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Ashwin Rutansi opens Going Underground from Dubai, noting that the UAE has been targeted by Iranian missiles and drones, and references former US President Trump’s threats to destroy Iran’s civilization. He frames the discussion around Iran’s targets in the region and broader regional dynamics, including BRICS’ influence and multipolarity, and mentions Iran’s enrichment moves and past statements by Ayatollahs on nuclear weapons. He previews a controversial claim from a participant: a plan “where every bridge in Iran will be decimated by 12:00 tomorrow night, where every power plant in Iran will be out of business, burning, exploding, and never to be used again,” followed by an acknowledgment that “we don’t want that to happen.” The host also notes the region’s strategic importance and asks what events mean for global scarcity in food and health care, as well as how Western media portrays Dubai. In the interview segment, the guest is Michel Kanu, chairman of the Kanu Group, a major UAE business conglomerate with divisions including Kanu Travel, Logistics, Shipping, and Real Estate. Rutansi begins with a provocative line about the “dream” being over and asks how international propaganda portrays the UAE, especially Dubai. Kanu responds by describing Dubai’s resilience through prior shocks—the Gulf War, the 2008 financial crisis, 2014 oil-price shock—and attributes Dubai’s strength to its diverse population of over 200 nationalities who come to create opportunities. He emphasizes that the “magic of Dubai” lies in the people and their drive to make things work, rather than external perceptions. The discussion then turns to why Dubai is perceived as a target and the motivations behind hostility toward the city. Kanu refrains from blaming particular actors, suggesting instead that envy and “sour grapes” from some media and observers exist, while noting that those who benefit most from Dubai’s success are its residents and international partners. He asserts that Dubai’s openness and tolerance extend to neighbors and stresses that prosperity for all neighbors reduces conflict. He recalls the region’s historical ties across the Gulf and argues that the UAE has historically balanced relations with Iran and other neighbors, even when the region’s leadership has shifted. He says Dubai “walks a tight rope” and wants all neighbors to prosper, insisting that antagonism from abroad is not in Dubai’s interest. The host and Kanu discuss the impact of hosting US bases in the UAE, comparing it to other countries with foreign bases (Azerbaijan, Turkey, Japan), and the potential consequences for regional security. They debate whether the presence of bases makes GCC states targets and how to assess retaliation prospects given Iran’s population and geography. On shipping and the Strait of Hormuz, the conversation covers whether passage must go through Iranian and Omani territories, with Kanu noting international maritime law but arguing the strait is a natural passage that should not be weaponized. They discuss how insurance costs and potential tolls could affect shipping, with traders weighing the economics of paying tolls against the value of cargoes. The possibility of a GCC reinsurance or state-backed insurance mechanism is raised, including ARIG, and whether a regional solution might emerge if traditional reinsurers refuse coverage. Towards the end, Kanu reflects on Dubai’s real estate, acknowledging a period of rapid price growth that raised affordability concerns. He argues for sustainable growth that supports first-time buyers and long-term stability rather than short-term flips, expressing a desire for a balance between investor returns and housing for residents. The interview closes with gratitude to Kanu and a pledge to continue geopolitical and investment coverage, with a note of sympathy for those affected by the Israeli-US conflict in West Asia.

Afshin Rattansi introduces claims of renewed U.S. and Israeli bombardment of Iran amid ongoing violence in Gaza and Lebanon, including the assertion that Trump bombed southern Hormuzgan province leaving 20,000 Iranians without water. He says Israel launched a surprise attack on Iran a year earlier during negotiations, striking military and nuclear facilities and killing senior commanders, nuclear scientists, and their families. Rattansi further says Tehran responded with missile waves, whose impact is “heavily censored,” and that days later the U.S. entered the war by striking Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan with B-2 bombers and Tomahawk missiles, after which Trump declared Iran’s nuclear program “obliterated.” This year, Rattansi alleges that Washington and Tel Aviv used “so-called imminent threat” and peace negotiations as a pretext to kill Iran’s supreme leader Ali Khamenei and family members, and to kill 168 elementary schoolgirls, while Iran still retains a “massive stockpile” of enriched uranium and could produce 10–20 nuclear weapons in days. Rattansi asks Professor Ted Postol, a nuclear weapons and missile defense expert, whether the U.S. has a sustainable strategic position. Postol says the U.S. does not have such a position and argues Trump is constrained by domestic politics and pressured by an Israeli lobby with outsized influence and major financial power affecting U.S. and Congressional actions. Rattansi questions contradictions between Pentagon/CENTCOM self-defense framing and Trump rhetoric about “destroying” and even threatening to destroy Oman if it does not behave. Postol responds that the operation is not defensive, is a war of choice initiated with Israel, and from Iran’s perspective is a war of survival and existential protection against U.S. and Israeli aims to destroy Iranian civilization. He emphasizes that Iranian resistance would be driven by survival rather than U.S. internal politics. On war gaming and nuclear strike planning, Postol says military officers are servants of the Constitution, reserved about limits of military action, and that if Trump ordered nuclear weapons use, there is a real chance people would refuse due to nuclear weapons being in a special category. Asked about claims that Iran’s nuclear knowledge could be removed, Postol says knowledge cannot be erased and that even killing experts would not stop a program because societies have large numbers of capable people; he gives an analogy to Russia under Stalin, describing how reconstitution occurred after large purges. He also argues Israel lacks a chance of successfully stopping Iran via this approach. Rattansi asks why Iran would not declare it has nuclear warheads and delivery mechanisms. Postol answers that doing so would be bad for Iran and could provoke neighbors into developing nuclear weapons, reducing Iran’s security. He describes an Iranian strategy of preparing capability without crossing the line, including enriching 60% uranium hexafluoride to 90%, converting it to uranium metal, and using deep underground facilities; he states this could be achieved in weeks or months, potentially even in weeks, based on available centrifuge capability and setup. When discussing Trump’s fear of nuclear weapons, Postol says he is more comfortable with Trump being afraid of nuclear weapons and argues Iran is not the main source of nuclear instability—Israel is—asserting Israeli leadership has been pushing toward escalation despite military limits. He claims Iran’s ballistic missiles are more capable than initially seen, are hard to intercept, have larger warheads, greater accuracy, and are backed by large numbers, alongside drones and air defense misuse. On ballistic missile defense effectiveness, Postol disputes claims about Patriot performance and says air defenses have almost no capability against ballistic missiles. He also addresses regional nuclear risks: for Bushehr, he says a catastrophic meltdown could spread radioactivity depending on weather and winds, potentially reaching Dubai under some conditions. For Zaporizhzhia, he says if plants are shut down for a period of weeks, residual core energy is small enough that loss of cooling would not necessarily lead to major release; if operating, there is danger. On Dimona, he suspects the reactor is shut down; if shut down long enough, plutonium production could be lost, and severe core damage would likely not cause major radioactive release unless near and affected by wind. He warns that if Israel believed it had no choice but to attack Iran with nuclear weapons, Iran would respond differently, using underground facilities to convert 60% enriched uranium hexafluoride to nuclear weapons in potentially weeks.

The transcript centers on a loud, multi-voiced discussion about the prospect of war with Iran, U.S. policy dynamics, and the influence of allied actors—especially Israel—on Washington’s decisions. - The opening segment features sharp, provocative claims about President Trump’s stance toward Iran. One speaker asserts that Trump gave Iran seven days to comply or “we will unleash hell on that country,” including strikes on desalinization plants and energy infrastructure. This is framed as part of a broader, catastrophic escalation in Iran under heavy pressure on Trump to commit U.S. forces to Israel’s war. - Joe Kent, a former director of the National Counterterrorism Center who resigned from the administration, presents the central prognosis. He warns that Trump will face immense pressure to commit ground troops in Iran, calling such a move a “catastrophic escalation” that would increase bloodshed. Kent urges the public to contact the White House and members of Congress to oppose boots on the ground in Iran, advocating for peaceful resolution and public pressure for peace. - The discussion shifts to Israeli involvement. The panel notes that Israeli media report Israel will not commit ground troops if the U.S. invades Iran, and some assert Israel has never, in any conflict, committed troops to support the U.S. The conversation questions this claim, noting counterpoints from analyst Brandon Weichert that Israel has undermined American forces in certain areas. - The debate then returns to Trump’s diplomacy and strategy. The host asks whether Trump’s stated approach toward Iran—potentially including a peace plan—is credible or “fake news.” Kent responds that Iran will not take diplomacy seriously unless U.S. actions demonstrate credibility, such as restraining Israel. He suggests that a more restrained Israeli posture would signal to Iran that the U.S. is serious about negotiations. - The program examines whether the MAGA movement has shifted on the issue. There is testimony that figures like Mark Levin have advocated for some form of ground action, though Levin reportedly denies calls for large-scale deployment. Kent explains that while he believes certain special operations capabilities exist—units trained to seize enriched uranium—the broader question is whether boots on the ground are necessary or wise. He emphasizes that a successful, limited operation could paradoxically encourage further action by Israel if it appears easy, potentially dragging the U.S. deeper into conflict. - A recurring theme is the perceived dominance of the Israeli lobby over U.S. foreign policy. Several participants contend that Israeli influence drives the war timeline, with Israeli action sometimes undermining U.S. diplomacy. They argue that despite public differences, the United States has not meaningfully restrained Israel, and that Israeli strategic goals could be pushing Washington toward conflict. - The conversation also covers domestic political dynamics and civil liberties. Kent argues that the intelligence community’s influence—infused with foreign policy aims—risks eroding civil liberties, including discussions around domestic terrorism and surveillance. The group notes pushback within the administration and among some members of the intelligence community about surveillance proposals tied to Palantir and broader counterterrorism practices. - Kent addresses questions about the internal decision-making process that led to the Iran policy shift, denying he was offered a central role in any pre-crime or AI-driven surveillance agenda. He acknowledges pushback within the administration against aggressive domestic surveillance measures while noting that the debate over civil liberties remains contentious. - The program touches on broader conspiracy-like theories and questions about whether individuals such as Kent are “controlled opposition” or pawns in a larger plan involving tech elites like Peter Thiel and Palantir. Kent insists his campaign funding was modest and transparent, and he stresses the need for accountability and oversight to prevent misuse of powerful tools. - In closing, the speakers converge on a common refrain: no U.S. boots on the ground in Iran. They stress that the priority should be preventing another ground war, avoiding American casualties, and pressing for diplomacy rather than expansion of hostilities. The show highlights public involvement—urging viewers to contact representatives, stay vigilant about foreign influence, and oppose a march toward war. - Across the exchange, the underlying tension is clear: competing visions of American sovereignty, the balance between counterterrorism and civil liberties, and the extent to which foreign actors (notably Israel) shape U.S. policy toward Iran. The participants repeatedly return to the need for accountability, restraint, and a peaceful path forward, even as they recognize the high stakes and the intense political pressure surrounding any potential intervention.

The discussion centers on shifting U.S. rhetoric toward Iran and Israel amid negotiations and escalating conflict. As the interview goes live, news reports Iran suspended its trip to Switzerland for the opening round of nuclear negotiations. Iran’s stated reason is ongoing Israeli military operations in southern Lebanon, arguing Israel is operating over six miles inside Lebanese territory in violation of Article 1 of the MOU calling for an immediate end to hostilities on all fronts, including Lebanon. Iran says if the ceasefire clause is being breached before negotiations begin, there is nothing to go to Geneva for. Trump is also described as posting a call for a complete ceasefire on all fronts, including Lebanon, Hezbollah, and Israel. The interview then focuses on Israel as a “wild card” in the MOU and whether Trump can restrain Netanyahu. The colonel says Israeli leadership and U.S. billionaire supporters helped put Trump into office and are turning current events into “a test of Jewish power,” aiming to pressure Trump back into attacking Iran. He argues this approach reflects disproportionate influence already held by these actors, and predicts efforts to bully the president toward war. A CNN report is referenced describing Netanyahu lobbying to shape the final U.S.-Iran agreement by pressuring Trump through allies and intermediaries in Washington, mobilizing pro-Israeli senators and media allies. Netanyahu is said to believe a final agreement will be reached but is concerned Tehran will not uphold it. Separately, Netanyahu is described as saying Israel will restore security to the north through maintaining a security zone in southern Lebanon until Israel’s security needs require it, which the interviewer links to Netanyahu rallying U.S. influence to pressure Trump. When asked whether Trump can withstand this pressure, the colonel describes a transformation in Trump’s foreign-policy posture: he says Trump did not want a war with Iran, believed an arrangement could be reached, and showed reluctance to go to war generally. The colonel describes interruptions in foreign-policy dialogue after Ukraine in April 2022, then describes increasing belligerence around the early Iran conflict, including an account of Trump’s expectation that military action could end the war quickly. He then says Trump concluded the approach was not going well, became concerned about financial markets and the U.S. economy, and that the repeated claim “this war is going to end soon” could not end the conflict without a closure. The colonel argues Trump found no military solution and that using a nuclear weapon was “off the table.” He frames Trump’s challenge as dealing with Israel in a context where only an MOU exists as a rough framework, and highlights provisions aligned with Trump’s instincts, including not meddling in internal affairs and desire for forces to return home. He claims Trump was shown information about atrocities by Israelis against people in Gaza and Lebanon and that Trump’s statement about not needing to destroy an entire apartment building to eliminate one person reflects a broader realization. The colonel says some people are calling for Trump’s resignation because he “lost a war,” and responds that major powers do not achieve permanent “perfect victory streaks,” but instead must cut losses and move on. The colonel argues that future power in the Middle East will be dominated by Iran and Turkey, describing them as different from Israel and emphasizing that provoking Turkey would lead to a “fight to the finish.” He argues Israel’s existential threat is not Iran but Turkey, and contends that Israel and others are operating in a changing global environment where ISR-strike complexes and persistent surveillance plus standoff attack weapons enable new defensive and offensive capabilities. He concludes that the war must be brought to an end because the world has fundamentally changed and efforts to “reset it to backwards” are tied to calls for bombing more. A question is raised about how escalation could work if Israel continues strikes in Lebanon and Iran retaliates, and Trump chooses not to get involved, including not intercepting missiles. The colonel replies that this is “almost already happening,” citing Israeli shelling from southern Lebanon artillery positions and predicting Israel will attack Hizballah positions, which he describes as an existential threat for Israel. He says Israel would need U.S. assistance—munitions, missiles, intelligence—and predicts Netanyahu would pressure Trump politically if support were withheld, including threats aimed at Trump’s political survival. He also says he is “genuinely concerned” about the president’s safety. The conversation then shifts to claimed political and systemic factors limiting presidential agency and the possibility of escalation beyond normal pressure campaigns. The colonel suggests investigations involving members of the president’s family and references wealth growth and “Epstein files” as elements that could return to center stage. He also describes how criminal or political actions and unpredictable events have historically led leaders to be removed or harmed, and compares concerns to the experience of President Kennedy’s assassination. When discussing how pressure campaigns could become more sinister, he outlines ways investigations, media narratives, and orchestrated blame could be pursued. Near the end, the colonel discusses how broader U.S. and military bureaucracies operate, stating commanders can be constrained by service chiefs and confirmed positions, and arguing that institutional incentives discourage independent action. He recommends his book “A Margin of Victory: Five Battles That Changed the Face of War, Modern Warfare,” and says it addresses the limits of what government can accomplish on an average day due to other people’s decisions and confirmed constraints. The interview closes with the colonel referencing a Substack piece coming out Sunday or Monday discussing a shift in power and asserting that Iran has won the war and is “invincible,” “humbled, but not broken.”

The discussion centers on the alleged Iranian nuclear threat and the possibility of a U.S.-led or Israel-led military confrontation, with a mix of arguments about intelligence, strategy, and public appetite for war. - Recurrent warnings about Iran: The hosts note that for decades the U.S. government has warned Iran is on the brink of reconstituting a nuclear weapons program. They reference claims of “fresh intelligence” and “new evidence” of a renewed program, contrasting them with past warnings during the Obama, Trump, and Biden administrations. The tone suggests these claim cycles reappear with each new administration or set of negotiations. - Netanyahu and Iran timing: A compilation is shown of Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu stating over two decades that Iran has a nuclear program that could be imminent. One clip claims Iran could produce a weapon in a short time, with phrases like “weeks away,” “three to five years,” and even apocalyptic projections. The conversation then questions whether those warnings have come to fruition and whether media and public commentary have overstated the immediacy or impact of those claims. - Stuxnet and sanctions context: The moderator recalls that during the Bush era the U.S. launched Stuxnet against Iran’s centrifuges, and argues that Obama continued those efforts with sanctions; they portray sanctions as bipartisan pressure intended to justify claims about Iran’s nuclear ambitions. A guest mentions “demonic officials” and cites a book to underscore a harsh view of the two-term sanction era. - Diplomatic vs. military options: The panel describes the Biden administration sending negotiators to address the nuclear issue, while noting that “other options” exist. They discuss the tension between diplomacy and potential coercive measures, including the possibility of coalition or unilateral strikes. - Military balance and potential outcomes (Colonel Douglas MacGregor’s view): The guest emphasizes the complexity and risk of fighting Iran. He argues: - Iran is capable and not a “backward desert” opponent, with an arsenal including roughly 2,000 ballistic missiles and significant, varied air defenses. - Iranian forces could target U.S. bases and Israel, potentially inflicting substantial losses, though the duration and scale of any campaign are uncertain. - The aim would be to “disintegrate the state” and induce chaos rather than secure swift compliance; the scenario could produce high casualties among both sides, potentially thousands for Iran and substantial American losses, depending on scale and duration. - The long-term goal, he says, is to “make the region safe for Israel” and establish Israeli hegemony, noting the defensiveness and regional power dynamics in play, including rising concerns about Turkey as a threat. - Intelligence reliability and sources: A CIA veteran (John Kiriakou) challenges the immediacy and reliability of intelligence asserting that Iran reconstituted a nuclear program. He contends: - The Israelis and the U.S. have historically provided intelligence that may be biased toward aggressive action. - The CIA has produced intelligence estimates stating Iran did not have a nuclear weapons program; he questions whether boots-on-the-ground intelligence would confirm otherwise. - He emphasizes the risk that media outlets amplify “existential threat” narratives rooted in political calculations rather than verified evidence. - The domestic political-media dynamic: The discussion highlights perceived incentives for hawkish messaging from certain U.S. and Israeli actors, including prominent commentators who push the threat narrative. One commentator argues that the push for war serves particular political or financial interests, suggesting that public opinion in the U.S. is not aligned with an immediate military conflict. - Regional and alliance implications: The panel debates how a U.S.-led or Israeli-led strike would affect alliances, regional stability, and the global economy. They highlight: - The possibility that Iran could retaliate with volumes of missiles and unmanned systems, inflicting damage on Israel and regional targets. - The risk that a prolonged conflict could undermine NATO cohesion and Western diplomatic credibility in the Middle East and beyond. - Concerns about the effect on energy routes, particularly the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz, and broader economic ramifications. - Operational and logistical strains: They discuss the practical challenges of sustained conflict, including: - Navy and air defenses, the need for replenishment of carrier groups, and the strain on logistics and maintenance after extended deployments. - The impact of political missteps and controversial statements (such as comments linked to public pro-war stances) on alliances and military readiness. - Speculation on timing and signals: The guests speculate about when or whether a conflict might occur, noting that political leaders may face pressure “between now and March” or around certain holidays, while acknowledging uncertainty and the potential for last-minute changes. - Ending note: The conversation closes with a recognition that the set of actors—intelligence, defense officials, media, and political leaders—are collectively influencing public perception and policy directions. The speakers emphasize contrasting views on Iran’s threat, the legitimacy and consequences of potential war, and the stakes for the United States, Israel, and global stability.

The discussion centers on the rapid escalations in the Iran-Israel-US-Russia dynamic over the last 48 hours, with each side framing the situation differently. The hosts contrast the Trump administration’s claims of control and progress toward a ceasefire with Iranian statements about targeting Middle East bases and oil infrastructure. They also reference Sergei Lavrov’s assertion of a “new era” and a realignment of global actors as the conflict unfolds, asking who is in control: Iran, Israel, the United States, or Russia. Captain Matthew Ho, an Iraq war veteran and former state department officer, is brought on to analyze the situation. He is framed as anti-war and thoughtful about these issues. The hosts ask for a high-level assessment of the past 48 hours and the likely trajectory. Captain Ho argues that the conflict is proceeding as many had anticipated: after an initial American-Israeli shock-and-awe campaign, the Iranians demonstrated they can execute a strategy to achieve clear political objectives, both immediate (deterrence and protecting sovereignty) and long-term. He notes that while the Americans and Israelis can continue bombing, there is no clear pathway to success for them, whereas Iran has built a durable capability through missiles, drones, and naval forces, and has shown strategic patience. He points to economic signals, such as West Texas Intermediate crude around $105 per barrel, as evidence of Iranian deterrence taking shape. Ho emphasizes that the Americans are increasingly perceived as desperate and lacking initiative, with Iran in control of the war’s momentum. He cites examples of countries pushing back on American basing plans and airspace access (Spain, Italy), suggesting a broader erosion of Western unity and credibility as the conflict persists. He also notes the entrance of the Houthis (Ansar Allah) into the war, arguing that Iran’s axis of resistance—now including Yemen, Iraq, and Hezbollah—has captured the initiative and constrained American options, potentially making ground invasions a consideration rather than a plan that is likely to succeed. He warns that the idea of an imminent American ground invasion is driven by public-relations calculations to claim a victory and exit, rather than a coherent strategic objective. The conversation then turns to the potential ground campaign, including landings on islands like Karg Island and other objectives tied to controlling oil exports routed through Iranian territory. Ho argues that a credible administration would not reveal specific invasion plots, suggesting such disclosures are distractions or misstatements aimed at shaping perception. He questions whether Washington’s real aim is regime change or something else, but asserts that the United States lacks a clear, controllable narrative and initiative. Beyond the immediate battlefield, the discussion touches on how Iran’s strategy extends to economic and geopolitical disruption: deterring future conflicts by making them costly, leveraging energy routes through the Strait of Hormuz, and enabling a shift toward a multipolar world. Ho argues that Iran’s long-range vision may transform global power structures, potentially involving tolled passage in the strait and dedollarization implications, with economic consequences for the United States and its allies. The European response is analyzed as fracturing from the United States: countries like Italy and Spain resist unilateral American actions or airspace usage, and even Germany’s stance has cooled. The hosts explore how Europe’s alliance with the United States is fraying, with NATO’s future in question as European leadership grapples with economic and political hollowing and a rethinking of strategic dependencies. Ho concludes that the war’s trajectory could redefine the post-World War II order if it continues, marking a potential shift toward a multipolar world and altering US dominance. He emphasizes the importance of understanding Iran’s preparation, patience, and coordination with allied forces in the region, which together shape a war where US objectives—beyond regime change—are not clearly defined or likely to be achieved through traditional means.

Ashwin Rutansi hosts Going Underground, opening with a broad claim about Iran, retaliation, and world events surrounding a US-Israeli military posture in the region. He notes that it is Easter Monday, with Iranians mourning the targeting of Iranian Christians by the USA and Iran’s Jewish community observing Passover. He references ongoing tensions, a looming deadline for actions like opening the Strait of Hormuz, and describes Iran as retaining “the world’s most powerful military” capabilities to choke world trade, while saying Trump’s leadership appears unstable and that “the dissembling of Trump has some in The USA wanting to invoke the twenty fifth amendment.” Rutansi frames Iran as potentially threatening regime-change in the USA, while asserting that in Iran, Supreme Leader Khamenei remains officially in charge. He contends that Trump’s unpopularity foreshadows Republican losses in Congress and situates a recent confrontation in which a combat veteran was forcibly removed from a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing as part of broader anti-war sentiment. The program transitions to the incident: an Iraq invasion-era US Marine Corps veteran, Sergeant Brian McGinnis, is shown being removed from a hearing, his arm broken during the confrontation. The veteran, who is running as a Green Party candidate for the US Senate in North Carolina, joins Rutansi by phone. McGinnis reports that his arm is “doing well” after treatment at George Washington University Hospital, and explains he cannot discuss the incident in detail due to legal charges, but asserts that his message about “troops for dying for another country, Israel, not The United States Of America” came through clearly. McGinnis accuses U.S. leadership of being beholden to Israel and argues that the American people are waking up to that reality, contrasting a long-standing narrative with what he calls “the Gaza genocide” and Israel’s “greater Israel project.” He blames corporate donors and lobby groups, specifically APAC, for political decisions, insisting that his Green Party candidacy rejects “big money” and represents “the people.” He discusses public opinion in the United States, noting a shift toward unfavorable views of Israel, and links this to the influence of the military-industrial complex and media complicity. On military conduct and media: McGinnis reflects on the mood among troops, acknowledging their training and obedience to orders, while criticizing the current use of the U.S. military “for nefarious reasons” and “the profiteering of the Epstein class.” He discusses how social media and digital connectivity expose soldiers to anti-war sentiments and suggests conscientious objection as an option. He recalls incidents from his own experience, including Camp Lejeune controversies, and remarks on the bombing of U.S. assets in Iraq and the West Bank’s humanitarian crises. McGinnis condemns the West Bank occupation and settler violence, describing it as evidence of an “apartheid government” and detailing personal horror at Palestinian suffering. He criticizes Pentagon rhetoric that frames a war against Islam as a “holy war,” calling Pete Hegseth a propagandist who fails to gain the respect of true military figures. He references the USS Liberty incident to illustrate perceived deliberate misdirection by U.S. leadership in allied actions. Regarding political and financial dynamics, McGinnis argues that war profits accrue to a small elite and that “APAC” and other pro-Israel interests shape policy, urging voters to reject two-party limitations. He cites Joe Kent’s resignation over concerns that the Iran war serves Israel’s interests and contrasts that with his own stance against “the Epstein class” profiting from bloodshed. He reiterates his commitment to a Green Party platform, asserting he can defeat Israeli money in North Carolina’s Senate race and condemning corporate donors. In closing, Rutansi confirms the program’s direction and hints at continued coverage of the Trump-Netanyahu Iran war, inviting viewers to engage via social media and the program’s platform.

The discussion centers on “breaking news” and the risk of an escalation involving Iran, Israel, and the United States, particularly around negotiations in Qatar and the Strait of Hormuz. The New York Times reported that during nuclear negotiations involving Iran, Washington feared Israel was planning to assassinate Iranian Parliament Speaker Ghalibaf and Foreign Minister Arachi to derail the talks. The report says Washington asked several countries to warn Iran, and that Iran sought guarantees through Pakistani and Qatari mediators that its delegation would not be targeted. Ghalibaf’s plane later made an emergency landing in Mashhad after warnings and intelligence that Israel planned to strike. The story also describes escorting of the Iranian delegation aircraft between the Iranian border and Islamabad by Pakistani fighter jets, and on the return flight Iranian security services warning of intelligence that two Israeli fighter jets had entered Iranian airspace from the Iraqi border, followed by an emergency landing near the location mentioned as Mashhad and travel by road to Tehran. The Wall Street Journal report discussed a separate development: the United States offered Iran a proposal in Qatari negotiations to release frozen funds in exchange for Iran fully opening the Strait of Homs (as stated) without any fees. Iran rejected the proposal. A recurring claim made in the conversation is that if the U.S. does not accept the terms related to fees in the Strait of Homs (as stated), or if Iran does not accept not charging a fee, then the U.S. has “no choice but to go back to war.” The conversation links this to a perceived deadlock and to concern that continuation of war is becoming inevitable. Anthony describes the indirect negotiation method via third parties in Qatar and other channels, arguing it is unlikely to yield tangible results because Iran is not compelled or leveraged enough to capitulate to U.S. demands. He also says the U.S. is closer to war than negotiations given the lack of substantive progress, and points to a redeployment of U.S. forces: the USS Boxer (described as a WASP-class amphibious carrier) being redeployed with a fresh rotation of amphibious Marines from an Amphibious Readiness Group. He claims there are upwards of 50,000 troops in the region and that carriers and other units have been resupplied and rotated, including fresh deployments replacing the 82nd Airborne Division. The conversation then turns to Iran’s upcoming Ayatollah Khamenei funeral ceremonies, described as a week of events running July 4 through July 9, with July 9 as the main funeral procession/burial day. The argument presented is that the funeral week creates multiple opportunities for targeted actions. Anthony suggests it is “not beyond Israel” to carry out an assassination during such ceremonies and lists prior examples discussed during the conversation, including strikes targeting figures connected to Hamas, Hezbollah, the Houthis, and events in multiple countries (including Malaysia and Tunisia) during funerals or funeral processions. He argues the calculus is different when many world leaders are present but still claims that opportunities exist in the days before July 9 and in moments when fewer Iranian figures or IRGC representation are isolated. The exchange also notes that actions do not necessarily require large explosions, suggesting alternatives like sniper attacks or other covert means. A major segment concerns a weapon described as a “Ginsu Hellfire” or Hellfire R9N variant. Anthony claims the missile does not explode but instead ejects blades at high speed and can penetrate precisely, minimizing collateral damage. A related explanation is read aloud by “Speaker 0,” describing laser guidance and hidden blades ejected by high-pressure gas. The conversation states that the technology is used by the United States and that Israel “absolutely possesses that weapon,” including a claim about its use in Iran, where the missile allegedly penetrated a building side with blades leaving marks while neighboring occupants were not affected. The discussion concludes that Israel could conduct assassination attempts in a way that limits collateral damage, with the funeral procession highlighted as a potential high-impact setting. The discussion also returns to military posture and “no reduction” claims: it states that there has been no order to reduce U.S. forces, and that U.S. Central Command commander Brad Cooper described “more than 50,000 American service members” operating across the region and remaining vigilant and ready. Another point raised is a U.S.-led 12-nation military summit in Bahrain focused on the Strait of Hormuz, described as military rather than diplomatic. Anthony argues that the only way the U.S. can attempt to change negotiation conditions through military power is via the Strait of Hormuz or by changing Lebanon’s calculus, and he suggests the U.S. may be preparing direct operations in the Strait of Hormuz involving other nations. Further claims are made about regional complications: the Houthi movement via “Ansar Allah” is said to have stated that the Strait of Bab al-Mandab is closed to Israeli or “Israeli associated” vessels, raising questions about whether U.S. vessels or drone bases in Djibouti (Camp Lemonnier, as stated) and other U.S. presence connect to the restriction. The conversation also references an “explosion in Syria” and states that Alshara reportedly said he does not want to be part of the proxy game and will not fight Hezbollah, while also worrying others might want to undermine that stability. The overall conclusion presented is that Iran rejected the latest U.S. offer, U.S. forces are not reducing and have increased with the USS Boxer deployment, Israel’s alleged attempt to target Ghalibaf and Arachi during negotiation-related travel is part of the backdrop, and attention is focused on what happens during the Khamenei funeral ceremonies—especially whether Mustafa Khamenei will appear and whether an assassination attempt occurs within the days leading up to or around July 9.

Afshin Ratansi, broadcasting from the UAE, frames the week’s developments as a U.S. defeat and describes an Iran-related deal: Iran would reopen the Strait of Hormuz, restore oil exports, and receive sanctions waivers and unfrozen funds, with final terms to be negotiated later. Ratansi references an Israeli newspaper owned by Miriam Adelson’s family network and contrasts celebratory U.S. wartime rhetoric with a list of wars and interventions that Ratansi says did not defend the American homeland and instead served U.S. elites and the military-industrial complex. Ratansi then interviews retired U.S. Navy SEAL Vice Admiral Robert Harwood, a former CENTCOM Deputy Commander and ex-Chief Executive of Lockheed Martin Middle East, who is Executive Vice President of Shield AI’s international operations and involved in Iran policy. Harwood discusses the role of a national security advisor, emphasizing the process of advising the president by turning objectives into policy options and aligning interagency inputs, describing how he previously declined the job when approached under President Trump’s team while remaining “on your bench” to support policies he liked. On whether the U.S. should return to bombing Iran if Iran violates the memorandum of understanding (MOU), Harwood argues Iran has historically not complied with demands unless it received what it wanted. He says the IAEA’s access was not “unfettered” access “we require or need,” and adds that some activities may occur outside what the IAEA and Iran intend to show. He asserts Iran’s behavior should be inspected as negotiations continue and that Iran does not intend to comply with the president’s objectives. Ratansi challenges Harwood on whether the war is causing growing support in Iran for nuclear weapons to deter Israel. Harwood responds by saying he disputes that claim, stating he thinks the Iranian population wants peace, stability, and economic benefits. He argues the Iranian government prioritizes economy and daily survival concerns and that nuclear weapons function as an instrument of power for the current government, while Iranian people focus on wellbeing, freedom of choice, and avoiding being murdered. He also links Iranian protests to the idea that people are focused on the regime. Ratansi asks Harwood about competing claims regarding Israeli involvement in Iranian protests and the accuracy of figures. Harwood says verifying information is difficult because the regime controls intelligence and information and that statistics are hard to confirm. He emphasizes what he calls irrefutable evidence of murders, and argues Iran has carried out attacks beyond its immediate region, including missile and drone attacks affecting the UAE, while also stating accountability has not been held consistently. He says President Trump held Iran accountable and argues for accountability across countries affected. Ratansi pivots to Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states making deals with Iran, including Oman’s arrangement for sharing the Strait of Hormuz. Harwood says the GCC’s approach reflects instability in U.S. policy driven by election cycles, while GCC governments remain stable. He argues GCC states accommodate Iran because they cannot trust the United States to deliver consistent long-term outcomes. Discussing Ukraine, Ratansi references Harwood’s “February plan” as calling for security guarantees and asks whether the U.S. should risk nuclear confrontation by backing Ukraine. Harwood argues the situation in Ukraine is different from hypothetical comparisons, emphasizing Russia’s invasion and the presence of Russian troops in Ukraine, plus violation of sovereign integrity. He states Ukraine’s ability to hold off major powers is demonstrated by use of drones and long-range systems and argues Russia invaded and chose to reinforce territorial gains during the campaign. Ratansi continues to press whether Harwood would advise continuing the war rather than pursuing peace talks, deterrence, and detente. Harwood clarifies that a national security advisor’s role is to take a president’s objectives and present pros, cons, and interagency limitations to support those objectives, while the president decides. In response to the final framing that Harwood would want renewed bombing of Iran if the MOU is broken and would pour resources into Ukraine, Harwood says he did not say that. He argues for focusing on political, military, and financial tools of national power—especially “financial strangulation of Iran”—to enhance objectives and force compliance, maintaining leverage through policy and capabilities.

Ashwin Rutansi hosts Going Underground from Dubai, discussing the unfolding Trump-Netanyahu campaign against Iran and Lebanon, amid claims of a failed ceasefire and a chaotic US policy that could lead to peace talks or mass US casualties. The conversation centers on how US military operations were conducted with unclear objectives, the blockade of Hormuz, and broader questions about international alignments, domestic politics, and the integrity of US national security. Key points and claims discussed - James Webb, former senior foreign policy adviser to RFK Jr., discusses the conflict’s origins and the US military response: - The Iran conflict is described as atypical for the US military, with a lack of contingencies for evolving events, including the closure of the Strait of Hormuz. Webb contrasts this with the Iraq War era, noting that past conflicts saw hundreds of thousands of troops staged for various contingencies. - He asserts the Strait of Hormuz closure is a significant, probable danger, and claims it was “the most probable and dangerous course of action” by the Iranian government, though later remarks acknowledge it was “closed for some.” - Webb accuses the President of denying the risk of such a closure and asserts this has harmed the US’s reputation and economic partnerships, painting the war as one fought on behalf of another country; he notes this stance as anomalous and unpopular domestically. - Assassination of Khamenei and Netanyahu’s involvement: - Webb describes waking to news of the assassination attempt on Khamenei as indicative of an Israeli planning cycle, arguing that assassinating foreign leaders risks violating norms and has long-term strategic consequences. - He claims the operation “bloody[s] the United States” and creates a blood feud between the US and Iran, undermining state-to-state negotiation dynamics. - Netanyahu’s influence and possible foreign power infiltration: - Webb questions what Netanyahu might have over Trump that resonates with MAGA voters, touching on theories involving foreign influence and the Epstein files, and suggesting long-standing efforts to cultivate influence within US politics. - He describes a broader pattern of neoconservative and pro-war pressures predating the Iraq War and accuses various political actors of co-opting Congress and government for an ongoing Iran-focused agenda. - Webb cites corruption in the US military procurement system and sanctions dynamics, noting cases where private-sector investments allegedly intersect with sanction decisions. - War powers, legality, and governance: - Webb emphasizes the constitutional requirement that Congress holds war powers (Article I, Section 8) and argues that the war with Iran did not follow proper processes or a legitimate declaration. - He critiques the War Powers Resolution’s applicability in this context, suggesting the administration acted beyond its constitutional authority. - RFK Jr., Tulsi Gabbard, and broader political dynamics: - Webb says he resigned from the RFK Jr. campaign after RFK Jr. equivocated on IDF tactics in Gaza, arguing this demonstrated an external influence on policy. He notes Tulsi Gabbard as DNI and expresses hope she can influence decisions, while acknowledging restricted access to the White House. - He believes there is bipartisan concern about the drift toward war and notes polling showing growing public wariness of foreign entanglements, including U.S.-Israel dynamics. He highlights potential shifts toward a more America-first foreign policy. - Military hardware, strategy, and vulnerability: - Webb discusses modern anti-ship and ballistic missile capabilities from Iran, Russia, and China, arguing US carriers require significant standoff distance and are vulnerable to advanced missiles, limiting traditional carrier-based operations. - He mentions USS George H.W. Bush’s unusual movements and raises questions about naval readiness and procurement integrity, as well as unexplained incidents aboard ships (e.g., clogging sewage systems) used to illustrate perceived internal disruptions. - Regional realignments and the petrodollar: - Webb suggests that aggressive Middle East actions could push regional allies to rethink loyalties and alliances, with potential implications for the dollar’s status as the global reserve currency. - He expresses cautious optimism that public sentiment toward “America first” and opposition to endless wars could drive political renewal, including a return to merit-based leadership and reduced foreign entanglements. - Final reflections: - Webb laments civilian casualties and school-targeting incidents, emphasizing the need for accountability and a reconsideration of strategic aims, while reiterating concern about the influence of powerful interests on national security decisions. - The program closes with condolences to those affected by NATO-related conflicts and a tease of continued coverage of the Trump-Netanyahu war. Note: The summary preserves the speakers’ names and quotes as presented, without adding external evaluation or commentary.