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The discussion centers on CNN’s report that the CIA is establishing a foothold in Venezuela, with the claim that the CIA has, for decades, enabled the Venezuelan drug trade. The speakers argue that the attack on Venezuela cannot be about drugs if the CIA itself facilitated drug trafficking. They cite CIA whistleblower Kevin Shipp, who said the CIA has been involved in Venezuela since at least the Cartel of the Sun, run by a general who was a CIA proxy and helped reconstitute Venezuela’s intelligence to penetrate the government; the general named Ramon Gulen allegedly ran narcotics and created the cartel of the sun. They claim the cartel is used by the Trump administration as a pretext to stage attacks on boats and in Venezuela and that the CIA, with its long history, was behind the Secret Service and the general in creating the drug trade and the cartel, with the Trump administration leveraging it to circumvent Congress. There is reference to a 60 Minutes piece from the 1990s reporting that the CIA collaborated with Venezuelan National Guard generals who moved tons of cocaine into the United States. The conversation then moves to John Kerry, who in the mid-1980s led the Contra Cocaine Investigation hearings into U.S. government complicity in the contra drug trade. The Reagan administration resisted the inquiry, attempted to discredit witnesses, and assigned the CIA to monitor the probe. Ten years later, the HITS report (the CIA Inspector General report authorized under Inspector General Frederick HITS) concluded that while the CIA did not officially participate in cocaine trafficking during the Contra War, it knowingly maintained relationships with and protected numerous contra-linked individuals and organizations involved in the drug trade when deemed operationally important, to keep the Contra War alive and to maintain U.S. objectives in Central America, even if it meant enabling and protecting drug lords; the CIA hid this from Congress, contributing to drug flow into the United States. The Iran-Contra framework is referenced as arms to Iran funding the Contras, with connections to cocaine trafficking, forming a single pipeline, allegedly placing the CIA at the center of these operations. The panel critiques CNN’s headline as suggesting the CIA’s new foothold is about establishing a presence, arguing the real aim is to block Russia and China’s influence, not democracy or drugs. Venezuela’s oil trade outside the petrodollar with BRICS nations is noted, with claims that the move away from the petrodollar spurred interference and invasion, and that Venezuela later returned to endorsing the petrodollar after a period of yuan transactions with China. The discourse asserts that the CIA’s purpose is to prevent free trade outside U.S. influence and to suppress alternative financial arrangements like BRICS or yuan-based oil transactions. The participants discuss the idea that the CIA has shifted from operating covertly to openly engaging in such activities, suggesting a normalization of “strategy of tension” and the notion that a third of the population would support the government’s actions, a third oppose, and a third are indifferent, thereby reducing public resistance. They connect these elements to broader media complicity, including Operation Mockingbird and the integration of former intelligence heads into media roles, implying entrenched deep-state influence.

Speaker 0 raises the question of CIA involvement in drug trafficking, referencing a past discussion with former Tel Aviv CIA chief of station Susan Miller and noting a reminder about Iran-Contra. They ask why the CIA would be intimately involved with drug trafficking, and mention Candace Owens discussing it in relation to the Charlie Kirk assassination. Speaker 1 answers that trafficking in drugs allows the CIA to get closer to the targets they want to reach. They point to a popular Netflix series, Narcos, which follows the hunt for Pablo Escobar, the Cali cartel, and other major cartels. They claim that, in the show, and in real life, every time the Drug Enforcement Administration gets close to its primary target, the CIA station chief steps in and ruins the investigation. They state that this happens because the CIA doesn’t care about drugs. Speaker 1 continues that the CIA cares about terrorism and communism, implying there are always some other bigger ideological concerns. Therefore, the CIA is “perfectly happy” to allow cocaine to flood into the United States in the 1980s during the Iran-Contra period, just as it was “perfectly happy” to allow Afghanistan to provide 93% of the world’s heroin once the United States began its occupation of Afghanistan.

- Speaker 0 asks for the first reaction to the news and whether it was clearly a special operations effort to capture Maduro or a larger military operation. Speaker 1 says it quickly became obvious it was a special operations mission, citing the ships and platforms ideal for this, and the ability to fly helicopters into Venezuela as supporting evidence. - On how the operation penetrated Caracas and Maduro’s defenses: Speaker 1 says cyber operations were used to turn off power and to blind the air defense by making tracking and identification difficult, in addition to traditional jamming and excellent on-the-ground intelligence built up over weeks. He also suggests internal help within the Venezuelan regime was likely. - On the possibility of an inside asset and the defensive protections: Speaker 0 notes Cuban intelligence and Venezuelan National Guard protection for Maduro and asks how insiders could have enabled the operation. Speaker 1 says insiders could have assisted, and acknowledges the intelligence on Maduro’s whereabouts was very strong. He cautions the president’s administration should not publicly reveal inside help, as that could cause paranoia within the command structure. - On the operation’s execution and its comparison to past regime-change operations: Speaker 1 emphasizes training and technology, noting the unit would include special operations aviation, Delta, and other components; argues this is a joint operation involving army, navy, air force, marines, cyber, and space-based platforms, requiring extensive rehearsals over weeks. He references Noriega’s capture as a point of comparison, but notes Maduro is on a different level. - On the electricity outage in Caracas: Speaker 0 asks if it was a cyber disruption or a kinetic strike. Speaker 1 responds that a cyber disruption to power is more likely than a kinetic strike, given the context. - On Venezuela’s air defense systems (S-300s, BUKs) and the $6 billion investment: Speaker 0 questions whether it’s fair to criticize these systems given the operation. Speaker 1 acknowledges they are sophisticated and capable but not sure of their maintenance and training levels. He notes the United States had telegraphed expectations for weeks and suggests negligence or incompetence in air-defense command and control if surprised. - On possible inside help and seniority of the asset: Speaker 0 asks who within the regime might have cooperated with the CIA. Speaker 1 is reluctant to speculate beyond confirming there was very good intelligence on Maduro’s whereabouts. He finds it unlikely that the vice president would have been an internal asset, though he concedes nothing is impossible, given a mix of factions in the regime and third-party interference. - On geopolitical repercussions and messaging to China, Iran, and Russia: Speaker 0 points to the timing with a Chinese delegation in Caracas and asks what message this sends to China and whether the date had symbolic resonance with other events. Speaker 1 says the date was probably driven by weather and other operations rather than a deliberate China signal; he suggests China would reassess oil dependencies and potential leverage now that Maduro is captured. He predicts the next target could be Cuba and discusses logistical challenges, such as Cuba’s island geography and Guantanamo Bay. - On US strategy in the Western Hemisphere and potential targets: Speaker 1 opines that Cuba is a plausible next target and explains why, including electoral considerations in Florida. He notes that a Cuba operation would be more difficult than Venezuela due to geography but could be motivated by domestic political calculation and the Monroe Doctrine as a signal. - On China, Russia, and Iran in the wake of Maduro’s capture: Speaker 1 argues the US demonstrates strong capabilities, and China would need to reassess oil supply and leverage; Russia’s and Iran’s interests could be pressured as the US asserts influence in the region. He mentions that the US might not directly engage in large-scale intervention in Iran but warns against overreach due to domestic political constraints. - On the broader pattern and future: Speaker 1 cautions about the risk of hubris and notes domestic political constraints and upcoming congressional pressures that could shape how far the administration pursues this strategy beyond Venezuela. He stresses the importance of not overestimating the ability to sustain similar moves without a plan for the post-Maduro environment.

The discussion centers on claims that the CIA has long been involved in Venezuela, has enabled drug trafficking, and now seeks a visible foothold in the country to counter Russia and China. Speaker 0 argues CNN’s report that the CIA will establish a foothold in Venezuela is emblematic of a duplicative pattern: the CIA has supposedly enabled the drug trade for decades, so the attack on Venezuela cannot be about drugs if the CIA is involved. They cite Kevin Shipp, a CIA whistleblower, who said the CIA has been involved in Venezuela since at least the Cartel of the Sun, run by a general who was a CIA proxy and helped reconstruct Venezuela’s intelligence service to penetrate the government. The general cited is General Ramon Gulen, described as running narcotics and creating and running the Cartel of the Sun. The Cartel is portrayed as a pretext used by the Trump administration to stage attacks and operate around Congress, with the CIA behind past secret dealings tied to it. Speaker 0 then references a 60 Minutes piece from the 1990s reported on by mainstream media that allegedly showed the CIA collaborating with Venezuelan National Guard generals who moved tons of cocaine into the United States. The discussion moves to John Kerry, who led the Contra Cocaine Investigation in the mid-1980s, seeking to determine US government involvement in the contra drug trade. The Reagan administration resisted, stonewalled the Senate, and monitored the probe. The HITS report (the CIA inspector general report authorized under inspector general Frederick HITS) is described as concluding in the late 1990s that while the CIA did not officially participate in cocaine trafficking during the Contra War, it knowingly maintained relationships with and protected numerous contra-linked individuals and organizations involved in the drug trade when operationally useful, to keep the contra war alive and to maintain US objectives in Central America, even if it meant enabling and protecting drug lords. It also states the CIA hid this from Congress, contributing to drugs entering the United States. The Iran-Contra connection is summarized as arms to Iran generating cash to fund the Contras, with the same network tied to cocaine trafficking, implying a single pipeline of influence and criminal activity. The speakers discuss media coverage and relationships with locals in Venezuela, questioning the claimed “relationship-building” as a cover for coercive activities, given sanctions that harm locals. They criticize the notion that the CIA is simply building positive ties, suggesting instead a pattern of disruption and control. The dialogue then shifts to geopolitics: Venezuela reportedly traded oil with BRICS outside the petrodollar since at least 2017, which is framed as undermining US global oil hegemony. A recent move to settle oil transactions in yuan is mentioned, with a snide remark that the CIA’s presence in Venezuela aims to prevent any free-trade diversification away from the petrodollar. The claim is made that the CIA’s objective is to prevent alternative global trade arrangements and maintain US influence by blocking competition from Russia, China, and BRICS members. Speaker 3 adds that the CIA’s actions align with a long-standing pattern of intervention, suggesting that the agency’s open, unapologetic approach reflects a broader strategy of tension, where a third of the population would support such actions, a third would oppose, and a third remain indifferent. They reference Operation Mockingbird and the presence of CIA-linked figures in media, including Mike Pompeo as a Fox News contributor, arguing that mainstream outlets act as channels for the deep state’s messaging, with information often flowing from the CIA to outlets like the New York Times. In sum, the discussion argues that US intervention in Venezuela is less about drugs or democracy and more about strategic counteraction to Russian, Chinese, and BRICS influence, with a long history of CIA involvement in drug trafficking and media manipulation. The speakers invite audience reactions on these points.

The United States government decides to send the CIA to Venezuela. They say the CIA will conduct operations against Venezuela, against the peace of Venezuela. This is claimed to be unprecedented; the speaker notes that never before has any government since the CIA’s existence publicly said it would order the CIA to kill, to derange, and to topple countries. A historian named Alejandro is invoked to support this claim. The speaker lists past Latin American coups, asserting that all involved the CIA and resulted in governments being overthrown and presidents assassinated, with documents allegedly published by the U.S. government that have since been declassified. Specific examples named are: 1974, Guatemala, Jacobo Arbenz; 1965, Dominican Republic, Juan Bosch; 1964, Brazil, Joao Goulart; 1973, Chile, Salvador Allende. The speaker says these are “a few” among many coups in Latin America, all documented through declassified U.S. government documents. Additionally, the case of Mosaddegh in Iran (1952) is cited as another example of a national leader toppled. The speaker asserts that, over time, the CIA apologized for overthrowing these presidents, stating the pretenses were that they were communists or terrorists, but later acknowledging the deception. The speaker uses the term “immorality” to describe those past actions and contrasts them with the present claim, stating that for the first time in history, a U.S. government says it has given authorization and issued orders to attack a country. The speaker concludes with a call to the Venezuelan people, saying their people are clear, united, highly conscious, with “1000000 of eyes and 1000000 of ears,” and that they possess the means to defeat this “open conspiracy” against the peace and stability of Venezuela. The ultimate aim asserted is to restore the peace and stability to which the people of Venezuela have a right, and to ensure they regain and sustain that peace and stability.

A ton of cocaine, worth hundreds of millions, was smuggled into the United States not in the usual way, but through a CIA-backed operation with Venezuela’s National Guard, according to former DEA head Judge Robert Bonner. He says this drug trafficking was approved or condoned by the CIA, and that it was illegal unless approved by the DEA or a US law enforcement authority. Bonner conducted a two-year secret investigation with the DEA’s Office of Professional Responsibility in cooperation with the CIA’s inspector general, and concluded that the CIA broke the law by facilitating drug shipments into the United States. The CIA’s stated rationale for promoting the drug smuggling was that it would yield valuable drug intelligence about the Colombian cartels. The plan, described as an undercover operation in Venezuela, involved the CIA and Venezuela’s Guardia Nacional to handle the transshipment of the cartel’s cocaine en route to the United States and Europe. The operation reportedly produced more than a ton of cocaine, stored at a CIA-financed Counter Narcotics Intelligence Center in Caracas. The center’s commander and the CIA’s man in Venezuela was National Guard General Ramon Guillen Davila. Annabelle Grimm, a DEA agent with eighteen years’ experience, testified that CIA station chief James Campbell and CIA officer Mark McFarlane told her that to keep the undercover smuggling operation credible, they had to keep the cartel happy by delivering their dope untouched by US law enforcement to the cartel’s distributors in the United States. Grimm said the CIA and the Guardia Nacional wanted “to let cocaine go on into the traffic without doing anything,” with no surveillance, no interference. Grimm and others argued that the operation would not stop drugs in Miami, Houston, or elsewhere; the plan was to allow shipments to reach the United States and then enter the traffic. Campbell and McFarlane sought Washington approval, but the CIA leadership in Washington allegedly went over Grimm’s head to DEA headquarters. The joint DEA-CIA investigation confirmed that more than a ton of cocaine moved from the Caracas counter-narcotics center to US streets, and that at one point Guillen’s National Guard tried to ship 1,500 kilos at once—an effort that failed because the box would not fit through the airplane door of a Boeing 707. General Guillen admitted bungling the operation, but he denied involvement in an unauthorized shipment. He insisted the operation was approved by US authorities. The CIA maintains it found no evidence of criminal wrongdoing, though it acknowledged instances of poor judgment and management leading to disciplinary actions for several CIA officers; Mark McFarlane resigned, and James Campbell was brought back to the US, promoted, and later retired. Campbell claimed he devoted his life to his country and felt like a victim in this thing, insisting the issue occurred without CIA knowledge. Senator Dennis DeConcini was briefed by the CIA, and some officials argued no one in the CIA has been prosecuted, while others argued that the drugs did reach the streets. The intelligence gained from the operation was disputed; some questioned whether any valuable intelligence was produced. Three to four truck drivers were arrested, but the larger goal—US intelligence or seizures—was contested. General Guillen later traveled to Miami and was subpoenaed to testify before a grand jury investigating the CIA’s cocaine, but Venezuela reportedly would not permit testimony. The investigation continues to raise questions about the CIA’s involvement in drug trafficking, with ongoing inquiries by House and Senate intelligence oversight committees.

The discussion centers on the Venezuelan political crisis, U.S. involvement, and historical precedents of regime change in the region. The speakers contrast current military buildup around Venezuela with past Latin American coups, and they assess domestic support, international dynamics, and potential outcomes. - Venezuela under Maduro: Speaker 0 notes a broader deployment of military infrastructure than in recent Latin American coups, implying heightened risk or intensity of any intervention. Speaker 1 counters that domestically there is a “rally around the flag” effect in response to U.S. threats, with about 20% of Venezuelans supporting U.S. military intervention and over 55% opposing it. - Regime-change calculus: The conversation asks for the value of regime change when Maduro is willing to open the Venezuelan market to the U.S. Speaker 1 responds that there is no clear political or economic value to regime change; the predicted consequences would include a massive migration wave, civil war, and higher oil prices. They discuss the implications of implementing a regime-change strategy in the Venezuelan context. - Cartel of the Suns: The Cartel of the Suns is discussed as a U.S.-designated terrorist group. Speaker 1 explains that the designation emerged from a DOJ/intelligence collaboration during the Trump era, with William Barr involved in pursuing Maduro. The term traces back to the Reagan era, when the CIA and DEA allegedly allowed drug trafficking through Venezuela to monitor routes, revealing a long history of U.S. involvement in narco-trafficking networks as a tool of influence. Ramon Guillen Davia is named as a Venezuelan National Guard contact, with broader exposure through media such as a 60 Minutes segment and a New York Times expose by Tim Weiner. The cartel’s earlier existence and its resurfacing in U.S. legal actions are tied to broader U.S. efforts to delegitimize Maduro’s government. - Venezuelan political history since Chavez: Speaker 1 outlines Chavez’s rise and popularity (e.g., reducing extreme poverty by 60% before sanctions), the 2002 coup attempt led by opposition figures including Leopoldo Lopez, and the subsequent public support for Chavez when the people protested to restore him. They describe “La Salida” in 2004–2014 as an opposition strategy funded by U.S. entities (NED, USAID) to depose Chavez, with various protests and riots that damaged the economy. After Chavez, Maduro faced U.S. sanctions and a narrative of illegitimacy framed by the opposition’s efforts to install Guaidó as a parallel government in 2019, enabling asset seizures and embargos on Venezuela’s Sitco assets. - 2019 events and aftermath: The 2019 U.S.-backed attempt to install Juan Guaido as interim president is described, including the staged “humanitarian aid” convoy at the Colombia border which failed; Guaidó’s association with Las Bratas (the Las Frastrojos cartel members) is cited as a public-relations embarrassment, corroborated by major outlets. Leopoldo Lopez is described as a persistent organizer of opposition efforts, connected to a broader U.S.-funded framework through the CIA’s ecosystem (Canvas, Einstein Institute), and by extension to regime-change policy. The possibility of Maduro arresting Guaido is discussed as strategically unwise for Maduro to avoid bolstering U.S. claims of repression. - Opposition fragmentation and polling: The panel debates whether the opposition has broad support. Speaker 1 says a November poll by Datanalysis shows Maria Carina Machado at roughly 14–15% and Maduro around 20%, with most voters undecided and younger voters leaning toward external media narratives. Older, rural, and poor Venezuelans—Chavista base—remain a significant portion of the population. Young people are described as more influenced by social media and potentially more susceptible to pro-U.S. messaging but not broadly supportive of the radical opposition. - External actors and drug-trafficking links: The dialogue links narco-trafficking networks to geopolitical strategy, arguing that the U.S. has used or tolerates narcotics channels to fund political aims in Latin America. The discussion covers broader examples, including Ecuador and the Balkans, and references to U.S. figures and policies (e.g., regime-change agendas, naval movements, sanctions, and strategic partnerships) to illustrate how narcotics intersects with geopolitics. - Geopolitical trajectory and outcomes: The speakers speculate on possible futures: (1) a negotiated deal between Trump and Maduro or U.S. diplomacy (with the oil sector’s re-entry and debt relief) being preferable to open intervention; (2) a decapitation strike leading to destabilization and civil war with severe humanitarian and migration consequences; (3) ongoing sanctions and coercive measures as a long-term strategy. They caution that a direct, large-scale military invasion seems unlikely due to political and logistical risks, including American public opinion and potential backlash if U.S. troops are lost. - Global context and strategy: The broader international framework is discussed, including the U.S. strategic doctrine shifting toward a multipolar world and hemispheric dominance concerns. The conversation touches on how U.S. policy toward Venezuela fits into wider ambitions regarding Russia, China, and regional partners, as well as potential domestic political changes in the U.S. that could influence future approaches to Venezuela and Latin America. - Concluding note: The discussion closes with reflections on the complexity of regime-change ambitions, the difficulty of predicting outcomes, and the possibility that diplomacy or limited, targeted pressure may emerge as more viable paths than broad invasion or decapitation strategies. The participants acknowledge the influence of regional personalities and U.S. domestic politics on policy direction.

Dr. Paul and the other speaker discuss a sequence of public claims and shifts regarding Venezuela, Nicolas Maduro, and the Cartel de los Soles. They begin by recalling a $50,000,000 bounty on President Nicolas Maduro of Venezuela, arguing that Maduro is the head of a narco-terrorist drug cartel called Cartel de los Soles. They note that Secretary of State-designate Marco Rubio stated in November that the State Department intends to designate Cartel de los Soles as a foreign terrorist organization headed by the illegitimate Nicolas Maduro, asserting that the group has corrupted Venezuela’s institutions and is responsible for terrorist violence conducted with other designated foreign terrorist organizations, as well as for trafficking drugs into the U.S. and Europe. The speakers claim that for weeks Americans were exposed to a narrative portraying foreign narco-terrorist cartels running the country and that this narrative influenced public opinion, making some believe it might be acceptable to take drastic actions, including attacking boats, on the premise that “they’re all terrorists.” They then point to a development that “dropped yesterday,” presenting a clip that, once Maduro was “in their grasp,” the Justice Department allegedly dropped the claim that Venezuela’s Cartel de los Soles is an actual group. They assert that after months of hype intended to drum up support for invading Venezuela, the claim was retracted, with the implication that the government figures had misrepresented the situation. The speakers compare this sequence to the Iraq WMD narrative, asserting that officials “swore up and down for years” about WMDs, and when the invasion occurred they were shown joking about the existence of WMDs. They recall President George W. Bush joking about WMDs at a White House Correspondents’ Dinner, looking under the couch and the coffee table, asking “Where’s those WMDs?” They conclude by likening the Cartel de los Soles to the WMDs of their operation, arguing that the construct is already completely falling apart. The overarching claim is that the Cartel de los Soles was used as a justification for aggressive action, and that the narrative surrounding the cartel has been exposed as unreliable or false.

Ian and Mario discuss the Venezuelan operation and its wider implications. - Maduro’s regime and Venezuela’s situation are contrasted with Chavez. Maduro is not as popular or charismatic, the economy is in shambles, and Venezuela possesses billions in Russian air defenses that failed to down US helicopters, highlighting a discrepancy between defense systems and battlefield outcomes. - The Washington assessment is that the operation to capture Maduro involved substantial internal support from Maduro’s circles, potentially including CIA-assisted tips and insider cooperation, enabling real-time intelligence on Maduro’s movements. This inside help is seen as a critical factor alongside the United States’ capabilities. - The operation was planned for months, with the White House reportedly approving strikes in advance as long as a window existed. The goal was to capture Maduro and bring him to the United States, not simply to eliminate him; the plan also involved a minimal American casualty count (one helicopter injury, no American deaths). - The vice president, Delsy Rodríguez, is discussed as a possible insider who might have privately engaged with the United States, though it’s not clear she knew the exact timing of the strike. Cuban intelligence was described as protecting Maduro, and Maduro’s inner circle would have had reasons to avoid leaks. - There was emphasis that the operation was not framed as democracy promotion or regime change, but rather about removing Maduro and establishing a transition that could reshape Venezuela’s leadership and oil/drug policy, with the oil sector and sanctions regime central to the US strategy. The leaders around Maduro, not Maduro alone, shape the outcome. - The Venezuelan air defense systems, largely Russian, were targeted and neutralized in advance of the Delta Strike Force. The attack demonstrated US surgical strike capabilities, but also underscored the risk of Venezuelan retaliation and the complexity of operating in a heavily defended airspace. - The discussion shifts to the political implications for allied and regional actors. The operation raises questions for Mexico, Colombia, Brazil, and Denmark (in terms of leverage and responses to US unilateral actions). Colombia, under Petro, faces considerable pressure as US leverage increases, while Brazil’s stance is tempered by prior sanctions and subsequent negotiations. Denmark and other partners are noted for their responses to geopolitical shifts. - China’s role is addressed: China had a delegation in Caracas at the time, with public shock at the US move. The US did not appear to have given heads-up to China. This underscores the multipolar dynamic where the US can project military power, but economic and technological power remains more distributed. - The broader geopolitical context includes Russia’s strategic vulnerabilities. The Venezuela operation signals American military capability and willingness to act unilaterally, yet Africa, the Middle East, and Ukraine illustrate ongoing limits and risks. Moscow’s alliances with Venezuela and Iran are highlighted, but the operation did not rely on formal mutual defense commitments; Russia’s global influence is depicted as waning in the face of US operational decisiveness. - The discussion covers potential long-term effects on global order. The US displays “extraordinary military capability” but faces political constraints as a democracy with checks and balances. The speaker warns of a possible “law of the jungle” trajectory if the US continues to rely on coercive power, potentially diminishing international legitimacy and provoking responses from China and others who possess economic leverage. - The possible phase two is referenced as a strategic instrument; if the new Venezuelan leadership does not align with US aims, offshore oil facilities could be targeted to compel compliance, signaling ongoing leverage without ground troop deployments. - Regarding Iran, there is no current plan for a Maduro-like operation. Israel’s potential pushes against Iran are discussed, but the US position remains cautious: strikes would be contingent on broader strategic considerations, with the US wary of deepening conflicts if not coordinated with partners. - Ian offers forecasts: Iran is likely to face increased pressure domestically and internationally, while Venezuela could see a transitional government for 12–18 months amid power-sharing negotiations, with ongoing instability possible as opposition figures push for more influence. The expectations emphasize ongoing US leverage, limited appetite for full regime change, and the risk that military weakness and political maneuvering will shape outcomes in the near term.

Fox News alert: B-52 bombers are flying off the coast of Venezuela. Trump says he’s not bluffing. Right now, more than 10,000 US soldiers are built up in the Caribbean on ships in Puerto Rico, locked and loaded. Special operations helicopters were seen 90 miles from Venezuela’s coast. The chopper units are used by Delta Force, Navy SEALs, and the Green Berets. The Black Ops were spotted off the coast of Trinidad. Also seen were little birds—smaller but faster aircraft designed for quick insertion of special operators behind enemy lines. The Ghost was also confirmed to be in the Caribbean. That’s the nickname for MV Ocean Trader, a ship designed for black ops and special missions because it’s dark and blends in with cargo. There’s more. 10% of US naval power is now in the region. It’s a major shift with submarines, several destroyers, and F-35 fighters in Puerto Rico, on top of the cocaine boats being smoked to pieces by the week. Kilos of cocaine are washing ashore. Don’t tell Hunter. Dozens of bad hombres are being described as shark bait. Maduro’s attention is captured. He’s the dictator of the narco state, and the US has doubled the bounty on his head to 50 million dollars. According to the New York Times, Maduro offered the United States a dominant stake in Venezuela’s oil, gold, and mineral wealth and promised to cut ties with Russia and China. Trump and Rubio said no. That suggests the gunboat diplomacy could end with Maduro removed and Venezuela aligned with the US, not Putin or China. American action in Latin America hasn’t always ended well; the Bay of Pigs is cited as a historical reference. It’s the US backyard, and Trump is reestablishing the Monroe Doctrine, referred to here as the Dunro Doctrine. Hopefully, a Venezuelan general does the right thing and collects the 50-million-dollar bounty. No one wants a messy conflict in South America. Maduro controls drug traffickers who are well-armed, and Biden allowed hundreds of thousands of Venezuelans into the United States, who could be activated. If Trump can pull this off and push China and Russia out of Venezuela after what he did with the Iranians, it will give him significant power to deter Russia and Ukraine and China and Taiwan.

Grant and Mike Benz discuss alleged U.S. and CIA involvement in drug trafficking connected to Venezuela and the implications for prosecuting Nicolas Maduro. - Maduro indictment history: The DOJ superseded its 2020 drug trafficking indictment of Nicolas Maduro in 2025. The conversation references the Bay of Piglets failed operation to capture Maduro in 2019 and the 2020 indictment linked to Jordan Goudreaux’s Silvercorp private mercenary firm. The discussion frames this within a broader Cold War context of U.S. actions in Latin America. - CIA and drug trafficking link: The speakers claim the “Cartel of the Suns” (Cartel of the Suns) was a CIA cartel. They state two Venezuelan military brigadier generals who started the Cartel of the Suns were on the CIA payroll. They reference a 1993 confrontation where the head of the DEA resigned in protest after the CIA allegedly greenlit the deliberate importation of 1,500 kilos of cocaine from Venezuela into the U.S. They allege the CIA and DOJ later granted immunity to Venezuelan military officials involved in the operation. This is presented as pre-Hugo Chávez era activity in the 1990s. - Broader historical pattern: The discussion situates these actions within a long-running pattern across the 20th century—U.S. support for pro-American groups (insurgent, rebel, or militia-type entities) funded by drug proceeds. They compare this to past episodes in Afghanistan (Mujahideen, warlords) and to narcotics and intelligence collaborations in South America (Colombia, Peru, Ecuador, Venezuela). The speakers draw a parallel to a Noriega-style “smash and grab,” noting Noriega’s trial revealed decades of CIA association and payroll. - Implications for Maduro prosecution: Mike Benz suggests the case could be complicated because many allegations about Maduro are “thinly sourced” and relate to minor Venezuelan officials rather than Maduro directly. He notes that many points of evidence are tangential and question whether Maduro’s leadership directly sanctioned drug operations, despite the indictment labeling him as head of the Cartel of the Suns multiple times. The Bush family connections and historic CIA involvement are mentioned to illustrate the complexity of attributing direct responsibility. - Stabilization and funding argument: Benz outlines a three-part stabilization plan for Venezuela—stabilization, privatization, and transition. He describes stabilization as “hearts and minds work,” which in practice involves paying off military, civil society, and business leaders with cash. He cites the CIA’s reported $70,000,000 in drug-money bribes used to influence such actors in stabilization campaigns in Afghanistan and analogous actions in Latin America. - Closing notes: Grant appreciates Benz’s insights and asks where to follow him. Benz directs listeners to X (Twitter) at @mikebencyber, and also mentions YouTube and Rumble. - Notable names: Nicolas Maduro, Jordan Goudreaux, the Silvercorp firm, the Cartel of the Suns, Noriega, the head of the DEA who resigned in 1993, and George H. W. Bush’s historical CIA involvement are referenced to frame claims.

Speaker 0 argued that Maduro was not democratically elected and was not cracking down on drug trafficking to the U.S. and other countries, contrasting this with Honduras’ crackdown on drug trafficking supported by agencies like the DEA and Southcom, which earned praise for the Honduran government. The discussion then turned to U.S. policy. Speaker 0 asked whether the interviewee supports what the Trump administration did, or believes there is a line that should not be crossed. They noted that the U.S. military action against Maduro—bombing the country, entering, capturing Maduro, killing members of his government, and taking him to jail—was seen by some as positive, with Maduro described as a criminal who destroyed the country and economy. Speaker 1 responded by focusing on the human impact in Venezuela and other Latin American countries. They stated that a large portion of the population has suffered, with a notable number of people migrating from Venezuela and Honduras. They asserted that elections in Venezuela were stolen by Maduro’s regime, stating that the opposition’s poll results were stored in the cloud and the government did not want to see them because they knew they would lose. They described this as not democracy. They added that, since Hondurans left the country due to trafficking, vessels by sea and illegal flights were bringing jobs to Honduras, but also causing deaths and bloodshed. They argued that if the Trump administration framed Drug Trafficking as terrorism, it was warranted because the drug flow to the United States harmed not only U.S. citizens but also Honduras, which faced the highest death toll in fifteen years due to drugs coming through its borders, largely from Venezuela, and that nothing was done about this by prior administrations. Speaker 0 then asked for the stance on U.S. intervention in general: should intervention be allowed only in certain cases (e.g., Maduro), or should there be no U.S. intervention in Latin America under any president? Speaker 1 shared a Venezuelan friend’s view that there are no options to change Venezuela and that intervention might be necessary if there is no other way to save Venezuela. From a Honduran perspective, they believed Trump’s actions helped not only Honduras but also other Central American and regional countries along the drug-trafficking routes, by reducing corruption, bloodshed, and deaths. They argued that the political machinery Chavez created and used to stall elections in other Latin American countries had previously gone unchecked by the U.S., and that Trump faced Maduro with a confrontation. They concluded that many people in the world do not know what has been happening in Venezuela and its impact on the region. They stated that Trump confronted Maduro, who now has a chance to defend himself in a trial, and emphasized the issue of sovereignty for every country.

Speaker 0 asks about how common it is for the CIA to use drugs as a weapon or to create cartels for various purposes, and whether it sometimes works as a strategy. Speaker 1 responds that it continues to this day, with key US allies implicated in the drug trade. The Organization for Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project, funded by the State Department, is described as an investigative journalist outlet that has a new report about the Noboa family’s ties to the Balkan mafia. The Noboa family controls Ecuador; Daniel Noboa, born in Miami, is the president, and his family owns a Noboa shipping company. The shipping company is alleged to have been involved in sending bananas through the Noboa Bonita Fruit Company packed with cocaine to Europe via routes overseen by the Balkan Mafia. Ecuador is described as the largest drug export center to the United States, per the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, while Venezuela is claimed to be responsible for about 5% of drug transit. Kristi Noem, identified as the DHS secretary, is said to have visited Ecuador to meet with Daniel Noboa and campaign for a referendum to bring US military bases back to Ecuador, a referendum that was rejected by Ecuadorians. Noboa is portrayed as strategically valuable to the US, described as friendly with Marco Rubio, who has touted him as a partner in the war on drugs, yet the claim is made that the issue is about geostrategic interests. Noboa is said to have ended the legacy of social democrat Rafael Correa and is purportedly supporting US military bases on Ecuadorian soil, aligning with US interests even as Ecuador becomes a center of narco-trafficking and cartels destabilize parts of the country. In Mexico, the narrative references Vicente Fox and Felipe Calderón, noting Calderón as author of Plan Mérida, a US military-directed program to combat drugs in Mexico. Gennaro García Luna, head of Mexico’s equivalent of the FBI, is described as now in a US federal prison for life for involvement in a conspiracy with the Sinaloa cartel to ship drugs to the United States. The State Department is said to have acknowledged knowing about Luna’s activities while valuing him as a political partner. The Fast and Furious program is mentioned, alleging that the US armed Mexican cartels to track guns, and a 2011 federal court testimony by a Chapo Guzmán lieutenant claimed the US armed the Sinaloa cartel to defeat rivals like the Guadalajara cartel. A recent raid in Oakton, Northern Virginia, on Paul Campo, former director of the DEA’s financial division, is described. Campo was in charge of money laundering investigations and was associated with a CIA asset named Robert Sensi to launder $12,000,000 for the Jalisco New Generation Cartel. The speaker notes ongoing exploration of these connections. Historically, the CIA is said to have worked with narco cartels to fund black operations, funding proxy wars in Central America with off-the-books money. The Guadalajara cartel allegedly funded the Nicaraguan Contras through cartel profits. Enrique “Kiki” Camarena, a DEA agent, reportedly discovered the Guadalajara cartel’s involvement in black operations and was captured and tortured, with alleged monitoring by CIA operatives including Felix Rodríguez, who supervised the capture of Che Guevara. This is tied to a documentary on Amazon called The Last NARC.

Mario: Let's start with Venezuela. Do you think this is a strategy by Trump? Larry: I saw something similar back in 1988. The CIA was involved with trying to provoke Manuel Noriega into taking some action, so we could say we had to respond to set the stage for a military invasion, which I believe that in 2018, Donald Trump signed a finding authorizing a covert CIA action to get rid of Maduro. That attempt failed. And now the objective is to get control of the oil. That's the number one priority, with an eye toward the risk of a renewed Iran conflict and the prospect of shutdown of the Persian Gulf, and the need to have an alternative supplier. Ukraine defeating Russia was the plan, and Russia’s military is now around 1,500,000. Mario: What’s your initial reaction to Venezuela? I talked to John Kuriaki who said to read naval movements to gauge what the military plans. The buildup on the coast of Venezuela is significant. They’ve got 14, 12 warships, including the Gerald Ford. Do you think they are bluffing or this is a Trump strategy? Larry: It could be a bluff. I saw something similar in 1988. I was in the Central America branch, and the CIA’s analytical thrust was to provoke Noriega into taking action to justify a response and invasion. That happened in 1988. But that time there were US bases in Panama; Quarry Heights was full. Southern Command was there. Now Southern Command has moved to Miami, just near Southcom. Another issue: within the military, the concept of supported and supporting commands means the special operations command (SOCOM) would normally be the supporting commander, but here Southern Command would be subordinate to SOCOM, which is problematic because SOCOM cannot fight a conventional war. Delta Force, SEAL Team Six, and others are light infantry for raids, not mass warfare. So launching shells or sending ground forces won’t solve Venezuela; terrain is rugged and favors ambushes. If US troops ashore, body bags would likely exceed those from Iraq and Afghanistan. Venezuelans will fight, and insurgents from Brazil and Colombia could join. Decapitation strikes against Maduro could provoke an insurgency that the US would struggle to pacify. Mario: Could we see a decapitation strike like Israel against Hezbollah and Iran? Larry: Decapitating Maduro would still leave loyalists and other actors with weapons; an insurgency could erupt, and the US would be unable to pacify it. The real objective here is unclear. The State Department’s INL/INSCR programs have long documented Venezuela as a transit point for drugs; Trump claimed fentanyl is the issue, but most cocaine also goes to Europe. The 2018 Trump era mentioned the Trendy Aragua as a pretext to justify covert actions; I believe Trump signed a finding authorizing a CIA operation to remove Maduro, leading to Guaidó, but that failed. The broader agenda appears to be regaining oil influence and countering Russia, China, and Iran’s influence in Venezuela. Mario: Elaborate the agenda and strategy behind these strikes on boats out of Venezuela and Trump’s public acknowledgement of a CIA covert operation. What’s the strategy and intention? Larry: The objective is to restore oil control in Venezuela and reduce adversary influence. Maduro once aligned with the CIA, and Chavez/Maduro have maintained cordial relations with Moscow and Beijing. The US aims to curtail BRICS and reduce Venezuelan ties to Russia, China, and Iran, potentially moving Venezuela away from the dollar-based system. The theory that this is a message to Putin circulates, but if that were the aim, it’s a poor strategy given the broader geopolitical dynamics in Syria, Iran, and the Palestinian-Israeli arena. The US previously overpromised in the Red Sea and failed to secure freedom of navigation, signaling limited military capacity for large-scale campaigns. The objective of any Venezuela action must be concrete, otherwise it risks entanglement in an insurgency. Mario: Turning to general foreign policy under Trump. What about the national security strategy? Europe’s criticisms, and Trump’s approach to Ukraine—Witkoff and Kushner meeting Putin? Larry: The 2025 national security strategy signals change, but these documents are not blueprints; they’re guidelines. Europe is being asked to step up, while the US distances itself, arguing Europe’s resources and industrial capacity have diminished while Russia and China shift. Europe’s censorship and defense spending are under scrutiny. The US–UK intelligence relationship still lingers, but overall the West’s ability to project force is questioned. Russia and China’s relationship is deep and mutually reinforcing; the Rand Corporation’s earlier ideas that Ukraine would defeat Russia to force Moscow to join the West have not materialized. Ukraine’s fight has forced Russia to mobilize and shift front lines; casualty counts are contested, but Russia’s front has expanded with a larger force and higher attrition. Mario: What about Ukraine negotiations and Putin’s terms? Larry: Putin’s terms (as stated on 06/14/2024) are: Crimea, Zaporizhzhia, Kherson, Donetsk, and Luhansk permanently part of Russia; Ukraine must withdraw forces from those territories before negotiations begin. An election must be held in Ukraine with a legitimately elected president, potentially replacing Zelenskyy, and Russia would then talk to Ukraine. Russia’s stance treats these territories as non-negotiable; freezing lines is not acceptable to Russia. If negotiations fail, Russia is likely to maintain control over large parts of Donbas and southern Ukraine, potentially extending into Kharkiv and Odessa. Western military support is insufficient in scale to match Russia’s production; Russia’s oil revenue remains a significant portion of GDP, and the global south is pivoting toward BRICS, with Modi’s meeting signaling stronger ties with Russia and China. The strategic trend is a shift away from Western dominance toward a multipolar order. Mario: Larry, appreciate your time. Larry: Pleasure as always, Mario.

Venezuela is turned into a narco terrorist state that continues to work with the FARC, continues to work with ELN from Colombia to send record amounts of cocaine from Venezuela, from Colombia into the Mexican cartels that continue to come into The United States at record amounts. "We have seized more cocaine this year than past years." "The amount of methamphetamine coming into this country continues to be on the uptick, and we still see record amounts of fentanyl coming into our country." "But the Venezuelan corruption, the Venezuelan dictatorship, he is a narco terrorist." "They continue to send this poison to The United States killing hundreds of thousands of Americans, not to mention the TDA members that they send to our country to destroy the beautiful streets of The United States."

The speaker argues that Venezuela has already been invaded, naming Russian agents, Iranian agents, and terrorist groups such as Hizbola and Hamas operating freely in alignment with the regime. They also point to the Colombian guerrilla and drug cartels as factors that have taken over 60% of the population, not only in drug trafficking but also in human trafficking and networks of prostitution. This, the speaker says, has transformed Venezuela into the criminal hub of The Americas. The regime’s sustainability, according to the speaker, relies on a powerful and heavily funded repression system. The speaker asks where this funding comes from, answering with multiple illicit streams: drug trafficking, the black market of oil, arms trafficking, and human trafficking. They assert that these flows must be cut, arguing that once repression is weakened, “it's over” because violence and terror are all the regime has left. The speaker urges the international community to cut these sources of funding and support. They claim that the other regimes that back Maduro and the criminal structure are active and have turned Venezuela into a safe haven for their operations, extending their influence into the rest of Latin America.

There is a story about a load of cocaine found at Miami International Airport by the DEA that allegedly traced back to Venezuela and led to Brigadier General Ramon Guillen Davila, who was described as the CIA’s man in Venezuela at that time. He was the person who was handling indictments and working with the CIA, acknowledged as the most trusted CIA asset in Venezuela back then. The narrative notes that there is a sixty-minute program focusing on this episode of the war against drugs, portraying drugs winning by a huge score, and alleging that the CIA was working in a different direction than the DEA. The CIA is said to have met with the DEA in Caracas and NASA, and to have allowed Guillen Davila to bring shipments of drugs through the United States in order to make him reliable for their purposes. The story is linked to earlier episodes such as the contract cocaine scandal and the cocaine coup in Bolivia in the eighties, described as another instance of interagency infighting in which the CIA was effectively funding its own operation with drug money. The emblem of these generals is said to be a son, and the operation was referred to as “El Cartel del Sol” in singular, a name that went offline until 2005. In 2005, after all these years, the commander decided to suspend all collaboration with the DA. The name reappears in a Miami Herald report from 2005, cited by a high-level diplomat based in Venezuela who did not want to disclose his name. The diplomat reportedly referred to the resurgence of the name as “El Cartel de los Soles.”

Mario: Let's start with Venezuela. Do you think this is a strategy by Trump? Larry: I saw something similar back in 1988. The CIA was involved with trying to provoke Manuel Noriega into taking some sort of action. They could say, oh, well, we gotta go respond to this to set the stage for our military invasion, which I believe that in 2018, Donald Trump signed a finding authorizing a covert action by the CIA to get rid of Maduro. That attempt failed. And now the objective, get control of the oil. That's the number one priority. And I think it's being done with an eye looking forward, recognizing the potential risk. If conflict is renewed with Iran, prospect of the shutdown of Persian Gulf— Mario: Ukraine defeated Russia. Larry: Yeah. That was the plan. Russia's military is now around 1,500,000. Mario: Let’s talk Venezuela. What’s your initial reaction? When John Kuriaki suggested the best indicator is naval movements, and the buildup off Venezuela is significant. I’ve heard they have 14, twelve warships, including the Gerald Ford. Do you think they are bluffing? Is this Trump strategy? Larry: It could be a bluff. I saw something similar in 1988. I was in the CIA’s Central America branch. They tried to provoke Noriega into action to justify invasion, which happened in December 1988. What’s different now is the base infrastructure. In Panama, Quarry Heights was full; Southern Command was there. Southern Command has moved to Miami. The weaponization of the idea of a “supported vs. supporting” commander is reversed here: Southern Command would be subordinate to Special Operations Command. SOCOM cannot fight a conventional war; they’re light infantry, raids, hostage rescue. So the question is: what will the ships actually do? Shells into Venezuela won’t defeat Venezuela. Ground forces would require mass, and Venezuela is three times the size of Vietnam with rugged terrain that favors ambushes. If US troops ashore, you’d stack body bags far beyond Iraq and Afghanistan. Mario: Do Venezuelans have the will to fight Maduro? Larry: Yes. It will rally insurgents from Brazil and Colombia. If we decapitate Maduro, there are loyalists with weapons; an insurgency could follow, and the US would be hard-pressed to pacify it. The State Department’s INL/INSCR reports on narcotics note Venezuela as a transit point for marijuana and some cocaine, with fentanyl less central than claimed by Trump. The 2018 emphasis on Trendy Aragua looked CIA-driven. Trump reportedly signed a covert action finding in 2018 to remove Maduro, leading to the Guaidó fiasco; that covert action included some public diplomacy via USAID. The objective now, as you asked, is oil control and curtailing Russia, China, and Iran’s influence, with an eye toward BRICS. Mario: Could there be a decapitation strike on Maduro, and would someone like Maria take over? Larry: A decapitation strike could spark insurgency; the US would not be able to pacify it. The broader agenda seems to include a strategy to seize oil and reduce regional influence by Russia and China. Venezuela’s role as a transit point and possible BRICS alignment complicates any straightforward regime-change scenario. Mario: Moving to general foreign policy under Trump. The national security strategy (NSS) for 2025 signals a shift, but you question how binding NSS papers are. What did you make of it, and how does it relate to Ukraine? You’ve noted Trump isn’t serious about peace in Ukraine on some occasions. Larry: The NSS is a set of guidelines, not a blueprint. Europe is being asked to step up, the US distancing itself from Europe, and the strategic relationship with Europe is damaged by the perception of long-term reliability and sanctions. The document highlights China as an economic rival rather than an enemy; it criticizes Europe’s defense spending and censorship, and it frames Russia as less of a direct threat than before, though the reality is nuanced. The US-EU relationship is strained, and the US wants Europe to shoulder more of the burden in Ukraine while maintaining strategic pressure. Mario: What about Ukraine? Zelensky’s negotiation posture, security guarantees, and the Moscow terms? Larry: Putin spoke on 06/14/2024 with five Russian demands: Crimea, Zaporizhzhia, Kherson, Donetsk, and Luhansk are permanently part of Russia; Ukraine must withdraw its forces from those republics; there must be an election in Ukraine with a legitimately elected president (the Russians argue Zelensky is illegitimate for not holding elections); they suggest a successor to Zelensky and elections within 90 days. Freezing lines in Donbas is not accepted by Russia; the Russians claim further territory may be annexed with referenda. If peace talks fail, Russia is likely to push to occupy Kharkiv, Sumy, Mykolaiv, and Odessa, potentially Kyiv. Western support is insufficient to alter that trajectory, given Russia’s large artillery and drone production. The US and Europe cannot match Russia’s drone and shell output; even if they supply Tomahawks, escalation risks, including nuclear considerations, grow. Russia’s economy and war capacity remain robust, and the BRICS poles are strengthening as Western leverage wanes. Mario: What about sanctions strategy and Russia’s oil revenues? Larry: Oil remains a significant but not decisive portion of Russia’s GDP. The West’s sanctions are not enough to force collapse; Russia has endured the 1990s and remains resilient. BRICS cooperation and the shift to the Global South are changing the global order, with Russia and China deepening ties and reducing Western influence. The war in Ukraine has not produced a decisive Western victory, and the global south is moving away from Western-led sanctions, reshaping geopolitical alignments. Mario, it’s been a pleasure.

Speaker 0 frames the discussion around technocracy as the bigger picture in Venezuela, arguing that the US bombing of Venezuela and capture of Nicolas Maduro cannot be rationally explained as a drug enforcement operation, or solely about oil. The claim is that the situation is part of a broader technocratic takeover, and the guest is Derek Bros, an investigative journalist who has written about this topic in an American Vagabond piece titled “Venezuela Technocracy Connection.” Speaker 1 (Derek Bros) agrees with the larger framing and says the drug charges do not stack up. He notes that the DOJ indictment does not even include the claim that Maduro was the head of the Cartel of the Suns, which he views as evidence that the drug-Charges narrative is weak. He mentions there are some oil-related connections discussed in his article, specifically oil companies that could stand to benefit if the US were to invest in Venezuela. He highlights connections to BlackRock, stating that BlackRock has about one-quarter to one-fifth ownership of some of these companies. Despite noting these oil-related links, he asserts that the bigger picture is the technocratic picture, implying that control and influence through technocratic mechanisms are the underlying driver of events in Venezuela. Key points highlighted: - The broader claim that technocracy is the underlying framework driving events in Venezuela. - The assertion that the US bombing and Maduro’s capture cannot be explained solely by drug enforcement or oil interests. - The DOJ indictment allegedly does not claim Maduro was the head of the Cartel of the Suns, challenging the drug-related narrative. - There are oil-related connections explored, including potential beneficiaries of US involvement in Venezuela. - BlackRock’s ownership stake (about one-quarter to one-fifth) in some oil-related companies is noted as part of the financial linkage. - Derek Bros emphasizes that the article presents a broader, technocratic perspective on the Venezuelan situation rather than focusing only on drugs or oil. Overall, the discussion centers on reframing the crisis in Venezuela as part of a technocratic takeover, with the article and interview presenting elevated attention to financial and corporate interests (e.g., BlackRock) and challenging the adequacy of drug-enforcement explanations.

Speaker 0: Have you considered talking to the president of Colombia who you called a drop leader? Speaker 1: No. I haven't really thought too much about him. He's been fairly hostile to The United States, and I haven't given him a lot of thought. He's he's gonna have himself some big problems if he doesn't wise up. Speaker 2: Did you say Colombia is producing a lot of drugs. Have cocaine factories that they make cocaine, as you know, and they sell it right into The United States. So he better wise up or he'll be next. He'll be next too. I hope he's listening. Speaker 0: So was this operation a message that you're sending to Mexico, to Claudia Scheinbaum, president there? Speaker 2: Well, it wasn't meant to be. We're very friendly with her. She's a good woman, but the cartels are running Mexico. She's not running Mexico. The cartels are running Mexico. We could be politically correct and be nice and say, oh, yes. Is no. No. She's very, you know, she's very frightened of the cartels that are running Mexico. And I've asked her numerous times, would you like us to take out the cartels? No. No. No, mister president. No. No, no, please. So we have to do something because we lost the real number is 300,000 people, in my opinion. You know, they like to say a 100,000. A 100,000 is a lot of people, but the real number is 300,000 people. And we lost it to drugs, and they come in through the southern border, mostly the southern border. A lot plenty come in through Canada too, by the way, in case you don't know. But but they come in through the southern border, and something's gonna have to be done with Mexico. Cuban government, the Trump administration's next target, mister secretary, very quickly. Speaker 3: Well, the Cuban government is a is a huge problem. Yeah. The the the the Cuban government is a huge problem for Speaker 2: some So is that a yes? Speaker 3: Cuba. But I don't think people fully appreciate. I think they're in a lot of trouble. Yes. I'm not gonna talk talk to you about what our future steps are gonna be and our policies are gonna be right now in this regard, but I don't think it's any mystery that we are not big fans of the Cuban regime, who, by the way, are the ones that were propping up Maduro. His entire, like, internal security force, his internal security opera apparatus is entirely controlled by Cubans. One of the untold stories here is how, in essence, you talk about colonization because I think you said Dulce Rodriguez mentioned that, the ones who have sort of colonized, at least inside the regime, are Cubans. It was Cubans that guarded Maduro. He was not guarded by Venezuelan bodyguards. He had Cuban bodyguards. In terms of their internal intelligence, who spies on who inside to make sure there are no traitors, those are all Cubans. Speaker 0: He felt very strongly. We we needed for nationals. We need Greenland for national security, not for minerals. We had some we have so many sites for minerals and oil and everything. We have more oil than any other country in the world. We need Greenland for national security.

- Fox News-style segment declares judgment day for Maduro, describing him as a narco terrorist socialist dictator who took over for Hugo Chavez and flooding the U.S. with migrants, gangs, and cocaine. 11 US warships, including the USS Gerald R. Ford, are in the Caribbean; Venezuela is surrounded. The strike group awaits orders as the president’s White House meetings calculate the next move against the narco state. Trump is said to be giving Maduro an ultimatum: abdicate power or face force; after a phone call, the claim is that it’s a decisive moment. - The New York Times allegedly reported a phone call with Maduro; Trump confirms it happened but offers few details. Reports describe Maduro asking for global amnesty and elections, which Trump reportedly rejected. Maduro allegedly asked if stepping down would still allow him to control the military; the claim is Maduro was told to pack his bags. - It’s claimed Maduro, despite a $50 million bounty, remains in power through crony bribery tied to coke, oil, and gold rackets. The narrative asserts that this time, the narcos aren’t calling the shots; Uncle Sam is, with Trump tightening the noose. In the last 24 hours, airspace above Venezuela was closed, described as an escalation. - Questions are raised about ground troops in Venezuela, with officials saying there are many options on the table and that Maduro is a sitting duck who could be out before Christmas. Beijing and Moscow are cast as not supporting Maduro, while Trump supposedly engages in larger trade and diplomatic deals with them. Venezuelan gangs are said to have trafficked large quantities of cocaine to West Africa, fueling flows to Europe. - Chuck Schumer is described as previously backing military action in multiple countries; now under Trump, there are questions about plans in Venezuela. The segment emphasizes that drugs are framed as a national security issue, with a focus on destroying cartel finances by targeting cocaine boats, described as 40-foot speedboats carrying millions in contraband. - The CIA is asserted to be on the ground with authorized options for the president; Operation Southern Spear is said to defend the American homeland from drug warfare. A debate erupts over the legitimacy and legality of strikes in the Caribbean, with references to a Washington Post report of a second strike that reportedly killed survivors, which some call a war crime and others defend as lawful self-defense in international waters. - Critics are represented as arguing there’s no war with Venezuela, but rather murder; discussions surface about whether a second strike that killed survivors constitutes a war crime. Some participants warn against obeying unlawful orders, citing laws that prohibit interfering with military loyalty or discipline, and noting that some veterans would refuse illegal orders. - The View is invoked to question accountability for orders; a captain in the Navy is asked if he would carry out orders to strike drug boats. The segment accuses a “Seditious Six” and a CIA-backed propaganda effort of aiming to undermine Trump’s Latin American actions, suggesting factions within the government leak intelligence and oppose a successful Latin American operation. - The overall theme portrays a high-stakes U.S. intervention in Venezuela as a landmark confrontation with Maduro, framed by constitutional-law debates, alleged war-crimes concerns, and internal political maneuvering aimed at potential martial-law or insurrection scenarios, all while positioning the CIA, the Monroe Doctrine, and Operation Southern Spear as central to deterring narcotics and reasserting American deterrence.

Max Blumenthal explains that the January 3 operation in Caracas appeared to be a terrorist assault on Caracas, involving the kidnapping of Nicolas Maduro and his wife Celia Flores. He notes Maduro’s presidential guard was massacred, 32 Cuban officers were killed, and many civilians died, with no US casualties reported. He suggests the operation reflected a long-prepared plan by the US, with initials of a “hay a halo” style high-altitude entry into Miraflores Palace. He cites Venezuelan official Diosdado Cabello stating that Flores demanded to accompany Maduro and may have saved his life, and he questions whether there was a betrayal or widespread military collapse on the Venezuelan side. He interviewed former Venezuelan foreign minister Jorge Arreaza, who denied insider deals or betrayals and supported Maduro’s view, though Blumenthal notes there is backroom dealmaking with the US occurring under Maduro. Ariasso is said to have reported that communication systems were taken out, bases bombed, and key communication towers destroyed, with drones still in Venezuelan airspace; thus, Blumenthal questions whether an order not to scramble Sukhoi jets prevented an escalation. He describes the episode as a “staggering failure of intelligence, counterintelligence, military,” while observing the resilience of the Chavista movement: Delsy Rodriguez as acting president committed to sovereignty, and officials like Cabello and Vladimir Padrino López remaining in place, with collectivos in the streets. He argues Trump must contend with the Chavista movement because they control institutions. He notes Venezuela announced the release of “political prisoners,” arguing many were linked to US-backed opposition efforts, but he cannot provide names. Blumenthal cites Rick Grinnell, Trump’s envoy to Venezuela, who reportedly negotiated directly with Maduro for a deal involving Chevron’s drilling license in exchange for deported Venezuelan migrants; Grinnell implied the opposition, led by Maria Corina Machado, resisted allowing Maduro or Venezuela to strike a deal and instead aimed to delegitimize Maduro. He accuses Rubio of aiding移 deportations of Venezuelan migrants to Nayib Bukele’s El Salvador, where detainees were publicly humiliated and tortured; he claims these actions were designed to prevent deals that would allow Maduro to gain revenue or preserve ties. He argues Maduro was open to a deal, but not one controlled by Trump. Blumenthal asserts Trump’s larger aim is regime change to control Venezuela’s oil and cut ties with Russia and China, pressing Maduro to run Venezuela under US orders, potentially to funnel oil proceeds offshore to avoid US accountability. He claims Trump seeks a 30–50 million barrel oil deal, with revenue used to buy American products, but offshore holdings would enable plunder by Trump Incorporated, and the operation signals a broader Monroe Doctrine-esque strategy. He argues this has implications for multipolar states and regional stability, noting Russia and China’s positions, including Xi’s visit to Miraflores before Maduro’s kidnapping and possible retaliation against Venezuela’s Belt and Road interests. In discussing legality, Blumenthal says kidnapping a head of state and trying him in New York would violate international law; under ICJ precedent, a national court cannot try a head of state without an ICC indictment and transfer to The Hague. He contends the Maduro indictment’s narcoterrorism claim is a fraud; he traces its origins to CIA-linked drug networks from the Reagan era, including “cartel of the Suns.” He discusses Hugo Carvajal (El Pollo) and his cooperation with the US, including a secret plea deal and testimony alleging Maduro’s regime involvement, including a claim that Venezuela’s Smartmatic allegations could be used to convict Maduro. He notes a DOJ superseding indictment calling the cartel a “loose network” rather than a formal cartel, and mentions a DC-9 flight (Cocaine One) allegedly connected to CIA-backed operations, potentially exposing CIA involvement, which Judge Hellerstein did not allow in court. Blumenthal concludes by calling the operation a mafia-like show—“gangsterism”—and suggests the Maduro case could challenge international law; he references prior interviews where he argued the “Cartel de los Soles” was not a real organization, a point later echoed by Washington Post and France 24. He closes acknowledging time constraints.