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The deep state's open support for Al Qaeda and the Islamic State (ISIS) is shocking, especially given their role in the Syrian conflict. Despite claiming to oppose Al Qaeda, the U.S. has provided support to groups aligned with them in Syria, raising questions about the rationale behind such actions. There are concerns about backing the wrong factions, with evidence suggesting that U.S. weapons may have ended up with ISIS. Former officials have indicated that the Obama administration ignored warnings about ISIS's rise, and even John Kerry acknowledged the situation's escalation. Historical parallels are drawn to past U.S. support for Mujahideen in Afghanistan, highlighting the long-term consequences of such interventions. The narrative emphasizes the complexity and contradictions in U.S. foreign policy regarding jihadist groups.

Chapter 1, the MI6 plot: In the early 1990s, MI6 consultants and academics debated lines to split China into three pieces. Gerald Siegel of the Royal Institute of International Affairs in the UK was commissioned to map where the country should be chopped. Western journalists and researchers at the time acknowledged Western manipulation of a small portion of Xinjiang’s Uighur population, with the majority of Uighurs living peaceful agricultural lives. The plan targeted a small radicalized minority, a tactic attributed to the CIA and NED. A 1990s Western academic publication, Strategic Studies, stated that Xinjiang had long been a target of British intelligence and that London hoped to manipulate Uighur refugees into cannon fodder for plans to break up China. The document cited is academic rather than propaganda, noting London’s aim to destabilize China through Uighur separatists. Chapter 2, a secret agent: The MI6 effort included a secret agent, not a conventional Bond figure, who arrived in Xinjiang under multiple identities as Michael Nicholson, though his real name was Abdullah Chatlie (Chattley), a Turkish operative with Central Asian language skills. According to CIA histories on Gladio, Chatlie helped Uighurs mount attacks that killed 162 people. Chinese sources corroborate violent unrest in Xinjiang in the early 1990s, including confirmed incidents such as 22 deaths in 1992 in Buran, though precise totals vary. Chapter 3, recognizing the problem: Xinjiang leadership recognized the overseas meddling. In March 1992, Tomo Mat (Weia name) chaired the Xinjiang Autonomous Region People’s Government and warned that hostile forces had stepped up infiltration, subversion, and sabotage. Chapter 4, the US propaganda push: The United States supported British efforts while also planning its own destabilization, backing Uighur nationalist Isa Youssef Alpdukin, who spoke in 1992 in Turkey about the collapse of the Chinese empire. Alpdukin, aligned with KMT nationalist aims, worked for Radio Liberty (Radio Free Asia) and advanced anti-China propaganda. Western intelligence and Uighur separatists formed a growing collaboration, with BBC involvement later. Chapter 5, the US trains fighters: The CIA and US military intelligence ran a Central Asia program, training Mujahideen and transferring hundreds of Xinjiang separatists to Central Asia for training. This alliance extended to Turkish agent Chatlie’s operations, including organizing protests and a coup in Azerbaijan. Chatlie died in a suspicious car crash in Turkey in 1996. From 1996 to 2002, Western agents continued to train Uighur separatists who conducted terrorist attacks, with Chinese authorities noting Western involvement. Chapter 6, a new country: The US initially portrayed Tibetans as victims of genocide, but UN data showed Tibetan population growth, shifting focus to Xinjiang. In February 2004, the US formally founded East Turkestan as a country, appointing Anwar Yusuf Tarani as prime minister in Washington, DC. Tarani’s government issued calls for economic aid and recognition but received none; Tarani resided in Fairfax, Virginia. Chapter 7, terrorism escalates: From 2007 to 2014, Xinjiang witnessed numerous terrorist attacks attributed to East Turkestan operatives, including a 2009 machete attack at a train station killing 197, a major car bomb in Urumqi, and the Kunming railway station attack. Western reporting rarely connected these events to MI6 or CIA collaboration, instead often blaming China’s policies or crackdowns. Chapter 8, a new narrative: The US and UK sought to suppress acknowledgment of intelligence involvement, aiming to recast terrorists as victims, and to depict Chinese authorities’ countermeasures as the cause of violence, aided by BBC and other outlets. The narrative aimed to deny Western complicity and demonize Xinjiang authorities. Chapter 9, blaming the victims: Western media, including NPR and BBC, reported on attacks by framing Chinese blame on Uighurs, often omitting Western involvement. Quotations from James Millward and others suggested crackdowns exacerbated violence, while sources like Radio Free Asia were presented without noting their propaganda relationships. Exiled Uighur groups cited Uighur oppression as a driver, while mainstream outlets echoed anti-Chinese framing. Chapter 10, the Uighur genocide hoax: By 2014, references stopped mentioning MI6 or CIA roots, with victims blamed as the cause of violence. The creator of this narrative shift prepared to discuss a broader “Uighur genocide hoax” in a future piece. The closing note cites sources and further reading, including Strategic Studies (1996), CIA operation Gladio literature, Sybil Edmunds, and Tony Cartolucci, dedicating the report to Xinjiang’s people.

In this discussion, Zhang Shuay Shin and Speaker 1 analyze the evolving U.S.-Iran confrontation through the lens of global power dynamics, the petrodollar, and the shifting balance among major powers. - The war is framed as primarily about preserving the petrodollar. Speaker 1 argues the United States, burdened by enormous debt, seeks to maintain the dollar’s dominance by controlling energy trade through naval power and strategic choke points. The belief is that the U.S. can weaponize the dollar against rivals, as seen when it froze Russian assets and then moved to stabilize oil markets. BRICS and others are moving toward alternatives, including a gold corridor, challenging the petrodollar’s centrality. The aim is to keep Europe and East Asia dependent on U.S. energy, reinforcing American hegemony, even as historical hubris risks a global backlash turning growing powers against Washington. - The sequence of escalation over six weeks is outlined: after the American attack on Tehran and the Iranian move to close the Strait of Hormuz, the U.S. eased sanctions on Russian and Iranian oil to maintain global stability, according to Treasury statements. Escalations targeted civilian infrastructure and strategic chokepoints, with discussions of striking GCC energy infrastructure and desalination plants. A U.S. threat to “bomb Iran back to the stone age” was countered by Iran proposing a ten-point framework—encompassing uranium enrichment rights, lifting sanctions, and security guarantees for Iran and its proxies. The Americans reportedly suggested the framework was workable, but negotiations in Islamabad stalled when U.S. officials did not engage seriously. - The broader objective is posited as not simply a tactical war but a strategic move to ensure U.S. imperial supremacy by shaping energy flows. Speaker 1 speculates Trump’s motive centers on keeping the petrodollar intact, potentially forcing China and other partners to buy energy with dollars. Iran’s willingness to negotiate in Islamabad is linked to pressure from China amid China’s economic strains, particularly as energy needs and Belt and Road investments create vulnerabilities for China if Middle East energy becomes unreliable. - The proposed naval blockade is discussed as difficult to implement directly against Iran due to ballistic missiles; instead, the plan may aim to choke off alternative routes like the Strait of Malacca, leveraging trusted regional partners and allies. Iran could respond via the Red Sea (Bab al-Mandab) or other leverage, including the Houthis, challenging Western control of energy corridors. The overarching aim would be to force a global energy reorientation toward North America, though it risks long-term hostility toward the United States. - The roles of great powers are analyzed: the U.S. strategy is described as exploiting Middle East disruption to preserve the petrodollar, with short-term gains but long-term risks of a broader alliance against U.S. hegemony. Europe and Asia are pressured to adapt, with China’s energy needs especially salient as sanctions tighten Middle East supply. Russia is identified as the principal challenger to U.S. maritime hegemony, while China remains economically entangled, facing strategic incentives to cooperate with the United States if required by economic pressures. - The dialogue considers NATO and Europe, arguing that the real contest is between globalists and nationalists in the United States, with Trump viewed as an agent of empire who may threaten the existing globalist framework. The speakers discuss whether this competition will redefine alliances, the future of NATO, and the possibility that a more Eurasian-led order could emerge if Western powers fail to maintain their maritime advantages. - Finally, Russia’s role is emphasized: Moscow is seen as the key counterweight capable of challenging American maritime dominance, with the war in Iran serving, in part, to counter Russian actions in Ukraine and to incentivize alignment with Russia, China, and Iran against U.S. leadership over the next two decades.

China uses other countries like Russia, Iran, and Hamas for its own benefit, without any real loyalty or friendship. Similarly, these countries rely on China for economic aid and military defense when they face isolation and sanctions from the US and its allies. This transactional relationship presents an opportunity for the US to intervene and disrupt these alliances. There is no honor among thieves, and when China, Iran, Russia, North Korea, Hamas, and Hezbollah are all considered, they can be described as thieves or even violent extremists.

Brandon and Kieran Andrew discuss the mounting regional dynamics as the Iran war drags into its fourth week. They agree on the possibility of serious unrest in at least one or two Arab countries in the coming years, though they caution not to overstate things. They note that the Gulf states lack a strong social contract, so economic volatility and external shocks could push instability, even if regimes recalibrate and survive. Kieran argues the perception in the region is that Iran has punched above its weight, pursuing a strategy of absorbing losses while raising costs for opponents, especially the US and Israel. Across the region, people are furious with the disruption and violence, privately blaming Israel and the United States for attacking Iran, even if publicly they maintain official narratives. Sovereignty violations against Iran are seen as justification for Iranian retaliation, with regimes prioritizing survival and counterattack. They touch on Bahrain as a case study: civil and political fragility, with Shiite civilians allegedly assisting Iranian targeting, and the Bahrain monarch’s status complicating regional dynamics. This feeds into the broader idea that a new Arab Spring is plausible in the Gulf as governments face popular pressures and a deteriorating social contract. Brandon reflects on the American role, noting the US prioritized defending Israeli targets over its own bases in the region, which erodes trust among Arab states. This feeds a fear that American retreat could materialize, altering long-standing regional alignments and making it harder to maintain bases or security commitments. The conversation shifts to the US-Israel relationship. They discuss the “wolf’s milk of nationalism” and how many Israelis are conditioned to view themselves as besieged and exceptional, which shapes policy and public opinion. They critique a top Israeli official’s stance that the Strait of Hormuz is not Israel’s concern, calling it insane and arguing that open sea lanes affect everyone. They contrast Israel’s unified national narrative with the region’s broader interests, suggesting that the Israeli leadership often acts in ways that may be unsustainable in the long run. They discuss the economics of the conflict. The IEA highlighted that oil shocks in 1973 and 1979 produced a combined loss of about 10 million barrels per day; in this war, about 11 million barrels per day have been lost on average. Gas losses are also significant, with 2022 spikes reversing and accelerating inflation. They warn about broader macro effects: rising inflation (Goldman Sachs predicting 4.5% in the US), higher interest rates, stock market risks, and potential AI-related energy and helium shortages that could undermine tech-driven growth. They emphasize that this energy shock could feed a broader recession in the West. They debate possible endgames. Scenario one: Trump constructs a narrative that the US won, reaching a face-saving deal with Iran to “cover up” a catastrophic outcome; Iran then consolidates a more entrenched, economically weakened regime, and the US must manage the fallout with bases and allies. Scenario two: deployment of US troops leads to a quagmire, with escalating casualties and a draw-out conflict that could push toward nuclear risk. Scenario three: arguably not distinct, but a continued escalation toward wider conflict, potentially drawing in adversaries or increasing regional volatility. They see scenario two as more likely, driven by Israeli pressure and ongoing US engagement, possibly culminating in escalation to nuclear threats. They consider Russia and China’s roles. Russia is viewed as aligned with China; China is playing a cautious, calculating game, avoiding direct involvement while expanding its influence through trade and joint exercises with client states. They argue China’s approach could accelerate American decline and shift influence toward Beijing’s orbit over the next 15–30 years, with Pacific allies and others gravitating toward China for stability and economic ties, even if not openly allied. Iran remains central. They discuss Iran’s resilience: even if economic conditions deteriorate, the regime could deepen its internal consolidation and broaden its persistence through institutions and praetorian guard support. If nukes were used or if retaliation escalates, the regime’s survivability would hinge on its decentralized structure and potential for hardline consolidation. Brandon asks about the possible brain drain and long-term sustainability of Israel if the conflict endures. Kieran warns that even if Israel survives militarily, it faces a Pyrrhic victory with existential threats from within, including demographic shifts, brain drain, and an economy sustained by a war footing and American aid, which may not be sustainable in the long run. Brain drain and domestic social fractures could undermine Israel’s stability and economic vitality, especially once the immediate military crisis subsides. Towards the end, they acknowledge that the war’s trajectory will likely redefine US influence, the Gulf’s political landscape, and Israel’s future. They conclude with mutual acknowledgment of the complexities, agreeing that the situation is poised to reshape regional and global power dynamics for years to come, and that the path forward remains uncertain and dangerous. They sign off with plans to reconnect, noting Kieran’s Navarra Live and other media appearances.

China is gaining power and influence at the United Nations (UN) by placing its civil servants and allies in key positions. This allows China to suppress international scrutiny of its actions, both domestically and internationally. For example, China won a seat on a panel that selects UN representatives on human rights abuses, despite being criticized for imprisoning over a million Uighurs in reeducation camps. Additionally, China has garnered support for its Belt and Road Infrastructure Project from numerous UN agencies and institutions. This has enabled China to expand its projects globally and exert greater influence within the UN. The Chinese Communist Party's systematic takeover of international organizations is making them more aligned with its ideology.

Colonel Douglas MacGregor discusses the likelihood and dynamics of a potential new war involving Iran, the Middle East, and broader great-power competition. - On a possible Iran strike: MacGregor says there will be a resumption of the war, though he cannot predict timing. He cites Western attempts to destabilize Iran (Mossad, CIA, MI6-backed unrest) and argues Iran is more cohesive now than it was forty years ago, with demonstrations representing a small minority and not a broad collapse of support for the government. He contends that those who want to destroy Iran or empower Israel believe the regime can be toppled with Western support and Israeli action, but he asserts that such a regime change is unlikely and that Iran will respond forcefully if attacked. He notes that current deployments are heavy on airpower with limited naval presence, and he suggests Israel’s broader goals (Gaza, Lebanon, Syria) will not be achievable without addressing Iran. - Regional actors and incentives: Netanyahu’s regional aims require confronting Iran, and Turkish involvement with the Kurds could influence the balance. He describes a recent Kurdish incursion into northern Iran that Iran suppressed, aided by Turkish coordination. He frames BRICS as militarizing in reaction to Western actions, including in Venezuela, Russia, and Ukraine, and says disrupting the Persian Gulf oil flow would harm China, prompting cooperation with Azerbaijan and Turkey against Iran to undermine the One Belt, One Road project. He also argues that BRICS countries—Russia, China, India—will not easily align with U.S. plans if Washington proceeds toward war. - Russian and Chinese calculations: On Russia and China, MacGregor says they have supplied Iran with military tech and missile/radar capabilities and helped counteract efforts to disrupt Iran with Starlink. He believes many Iranians still oppose regime collapse and that a broader war would risk escalation with Russia and China backing Iran. He cites Moscow’s withdrawal of Russian personnel from Israel and the sense in Moscow that Trump is unreliable, leading Russia to hedge against U.S. actions. He notes Russians are concerned about Europe and envision potential conflicts with Europe, while he questions U.S. strategy and end states. - No first-use and nuclear considerations: MacGregor discusses the idea of no-first-use (NNU) as a potential framework to reduce the risk of nuclear escalation, suggesting a multilateral agreement among the major nuclear powers (US, Russia, China, India, Pakistan, Israel, North Korea, Britain, France). He posits that such an agreement could advance diplomacy, including on Korea, and reduce the likelihood of Armageddon. He mentions that Trump could leverage such a stance, though he notes Trump’s tendency to pursue more aggressive policies in other areas. - Europe and NATO: He argues Europe is unprepared for renewed large-scale conflict and has disarmed substantially over decades. He criticizes Britain and France for rhetoric and capability gaps and suggests the United States is fatigued with European demands, though he doubts Europe could sustain a conflict against Russia. - Venezuela and domestic budget: He emphasizes the futility of long wars in certain contexts (Venezuela) and the mismatch between spending and real capability gains. He references the defense budget as largely consumed by fixed costs like veterans’ medical care and pensions, arguing that simply increasing the budget does not guarantee meaningful strategic gains. He notes the role of special operations as valuable but not decisive in major wars. - Concluding view: MacGregor reiterates that war in the region is likely, with many overlapping alarms and uncertainties about timing, leadership decisions, and the risk of escalation. He stresses that both Russia and China have stakes in the outcome and that the Middle East conflict could influence global alignments and deterrence dynamics. He closes by underscoring the potential importance of no-first-use diplomacy and broader nuclear risk reduction as a path forward.

ISIS fighters were airlifted by Western Coalition helicopters from Syria to Afghanistan, not reported by Western media. The US allegedly left behind ISIS fighters in Afghanistan to create chaos and hinder development in the region, potentially to benefit China, Russia, Iran, and Pakistan. The speaker suggests that ISIS is a US construct, specifically orchestrated by the CIA.

Glenn opened by noting the upcoming Trump-Xi meeting in Beijing and recalling Nixon’s 1972 visit as a historic opening, asking Chas Freeman for an assessment of why Trump is going, what’s on the agenda, and what to expect. Chas Freeman replied that Trump’s trip seems driven more by ego and the desire to feel honored in public pomp, rather than any clear strategic preparation. He contrasted the current visit with Nixon’s, which occurred amid a perceived Soviet expansion threat that made China a “protected state.” Nixon’s approach aimed to bind China to the West against a common threat, leveraging China’s sovereignty to counter Japanese expansion and Soviet influence. Freeman said the current moment lacks evidence of serious preparation or sherpa-style groundwork; there is a hurried, last-minute negotiation underway in South Korea between China’s trade negotiator and U.S. Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen’s administration. He suggested Trump is accompanied by senior American business figures seeking deals—likely Boeing sales, soybean trade, AI topics—and noted the China-U.S. contrast in AI strategies: the U.S. pursues general intelligence with heavy investment, while China applies AI to practical projects with open software. Freeman argued that beyond trade and tech issues, the broader context is muddled, with no obvious shared interests that would compel China to act concretely to help the U.S. in the Gulf or Hormuz, despite China’s interest in free trade and openness. He projected the question of how this meeting might affect West Asia: the war’s outcome signals a post-Iraq-Iran era emerging not favorable to the West, and he anticipated China’s strategic calculus would be to avoid being drawn into U.S. missteps while advancing its own interests in energy corridors and regional stability. Glenn speculated about wanting a grand power compromise (with Putin included) and suggested more is needed on Iran. He referenced Robert Kagan’s “The Jungle Grows Back,” noting that the West’s disregard for international law now clashes with a rising Sino-Russian-Iran axis. Freeman agreed with Kagan’s assessment of the war as a strategic debacle for the U.S., arguing that Iran’s retention of the Strait of Hormuz is likely and that international law is endangered in sea-navigational terms. He described a broader shift: Gulf Arabs may diversify away from the U.S., leaning toward Sino-Russian partnerships, and sea-power norms could be devalued. He emphasized that the conflict reduces the likelihood of a favorable new status quo and could push proliferation in the region; Iran may have or soon develop a nuclear capability, while others might follow. The war’s main strategic consequence, Freeman asserted, is a move toward a Sino-Russian axis and a transformed balance of power in the Middle East, with diversification away from U.S. security guarantees. Glenn added that the Nixon move was strategic, while Trump’s engagement seems tactical, and Freeman underscored the broader transformation in West Asia. They discussed the rule-of-law crisis in the West, the difference between “rule of law” and “rule by law,” and how domestic and international norms influence each other. Freeman argued that China has become a defender of the UN Charter and international law, in contrast to perceived Western unilateralism, and that the “jungle” is reconstituting a new order under Westphalian principles with many middle powers maneuvering. They debated whether China would want Iran to succeed to push the U.S. out of the region, and Freeman reiterated that the Chinese aim aligns with Westphalian sovereignty and peaceful coexistence, not ideological missionary diplomacy. They concluded that the Trump-Xi meeting could yield either a cautious pause or a dangerous misstep, given Trump’s temperament and Xi’s steadiness, and Freeman voiced cautious relief that nothing catastrophic occurs, while Glenn expressed a wish for a constructive outcome that could open space for rethinking Western hegemonic strategies.

The US wants to separate Xinjiang from China due to its strategic location connecting China with Central Asia. Xinjiang is a key hub in the Belt and Road Initiative, which threatens US hegemony. The US has spent billions sponsoring terrorism and instability in the region. The plan is to support separatism among Uighurs to destabilize China. The US military presence in Afghanistan is also related to countering China's Central Base Road Initiative and stabilizing Pakistan's nuclear stockpile. However, China's efforts to bring economic development and infrastructure to Xinjiang are improving living standards and reducing the incentive for conflict. The US plan to separate China is failing as all ethnic groups in China unite for a shared future.

Many Western corporations are unaware of the true nature of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and its leader, Xi Jinping. Throughout history, no organization has survived when dealing with the CCP. Xi Jinping has transformed the party into his own, and it is no longer representative of communism. It is crucial for corporations to realize this for their long-term benefit. The New Federal State of China is a group that possesses internal intelligence about the CCP. They can provide valuable information and protection, not just for profit.

Speaker: The way ISIS got there, as I remember from covering the Syrian war, includes reporting from the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOAR), which is based in the UK. SOAR reported that anti-ISIS Western coalition helicopters were airlifting foreign ISIS fighters—not the Syrian ISIS fighters—but out of Deir al-Zor in Syria. And, of course, Western media didn’t report this at all. It was a shock because at the time, nobody could understand where they were taking them or whether they were shuttle them back into the Iraqi theater. Two different sources told me that the US coalition was airlifting foreign ISIS fighters into Afghanistan, which at the time I didn’t understand at all. But in light of what’s happened, the US needed to leave behind a dirty fighting force that would blow up mosques, blow up schools, infrastructure to continue chaos once US forces left to impede the development of pipelines and roadways that would allow China, Russia, Iran, and Pakistan to connect with Afghanistan, to keep the country chaos. Basically, the story of ISIS itself—when we talk about it being potentially a US construct—ISIS K is really absolutely a US CIA specific construct.

The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOAR) reported that Western coalition helicopters were airlifting foreign ISIS fighters out of Deir Zor in Syria. Two sources told the speaker that the US coalition was airlifting foreign ISIS fighters into Afghanistan. The speaker didn't understand this at the time. The speaker believes the US needed to leave behind a dirty fighting force to blow up mosques, schools, and infrastructure to continue chaos after US forces left. This would impede the development of pipelines and roadways, preventing China, Russia, Iran, and Pakistan from connecting with Afghanistan. The speaker believes ISIS is potentially a US construct, and ISIS K is a US CIA construct.

Speaker: The CCP builds influence in democratic societies through overseas United Front work, a system the party uses to expand control and influence without force. The United Front is the party’s weapon to shape political, social, and economic environments to serve its goal of becoming the dominant global power and advancing claims such as the annexation of Taiwan. Through ongoing, long-term relationship building, the Party has created a global network of individuals and organizations inside open societies. In Canada, organizations connected to the United Front are substantial: Canada has at least 575 United Front–linked organizations, making it the second largest network among the four countries studied and with the highest per-capita presence. Much of the United Front work operates through informal ties—personal relationships, invitations to China, honorary titles, and privileged access. The 575 United Front–linked organizations identified in Canada represent only a visible layer of a much larger system operating quietly underneath. Canada is important to the CCP because it has strong institutions, vibrant civil society, and large diaspora communities. To the Party, shaping thinking, networks, and decisions in countries like Canada yields accommodation rather than confrontation. Alongside the United States, Canada has become one of the key environments where overseas United Front work is actively developed. From the research, three things stand out. First, the Chinese Communist Party politicizes everything: activities that appear social, cultural, or economic are treated by the CCP as political resources. Second, most United Front activities are not illegal; they operate through relationships. Influence is built through access, invitations, titles, and personal ties, not necessarily through breaking rules. For example, individuals with strong United Front ties have accompanied multiple Canadian prime ministers from both political parties to visit the PRC and have also participated in policy consultations ahead of those trips. Third, once this network is embedded, it can be mobilized. With the network in place, the Party gains the ability to make requests for political influence, narrative shaping, talent recruitment, and even voter mobilization on Beijing’s behalf.

TikTok poses two major threats: surveillance and foreign influence. The first threat is evident, and now we see the second component emerging. This involves an influence campaign on Hamas in Israel, which is likely being observed by a Chinese Communist Party (CCP) official in Beijing. They will use this campaign to update their strategies for China and Taiwan. It is important to remember that TikTok is not only an intelligence platform for the CCP but will also face criminal charges globally.

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is allegedly planning to engage the United States in four separate wars, including one involving a terrorist organization. Recent attacks by Hamas on Israel seem to align with this plan. There are reports that Taliban weapons left by the US have reached terrorists in Gaza, and Iran may have played a role in coordinating these attacks. However, what is receiving less attention is the meeting between CCP leader Xi Jinping and Palestinian president Mahmoud Abbas in June. They announced the establishment of a China Palestine strategic partnership, which Xi Jinping described as a significant milestone in their bilateral relations.

Professor Jiang discusses the Iran war and its wide-ranging implications, framing it as a protracted conflict with potential strategic recomposition rather than a quick end. - Trump’s posture and off ramp: Jiang says Trump is frustrated by the war, expected a quick strike and Iranian capitulation, and has sought an off ramp through negotiations (notably in Islamabad) that the Iranians rejected. He states there is no clear, real off ramp at present, with Iran “holding the global economy under siege” and controlling the Strait of Hormuz despite a naval blockade. He notes two alleged off ramps discussed by Kushner and others: (1) Trump paying reparations to Iran (about a trillion dollars) and granting Iranians sovereignty over Hormuz while removing US bases; (2) deploying ground forces to topple the regime and install a more US-friendly government. He predicts the war will drag on, potentially for months or years, and suggests Trump may distract with other conflicts (such as Cuba or actions against Mexico’s cartels) to avoid losing face. - Long-term, three-pillar US strategy: The first pillar uses ground forces to strangle Iran by controlling the Strait of Hormuz, destroying Iran’s oil export capacity and finanical leverage. The second pillar involves forward operating bases in Iran’s ethnic enclaves (e.g., southeast near the Pakistani border with Baluchis, and northwest with Kurds) to stir ethnic tensions and foment civil conflict. The third pillar aims to “suffocate Tehran” by targeting infrastructure, water reservoirs, power plants, and rail networks to starve the population, all while trying to minimize troop casualties. Jiang emphasizes that this would be a gradual process designed to pressure Iranians toward a political settlement. - Perception and domestic storytelling: The speakers discuss how to frame this as not a real war but as economic consequences or recalibration, with ongoing disruption and potential shortages as a form of pressure. Jiang notes the goal of creating a new strategic equilibrium that reduces domestic desire for prolonged engagement unless casualties rise substantially. - Domestic and global economic concerns: The conversation shifts to the economy, with Christine Lagarde warning that one-third of the world’s fertilizer passes through Hormuz and discussing risks of price inflation, shortages, and potential rationing. Lagarde argues that disruptions could lead to inflationary pressures and supply-chain fragility, with ripples in aviation fuel and European airports imposing rationing. Jiang agrees Lagarde foresees a major catastrophe approaching the global economy, highlighting just-in-time supply chains as particularly vulnerable and suggesting policy responses may involve greater control over populations, possibly including digital currency and digital IDs. - How the war could influence American society and policy: The discussion covers the possibility of a wartime footing in the United States, including a broader move toward control mechanisms such as digital currencies and surveillance. Jiang and the hosts discuss the potential for an AI-driven control grid, the role of hypersurveillance agencies like ICE, and a “Stargate”-level expansion of data-centers. They raise concerns about the implications of a draft, and Palantir’s stated push to bring back conscription, arguing that an AI surveillance state could justify such a mechanism. - War as a narrative and distraction tool: The hosts explore the idea that the public may be gradually desensitized to ongoing conflict, with the war in Iran serving as a backdrop for broader geopolitical maneuvers, including space and defense initiatives. They discuss how narratives around space programs, alien-invasion scenarios, and “control-grid” technologies could function as social control mechanisms to maintain obedience during economic or political crises. - Final reflection: Jiang cautions that a shift in mindset is needed, urging viewers to consider the worst-case scenarios and to prepare for economic and social stress, including the possibility of a prolonged, multi-pillar strategy aimed at reshaping Iran and embedding a wider, domestically straining economic order. Overall, the conversation centers on a predicted transition from a rapid conflict to a calculated, multi-pillar strategy aimed at eroding Iran’s capacity and potentially fracturing its social fabric, while simultaneously highlighting impending domestic economic distress and the possible expansion of control mechanisms in the United States.

China's influence over Iran is a major concern, as it supports the Iranian regime. This raises the question of whether we should confront China directly. The involvement of China is alarming, especially considering the credibility of whistleblowers from within the Chinese CCP. Nicole, representing the new federal state of China, an organization aiming to dismantle the CCP, joins the program to provide crucial information. The organization hopes that sharing this intel will aid the US, Israel, and other peace-loving nations in defeating the CCP.

Speaker 0 discusses working with the Israelis, describing them as “very American” and noting that they could get into shouting matches during meetings over whose idea was best, followed by casual lunch and reconciliation. He emphasizes that Israel is a good ally that the U.S. needs to protect and support, and he asserts that CIA and Al Qaeda had worked closely together in Iraq and in Syria, and that there are times when covert action allowed meetings with the “quote unquote, enemies” to try to bring things down as CIA officers. Speaker 1 adds that most of the world has a problem with Al Qaeda and ISIS/Daesh, but there is less of a problem because the CIA worked with ISIS/Daesh and Al Qaeda. He suggests that if the CIA worked with them, it would be better to understand what they were doing, and if the plan is for the U.S. to work with them on a security agreement, which has been done with enemies before, then this has been done in concert with diplomats and other countries involved. He indicates he wouldn’t be surprised if that was happening and would call it possibly hopeful. Speaker 0 continues by noting that newspapers in the United States once celebrated Qasem Soleimani as a fighter with American troops against ISIS and Al Qaeda. He states that Soleimani “was, and now it's switched,” implying a shift in perception or policy. The overarching theme is the idea of collaboration or coordination with hostile or extremist groups in pursuit of broader strategic objectives, including countering Iran, and the possibility that such collaborations could be framed as necessary or hopeful within a complex web of alliances and covert actions. Speaker 0 ends by reiterating the shift in stance: “Now we have to go to al ISIS and Al Qaeda to go back against Iran.” This underscores a cyclical or ironic pivot in U.S. strategy, moving from partnering with certain adversaries against common threats to reengaging those same groups to counter another adversary. The dialogue presents a candid view of realpolitik, suggesting that relationships with seemingly incompatible actors and shifts in alliances occur as part of broader geopolitical objectives, with collaboration sometimes described as acceptable when it serves strategic goals, and public narratives sometimes contrasting with behind-the-scenes actions.

China's support for Iran and Iran's support for Hamas are concerning in the broader geopolitical context. China and Iran have a 25-year weapons deal, making them firm partners. Recently, China and Russia blocked any response to a terror attack in Israel, which undermines relationships between the US and Gulf Arab States. The administration's dealings with China have negatively impacted the American economy. The Chinese Communist Party sees the attacks in Israel as advantageous for their geostrategic goals and their plans regarding Taiwan.

The Chinese Communist Party is not only a challenge for Taiwan and the South Pacific, but also for cities like Los Angeles, Denver, Washington DC, Chicago, and Kansas. They are actively working to undermine our values and bring about American decline. Their efforts are not passive, but rather intentional and strategic.

Brian Berletic discusses connections between the US “economic war against China” and wars/proxy conflicts involving Russia and Iran, arguing that the US seeks primacy rather than balance of power and uses diplomacy to build pretexts for additional war and to shape geopolitics. He says US policymakers do not expect China to pressure Iran or to pressure Russia, because China has reasons to avoid helping isolate itself, and he frames US actions as deliberate attempts to keep adversaries from becoming independent centers of power. He argues the US aims to weaken Russia, Iran, and China by creating wedges and subordination through client regimes and proxies. He claims Europe, Israel, Persian Gulf states, Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines are treated as extensions of US foreign policy rather than independent balancing powers. He also contrasts what he describes as US strategic framing—portraying America as reasonable while treating opponents as “evil”—with the claimed reality of proxy war, including in Europe and Iran. When asked about the goal of restoring primacy, Berletic says the US tries to pursue multiple forms of dominance—military, financial, trade-route control, and technological dominance—while acknowledging it is becoming less realistic as China surpasses the US plus its proxies. He says US strategy, as he describes it, shifts to wrecking multiple theaters and trade systems rather than direct head-to-head conflict, including efforts to disrupt energy exports and contested waterways. He cites US-created crises in the Middle East and describes US pressure on Indonesia near the Strait of Malacca, attempts to gain military access to that chokepoint, and blockading tactics affecting Russian energy exports and other routes. He claims the US has reorganized the Marine Corps into an anti-shipping force “specifically” for interdicting shipping, with preparation starting before the Trump administration. He argues that these actions aim to increase leverage over Asian states through energy dependence on US LNG exports, and to coerce regional countries away from balancing China. He compares this to how he says the US subordinated Europe via energy dependence, including by disrupting Russia–Europe energy flows over years. Addressing the US strategy’s “double blockade” concept and chokepoints, Berletic argues it is not about shutting everything down instantly. He claims the US does not need to seize every ship; he says ships often turn back and/or are disabled or seized, and he points to examples of US warplanes disabling ships. He argues this creates deterrence and manages economic damage rather than causing total collapse at once, with the goal of controlled destabilization and increased dependency that can be used to disrupt what China is doing in the region. On the Russia–China dynamic, he says Russia is a large energy producer and shares a direct border with China, leaving fewer “middle countries” through which disruption can be mediated compared with routes like Russia–Europe gas via Ukraine. He argues that because Russia and China together can attract other states into a broader gravitational pull, the US strategy carries risks but fits a longstanding pattern of maritime corridor control and chokepoint strategies. Berletic expands on what he describes as long-running pressure against Belt and Road corridors: he claims US-backed militants attack Belt and Road infrastructure in Myanmar and that the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor is attacked by US-backed terrorists. He also describes attacks in Afghanistan against the Afghan government and Chinese investments, framing this as a long-term “global dirty war” against China and its partners. When discussing Iran and Russia, he says Iran and Russia could strike deals with the US but are instead aiming to prevent a return to the prior status quo of sanctions/perpetual threats and NATO’s incremental expansion. He frames their posture as insisting adversaries must be included in the security architecture. He then compares the current era to a “new great game,” arguing it extends beyond Eurasia and now involves technology and rapid integration of advanced capabilities into deterrence for states such as Iran. He characterizes US behavior as either dividing adversaries or weakening them to prevent coordination. He says the US does not want friends among Iran or Russia because it wants them to be subordinated or weakened; otherwise, he claims they would work together with China. Finally, regarding Taiwan, he says the US “keeps” the one-China policy rhetorically but undermines it in practice through laws, troop presence, and military cooperation with Taiwan alongside regional partners, framing US support as preventing any meaningful back-off. He says US diplomacy functions as cover, including in relation to Russia/Ukraine and Iran, and describes US strategy as a multi-domain approach that already functions as economic and proxy war against China while escalating across Russia, Iran, the Middle East, and Asia-Pacific military integration. He concludes by warning that US policy will likely continue escalating and that China’s ability to build faster than the US can disrupt and destroy is central to whether open conflict can be deterred.