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Europe should have been negotiating with Russia, but now that Trump is, some are in an uproar. If the US stops sending arms and funding, the war will end. This all stems from American arrogance, going back decades to the US declaring itself the sole superpower and expanding NATO eastward, ignoring Russian concerns. The US participated in a violent coup in Ukraine in 2014, further escalating tensions. Europe needs a grown-up foreign policy, not one based on hate speech or Russophobia, but real diplomacy. NATO should have been disbanded in 1991. The US sees this as a game, but for Russia, it's about core national security.

Glenn discusses growing fears that the Russia-Ukraine conflict is approaching a “third world war,” citing weekend attacks on Moscow, claims of Western assistance to Ukraine, and attacks “coming from NATO territory” without permission from Baltic states and Finland. He notes Europe mass-producing or intending to mass-produce long-range strike weapons to strike deep inside Russia, and asks Professor John Mearsheimer how events may develop, what options Russia has, and what futures lie ahead. Mearsheimer says Ukrainians are escalating against the Russian homeland. Earlier in the war they relied mainly on missiles under limits from Europeans and Americans; now they have turned to drones and developed a significant drone force capable of striking into Russia. He argues drone damage is not enough to affect the war’s outcome meaningfully, but warns the danger is continued escalation: drone attacks rising over time, and later missiles being added, resulting in combined missile-and-drone attacks on Russia. He says the key question is what Russia will do in response. He reports that Sergei Karaganov argues Russia should strike European targets to send a signal that actions are unacceptable, starting with conventional weapons and then—if necessary—nuclear weapons. Mearsheimer says Karaganov claims that while the idea was previously a minority view, now most Russians Mearsheimer speaks to agree, arguing Russia is “fed up” and that escalating attacks on the Russian homeland are unacceptable. Glenn suggests further escalation may occur beyond retaliation, including more brutal attacks on Ukraine and conventional attacks against countries such as Germany or Estonia, and raises discussions about Ukraine possibly “liberating Moldova” from Transnistria, where thousands of Russian troops are present, as another escalation pathway. Mearsheimer frames the conflicts as lacking bargaining space—comparing them to the Iran conflict between Iran and the United States/Israel. He says both sides see the other as an existential threat, leaving no room for negotiation, and that desperation drives risky behavior. Regarding diplomacy, Glenn questions how diplomacy can fail repeatedly. Mearsheimer says there is “zero bargaining space” because Russia sees Ukraine and European positions as existential threats, while Europe and Ukraine increasingly view Russia’s success in Ukraine as an existential threat. He adds that the United States does not view Russia as an existential threat, implying Trump is willing to bargain, but Europeans and Ukrainians do not want to negotiate the deal Trump proposes. He says Trump may have “washed his hands” of a diplomatic settlement and believes the war must be settled on the battlefield. Glenn then asks whether the United States would join if Russia struck Estonia. Mearsheimer says Karaganov’s framework involves attacking NATO countries with conventional weapons, which in the past would almost guarantee U.S. involvement. He says it is unclear what Trump would do, but emphasizes that once escalation begins, nuclear weapons are in the background. He describes the escalation ladder as being “felt in the dark,” where nuclear use is a rung that everyone wants to avoid, giving nuclear threats “huge deterrent value.” Glenn returns to deterrence and escalation dynamics, suggesting NATO is overly confident Russia is deterred, while Russia waits and then takes bigger steps. Mearsheimer says even limited conventional missile strikes into NATO countries—killing hardly anyone—would be a huge step because they would strike NATO members. He also argues Russia is winning the war and that drones have slowed Russian territory gains, making progress incremental. He concludes that slow battlefield progress, no bargaining space, and rising homeland attacks make serious escalation likely, and that Russia may only need a major conventional step to trigger a “gigantic leap forward.” He further argues narrative incentives increase the risk: if the West believes Russians are losing momentum, Europeans and Ukrainians may increase attacks on Russian homeland. He says rebranding in the West could also shape decisions, including how people describe the Iran war’s objectives. Glenn pivots to Iran, saying it may be “hours away” or within 20–48 hours, and asks how it may develop. Mearsheimer says Iranian and American settlement proposals are “light years apart,” with no public evidence of behind-closed-doors concessions. He describes the sequence as a 40-day bombing campaign failing, followed by a ceasefire and a blockade strategy that also is not working; he says time is something Trump does not have because of economic consequences. He argues Trump’s choices appear to be restart bombing or cut a deal on Iran’s terms, and that returning to bombing would not cause Iranian surrender, while increasing incentives for Iran to escalate attacks across the Gulf, including threats to shut down the Red Sea and damage key infrastructure. When Glenn asks about strengthening the blockade by moving it (e.g., toward the Strait of Malacca), Mearsheimer says the location does not matter much; the blockade is not inflicting sufficient punishment to get Iran to surrender, and if the Strait of Hormuz is closed, economic damage worsens over time. He says Iran and Gulf countries are working on ways to beat the blockade, complicating any attempt to inflict punishment strong enough to force surrender. Glenn asks about the broader U.S. strategy amid multipolarity claims and the sense that diplomacy is failing. Mearsheimer says the U.S. is shifting the burden of Ukraine onto Europeans, is working to prevent crises or war in East Asia involving the U.S., and is deeply involved in fighting in the Middle East—specifically the Iran war. He concludes that the U.S. is unlikely to accept defeat in a war once involved, tying it to lessons from Vietnam: entering wars is easier than getting out, and the U.S. searches for ways to win even when defeat is recognized. He says there is reason to believe Trump may return to a massive bombing campaign driven by desperation, but that it still would not work. He adds that a “meltdown” may be overstated, drawing on historical comparison between Johnson in Vietnam and Trump’s potential political fate, while arguing Trump has “no good option.” Glenn asks about additional “cards” the U.S. could play through regional actors or proxies. Mearsheimer says no comparable proxy force exists to match what Ukraine represented, and argues that if the U.S. and Israel together could not defeat Iran, then other actors like the UAE by themselves are not positioned to take on Iran. In closing, Glenn notes fears of more escalation in both Ukraine and Iran and says the situation ahead may be “very troubling.” Mearsheimer agrees and calls the escalation ladder framing “very depressing,” ending with the theme that once conflicts begin, escalation and difficulty exiting are persistent.

In this conversation, Brian Berletic discusses the current collision between the United States’ global strategy and a rising multipolar world, arguing that U.S. policy is driven by corporate-financier interests and a desire to preserve unipolar primacy, regardless of the costs to others. - Structural dynamics and multipolar resistance - The host notes a shift from optimism about Trump’s “America First” rhetoric toward an assessment that U.S. strategy aims to restore hegemony and broad, repeated wars, even as a multipolar world emerges. - Berletic agrees that the crisis is structural: the U.S. system is driven by large corporate-financier interests prioritizing expansion of profit and power. He cites Brookings Institution’s 2009 policy papers, particularly The Path to Persia, as documenting a long-running plan to manage Iran via a sequence of options designed to be used in synergy to topple Iran, with Syria serving as a staging ground for broader conflict. - He argues the policy framework has guided decisions across administrations, turning policy papers into bills and war plans, with corporate media selling these as American interests. This, he says, leaves little room for genuine opposition because political power is financed by corporate interests. - Iran, Syria, and the Middle East as a springboard to a global confrontation - Berletic traces the current Iran crisis to the 2009 Brookings paper’s emphasis on air corridors and using Israel to provoke a war, placing blame on Israel as a proxy mechanism while the U.S. cleanses the region of access points for striking Iran directly. - He asserts the Arab Spring (2011) was designed to encircle Iran and move toward Moscow and Beijing, with Iran as the final target. The U.S. and its allies allegedly used policy papers to push tactical steps—weakening Russia via Ukraine, exploiting Syria, and leveraging Iran as a fulcrum for broader restraint against Eurasian powers. - The aim, he argues, is to prevent a rising China by destabilizing Iran and, simultaneously, strangling energy exports that feed China’s growth. He claims the United States has imposed a global maritime oil blockade on China through coordinated strikes and pressure on oil-rich states, while China pursues energy independence via Belt and Road, coal-to-liquids, and growing imports from Russia. - The role of diplomacy, escalation, and Netanyahu’s proxy - On diplomacy, Berletic says the U.S. has no genuine interest in peace; diplomacy is used to pretext war, creating appearances of reasonable engagement while advancing the continuity of a warlike agenda. He references the Witch Path to Persia as describing diplomacy as a pretext for regime change. - He emphasizes that Russia and China are not credibly negotiating with the U.S., viewing Western diplomacy as theater designed to degrade multipolar powers. Iran, he adds, may be buying time but also reacting to U.S. pressure, while Arab states and Israel are portrayed as proxies with limited autonomy. - The discussion also covers how Israel serves as a disposable proxy to advance U.S. goals, including potential use of nuclear weapons, with Trump allegedly signaling a post-facto defense of Israel in any such scenario. - The Iran conflict, its dynamics, and potential trajectory - The war in Iran is described as a phased aggression, beginning with the consulate attack and escalating into economic and missile-strike campaigns. Berletic notes Iran’s resilient command-and-control and ongoing missile launches, suggesting the U.S. and its allies are attempting to bankrupt Iran while degrading its military capabilities. - He highlights the strain on U.S. munitions inventories, particularly anti-missile interceptors and long-range weapons, due to simultaneous operations in Ukraine, the Middle East, and potential confrontations with China. He warns that the war’s logistics are being stretched to the breaking point, risking a broader blowback. - The discussion points to potential escalation vectors: shutting Hormuz, targeting civilian infrastructure, and possibly using proxies (including within the Gulf states and Yemen) to choke off energy flows. Berletic cautions that the U.S. could resort to more drastic steps, including leveraging Israel for off-world actions, while maintaining that multipolar actors (Russia, China, Iran) would resist. - Capabilities, resources, and the potential duration - The host notes China’s energy-mobility strategies and the Western dependency on rare earth minerals (e.g., gallium) mostly produced in China, emphasizing how U.S. war aims rely on leveraging allies and global supply chains that are not easily sustained. - Berletic argues the U.S. does not plan for permanent victory but for control, and that multipolar powers are growing faster than the United States can destroy them. He suggests an inflection point will come when multipolarism outruns U.S. capacity, though the outcome remains precarious due to nuclear risk and global economic shocks. - Outlook and final reflections - The interlocutors reiterate that the war is part of a broader structural battle between unipolar U.S. dominance and a rising multipolar order anchored by Eurasian powers. They stress the need to awaken broader publics to the reality of multipolarism and to pursue a more balanced world order, warning that the current trajectory risks global economic harm and dangerous escalation.

Donald Trump started the war in Ukraine, not Joe Biden, and Russia is aware of this. Despite Trump's unpredictability, Russia will engage in diplomacy with the U.S. Trump's alleged leaked 2024 campaign statement, where he threatened to bomb Moscow if Putin moved into Kyiv, was never made, portraying Trump as a liar in the eyes of the Russians. Sanctions are not a credible threat because Russia doesn't care about them, and its major partners won't yield. Trump's claim of providing 17 weapon batteries to Ukraine is unrealistic, as countries like Germany, Spain, and the Netherlands cannot readily supply that many. Germany won't provide transit support until they receive replacements, and the U.S. is prioritizing Israel and replenishing its own stocks. Trump's proposition to Mark Rutte involves the Netherlands giving up its weapons to Ukraine and then buying them from the U.S. at no cost to America. Rutte should instead tell Trump to leave NATO because he is useless. This is not a serious proposal, but posturing to appease the Republican base who oppose aid to Ukraine.

Afshin Rattansi, broadcasting from the UAE, marks the U.S. 250th anniversary of independence and argues that the United States, once resisting British rule, has become an expansive empire through military power—maintaining over 800 bases and spending trillions on wars—while facing severe national debt and domestic hardship, including reliance on food stamps. He frames U.S. politics as shaped by special interests and describes American foreign policy under a neoconservative approach as producing mass killing and chaos across multiple conflicts, culminating in what he calls a catastrophic failure against Iran. He then brings in veteran U.S. Congressman Dennis Kucinich from Cleveland, Ohio. Kucinich says he celebrates July 4th for the founding principles tied to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, and contrasts that ideal with “where we are now.” On war powers, he argues Congress should “cut off funds” to stop wars, noting Article 1, Section 8 gives Congress the power to declare war, and saying Congress is not ready to do that. Rattansi links this to impeachment, raising reports of Donald Trump’s personal enrichment and stating polls suggest many Americans want impeachment. Kucinich argues Democrats will not aim to remove Trump because impeachment is not guaranteed to succeed without a two-thirds Senate vote and because Democrats would rather keep Trump as an opponent than confront J.D. Vance as president, predicting that partisan politics will prevent impeachment. Rattansi then asks about a National Defense Authorization Act-related integration of U.S. and Israeli militaries. Kucinich reacts that while America is sovereign, integrating another nation’s military creates a merger that increases the risk of war and does not serve American interests. He says the proposal grants Israel access to an entire $1.5 trillion annual U.S. defense budget through top-level direction of assets and resources, calling it against U.S. interests and unconstitutional. He adds that the issue is delayed and will be revisited after House procedural changes, and he cites concerns including Israel’s record and arrest warrants discussed via the International Criminal Court. He rejects the idea of operating U.S. military with Israel as a matter of interest. Rattansi contrasts Washington’s opposition to permanent alliances with claims from Mike Huckabee linking Israel to America’s existence, and Kucinich says the U.S. should prioritize its own destiny and interests without “foreign entanglements.” He argues Israel-driven guidance of U.S. resources pushes the country away from the founders’ warnings and says Israel was instrumental in pushing Trump toward attacking Iran with disastrous effects, which he says he opposed vocally. On Netanyahu as “George III”-like influence, Kucinich reiterates that the journey from independence from Great Britain should not end in “thrall” to another country, and he argues joint military arrangements violate constitutional requirements for commander-in-chief control and treaty-related Senate processes. Rattansi asks whether J.D. Vance’s remarks align with this idea, and Kucinich cites Vance as aiming to end the Iran war while arguing Vance is attacked by neoconservatives. He describes Trump as “betwixt and between,” with Israeli interests prevailing alongside a desire to resolve the conflict, and he attributes Trump’s actions to political and economic pressures (oil, gas, inflation, and Republican fortunes). He also raises that Democrats remain hardwired on Russia-related escalation, and contrasts this with his hope for de-escalation. On reports that Trump told Zelensky “fire on Moscow,” Kucinich says he would not base foreign policy on offhand remarks, while suggesting possible motives tied to pulling Europe deeper into conflict. He says the U.S. should de-escalate in Ukraine, counseling England, France, and Germany not to prepare attacks on Russia, emphasizing the risk of a wider war. He argues an Iran-related memorandum of understanding lacks validity because its terms have been nullified and because steps such as unfreezing funds are not happening. He frames diplomacy as requiring readiness to use force when a “gun” is put on the table, and says he rejects that approach, advocating human unity and peace. Kucinich rejects the idea that Iran, Russia, or other countries are weak, describing resilience and criticizing Western media for not going deep into events that might evoke sympathy. He links broader conflict dynamics to U.S. financial fragility, mentioning bond-market fragility, heavy debt, and the lack of “endless resources,” and he argues Trump does not want to accelerate conflicts between Russia and Ukraine. He also suggests Europe’s dependence increases when it is pressured to spend more. Finally, Kucinich assesses the American working class, citing rising housing costs, real inflation, educational loans, student rebellion, shifts within the Democratic Party, and political toppling of mainstream Democrats on economic and Israel-related issues. He says people’s savings are exhausted, 401(k)s face risk due to market games, and Social Security is discussed as something that could be cut. He concludes that war is a “loser,” arguing only arms-makers profit while everyone else loses.

Concerns are growing that those opposed to Trump, having exhausted other means to undermine him, may resort to instigating a world war to prevent his return to power and the potential exposure of their actions. The focus of Washington is on foreign policy and military power rather than domestic issues like border control or the drug crisis. A war with Iran, which is now allied with major global powers, could escalate into a world war involving Russia and China. The ongoing situation in Ukraine is seen as a failure, with no clear victory in sight. Anyone advocating for conflict with Iran or Russia lacks the wisdom necessary for leadership.

The speaker argues that Russia is winning the war in Ukraine due to superior weaponry and manpower, and Ukraine's dependence on Western support. He claims Trump will likely end the "Biden pipeline" of weaponry. A negotiated settlement is unlikely because Russia's demands—Ukraine's neutrality, demilitarization, and acceptance of Russian annexation of Crimea and four oblasts—are unacceptable to Ukraine and the West. The speaker believes Ukraine is losing and should cut a deal now to minimize losses, but nationalism and Western Russophobia prevent this. He dismisses the idea that Russia threatens to dominate Europe, calling it a "ridiculous argument" given their struggles in Eastern Ukraine. He says Putin wants to restore the Soviet empire, but Putin has stated that recreating the Soviet Union makes no sense. He views NATO expansion into Ukraine as the "taproot" of the war, analogous to the US Monroe Doctrine. He argues that the US foreign policy establishment is incompetent and has driven Russia into China's arms, undermining US strategic interests. He says the decision to bring NATO to Ukraine was made in 2008, and backing off is unacceptable to the US and the West. He claims the US has a special relationship with Israel that has no parallel in recorded history, and the Israel lobby has awesome power and profoundly influences US foreign policy in the Middle East. He says the Israelis are executing a genocide in Gaza, and the goal is ethnic cleansing. He believes the world will be dominated by the US, China, and Russia in the next 10 years.

The speaker argues that Russia is winning the war in Ukraine due to superior weaponry and manpower, and Ukraine's dependence on Western support. He claims that Trump won't refill the "Biden pipeline" of weaponry. He says Ukraine's defenses are collapsing and a diplomatic settlement is impossible because Russia's demands are unacceptable to Ukraine and the West. These demands include Ukraine becoming a neutral state, demilitarizing, and accepting Russia's annexation of Crimea and four oblasts. He believes Ukraine should cut a deal now to minimize losses, but nationalism prevents it. He dismisses the idea of Russia dominating Europe as ridiculous, stating Russia struggles to conquer eastern Ukraine. He says Putin pines for the Soviet era but understands recreating the Soviet empire is impossible. He views NATO expansion into Ukraine as the taproot of the war, analogous to America's Monroe Doctrine. He says the decision in 2008 to bring Ukraine into NATO was made despite recognizing Ukraine as a special case and a potential source of trouble. He attributes this decision to the belief that the US could "shove it down their throat," underestimating Russia's security concerns. He says the US has driven Russia into China's arms, which is against American interests. He says the Israel lobby has awesome power and influences US foreign policy in the Middle East, even when it conflicts with American interests. He says Israel is executing a genocide in Gaza to ethnically cleanse Palestinians from Greater Israel. He says the US has a special relationship with Israel that has no parallel in recorded history.

In a wide-ranging discussion about the Ukraine war and related strategic developments, Colonel and the host cover several key topics, facts, and analyses. Skyfall/Burevznik nuclear-powered cruise missile - The Skyfall (Burevznik) is a nuclear-powered, nuclear-capable cruise missile. A test five years ago ended with five deaths and an explosion; a newer test reportedly flew 14 hours and 15,000 miles. Its characteristics include very long range, low-altitude flight to hug terrain, and high maneuverability, making detection and interception challenging. - The U.S. perspective is that it is not a silver bullet, but it represents an advanced capability: maneuvering over great distances, flying subsonically at very low altitude (within about 20 meters of the ground), and potentially approaching from unexpected directions. - Russia claims it cannot be shot down; the guest cautions that nothing is invulnerable until proven operational, but the missile adds a troubling dimension to deterrence and arms competition. - The broader significance is that it accentuates concern about nuclear weapons and underscores the desirability of nuclear arms reduction talks before START’s expiration. Nuclear arms talks and China’s potential role - The guest indicates Russia is pushing for nuclear arms reduction talks before START expires (February). China is conceptually willing to join, according to some Russian sources, but no authoritative statements from China are cited. Any willingness would depend on Western engagement to explore meaningful participation. Poseidon and other advanced weapons - Poseidon is described as a Russian nuclear-powered autonomous underwater vehicle (a "massive unmanned torpedo drone") intended as a strategic deterrent. Its exact status is uncertain; reports and videos circulate, but it remains largely experimental. - The discussion notes general concerns about U.S. safety from advanced weapons such as Poseidon and other long-range strike capabilities. Encirclement near Donbas: Pokrovsk and Kupiansk - Grasimov claimed 49 Ukrainian battalions are involved in Donbas, with about 31 allegedly encircled near Pokrovsk (for roughly 5,000 troops). Ukraine says supply lines are not cut and that encirclement is not complete. - The analysts explain that Russia has achieved notable progress in Kupiansk and Pokrovsk areas. Ukraine has mounted limited counterattacks in the north near Pokrovsk to disrupt a potential northern encirclement pivot at Rodinsky, but sustained pressure is difficult due to Ukraine’s manpower and logistics constraints. - The northern shoulder near Rodinsky is a focal point: if Russians move beyond Rodinsky, encirclement risk increases. Ukraine’s ability to keep tens of thousands of troops supplied and to hold the city is limited; Russia’s reserves enable more methodical advances. - The overarching view: Ukraine can slow Russian advances but cannot realistically stop or reverse the broader trajectory due to manpower, equipment, and ammunition imbalances. Russia’s advantage in resources makes a prolonged war of attrition unfavorable to Ukraine. Ukraine’s manpower, equipment, and ammunition - The central constraint for Ukraine is manpower. Even with missiles, drones, and air defense, without sufficient infantry to hold and seize territory and to provide reserves, Ukraine cannot win. - Russia’s industrial capacity and reserves enable it to sustain campaigns, whereas Ukraine’s supply and manpower constraints limit sustained operations. - The discussion notes Western missiles (Storm Shadow, Flamingo) and the pace of Tomahawk deliveries, with the implication that gaps in long-range standoff capability affect Ukraine’s offensive and defensive options. Mercenaries and potential foreign troop contributions - Reports of North Korean troops aiding Pokrovsk are discussed. The guest sees little likelihood of other countries sending troops, given the risk of provoking Russia. Mercenary recruitment by other countries is mentioned as a potential but unverified factor. Western sanctions and energy dynamics - The significant development of American sanctions on Rosneft and Lukoil (two-thirds of Russia’s oil exports, roughly 4.4 million barrels per day) is analyzed. China’s state-owned majors and India are reducing seaborne imports but still engaging via pipelines or other mechanisms; the long-term impact on Russia’s revenue is likely substantial but may be offset through workarounds. - The guest emphasizes that history shows Russia tends to absorb economic pain and adapt, making it unlikely that sanctions alone will force strategic changes in Russia’s posture. Global Thunder and other security signals - The Global Thunder nuclear command exercise is mentioned, but the guest signals incomplete knowledge of this particular exercise’s details. Other security signals include drone activity near the Kremlin and assertions about Russia’s broader strategic planning, including potential NATO-related concerns and the Arctic buildup. NATO, European militaries, and relative capabilities - The discussion contrasts Europe’s growing modernization and ambition with actual combat experience. Europe’s strategic parity with Russia is viewed as plausible at a high level, but conventional capabilities lag Russia’s real-time battlefield experience and industrial scale. - The guest warns that perception of inevitable war between NATO and Russia could create self-fulfilling dynamics, urging cautious interpretation of escalatory signaling on both sides. Trump’s negotiation tactics and Ukraine peace prospects - The host questions Trump’s peace negotiation tactics: threats of Tomahawk missiles, meetings with Putin, and attempts to tailor a peace deal offering to freeze lines or concede Donbas. The guest describes Trump’s approach as transactional and inconsistent, with fluctuating positions that depend on the perceived personal and political gains. - The guest argues that Russia’s position has remained consistent since 2014-2022, centering on existential-security demands and denazification logic, including ensuring rights and language protections for ethnic Russians within the contested territories. A lasting peace would require a win-win vision that both sides can accept; transactional bargaining alone is unlikely to lead to a durable settlement. Venezuela and broader geopolitics - The discussion notes a Wagda-linked cargo flight to Venezuela amid sanctions evasion talk, with implications of mercenaries or military parts and a broader strategic alignment with Russia. The host and guest agree that U.S. regime-change impulses in Venezuela complicate international norms, risk escalation, and could inadvertently shift attention away from Ukraine. Overall, the conversation traces the evolving military balance in Ukraine, the emergence of new weapons systems and strategic deterrence concerns, the limits of Western capabilities and sanctions, and the complex interplay of diplomacy, negotiation tactics, and geopolitical aims shaping the conflict and potential resolutions.

John Mearsheimer and Glenn discuss the trajectory of the United States’ foreign policy under Donald Trump, focusing on the shift from an anticipated pivot to Asia and a reduction of “forever wars” to the current Iran confrontation and its global implications. - Initial optimism about Trump: Glenn notes a widespread belief that Trump could break with established narratives, recognize the post–Cold War power distribution, pivot to the Western Hemisphere and East Asia, end the “forever wars,” and move away from Europe and the Middle East. Mearsheimer agrees there was early optimism on Judging Freedom that Trump would reduce militarized policy and possibly shut down the Ukraine–Russia war, unlike other presidents. - Drift into Iran and the current quagmire: The conversation then centers on how Trump’s approach to Iran evolved. Mearsheimer argues Trump often vacillates between claims of victory and deep desperation, and he characterizes Trump’s current stance as demanding “unconditional surrender” from Iran, with a 15-point plan that looks like capitulation. He describes Trump as sometimes declaring a “great victory” and other times recognizing the need for an exit strategy but being unable to find one. - The escalation ladder and strategic danger: A core point is that the United States and its allies initially sought a quick, decisive victory using shock and awe to topple the regime, but the effort has become a protracted war in which Iran holds many cards. Iran can threaten the global economy and Gulf state stability, undermine oil infrastructure, and harm Israel. The lack of a credible exit ramp for Trump, combined with the risk of escalation, creates catastrophic potential for the world economy and energy security. - Economic and strategic leverage for Iran: The discussion emphasizes that Iran can disrupt global markets via the Strait of Hormuz, potentially shut down the Red Sea with Houthis participation, and target Gulf desalination and energy infrastructure. The U.S. should maintain oil flow to avoid devastating economic consequences; sanctions on Iran and Russia were strategically relaxed to keep oil moving. The longer the war drags on, the more leverage Iran gains, especially as Trump’s options to harm Iran’s energy sector shrink due to the global economy’s needs. - Exit possibilities and the limits of escalation: Glenn asks how Trump might avoid the iceberg of economic catastrophe. Mearsheimer contends that a deal on Iran’s terms would entail acknowledging Iranian victory and a humiliating US defeat, which is politically challenging—especially given Israeli opposition and the lobby. The Iranians have incentive to string out negotiations, knowing they could extract concessions as time passes and as U.S. desperation grows. - Ground forces and military options: The possibility of a U.S. ground invasion is deemed impractical. Mearsheimer highlights that Desert Storm and the 2003 invasion involved hundreds of thousands of troops; proposed plans for “a few thousand” light infantry would be unable to secure strategic objectives or prevent Iranian counterattacks across the Gulf, Red Sea, and Persian Gulf, with Iran capable of inflicting significant damage on bases and ships. The discussion stresses that even small-scale operations could provoke heavy Iranian defense and strategic backlash. - European and NATO dynamics: The Europeans are portrayed as reluctant to sign onto a risky campaign in support of U.S. objectives, and the episode warns that a broader economic crisis could alter European alignment. The potential breaching of NATO unity and the risk of diminished transatlantic trust are underscored, with Trump’s stance framed as blaming Europeans for strategic failures. - Israel and the lobby: The influence of the Israel lobby and its potential consequences if the war deteriorates are discussed. Mearsheimer notes the danger of rising antisemitism if the war goes catastrophically wrong and Israel’s role in pressuring continued conflict. He also observes that a future shift in U.S. strategy could, in extreme circumstances, diverge from traditional Israeli priorities if the global economy is at stake. - Deep state and decision-making: The final exchange centers on the role of expertise and institutions. Mearsheimer argues that Trump’s distrust of the deep state and reliance on a small circle (Kushner, Whitkoff, Lindsey Graham, media figures) deprived him of necessary strategic deliberation. He contends that a robust deep-state apparatus provides essential expertise for complex wars, offering a counterpoint to Trump’s preferred approach. He contends the deep state was not fully consulted, and that reliance on a limited network contributed to the strategic miscalculations. - Concluding tone: Both acknowledge the grave, uncertain state of affairs and the high risk of escalation and miscalculation. They express a desire for an optimistic resolution but emphasize that the current trajectory is precarious, with signs pointing toward a dangerous escalation that could have wide-ranging geopolitical and economic consequences. They close with a note of concern about the potential for rash actions and the importance of considering responsible exits and credible diplomatic channels.

Wanna get on to Ukraine. But, given that Israel is signaling it doesn't like the, Al Qaeda operative, Jelani in Damascus, and we know Tulsi Gabbard is something of an expert on Syria because she exposed the lies and the, phony war in Syria when The United States was supporting the ISIS and Al Qaeda rebels there. How do you and Trump has been very brave arguably saying, he's not gonna, start sending loads of money like Britain is to Tchelani. There's still thousands of American troops, though, in Syria. What is American Syrian policy Syria policy? America's policy towards Syria is basically Israel's policy. And what The United States was bent on doing was wrecking Syria and keeping it wrecked. That's the Israeli objective here. This is what the Israelis wanna do with Iran. They don't simply wanna do away with Iran's nuclear capability. They surely do wanna do that, but they wanna wreck Iran. They wanna turn Iran into Syria. And what the Israelis are doing in Syria is going to great lengths to make sure that Syria remains, a dysfunctional state. They don't want Syria to become, a formidable adversary. They want it to remain broken. And, of course, The United States will support the Israelis in that regard. So, of course, the Israelis are not gonna allow the Americans to give huge amounts of aid to Jalani so that he can produce a viable Syrian state because that's not Israeli policy. Just look at what they're doing in Iran. I mean, excuse me, what they're doing in Lebanon. It's a similar situation.

Speaker 0: The transcript portrays Putin issuing a chilling World War III threat with a flying Chernobyl-style nuclear weapon. The classified missile is rumored to reach Mach 15, change direction midair, and the Russians believe no one can shoot it down. They’ve already tested earlier versions on Ukraine. Even with high-tech missile defense systems, it cannot be stopped. Russia reportedly has hypersonic missiles that fly hundreds of feet above the ground, alongside ballistic missiles. The speaker asserts the Russians have it all, and that the US says Russia is ahead of us in hypersonic missiles. The Pentagon is described as keeping most powerful capabilities secret, with about two generations of weapons tucked away. The speaker claims Russia has almost a two-to-one nuclear superiority over the US, and that once war starts, nobody wins: even if 95% of missiles are shot down, they would still flatten every city and military base. A classified unnamed ballistic missile is shown dropping many dummy warheads as a demonstration. The narrative references alleged testing in Ukraine and notes a claim that a demonstration MIRV (multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle) was presented: a demonstration that Russia can penetrate defenses and deliver nuclear payloads, though no warheads were involved in that particular display. The speaker recalls Biden announcing long-range cruise missiles, and Putin responding by attacking a missile factory, with subsequent release of photos showing holes in the centers of buildings within the factory. Western media allegedly dismissed these as not powerful missiles, but the speaker counters that it was a MIRV demonstration, and Russia later confirmed the demonstration of capability to field nuclear payloads. The speaker also claims Trump is frustrated with NATO and the EU, accusing them of starting the war with Russia and not wanting it to end. It is stated that Trump decided, over a week prior, not to provide Tomahawks to Zelenskyy. In response, EU and NATO are said to be supplying comparable or more advanced weapons to Ukraine, which would escalate the conflict on the escalatory ladder. Putin is said to be amassing nuclear weapons and attack submarines, with references to maps in the Daily Mail illustrating Russia’s buildup in the Arctic Circle as preparations for war with NATO are described. A segment mentions footage of the Skyfall ballistic missile factory. Speaker 1: Closing outro promoting Infowars, urging followers to connect on X (Twitter) at real Alex Jones and at AJN Live, and to download the Alex Jones app, urging support against the “democrat deep state party” and declaring that they will never be silenced.

The conversation centers on Israel’s war with Iran and its broader regional implications, with Speaker 0 (an Israeli prime minister) offering his assessment and critiques, and Speaker 1 pushing for clarification on motives, strategy, and policy directions. Key points about the Iran war and its origins - Speaker 0 recalls learning of the war on February 28 in Washington, and states his initial reaction: the United States’ claim that Iran is an enemy threatening annihilation of Israel is understandable and something to be supported, but questions what the next steps and the endgame would be. - He argues that Iran, through proxies like Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis, posed a global and regional threat by arming missiles and pursuing nuclear capacity, and asserts that Iran deserved punishment for its actions. He raises the question of whether the outcome could have been achieved without war through a prior agreement supervised by international bodies. - He emphasizes that the lack of a clear, articulated next step or strategy undermines the legitimacy of the war’s continuation, even as he concedes the necessity of addressing Iran’s nuclear ambitions. - He also notes that the war affected the global economy and regional stability, and stresses the importance of coordinating a path that would end hostilities and stabilize the region. Speaker 1’s analysis and queries about U.S. interests and Netanyahu’s influence - Speaker 1 questions the rationale behind U.S. involvement, suggesting that strategic interests around the Strait of Hormuz and Iran’s nuclear program were not the only drivers, and cites reporting that Netanyahu presented Iran as weak to push Trump toward regime change, with limited pushback within the U.S. administration. - He asks how much influence Netanyahu had over Trump, and whether the war was pushed by Netanyahu or driven by broader strategic calculations, including concerns about global economic consequences. - He notes that, even if Iran was making concessions on nuclear issues, the war’s continuation raises concerns about broader U.S. and global interests and the potential damage to European and allied relationships. Israeli-Lebanese dimension and Hezbollah - The discussion moves to Lebanon and the question of a ground presence in the South of Lebanon. Speaker 1 asks whether Netanyahu’s administration intends annexation of Lebanese territory and whether there is a real risk of such plans, given the recent destruction of villages and the broader context of regional diplomacy. - Speaker 0 distinguishes between military necessity and political strategy. He says the ground operation in southern Lebanon is unnecessary because Hezbollah missiles extend beyond 50 kilometers from the border, and he argues for negotiating a peace process with Lebanon, potentially aided by the international community (notably France), to disarm Hezbollah as part of a larger framework. - He asserts that there are voices in the Israeli cabinet that view South Lebanon as part of a Greater Israel and would seek annexation, but he insists that such annexation would be unacceptable in Israel and that disarming Hezbollah should be tied to a broader peace with Lebanon and Iran’s agreement if a negotiations-based settlement is reached. - The idea of integrating Hezbollah into the Lebanese military is rejected as artificial; disarmament is preferred, with the caveat that Hezbollah could not be dissolved as a military force if Iran remains a principal backer. Speaker 0 suggests that a Hezbollah disarmed and integrated into Lebanon’s political-military system would require careful design, potentially with international participation, to prevent Hezbollah from acting as an independent proxy. War crimes and accountability - The participants discuss imagery like a soldier breaking a statue of Jesus and broader allegations of misconduct during the Gaza war. Speaker 0 condemns the act as outrageous and unacceptable, while Speaker 1 notes that individual soldier actions do not represent an entire army and contrasts external reactions to abuses with a broader critique of proportionality in Gaza. - Speaker 0 acknowledges that there were crimes against humanity and war crimes by Israel, rejects genocide, and endorses investigations and accountability for those responsible, while criticizing the political leadership’s rhetoric and the behavior of certain ministers. - They touch on the controversial death-penalty bill for Palestinians convicted of lethal attacks, with Speaker 0 characterizing the Israeli government as run by “thugs” and criticizing ministers for celebratory conduct, while Speaker 1 argues that such rhetoric inflames tensions. Two-state solution and long-term vision - The conversation culminates in Speaker 0 presenting a long-standing two-state plan: a two-state solution based on 1967 borders, with East Jerusalem as the capital of Palestine, and the Old City of Jerusalem not under exclusive sovereignty but administered by a five-nation trust (Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Palestine, Israel, and the United States). - He asserts that this approach represents an alternative to the current government’s policies and reiterates his commitment to opposing Netanyahu’s administration until it is replaced. - They close with mutual acknowledgment of the need for a durable peace framework and reiterate that Hezbollah’s disarmament must be a condition for normalization between Israel and Lebanon, while cautioning against artificial or compromised arrangements that would leave Hezbollah armed or entrenched.

Professor Jeffrey Sachs and Glenn (Speaker 2) discuss the NATO summit in Ankara, portraying it as marked by heightened militarism, hostility toward NATO’s “enemies,” internal tensions, and a lack of serious strategy. Sachs says the summit amounted to “Trump isms” and “two days of” behavior he describes as bizarre, with leaders treating escalation as normal and joking about serious realities. He cites examples including statements about Spain and Greenland, and argues that NATO is not functioning as a serious alliance. They also discuss rhetoric and policy toward Russia and Iran. Sachs says European leaders call for deeper strikes into Russia using their own weapons and intelligence with the objective of forcing Russia to the negotiation table, while European leaders continue to boycott diplomacy. Glenn references statements including Marco Rubio arguing that attacking Russia helps advance peace, Trump’s casual reference to imposing a no-fly zone, and licensing Patriot missile manufacturing in Ukraine, raising the question of whether the United States is getting deeper into the war again. Sachs responds that Trump campaigned on ending “useless wars,” but that U.S. wars are driven by the military-industrial-digital complex, with big tech and platforms making profits and using wartime conditions to test systems and upgrade weapons. He argues Trump does not have the strategic capacity to change underlying dynamics, and that U.S. policy returns to sanctions, deadlines, and threats rather than a sustained diplomatic course. Mark Rutte’s stance is also discussed. Glenn says Rutte “threw NATO’s weight” behind the U.S. war against Iran, sending a signal that NATO is focused on war rather than peace. Glenn asks Sachs how to interpret Russian statements, including Dmitry Peskov’s claim that the “special military operation” has become a war due to NATO involvement. Sachs says Russian leadership does not expect U.S. diplomacy to play a decisive role, does not give heed to U.S. diplomatic efforts, and has largely given up after earlier hopes. He attributes Russia’s position to the enduring influence of the U.S. security state and military-industrial-digital complex, and says Russia has largely moved toward a Eurasian future aligned with views he associates with China and Iran. Sachs claims Western governments’ strategy leads to escalation rather than resolution, emphasizing that the war kills vast numbers of Ukrainians, solves nothing, and that Russia will not surrender to strikes into deep Russia—escalating toward nuclear war if pushed. He argues public opinion in the U.S. and Europe does not want escalation: a Gallup poll he cites says Ukrainians want the war to end even with concessions. He suggests the political class is out of step with its publics and lays out three possible outcomes: Russia achieves its military objectives; escalation to nuclear war; or war-mongering leaders are thrown out by publics. He also highlights political dissatisfaction, citing low approval for Merz and Macron, and says U.S. electoral outcomes could provide a check on the “political class.” Glenn adds that worsening war conditions may lead leaders to rely on militarism for economic and technological aims and to suppress dissent by labeling opposition as pro-Kremlin. Sachs agrees but says public resistance could become more decisive through political defeat driven by outside parties tapping into public opinion, citing examples he mentions in France, Russia, and the United States. Glenn then asks about objectives of Americans versus Europeans toward Russia and whether the logic is to pull the U.S. deeper into the war. Sachs argues the long-running intention since 1945 and especially since 1991 has been to weaken Russia through sanctions, NATO enlargement, unrest tools, and support for insurgencies on Russia’s periphery, and he says these motivations remain rooted in agencies and contractors that do not “count lives” and seek to sell goods.

A discussion centers on a report that Trump allegedly called Netanyahu an “effing idiot” during a tense phone call, with claims that Netanyahu received U.S. permission for an operation involving Beirut that was intended as a “bluff” with an evacuation order rather than actual bombing. The conversation explores whether Netanyahu could have obtained authority to strike Beirut through other officials in the U.S. administration without Trump’s direct approval, emphasizing how leaders can “work the system” via gaps between decision-makers. The colonel argues that the characters and relationships among decision-makers heavily shape national security outcomes, citing volatile leadership dynamics and describing how powerful political figures can conflict even when both consider each other “indispensable.” He links Netanyahu’s increasing vulnerability to domestic political setbacks, including the Knesset moving elections up, and to attacks from political opponents using Netanyahu’s perceived responsiveness to Trump’s instructions as a weapon. According to the discussion, Netanyahu initially seemed likely to follow Trump’s guidance about Lebanon, but the issue escalated across Jerusalem through diplomatic and political spillover, leading Netanyahu to reverse course and return to a “warpath” posture in Lebanon. The speakers discuss how rhetoric may diverge from action, and then broaden into a broader pattern: opponents are portrayed as escalating pressure by citing Netanyahu’s listening to the U.S. president in Gaza, the West Bank, Lebanon, and Iran, accusing him of not securing enough U.S. action. The colonel also points to Netanyahu’s use of terminology described as invoking “final solution” and says the phrase about completing the Iran mission “in a way that constitutes a final solution” is “nasty terminology,” while stating a hope that it is being used as material to “bluff.” Another major thread claims that Pakistan has moved toward China and Iran as its preferred alignment, with a described arrangement involving Pakistan’s ISI and the military and a transfer or provision of nuclear weapons capabilities to Iran, framed around AQ Khan’s network and Pakistan’s nuclear history. The discussion claims that logistics networks connecting rail and ports (including a Chinese rail route into Iran and maritime routes) support Hezbollah and Iran’s resupply, especially for ballistic missiles, and argues that the Strait of Hormuz situation is being worsened by continued confrontation rather than contained by it, with the claim that many ships have passed after paying tolls and that Iran would benefit if it gained full control. The speakers criticize what they describe as a lack of direct diplomacy with Iran, arguing that third-party communications and intermediaries have replaced real talks, and describe Iran responding more aggressively in Lebanon by freezing talks, threatening strikes on Israeli forces inside Lebanon, and issuing evacuation orders for northern Israel. The conversation also discusses whether Iran could develop or already have the capability to match warheads to missiles quickly and whether Iran might conduct a nuclear test as a warning to the U.S. and Israel to deter further strikes. A point is raised that openly demonstrating could force Trump into escalation, while another perspective suggests Iran might focus on deterrence vis-à-vis Netanyahu. The dialogue extends into nuclear deterrence and first-strike capability debates, alongside references to U.S. nuclear posture thinking and the idea that some in the U.S. government argue for using nuclear weapons rather than relying solely on deterrence. In closing, the conversation turns briefly to Ukraine and NATO, with a claim that Putin is seriously considering striking NATO and an argument that a “Not a penny more” approach from Trump could pressure Zelensky and NATO allies toward an outcome without needing NATO strikes. The host also plans to bring up the nuclear-warning-shot discussion with an upcoming guest and references a Pakistani-source report that Iran may already have a nuclear weapon and might do a test to deter further attacks.

Afshin Ratansi opens by saying J.D. Vance recently met Iran’s foreign minister Abbas Araghchi in Switzerland after what he describes as “capitulation” in the Trump-Netanyahu war in Iran, ahead of additional treaties signed in Versailles. Ratansi also says Israel continues to violate a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), with continued civilian slaughter in Lebanon, Gaza, and the West Bank, while other NATO nations allegedly continue funding the war on Russia through Ukraine. He frames Trump and Netanyahu as facing political jeopardy ahead of U.S. midterms and October quasi-elections on occupied land. Max Blumenthal responds to incoming Mossad chief Roman Goffman, discussing David Barnea’s prior stance that Israel will destroy Iran’s governance regardless of the MOU. Blumenthal describes what he calls Barnea’s failure: Kurdish groups allegedly backed by the U.S. (Komale and PJAK) under U.S. air cover to invade Iran and spark a mass uprising along ethnic lines, which he says went nowhere because the Kurdish groups could not advance without U.S. firepower and because U.S. firepower was described as brittle against Iran’s anti-aircraft capabilities. Blumenthal says Iran allegedly obtained Russian technology that cut off Starlink, and he says Naftali Bennett, leading the Israeli opposition, complained that Netanyahu eliminated special intelligence programs to fund Starlink for potential regime-change “chaos agents,” while Bennett pushed for more Starlink. He says Israel cannot act without U.S. firepower and the U.S. would not commit the men and material needed to break Iran’s deterrence. Blumenthal adds that he expects further efforts resembling the same approach, and says any attempt to unravel the MOU or the deal would focus on Lebanon—where he says the Lebanon “file” is mentioned multiple times in the MOU—along with escalation there and targeting the United States through proxies such as AIPAC, paid influencers, or other means. Ratansi then asks how liberal NGOs, media, and Amnesty International/Human Rights Watch could have “fertilized the field” for war growth, referencing protests inside Iran. Blumenthal ties the riots and subsequent war dynamics to what he calls the “liberal NGO class” and the Democratic Party, and he describes the timeline as beginning January 7–8 with protests in marketplaces that he says were transformed into violent regime-change riots. He describes large-scale killings, attacks on mosques, burning of government buildings, and police stations, and he says Amnesty International held protests in Europe calling for intervention or harsher sanctions. He claims Amnesty’s figures (including 40,000) were a hoax and attributes the numbers to monarchist elements tied to Reza Pahlavi, and says the “responsibility to protect” (R2P) narrative has parallels he links to Yugoslavia. Blumenthal says outside intelligence forces guided the unrest, and he references alleged U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Besant claims that the U.S. manipulated Iranian currency to cause a currency crisis and fan the flames, which he says ultimately failed because the Iranian government defended itself. He further connects these events to a sequence of conflicts including a “12-day war” and an “Operation Epstein-Fury,” which he says began with the assassination of Iran’s leadership, including its Ayatollah on February 28. He argues Democrats and the Biden administration set conditions by supporting Israel’s escalation in southern Lebanon in October 2024 instead of pushing a ceasefire in Gaza, and he cites Tony Blinken, Jake Sullivan, and Amos Hochstein. Blumenthal also says Amos Hochstein declared in a CNN interview that the Biden administration was preparing to support an assault on Iran, with the alleged issue being Trump’s execution. Ratansi later asks whether capital forces and capitalism are a choke point. Blumenthal responds by arguing the MOU will fail and Iran could close maritime routes, including closing Bab al-Mandeb to affect commodities and energy prices. He says the U.S. cannot force outcomes because of an oligarchy and an “Israel lobby” exploiting campaign-finance openings, but that the Strait of Hormuz remains closed due to Iran’s deterrence doctrine. He also mentions Donald Trump firing the top Iran expert at the National Security Council after comments by Laura Loomer, and he says that expert warned that attacking Iran would lead to closing the Strait of Hormuz. Blumenthal claims the Zionist movement faces “hard rocks of reality” tied to capitalist classes sensing consequences through gas prices. Blumenthal says the likely U.S. side effect is more repression of dissident movements, citing a 100-year sentence for anarchists involved in an incident outside an ICE facility in Texas and DHS designations. He says U.S. public mass protests are absent but that disgust with Trump and Israel has become a major election issue, with candidates campaigning against AIPAC and some AIPAC-sponsored figures losing primaries. He says Zionist lobbying is in “panic mode,” with remaining tools described as bombing, censorship, and criminalizing opponents. He then discusses donors and leverage, saying Israel has proxies in Congress and that he believes Trump feels used and cannot find an exit ramp. He says JD Vance’s situation could be favorable because the American public wants the war to end but not Trump to be the one blamed. Blumenthal references claims about assassination plots allegedly used to push Trump toward authorizing Operation Epstein-Fury, describing alleged figures within FBI-linked plots and an alleged Pakistani national Asif Murshid. He adds another alleged attempt to frame Butler, Pennsylvania as an Iran-linked plot, and he describes Mike Waltz as a key figure he says tried to convince Trump Iran directed an attempted lone-wolf killing. He claims this framing involved pushes by figures including Benjamin Netanyahu and Nikki Haley. Ratansi asks about prospects for a third party based on a new MAGA base including Tucker Carlson, Candace Owens, and others. Blumenthal says Tucker Carlson has said he is leaving the Republican Party and that a third party started by Carlson would likely kneecap a Vance successor, but that Tucker’s leverage over Vance could function as a restraint on future wars. He says other expelled Republican figures such as Marjorie Taylor Greene and Thomas Massey could join a coalition, while on the left the DSA is making itself a faction within the Democratic Party and the Green Party is denied ballot access through mechanisms he links to the Democratic Party. Finally, Ratansi asks whether Trump will pivot toward Ukraine or Russia. Blumenthal says Trump needs a win and might pivot to Cuba, and he says pivoting to Russia would be disastrous and increase chances of escalations, describing the national security state as addicted to war and using drone warfare learned through the Ukraine conflict as profitable and as a laboratory. He says if Trump pivots toward peace he would collide with that national security state. He ends by saying he thinks there is an increasing chance of a NATO state—probably in the Baltics—being attacked as a staging base for attacks on Russia and on Russian critical infrastructure.

President Zelensky was supposedly humiliated by President Trump and Vice President Vance at the White House for disrespecting the American people and acting like a "welfare queen." According to sources, Boris Johnson influenced Zelensky to go to the White House to embarrass Trump and force him to continue funding the war for Europe. Trump supposedly put Zelensky in his place, which was cheered globally. However, Trump is now reportedly asking Zelensky to strike Saint Petersburg and Moscow, with Zelensky agreeing if provided the weapons. There is concern that Trump is now endorsing neocons like Lindsey Graham and potentially pursuing World War Three. One speaker expressed concern that Trump is not the same person he met in 2020 who wanted to pull troops out of Afghanistan. The speaker is now unsure about supporting Trump due to escalating actions that people did not expect or vote for.

Mario: Let's start with Venezuela. Do you think this is a strategy by Trump? Larry: I saw something similar back in 1988. The CIA was involved with trying to provoke Manuel Noriega into taking some sort of action. They could say, oh, well, we gotta go respond to this to set the stage for our military invasion, which I believe that in 2018, Donald Trump signed a finding authorizing a covert action by the CIA to get rid of Maduro. That attempt failed. And now the objective, get control of the oil. That's the number one priority. And I think it's being done with an eye looking forward, recognizing the potential risk. If conflict is renewed with Iran, prospect of the shutdown of Persian Gulf— Mario: Ukraine defeated Russia. Larry: Yeah. That was the plan. Russia's military is now around 1,500,000. Mario: Let’s talk Venezuela. What’s your initial reaction? When John Kuriaki suggested the best indicator is naval movements, and the buildup off Venezuela is significant. I’ve heard they have 14, twelve warships, including the Gerald Ford. Do you think they are bluffing? Is this Trump strategy? Larry: It could be a bluff. I saw something similar in 1988. I was in the CIA’s Central America branch. They tried to provoke Noriega into action to justify invasion, which happened in December 1988. What’s different now is the base infrastructure. In Panama, Quarry Heights was full; Southern Command was there. Southern Command has moved to Miami. The weaponization of the idea of a “supported vs. supporting” commander is reversed here: Southern Command would be subordinate to Special Operations Command. SOCOM cannot fight a conventional war; they’re light infantry, raids, hostage rescue. So the question is: what will the ships actually do? Shells into Venezuela won’t defeat Venezuela. Ground forces would require mass, and Venezuela is three times the size of Vietnam with rugged terrain that favors ambushes. If US troops ashore, you’d stack body bags far beyond Iraq and Afghanistan. Mario: Do Venezuelans have the will to fight Maduro? Larry: Yes. It will rally insurgents from Brazil and Colombia. If we decapitate Maduro, there are loyalists with weapons; an insurgency could follow, and the US would be hard-pressed to pacify it. The State Department’s INL/INSCR reports on narcotics note Venezuela as a transit point for marijuana and some cocaine, with fentanyl less central than claimed by Trump. The 2018 emphasis on Trendy Aragua looked CIA-driven. Trump reportedly signed a covert action finding in 2018 to remove Maduro, leading to the Guaidó fiasco; that covert action included some public diplomacy via USAID. The objective now, as you asked, is oil control and curtailing Russia, China, and Iran’s influence, with an eye toward BRICS. Mario: Could there be a decapitation strike on Maduro, and would someone like Maria take over? Larry: A decapitation strike could spark insurgency; the US would not be able to pacify it. The broader agenda seems to include a strategy to seize oil and reduce regional influence by Russia and China. Venezuela’s role as a transit point and possible BRICS alignment complicates any straightforward regime-change scenario. Mario: Moving to general foreign policy under Trump. The national security strategy (NSS) for 2025 signals a shift, but you question how binding NSS papers are. What did you make of it, and how does it relate to Ukraine? You’ve noted Trump isn’t serious about peace in Ukraine on some occasions. Larry: The NSS is a set of guidelines, not a blueprint. Europe is being asked to step up, the US distancing itself from Europe, and the strategic relationship with Europe is damaged by the perception of long-term reliability and sanctions. The document highlights China as an economic rival rather than an enemy; it criticizes Europe’s defense spending and censorship, and it frames Russia as less of a direct threat than before, though the reality is nuanced. The US-EU relationship is strained, and the US wants Europe to shoulder more of the burden in Ukraine while maintaining strategic pressure. Mario: What about Ukraine? Zelensky’s negotiation posture, security guarantees, and the Moscow terms? Larry: Putin spoke on 06/14/2024 with five Russian demands: Crimea, Zaporizhzhia, Kherson, Donetsk, and Luhansk are permanently part of Russia; Ukraine must withdraw its forces from those republics; there must be an election in Ukraine with a legitimately elected president (the Russians argue Zelensky is illegitimate for not holding elections); they suggest a successor to Zelensky and elections within 90 days. Freezing lines in Donbas is not accepted by Russia; the Russians claim further territory may be annexed with referenda. If peace talks fail, Russia is likely to push to occupy Kharkiv, Sumy, Mykolaiv, and Odessa, potentially Kyiv. Western support is insufficient to alter that trajectory, given Russia’s large artillery and drone production. The US and Europe cannot match Russia’s drone and shell output; even if they supply Tomahawks, escalation risks, including nuclear considerations, grow. Russia’s economy and war capacity remain robust, and the BRICS poles are strengthening as Western leverage wanes. Mario: What about sanctions strategy and Russia’s oil revenues? Larry: Oil remains a significant but not decisive portion of Russia’s GDP. The West’s sanctions are not enough to force collapse; Russia has endured the 1990s and remains resilient. BRICS cooperation and the shift to the Global South are changing the global order, with Russia and China deepening ties and reducing Western influence. The war in Ukraine has not produced a decisive Western victory, and the global south is moving away from Western-led sanctions, reshaping geopolitical alignments. Mario, it’s been a pleasure.

He's trying to broker peace, but our engagement caused this war. We can't fix it with more engagement. Trump wanted a mineral deal, but it's unclear why he's pushing it. He initially considered removing sanctions on Russia, but after Russia's robust bombing campaign, he proposed large-scale sanctions and tariffs until a ceasefire. It's a proxy war, and it's best to admit our side has lost and wind down. Sanctions only strengthen Russia and weaken the West. Trump's back-and-forth is setting him up for a defeat that could have been blamed on Biden. He should walk away and disengage, it's Biden's war. More sanctions are ridiculous, they've all failed. Russia's fine, and we failed on the battlefield. It's like more COVID boosters, they don't work, get out of this already.

Trump may have already launched a war, restarting Biden and Obama's wars. The United Arab Emirates won't allow the US to use its base in Abu Dhabi for an attack. Iran is better than others who stand with Israel or do nothing for Palestine. A war on Iran is what Netanyahu wants, who has been dragging Trump in his direction. Trump came to power claiming he was a man of peace and wanted a Nobel Peace Prize, but now he is being dragged into military actions. An attack on Iran would be a huge disaster for the region, the world's economy, and everybody. Netanyahu dreams of being the new imperial leader controlling the Middle East. Netanyahu seems to control Trump. The whole crowd around Trump is Zionist and totally supportive of Israel. Trump has forced Netanyahu to accept a temporary ceasefire, but now supports violations of every ceasefire by Netanyahu. This will lead to disasters for everybody, including the United States.

The interview is delayed and then resumes, with discussion shifting to major international developments. On Iran-related negotiations scheduled for Saturday, July 11, Speaker 4 says the Pakistanis believe talks will resume by then, but multiple parties (Iranians, the U.S., Israel) can still disrupt events before that date. Speaker 4 says the first thing to check is whether the parties meet; if they meet, the MOU remains viable. He lists unresolved issues including failure of the United States to fulfill Article 1, efforts to control Iran’s duties under Article 5, Iran not relenting, and the issue of unfreezing assets. Speaker 1 adds that total relief of all sanctions is also still on the table, and raises the ongoing Lebanon issue. On maritime activity near the Strait of Hormuz, Speaker 1 cites a UKMTO statement claiming the southern route is open again for all traffic, with a corridor expanded for day or night travel if ships keep AIS on, radar on, and lights on. The threat level is described as substantial due to mine danger areas and concern about naval forces hailing ships over VHF. Speaker 4 says he is monitoring ship tracking and describes container ships and other cargo vessels returning, with most traffic going through Iranian channels and only one or two via Omani channels. The conversation then turns to a Netanyahu–Trump meeting during the NATO summit context. Speaker 1 relays an Axios report quoting a senior Trump official: Netanyahu made promises about the Iran war that didn’t come to pass, showing trust is broken, and the report’s leak is framed as significant. Speaker 4 references criticism of Netanyahu coming through reports attributed to Barak Ravid. Both discuss that any public warmth may mask deeper concerns, and they emphasize that what matters is what happens afterward. Speaker 1 worries about U.S. decisions that could greenlight Israel in Lebanon and undermine negotiations with Iran due to Israel’s violations of ceasefire and MOU language that Speaker 1 says is tied to Lebanon. Speaker 1 describes conversations with people from Lebanon (Laith Malouf of Free Palestine TV, and Sharmeen Narwani of The Cradle) and explains his focus on what the Lebanese government is thinking. He argues the Lebanese government’s actions contradict the MOU Iran made with the U.S. regarding Lebanon and references leaked clauses that he says require the Lebanese army to disarm Hezbollah across all Lebanon, which he says could trigger civil war. Speaker 4 replies that the deal represented only a portion of Lebanon’s population, with the rest split among Sunni and Shia Muslims and the Druze. Speaker 1 also relays an Axios item saying Netanyahu urged Trump to reign in Erdogan over increasingly anti-Israel rhetoric, and asked Trump to avoid approving weapon sales that would help Turkey modernize its air force. Discussion includes claims of mutual hostile rhetoric and disagreements between Israel and Turkey, as well as debate over whether economic escalation like oil pressure should occur. A clip of Trump’s comments is discussed, describing threats to attack Iran’s infrastructure and promises about enriched uranium. Speaker 1 then reads Iran’s response, attributed to Muhammad Bagheri, criticizing the threats and urging respect, with a statement that the Iranian people are “strangers to the language of threats” and warning of response “in another language.” Speaker 4 says the language was prohibited in the MOU and frames it as a violation, while Speaker 1 counters that violations may not be expected to be perfect in an MOU context. The transcript then focuses heavily on the scale of Ali Khamenei’s funeral as reported by Al Jazeera and other estimates: Speaker 1 cites projections of 14 to 20 million across Iraq and Iran over the entire period, and gives specific city estimates: Iran 15 million, Qom 2 to 4 million, Iraq 3 to 5 million, and Mashhad 7 to 10 million, with combined attendance projected around 30 to 40 million. Speaker 4 responds that the size indicates Sayyed Ali Mohammed’s unpopularity. Speaker 1 describes a viral post and a quote broadcast on Iranian national television from a person who says they were previously against the government, engaged in protests, and now begs forgiveness, portraying a shift in sentiment after the war. Speaker 4 compares the funeral’s impact to the U.S. unity shift after December 7, 1941, and says it will affect Iranian culture for the next 50 years. Speaker 1 agrees, adding that even critics may mourn and respect due to the defense of the country and the war’s narrative. Israel/Iran-related moral and protest comparisons appear next, including discussion of alleged violence by Israeli police and prisons versus claims about Iranian guards. The conversation then reports a new maritime incident: Speaker 1 says an unknown projectile hit a Qatari-owned LNG tanker, Al-Raqayat, on the port side near the Omani side of the Strait of Hormuz, causing fire with no casualties or environmental impact reported. Authorities advise vessels transit with caution, report suspicious activity to UKMTO, and Speaker 1 frames the incident as showing escalation risk despite ongoing negotiations. On Ukraine, Speaker 1 relays comments attributed to Russian spokesperson Peskov calling it “a war,” and Zelensky’s statements about nuclear weapons as a form of security and vulnerability if lacking them. Speaker 1 connects this to reports that Ukraine may consider obtaining a nuclear capability and mentions a large Russian attack allegedly with drones intercepted but few or no missiles intercepted. Trump’s remarks are also discussed, including a claim that a 90-minute call with Putin and efforts by Trump could bring talks to an end, and that NATO summit discussions may help. Speaker 4 responds by shifting to arguments about escalation and retaliation patterns, then provides a long historical breakdown of Russia’s shifts in tactics and force posture: from early invasion framed as special military operation, to mobilizations, shifting operational focus (e.g., Bakhmut, Avdiivka, Pokrovsk), the Kursk invasion, and later expansion across multiple regions. Speaker 4 claims Kyiv has been struck repeatedly and discusses air defense failures, and he asserts Russia has reserves while Ukraine does not. The transcript then returns to military, economic, and political pressures. Zelensky’s Financial Times quote is read: once attacks reach “1,000 flying towards Moscow” Putin will “feel it personally,” and farther from Moscow means closer to ending the war. Speaker 4 counters with skepticism about Ukraine’s ability to match Russia’s scale of attacks, and discusses glide bombs and claimed casualty impacts. Speaker 1 asks about pressure from energy infrastructure strikes and oil market impacts, while Speaker 4 says Russia exports increase, premiums are obtained, and the broader oil-market impact is limited. Additional regional updates include Lebanon: the Lebanese president denies reports of meeting Netanyahu and says he would immediately leave if in the same room while Israeli attacks and violations continue. Speaker 1 also cites a Lebanese government preliminary report placing direct damage from the war between $3 billion and $4 billion, excluding indirect economic losses of $16 billion, and Speaker 4 responds by calling the deaths “priceless.” Yemen is described as a major development: Speaker 1 says Saudi imposed a blockade preventing Iranian airplanes from going to Yemen for the first time in 11 years, and Iran breached it with an Iranian Mahan air flight to Sana’a transporting injured people and a high-level delegation. The conversation frames this as strategically favorable for Iran, with proxy-war consequences and ongoing clashes linked to Houthi activity and Saudi-backed forces. Speaker 4 adds that Yemen heating up could affect Saudi exits through Bab el-Mandab and change logistics depending on where oil is being sold. On Gaza, Speaker 1 discusses claims that Hamas government bodies resigned or were dissolved and describes other circulating reports (from Emirati outlets) saying these were false and that Hamas instead renovated an emergency committee into an interim committee led by Abdul Hadi al-Aqra (as stated). Speaker 4 accepts this alternative framing as more credible, and Speaker 1 says Hamas aims to expand political control in Gaza and the West Bank. Speaker 1 adds news that an International Security Force presence (described as Trump’s “peace” border force) may bring 20,000 personnel mostly from Indonesia, Morocco, Kazakhstan, and Albania, while Gaza continues to be bombed. The episode ends with discussion of negotiation prospects: Speaker 1 argues Trump needs a political win after the Iran war and is more optimistic about Ukraine negotiations, while Speaker 4 says Europe may push confrontation with Russia and risks of escalation at sea. Both agree that the conflict’s end may happen while Trump is still president, but not on Trump’s terms, and they conclude after exchanging commentary on future tracking tools and other unrelated remarks.

The speaker asserts that Russia is winning the war in Ukraine, and Ukraine is doomed due to a lack of weaponry, manpower, and Western support. A negotiated settlement is impossible because Russia's demands—Ukraine's neutrality, demilitarization, and acceptance of Russian annexation of Crimea and four oblasts—are unacceptable to Ukraine and the West. The speaker believes Ukraine should cut a deal now to minimize losses, but nationalism and Russophobia prevent this. The speaker argues that NATO expansion into Ukraine is the taproot of the war, analogous to America's Monroe Doctrine. He believes the West mistakenly thinks Russia is a mortal threat to dominate Europe. Putin pines for the Soviet era and wants to restore it. The speaker says that during the Cold War, he thought that the Soviets were not ten feet tall. He also says that the decision to bring Ukraine into NATO was made in 2008. The speaker thinks that the US believed that they could shove it down their throat. The speaker believes that the US has driven the Russians into the arms of the Chinese. He says that the American foreign policy establishment is incompetent. The speaker says that the US has a special relationship with Israel that has no parallel in recorded history. He also says that the Israel lobby is an incredibly powerful interest group. The speaker defines the Israeli actions in Gaza as genocide. He says that the Israelis have long been interested in expelling the Palestinian population from Greater Israel. The speaker believes that the international system will continue to be dominated by the United States, China, and Russia. He thinks that the US and China will remain the two most powerful countries on the planet.