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Stanislav Krapivnik, a former US army officer from Donbas, returns to discuss the escalation of NATO-Russia proxy warfare, the role of drones, and potential strategic escalations. The conversation centers on how Europe is contributing to deep strikes in Russia, especially against energy installations, and the resulting danger of a broader conflict. Key points and claims, as presented: - Drones and deep strikes: The EU, through its defense alignment, aims to overwhelm Russian air defenses and threaten strategic assets, including nuclear-capable targets, by using long-range drones. The objective is to degrade Russian defensive systems and the production rate of missiles, potentially opening the path to strikes on radars, early warning systems, strategic assets like bombers, and even nuclear submarines in port. - Nuclear war risk: The interviewee asserts that by mid-to-late summer there could be a zone of possible nuclear war if ground warfare arises or escalates due to Western actions. He notes that Russia’s anti-aircraft and early warning capabilities are limited to manageable scopes, with occasional corridors allowing strikes in, and that Europe’s current strategy could push the conflict toward a nuclear dimension. - Deterrence and first strikes: The discussion contrasts U.S. first-strike doctrine with other nations’ second-strike assurances. The speaker argues that in a blinded Russia, the logic for targeted first strikes becomes stronger for the other side, while lamenting that Europe’s leadership might be pushing toward a nuclear exchange. He cites studies suggesting that as few as 47 key targets could collapse the U.S. in a nuclear context, highlighting the fragility of a high-tech economy under nuclear disruption. - European psyche and policy: There is criticism of what the speaker describes as a mass psychosis in Europe, where warnings about striking Russia’s early radar or deterrent systems are dismissed in favor of defending Ukraine. The rhetoric suggests deep political and media reinforcement of pro-Ukraine narratives, with limited space for risk discussion about nuclear consequences. - Energy installations and economy: While drone strikes have targeted oil facilities, the speaker notes that most damage has been to storage facilities rather than critical infrastructure like pipelines or refineries. Refineries are large, and damage to some vessels can take longer to repair. Russia’s production has not been significantly reduced, but the attacks are accelerating a shift of energy facilities eastward toward Asia, while Europe faces higher oil prices on the spot market and potential disruptions to gas routes like TurkStream and Caspian Pipeline Authority, with broader economic impact on Southeastern Europe and Turkey. - Russia’s response and drone modernization: The Russian military has reorganized its drone capabilities, forming dedicated drone battalions and establishing new schools to standardize and professionalize drone operations. The move encompasses reconnaissance, kamikaze, bombing, and supply drones, with adjustments after initial disorganization. Ukrainians reportedly helped inspire and provide drone countermeasures, and Russia’s modernization integrates drones with air defenses. - Zelensky and Victory Day threat: The possibility of Zelensky threatening to strike Moscow’s Victory Day parade is discussed. The guest suggests Zelensky would want to be at the head of such a move, while acknowledging the uncertainty of who controls decisions in Kyiv and the level of Western involvement. The parade’s downscaled format is noted, but the broader question remains whether such a strike could occur. The guest asserts that Russian deterrence may have been eroded, and Western actors might not take credible deterrence seriously until an incident occurs. - Africa and Mali: Russia’s activities in Africa, especially Mali, are described as significant. Mali’s leadership under Asimi Goata is navigating between Western and Russian influence. Russian forces, including elements from the former Wagner group now under the Russian defense ministry, are described as rebuilding Mali’s military and supporting a campaign by jihadist groups. The situation includes rapid, mobile “flying columns” that can cause chaos but lack staying power against organized defenses. Russian drones and aviation (including ME-20 aircraft) are reportedly effective, and Mali is moving toward energy and resource development, including three nuclear power plants proposed by Russia to Elektrify the country. France’s position is framed as colonial, with Mali’s uranium, gold, and other resources creating strategic interest. Burkina Faso’s involvement and regional dynamics involving Niger are cited as part of a broader, expanding conflict network across Africa. - Global frontlines and war risk: The guest argues that multiple frontlines are forming—Ukraine, the Persian Gulf, and Western Africa—and that they could merge into a single broader conflict if not stopped. He asserts that the West is driving this escalation, and he characterizes Western public sentiment as often indifferent to Ukrainian casualties, focusing instead on political or financial gains from the conflict. - Frontline realities: On the ground, Ukraine has tactical successes but limited staying power due to heavy casualties and supply problems. Russian forces are reportedly stronger in Donbas, Kherson, and Sumy, while Ukrainian forces face difficult conditions, including open fields and heavy artillery advantages for the Russians. Drone warfare has prompted reorganized Russian drone corps, with improved training and standardized units. The discussion ends with a warning that the conflict has global implications, with fronts expanding and risks of a broader, possibly world-scale war if not curtailed. The interviewee emphasizes that the West’s actions are fueling escalation and that African theaters, particularly Mali, are becoming an integral part of the wider confrontation.

Mario and Malcolm discuss the evolving drone warfare landscape and the strategic implications for the United States, Iran, Ukraine, and Gulf states. Malcolm argues that Iran’s drone arsenal represents a persistent, low-cost threat with an 88,000 Shahid drone inventory at the lowest cost, and mass production estimated at 7,000. He notes Iran has destroyed roughly $5,000,000,000 of technology, underscoring the waste associated with high-value defenses. He contends the conflict “is gonna come down to rifles and knives and drones,” and suggests the U.S. and its allies have limited tolerance for the level of death this entails. He emphasizes the learning curve for anti-Shahid drones, estimating 35 to 45 days to train someone to fly such drones, and notes that combat veterans and Ukrainian international legionnaires could assist with training in Ukraine, Abu Dhabi, and beyond. They discuss defense markets and training pipelines. Mario recalls speaking with a U.S.-based VC in Ukraine who might be tapped to bolster defense industry interests; Malcolm reiterates that Ukrainian-made, locally developed systems dominate, and that Western companies must avoid partnerships that involve theft of technology. He stresses that Ukrainians own the drone industry, and that the U.S. has historically relied on foreign-made drones for ISR rather than attack, contrasting Ukraine’s trajectory from reconnaissance to drones used for direct attack and artillery fusion. Malcolm criticizes the U.S. approach to drones, arguing that the U.S. military has not adapted to modern drone warfare and that Ukraine’s battlefield experiences demonstrate rapid adaptation and innovating countermeasures, such as drone drop kits and improvised aerial bombs. He explains the progression: drones used for surveillance evolved into attack platforms, counter-drone tactics, and drone-enabled artillery. He provides detailed examples: using DJI drones for reconnaissance early on, then using drone-based bombing, counter-jamming techniques, and fiber-optic lines to guide munitions. He notes Ukrainian Sea Baby Magura drones and unmanned surface vessels (USVs) that attacked Russian ships, and describes a dramatic incident where a Ukrainian drone disabled a Russian submarine tail by docking behind it and flooding it with explosive force. The conversation shifts to recent strikes on Gulf-based assets. Mario asks about Zelensky’s visits to the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar, and why Gulf defense preparedness appeared slow. Malcolm suggests the U.S. misreads regional resilience and that Gulf states will adapt using homegrown drone capabilities, with examples such as Kuwait buying thousands of Ukrainian drones and the UAE potentially building domestic drone factories. He cautions against overreliance on “wonder weapons” and emphasizes practical measures like machine guns, shotguns, and ground-based defenses, noting that 50-caliber weapons and simple tactics can counter Shahid drones if properly deployed. He asserts that the Gulf states will need to supplement their arsenals with practical, scalable training and production rather than expensive foreign capabilities. Malcolm discusses the strategic logic behind any potential concessions with Iran. He argues that Iran has geography, topography, history, and manpower advantages, and that Donald Trump’s threats to bomb Iran’s infrastructure are unlikely to force concessions. He claims Iran would not negotiate under U.S. pressure and that the Strait of Hormuz (SOH) would remain a focal point of conflict. He contends that Trump’s approach risks escalating toward broader conflict, and that Iran could respond by leveraging the Houthis or other regional proxies to disrupt shipping and Gulf economies, potentially closing the Red Sea and Suez Canal if alignments shift. They touch on Russia’s role, noting Moscow’s financial and strategic interests in the region. Malcolm argues Putin benefits from the conflict and that Trump’s priorities are tied to accumulating frozen Russian assets and broader political maneuvering, sometimes at odds with the publicized goal of restraining Iran. He observes that Russia’s drones, weapons components, and intelligence could be flowing to Iran, influencing the Gulf theater. The discussion closes with a broader warning: the war’s consequences will be felt for years or generations, with energy prices, inflation, and global economic disruption, and only a realignment of strategy—embracing distributed defenses, domestic production, and adaptable tactics—will shape outcomes. They acknowledge the difficulty of predicting concessions, the complexity of Gulf politics, and the precarious balance between deterrence and escalation.

Мы исследовали броню толщиной 30 мм и увидели, что она легко пробивается 30-мм снарядом. Осколки создают большие вмятины, нанося ущерб внутреннему пространству БТРа. Эксперты выявляют уязвимые места в натовской технике, включая раритетный М-113, который оказывается в затруднительном положении. Translation: We examined 30mm armor and found it easily penetrated by a 30mm projectile, causing significant damage inside the vehicle. Experts identify vulnerabilities in NATO equipment, including the rare M-113, which faces significant challenges.

**Original Language Summary:** Украинская сторона использует сельскохозяйственный квадрокоптер для сброса боеприпасов на позиции. Данный квадрокоптер был сбит из стрелкового оружия и теперь находится в музее. **English Translation:** The Ukrainian side is using an agricultural drone to drop munitions on positions. This particular drone was shot down with small arms fire and is now in a museum.

Glenn: Welcome back, with Janis Varoufakis, former Greek finance minister and founder of DM25. The world has grown more dangerous. He notes the war in Iran is asymmetric: the US is more powerful but Iran can shut down energy trade and view the conflict as existential, willing to shut down the global economy to avoid defeat. Glenn asks where the war is headed and whether there is an off-ramp. Yanis: The US has a history of asymmetric conflicts where it enters with confidence and exits with its wings clipped—Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Syria. Iran has faced stronger opposition than those cases, and despite striking Tel Aviv and Gulf bases, the US pain threshold seems lower than Iran’s. He points out the difference this time is a broader regional and global resistance and Iran’s capacity to respond through strategic actions like shutting Hormuz, making escalation costly for the US. Glenn: Economics show that industrial might, supply chains, and technological sovereignty matter, suggesting a shift away from free trade. He asks whether these lessons will redefine Western ideology and asks about the role of deindustrialization over the last decades. Yanıs: He says the shift began after Bretton Woods and the era of financialization and neoliberalism, with industrial capacity shipped out and the West leveraging finance and, later, big tech. He notes Margaret Thatcher’s role in deindustrialization and shipping capacity abroad, and he is surprised Trump fell into a war against Iran without a clear exit strategy. He argues Netanyahu’s influence pulled the US into a long war, framing it as a tactic to keep Israelis in fear and justify annexation moves in the West Bank, thus sustaining conflict. He also addresses the liberal-imperialist claim of liberating women, stating that women of Iran do not need bombs and that liberation would require defeating the powers that prevent peace and democracy, citing the 1953 coup and the suppression of the left in Iran after 1979. He emphasizes that the regime’s survival has involved neoliberal policies within Iran and that both reformists and conservatives in Iran ultimately align around survival and regional power, with the regime having benefited from long-term Western hostility and recent escalations. Glenn: Raises the point that the US miscalculated even the narrative—often incoherent, with statements about “liberating women” fluctuating between aims of freeing women and destroying Iran’s ability to rebuild. Yanīs: He challenges the idea that this war is about liberating women, and reiterates that the people of Iran face a stark choice between the current regime and a failed-state trajectory. He argues the regime's popularity is enough to sustain it, and that external pressures are not driving a straightforward democratic outcome. He notes that the real losers are ordinary people in the US, Iran, and globally, with rising food and energy prices, while the leaders of Iran may see gains in rallying around a common external threat. Glenn: Cites Trump’s tweets about higher oil prices and questions the populist credentials when the impact is on the average person. Yanīs: He discusses the changing nature of warfare, highlighting drone technology as a major shift. A drone economy makes cheap drones capable of challenging costly missiles, altering the political economy of war and enabling autonomous, AI-driven weapons. He notes that drone warfare, as seen in Ukraine and now Iran, could lead to a permanent-war dynamic where peace becomes a system error. He mentions how tech companies like Palantir train AI for civilian and military applications, including hospital management, illustrating the broader commercialization of war tech. Glenn: Reflects on how competition among NATO, Russia, and China could reshape power dynamics, particularly with autonomous weapons and the ability of adversaries to strike at vulnerabilities. Yanīs: He cautions about the risk of a broader great-power war and notes that drones, autonomy, and AI could enable rapid decision-making with less human oversight, expanding the lethality and reducing accountability. Glenn: Observes that Iran can absorb pain and still threaten Hormuz, while the US and Israel may be unable to declare a decisive victory without economic and political costs. He asks where US and Israel go from here. Yanīs: He argues Netanyahu seeks permanent war to justify expansion, while the Trump administration would like a quick victory. He underscores that a clear victory is hard to define when Hormuz remains contested, and that Trump’s options may be to declare a triumph or continue the conflict, depending on midterm politics. He emphasizes that the war’s outcomes are measured by the cost to ordinary people rather than leaders’ narratives. Glenn: Adds that the war’s casualties and economic effects will hit working people hardest, and notes Trump’s failure to align populism with real-world costs. Yanīs: Returns to the moral dimension, explaining that he has opposed illegal wars by the US and Israel in various contexts and that his duty is to call out both sides, stressing international law and stopping his own governments from dropping bombs on Iran as the top priority. Glenn: Agrees, adding that human rights should restrain war, not justify it, and warns against substituting humanitarian rhetoric for power plays. Yanīs: Concludes by recalling past anti-war activism and reiterates that solidarity should resist imperialism, not substitute it with bombings of other regimes. He emphasizes choosing international law and opposing the gang-like rule of Western governments. Glenn: Thanks Yanis; Yanis thanks him as well.

**Original Language Summary:** Обсуждается возможность разрешения киевскому режиму наносить удары по территории России западным вооружением большой дальности. Подчеркивается, что украинская армия не может самостоятельно наносить удары современными высокоточными системами большой дальности без разведданных со спутников НАТО и внесения полетных заданий военнослужащими стран НАТО. Разрешение на такие удары будет означать прямое участие стран НАТО в войне на Украине, что существенно изменит суть конфликта и потребует от России принятия соответствующих решений, исходя из создаваемых угроз. **English Translation:** The possibility of allowing the Kyiv regime to strike Russian territory with long-range Western weapons is being discussed. It is emphasized that the Ukrainian army cannot independently carry out strikes with modern high-precision long-range systems without intelligence data from NATO satellites and the entry of flight missions by NATO member states' military personnel. Permission for such strikes would mean the direct participation of NATO countries in the war in Ukraine, which would significantly change the nature of the conflict and require Russia to make appropriate decisions based on the threats created.

US drones face restrictions that limit their operation, such as needing to stay within line of sight or requiring pilots to have licenses. In contrast, Chinese drones can be purchased and used freely in the US, leading to compliance issues for users, which are often overlooked. This situation has resulted in Chinese manufacturers dominating the drone market, with 90% of drones used by the US military and police being Chinese-made. This reliance on Chinese drones poses significant security risks, as they can serve as both surveillance tools and potential weapons.

Звісно, це по-любому. Роблять 4-12 вильотів на одному важкому дроні за добу. Це вже має свою систематику. Особиста ціль на літо – систематичне застосування. --- Of course, it's a given. They make 4-12 sorties per day on one heavy drone. This already has its own system. The personal goal for the summer is systematic application.

Ukrainians at the NATO Innovation Summit stated 30% of their casualties were from drone strikes. In the Kursk offensive, drones account for the majority, if not almost all, of Russian tank and vehicle losses. FPV drones are currently operated in a one v one fashion. In the next few years, drone warfare will evolve to one v many. Command and data links, essential for drone operation, are becoming more vital. Countermeasures exist to jam or deny these links. The goal is to make drones more autonomous, enabling one operator to control many drones simultaneously.

Проходил обучение в сентябре 2023 года в Британии на базе Лонгкоп. Обучение проводил британский инструктор, и группа состояла из 300 человек, включая украинцев и обучающий персонал. Само обучение было неэффективным и напоминало обычный курс. Вопрос о том, пригодилось ли обучение, остается открытым, так как оно не дало ожидаемых результатов. I underwent training in September 2023 in Britain at the Longcop base. The training was conducted by a British instructor, and the group consisted of 300 people, including Ukrainians and training staff. The training itself was ineffective and resembled a standard course. The question of whether the training was useful remains open, as it did not yield the expected results.

Russia has relative freedom in Ukraine for drone and missile operations, with good intelligence coverage. Patriot batteries transferred to Ukraine are likely to be detected and destroyed by Russia before installation. Therefore, sending Patriot batteries to Ukraine is a waste of money. At best, it will extend the war by weeks, resulting in more Ukrainian and Russian deaths, but it will not change the outcome of the war.

**Ukrainian Summary:** Легко вдосконалити безпілотну систему, адаптувати її та зациклити всі напрямки БПЛА. Тоді з'явиться щось більше, ніж просто БПЛА. Це потрібно проти "тушок", запусків балістичних ракет, авіабомб типу FAB-3000. Загалом, однією ЛВС можна битися дронами, бо вони точніші та маневреніші. **English Translation:** It is easy to improve an unmanned system, adapt it, and cycle all UAV directions. Then something more than just UAVs will appear. This is needed against "corpses", ballistic missile launches, and FAB-3000-type aerial bombs. In general, one LVS can fight with drones because they are more accurate and maneuverable.

Drones: A year ago, Ukraine had more drones, but now drone numbers are roughly at parity. Both sides launch a similar number of drones. Russia uses fiber optic drones more actively, which are immune to Western electronic warfare systems. These drones render jamming antennas useless. The army is actively using unmanned systems, including remotely controlled carts that can carry ammo, food, evacuate wounded soldiers, or carry explosives. Russia considers its approach to warfare as complex, dangerous, and highly professional.

**Original Summary (Ukrainian):** Аналізатори не бачать дрони, їх можна виявити лише візуально або на слух. В умовах контузії та відсутності тактичних навушників, виявлення ускладнюється. Рекомендується спостереження та використання гладкоствольної зброї для боротьби з дронами, оскільки їх неможливо заглушити, тільки збити. **English Translation:** Analyzers cannot detect drones; they can only be identified visually or by sound. Detection is complicated by concussion and the absence of tactical headphones. It is recommended to observe and use smoothbore weapons to combat drones, as they cannot be jammed, only shot down.

Europe must quickly increase support for Ukraine as artillery shells, air defense interceptors, and drone production capabilities dwindle. Europe could use proposals and potentially collateralize frozen Russian assets to act fast. The speaker is concerned about the cutoff of intelligence streams from the U.S. and pressure on allies like the UK not to use US intelligence for their own weapons. The primary purpose of US intelligence has been to help Ukrainians see Russian attacks coming and have advanced warning. Key weapon systems require U.S. satellite queuing and the military GPS system to hit targets. Without these, more Ukrainians will die, and Europe cannot replace this capability quickly.

Я начинал как обычный штурмовик, потом перешел в БПЛА, и шаг за шагом это начало давать результаты. Самое прикольное, когда противник погибает от твоих действий. Уничтожив одного противника, ты спасаешь как минимум две жизни наших. **English Translation:** I started as a regular stormtrooper, then moved to UAVs, and step by step it started to yield results. The best part is when the enemy dies from your actions. By destroying one enemy, you save at least two of our lives.

**Original Language Summary:** Коптер взлетел непонятно откуда. Клоун. Ни с того ни с сего. До чего техника дошла. Зачем работать за рулем, если можно коптером управлять? Менты сшибают коптер. Какой-то пидорас с автомата стреляет. Менты промазали. Коптер опять полетел в гущу. Еще один пидорас, еще один коптер. **English Translation:** A drone took off from an unknown location. A clown. Out of nowhere. What has technology come to? Why work behind the wheel if you can control a drone? The cops are shooting down the drone. Some пидорас is shooting with a machine gun. The cops missed. The drone flew back into the thick of it. Another пидорас, another drone.

**Original Language Summary:** Обсуждается возможность разрешения киевскому режиму наносить удары по территории России западным оружием большой дальности. Подчеркивается, что украинская армия не может самостоятельно наносить такие удары из-за отсутствия необходимых разведданных и возможности вносить полетные задания в ракетные системы. Это требует участия военнослужащих стран НАТО. В случае принятия решения о нанесении таких ударов, это будет означать прямое участие стран НАТО в войне на Украине, что существенно изменит суть конфликта и потребует от России принятия соответствующих решений, исходя из создаваемых угроз. **English Translation:** The possibility of allowing the Kyiv regime to strike Russian territory with long-range Western weapons is being discussed. It is emphasized that the Ukrainian army cannot independently carry out such strikes due to the lack of necessary intelligence data and the ability to enter flight missions into missile systems. This requires the participation of NATO military personnel. If a decision is made to carry out such strikes, it would mean the direct participation of NATO countries in the war in Ukraine, which would significantly change the nature of the conflict and require Russia to make appropriate decisions based on the threats created.

Scott Ritter discusses the Iran talks, U.S. and Iranian positions, and the broader implications for U.S. foreign policy. - He states the talks aren’t over, describing them as a process. The United States came in crudely and with a stunt, while the Iranians were well prepared with technical papers and talking points. The talks remain ongoing, with both sides leaving technical teams behind after high-level visits; the ceasefire is two weeks and has not been terminated, so the process continues. - Ritter characterizes the situation as “the theater of the absurd” and warns it’s dangerous and could spin out of control. He criticizes Donald Trump’s approach as bluster and high-stakes posturing, saying the Iranians haven’t budged and that the U.S. has no clear objectives in the negotiations. He notes the president allegedly has “hard commitment” to Iran not producing a nuclear bomb, but asserts the fatwa against nuclear weapons remains in place and U.S. actions have undercut that position by killing the official who put the fatwa on the table. - He argues the easiest deal would be to sit down with the Iranians and “shut the door on any potential of Iran ever producing a nuclear weapon,” provided genuine experts were involved, but claims the U.S. isn’t there to make that deal. The aim, he says, is to project U.S. control and to frame Trump as the winner, irrespective of the actual outcomes. - Ritter contends Trump’s inner circle includes JD Vance, Marco Rubio, and others; he asserts Trump is using public appearances (e.g., an MMA event) to signal who is in charge and to replace others who opposed the war. He claims JD Vance did not support the war and is being sidelined or publicly discredited. He also criticizes Rubio as nominally in charge of foreign affairs but notes the State Department has been gutted, lacking a full team and interagency process. - He predicts the next two weeks will yield a deal that makes Trump the winner and Vance the loser, suggesting Rubio isn’t being promoted much and that Trump will throw everyone under the bus. He asserts there is no real change in U.S. capabilities, noting the stockpiles of missiles have not been rebuilt. - On NATO and the Ukraine war, Ritter argues drones are redefining warfare: the Ukrainian and Russian use of drones is changing battlefield dynamics, with drone operators becoming central to military effectiveness. He asserts NATO and the U.S. do not fully understand how to fight this war, and claims the conflict demonstrates the end of NATO and a broader “empire terminating event” linked to America’s failure in Iran. He stresses that drone dominance could break the battlefield’s traditional dynamics, leaving tanks and infantry less decisive. - He claims the Ukraine war’s drone innovation is the most significant development in warfare since dynamite, saying without drones you cannot prevail on the battlefield. - On Melania Trump and Epstein, Ritter declines to engage with the specifics of Melania’s personal involvement, but discusses Epstein as emblematic of America’s elite rot. He argues that Melania normalized relationships with Epstein and Maxine and that she will be seen as an enabler, whether or not criminal liability is established. He contends this politics of normalization reflects deeper decay in American power elites.

Ukrainians are not superheroes and face casualties on a daily basis. Today, I will show you unique videos of Russians destroying Ukrainian equipment. "This is an American m triple seven howitzer." "The Russian UAV hits the exact target and destroys the howitzer." "The rare and valuable SAM has been destroyed." "The UAV dives and hits the target." "This is a Polish AHS Crab Self Propelled Artillery Unit. The hit causes fire and destroys the launcher." "A battery of Ukrainian S-three 100 SAMs." "A kamikaze drone strike on the installations leads to a powerful explosion and the destruction of an adjacent installation." "Everything that you saw earlier was the work of the Russian Zala Lancet UAV." "At least 250 different pieces of equipment were destroyed by Russians using it." "The range of such a warhead drone is about 70 kilometers." "Lancets are launched with a metal rail." "The Russians are increasingly using lancets."

Dmitry Sims junior hosts lieutenant general Abty Alaudinov, hero of Russia, hero of the Chechen Republic, hero of the Donetsk People’s Republic, commander of the Akhmet Special Forces, and deputy head of the main military political directorate of the Russian Ministry of Defense. The conversation centers on the current phase of the conflict, Russia’s strategy, the role of Western support, and comparisons with Israeli actions in Gaza and other theaters. Key points and claims: - Russia’s combat capability and strategy - Alaudinov states that “overall, all troops of the Russian Federation’s Ministry of Defense are engaged in active offensive operations across all sectors where we’re positioned,” with the most intense fighting around Pokrovsk, seen as the key point to break through to operational space. He notes progress in sectors where the Ahmad (Akhmet) special forces operate and emphasizes a broader offensive plan while maintaining an “active defense” to engage the entire front line and stretch the enemy’s resources. - He asserts that “only Russia is advancing” along the 1,000-kilometer line of contact and attributes slower offensive tempo to preserving personnel and avoiding a sharp breakthrough that could trigger NATO involvement. He argues the primary damage comes from unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) on both sides, and contends a rapid thrust would yield enormous losses. - Perceived signs of enemy strain - The speaker describes Ukraine as gradually crumbling under pressure, with Pokrovsk, Kupiansk, and the surrounding agglomeration “gradually falling apart.” He claims Russia liberates one or two settlements daily and that NATO support—drones and equipment—has not changed the overall dynamics; Ukraine cannot hold the front despite the influx of foreign weapons. - Western/NATO support - Alaudinov asserts that NATO testing is ongoing on Ukraine with drones, weapons, electronic warfare, etc., and that Trump’s shifting rhetoric does not reduce the flow of weapons or support. He contends that American support persists even as political statements change, and he notes deep American-NATO involvement via think tanks, satellites, and arms supplies that reach the front. - Drones and the changing nature of war - He emphasizes drones as the central element of modern warfare, while not negating the continued relevance of artillery and tanks. He argues: “a tank worth millions of dollars can be destroyed by a drone that costs $500,” and stresses the need to compete economically in war, deploying cheaper, effective unmanned systems to exhaust the enemy’s resources. - He claims Russia has a layered drone system for deep reconnaissance and strike with various warhead levels, ranges, and maneuverability, enabling operations from closest to farthest sectors and allowing “all targets” to be hit today. He asserts Russia is ahead of NATO in unmanned aviation. - Mobilization and tactics - Refuting Western depictions of “meat assaults,” he notes Russia conducted only one mobilization (300,000) and has continued advancing, while Ukraine has mobilized for years and still struggles. He attributes Ukraine’s resilience to nationalist formations behind mobilized troops, and he suggests that without NATO support, Ukraine would not sustain the front for many days. - Mercenaries and comparisons to Israeli actions - He characterizes Western mercenaries as having arrived with false expectations and being killed off in large numbers; Ukrainians are described as having strong spirit, but NATO soldiers lack endurance in the same way. Israeli mercenaries are described as capable in some contexts but not decisive against Russia. - On Gaza and the Israeli army, Alaudinov accuses Israel of “a fascist state” with tactics that spare no one, arguing Russia fights only those who fight with weapons and does not target women, children, or elders. He contrasts this with alleged Israeli actions in Gaza, saying Israel has no tactics and destroys civilians. - Nuclear considerations and doctrine - He asserts Russia is a nuclear power with substantial combat experience and advances in missiles like Zircon that could sink carriers, arguing NATO did not account for Russia’s capabilities when initiating the conflict. He presents a broader critique of Western policy and the so-called “deep state,” alleging far-reaching political dynamics involving Israel, Epstein, and compromise among Western leadership. - Closing perspective - The discussion closes with the host thanking Alaudinov for the detailed analysis of the operation and broader geopolitical commentary, including views on Israel, Gaza, Iran, and U.S. roles.

**Original Language Summary:** Спикер наблюдает за коптером, который взлетает непонятно откуда. Затем он видит еще один коптер. Он удивляется, зачем работать за рулем, когда можно управлять коптером. Потом он замечает, что в коптер стреляют, предположительно, менты из автомата. Спикер комментирует промахи ментов и то, что коптер опять полетел в гущу. **English Translation:** The speaker observes a drone taking off from an unknown location. Then he sees another drone. He wonders why work behind the wheel when you could control a drone. He then notices that someone is shooting at the drone, presumably cops with an automatic weapon. The speaker comments on the cops missing and the drone flying back into the thick of it.

Original: МУЗЫКАЛЬНАЯ Полностью готовый к боевому применению дрон. Именно таким и был вчера подбит американский танк Abrams. Translation: A drone fully ready for combat use. It was with such a drone that an American Abrams tank was hit yesterday.

Europe must quickly increase its support for Ukraine as artillery shells, air defense interceptors, and drone production capabilities dwindle. Europe could use proposals and potentially collateralize frozen Russian assets to act fast. The speaker is concerned about the cutoff of intelligence streams from the U.S. and pressure on allies like the UK not to use US intelligence for their own weapons. The primary purpose of US intelligence has been to give Ukrainians advanced warning of Russian attacks. Key weapon systems require support from US satellite queuing and the military GPS system to hit their targets. Without this support, more Ukrainians will die, and Europe cannot replace this capability quickly.

Europe must quickly increase its support for Ukraine as artillery shells, air defense interceptors, and drone production capabilities dwindle. Europe could use proposals and potentially collateralize frozen Russian assets to act fast. The speaker is concerned about the cutoff of intelligence streams from the U.S. and pressure on allies like the UK not to use US intelligence for their own weapons. The primary purpose of US intelligence has been to help Ukrainians see Russian attacks coming and have advanced warning. Key weapon systems require U.S. satellite queuing and the military GPS system to hit targets. Without these, more Ukrainians will die, and Europe cannot replace this capability quickly.