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NATO's head has warned allies to adopt a war mindset and increase defense spending due to rising threats, marking a significant shift in tone. This call to action raises questions about whether European governments, including the UK, are heeding the warning. Political leaders, like Keir Starmer, prioritize domestic issues over military readiness, despite military chiefs expressing concerns about defense capabilities. The NATO chief emphasized the dangers posed by Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran, stating we are in a state of conflict, even if not officially at war. Governments are preparing citizens for potential conscription and wartime readiness. The narrative suggests a growing inevitability of global conflict, driven by geopolitical interests and the military-industrial complex.

Europe should have been negotiating with Russia, but now that Trump is, some are in an uproar. If the US stops sending arms and funding, the war will end. This all stems from American arrogance, going back decades to the US declaring itself the sole superpower and expanding NATO eastward, ignoring Russian concerns. The US participated in a violent coup in Ukraine in 2014, further escalating tensions. Europe needs a grown-up foreign policy, not one based on hate speech or Russophobia, but real diplomacy. NATO should have been disbanded in 1991. The US sees this as a game, but for Russia, it's about core national security.

NATO has expanded eastward, but claims it is not a threat to Russia. The Russian army's proximity to NATO is due to NATO's expansion, not Russia's. NATO insists it is a defensive alliance, while Russia's actions in Ukraine are seen as aggressive. The debate centers on whether NATO's expansion is perceived as hostile by Russia.

Guy Mettin argues that Russophobia is rooted in religious and historical narratives that long predate modern geopolitics. He traces the irrational hostility toward Russia to deep-seated religious split dynamics, notably the Schism between Western Catholics and Eastern Orthodox in the eleventh century, and the way Catholic propaganda cast Byzantium’s Orthodox as schismatic, barbarian, and despotic. After Byzantium fell, Russia claimed the Orthodox heritage, which then fed a narrative of confrontation with Western Europe. In the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, Western powers weaponized this narrative to justify anti-Russian sentiment as Russia rose as a European power after Peter the Great and Catherine II. A key example is the forged “testament of Peter the Great,” which France’s Louis XV, Napoleon, Britain after Vienna 1815, and later U.S. circles used to cast Russia as aiming to conquer the West, justifying preemptive actions and fear-driven policy. He notes the testament’s repeated misuse by Napoleon, the British, and even post-Vienna propaganda that shaped decades of Russophobia, including cartoons and cultural depictions like Bram Stoker’s Dracula as a symbol of Russian aristocracy. He emphasizes that this phobia has two functions: the belief that Western security depends on opposing Russia, and the idea that failure to act against Russia invites invasion. This dual function persists in contemporary discourse, where European calls for more weapons to deter Russia echo the old premise that what happens on Russia’s borders determines Europe’s fate. He asserts that Russia has not historically aggressed against Western Europe in the way Western narratives claim; rather, invasions often originated from the West (Teutonic knights, Mongols, Poland, Sweden, Napoleonic France, Germany, Britain). Russia’s own incursions into Europe have been responses to aggression by others, such as Napoleon’s invasion or Hitler’s World War II actions. The discussion turns to how the West constructs an ethical framework in which liberal democracy and human rights are presented as universal ideals, and any actions by Russia are interpreted through that lens. This leads to a paradox: when European powers sanction Russian academics or journalists in the name of defending freedom of expression, it appears inconsistent with the First Amendment protections observed in the United States, while Europe pursues sanctions that curb scholarly debate. He cites specific cases: sanctions against Swiss journalist Xavier Meurice and Jacques Bou, and mentions the sanctioning of other researchers; he also highlights Thierry Breton’s sanctioning by the United States as an example of perceived contradictions in Western policy. He contrasts the greater freedom of opinion in the U.S. with growing European censorship and the suppression of discourse on topics such as NATO expansion and U.S. involvement in Ukraine. Mettin discusses how Western journalists and NGOs may be influenced or embedded within foreign policy aims. He recalls Udo Ulfkotte’s critique of the “corrupted journalist” ecosystem—NATO/N Atlantis-linked influence, seminars, and conferences designed to mold media narratives. He recounts personal experiences in Sarajevo during the 1990s, where journalists were invited by NATO and the UN and later found the narrative they were fed to be constructed. He argues that funding sources, such as Open Society foundations, can bias investigative journalism, leading to a loss of independence, as observed in his experience with the Consortium of International Investigative Journalists (ICIJ) under Soros-Open Society money. The conversation shifts to the global dimension of Russophobia. He notes a growing anti-Russian sentiment is not shared elsewhere; in parts of Africa, Asia, and Latin America, there are relatively more favorable or nuanced attitudes toward Russia, which gives him optimism that the anti-Russian stance in Europe may eventually wane. He suggests broadening analysis to Ukraine and Eastern Europe—Finland, the Baltic states, Poland, Romania, Moldova—to understand how resentment toward Soviet-era rule persists and morphs into modern attitudes toward Russia, even as the Soviet past fades. Towards the end, he mentions Orban in Hungary as an example of a leader who can separate past anti-Russian sentiment from a rational present-day policy, arguing for a more principled approach. He closes with an endorsement of discussing these issues openly and hopes that the hate of Russia will eventually diminish. He invites listeners to read his book, Russophobia, and thanks the interviewer, Maxime, for the dialogue.

In this conversation, Professor Glenn Diesen discusses his critical view of current Western and NATO policies, the treatment of contrarian analysis, and the evolving security dynamics in Europe, with a focus on Norway and the Nordic region. - On academic freedom and public discourse: Diesen explains that challenging the mainstream view is met with terms like “Putin Verster,” suggesting that understanding an opponent is seen as taking their side. He argues this suppresses discussion of security concerns and inhibits analysis on how to avoid or end conflicts. He notes that those who were right about Russia and NATO developments are often marginalized in the mainstream narrative. - Norway’s shift in security posture: In Norway, a move away from Cold War-era restraint toward greater alignment with the United States is described. Diesen notes that Norway previously avoided foreign bases on its soil, hosting limited Arctic activity and practicing deterrence without provoking the Soviet Union. He asserts this has changed, with Norway now granting access to American bases across the country, particularly in the Arctic, to confront Russia. He points out that Norway historically did not send weapons to countries at war, a policy that has shifted since the Ukraine conflict. - The Ukraine war and arms policy: Diesen contrasts the pre-2022 stance of “diplomacy first” with the current reality in which Norwegian leaders and parliament have largely supported arming Ukraine. He recounts his own attempt to run for parliament on a platform advocating diplomacy rather than weapon supplies, and he highlights that the current consensus—across almost all parties—favors weapons support, with perceived little room for alternative approaches. - Sweden and Finland in NATO and Nordic implications: The joining of Sweden and Finland to NATO is discussed as a response to fear of Russia after the Ukraine invasion. Diesen argues the public was initially hesitant in both countries, and argues that the narrative framing of Russia as an existential threat influenced rapid NATO accession once public opinion shifted. He suggests this shift was prepared in advance by Western powers, with media and political networks supporting pro-NATO positions. - Arctic geostrategy and regional stakes: The rapporteur explains that the Arctic and Baltic regions are central to Western containment of Russia. With Finland and Sweden in NATO and Norway militarized, the potential to block Russian access to key maritime corridors is emphasized. Diesen warns that expanding military leverage against Russia under a “more security through greater weapons” logic is flawed, predicting that Russia would respond forcefully if provoked. He stresses that the notion of Russia capitulating under increased pressure is unrealistic. - Denmark and Greenland scenarios: The discussion shifts to Denmark’s Greenland, noting President Trump’s interest in the territory. Diesen outlines possible US strategies: threaten force but favor negotiated settlements, offer financial incentives to Denmark to cede Greenland, or stage a sequence of steps (including a potential secession in Greenland) to facilitate absorption by the US. He suggests that the US might prefer a negotiated outcome over direct military action to avoid broad European backlash. - Europe’s strategic dependency and future: The European tendency to lean on the United States for security and economics is highlighted as a vulnerability. Diesen argues Europe has become heavily dependent—politically, economically, and militarily—and that this dependency limits Europe’s bargaining power in disputes over Greenland and other strategic issues. He proposes rethinking Europe’s security architecture towards inclusivity and dialogue with Russia, rather than a divides-based approach that feeds security competition. - A call for inclusive security architecture: Concluding, Diesen advocates reviving an inclusive European security framework based on indivisible security and open dialogue with Russia. He argues that NATO expansion and an exclusive security structure since the 1990s eroded the possibility of a cooperative European security order and that Europe should rethink its approach to reduce tensions and dependence on the United States. The interview ends with Diesen promoting his channel and noting translations into German, inviting further discussion on these themes.

Nikolay Petro and Gwen were discussing the Munich Security Conference and the broader shift in global order. The core theme is the destruction or breakdown of the post–Cold War order as the world moves toward multipolarity, with the United States and Europe following diverging paths. - The transition to multipolarity is described as chaos and a vacuum of strategic thinking. From a European perspective, this is an unwanted transition into something unfamiliar, while the US debates a more pragmatic approach that may bypass traditional institutions to position itself favorably. The multipolar world would be more democratic, with more voices in actual discussion of each nation’s needs and contributions, in contrast to the hegemonic, rules-based order. - The concept of multipolarity presumes multiple poles of interest. Nations at the top of the old order feel uncomfortable; they had a lead dog (the United States) and knew where they were going. Now the lead dog may be wandering, and the rest are lost. There’s a push to engage voices from the global South, or the global majority, though the term “global South” is viewed as imprecise. - At Munich, Kaia Kallas and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz (Mertz) urged order to avoid chaos. Kallas favored restoring or preserving the structures of the past, arguing the European Union should reconnect with the US and dominate collectively as the political West. Mertz used aggressive language, saying Germany’s army must be the most powerful in Europe and that the war in Ukraine will end only when Russia is exhausted economically and militarily; he argued Europe imposed unheard-of losses on Russia. - In response, the US role in Munich was anticipated to feature Marco Rubio as the delegation head, signaling a security-focused agenda rather than deep internal European discourse. The discussion suggested the US may push a strategy of returning to or reshaping a hegemonic order, pressuring Europe to align with American priorities, and highlighting that the old order is over. - There is a perception of internal German political dynamics: the rise of the anti-establishment party (IFD) could challenge the current SPD/CSU coalition, potentially altering the German stance on Russia and Europe’s strategy toward Moscow. The possibility exists that internal German shifts could counter aggressive German policy toward Russia. - In Europe, there is a tension between those who want to sacrifice more national autonomy to please the US and those who advocate diversifying ties to avoid total dependence on Washington. In practice, EU policy has often mirrored US priorities, thereby delaying a truly autonomous European strategy. - The EU’s foreign policy structure remains weak due to political diversity among member states, the need for cooperation with national governments, and resistance to surrendering power to Brussels. There is no cohesive grand strategy within the EU, making it hard to present a unified vision in a multipolar world. The EU’s reliance on crisis-driven centralization contrasts with those internal contradictions. - Ukraine’s war exposed tensions in Europe’s cohesion. Initially, there was a rallying effect and unified front against Russia, aided by US support, aiming for a rapid Russian defeat. Now the EU’s rhetoric shifts toward seeking a ceasefire and preserving what remains of Ukraine, labeling victory in terms of saving Ukraine rather than expelling Russia. EU funding for Ukraine—about €90 billion over two years—may be insufficient, with Ukraine claiming higher needs. - The discussion suggested that European leadership’s view of Russia and Putin is unstable: some European circles believe Russia could collapse economically, while others see Russia’s leadership as capable of countermeasures. Reports of France reestablishing high-level political contacts with Russia were noted as part of this flux. - The conversation contrasted backward-looking US/EU visions with a forward-looking multipolar vision promoted by BRICS, especially Russia, which could be more promising due to its forward outlook. The EU, dominated by internal divisions, struggles to articulate an autonomous multipolar path, while the United States appears intent on reviving its dominant position and reshaping the international order, sometimes in ways that delay the shift to multipolarity. - Overall, the speakers highlighted a shared but backward-looking orientation between the EU and the US, versus a forward-looking, multipolar alternative; they also underscored the strategic vacuum, internal European divisions, and the continuing tug-of-war between attempting to restore past structures and embracing a new global arrangement.

We are facing immense crises in the European Union. War has returned to our territory, and we need the EU more than ever. However, the far-right is gaining success in elections, with figures like Mr. Wilders campaigning against Muslims, immigration, and even the European Green Deal. If we don't wake up and realize the gravity of the situation, if we don't find the strength to convince others that we need to save the EU, it is in danger of extinction. There is a combination of external and internal threats that we have never seen before in European history. The upcoming election is crucial and decisive. Putin's plan to pressure and weaken Europe is succeeding.

Richard Wolff and Glenn discuss Trump’s political project, the trajectory of US capitalism, and how Europe is adjusting to a perceived decline of Western hegemon. - Trump’s politics are, in Wolff’s view, more traditional Republican strategy than a wholesale break with the past. The core priority remains to “make money for the top one to 5%” of people—corporate executives and the employer class that the US census identifies as about 3% of the population. The first-term flagship was the 2017 tax cuts for corporations and wealthier individuals; in the second term, the “big beautiful tax bill” of April likewise serves the core financial base before other issues like immigration or tariffs. - Trump’s more radical or theatrical moves—anti-immigrant campaigns, ICE enforcement, heightened rhetoric toward immigrants, and provocative international actions—are political theater intended to mobilize the traditional Republican coalition and reassure the business constituency. This theater targets the mass voting blocs, while the core funders provide the money to sustain the spectacle. - The domestic political dynamic: while a sizable segment of his base remains supportive, there is growing election-time anxiety within the business coalition and among some voters who are unsettled by his handling of events, including the Epstein scandal. Still, his base numbers hover around 30–35%, giving him a platform to push ahead, though the broader economic critique remains largely taboo in US politics across parties. - The fundamental economic problem: US decline as a structural issue is not debated openly by Trump’s circle or rival parties; the decline persists as China continues to outpace the US in growth. Even with tariffs, China redirected exports to other markets, maintaining a large overall export footprint and signaling the limits of unilateral US pressure. - The “tribute economy” concept: Trump’s international approach can be read as trying to convert other countries into tributaries—using tariffs, coercive measures, and diplomacy to extract relative gains from others while protecting US interests. This aligns with a broader narrative Wolff attributes to a waning hegemon resorting to coercive leverage rather than genuine economic strategy. - Andrew Jackson frame vs. reality: Trump’s use of a Jacksonian nationalist rhetoric is a superficial political device, not a deep historical redefinition. The honest historical view is that Trump adopts a veneer of Jacksonianism to justify a broader, conventional Republican agenda oriented toward the business class, while the world has changed in ways that the Jacksonian frame cannot fully accommodate. - The European reaction: Europe faces a difficult, shrinking trajectory. Wolff argues Europeans are increasingly likely to become an adjunct to the United States, with growth constrained by dependence on outside high-tech powerhouses (the US and China), shrinking industry from auto to other sectors, and rising social strain as welfare states come under pressure. - European policy implications: leaders may resort to increased militarization and a stronger anti-Russia stance to justify repression and social control at home, even as Russia’s actual military threat is overstated as a rationale. Wolff foresees growing social fragmentation, a potential class split between ruling elites and the working/middle classes, and the risk that external threats become a justification for expanding state power and military spending. - A longer arc: Wolff suggests that the current European and American trajectories reflect a broader decline of liberal hegemonies post-World War II. The solution would not be to return to a full Cold War-style confrontation but to acknowledge new multipolar realities, diversify alliances, and address domestic social needs rather than pursuing an ever-expanding militarized security paradigm. - The Minneapolis example and domestic politics: events like the ICE deployment in Minneapolis reveal a troubling trend toward heavy-handed, performative state power that could backfire politically for Trump, especially as more Republicans question Epstein-related narratives and other scandal-driven headlines intensify. - In Europe, the declining empire dynamic suggests a potential return to earlier anti-establishment currents, but leaders face the dilemma of maintaining welfare states while contending with reduced imperial leverage. The conversation anticipates rising social tensions unless new economic strategies and political alignments emerge that recognize changing power structures.

Larry Johnson and the host discuss the current trajectory of U.S. policy under Donald Trump and its implications for international law, NATO, and the global balance of power, with frequent emphasis on Greenland as a flashpoint. - They suggest Trump is making a case for peace through overwhelming strength and unpredictability, implying that international law is seen by him as a restraint US power. Johnson argues that Trump’s stance includes threats and pressure aimed at annexing Greenland, and he questions whether this represents a genuine peace strategy or a coercive strategy that disregards international norms. - Johnson catalogs a sequence of Trump-era actions and rhetoric: Donald Trump “launched the coup against the Iranian government,” was involved in discussions with Zelensky, helped Ukraine, and then “kidnapped Nicolas Maduro,” followed by an escalation that included the suggestion of a military attack on Iran. He says Trump has “declared openly” that he does not recognize or respect international law, describing it as “useless. It’s whatever he thinks is right and what needs to be done.” - The conversation notes that Trump’s position has been reflected by close aides and allies, including Steven Miller, Marco Rubio, and Scott Bessette. Johnson claims this broad endorsement signals a shift in how major powers might view the U.S. and its approach to international law, with Putin, Xi, Macron, and others watching closely. - They argue this marks a breakdown of the international system: “a complete breakdown of the international system,” with NATO potentially coming apart as the U.S. claims a threat to Greenland from China or Russia and insists that NATO is unnecessary to protect it. The debate frames Europe as being in a toxic relationship with the United States, dependent on U.S. security guarantees, while the U.S. acts with unilateralism. - The European response is discussed in detail. The host describes European leaders as having “ Stockholm syndrome” and being overly dependent on Washington. The letter to Norway’s prime minister by Trump is cited as an astonishing admission that peace is subordinate to U.S. self-interest. The question is raised whether NATO is dying as a result. - They compare the evolution of international law to historical developments: Magna Carta is invoked as a symbol of limiting rulers, and Westphalia is discussed as a starting point for the balance-of-power system. The hosts consider whether modern international law is viable in a multipolar world, where power is distributed and no single hegemon can enforce norms as unilaterally as in the past. - They discuss the economic dimension of the shift away from U.S. hegemony. The U.S. dollar’s status as the global reserve currency is challenged as BRICS-plus and other nations move toward alternative payment systems, gold, and silver reserves. Johnson notes that the lifting of sanctions on Russia and the broader shift away from dollar-dominated finance are undermining U.S. financial hegemony. He highlights that Russia and China are increasing gold and silver holdings, with a particular emphasis on silver moving to new highs, suggesting a widening gap in global finance. - The Trump administration’s tariff strategy is discussed as another instrument that could provoke a financial crisis: Johnson cites reports of European threats to retaliate with massive tariffs against the U.S. and references the potential for a broader financial shock as gold and silver prices rise and as countries reduce their purchases of U.S. Treasuries. - The discussion examines Greenland specifically: the claim that the U.S. wants Greenland for access to rare earth minerals, Arctic access, and strategic bases. Johnson disputes the rare-earth rationale, pointing out U.S. processing limits and comparing Arctic capabilities—Russia has multiple nuclear-powered icebreakers. He characterizes Trump’s Greenland gambit as a personal vanity project that could set off broader strategic consequences. - They touch on the role of European defense commitments, with German and other European responses to defend Greenland described as inconsequential or symbolic, and a suggestion that Europe might respond more seriously by hedging against U.S. influence, though current incentives make a real break difficult. - A broader warning emerges: the possibility of a new world order emerging from multipolarity, with the United States weakened economically and politically. They foresee a period of adjustment in which European countries may reorient toward Russia or China, while the United States pursues a more fragmented and confrontational stance. - The conversation ends with mutual concerns about the trajectory toward potential geopolitical conflict and a call to watch the evolving relationship between the major powers, the role of international law, and the coming economic shifts as the global system transitions from unipolar to multipolar.

America and Europe are facing similar problems due to a globalist agenda. Europe is experiencing challenges with immigration from non-Western countries, leading to the erosion of national identities and sovereignty. Additionally, there is excessive spending on a nonexistent climate crisis and a war in Ukraine that is not Europe's concern. These actions are contributing to our own downfall.

We are facing immense crises in the European Union. War has returned to our territory, and we need the EU more than ever. However, the far-right is gaining success in elections, with figures like Mr. Wilders campaigning against Muslims, immigration, and even the European Green Deal. If we don't wake up and realize the gravity of the situation, if we don't find the strength to convince others that we need to save the EU, it is in danger of collapse. There is a combination of external and internal threats that we have never seen before in European history. The upcoming election is crucial and decisive. Putin's plan to pressure and weaken Europe is working.

Glenn and John Mersheimer discuss US interests in Venezuela beyond democracy promotion and narco-terrorism. Mersheimer argues the Monroe Doctrine defines US Western Hemisphere aims: preventing distant great powers from forming military alliances with or basing forces in the Americas. He asserts the Venezuela operation is not about the Monroe Doctrine or great-power competition, but an imperialist or neocolonial effort by the US to control Venezuela’s politics and oil. He notes Trump’s emphasis on who controls Venezuelan oil reflects blunt imperialism, not classical doctrine. Glenn asks if this aligns with past patterns of intervention or if it’s more brazen. Mersheimer says the US has a long history of interfering in Western Hemisphere politics, targeting leftward movements, toppling regimes, and even hinting at broader regional actions under Trump. He emphasizes Trump’s blunt rhetoric and actions—saying the US can “run Venezuela” and that Venezuela’s oil is “our oil”—as evidence of a brazen approach that lacks typical liberal-justifying rhetoric and resembles a naked imperial project. The conversation shifts to international law and the liberal rules-based order. Glenn notes that liberal order sometimes legitimized force (as in Kosovo) and asks how the Venezuela episode fits. Mersheimer argues that during the unipolar moment the US adhered to international law more and created many rules, but Trump has shown contempt for international norms, trashing the rules-based system. He contends this shift harms US interests and shows that Trump cares primarily about the United States, not about international law or other countries. They discuss European reactions and the Nord Stream incident as a test of Western liberal rhetoric. Glenn notes perceived hypocrisy in European support for Israel’s actions in Gaza and questions whether Europe will push back against Trump. Mersheimer says Europeans fear losing the US security umbrella and NATO, so they appease Trump to maintain American presence in Europe, even as they recognize his bully tendencies. He suggests Europeans might criticize but avoid costly confrontations that would threaten NATO, though Greenland could test this dynamic. He predicts the possibility of a US move on Greenland given Trump’s willingness to use force “on the cheap,” and notes that such a move could fracture NATO and European unity. They discuss the broader West, arguing the concept of a homogeneous West is fading. The US pivot to East Asia due to China’s rise undermines traditional Europe-centered alliances. The deterioration of US-European relations, combined with Moscow’s efforts to exploit European fault lines, could produce a fractured West. The discussion highlights the erosion of liberal values as a coordinating narrative, with European dependence on the US as a pacifier intensifying appeasement dynamics. The Ukraine war remains central in assessing future alliances. Mersheimer asserts Trump’s strategy shifts burden to Europe, which cannot sustain Ukraine support, and predicts blame games if Ukraine loses, with European leaders and Washington trading accusations. Russia’s efforts to deepen European and Atlantic tensions will persist, potentially leaving Europe more divided and the US less able to serve as a stabilizing force. He concludes that the Venezuela episode, while notable, does not fundamentally alter the trajectory set by Ukraine and the pivot to Asia, though it underscores weakening Western cohesion and the fragility of NATO if US commitments wane. Glenn and Mersheimer close reflecting on the difficulty of maintaining a unified Western order amid shifting power and repeated demonstrations of Western frictions, expressing concern over future stability and the risk that major actions—such as potential Greenland intervention—could further destabilize the transatlantic alliance.

Europe is not preparing for war, but for collapse, and elites are not gearing up for war with Russia because they care about freedom. They are doing it because their grip on power is slipping, economies are breaking, and the middle class is crushed. Hungary was sanctioned for refusing to send money to Ukraine, and Slovakia and Poland are breaking rank. The AFD is rising in Germany, and France is trying to stop Marine Le Pen. These are the voices of the people, and that terrifies the establishment. Elites crank up the fear, blame Russia, and push for war to cover for their own failures. The threat is coming from within, from the millions of people across Europe and the US who are done being lied to, used, and ignored. The media repeats the same script every day, and Trump is punching holes straight through it. The solution is to speak the truth, ask the right questions, and stop playing along.

What does "revisionist Russia" mean? It suggests a desire to return to the Soviet Union's former glory. Secretary Hagel mentioned Russia's army being on NATO's doorstep. Some argue this is due to NATO's eastward expansion, but that perspective isn't universally accepted. NATO's expansion is seen as beneficial, not a threat. While NATO is a defensive alliance, Russia's military movements, including actions in Ukraine, are viewed as aggressive. The expansion of NATO doesn't imply hostility; it's about security. The focus should be on Russia's actions that destabilize neighboring countries, rather than blaming NATO for its proximity to Russia.

I think President Putin believes NATO's expansion is the reason the Russian army is at NATO's doorstep, but we certainly don't see it that way. NATO has expanded, but that's a good thing. I'm pretty sure it wasn't NATO who ordered troops to the Ukrainian border or destabilized Eastern Ukraine. NATO is a security alliance, not an anti-Russia alliance. For fifty years, it was an anti-Soviet alliance. I'm not going to pretend to know what goes on in President Putin's mind. NATO has expanded, but there's no reason to think the expansion is hostile. We're blaming Russia for violating Ukraine's territorial integrity.

NATO raises questions about its role in American national security. Americans and NATO members must consider the cost in taxpayer dollars and lives. The U.S. cannot continue to bear the burden of defense while other members do not contribute equally.

The conversation centers on the idea that Europe’s leadership has deteriorated and that powerful voices from the past warned this would happen. Colin Powell, according to Speaker 1, told Speaker 0 in 1989 that Europe would end up with “horrible leaders,” and that those who replace them would be people “who have no conscience, people who have no sense of reality, people who have not been seasoned by warfare… who think they control their lives but don't.” Powell’s view, developed from his experience as a military and strategic analyst, was that once the pressure of the Cold War abated, there would be little rationale for NATO, and Europe would drift without a coherent security structure. Speaker 1 elaborates that Powell’s instincts led him to anticipate a dissolution of the postwar security order. Powell argued that NATO’s justification would erode, and a political debacle would accompany the military one as Europe’s leaders lacked direct experience of war. He advised creating a European security identity (ESI) consisting of a 3,000-person brigade, with its own equipment, training, and industrial base, divorced from NATO. The idea was that, over time (perhaps a 20–25 year period), the ESI could grow into a division, then a corps, with its own air power and arms industry, eventually allowing NATO to fade away while Europe managed its own security. Speaker 1 notes that Powell’s position was controversial with U.S. defense and defense contractors, who viewed him as dangerous for proposing such an independent European security framework. The discussion parallels George Kennan’s 1987 warning that if the Soviet Union collapsed, American society would face a shock because so much of its domestic and alliance structures depended on the external threat. The speakers discuss Clinton-era shifts, including Bill Perry’s attempts to revive cooperation with Russia, and the way Clinton’s policies altered the trajectory away from Powell’s envisioned framework. They mention a shift away from a fixed European security reliance on a NATO-centric model toward broader strategic engagement, but also criticize the departure from a legally grounded approach to world affairs. The conversation then turns to current tensions, including Europe’s involvement in Ukraine. The participants reflect on Powell’s broader aim of integrating security arrangements with law, noting that international law should guide actions, even if law alone cannot ensure outcomes. They discuss the possibility that the war in Ukraine could reflect the consequences of earlier decisions to preserve U.S. footprints in Europe and the Cold War security architecture, which in their view helped maintain stability but also embedded Europe within a security framework that relied on American leadership. The dialogue references the Balkans as an example of policy divergence: Powell warned that stabilizing the Balkans would require extensive forces, but President Bush was reluctant. Clinton eventually conducted a prolonged bombing campaign against Serbia, altering the dynamic with Russia and highlighting the tensions between ambitious security vision and political practicality. The speakers emphasize the importance of law and national security structures, the desire to rethink post–Cold War decisions, and the ongoing question of how Europe should secure its own stability while balancing relations with Russia and the United States.

This conflict is primarily against Russia and aims to destabilize Europe. The neocons have sought to deindustrialize Europe and sever its economic ties with Russia, particularly targeting Germany, to make Europe subservient to their agenda. We are approaching a critical point where, if their efforts against Russia fail, they might resort to extreme measures, including limited nuclear options, similar to past interventions in Libya and Iraq. Historically, NATO has not succeeded in promoting peace or security, and past actions have led to significant destruction without achieving stability.

George Bibi and Vlad discuss the United States’ evolving grand strategy in a multipolar world and the key choices facing Washington, Europe, Russia, and China. - The shift from the post–Cold War hegemonic peace is framed as undeniable: a new international distribution of power requires the U.S. to adjust its approach, since balancing all great powers is impractical and potentially unfavorable. - The U.S. previously pursued a hegemonic peace with ambitions beyond capabilities, aiming to transform other countries toward liberal governance and internal reengineering. This was described as beyond America’s reach and not essential to global order or U.S. security, leading to strategic insolvency: objectives outpaced capabilities. - The Trump-era National Security Strategy signals a reorientation: U.S. priorities must begin with the United States itself—its security, prosperity, and ability to preserve republican governance. Foreign policy should flow from that, implying consolidation or retrenchment and a focus on near-term priorities. - Geography becomes central: what happens in the U.S. Western Hemisphere is most important, followed by China, then Europe, and then other regions. The United States is returning to a traditional view that immediate neighborhood concerns matter most, in a world that is now more polycentric. - In a multipolar order, there must be a balance of power and reasonable bargains with other great powers to protect U.S. interests without provoking direct conflict. Managing the transition will be messy and require careful calibration of goals and capabilities. - Europe’s adjustment is seen as lagging. Absent Trump’s forcing mechanism, Europe would maintain reliance on U.S. security while pursuing deeper integration and outward values. The U.S. cannot afford to be Europe’s security benefactor in a multipolar order and needs partners who amplify rather than diminish U.S. power. - Europe is criticized as a liability in diplomacy and defense due to insufficient military investment and weak capability to engage with Russia. European self-doubt and fear of Russia hinder compromising where necessary. Strengthening Europe’s political health and military capabilities is viewed as essential for effective diplomacy and counterbalancing China and Russia. - The Ukraine conflict is tied to broader strategic paradigms: Europe’s framing of the war around World War II and unconditional surrender undermines possible compromises. A compromise that protects Ukraine’s vital interests while acknowledging Russia’s security concerns could prevent disaster and benefit Europe’s future security and prosperity. - U.S.–Europe tensions extend beyond Ukraine to governance ideals, trade, internet freedom, and speech regulation. These issues require ongoing dialogue to manage differences while maintaining credible alliances. - The potential for U.S.–Russia normalization is discussed: the Cold War-style ideological confrontation is largely over, with strategic incentives to prevent Russia and China from forming a closer alliance. Normalizing relations would give Russia more autonomy and reduce dependence on China, though distrust remains deep and domestic U.S. institutions would need to buy in. - China’s role is addressed within a framework of competition, deterrence, and diplomacy. The United States aims to reduce vulnerability to Chinese pressure in strategic minerals, supply chains, and space/sea lines, while engaging China to establish mutually acceptable rules and prevent spirals into direct confrontation. - A “grand bargain” or durable order is proposed: a mix of competition, diplomacy, and restraint that avoids domination or coercion, seeking an equilibrium that both the United States and China can live with.

Colonel Douglas MacGregor and Glenn discuss the current strategic picture across Ukraine, the Russia–China–Iran axis, and the broader Western political environment. On Russia and Ukraine: - MacGregor notes a major “Cauldron battles” situation in Southeastern Ukraine, with remaining Ukrainian forces being encircled and largely annihilated by precision strike weapons, and a Russian swarm anticipated to complete the encirclement. - He identifies two focal points of Russian activity: Odessa (where Russian special operations are reportedly active at night, Odessa largely undefended with air defenses degraded) and Kharkov, with ongoing pressure toward Kyiv. He emphasizes that none of these alone solves the core problem of removing Zelenskyy’s government in Kyiv, which he describes as a facade Europeans seek to preserve. - Russia has increased its force size, adding reservists and training new draftees; options for Moscow appear to be Odessa, Kharkov, and Kyiv. Putin is watching Western European political developments to gauge timing, potentially waiting for Western government changes to move decisively. - MacGregor argues NATO is effectively irrelevant to Russia’s calculus and asserts the United States does not want a war with Russia over Ukraine, giving Moscow more freedom of action than Western audiences realize. On Russia–China relations and Europe: - Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin are pursuing a bilateral strategy to mutually reinforce military and economic capabilities, forming a large continental fortress against the United States. The two powers seek to strengthen ties as they view the U.S. as increasingly belligerent. - MacGregor contends that European leaders, including Starmer, Macron, and Metz, are aligned with globalist and financial elites (referencing ties to BlackRock and others) and that personal relationships between leaders are not meaningful in the international arena; strategic interests drive policy. - He argues that many European elites’ rhetoric about Russia serves to deflect from domestic vulnerabilities and to mobilize anti-Russian sentiment as political cover. On the Middle East and Iran: - The talk about Iran is framed as not serious; MacGregor describes a plan to escalate toward regime change in Iran, driven by U.S., Israeli, and allied intelligence communities, despite Iranian resistance and regional risk. - He claims Mossad, MI6, and CIA influenced President Trump regarding Iran’s fragility, while Iran’s internal protests (economic grievances) were legitimate and quickly mischaracterized as attempts to overthrow the government. He asserts Chinese and Russian assistance helped Iran counter covert efforts, including providing satellite imagery and assisting integrated air and missile defenses. - The declared Western goal is to destroy Iran as a nation-state, with the Iranian leadership prepared to respond with full use of capabilities if attacked. He suggests a potential air and missile campaign could target the regime and strategic hubs, with the United States likely relying on high-altitude precision strikes and long-range missiles, while questioning the effectiveness and survivability of U.S. platforms like B-52s against Iranian defenses. - China and Russia are depicted as unlikely to allow Iran to be pulverized; they could intervene if Iran is near disintegration, possibly through non-nuclear actions such as a collision at sea, leveraging their submarine capabilities and influence. On European political legitimacy and future: - MacGregor connects the Epstein-related discourse in Europe to a broader critique of ruling elites, comparing the potential for political upheaval to late-18th-century France. He argues that as publics grow disillusioned with elites, there could be a crisis of political legitimacy and a shift toward more realistic leadership, with potential upheaval in Britain, France, and Germany. On Putin and future moves: - He suggests Putin views the possibility of reconciliation with Washington as unlikely, having reached somber conclusions about the prospects for meaningful agreement. He predicts Russia will act on its terms, potentially advancing toward the Dnieper River, Odessa, and perhaps Kyiv, while noting Russia does not intend to govern Western Ukraine long-term. He emphasizes that events will unfold on Russian terms, with European irrelevance in the decision-making process fading as Moscow executes its plans.

The conversation centers on Iran, potential U.S. action, and the wider strategic spillovers across the Middle East and beyond. The speakers discuss what prompted a delay in striking Iran, the likelihood of a broader attack, and how regional and great-power dynamics might unfold. - On why a strike against Iran was postponed, the consensus from the guest is that Netanyahu asked for more time to prepare for defending against Iranian missiles and to enable a larger attack footprint. The guest also cites public statements by U.S. figures supporting a bigger operation: Lindsey Graham emphatically said last Friday that the delay was so we can go bigger; General Jack Keane stated that military operations would target political and military leaders and destroy their military infrastructure to take the regime out. The guest emphasizes that the most likely scenario is an expanded target set and greater combat power in the region to defend bases and improve the attack’s effectiveness, rather than a symbolic strike. - Regarding whether Russia or China would become involved, the guest doubts active involvement by either country, but suggests indirect support or intelligence help could occur. The logic is that direct involvement would be costly for these powers, though they might assist Iran indirectly. - On the readiness and capability of Iran, the guest argues Iran is now far more prepared than in the twelve-day war. They note that insiders were purged after the prior conflict, defenses were strengthened, and missile production likely accelerated since June, with production areas shielded from prior attacks. Iran’s ability to respond quickly and with significant damage is viewed as higher, and the guest warns that if Iran experiences an existential threat, it could abandon restraint and retaliate in a way that makes a broader war more likely. - The discussion covers U.S. bases in the region, where the guest concedes that the U.S. air defense is not at the level of Israel’s Iron Dome and David Sling, THAAD, and other integrated systems. Some bases lack robust defense against ballistic missiles, drones, and other threats, and, while 30,000 U.S. troops remain in the area, the overall air-defense capability is described as insufficient to stop all Iranian missiles. - Would Iran strike Gulf nations directly to pressure them to push the U.S. to end the war? The guest says not likely, arguing that Iranian leadership has signaled a preference for good relations with Gulf states and that attacking Gulf bases or cities would create more enemies and complicate Iran’s strategic posture. - A decapitation strike targeting leadership is considered plausible by some but deemed risky. The guest notes Iran has continuity of government plans and could designate successors; even if leadership is removed, a power vacuum could ignite internal fighting. The possibility of an existential attack by Iran—coupled with a broader regional war—could be catastrophic and is something to avoid. - The discussion turns to Lebanon, Hezbollah, the Houthis, Hamas, and the broader spillover risk. The guest suggests that if Iran’s retaliation is strong and Hamas or Hezbollah see an opportunity, there could be escalations, including potential involvement by Turkey. However, Iran would likely avoid opening new fronts that would diffuse its capability to strike U.S. bases in the region. - The problem of Iran’s internal diversity is highlighted: Persians, Azeris, Kurds, Lurs, Arabs, Baluchs, and Turkmen, among others, complicate any post-regime-change scenario. The guest argues Iran could fragment, but emphasizes that a successful Western-backed regime change could still lead to civil strife rather than a stable replacement, warning of a “textbook failed regime change” akin to past Middle East interventions. - On NATO and Western unity, the guest asserts NATO is dead or in deep trouble, citing European leaders who doubt U.S. stability and reliability. He notes European politicians discuss building an autonomous European security architecture, implying growing European reluctance to rely on U.S. leadership for defense. - Greenland as a strategic issue: the guest argues there is no rational military need for Greenland for security, and that the notion of occupying or militarizing Greenland is driven more by Trump’s personal preferences than strategic necessity. He points out that even if Greenland were militarized, Russia and China would have little to gain, given logistical and strategic barriers. - Finally, the future trajectory: the guest predicts Iran will likely be pressed hard in a large strike but warns that the consequences could be severe, including regional destabilization, potential civil conflict inside Iran, and long-term strategic costs for the U.S. and its European partners. He suggests that as long as the U.S. overextends itself in multiple theaters (Iran, Greenland, Ukraine, Venezuela), global stability and the U.S. economic footing could be endangered. The guest closes by highlighting the uncertainty of Trump’s next moves, citing possible abrupt shifts and cognitive concerns that could influence decisions in unpredictable ways.

Europe is not preparing for war, but for collapse, and this is not about defending democracy. Elites in France, Germany, and the UK are preparing for war with Russia because their grip on power is slipping due to failing economies and a crushed middle class. They sanctioned Hungary for refusing to send more money to Ukraine. Slovakia is breaking rank, Poland is pushing back, and the AFD is rising in Germany. The establishment calls these movements extremist and tries to erase them because they are the voices of the people. They blame Russia and push for war to cover their failures. The threat is coming from within, from people tired of being lied to. The media repeats the same script, but Trump punches holes in it. The solution is to speak the truth, ask questions, and stop playing along, because when enough people refuse to lie, the machine breaks.

The NATO Summit in Madrid was criticized for being a platform for the military industrial complex. NATO is seen as a war machine rather than a defense alliance, with examples like Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya being cited. Its main purpose is to defend US hegemony and maintain a unipolar world system. The war in Ukraine is seen as a proxy war between the US and Russia, both countries being dominated by oligarchs. The majority of European citizens desire peace instead of punishing Russia, but NATO seems to prioritize conflict. The speaker questions the true intentions of the EU.

Professor Zhang argues that geopolitics is a game where players maximize their self-interest, with predictions built on game theory rather than ideology. For 2026, the central event is Trump’s state visit to China in April, and the US–China relationship is identified as the key uncertain variable, while Russia–Ukraine is considered settled and Europe–NATO–Russia largely forecastable. Zhang outlines the grand strategy behind current tensions: Trump supposedly aims to force a grand bargain with China by leveraging the destabilization of the Middle East and Western Hemisphere to push China into continuing to buy US dollars. He contends that since Nixon’s 1971 decision to float the dollar, the US has relied on two pillars—the petrodollar system and opening China to American technology and markets. As the US then ran deficits and engaged in Middle East wars, China sought to internationalize the yuan and reduce dependence on the dollar via instruments like the Shanghai gold exchange. This, in his view, destabilizes the dollar, prompting Trump to push China to maintain dollar demand by destabilizing oil supply routes and minerals for China’s EV, AI, and other sectors. By invading Venezuela and potentially destabilizing Iran, Trump allegedly aims to force China to rely more on Western Hemisphere oil, silver, gold, lithium, copper, etc., and thus buy more US Treasuries to support the dollar. The discussion then shifts to possible bifurcations: if the United States truly wants China to use the dollar, it would create trust and a predictable, rules-based order; yet current actions—such as cutting China off from semiconductors or “crushing its tech industry”—could push China away, making it more independent and less dependent on the dollar. The Venezuelan case is cited as evidence that the aim is to obstruct China rather than claim oil directly; it would rather block rival powers than simply seize resources. The two powers are described as codependent: China imports about three-quarters of its oil, with roughly 50% from the Middle East and 20% from Russia; China would face a long and costly transition to replace Russian oil entirely, including pipelines. China also has tools to push back, such as triggering instability in silver markets (where China dominates) or other commodities used for manufacturing, a dynamic described as mutually assured economic destruction if either side overplays. When asked how the US could simultaneously pursue trust and coercion, Zhang asserts it cannot have both; the US is described as a global hegemon that should treat China as an equal, but instead presses to subordinate China. This creates a “ladder over an abyss” metaphor: both sides must climb together, or both fall; overt coercion could push China toward a different strategic alignment, possibly toward Russia or a diversified energy portfolio. Zhang emphasizes the role of hubris and racism in US policy, rather than pure ideology, and says the US dollar’s strength is also its vulnerability. Looking at US domestic dynamics, Zhang predicts a potential US economic crisis could magnify political instability. He identifies three US fragilities: (1) AI-driven GDP components that may not generate enduring profits, as data centers consume vast resources and job loss looms; (2) over-financialization, including a speculative silver market and leverage in commodities; and (3) cryptocurrency de-coupled from real utility, with quantum easing allowing continued money printing. He argues these weaknesses could precipitate a fiscal crisis and civil conflict if not contained, potentially catalyzing a broader crisis of state legitimacy. In Europe, Zhang foresees militarization and a misguided pro-war stance despite domestic discontent, predicting irrational policies and a possible collapse of NATO’s existing framework. He forecasts intensified Europe–Russia tensions, including a possible endgame around Odessa, with NATO likely to be overwhelmed militarily, leading to civil unrest and a “slow death” for European cohesion over five to ten years. He contends Europe’s strategic autonomy is eroding under multiculturalist policies and internal polarization, undermining willingness to fight. Regarding the United States’ global posture, Zhang argues Washington is moving toward transactional empire-building—exploiting its vassals when advantageous and abandoning them when not—while projecting power from the Western Hemisphere as a core strategy. He argues that this approach will erode Europe’s relevance and provoke global backlash. Finally, Zhang returns to Iran: Trump’s push for regime change there is linked to leveraging support from Israel and influential backers, such as Adelson and Elon Musk, with the likely aim of a ground invasion. Yet the plausibility of a successful invasion is questionable, given Iran’s size and power, and Trump’s emphasis on optics over sustained policy. The main unknown is China’s response; factions within China differ on dependence on Russia versus diversified oil sources, and the April meeting will shape whether a grand bargain reduces conflict or merely preserves the empire’s decline. To conclude, the April China meeting is pivotal, with four scheduled meetings in 2026; a China–US deal could stabilize some tensions, but the underlying imperial collapse is expected to persist, fueling wars and confrontations worldwide regardless of occasional bargains.

Glenn: Welcome back. We are joined today by Professor John Mersheimer to understand what is happening in the world with this new great power rivalry and how the outcome of the Ukraine war will impact this new Cold War. Have we entered a new Cold War? Who are the players, competing interests, and the rules? Mersheimer: I think we have entered a new Cold War. We're in a multipolar system, and the United States, China, and Russia are the three great powers. The United States is certainly in a cold war with China. China is powerful and threatens to dominate East Asia, and the United States will almost certainly go to great lengths to prevent that from happening, which axiomatically creates an intense security competition in China. An intense security competition is a cold war, and the name of the game is to make sure that security competition does not turn into a hot war. We are in a cold war with the Chinese, or the Chinese are in a cold war with us. The hot war is avoided. Regarding Russia, since we moved into multipolarity, the Russians and the Chinese have been close allies against the United States. This is largely a result of the Ukraine war, which has pushed the Russians into the arms of the Chinese and caused closer Sino-Russian cooperation. The United States, through the Biden administration, was involved in a cold war with both Russia and China. Trump tried to change that, seeking good relations with Russia to form a Russia-plus-US alliance against China, but he has been unable to make that happen. The result is that the United States is basically still in a cold war with both Russia and China. The war in Ukraine has made me worry greatly that the Cold War in Europe could turn into a hot war, even as the U.S.-China relationship remains cooler so far. Glenn: European leaders hoped the United States and Europe would unite in this new Cold War, with liberal hegemony fading and a return to unity against Russia. But Ukraine has instead divided Europe. How do you explain this? Is it the US not seeing Russia as the same threat as Europeans, or a concern about pushing Russia toward China, or Europe’s costs of the partnership? Is this uniquely a Trump-era approach? Mersheimer: From an American point of view, good relations with Russia make sense. China is the peer competitor, and the United States wants to pivot to East Asia to prevent China’s dominance. Russia is the weakest of the three great powers and not a major threat to Europe. The Americans believe Europe can deal with Russia, freeing them to focus on China. Europe, by contrast, is threatened by Russia’s proximity and thus prioritizes Russia. NATO expansion into Ukraine is seen by many Europeans as a disaster, poisoning Russia–Europe relations, making Europe deeply committed to using Ukraine to weaken Russia. The transatlantic alliance becomes strained, especially with Trump raising the possibility of leaving NATO. Europeans fear losing the American pacifier that keeps centrifugal forces in check, which would complicate European coordination with Russia. Glenn: If the United States signals a departure, won’t Europe face greater challenges in managing Russia? And is Russia truly an empire-building threat, or is this a post-2014 narrative that intensified after February 2022? Mersheimer: Bringing Ukraine into NATO was destined to cause trouble. The crisis began in 2014, and the 2022 war is ongoing. The Ukrainians and Europeans want a security guarantee for Ukraine, essentially NATO membership, while Russia demands territory and rejects a security guarantee that would enshrine NATO’s presence near its borders. The Europeans see NATO expansion as threatening, while the Americans view Russia as the weaker power and the need to pivot to China. The controversy over responsibility for this disaster arises from competing interpretations of NATO expansion and Russian aggression. Glenn: Do you see Russia changing course soon? There has been escalation—Odessa blockades, port attacks, and targeting infrastructure. Could this signal a new stage of the war? Mersheimer: The Russians believe Ukraine is on the ropes and expect to win on the battlefield in 2026, possibly expanding fronts in Kharkiv and Sumy. They may consider increasing conventional force and possibly using nuclear weapons if the war drags on. They view the conflict as existential and fear losing, which could push them toward drastic measures to end the war. The Russians could escalate if they think they cannot win conventionally. Glenn: What are the non-nuclear options to win quickly? Could the Russians deliver a decisive conventional victory? Mersheimer: It’s a war of attrition. If Ukraine’s army is weakened, Russia could surround large Ukrainian formations, disrupt logistics, and open larger fronts. They may build up forces in the rear, potentially for a breakthrough or to deter Western escalation. The battlefield outcome may determine the next steps, including whether nuclear options are considered. Glenn: How will Ukraine end? Is it a military defeat, economic collapse, or political fragmentation? Mersheimer: Ukraine is likely to be defeated on the battlefield. Its economy is in desperate shape, and losing Odessa or more territory would worsen it. Politically, Ukraine will face internal divisions once the war ends. Europe will face a broken Russia–Ukraine relationship, with some European states viewing the conflict differently. Ukraine’s demographic decline compounds its bleak outlook, and the country may become a problematic rump state. The war should have been settled earlier; the negotiators in Istanbul in 2022 could have sought a different path. Zelensky’s choice to align with Western powers and walk away from Istanbul negotiations deepened Ukraine’s predicament. Glenn: Any final reflections? Mersheimer: The war’s outcome will reshape Western unity and European security. Historians may view this as a major mistake in weakening the West. The blame for the disaster will likely be attributed in the West to Russia’s imperialism, but the expansion of NATO is also central. Europe’s economic and political landscape will be altered, and Ukraine’s future will be deeply challenging.