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In this conversation, Professor Glenn Diesen discusses his critical view of current Western and NATO policies, the treatment of contrarian analysis, and the evolving security dynamics in Europe, with a focus on Norway and the Nordic region. - On academic freedom and public discourse: Diesen explains that challenging the mainstream view is met with terms like “Putin Verster,” suggesting that understanding an opponent is seen as taking their side. He argues this suppresses discussion of security concerns and inhibits analysis on how to avoid or end conflicts. He notes that those who were right about Russia and NATO developments are often marginalized in the mainstream narrative. - Norway’s shift in security posture: In Norway, a move away from Cold War-era restraint toward greater alignment with the United States is described. Diesen notes that Norway previously avoided foreign bases on its soil, hosting limited Arctic activity and practicing deterrence without provoking the Soviet Union. He asserts this has changed, with Norway now granting access to American bases across the country, particularly in the Arctic, to confront Russia. He points out that Norway historically did not send weapons to countries at war, a policy that has shifted since the Ukraine conflict. - The Ukraine war and arms policy: Diesen contrasts the pre-2022 stance of “diplomacy first” with the current reality in which Norwegian leaders and parliament have largely supported arming Ukraine. He recounts his own attempt to run for parliament on a platform advocating diplomacy rather than weapon supplies, and he highlights that the current consensus—across almost all parties—favors weapons support, with perceived little room for alternative approaches. - Sweden and Finland in NATO and Nordic implications: The joining of Sweden and Finland to NATO is discussed as a response to fear of Russia after the Ukraine invasion. Diesen argues the public was initially hesitant in both countries, and argues that the narrative framing of Russia as an existential threat influenced rapid NATO accession once public opinion shifted. He suggests this shift was prepared in advance by Western powers, with media and political networks supporting pro-NATO positions. - Arctic geostrategy and regional stakes: The rapporteur explains that the Arctic and Baltic regions are central to Western containment of Russia. With Finland and Sweden in NATO and Norway militarized, the potential to block Russian access to key maritime corridors is emphasized. Diesen warns that expanding military leverage against Russia under a “more security through greater weapons” logic is flawed, predicting that Russia would respond forcefully if provoked. He stresses that the notion of Russia capitulating under increased pressure is unrealistic. - Denmark and Greenland scenarios: The discussion shifts to Denmark’s Greenland, noting President Trump’s interest in the territory. Diesen outlines possible US strategies: threaten force but favor negotiated settlements, offer financial incentives to Denmark to cede Greenland, or stage a sequence of steps (including a potential secession in Greenland) to facilitate absorption by the US. He suggests that the US might prefer a negotiated outcome over direct military action to avoid broad European backlash. - Europe’s strategic dependency and future: The European tendency to lean on the United States for security and economics is highlighted as a vulnerability. Diesen argues Europe has become heavily dependent—politically, economically, and militarily—and that this dependency limits Europe’s bargaining power in disputes over Greenland and other strategic issues. He proposes rethinking Europe’s security architecture towards inclusivity and dialogue with Russia, rather than a divides-based approach that feeds security competition. - A call for inclusive security architecture: Concluding, Diesen advocates reviving an inclusive European security framework based on indivisible security and open dialogue with Russia. He argues that NATO expansion and an exclusive security structure since the 1990s eroded the possibility of a cooperative European security order and that Europe should rethink its approach to reduce tensions and dependence on the United States. The interview ends with Diesen promoting his channel and noting translations into German, inviting further discussion on these themes.

I met with Putin before or after becoming president, and we discussed NATO potentially fracturing. He seemed excited about the idea of causing problems for NATO.

- The conversation opens with a discussion of escalating dynamics in the Ukraine conflict as a new year begins, focusing on how the rules of war have shifted over the past four years, including the depth of NATO involvement and when actions cross into direct war. The speakers note that political leadership has largely been exempt from the war, but Russia has had opportunities to strike Ukrainian leaders that have been avoided, raising questions about future targets and the diplomatic path. - Speaker 1 argues that the political leadership has indeed been outside the war, and that voices inside Russia are growing more critical. They challenge the Western portrayal of Vladimir Putin as a dictator, suggesting Putin has restrained destruction that could hit the West, and asserting that the West and Zelenskyy have grown comfortable with exemptions. They warn that continued escalation could lead to a nuclear conflict with Europe at risk due to its geographic compactness, citing the potential fallout from attacks on American nuclear bases and the broader geopolitical consequences. - The discussion moves to the potential consequences of Western strikes on energy infrastructure and frontline energy targets, including refineries and civilian vessels. The speakers examine how Russia might respond if its assets are attacked at sea or in the Black Sea, and the possibility of Russia forcing Ukraine to lose access to the Black Sea through strategic military actions. The analysis includes a few provocative specifics: British and European actors allegedly orchestrating or enabling attacks, the role of third-country-flagged ships, and the idea that reflagging to Russian flags could be treated as an act of war by Russia. - The dialogue delves into the operational dynamics of the Mediterranean and Black Sea theatres, noting incidents such as sunflowers and other oil cargo damage, the Caspian transit company's facilities, and the implications for Turkish oil revenue and Western economies. The speakers argue that Western powers are drawing in broader international actors and that the war could expand beyond Ukraine, potentially dragging in NATO ships and submarines in a conflict at sea. They warn that if escalation continues, it could trigger a broader, more destructive war in Europe. - The conversation shifts to the likely trajectory of the battlefield, with Speaker 1 offering a grim assessment: the Donbas front and the Zaporozhye region are nearing collapse for Ukrainian forces, with Russian forces dominating missile and drone capabilities and outmaneuvering on three axes. The analysis suggests that within two to three months, upper-river-front areas, including the Zaporozhzhia and surrounding Donbas fronts, could be fully compromised, leaving only a few large urban pockets. The absence of civilian protection and the encirclement of cities would accelerate Ukrainian withdrawals and surrender, while Russia could enhance pressure on remaining fronts, including Donbas and Sumy, Kharkiv, and Dnieper regions, as weather and terrain favor Russian movements. - The speakers discuss the impact of collapsing command posts and morale, likening the abandonment of Gudai Poia to a sign of impending broader collapse, with open terrain making Ukrainian forces vulnerable to rapid Russian breakthroughs. They suggest that strategic fortifications will be overwhelmed as the front line collapses and supply lines are severed, with a predicted sequence of encirclements and city sieges. - The US role is analyzed as both a negotiator and strategist, with the assertion that the United States has long led the proxy dimension of the conflict and continues to influence targeting and weapons delivery. The discussion questions the coherence of US policy under Trump versus Biden, arguing the conflict remains a US-led enterprise despite attempts to reframe or outsources it. The speakers describe the US as hedging its bets through ongoing military support, budgets, and intelligence cooperation, while insisting that Ukraine remains a core objective of US hegemony. - A critical examination of European Union leadership follows, with strong claims that the EU is increasingly tyrannical and undemocratic, sanctioning dissidents andSuppressing speech. The dialogue condemns the deplatforming of individuals and argues that the EU’s leadership has undermined diplomacy and negotiated peace, instead pushing toward a broader confrontation with Russia. The speakers suggest that several European countries and elites are pursuing escalating policies to maintain power, even at the risk of deepening European instability and economic collapse. - The conversation ends with reflections on broader historical patterns, invoking Kennan’s warnings about NATO expansion and the risk of Russian backlash, and noting the potential for the EU to fracture under pressure. The participants acknowledge the risk of a wider conflict that could redefine global power and economic structures, while expressing concern about censorship, deplatforming, and the erosion of diplomacy as barriers to resolving the crisis. They conclude with a cautious note to prepare for worst-case scenarios and hope for, but not rely on, better circumstances in the near term.

Украина рассматривает вступление в НАТО, но это может вызвать крупные военные операции России. Россия может атаковать Украину, чтобы предотвратить вступление в НАТО. Выбор стоит между войной с Россией и вступлением в НАТО после победы. Крупная война включает воздушные операции, вторжения армий, осаду Киева, диверсии и другие действия. Вероятность войны 99%, особенно после 2021-2022. Translation: Ukraine considers joining NATO, but it may lead to major Russian military operations. Russia could attack Ukraine to prevent NATO membership. The choice is between war with Russia and joining NATO after victory. A major war involves air operations, army invasions, siege of Kyiv, sabotage, and other actions. The likelihood of war is 99%, especially after 2021-2022.

If Putin attacks a NATO ally, we will defend every part of NATO as required by treaty. It's important to clarify that we do not seek American troops to engage in combat in Russia or against Russia.

Russia will remain a dangerous opponent for a long time, and we must include Ukraine in NATO. The only way to have trusting relations with Moscow is through a decisive defeat and a reset in Russia, where the Russian population and politics abandon their deeply rooted imperial, aggressive, and colonial ideas.

If Putin attacks a NATO ally, we will defend every part of NATO as required by treaty. It's important to clarify that we do not seek American troops to fight in Russia or against Russia.

The speaker recounts a conversation where Russian counterparts expressed concerns about NATO expansion, suggesting they might turn to China in response. The speaker sarcastically wished them luck, implying this was not a viable option. The speaker stated they also suggested Iran as an alternative. According to the speaker, all involved knew these alternatives were unrealistic. The speaker believes Russian leaders need to look west, regardless of their resentment. The speaker questions whether the current situation is designed to completely shut Russia out, not necessarily as a direct military threat.

The speaker discusses the idea of Russia joining NATO and relates it to recently declassified documents. He reads a 1954 note from the Soviet government to NATO member countries, stating: "Relying on the unchanging principles of our peaceful foreign policy and striving to reduce tension in international relations, the Soviet government expresses readiness to consider jointly with interested governments the question of the USSR's participation in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization." He then presents the response to that proposal: “There is no need to underline the utterly unrealistic nature of such a proposal.” The speaker recalls an earlier moment, about a year prior, when, in response to the question about Russia possibly joining NATO, he said, “why not?” He notes that former U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, while traveling in Europe, responded that this is not being discussed now. The core discussion is framed around understanding whether NATO is a military organization and whether Russia would be welcome there. The speaker suggests that NATO is indeed a military organization and questions whether Russia would be wanted there. He asserts that NATO “is moving toward our borders,” and he ascribes to this movement a purpose or inevitability that shapes Russia’s position on the issue. In summarizing the underlying basis of the Russian position, the speaker emphasizes the perception that NATO’s character as a military alliance and its movements toward Russia’s borders inform a strategic stance against expanding membership to include Russia. He contrasts the historical openness expressed in 1954 with the contemporary response that such a proposal is not realistic, and with current statements from Western officials indicating that Russia’s accession is not under consideration. The narrative ties together declassified archival material, a past provocative-appearing suggestion, and present-day geopolitical calculations about NATO’s reach and military posture near Russia.

NATO and Russia debate over who is responsible for the Russian army's proximity to NATO's doorstep. NATO argues its expansion is defensive, while Russia blames NATO for moving closer to its borders. The discussion delves into the perception of threat and territorial integrity violations in Ukraine. Despite NATO's expansion eastward, they maintain it is not hostile. The conversation highlights differing perspectives on the situation. Translation: The debate between NATO and Russia revolves around the Russian army's presence near NATO's borders. NATO sees its expansion as defensive, while Russia accuses NATO of moving closer to its territory. The discussion touches on the perceived threat and violations in Ukraine, showcasing differing viewpoints.

There's debate over expanding NATO to Central European countries like Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia. Russia is against further expansion, warning of a potential "cold peace." While the US hasn't set a date, the understanding is that expansion will happen eventually. The issue isn't *if*, but *when*. Germany primarily advocates for expansion within NATO. While keeping the option open, expansion should only proceed if there's a real threat. The focus should be on encouraging Russia to cooperate peacefully. It's also more important for Eastern European countries to join the European Union for economic benefits. Expanding NATO to protect borders that aren't currently threatened doesn't make sense. Creating a buffer zone in Central Europe could lead to renewed tensions between Russia and Germany. We should aim for friendly relations with Russia.

NATO's response to the use of Sarin gas in Syria raises questions about their actions if such an attack were to occur on European soil. Will they intervene or remain passive? And if they do intervene, how far are they willing to go? The possibility of a direct confrontation with Vladimir Putin looms.

Moving NATO forces, including American troops, closer to Russia's borders would escalate tensions and increase the risk of war. It is crucial to understand that Russia will not back down, as this is a matter of existential importance due to past events. It is not just Putin who holds power, but a political class with their own opinions. The majority of the public supports Russian policy, making it unlikely for Putin to compromise or retreat if faced with military confrontation.

What does "revisionist Russia" mean? It suggests a desire to return to the Soviet Union's former glory. Secretary Hagel mentioned Russia's army being on NATO's doorstep. Some argue this is due to NATO's eastward expansion, but that perspective isn't universally accepted. NATO's expansion is seen as beneficial, not a threat. While NATO is a defensive alliance, Russia's military movements, including actions in Ukraine, are viewed as aggressive. The expansion of NATO doesn't imply hostility; it's about security. The focus should be on Russia's actions that destabilize neighboring countries, rather than blaming NATO for its proximity to Russia.

If the Ukrainian military doesn't stop the Russian invasion, it won't be long before our NATO forces have to fight the Russian army crossing the border.

Finland and Sweden are being considered for NATO membership. The question is whether they meet the criteria and if they are democratic enough. The speaker previously predicted a "Finlandization of Europe," but now sees a potential "NATOization of Finland."

Admitting the Baltic states to NATO could cause significant tension in US-Russian relations, potentially leading to a hostile reaction from Russia. This move could tip the balance and escalate the situation, despite the Baltic states' readiness for admission.

Glenn and Stanislav Krapivnik discuss a string of escalating security and geopolitical crises with a focus on drone incidents, NATO-Russia tensions, and the broader international energy and security implications. - Baltic drone incidents: Glenn asks about an attack on a key Russian port in the Baltic Sea, noting drones entered from NATO territory through the Baltic States and may have circumvented Belarus. Stanislav explains that two drones hit targets in the Baltics—one at an Estonian power-plant chimney and another at a separate object in Latvia—and suggests dozens of drones may have flown through airspace, possibly from Ukraine via Poland and the Baltics or launched from the pre-Baltics. He argues this is not a one-off event and raises two possibilities: either NATO member states have incompetent security, or they are directly engaged, with the more likely conclusion that the pre-Baltic states are direct participants in the war. - Deterrence and red lines: The conversation notes that NATO has aimed to pressure Russia economically (targeting energy, shipping, and oil). Glenn asks how these actions affect sentiment and Kremlin incentives. Stanislav counters that Tallinn and other Baltic leadership have crossed red lines, citing past incidents (Estonia drone attack on Skowabur Air Base) and suggesting Estonian actions are part of a broader pattern of Russophobia. He argues that Estonia’s leadership and policies threaten deterrence calculations and calls for accountability, positing that deterrence must be reset against Estonia given the perceived egregious escalations. - Interconnected conflicts and the Iran-Russia axis: The speakers discuss Sergei Lavrov’s remarks about a potential third world war linked to Iran and Russia. Stanislav asserts that conflicts are becoming highly interconnected, with the West having fomented them through proxies and direct actions. He asserts that Western leaders, whom he characterizes as pursuing broad war aims, are willing to sacrifice lives for geopolitical objectives, and he highlights ongoing cross-border terrorism and sanctions on supply chains. He emphasizes that Russia has long been involved in Iran’s military upgrades and drones, noting that Russian components power Iranian drones. He also points to the potential for China to align with expanding conflict dynamics, suggesting that Russia has already embedded itself in supporting Iran and that a fall of Iran would threaten Russia’s regional borders, especially along the Kazakhstani frontier. - Energy, fertilizer, and economic shocks: Stanislav draws on his supply-chain experience to describe the cascading effects of war on energy and fertilizer. He explains the logistical challenges of large-scale industrial repair after missile strikes, including the long lead times for steel, valves, and large refinery components, and argues that Europe’s gas and steel supply are constrained. He notes Russia’s restriction on diesel exports and Qatar’s role in fertilizer, highlighting how Europe has become dependent on Russian and Qatari supplies and is now left vulnerable by policy choices. He foresees a multi-year disruption of energy, fertilizer, and food supplies, warning of price spikes and potential starvation in parts of Europe and beyond as planting seasons approach. He highlights that fertilizer production relies on natural gas and that gas-rich regions are facing supply limitations, which would prolong and intensify food insecurity and economic disruption. - Gulf energy states and strategic calculations: The discussion turns to the Gulf, describing Gulf states as corporate-like entities run by wealthy families. Stanislav speculates on the strategic calculations of states like Qatar and the UAE, including the possibility that political and economic incentives could shape decisions about involvement in broader regional conflict, arms supplies, or island and maritime control. He argues that damage to energy infrastructure, maritime chokepoints, and desalination plants could have devastating regional consequences, potentially forcing costly rebuilding campaigns over several years. - Military capability and future risks: Stanislav critiques U.S. military capability for large-scale ground campaigns, arguing that the U.S. is not a traditional land-power and that a sustained invasion of Iran would face enormous logistical and manpower challenges. He emphasizes the scale and difficulty of mobilizing, training, and sustaining a large force in conflict terrain, particularly in Iran’s mountainous, fortified landscape. He also discusses the domestic constraints of U.S. recruitment, obesity rates, and the challenges of sustaining a 21st-century volunteer force in a major war. - Final reflections on leadership and narrative: The conversation closes with a discussion of Trump-era war briefs, characterizing them as short, sensational videos focused on explosions rather than reality, and a broader critique of political leadership and messaging in wartime decision-making. Glenn and Stanislav note the risk that political leaders may oversell battlefield successes and struggle to withdraw from costly, escalating commitments. In sum, the discussion centers on cross-border drone activity and its implications for NATO-Russia dynamics, the widening economic and energy-security consequences of contemporary conflicts, the deepening Iran-Russia alignment, and the daunting logistical and strategic challenges of any potential military escalation in the Middle East, including Iran.

Admitting the Baltic states to NATO could cause significant tension in US-Russian relations, potentially leading to a hostile reaction from Russia. This move could tip the balance and escalate the situation.

If Ukraine's military doesn't halt the Russian invasion, it won't be long before our NATO forces have to fight on the border.

Speaker 1 explains that "revisionist Russia" refers to Russia's intentions resembling the Soviet Union's glory days. They discuss NATO's expansion eastward, stating it's a defensive move. Speaker 0 questions if NATO's actions are perceived as a threat by Russia due to proximity. Speaker 1 emphasizes NATO's defensive nature and denies hostile intentions. The conversation highlights differing perspectives on NATO's expansion and Russia's actions in Ukraine.

If Russia invades Ukraine, Nord Stream 2 will be canceled. The speaker assures that they will find a way to stop the project, even though Germany currently controls it.

russian_summary = Обсуждается возможность присоединения России к НАТО. Рассекреченная нота 1954 года: «Советское правительство выражает готовность рассмотреть совместно с заинтересованными правительствами вопрос об участии СССР в Североатлантическом договоре». Ответ: нет необходимости подчеркивать совершенно не реалистический характер такого предложения. Это ответ. Год назад я сказал: «почему бы и нет». Бывшая госсекретарь Олбарит: «Но это не обсуждается сейчас. Это военная организация или нет? Военная. Нас там видеть не хотят?» Затем: «Не хотят. Она двигается к нашим границам? Двигается.» «Зачем? Вот что лежит в основе нашей позиции.» english_translation = Discussion about Russia joining NATO. A declassified 1954 note: “The Soviet government expresses readiness to consider jointly with interested governments the question of the Soviet participation in the North Atlantic Treaty.” The reply: “there is no need to emphasize the completely unrealistic character of such a proposal. This is the answer.” A year ago I said: “why not.” Albright: “But this is not discussed now. Is it a military organization or not? Military. They do not want to see us there?” Then: “No. It moves toward our borders?” “Why? Here is what lies at the core of our position.”

In the short term, admitting the Baltic states to NATO could cause significant tension in US-Russian relations. This move might provoke a strong and hostile reaction from Russia, potentially tipping the balance towards conflict. The speaker believes that this decision could have serious consequences.

NATO denies responsibility for Russian army's proximity, citing NATO's defensive nature. Russia's actions in Ukraine and Georgia are questioned. NATO's eastward expansion is acknowledged but not seen as hostile. The debate centers on perceived threats and territorial integrity. Other countries also feel threatened. Translation: NATO denies blame for Russian army's closeness, emphasizing defense. Actions in Ukraine and Georgia are disputed. Expansion eastward is noted but not seen as hostile. Debate focuses on threats and territorial integrity. Other countries also feel threatened.