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The January 6th committee never requested my public testimony as the Capitol Police chief. This raises questions about their intentions, as my testimony could reveal critical details about the events of that day and the days leading up to it, including the involvement of political leaders and their appointees.

The former Capitol Police chief, Stephen Sund, reveals in his new book that the Pentagon, FBI, and DHS failed on January 6th during the attack on the Capitol. Despite the federal government's extensive security network, which was designed to detect potential threats, it provided no protection on that day. Sund explains that the FBI, DHS, and his own agency were aware of the right-wing extremists' plans to attack the Capitol but failed to take action. Additionally, military leaders hesitated to send help due to political or tactical concerns. Sund warns that without proper measures, a similar incident could easily occur again.

The discussion outlines that a year before January 6, the FBI conducted a planning exercise and had specific plans for the event. Speaker 1 states there was a tabletop exercise run in Boston in August 2020, five months before January 6. The memos that Kash Patel turned over to Congress, recently provided at the request of Chairman Barry Lautomilk, show that the FBI knew there was a strong possibility of a hanging or contested election, with both sides agitated and likely to escalate to violence. The memos also reveal that the FBI devised specific strategies, including embedding informants inside groups where political violence or agitation might occur. According to Speaker 1, the FBI had two dozen informants on the ground on the morning of January 6, and recommended mass prosecutions, even for the most minor crimes—described as exactly what the FBI did after January 6. Speaker 1 emphasizes two major points about the strategy: first, that the strategy was conceived months in advance and was carried out; second, that it represented a double standard because it differed from how political violence at BLM protests and far-left actions in 2020 were handled. The claim is that informants were embedded in both left- and right-wing groups, including Antifa and right-wing groups, and that intelligence suggested a bad episode would occur. They allege that, according to Chairman Barry Lautemux, warnings from informants were strong, but Capitol stakeholders in Washington, DC, did not receive those warnings or pass them along. This, they argue, shows two failed examples of the FBI under the Chris Ray era, with foreknowledge of events but actions that hurt conservatives while not alerting liberals or those who could have prevented violence. The documents are presented as now public, described as stunning by the speakers. Regarding whether there was any briefing to higher-level officials, Speaker 0 asks if there is evidence that Bill Barr, Chris Ray, or staff at the White House were briefed after the tabletop exercise and plan development. Speaker 1 responds that there is no indication of briefing the attorney general or other senior officials. There is no documentation showing that Barr, the Homeland Security Department, the Capitol Police, or the Washington, DC Metropolitan Police were alerted. The speaker notes that this suggests an insular FBI operation, drawing a comparison to pre-nine-eleven dynamics, implying systemic issues within the FBI.

Congress passed a law requiring the speaker to request federal resources for events like the Capitol attack. The speaker was denied twice by the House and Senate Sergeant Arms due to optics and lack of intelligence support. The speaker had to go through these individuals to request the National Guard, even during the attack. After 71 minutes and 32 calls, the speaker finally received approval. This delay is surprising considering the severity of the situation, and the speaker was frustrated by the delay.

The discussion centers on whether January 6 violence was an FBI operation. Speaker 0 denies that the violence at the Capitol was part of any operation orchestrated by FBI sources or agents. Speaker 1 asks if the FBI had an engagement with embedded agents; Speaker 0 repeats denial. Several speakers challenge the lack of answers about how many agents were present, suggesting informants were involved. Speaker 5 says "attorneys for the Proud Boys revealed at least 40 undercover informants were doing surveillance on the defendants that day, including 13 working in the DC Metro Police." Plainclothes MPD officers on Capitol Grounds are referenced. Speaker 6 says he provided high-definition video to lawmakers and accuses the FBI/DOJ of ignoring it; he describes an open window and an operative pulling it. Speaker 7 concludes: "it was the FBI and not Trump supporters who led the insurrection of the Capitol on January 6."

Capitol Police Chief describes an "intelligence failure" before Jan 6: "absolutely zero with the intelligence that we know now existed talking about attacking the capital, killing my police officers, attacking members of Congress and killing members of Congress." He says "FBI DHS was swimming in that intelligence" and "the military seemed to have some very concerning intelligence as well." There was "no jib, a joint intelligence bulletin zero for January 6" and "no coordination, no discussion in advance." He notes FBI Washington field office and DHS "didn't put out a single official document specific to January 6" and cites a Senate/GAO finding of emails to Steve D’Antuano about threats he did not hear on a conference call: "Nobody from DHS was on" January 5 call. On Jan 4, Miller "puts out a memo restricting the National Guard from carrying the various weapons"—and Pelosi/McConnell allegedly blocked his request: "optics." After 12:53 attack, he makes "32 calls" over "seventy-one minutes" until "02:09" when "approval" comes. "The chain is Pelosi" and "The law says in a mercy, he can grant me authorization, but he didn't."

In this video, former Chief of Capitol Police, Stephen Sund, discusses the intelligence failures and lack of support during the January 6th Capitol attack. He reveals that the intelligence he received did not accurately convey the severity of the attack, and that key agencies like the FBI and DHS had more concerning intelligence that was not shared. Sund also highlights the delayed response in providing National Guard assistance, questioning the motives behind these decisions and suggesting a deliberate effort to downplay the intelligence. He further raises concerns about potential political influence, the presence of federal agents in the crowd, and the lack of arrests for those instigating violence. Sund emphasizes the need for an independent investigation to uncover the truth.

In this video, former Chief of Capitol Police, Stephen Sund, discusses the intelligence failures and lack of support during the January 6th Capitol attack. He reveals that the severity of the attack was not indicated in the intelligence he received, and key agencies like the FBI and DHS were aware of the threats. Sund also highlights the delay in receiving approval to bring in the National Guard, with Pelosi and McConnell denying his requests for 71 minutes. He questions the political motivations behind these decisions and the lack of accountability. The military's response is criticized for prioritizing optics over immediate assistance. Sund raises concerns about a possible setup and emphasizes the need for a thorough investigation. He also questions why the Pentagon and Defense Intelligence Agency did not provide support or share intelligence regarding the potential threats. Sund raises concerns about the presence of federal agents in the crowd and the lack of arrests for individuals instigating violence. He criticizes the media for not thoroughly investigating these issues and emphasizes the need for an independent investigation.

I received a call from someone in Great Britain asking about federal agents in the crowd. I denied their presence, assuming I would have been informed. However, later I learned that there were indeed federal agents present. This was confirmed by Jill Sanborn's testimony in 2021, where she mentioned the FBI taking overt action to prevent certain individuals from attending the January 6th event in DC. In February 2023, a GAO report revealed that the FBI was tracking 4 domestic terrorists on January 3rd, which increased to 18 or 19 by January 6th. It's reasonable to have resources and multiple agents for such a situation, but it's concerning that this information wasn't shared in intelligence.

They say the FBI anticipated consternation around the election and actually prepared plans for January 6. They held a tabletop exercise in Boston in August 2020, five months before January 6. Kash Patel recently turned over memos to Congress at the request of Chairman Barry Lautenberg (Lautomilk) of the J-six investigation. The memos show the FBI knew there was a strong possibility of a hanging or contested election, with both sides agitated and likely to escalate to violence. They devised specific strategies, including embedding informants inside the groups where political violence or agitation might occur. They say the FBI had two dozen informants on the ground the morning of January 6. They also recommended mass prosecutions, even for the most minor crimes, which is described as exactly what the FBI did after January 6. Two big takeaways: the strategy appears to have been hatched months before and then carried out, and it involved a clear double standard compared to the political violence by the left in 2020. The FBI allegedly embedded informants in a broad range of groups, including Antifa and right-wing groups, and gathered intelligence suggesting a bad episode would occur. Barry Lautemux reportedly stated that while the warnings from informants were strong, the preparations of warnings to the brethren of the Capitol in Washington, DC did not exist. In other words, warnings were not passed along. The claim is that two failed examples of the Chris era of the FBI show that, knowing something was going to happen, they implemented a strategy that hurt conservatives but not liberals and did not warn the people who could actually prevent the violence. This is described as the legacy of the Chris Ray FBI, now laid open in documents for all to see. The question is whether any part shows that Bill Barr or Chris Ray briefed the president or his staff, or senior White House officials after the tabletop exercise and the development of the informant plan. The answer given is no: there is no documentation showing that the attorney general, Barr or other brass were briefed, and no mention that the White House, Homeland Security Department, Capitol Police, or Washington DC Metropolitan Police were alerted. The characterization is that the FBI remained insular, echoing the same “diseases” seen before nine-eleven.

General Milley was found to be using an intelligence platform called DataMiner, which he used to gather information about potential threats to Congress and the US Capitol. However, he did not share this intelligence with the Chief of Police or other relevant authorities. The Chief of Police expresses concern about not being informed, as it is their duty to take necessary action. They discuss how this handling of intelligence differs from previous protests and suggest that the intelligence may have been intentionally downplayed.

The speaker discusses the FBI's "failed investigation" of the January 6th pipe bomb, alleging the FBI has no leads or suspects, has lost information and evidence, and that the Secret Service deleted all texts from January 6th. The speaker claims Steve D'Antuono said cell phone data that could have been used to find the bomber was corrupted. The speaker states that the FBI does not have video footage of the DNC from January 6th. The speaker asks if confidential human sources were involved in the pipe bomb incident. The other speaker responded they would have to refresh themselves on the information gathered to date. The speaker suggests getting the information public before the election.

I, as the former Capitol Police chief, question why the January 6th committee never asked me to testify publicly. They may have been worried that my testimony would reveal what happened on January 6th, the events leading up to it, and the role of political leaders and their appointees.

The speaker asks if the FBI had communication with their agents during the Capitol attack, to which Speaker 1 denies any involvement. Speaker 0 then asks about "ghost vehicles," but Speaker 1 is unfamiliar with the term. Speaker 0 claims to have evidence of two buses used by FBI informants disguised as Trump supporters during the attack. There is a brief interruption from Speaker 2, who reminds everyone to stay within their allotted time. Speaker 0 objects to his question being cut off, stating that the buses were nefarious and filled with FBI informants. The transcript ends with Speaker 2 attempting to move on to the next speaker.

The discussion centers on the security failures during the January 6, 2021, Capitol breach. It is clarified that there were three calls between the Chief and Speaker Pelosi on that day, contradicting her claim of no communication. The Chief expressed concerns about the House Sergeant at Arms, Paul Irving, who prioritized optics over security, delaying the National Guard's deployment. The conversation shifts to political implications, with accusations that Speaker Pelosi politicized security issues. Several speakers criticize the focus on January 6 rather than pressing issues like crime and inflation. They emphasize the need for serious discussions about security and governance, expressing frustration over perceived political gamesmanship. The dialogue also touches on the treatment of January 6 detainees and the use of force by correctional officers, highlighting concerns about civil rights violations.

The speaker urgently called General Walker to request the National Guard's assistance at the Capitol. Despite the imminent danger, the speaker faced resistance from higher-ups who didn't like the optics of the National Guard's presence. The speaker pleaded for help, but was denied multiple times. Eventually, shots were fired, and the speaker had to hang up to handle the situation. The National Guard didn't arrive until 6 PM, and instead of being deployed at the Capitol, they were driven back to the DC Army. The speaker felt betrayed and questioned if there was a conspiracy against protecting the Capitol. The systematic denial of intelligence and support from various agencies led to the baffling conclusion of not protecting the capital.

Steve D'Antwono, the FBI director, received multiple emails warning about the violence expected at the Capitol before January 6th, but nothing was mentioned during a video call with him. The military had discussed locking down Washington DC and revoking permits on Capitol Hill due to concerns about violence. However, on January 4th, the acting secretary of defense issued a memo restricting the National Guard from carrying weapons or equipment for crowd control. This decision hindered the National Guard's response when assistance was desperately needed on January 6th. Governor Hogan even pleaded for help but was denied due to the memo. The situation doesn't make sense.

The Capitol Police faced an intelligence failure on January 6, 2021, with critical warnings about potential violence not communicated to the chief. Despite having a dedicated intelligence unit, Sund received no actionable intelligence regarding threats to Congress or police officers. Requests for National Guard assistance were denied for over 70 minutes due to concerns about optics, even as violence escalated. Other law enforcement leaders were similarly uninformed, raising questions about the handling of intelligence. Sund expressed frustration over the lack of accountability and transparency, noting that the aftermath of the event has led to significant concerns about the politicization of law enforcement and the safety of officers. Despite the challenges, he maintains a commitment to the integrity of law enforcement.

The denial of the request for national guardsmen on January 6th was a pivotal moment. The person who made that decision has not answered why. Representative Bennie Thompson stated that Speaker Pelosi was off limits to the inquiries of the January 6th committee. However, if we truly want to find out what happened, everyone's records should be examined. The speaker emphasizes that they have been forthright and provided their phone records. They made numerous calls to request approval and called multiple police agencies and officers to help regain control of the Capitol. The speaker's recollection is detailed and precise.

The speaker discusses the FBI's ongoing investigation into the January 6th Capitol riot and the arrest of Trump supporters. They highlight the FBI's inability to find information about the person or people who planted pipe bombs outside the RNC and DNC headquarters the night before the riot. The speaker then introduces new surveillance footage released by Capitol Police, showing the moment one of the bombs was discovered. They describe the video, pointing out the lack of concern from law enforcement and the Secret Service, as well as the proximity of the bomb to VP-elect Kamala Harris. The speaker raises questions about the identity of the person who alerted authorities to the bomb and the subsequent cover-up.

The speaker questions why the FBI didn't inform cabinet secretaries about potential threats on January 6th. They criticize the lack of security measures at the Capitol and mention offering National Guard support, which was declined. They believe better information sharing could have prevented the events. The speaker emphasizes that protecting the Capitol is a law enforcement responsibility, not a military one, and suggests cooperation between agencies. They imply political reasons for the lack of action.

In the video, the speaker mentions various pieces of intelligence that were not included in assessments regarding the Capitol attack. These include plans to harm palace guards, use chemicals at entry points, burn down the Supreme Court, attack members of Congress, and storm the building. The speaker's intelligence unit even released documents indicating a low probability of civil disobedience. Speaker 1 suggests that certain agencies may have allowed the chaos at the Capitol to serve their political purposes and prevented the speaker from stopping it.

Speaker 1 argues that Jack Smith’s request to prevent evidence about security or intelligence failures before January 6 is unacceptable, claiming it would excuse Nancy Pelosi and the mayor of DC for failures. He asserts Pelosi was responsible for January 6 because she did not accept the security help offered, stating that 10,000 troops or National Guard were available if needed before the event, and that the event would have been different if 500 or 200 people had been used; he emphasizes that he offered 10,000 troops and that January 6 would not have happened with a larger deployment. He notes that he personally attended and gave a speech, and claims the audience included the largest number he has spoken to, contrasting with the smaller group that he says went down to the Capitol. Speaker 1 contends that the party should be allowed to introduce evidence showing that there were security and intelligence shortcomings, including the assertion that Pelosi “did not take the security that we offered her,” with the offer of 10,000 troops and the fact that “you had far fewer people than that.” He mentions that the unselect committee did not discuss or include references to “peacefully and patriotically” behaving crowds and says this group was not highlighted by the committee or in their words. He criticizes the prosecutor, calling Jack Smith a “deranged human being, unattractive both inside and out,” and accuses Smith of wanting to suppress testimony because the committee “illegally destroyed everything” and deleted evidence related to Pelosi’s decisions about troop deployment. He asserts that much evidence indicated Pelosi did not want the troops and that a letter from the mayor contradicted Pelosi’s stance. Speaker 0 acknowledges the point but keeps the dialogue focused; Speaker 0 reminds that Capitol Police Chief Steve Sun said January 6 was a preventable event if the intelligence and resources requested had been provided, noting that Speaker 0 sees this as an amazing point and confirms that the offer of troops was in writing. Speaker 1 reiterates that he offered 10,000 troops for January 6 and emphasizes that this fact is in writing, arguing that the prosecution is attempting to suppress relevant evidence. He maintains that Pelosi’s leadership and decisions about security are central to the discussion, and he reiterates the claim that the offer of security was not acted upon. The conversation pivots back to the assertion that the Capitol Police Chief’s past statements support the claim that January 6 was preventable with proper intelligence and resources.

Speaker 0 expressed confusion about the lack of answers regarding two significant events on January 6. Firstly, other federal agencies withheld crucial information from the speaker, who was in charge of security at the Capitol. Secondly, despite the situation escalating for 71 minutes, Speaker Pelosi denied permission to bring in the National Guard. The speaker questioned why there is a lack of investigation into these matters, suggesting a lack of interest in uncovering the truth. The situation is described as worsening beyond these events.