China. - A potential shift in Russia’s approach could occur if it believes an improved U.S.-Russian relationship is unlikely to happen, whether due to Trump’s weakness or misperceptions about U.S. willingness to normalize. In that case, Russia might push for a decisive military victory in Ukraine. NATO and transatlantic alliance dynamics - The Iran conflict has intensified strains within NATO, with the U.S. pressing allies to help secure chokepoints like the Strait of Hormuz, while European allies push back, highlighting diverging national interests and energy concerns. - Trump’s public framing suggests NATO may face pressure or re-evaluation; Europeans view Washington’s Iran policy as jeopardizing European security and energy stability, potentially undermining confidence in long-standing alliance arrangements. Window for peace - Peavy believes a diplomatic window remains but is closing, likely not extending beyond this summer. Ukraine’s battlefield incentives push toward securing gains now, while Russia seeks a deal that could coincide with a more favorable U.S. posture. The durability of a negotiated settlement depends on perceptions of U.S. commitment and the willingness of both sides to compromise as the political calendars shift. Impact of alleged Russian support to Iran - If Russia aided Iran with intelligence, it could complicate U.S. discussions about a Ukraine ceasefire, though Moscow would argue reciprocity given Western activity since 2022. The strategic impact depends on how opposition to a compromise in Washington and Europe frames and utilizes this issue to shape diplomacy.

Colonel Douglas MacGregor and Glenn discuss the current strategic picture across Ukraine, the Russia–China–Iran axis, and the broader Western political environment. On Russia and Ukraine: - MacGregor notes a major “Cauldron battles” situation in Southeastern Ukraine, with remaining Ukrainian forces being encircled and largely annihilated by precision strike weapons, and a Russian swarm anticipated to complete the encirclement. - He identifies two focal points of Russian activity: Odessa (where Russian special operations are reportedly active at night, Odessa largely undefended with air defenses degraded) and Kharkov, with ongoing pressure toward Kyiv. He emphasizes that none of these alone solves the core problem of removing Zelenskyy’s government in Kyiv, which he describes as a facade Europeans seek to preserve. - Russia has increased its force size, adding reservists and training new draftees; options for Moscow appear to be Odessa, Kharkov, and Kyiv. Putin is watching Western European political developments to gauge timing, potentially waiting for Western government changes to move decisively. - MacGregor argues NATO is effectively irrelevant to Russia’s calculus and asserts the United States does not want a war with Russia over Ukraine, giving Moscow more freedom of action than Western audiences realize. On Russia–China relations and Europe: - Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin are pursuing a bilateral strategy to mutually reinforce military and economic capabilities, forming a large continental fortress against the United States. The two powers seek to strengthen ties as they view the U.S. as increasingly belligerent. - MacGregor contends that European leaders, including Starmer, Macron, and Metz, are aligned with globalist and financial elites (referencing ties to BlackRock and others) and that personal relationships between leaders are not meaningful in the international arena; strategic interests drive policy. - He argues that many European elites’ rhetoric about Russia serves to deflect from domestic vulnerabilities and to mobilize anti-Russian sentiment as political cover. On the Middle East and Iran: - The talk about Iran is framed as not serious; MacGregor describes a plan to escalate toward regime change in Iran, driven by U.S., Israeli, and allied intelligence communities, despite Iranian resistance and regional risk. - He claims Mossad, MI6, and CIA influenced President Trump regarding Iran’s fragility, while Iran’s internal protests (economic grievances) were legitimate and quickly mischaracterized as attempts to overthrow the government. He asserts Chinese and Russian assistance helped Iran counter covert efforts, including providing satellite imagery and assisting integrated air and missile defenses. - The declared Western goal is to destroy Iran as a nation-state, with the Iranian leadership prepared to respond with full use of capabilities if attacked. He suggests a potential air and missile campaign could target the regime and strategic hubs, with the United States likely relying on high-altitude precision strikes and long-range missiles, while questioning the effectiveness and survivability of U.S. platforms like B-52s against Iranian defenses. - China and Russia are depicted as unlikely to allow Iran to be pulverized; they could intervene if Iran is near disintegration, possibly through non-nuclear actions such as a collision at sea, leveraging their submarine capabilities and influence. On European political legitimacy and future: - MacGregor connects the Epstein-related discourse in Europe to a broader critique of ruling elites, comparing the potential for political upheaval to late-18th-century France. He argues that as publics grow disillusioned with elites, there could be a crisis of political legitimacy and a shift toward more realistic leadership, with potential upheaval in Britain, France, and Germany. On Putin and future moves: - He suggests Putin views the possibility of reconciliation with Washington as unlikely, having reached somber conclusions about the prospects for meaningful agreement. He predicts Russia will act on its terms, potentially advancing toward the Dnieper River, Odessa, and perhaps Kyiv, while noting Russia does not intend to govern Western Ukraine long-term. He emphasizes that events will unfold on Russian terms, with European irrelevance in the decision-making process fading as Moscow executes its plans.

Alistair Crook argues that the “Iran war” is not only a regional crisis but an inflection point reshaping multiple geopolitical centers, beginning with Israel. He describes a crisis inside Israel tied to Netanyahu: Israeli reporting suggests Netanyahu is “in despair” about a potential agreement opposed to him, while pending corruption cases and the lack of the promised erasure/pardon contribute to growing tensions. Crook says Israeli speculation increasingly favors Netanyahu resigning before elections, which are expected in September rather than October, partly to distance from the resonance of October 7. He also notes internal pressure about conscription and Orthodox groups, and says growing criticism of Israel’s war in Gaza is broad enough that the government could implode. If Netanyahu is gone, Crook poses uncertainty over who could carry forward the long-standing Likud/Nanyahu agenda and whether the broader political structure built over roughly two decades could fragment into internal faction fighting. He frames Iran’s outcome in Israel as an “internalized” shift from expectations of U.S. destruction of Iran to the belief that “Iran has won the war,” leaving Israel trapped in “unwinnable wars” without sufficient troops, and without a clear way out. Crook then links Iran’s impact to Russia and China. He cites Russian strategist Sergey Karaganov arguing Russia should “take the lessons” from Iran, specifically how Iran used conventional missile weapons to hit vulnerable Western targets and how the West “backed off and withdrew.” Crook says this moves Russian thinking toward conventional weapons alongside a return to nuclear deterrence, emphasizing fear as necessary for deterrence. He describes a changing European mood: European ratcheting of support for Ukraine through missiles and drones, including claims that NATO space could protect against Russian retribution, is portrayed as potentially mistaken. Crook says Russia instead indicates it will attack decision-making centers, which he claims are in Britain, France, and Germany rather than Latvia, and that this is “changing rapidly,” including after the summit in Beijing between Putin and Xi. On China, Crook says Beijing is pushing back mainly through economic measures: restricting purchases of Chinese holdings or access via U.S. stock markets, opposing elements of U.S. efforts to expand dollar/digital-currency influence, and strengthening the role of China-linked assets as collateral in bond markets—alongside European issuers issuing yuan-denominated bonds. He argues this reflects a broader move into a “hard-nosed” posture toward the West and that Chinese pushback is intensifying through measures rather than noise. In the discussion, Crook emphasizes a shift in Russia’s and Europe’s psychology. He contrasts the Western “luxury” of past decades—where wars were fought elsewhere with escalation control—with the current Russian desire for restraint and fear-based deterrence. He says Western actions that target Russian capabilities risk forcing Russia toward retaliation, including nuclear escalation at some point. A central theme is that fear and psychological awareness matter for deterrence, and that complacency in Europe is a threat. Crook expands to Israel and Iran’s strategic constraints and the possibility of a “third strategy” beyond all-or-nothing defeat. He argues Israel could eventually change relations with Iran and recalls that after the Iranian Revolution Israel had a period of better relations with Tehran. He attributes Israel’s later shift to internal Israeli political changes: the Labor Party’s attempt to invert the earlier equation (periphery allies vs. Arab states enemy) and the subsequent need to maintain an Iran “enemy” narrative within U.S. domestic support structures. He also proposes that changing the regional equation could lead to renewed dialogue with Iran. He links this to Gulf security developments: Crook describes Gulf states moving toward a Gulf-led security architecture without American participation, driven by fear of future attacks on Iran and their consequences, and says Iran has made clear it could accept Gulf security arrangements that do not leave Gulf states under Iranian dominance. Crook argues Iran’s leverage is not only military but also economic and logistical: controlling the Strait of Hormuz reduces dependence on crippling sanctions and enables toll-based incentives and pressure, including dismantling petrodollar-linked arrangements. He claims this would affect Gulf financial systems and the Gulf’s petrodollar/financialized Western architecture and also complicate AI/data-center investments tied to Western and U.S. security assumptions, because Gulf reliance on U.S. protection is weakened and ties to Iran must adjust. He adds that many states are already attempting to open relations with Iran—he cites “about thirty” states—and predicts that these changes will become more open and fixed, altering the region’s complexion.

Ray McGovern, a former CIA officer who chaired the National Intelligence Estimate and prepared daily briefs for the president, discusses the newly released US national security strategy and its implications for the war in Ukraine, as well as broader US-Russia and US-Europe dynamics. - McGovern notes a dramatic shift in the national security strategy’s emphasis. He observes it prioritizes the Western Hemisphere, Asia, Europe, and the Middle East, with Russia treated as part of Europe. He contrasts this with past eras, recalling Paul Wolfowitz’s post–Gulf War doctrine, which asserted US primacy and the ability to act that Russia could not stop, and he emphasizes the stark difference between that era and the current document. - He recounts a historical anecdote from 1991–1992: Wolfowitz’s belief that the US could win where others could not, followed by a warning to General Wesley Clark that Russia would challenge US primacy as times changed. He points to subsequent US actions in Iraq (2003) and Syria (2015) as evidence of a shift in capability to project power, and he argues that in 2022 Russia halted US plans by preventing NATO expansion into Ukraine. - McGovern interprets the current strategy as signaling a recalibration: the US may be acknowledging a changing balance of power, with a focus on deterring Russia and stabilizing relations with Moscow, while recognizing that Europe is central to strategic calculations. He stresses that Russia’s core principle, in its view, is to prevent Ukraine from joining NATO, and he underscores that the strategy doc frames core interests as seeking strategic stability with Russia and a negotiated modus vivendi, though he notes these appear as a “castaway” in the Europe section. - He discusses ongoing high-level discussions in Berlin involving Witkoff (Wittkop) and Jared Kushner, and Zelenskyy’s positions on NATO membership and security assurances. He recalls past European reactions, including Rubio’s role in watering down European talking points and US–Russian negotiations, suggesting a pattern of European concessions followed by US–Russian engagement that sidelines European voices. - McGovern argues that Russia has “won the war” on the battlefield and that Moscow’s tactic is gradual, minimizing Ukrainian casualties while consolidating control over parts of Donetsk and other territorial objectives. He asserts Putin’s priority is to maintain a workable relationship with the United States, with Ukraine as a secondary concern. He also notes Trump’s stated interest in improving US-Russia relations, including a willingness to consider extending New START, and he highlights that Moscow would react to whether Trump commits to the treaty’s limits for another year, which would influence Moscow’s strategic calculations. - The discussion covers the internal US debate over how to handle Ukraine and whether to pursue negotiations with Russia. McGovern argues that the reality of Russia’s position and Ukraine’s losses complicate any simple “win” scenario for Ukraine, and he suggests that a negotiated settlement might eventually emerge if a durable US–Russia relationship can be pursued, given Russia’s advances on the battlefield and its leverage in European security. - They discuss John Mearsheimer’s realist perspective, arguing that Western expansion toward Ukraine contributed to the conflict, and that voices emphasizing NATO enlargement as the sole cause are contested. McGovern mentions Obama’s warnings not to give Ukraine illusions of prevailing against Russia and to avoid escalation, and he contrasts this with Stoltenberg’s statements about Russia’s preconditions for peace. - They also critique EU moves to seize Russian assets to fund Ukraine, suggesting that European leaders may be acting to preserve political power rather than align with the public’s long-term interests, and question whether such measures will endure or provoke wider political backlash. - In closing, McGovern reiterates that Russia has the upper hand for now, with the war’s outcome dependent on political decisions in Washington and Moscow, particularly whether Trump can extend New START, and whether European and US policymakers can sustain a realistic approach to security guarantees and the balance of power in Europe. The conversation ends with a cautious note about the potential for a settlement but ongoing uncertainties about the strategic environment and transatlantic politics.

Professor Jeffrey Sachs and Glenn unpack how European security architecture evolved and why current moves toward a Europe-centered NATO, possibly including Ukraine and excluding Russia, look so perilous. - Sachs recounts a historic 1990 opportunity offered by Mikhail Gorbachev: a “common European home” stretching from Rotterdam to Vladivostok, with internal Soviet reforms, demilitarization, and, crucially, an end to NATO expansion. The promise by Germany and the United States in pursuit of German reunification was that “NATO would not move one inch eastward.” This indivisible-security concept echoed the Helsinki final act: no country would join an alliance threatening others. Yet NATO expanded, despite that explicit commitment, and that expansion contributed to the current Ukraine conflict. - Two motives behind NATO enlargement are highlighted. First, to keep the United States in Europe as a security defender, especially for Central and Eastern European states emerging from Soviet domination, which wanted continued U.S. protection despite no evident external threat. Second, the United States used NATO enlargement as a tool for projecting American power in a unipolar world after the Soviet collapse, turning NATO into the military branch of U.S. overseas power and serving a broader hegemonic aim. - Brzezinski’s influence is emphasized: in The Grand Chessboard (1997), he argued Eurasia centered on Ukraine; “he who controls Ukraine controls Eurasia.” Brzezinski advocated expanding Europe and NATO to diminish Russia, envisioning a weakened or divided Russia. This framed Ukraine as a geopolitical prize, with Ukraine’s joining NATO seen as a strategy to prevent a revived Russian power. - The expansion waves are traced: 1999 brought Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic; 2004 added seven states including the Baltic states and Romania; 2008 and the Bucharest summit sparked a pledge that Ukraine and Georgia would join NATO, a timetable Merkel later resisted but ultimately yielded to U.S. pressure. The 2004 expansion followed the U.S. withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 2002, further destabilizing the nuclear balance and fueling Russian resentment. - The Maidan coup of 2014 in Ukraine, aided by Western support, brought to power a government that favored NATO alignment, intensifying Russian pushback and making Europe’s pro-NATO stance more central to policy, even as Russia resisted. The aim was to bring Ukraine into NATO, which Sachs argues was not defense-driven but an assertion of American hegemony. - Sachs contrasts two mindsets: Eastern Europe’s Russophobia, rooted in decades of Soviet domination, especially among the Baltic states and Poland, driving a hardline stance; and a German role that has shifted from a historic commitment to make peace with Russia (Austrian-style realpolitik) to endorsing NATO expansion for commercial investments, a shift he finds dangerous. He criticizes Merkel for acquiescing to U.S. pressure on enlargement and labels Scholz and Merkel’s posture as failures to maintain a balanced European peace. British Russophobia also colors policy, he adds, underscoring a transatlantic appetite for confrontation. - The broader risk is a security dilemma: Europe’s defensive steps may provoke offensive reactions, potentially leading toward war, especially if a “European NATO” is formed to deter or strike at Russia without credible allied protection. Sachs argues the current direction shows a lack of political and security imagination in Europe, with a remilitarization path that could be a march to war. - In closing, Sachs notes the paradox: European leaders recognize risk but still pursue a path that could escalate conflict with a nuclear power, while the debate continues about deterrence, defense, and the future of European security architecture.

Glenn: Welcome back. We are joined today by Professor John Mersheimer to understand what is happening in the world with this new great power rivalry and how the outcome of the Ukraine war will impact this new Cold War. Have we entered a new Cold War? Who are the players, competing interests, and the rules? Mersheimer: I think we have entered a new Cold War. We're in a multipolar system, and the United States, China, and Russia are the three great powers. The United States is certainly in a cold war with China. China is powerful and threatens to dominate East Asia, and the United States will almost certainly go to great lengths to prevent that from happening, which axiomatically creates an intense security competition in China. An intense security competition is a cold war, and the name of the game is to make sure that security competition does not turn into a hot war. We are in a cold war with the Chinese, or the Chinese are in a cold war with us. The hot war is avoided. Regarding Russia, since we moved into multipolarity, the Russians and the Chinese have been close allies against the United States. This is largely a result of the Ukraine war, which has pushed the Russians into the arms of the Chinese and caused closer Sino-Russian cooperation. The United States, through the Biden administration, was involved in a cold war with both Russia and China. Trump tried to change that, seeking good relations with Russia to form a Russia-plus-US alliance against China, but he has been unable to make that happen. The result is that the United States is basically still in a cold war with both Russia and China. The war in Ukraine has made me worry greatly that the Cold War in Europe could turn into a hot war, even as the U.S.-China relationship remains cooler so far. Glenn: European leaders hoped the United States and Europe would unite in this new Cold War, with liberal hegemony fading and a return to unity against Russia. But Ukraine has instead divided Europe. How do you explain this? Is it the US not seeing Russia as the same threat as Europeans, or a concern about pushing Russia toward China, or Europe’s costs of the partnership? Is this uniquely a Trump-era approach? Mersheimer: From an American point of view, good relations with Russia make sense. China is the peer competitor, and the United States wants to pivot to East Asia to prevent China’s dominance. Russia is the weakest of the three great powers and not a major threat to Europe. The Americans believe Europe can deal with Russia, freeing them to focus on China. Europe, by contrast, is threatened by Russia’s proximity and thus prioritizes Russia. NATO expansion into Ukraine is seen by many Europeans as a disaster, poisoning Russia–Europe relations, making Europe deeply committed to using Ukraine to weaken Russia. The transatlantic alliance becomes strained, especially with Trump raising the possibility of leaving NATO. Europeans fear losing the American pacifier that keeps centrifugal forces in check, which would complicate European coordination with Russia. Glenn: If the United States signals a departure, won’t Europe face greater challenges in managing Russia? And is Russia truly an empire-building threat, or is this a post-2014 narrative that intensified after February 2022? Mersheimer: Bringing Ukraine into NATO was destined to cause trouble. The crisis began in 2014, and the 2022 war is ongoing. The Ukrainians and Europeans want a security guarantee for Ukraine, essentially NATO membership, while Russia demands territory and rejects a security guarantee that would enshrine NATO’s presence near its borders. The Europeans see NATO expansion as threatening, while the Americans view Russia as the weaker power and the need to pivot to China. The controversy over responsibility for this disaster arises from competing interpretations of NATO expansion and Russian aggression. Glenn: Do you see Russia changing course soon? There has been escalation—Odessa blockades, port attacks, and targeting infrastructure. Could this signal a new stage of the war? Mersheimer: The Russians believe Ukraine is on the ropes and expect to win on the battlefield in 2026, possibly expanding fronts in Kharkiv and Sumy. They may consider increasing conventional force and possibly using nuclear weapons if the war drags on. They view the conflict as existential and fear losing, which could push them toward drastic measures to end the war. The Russians could escalate if they think they cannot win conventionally. Glenn: What are the non-nuclear options to win quickly? Could the Russians deliver a decisive conventional victory? Mersheimer: It’s a war of attrition. If Ukraine’s army is weakened, Russia could surround large Ukrainian formations, disrupt logistics, and open larger fronts. They may build up forces in the rear, potentially for a breakthrough or to deter Western escalation. The battlefield outcome may determine the next steps, including whether nuclear options are considered. Glenn: How will Ukraine end? Is it a military defeat, economic collapse, or political fragmentation? Mersheimer: Ukraine is likely to be defeated on the battlefield. Its economy is in desperate shape, and losing Odessa or more territory would worsen it. Politically, Ukraine will face internal divisions once the war ends. Europe will face a broken Russia–Ukraine relationship, with some European states viewing the conflict differently. Ukraine’s demographic decline compounds its bleak outlook, and the country may become a problematic rump state. The war should have been settled earlier; the negotiators in Istanbul in 2022 could have sought a different path. Zelensky’s choice to align with Western powers and walk away from Istanbul negotiations deepened Ukraine’s predicament. Glenn: Any final reflections? Mersheimer: The war’s outcome will reshape Western unity and European security. Historians may view this as a major mistake in weakening the West. The blame for the disaster will likely be attributed in the West to Russia’s imperialism, but the expansion of NATO is also central. Europe’s economic and political landscape will be altered, and Ukraine’s future will be deeply challenging.