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In this conversation, Brian Berletic discusses the current collision between the United States’ global strategy and a rising multipolar world, arguing that U.S. policy is driven by corporate-financier interests and a desire to preserve unipolar primacy, regardless of the costs to others. - Structural dynamics and multipolar resistance - The host notes a shift from optimism about Trump’s “America First” rhetoric toward an assessment that U.S. strategy aims to restore hegemony and broad, repeated wars, even as a multipolar world emerges. - Berletic agrees that the crisis is structural: the U.S. system is driven by large corporate-financier interests prioritizing expansion of profit and power. He cites Brookings Institution’s 2009 policy papers, particularly The Path to Persia, as documenting a long-running plan to manage Iran via a sequence of options designed to be used in synergy to topple Iran, with Syria serving as a staging ground for broader conflict. - He argues the policy framework has guided decisions across administrations, turning policy papers into bills and war plans, with corporate media selling these as American interests. This, he says, leaves little room for genuine opposition because political power is financed by corporate interests. - Iran, Syria, and the Middle East as a springboard to a global confrontation - Berletic traces the current Iran crisis to the 2009 Brookings paper’s emphasis on air corridors and using Israel to provoke a war, placing blame on Israel as a proxy mechanism while the U.S. cleanses the region of access points for striking Iran directly. - He asserts the Arab Spring (2011) was designed to encircle Iran and move toward Moscow and Beijing, with Iran as the final target. The U.S. and its allies allegedly used policy papers to push tactical steps—weakening Russia via Ukraine, exploiting Syria, and leveraging Iran as a fulcrum for broader restraint against Eurasian powers. - The aim, he argues, is to prevent a rising China by destabilizing Iran and, simultaneously, strangling energy exports that feed China’s growth. He claims the United States has imposed a global maritime oil blockade on China through coordinated strikes and pressure on oil-rich states, while China pursues energy independence via Belt and Road, coal-to-liquids, and growing imports from Russia. - The role of diplomacy, escalation, and Netanyahu’s proxy - On diplomacy, Berletic says the U.S. has no genuine interest in peace; diplomacy is used to pretext war, creating appearances of reasonable engagement while advancing the continuity of a warlike agenda. He references the Witch Path to Persia as describing diplomacy as a pretext for regime change. - He emphasizes that Russia and China are not credibly negotiating with the U.S., viewing Western diplomacy as theater designed to degrade multipolar powers. Iran, he adds, may be buying time but also reacting to U.S. pressure, while Arab states and Israel are portrayed as proxies with limited autonomy. - The discussion also covers how Israel serves as a disposable proxy to advance U.S. goals, including potential use of nuclear weapons, with Trump allegedly signaling a post-facto defense of Israel in any such scenario. - The Iran conflict, its dynamics, and potential trajectory - The war in Iran is described as a phased aggression, beginning with the consulate attack and escalating into economic and missile-strike campaigns. Berletic notes Iran’s resilient command-and-control and ongoing missile launches, suggesting the U.S. and its allies are attempting to bankrupt Iran while degrading its military capabilities. - He highlights the strain on U.S. munitions inventories, particularly anti-missile interceptors and long-range weapons, due to simultaneous operations in Ukraine, the Middle East, and potential confrontations with China. He warns that the war’s logistics are being stretched to the breaking point, risking a broader blowback. - The discussion points to potential escalation vectors: shutting Hormuz, targeting civilian infrastructure, and possibly using proxies (including within the Gulf states and Yemen) to choke off energy flows. Berletic cautions that the U.S. could resort to more drastic steps, including leveraging Israel for off-world actions, while maintaining that multipolar actors (Russia, China, Iran) would resist. - Capabilities, resources, and the potential duration - The host notes China’s energy-mobility strategies and the Western dependency on rare earth minerals (e.g., gallium) mostly produced in China, emphasizing how U.S. war aims rely on leveraging allies and global supply chains that are not easily sustained. - Berletic argues the U.S. does not plan for permanent victory but for control, and that multipolar powers are growing faster than the United States can destroy them. He suggests an inflection point will come when multipolarism outruns U.S. capacity, though the outcome remains precarious due to nuclear risk and global economic shocks. - Outlook and final reflections - The interlocutors reiterate that the war is part of a broader structural battle between unipolar U.S. dominance and a rising multipolar order anchored by Eurasian powers. They stress the need to awaken broader publics to the reality of multipolarism and to pursue a more balanced world order, warning that the current trajectory risks global economic harm and dangerous escalation.

China and Russia have a non-confrontational relationship that promotes world peace. The US, on the other hand, is seen as a warmonger, having been involved in numerous armed conflicts and interfering in other countries' affairs. It has supported over 50 foreign governments, meddled in elections, and attempted assassinations. The US-led NATO has caused wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria, resulting in a high death toll and millions of refugees. The US's focus on Asia Pacific security is also a cause for concern. As long as US aggression persists, global peace will be hard to achieve.

The speaker argues that the Turkestan Islamic Party (TIP) has been a strategic asset far beyond Syria, with its usefulness tied to China rather than local Syrian aims. Uyghur militants are described as a disciplined, ideologically committed, battle-hardened force whose real target is Qingyang (Western China) and the Silk Road, making them the perfect lever against Beijing rather than a force to liberate Syria. Syria served as their training ground, where they were disciplined, hardened, and politically sanitized for a future phase. Turkey is said to have settled thousands of TIP families in Zambach, often in emptied Alawite and Christian villages, portraying them not as mere foreign fighters but as part of a demographic project. Ankara is depicted as viewing TIP as loyal, controllable, and ideologically aligned with its regional ambitions, with NATO members tolerating this due to long-term potential for a battle-tested, state-sponsored jihadist group to disrupt China’s western flank. When Bashar al-Assad’s government regained power, it is claimed one of the first moves was to integrate these fighters into the official Syrian army—giving them uniforms, ranks, legitimacy, passports, and protection. Washington’s response is described as approval, with Reuters cited as reporting that the US green-lighted integration of foreign jihadists into Jolani’s army as long as it appeared transparent. The central question raised is why these fighters are being normalized and why HTS’s terror designation was lifted, along with why Turkey is lobbying for their political inclusion and why Jolani is protecting them. The argument is that the next chapter is Central Asia, with TIP fighters reportedly moving into Afghanistan and warnings from regional think tanks about Uyghur militant cells near Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, edging toward China’s border. These fighters are said to threaten Chinese consulates, engineers, pipelines, and railways—targets along the Silk Road. The speaker asserts that Washington has historically weaponized radical networks when strategic interests demand, citing past use in the Mujahideen, Libya, and Syria, asserting that belt-and-road projects are a major threat to American primacy. TIP is described as tailor-made to disrupt Chinese economic corridors and create security headaches along the route. Beijing is criticized for normalizing relations with Jolani and appearing to recognize a stable Syrian government, while in reality engaging a political facade built on networks still influenced by Washington and Ankara. By legitimizing Jolani, Beijing is said to indirectly legitimize the infrastructure sheltering Uyghur militants and give political cover to networks that could be redirected toward China’s borders. The speaker concludes that China’s diplomacy in this regard is not smart geopolitics; whenever Washington backs a “reformed” jihadist, it reflects the jihadist’s usefulness entering a new phase. The TIP is claimed to be here to stay, being prepared, with China sleepwalking into the next phase of this strategy.

The ongoing conflict between Russia and Ukraine is not just a battle between two countries, but a larger struggle between democracy and dictatorship, specifically involving the Chinese Communist Party and the United States. The CCP's strategy includes creating chaos in multiple regions to overwhelm the US, with conflicts in the Middle East, Russia's aggression towards Ukraine, and CCP's intimidation of Taiwan. These actions highlight the global impact of the Chinese Communist Party's influence.

China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea are working together to disrupt the world. China funds Russia's war against Ukraine, while Russia obtains weapons from China, North Korea, and Iran. Iran sponsors terrorism globally, including Hamas and Hezbollah. The speaker supports helping Ukraine for two reasons. Firstly, the US promised to defend Ukraine when they returned Soviet nuclear weapons to Russia. Keeping this promise is crucial for maintaining credibility. Secondly, the speaker believes that Russia's aggression will not stop at Ukraine. By providing Ukraine with a small portion of the Pentagon budget, they have significantly degraded Russian military hardware, making it a worthwhile investment.

China's ultimate goal is not to trade with the United States, but to replace American businesses. The belief that investing in China would lead to a more open market is being replaced by the understanding that China wants to win twice. Despite hopes that trade would bring political change, China remains an authoritarian one-party state with no democracy or independent judiciary. The Chinese Communist Party surveils its people, censors information, tortures dissidents, and persecutes religious and ethnic minorities. China is using its economic power to influence and change America, as recognized by the current administration's China strategy. The CCP's campaign for ideological conformity extends beyond China's borders and aims to exert influence worldwide, including in the United States.

Trump is officially three in o with China. Here's what nobody's talking about. China had a heavy investment in Iran. Trump neutered them. China had a heavy investment in Gaza. Trump secured a regional firewall. China straightforwardly controlled Venezuela for two decades. Trump's moving in and China's blinking for a third time. And that's why everyone is asking the wrong questions when it comes to Venezuela. The cover story is this: Trump's military buildup toward Venezuela is about countering narcoterrorism and targeting drug cartels like Trend Agua, which are tied to the president Nicolas Maduro's regime. But analysts go a step further and they still miss the mark when they say, well, this is really about regime change. It's neither of these things. I mean, yes, we've got a drug problem, but it's actually ties to a much bigger issue. Trump's Venezuela offensive is much bigger. It's his proxy war against China, and he's the only president in history who was actually fighting China where it hurts. As of this week, Trump has positioned over 10,000 US troops and eight warships in the region. We have helicopters and Reaper drones taking out narco boats. We have F-35s, and Venezuela has scrambled their jets. And this week, Trump has authorized the CIA to carry out lethal operations in Venezuela. We'll dive into that one a little deeper in the next segment. All this to ostensibly go after drug boats and fight narco terrorism. Yet everyone is taking this at face value. Listen. Why not have the coast guard stop them, which it is empowered by law to do? So Trump answers question as asked. Because we've been doing that for thirty years, and it has been totally ineffective. Even the ostensibly right-leaning National Review gets it wrong by musing that this is all about regime change. Here's why this whole Venezuela offensive is really about China, and this is a shadow war against Beijing. The first in history that looks like it will actually work. You see, attacking Maduro is attacking Xi Jinping. To think that Maduro is some independent agent is naive and foolish. Why is Venezuela basically China? Well, follow the money, the oil money. Again, remember what I said yesterday about why China is likely the biggest force behind the Gaza war in promoting Palestine and Hamas protests around the globe? Remember, it's about taking advantage of bad leadership that sits over cheap oil and cheap resources. China sweeps in, buys out the leadership, gets free gas, essentially. Venezuela is the poster boy of this predatory China oil game. Beijing is Venezuela's largest creditor by far. Venezuela has over 60,000,000,000 in debt to Beijing since 02/2007. It pays Beijing back in, you guessed it, oil. Venezuela is economically paralyzed by sanctions. The only country supporting Venezuela meaningfully is Beijing because they're the primary buyers. This forces Venezuela to sell their oil for next to nothing, meaning they'll forever be indebted to Beijing. That's the whole game. That's the way China plays. In May 2025, at the China CELAC Forum, Beijing gave Venezuela an additional billion dollars in new oil investments, solidifying Venezuela's position as the front lines of The US China shadow war. But China's interests in Venezuela go far beyond cheap oil and economics. Chinese companies are neck deep in modernizing Venezuela's ports and telecom infrastructures. And in all things related to Chinese companies, you're a fool to think the Chinese Communist Party does anything without making it a dual military civilian use project. I'll say it again. China does not allow its companies to operate in the world unless it could also be used for their national security purposes. So don't be fooled when Trump is using all this force and manpower and CIA expertise in Venezuela. This is Trump taking the war to China. He's doing what no other president before him was even remotely capable of accomplishing. Trump is declaring war on China's most valuable assets, Iran, Venezuela, Gaza. What do these tin pot dictatorships have in common? They'd be nothing without the Chinese Communist Party. And China would be nothing in the geopolitical stage without them. And now Trump is taking them, Iran, Gaza, and now Venezuela. Three strikes, and you're out, Xi.

Many Western corporations are unaware of the true nature of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and its leader, Xi Jinping. Throughout history, no organization has survived when dealing with the CCP. Xi Jinping has transformed the party into his own, and it is no longer representative of communism. It is crucial for corporations to realize this for their long-term benefit. The New Federal State of China is a group that possesses internal intelligence about the CCP. They can provide valuable information and protection, not just for profit.

Speaker 0 observes that, despite a 'pitiful Shanghai Cooperation Organization meeting' happening among 'all our least favorite characters, Xi and Putin and Modi and the rest,' Trump nonetheless has 'plenty of options.' He identifies 'Number one, those secondary sanctions' as a principal option available to Trump. He further states, 'Yeah. I see these leaders trying to close ranks and gang up on Trump, but it is not going to work.' The overall framing centers on sanctions as a strategic lever in the international arena, with the participants at the SCO gathering appearing to attempt to form a united front against Trump, which the speaker suggests will not succeed.

China is considered a formidable adversary like Russia, and the speaker suggests that they should also support their side. They openly ask China to back them, just as Russia is believed to support Republicans. Additionally, they encourage China to obtain President Trump's tax returns, implying that the media would greatly appreciate it.

The United States believes China will attack Taiwan because America is always looking to start new wars to justify defense spending. America needs to find new enemies, and it believes that the greatest threat to American empire right now is China, even though there's no evidence of this. Currently, China sends America cheap goods, and the U.S. gives China U.S. dollars. The Communist Party is storing the wealth of the Chinese people in American banks, which benefits America, Wall Street, and the Chinese Communist Party. If China takes over Taiwan, America doesn't lose much. The semiconductor industry in Taiwan could be moved elsewhere. However, America has hubris and must save face.

The speaker opens by saying that insinuations that Chinese people celebrate “killing lines” against the United States are misguided and that those who say so do not understand how Chinese people truly feel about confronting the United States. They insist that most Chinese people are not happy about this; rather, Chinese education teaches that the poor must have dignity and survive, and that even though the United States is an enemy, it is not treated the same as Japan, which is described as an enemy to be despised. The United States is characterized as one of the few enemies China historically respected, and even the strongest. The “United States of America” is described as a country whose soldiers—especially American soldiers—are capable of fighting to the end, unwilling to turn and run, and able to cross oceans and build empires on foreign soil. American soldiers are celebrated for their grit and capacity to work hard, to bleed and sweat, and to be industrious; Americans are praised as intelligent, civilized, and family-oriented, with a distinct political system. The speaker concedes admiration for American innovation (computers, Internet, Apple, AI, etc.) and for American achievements that have shaped modern technology and industry, while acknowledging a critical view of the American political system, yet still respecting the will of the American people to choose their governance. The speaker then shifts to a nuanced view: the United States is both an enemy and a teacher, a former ally, a rival, and a former opponent in Korea and other contexts. They recount a long history of mutual actions—alliances and conflicts, blocking and opening, trade and sanctions, praise and insult—between the two nations. Across China’s history of unity and division, from 2000 years ago to the present, the United States has been the strongest and most formidable opponent China faced, yet also a partner at times. The current assessment is that the United States has changed: White-headed eagles no longer fight with the same vigor, American corruption and inertia have grown, and economic and moral foundations are weakening. The speaker notes that the United States no longer bleeds or toils as before; responsibility for national security and labor has shifted to criminals and elites, and ordinary Americans are no longer willing to stand up for their homeland. They describe the national collapse in terms of governance, mismanagement, and a failure to maintain national pride, with the capital misperceived and a “killing line” used to exploit patriotic sentiment, especially against those who love their country. Against this backdrop, the speaker asserts that the American people must awaken and that China has not forgotten its past. They argue that the only way for the United States to become great again is for Americans to act courageously and for China to pursue its own revolutionary transformation: not a simple change of leadership or social media campaigns, but a true revolution that overturns the old world order and establishes a new one. The speaker envisions a strengthened, prosperous China through this revolution, while asserting that both peoples can achieve happiness—“美 利 坚 民 族” (a prosperous American nation) and a strong Chinese nation. They express faith that the American people can likewise secure their own future and that China will remain observant, waiting for the day when the American nation awakens.

China, Russia, and Iran are seen as the new axis of evil and pose a significant threat. China, in particular, aims to rebuild its empire and challenge the US as a global superpower. They are establishing outposts, buying farmland and land near military installations in the US. Meanwhile, the US is the only nation with the ability to project power globally. The concern is that China is encroaching on this power. Additionally, there have been questionable decisions made by the Biden administration, such as allowing a Chinese spy balloon to float across the country for 8 days.

Richard Wolff and Glenn discuss the future of the West, NATO, Europe, and the international economic system. - The central dynamic, according to Wolff, is the rise of China and the West’s unpreparedness. He argues that the West, after a long era of Cold War dominance, is encountering a China that grows two to three times faster than the United States, with no sign of slowing. China’s ascent has transformed global power relations and exposed that prior strategies to stop or slow China have failed. - The United States, having defeated various historical rivals, pursued a unipolar, neoliberal globalization project after the Cold War. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of that era left the U.S. with a sense of “manifest destiny” to shape the world order. But now time is on China’s side, and the short-term fix for the U.S. is to extract value from its allies rather than invest in long-run geopolitics. Wolff contends the U.S. is engaging in a transactional, extractive approach toward Europe and other partners, pressuring them to concede significant economic and strategic concessions. - Europe is seen by Wolff as increasingly subordinated to U.S. interests, with its leadership willing to accept terrible trade terms and militarization demands to maintain alignment with Washington. He cites the possibility of Europe accepting LNG imports and investments to the U.S. economy at the expense of its own social welfare, suggesting that Europe’s social protections could be jeopardized by this “divorce settlement” with the United States. - Russia’s role is reinterpreted: while U.S. and European actors have pursued expanding NATO and a Western-led security architecture, Russia’s move toward Greater Eurasia and its pivot to the East, particularly under Putin, complicates Western plans. Wolff argues that the West’s emphasis on demonizing Russia as the unifying threat ignores the broader strategic competition with China and risks pushing Europe toward greater autonomy or alignment with Russia and China. - The rise of BRICS and China’s Belt and Road Initiative are framed as major competitive challenges to Western economic primacy. The West’s failure to integrate and adapt to these shifts is seen as a strategic misstep, especially given Russia’s earlier openness to a pan-European security framework that was rejected in favor of a U.S.-led order. - Within the United States, there is a debate about the proper response to these shifts. One faction desires aggressive actions, including potential wars (e.g., Iran) to deter adversaries, while another emphasizes the dangers of escalation in a nuclear age. Wolff notes that Vietnam and Afghanistan illustrate the limits of muscular interventions, and he points to domestic economic discontent—rising inequality, labor unrest, and a growing desire for systemic change—as factors that could press the United States to rethink its approach to global leadership. - Economically, Wolff challenges the dichotomy of public versus private dominance. He highlights China’s pragmatic hybrid model—roughly 50/50 private and state enterprise, with openness to foreign participation yet strong state direction. He argues that the fixation on choosing between private-market and public-control models is misguided and that outcomes matter more than orthodox ideological labels. - Looking ahead, Wolff is optimistic that Western economies could reframe development by learning from China’s approach, embracing a more integrated strategy that blends public and private efforts, and reducing ideological rigidity. He suggests Europe could reposition itself by deepening ties with China and leveraging its own market size to negotiate from a position of strength, potentially even joining or aligning with BRICS in some form. - For Europe, a potential path to resilience would involve shifting away from a mindset of subordination to the United States, pursuing energy diversification (including engaging with Russia for cheaper energy), and forming broader partnerships with China to balance relations with the United States and Russia. This would require political renewal in Europe and a willingness to depart from a “World War II–reboot” mentality toward a more pragmatic, multipolar strategy. - In closing, Wolff stresses that the West’s current trajectory is not inevitable. He envisions a Europe capable of redefining its alliances, reconsidering economic models, and seeking a more autonomous, multipolar future that reduces dependency on U.S. leadership. He ends with a provocative suggestion: Europe might consider a realignment toward Russia and China as a way to reshape global power balances, rather than defaulting to a perpetual U.S.-led order.

America would want China's help to avoid fighting too many wars, ensuring China continues buying US dollars to sustain American debt. Also, historically, Russia has been more of a threat to China, so US friendship with China would force Putin to focus on defense. China is now transferring its US dollars into gold, encouraging others to do the same because America's debt is a huge problem. It makes sense for China and the US to be friends because the US is a huge market for Chinese exports and provides technology. China wants to be friends with Russia because it feels threatened by the US, which has military bases surrounding China. China needs oil and food imports to sustain its economy, and if the US launches an embargo, China collapses. China needs new trade routes, and Russia is the best partner for energy and oil access. Chinese policymakers know China's economy and demographics have collapsed, making it vulnerable and dependent on the world.

The discussion centers on the rapidly evolving geopolitical landscape, with a focus on Venezuela, Iran, and the broader US-led strategic environment, as seen through the perspectives of Mario and Pepe Escobar. Venezuela and the Venezuelan crisis - Escobar frames Venezuela as a desperate move tied to the demise of the petrodollar, with a broader matrix of actors maneuvering in the back to profit from a potential annexation and to test regional security strategies. He notes that the United States has stated “this is my backyard, and I own it,” and questions whether Washington is ready to back that stance against the will of the Venezuelan people, including Chavistas and the new government led by Delcy Rodríguez, who he describes as “an old school Chavista” with a strong legal and negotiation background. - He argues that the operation against Maduro lacked a coherent strategy, including planning for reorganizing the Venezuelan oil sector to serve American interests. He cites expert opinion suggesting it would take five years to recondition Venezuela’s energy ecosystem to produce around 3,000,000 barrels per day, requiring about $183 billion in investment, which CEOs would require guarantees for before engaging. - The regime-change objective as pursued by Trump-era policy did not materialize; the core regime persists with figures like Padrino and Cabello still in place. The “mini Netflix special” of the operation did not translate into a durable political outcome, and the regime’s leadership remains, even as some key security figures were demoted or accused in the operation. - Dulce Rodríguez (Delcy), the vice president, is portrayed as a capable negotiator who must persuade the Venezuelan public that the security betrayal by the head of Maduro’s security apparatus was real. Escobar emphasizes that the domestic narrative faces a hard sell because the core regime remains and the security apparatus has not been fully neutralized. - Escobar stresses that sanctions are the most critical barrier to Venezuela’s economic recovery and argues that without sanctions relief, meaningful economic reconstitution is unlikely. He notes that Delcy Rodríguez enjoys broad popular support, and he argues that Latin American sentiment toward U.S. intervention complicates Washington’s position. - He warns Brazil’s Lula, a BRICS member, plays a crucial role; Brazilian foreign policy, influenced by Atlanticists, could veto Venezuela’s BRICS membership, complicating Venezuela’s regional integration. He contends that Maduro’s removal is not assured, and a more open Venezuelan regime under Delcy could potentially collaborate with the West, but sanctions and governance challenges remain central obstacles. Iran, protests, and sanctions - The Iranian protests are framed as economically driven, with inflation and cost-of-living pressures fueling dissent. Iran’s currency and real inflation are cited as severe stressors, and the regime’s subsidy policies are criticized as inadequate. Escobar emphasizes that the protests are hijacked by foreign actors to turn into a regime-change playbook, echoing familiar color-revolution patterns observed in other contexts. - He describes Iran’s resilience under extensive sanctions, highlighting infrastructure deficits and the broader economic stagnation as long-running issues. He stresses that Iranian society contains grassroots debate and a robust intellectual culture, including Shiite theology studies, universities, and a tradition of long-term strategic thinking with sustained cross-border alliances (Russia and China) as part of a broader BRICS alignment. - On foreign involvement, Escobar notes differing perspectives: some Iranians blame foreign meddling, while others point to domestic mismanagement and sanctions as primary drivers of discontent. He emphasizes that Iran’s leadership remains wary of external coercion and seeks to strengthen ties within BRICS and other partners, while being cautious about provoking Western escalation. Russia, China, and the evolving great-power dynamic - Escobar argues that Moscow, Beijing, and Tehran view US actions as part of a broader long-term strategy rather than short-term wins. He describes a sophisticated, long-horizon approach: China pursuing a multi-decade plan with five-year cycles, Russia testing BRICS-centered financial and payment systems to reduce dependence on SWIFT, and Iran leveraging BRICS relationships to counterbalance Western pressure. - He contrasts this with what he calls the “bordello circus” of American political-military maneuvering, suggesting that the US’s episodic threats and unpredictable diplomacy undermine any similar credibility or effectiveness. He emphasizes that Russia and China prioritize acts and long-term power balancing over American-style unpredictability. - The 12-day war and the Orishnik missile attack on Lviv are framed as signaling a more volatile phase in the Russia-Ukraine conflict, with Putin signaling that the war could extend beyond the previously imagined timelines if Western escalation continues. The missile strike is presented as a clear warning to NATO and the Polish border region, underscoring heightened geopolitical risk. The broader outlook and conclusions - Escobar remains deeply pessimistic about a swift resolution to the Russia-Ukraine war, citing the potential for a prolonged European conflict that could strain European economies. He views regime stability in Iran as fragile but enduring, while Venezuela’s path remains contingent on sanctions relief, domestic governance, and the strategic posture of Latin American neighbors and BRICS members. - The conversation closes with a reminder of the complexity of modern geopolitics, where sanctions, domestic economics, regional alignments, and long-term strategic planning interact in ways that defy simple “winner-loser” narratives.

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is allegedly planning to engage the United States in four separate wars, including one involving a terrorist organization. Recent attacks by Hamas on Israel seem to align with this plan. There are reports that Taliban weapons left by the US have reached terrorists in Gaza, and Iran may have played a role in coordinating these attacks. However, what is receiving less attention is the meeting between CCP leader Xi Jinping and Palestinian president Mahmoud Abbas in June. They announced the establishment of a China Palestine strategic partnership, which Xi Jinping described as a significant milestone in their bilateral relations.

China is positioning itself to replace the US as the world hegemon by hosting a summit attended by 130 countries, including Vladimir Putin. The summit celebrated the 10th anniversary of China's belt and road initiative, which has invested $1 trillion in infrastructure in 70 countries. This serves to make China's exports cheaper and buy countries out of the US orbit. China offers a menu of infrastructure projects, such as ports, trains, power plants, and telecom networks, in exchange for influence. Chinese companies also gain control over the infrastructure they build. China is selling US treasuries and cracking down on US firms in China, suggesting it sees conflict with the US as likely and potentially beneficial.

China's influence over Iran is a major concern, as it supports the Iranian regime. This raises the question of whether we should confront China directly. The involvement of China is alarming, especially considering the credibility of whistleblowers from within the Chinese CCP. Nicole, representing the new federal state of China, an organization aiming to dismantle the CCP, joins the program to provide crucial information. The organization hopes that sharing this intel will aid the US, Israel, and other peace-loving nations in defeating the CCP.

China's support for Iran and Iran's support for Hamas are concerning in the broader geopolitical context. China and Iran have a 25-year weapons deal, making them firm partners. Recently, China and Russia blocked any response to a terror attack in Israel, which undermines relationships between the US and Gulf Arab States. The administration's dealings with China have negatively impacted the American economy. The Chinese Communist Party sees the attacks in Israel as advantageous for their geostrategic goals and their plans regarding Taiwan.

The China-Russia relationship is based on non-alignment, non-confrontation, and non-targeting of third parties, contributing to world peace and stability. The U.S. is the primary cause for concern due to its destructive role. The U.S. is allegedly the number one warmonger, having been at war for over 224 years of its history and accounting for about 80% of post-World War II armed conflicts. It is also the number one violator of sovereignty, interfering in the internal affairs of other countries. Since World War II, the U.S. has reportedly supported over 50 foreign governments, interfered in elections in at least 30 countries, and attempted assassinations on over 50 foreign leaders. The U.S. is also the primary source of antagonism. NATO, led by the U.S., is responsible for wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria, which caused over 900,000 deaths and 37,000,000 refugees. U.S. actions focused on Asia Pacific security also require vigilance. The world will allegedly not have peace as long as U.S. hegemony and belligerence exist.

Professor Zhang argues that geopolitics is a game where players maximize their self-interest, with predictions built on game theory rather than ideology. For 2026, the central event is Trump’s state visit to China in April, and the US–China relationship is identified as the key uncertain variable, while Russia–Ukraine is considered settled and Europe–NATO–Russia largely forecastable. Zhang outlines the grand strategy behind current tensions: Trump supposedly aims to force a grand bargain with China by leveraging the destabilization of the Middle East and Western Hemisphere to push China into continuing to buy US dollars. He contends that since Nixon’s 1971 decision to float the dollar, the US has relied on two pillars—the petrodollar system and opening China to American technology and markets. As the US then ran deficits and engaged in Middle East wars, China sought to internationalize the yuan and reduce dependence on the dollar via instruments like the Shanghai gold exchange. This, in his view, destabilizes the dollar, prompting Trump to push China to maintain dollar demand by destabilizing oil supply routes and minerals for China’s EV, AI, and other sectors. By invading Venezuela and potentially destabilizing Iran, Trump allegedly aims to force China to rely more on Western Hemisphere oil, silver, gold, lithium, copper, etc., and thus buy more US Treasuries to support the dollar. The discussion then shifts to possible bifurcations: if the United States truly wants China to use the dollar, it would create trust and a predictable, rules-based order; yet current actions—such as cutting China off from semiconductors or “crushing its tech industry”—could push China away, making it more independent and less dependent on the dollar. The Venezuelan case is cited as evidence that the aim is to obstruct China rather than claim oil directly; it would rather block rival powers than simply seize resources. The two powers are described as codependent: China imports about three-quarters of its oil, with roughly 50% from the Middle East and 20% from Russia; China would face a long and costly transition to replace Russian oil entirely, including pipelines. China also has tools to push back, such as triggering instability in silver markets (where China dominates) or other commodities used for manufacturing, a dynamic described as mutually assured economic destruction if either side overplays. When asked how the US could simultaneously pursue trust and coercion, Zhang asserts it cannot have both; the US is described as a global hegemon that should treat China as an equal, but instead presses to subordinate China. This creates a “ladder over an abyss” metaphor: both sides must climb together, or both fall; overt coercion could push China toward a different strategic alignment, possibly toward Russia or a diversified energy portfolio. Zhang emphasizes the role of hubris and racism in US policy, rather than pure ideology, and says the US dollar’s strength is also its vulnerability. Looking at US domestic dynamics, Zhang predicts a potential US economic crisis could magnify political instability. He identifies three US fragilities: (1) AI-driven GDP components that may not generate enduring profits, as data centers consume vast resources and job loss looms; (2) over-financialization, including a speculative silver market and leverage in commodities; and (3) cryptocurrency de-coupled from real utility, with quantum easing allowing continued money printing. He argues these weaknesses could precipitate a fiscal crisis and civil conflict if not contained, potentially catalyzing a broader crisis of state legitimacy. In Europe, Zhang foresees militarization and a misguided pro-war stance despite domestic discontent, predicting irrational policies and a possible collapse of NATO’s existing framework. He forecasts intensified Europe–Russia tensions, including a possible endgame around Odessa, with NATO likely to be overwhelmed militarily, leading to civil unrest and a “slow death” for European cohesion over five to ten years. He contends Europe’s strategic autonomy is eroding under multiculturalist policies and internal polarization, undermining willingness to fight. Regarding the United States’ global posture, Zhang argues Washington is moving toward transactional empire-building—exploiting its vassals when advantageous and abandoning them when not—while projecting power from the Western Hemisphere as a core strategy. He argues that this approach will erode Europe’s relevance and provoke global backlash. Finally, Zhang returns to Iran: Trump’s push for regime change there is linked to leveraging support from Israel and influential backers, such as Adelson and Elon Musk, with the likely aim of a ground invasion. Yet the plausibility of a successful invasion is questionable, given Iran’s size and power, and Trump’s emphasis on optics over sustained policy. The main unknown is China’s response; factions within China differ on dependence on Russia versus diversified oil sources, and the April meeting will shape whether a grand bargain reduces conflict or merely preserves the empire’s decline. To conclude, the April China meeting is pivotal, with four scheduled meetings in 2026; a China–US deal could stabilize some tensions, but the underlying imperial collapse is expected to persist, fueling wars and confrontations worldwide regardless of occasional bargains.

The speaker discusses the Red Sea situation, highlighting how some claim to receive favorable treatment from the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) while other shipping methods are attacked or blocked. They mention that the CCP uses the Belt and Road Initiatives to establish spy bases, biological weapon labs, and shipping bases in participant countries, aiming to expand their power and defeat the United States. The speaker suggests that some are openly acknowledging their ties with the CCP to protect ships.

Pepe and Mario discuss a broad set of geopolitical developments, focusing on Venezuela, Iran, and broader U.S.-led actions, with insights on Russia, China, and other regional players. - Venezuela developments and U.S. involvement - Venezuela is described as a “desperate move related to the demise of the petrodollar,” with multiple overlapping headlines about backers maneuvering for profit and power in Latin America, and about the U.S. declaring “this is my backyard.” Delcy Rodríguez, the daughter of a slain revolutionary killed by the CIA, leads a new government, described as old-school Chavista with strong negotiation skills, who prioritizes Venezuela’s interests over U.S. interests. - The operation is criticized as having no clear strategy or forward planning for reorganizing the Venezuelan oil industry to serve U.S. interests. Estimates from Chinese experts suggest it would take five years to recondition Venezuela’s energy ecosystem for American needs and sixteen years to reach around 3 million barrels per day, requiring approximately $183 billion in investment—investment that U.S. CEOs are reportedly unwilling to provide without total guarantees. - There is debate about the extent of U.S. influence within Maduro’s circle. Some Venezuelan sources note that the head of security for the president, previously aligned with the regime, was demoted (not arrested), and there is discussion of possible U.S. ties with individuals around Maduro’s inner circle, though the regime remains headed by Maduro with key loyalists like the defense minister (Padrino) and the interior minister (Cabello) still in place. - The narrative around regime change is viewed as a two-edged story: the U.S. sought to replace Maduro with a pliant leadership, yet the regime remains and regional power structures (including BRICS dynamics) persist. Delcy Rodríguez is portrayed as capable of negotiating with the U.S., including conversations with Marco Rubio before the coup and ongoing discussions with U.S. actors, while maintaining Venezuela’s sovereignty and memory of the revolution. - The broader regional reaction to U.S. actions in Venezuela has included criticism from neighboring countries like Colombia and Mexico, with a sense in Latin America that the U.S. should not intrude in sovereign affairs. Brazil (a major BRICS member) is highlighted as a key actor whose stance can influence Venezuela’s BRICS prospects; Lula’s position is described as cautious, with Brazil’s foreign ministry reportedly vetoing Venezuela’s BRICS membership despite Lula’s personal views. - The sanctions regime is cited as a principal reason for Venezuela’s economic stagnation, with the suggestion that lifting sanctions would be a prerequisite for meaningful economic recovery. Delcy Rodríguez is characterized as a skilled negotiator who could potentially improve Venezuela’s standing if sanctions are removed. - Public opinion in Venezuela is described as broadly supportive of the regime, with the U.S. action provoking anti-American sentiment across the hemisphere. The discussion notes that a large majority of Venezuelans (over 90%) reportedly view Delcy Rodríguez favorably, and that the perception of U.S. intervention as a violation of sovereignty influences regional attitudes. - Iran: protests, economy, and foreign influence - Iran is facing significant protests that are described as the most severe since 2022, driven largely by economic issues, inflation, and the cost of living under four decades of sanctions. Real inflation is suggested to be 35–40%, with currency and purchasing power severely eroded. - Foreign influence is discussed as a factor hijacking domestic protests in Iran, described as a “color revolution” playbook echoed by past experiences in Hong Kong and other theaters. Iranian authorities reportedly remain skeptical of Western actors, while acknowledging the regime’s vulnerability to sanctions and mismanagement. - Iranians emphasize the long-term, multi-faceted nature of their political system, including the Shiite theology underpinning governance, and the resilience of movements like Hezbollah and Yemeni factions. Iran’s leadership stresses long-term strategic ties with Russia and China, as well as BRICS engagement, with practical cooperation including repair of the Iranian electrical grid in the wake of Israeli attacks during the twelve-day war and port infrastructure developments linked to an international transportation corridor, including Indian and Chinese involvement. - The discussion notes that while sanctions have damaged Iran economically, Iranians maintain a strong domestic intellectual and grassroots culture, including debates in universities and cafes, and are not easily toppled. The regime’s ability to survive is framed in terms of internal legitimacy, external alliances (Russia, China), and the capacity to negotiate under external pressure. - Russia, China, and the U.S. strategic landscape - The conversation contrasts the apparent U.S. “bordello circus” with the more sophisticated military-diplomatic practices of Iran, Russia, and China. Russia emphasizes actions over rhetoric, citing NATO attacks on its nuclear triad and the Novgorod residence attack as evidence of deterrence concerns. China pursues long-term plans (five-year plans through 2035) and aims to elevate trade with a yuan-centric global south, seeking to reduce dollar reliance without emitting a formal de-dollarization policy. - The discussion frames U.S. policy as volatile and unpredictable (the Nixon “madman theory” analog), while Russia, China, and Iran respond with measured, long-term strategies. The potential for a prolonged Ukraine conflict is acknowledged if European leaders pursue extended confrontation, with economic strains anticipated across Europe. - In Venezuela, Iran, and broader geopolitics, the panel emphasizes the complexity of regime stability, the role of sanctions, BRICS dynamics, and the long game of global power shifts that may redefine alliances and economic arrangements over the coming years.