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Glenn: Welcome back with professor Richard Wolff to discuss economic fury, the economic weaponization of the US campaign against Iran. How do you assess this effort, given the mix of oil sanctions, open markets for oil, and port blockades? Wolff: I’ll be blunt: I don’t know how to answer cleanly because the statements keep flipping on/off and have become “herky jerky.” The steps are inconsistent, sometimes increasing supply of oil and pushing down prices, other times constraining it. It’s not clear which way any given move will go, and the sequence is hard to parse. He notes that Gulf states are pressing for dollar swaps—foreign central banks can access dollars via swaps rather than buying them on markets. These swaps have shifted from weekly to daily, signaling worry about dollar access. The Gulf states—UAE and others—allege they depend on dollar-denominated oil revenues to service debts incurred through investments abroad. If dollars tighten due to strait closures and sanctions, they may be forced to sell assets in the US, including Treasury securities, which would lower bond prices and raise interest rates, potentially triggering a US recession. They could also sell holdings in the American stock market, affecting prices. Wolff emphasizes this as a surface manifestation of a broader global liquidity and debt dilemma tied to the Persian Gulf and the dollar’s role in the world economy. Glenn: So essentially the petrodollar is being unraveled because if Gulf states price and sell oil in dollars, but if they’re not exporting and not receiving dollars, they can’t pay debts or roll them over. They might sell treasuries or assets to cover shortfalls. How far can the US hold this position? Wolff: I don’t have a crystal ball, but I think the likely scenario is a political and economic squeeze. Trump has lost parts of his base—issues like the Epstein file and the economy’s inflation and job market. He relies on a narrative of victory; his base may be shrinking, while the wealthier 10% who own stock might be more supportive as the stock market stays buoyant. If the Gulf states must exchange dollars for debt relief or to cover losses, the government may have to grant more dollar swaps to prevent a spike in interest rates and a stock sell-off. Steven Bannon has warned that war could cost Trump the election, so the administration may shore up swaps to protect markets. Wolff suggests this is a desperate regime trying to exit a bad position with minimal damage. Glenn: You describe a broader pattern: the petrodollar’s decline, and the US dollar’s dwindling centrality in global reserves. How does this fit into the larger arc of American empire and capitalism? Wolff: It fits as part of the decline of the American empire and the corresponding decline of American capitalism. BRICS, China’s rise, and the shift away from dollar-dominated trade illuminate a trend toward reduced dollar dominance. Sanctions in Ukraine exposed the limits of that model, and there’s growing acceptance of payments outside the dollar for oil. The United States remains influential, but the dollar’s dominance is waning, and there’s no clear strategy to reverse that trend. Manufacturing has moved to other countries, notably China, which maintains low inflation and large-scale production. The world is moving toward multipolar arrangements, and the dollar’s preeminence is no longer assured. Glenn: Given this trajectory, is there any viable way to salvage the petrodollar, or is it beyond rescue? Wolff: I don’t predict the future with certainty, but I view the larger context as a decline in American hegemony and an erosion of dollar dominance. The war in Iran, like the war in Ukraine, demonstrates the limits of sanctions and the unintended consequences of aggressive confrontation. The dollar’s global reserve role is shrinking, and other powers are willing to transact outside it. He emphasizes this as a systemic shift, not a temporary setback. Glenn: Any final thoughts on how history and memory shape current policy? Wolff: History often gets reframed to fit current aims. There’s a tendency to present “victories” regardless of outcome, especially in wartime rhetoric. The dialogue in Europe and the US reflects a mix of nostalgia for past dominance and struggle to adapt to a changing global order. The conversation ends with questions about how Europe and the US should reorient foreign policy toward a multipolar world, where old assumptions no longer hold.

Chas Freeman and the host Glenn discuss how sea power has shaped global politics and why the current era may be signaling a shift toward land power and new kinds of strategic leverage. - Historical context of maritime dominance: Freeman traces a long arc from British naval hegemony after the Seven Years’ War to American preeminence after World War II, noting that naval power helped sustain a rules-based order and open sea lanes. He argues that dominance of the seas is no longer guaranteed, highlighting evolving ranges of weapons and the emergence of land-based controls that can threaten naval movements. - The evolving limits of naval power: He notes that artillery ranges kept territorial seas limited to about three miles in the eighteenth century, but advances in missiles and shore-based defenses have eroded that traditional maritime advantage. The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea’s 12-mile territorial limit is described as a political compromise rather than a fixed physical law. Modern missiles with ranges of up to 2,000 kilometers enable coastal forces to threaten carriers far from home waters, while shore installations can enforce blockades from land, as seen with Yemen’s Houthis in Bab El Mandeb and Iran in Hormuz. - The Strait of Hormuz as a strategic focal point: Freeman describes the current blockade as a sea-change that challenges the historic assumption that ships can freely operate in open waters. Aircraft carriers must stay well back from Iranian batteries, and surface ships at risk from Iran’s cruise missiles and drones. He emphasizes that control of Hormuz now rests more on land-based capabilities than on naval forces, making open-sea dominance increasingly untenable. - Implications for the traditional order: The discussion suggests that Anglo-American naval dominance, which helped sustain a liberal international order, is becoming less viable. Freedom of navigation operations and the appearant stability they created are no longer sufficient or sustainable in the new environment, where land-power and non-military instruments (energy, finance, and partnerships) matter more. - Energy, finance, and the petrodollar: The energy-trade dimension is central. Freeman and Glenn consider how the Strait of Hormuz underpins the petrodollar system, and discuss recent currency-swaps and dollar-reliance questions. They propose that if Gulf states shift toward the yuan or other currencies, U.S. financial hegemony could be challenged, catalyzing broader strategic realignments. China’s willingness to tolerate sanctions resistance and issue directives to its banks suggests a pushback against U.S. financial dominance. - China, Iran, and strategic realignments: Freeman notes China’s rise as a major sea power but argues China will not inherit Western maritime hegemony. He highlights China’s land-based connectivity initiatives (rail, roads, free-trade zones) that have maritime dimensions but are primarily land-centric, including Iran’s overland oil transport to China. He underscores a broader multipolar shift and the potential for Chinese and Iranian strategies to erode the effectiveness of U.S. sanctions. - Negotiations and potential outcomes: The conversation concludes that there is no viable military path to open Hormuz or a negotiated settlement in sight. Freeman describes the situation as a high-stakes stalemate with no clear diplomatic avenue. He suggests that the war could subside into a lower-intensity conflict reminiscent of Israel-Iran dynamics in the region, with ongoing tensions and episodic explosions rather than a decisive end. - NATO, Europe, and Israel: The hosts discuss the potential decline or reform of NATO, the pivot of U.S. strategy away from Europe toward Asia and the Western Hemisphere, and how these shifts could affect European security. Freeman questions the future viability of Israel given shifting U.S. stance and waning Western consensus, noting domestic and international criticisms of Israeli actions and leadership. He observes growing Western skepticism toward Netanyahu’s approach, and the broader political costs for Israel on the world stage. - Final reflections: Both speakers anticipate profound, systemic changes in international relations—multipolarity, weakened sea-power advantages, a possible redefined European security architecture, and a reevaluation of essential alliances. They caution against overreliance on any single power’s hegemonic framework and emphasize gradual, incremental reforms over abrupt, destabilizing shocks.

In this discussion, Zhang Shuay Shin and Speaker 1 analyze the evolving U.S.-Iran confrontation through the lens of global power dynamics, the petrodollar, and the shifting balance among major powers. - The war is framed as primarily about preserving the petrodollar. Speaker 1 argues the United States, burdened by enormous debt, seeks to maintain the dollar’s dominance by controlling energy trade through naval power and strategic choke points. The belief is that the U.S. can weaponize the dollar against rivals, as seen when it froze Russian assets and then moved to stabilize oil markets. BRICS and others are moving toward alternatives, including a gold corridor, challenging the petrodollar’s centrality. The aim is to keep Europe and East Asia dependent on U.S. energy, reinforcing American hegemony, even as historical hubris risks a global backlash turning growing powers against Washington. - The sequence of escalation over six weeks is outlined: after the American attack on Tehran and the Iranian move to close the Strait of Hormuz, the U.S. eased sanctions on Russian and Iranian oil to maintain global stability, according to Treasury statements. Escalations targeted civilian infrastructure and strategic chokepoints, with discussions of striking GCC energy infrastructure and desalination plants. A U.S. threat to “bomb Iran back to the stone age” was countered by Iran proposing a ten-point framework—encompassing uranium enrichment rights, lifting sanctions, and security guarantees for Iran and its proxies. The Americans reportedly suggested the framework was workable, but negotiations in Islamabad stalled when U.S. officials did not engage seriously. - The broader objective is posited as not simply a tactical war but a strategic move to ensure U.S. imperial supremacy by shaping energy flows. Speaker 1 speculates Trump’s motive centers on keeping the petrodollar intact, potentially forcing China and other partners to buy energy with dollars. Iran’s willingness to negotiate in Islamabad is linked to pressure from China amid China’s economic strains, particularly as energy needs and Belt and Road investments create vulnerabilities for China if Middle East energy becomes unreliable. - The proposed naval blockade is discussed as difficult to implement directly against Iran due to ballistic missiles; instead, the plan may aim to choke off alternative routes like the Strait of Malacca, leveraging trusted regional partners and allies. Iran could respond via the Red Sea (Bab al-Mandab) or other leverage, including the Houthis, challenging Western control of energy corridors. The overarching aim would be to force a global energy reorientation toward North America, though it risks long-term hostility toward the United States. - The roles of great powers are analyzed: the U.S. strategy is described as exploiting Middle East disruption to preserve the petrodollar, with short-term gains but long-term risks of a broader alliance against U.S. hegemony. Europe and Asia are pressured to adapt, with China’s energy needs especially salient as sanctions tighten Middle East supply. Russia is identified as the principal challenger to U.S. maritime hegemony, while China remains economically entangled, facing strategic incentives to cooperate with the United States if required by economic pressures. - The dialogue considers NATO and Europe, arguing that the real contest is between globalists and nationalists in the United States, with Trump viewed as an agent of empire who may threaten the existing globalist framework. The speakers discuss whether this competition will redefine alliances, the future of NATO, and the possibility that a more Eurasian-led order could emerge if Western powers fail to maintain their maritime advantages. - Finally, Russia’s role is emphasized: Moscow is seen as the key counterweight capable of challenging American maritime dominance, with the war in Iran serving, in part, to counter Russian actions in Ukraine and to incentivize alignment with Russia, China, and Iran against U.S. leadership over the next two decades.

Bretton Woods emerged during wartime when the United States leveraged its position to shape a new monetary system centered on the US dollar. At the Bretton Woods Conference, 44 states signed off on a treaty that bound postwar nations to using the dollar as the principal currency for world settlements, with the dollar fixed to gold at 35 dollars per ounce. This Gold-vanilla dollar standard created confidence that every dollar was worth a specific amount of gold, effectively anchoring global finance to gold and supporting widespread use of the dollar. The arrangement worked reasonably well for a period, but the United States’ domestic and foreign actions—driven by frequent wars and large domestic spending—made fiscal conditions unstable. By the 1970s, the US was engaged in Vietnam and expanding welfare, Medicare, and other social reforms alongside massive infrastructure spending, which generated substantial debt. As debt grew, other countries questioned the productivity of that spending and began to worry about accumulating more debt. France, Italy, Germany, and Britain sought gold in exchange for surplus dollars. The US sometimes accepted, but not uniformly; notably, the governor of the German Bundesbank committed never to ask for gold again, while other nations pressed for gold or alternatives. The system’s stability eroded as countries contemplated how to avoid reliance on the dollar. In 1971, Richard Nixon unilaterally suspended the exchange of dollars for gold, after weekend discussions with advisers, effectively ending the gold convertibility of the dollar and establishing fiat currencies not fixed to gold or to the dollar. The transition produced a volatile period with few established foreign exchange mechanisms, leaving the world in a more unsettled monetary environment. To stabilize the system, Henry Kissinger and Treasury officials pursued a new anchor by tying the dollar to a globally demanded commodity: oil. The idea was that oil would create sustained demand for the dollar. Following this, the United States and allied nations promoted the policy that oil would be sold in dollars, and many Middle Eastern producers aligned with this arrangement. Leaders of some oil-producing countries faced severe consequences for resisting the dollar-based system: for example, Saddam Hussein and Muammar Gaddafi sought to sell oil in currencies other than the dollar and faced significant repercussions, including their deaths and the occupation of oilfields by American forces when necessary. This dollar-oil linkage functioned as a mechanism to stabilize the post-gold monetary order but drew increasing criticism for coercive and violent measures to maintain the system, contributing to growing global interest in moving away from dollar dependence.

The discussion centers on claims that the CIA has long been involved in Venezuela, has enabled drug trafficking, and now seeks a visible foothold in the country to counter Russia and China. Speaker 0 argues CNN’s report that the CIA will establish a foothold in Venezuela is emblematic of a duplicative pattern: the CIA has supposedly enabled the drug trade for decades, so the attack on Venezuela cannot be about drugs if the CIA is involved. They cite Kevin Shipp, a CIA whistleblower, who said the CIA has been involved in Venezuela since at least the Cartel of the Sun, run by a general who was a CIA proxy and helped reconstruct Venezuela’s intelligence service to penetrate the government. The general cited is General Ramon Gulen, described as running narcotics and creating and running the Cartel of the Sun. The Cartel is portrayed as a pretext used by the Trump administration to stage attacks and operate around Congress, with the CIA behind past secret dealings tied to it. Speaker 0 then references a 60 Minutes piece from the 1990s reported on by mainstream media that allegedly showed the CIA collaborating with Venezuelan National Guard generals who moved tons of cocaine into the United States. The discussion moves to John Kerry, who led the Contra Cocaine Investigation in the mid-1980s, seeking to determine US government involvement in the contra drug trade. The Reagan administration resisted, stonewalled the Senate, and monitored the probe. The HITS report (the CIA inspector general report authorized under inspector general Frederick HITS) is described as concluding in the late 1990s that while the CIA did not officially participate in cocaine trafficking during the Contra War, it knowingly maintained relationships with and protected numerous contra-linked individuals and organizations involved in the drug trade when operationally useful, to keep the contra war alive and to maintain US objectives in Central America, even if it meant enabling and protecting drug lords. It also states the CIA hid this from Congress, contributing to drugs entering the United States. The Iran-Contra connection is summarized as arms to Iran generating cash to fund the Contras, with the same network tied to cocaine trafficking, implying a single pipeline of influence and criminal activity. The speakers discuss media coverage and relationships with locals in Venezuela, questioning the claimed “relationship-building” as a cover for coercive activities, given sanctions that harm locals. They criticize the notion that the CIA is simply building positive ties, suggesting instead a pattern of disruption and control. The dialogue then shifts to geopolitics: Venezuela reportedly traded oil with BRICS outside the petrodollar since at least 2017, which is framed as undermining US global oil hegemony. A recent move to settle oil transactions in yuan is mentioned, with a snide remark that the CIA’s presence in Venezuela aims to prevent any free-trade diversification away from the petrodollar. The claim is made that the CIA’s objective is to prevent alternative global trade arrangements and maintain US influence by blocking competition from Russia, China, and BRICS members. Speaker 3 adds that the CIA’s actions align with a long-standing pattern of intervention, suggesting that the agency’s open, unapologetic approach reflects a broader strategy of tension, where a third of the population would support such actions, a third would oppose, and a third remain indifferent. They reference Operation Mockingbird and the presence of CIA-linked figures in media, including Mike Pompeo as a Fox News contributor, arguing that mainstream outlets act as channels for the deep state’s messaging, with information often flowing from the CIA to outlets like the New York Times. In sum, the discussion argues that US intervention in Venezuela is less about drugs or democracy and more about strategic counteraction to Russian, Chinese, and BRICS influence, with a long history of CIA involvement in drug trafficking and media manipulation. The speakers invite audience reactions on these points.

The speaker questions the common narrative that Trump is an idiot and suggests a counterintuitive plan: what if losing the war in Iran is the point, aimed at accelerating the collapse of the American empire and the global economy, in order to rebuild power for the United States? Key claims and sequence: - The media portrays Trump as destroying America, waging an unwinnable war in Iran, threatening to invade with ground troops, angering NATO by threatening Greenland, and clashing with multiple countries; JPMorgan warns the world will run out of oil by mid-April; the global economy is described as on the brink of collapse; Trump is labeled as the worst president or a buffoon—yet this could be intentional. - The hypothetical strategy: what if Trump wants to lose the war in Iran to cause a broader decline of the American empire and the global economy, thereby gaining a strategic genius status. - Oil dependence highlights: currently, the world relies heavily on Middle East oil for major regions (20% of the world, 75% for Japan, 60% for Europe, etc.). Oil is not scarce worldwide; major reserves exist in Venezuela, Canada, and the United States. - Claim that Trump “took over Venezuela in January” and has threatened to take over Canada, implying moves toward controlling North American resources. - If Iran conflict closes the Strait of Hormuz, Middle East oil would be cut off, while North American production continues; thus Europe, China, Japan, and South Korea would become dependent on American oil and fertilizer (nitrogen for food) from the U.S./North American region. - Consequence: nations that hold U.S. debt—Japan, China, Taiwan, South Korea, Europe (UK, France, Belgium, Luxembourg)—need Middle East oil and now need American energy and resources; they cannot abandon the dollar due to this energy dependence. - The claim that Trump has transformed America’s debt into a potential weapon by forcing global dependence on North American energy, rather than allowing a debt-driven collapse. - Parallel to Russia: Putin’s Ukraine strategy is cited as proof that a war footing can restructure an economy around defense production (drones, munitions, military manufacturing); Russia moved from importing Iranian drones to making them domestically and exporting to Iran. - The proposed “Greater North America” concept: Greenland for rare earth minerals, Canada for oil and resources, Venezuela for oil reserves, Mexico for manufacturing, Panama Canal for trade control. The idea is to build a self-sufficient North American fortress while the rest of the world burns. - Outcome framing: Trump may appear reckless, but if the objective is to end the American empire’s current form and rebuild it for Americans by making the world dependent on U.S. resources, he could be remembered as a transformative, potentially greatest American president in history. - Closing: the “new world order” is deemed dead, replaced by a “Trump world order,” with a prompt to follow for more content.

In 2000, Iraq switched from trading oil in US dollars to euros, leading to tensions with the US. After 9/11, the US falsely claimed Iraq had weapons of mass destruction. Today, the US is at odds with Russia and China for not using US dollars for oil. The speaker predicts a future conflict in Ukraine, warning of lies to justify war. They caution against media manipulation and urge vigilance.

The video argues that a “new world order” is unfolding in real time, signaling the start of a “great reset.” The host points to events from the past Friday as evidence: 3,000,000 Epstein files released, the biggest one-day drop in the history of the precious metals market, and a large arbitrage developing among Chinese, London, and US precious metals markets. Gold is described as the indicator that a full-blown reset is upon us, with attention drawn to pathways like the US’s approach to Iran and the Epstein files, while claiming a broader resetting dynamic is at work. Context for the moment centers on Friday’s nomination of Kevin Warsh (referred to as Kevin Walsh in the transcript) as the new Fed chairman. The host notes baggage around Warsh, including his appearance in Epstein files, but emphasizes his views: Warsh “hates stimulus money,” “hates quantitative easing,” and “voted against it,” believing it pushes inflation higher. He is said to have shifted on interest rates, from believing higher interest rates were good for the dollar to a different stance, and he allegedly favors slashing the Fed’s balance sheet to lower rates. The implication is that the nomination marks a shift toward a new dollar era and a shift away from a strong USD, which the host frames as a response to concerns about the US owning precious metals and controlling energy markets. The host ties these changes to a new petrodollar era, arguing that the United States, now the largest producer of oil and natural gas, has moved the petrodollar structure away from Saudi Arabia and toward the US. This trifecta—new dollar policy from the Fed, a drop in the precious metals market driven by speculators, and US control over energy policy—constitutes a “reset.” The video asserts that the traditional petrodollar system, once led by OPEC, has shifted, reducing outside leverage over Washington in energy matters. The host also claims a debate over foreign influence in the Middle East and calls for ending involvement in regional wars and bringing troops home, while criticizing mainstream outlets and certain political figures. Four main points are then presented as the crux of the reset: 1) Trump desires a weaker US dollar and is pursuing greater domestic manufacturing to compete with China and India, including the aim to export more and import less; the host frames this as a deliberate strategic shift rather than inflationary debasement. 2) The end of the Fed’s independence, with a collaboration era between the Treasury and the Fed, led by figures like Scott Pissent and Warsh, suggesting much lower interest rates and a shift of debt ownership back to American hands, with foreigners potentially selling US Treasuries. 3) Energy wars are emerging, with the US drilling and producing more oil and natural gas than Russia and Saudi Arabia combined, changing the energy dynamic with China, which remains a large importer of oil and vulnerable to such shifts. 4) Sustaining public support for volatility, with Trump’s team allegedly aiming to declare a housing emergency to lower rates, discourage Wall Street from buying single-family homes, implement tariff dividends to Americans, deliver veterans’ checks, and lower inflation and gas prices in the lead-up to midterms. The host contrasts reactions within the Trump-supporting and anti-Trump camps, asserting the reset is underway regardless of opinion. A sponsor segment then pivots to copper, arguing that copper demand is surging due to global competition for materials, and highlighting Giant Mining Corporation (ticker: BFGFF) as a primary copper idea tied to the Majuba Hill Copper Project in Nevada, noting its favorable infrastructure, past production, and strategic importance to American copper independence. The segment cites executive actions and tariff movements, including a 50% tariff on semi-finished copper products effective August 1, 2025, positioning copper as central to the new industrial reality. The host reiterates Giant Mining as the foremost copper idea and invites viewers to conduct their own research.

In 1945, FDR met King Abdulaziz. They cut a devil's deal: oil for protection. Fast forward. Trillions of petrodollars flow. Saudi princes trade camels for lamborghinis. Yet, dissidents are silenced, women oppressed. A journalist meets a gruesome fate. The Yemen war rages, ignored by DC. Human rights run on fumes. Smash like, hurl puppet. Below brace yourself part nine lands next

Hey Mel, I have important intel to share. In 1957, the US made a deal with Saudi Arabia to use USD for oil sales. This deal ends on June 9th, and Saudi Arabia won't renew it. This could impact the USD's value. Just wanted to pass this on to you.

In 2000, Saddam Hussein announced that Iraq would sell oil in euros instead of dollars, leading to the US invasion in 2003. Similarly, Venezuela's plan to sell oil for euros in 2002 resulted in a failed coup backed by the US. Despite having the largest oil reserves, Venezuela is now one of the poorest economies. Libya, with the largest oil reserves in Africa, also faced consequences when Muammar Gaddafi suggested selling oil for gold instead of dollars. NATO intervened in Libya, leading to Gaddafi's execution. These countries wanted to break away from using the dollar for oil payments, but faced the wrath of America.

1945: Franklin Roosevelt made a deal with the Saudi king Abdulaziz al Saad—the Saudis would provide a safe, reliable source of oil, and the US would support and protect the Saudis. Initially, US arms sales were limited, but after the 1967 war the US sold fighter jets to Israel and later thousands of tons of arms to Israel, outraging Arab allies including Saudi Arabia. The oil-producing Arab states then used oil as a political weapon, cutting off supplies to protest US support for Israel; the price nearly quadrupled until the US brokered peace between Israel and Egypt. By the 1970s, Saudi Arabia’s monarchy was extraordinarily rich and US sales to Saudi Arabia skyrocketed. Iran emerged as another strategic ally; Nixon said the US would sell Iran virtually any conventional weapons it wanted. The USSR began arming Iraq and Syria, fueling an arms race, with Saudi Arabia the biggest buyer, thanks to the US.

Larry Johnson and Glenn discuss the shifting dynamics of the US dollar, the international financial system, and the rise of competing powers. - Johnson recalls the 1965 term exorbitant privilege describing the US dollar’s reserve-currency advantages. In 1971, the US closed the gold window, ending fixed gold value for the dollar; the dollar later became backed by “our promise,” enabling the petrodollar system as oil purchases were conducted in dollars. The dollar’s dominance rested on predictability, a stable legal system, and non-abusive use of the dollar as an economic tool rather than a political weapon. - Trump-era sanctions expanded broadly, impacting friends and adversaries alike, and BRICS nations began moving away from the dollar. Russia’s disconnection from SWIFT after its 2022 actions is noted as a turning point that encouraged the BRICS’ development of alternative financial infrastructure, including China’s cross-border interbank payment system (CIPS). This shift accelerates the decline of the dollar’s dominance. - Nations like Russia and China (and India, Brazil) are unloading US Treasuries and increasing gold and silver holdings. This is tied to concerns about the dollar’s reliability and the reduced faith in paper promises. The BRICS countries reportedly plan a currency tied to gold, with components of their reserves backing individual BRICS currencies, signaling a structural move away from the dollar. - The paper-gold issue is central: for every ounce of real gold, there is a range of 20-to-1 to 100-to-1 in paper gold. This disparity can undermine trust in the paper promise and create a run on physical gold. The price gap between New York (lower) and Shanghai (higher) for gold demonstrates a market dislocation and growing demand for physical metal. - Glenn emphasizes that a unipolar dollar system allows the US to run large deficits via inflation, which acts as a hidden tax on global dollar holders. Weaponizing the dollar through sanctions challenges trust and accelerates decoupling, prompting other nations to seek alternatives to reduce exposure. - Johnson argues that the US is confronting a historic realignment: the Bretton Woods order is dissolving, the dollar’s international dominance is waning, and sanctions and coercive policies are provoking pushback. He highlights Japan as a major remaining dollar treasuries holder that is now offloading, further increasing dollar supply and depressing its value. - The geopolitical implications are significant. Johnson warns that potential US actions against Iran—given their strategic position and the Gulf oil supply—could trigger a severe global disruption, including a price surge in oil. He notes that such actions would complicate global stability and magnify inflationary pressures. - The discussion also covers NATO’s cohesion, Western attempts to shape global alignments, and how rapidly shifting leverage could undermine existing alliances. Johnson suggests that Russia’s strategic gains in the war in Ukraine, combined with Western missteps, may prompt a rapid reevaluation of settlements and borders, while also noting that Russia’s position has hardened. - On Venezuela, Johnson argues that the stated pretexts (drug trafficking, oil control) were questionable and points to economic motives, including revenue opportunities for political allies like Paul Singer, and to Greenland’s strategic interests as possible motivators for US actions. - Looking ahead, Johnson predicts hyperinflation for the United States as the dollar loses value globally, while gold and silver retain value. He asserts that the ruble and yuan may hold value better, and that a mass shift toward de-dollarization is likely to continue, potentially culminating in a new multipolar financial order. - Both speakers agree that trust and predictability are crucial; the current trajectory—threats, sanctions, and unilateral actions—undermines trust and accelerates the move toward alternative currencies and stronger physical-commodity holdings. The overall tone is that a pivotal, watershed moment is unfolding in the global monetary system.

Saudi Arabia, despite its wealth, isn't in the top 10 for gold holdings officially, suggesting the numbers we see aren't the full story. After the gold window closed in '71, the US aimed to remove gold from the global financial system. Declassified documents reveal that in the early '70s, Europeans considered revaluing their gold to pay for oil deficits. US officials like Kissinger, Weintraub, and Volker, however, opposed this, preferring Saudi Arabia to invest in treasury bonds instead of accumulating gold. This led to the Bill Simon deal, which, in hindsight, seems unfavorable.

The transcript centers on a dramatic framing of Trump’s Davos appearance and a strategic reorientation of U.S. and Western policy away from the post-World War II rules-based order. The speakers argue that Trump’s actions signal the end of the Bretton Woods-era system and the unipolar order, unsettling globalists who want to cling to the old framework. The main points: - Davos as a turning point: Trump walked into the World Economic Forum and framed the room as “friends and maybe a few enemies,” telling European elites he no longer trusts them to defend American interests. He challenged their energy policies as suicidal and criticized Europe for not leveraging its own energy resources, despite North Sea oil and gas; he referenced Europe’s rising electricity prices (claiming a 139% increase) and highlighted wind power versus oil reserves. - The Greenland signal and a broader realignment: While Greenland is noted as a significant detail, the larger story is Trump recentering U.S. strategy toward the Western Hemisphere. This includes stabilizing the hemisphere, deterring mass migration, crushing transnational criminal networks, and preventing hostile powers from owning key assets near U.S. borders. The plan is described as a Monroe Doctrine-like approach, or a Donroe Doctrine, focusing on the Western Hemisphere rather than Brussels’ priorities. - Europe and NATO exposed: Trump’s rhetoric targeted European elites and NATO members, pushing back against what the speakers describe as the old order that expects U.S. protection without reciprocal responsibility. The claim is that the United States is moving toward a national-interest-based posture, rethinking involvement in the UN and NATO, and deciding who is in or out of major security arrangements. - Canada’s contrast at Davos: Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney presented a polite globalist counterpoint—calling for a rupture in the rules-based order and a coalition of middle powers to resist superpowers. The speakers contrast this with Trump’s inward, transactional approach and point to Canada’s perceived ingratitude toward the United States. - Domestic and regional actions: The show notes concrete steps, including Argentina’s open support for Malay’s government, the designation of Mexican cartels as terrorist organizations, and a large Western Hemisphere military meeting (34 countries) to plan actions against cartels and transnational criminal networks. There is emphasis on the United States acting decisively in the region and the broader implications for national security. - Alberta and Canadian diplomacy: Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen (referred to as Scott Benson) comments in Davos about Alberta as a potential natural partner for the United States, illustrating a shift in how Washington is evaluating regional partnerships. The contrast with Carney’s call for a rules-based order underscores the political climate. - Money and minerals emphasis: The speaker pivots to the financial implications of a shifted world order, arguing that money is moving into mining stocks as the U.S. seeks to secure domestic supply chains. The narrative highlights a surge in gold and silver prices and a pivot to mining equities as a strategic investment response to geopolitical shifts. - Vanguard Mining and specific metals: The sponsor Vanguard Mining is presented as exposing a diversified portfolio across five metals—gold, copper, uranium, lithium, and molybdenum—with direct exposure to projects in British Columbia, Argentina, and Paraguay. China’s dominance over these critical minerals is outlined: China’s control of lithium refining (60–70% of world capacity), copper refining and consumption (roughly 58% of refined copper), and molybdenum production (42–45% of global output), plus new export restrictions on moly powders. The company’s portfolio, including a focus on the Pokitos-1 lithium project in Argentina, is highlighted as strategically significant for Western supply chains. The ticker UUUFF is mentioned for Vanguard Mining, with availability on major U.S. exchanges. Overall, the transcript asserts a geopolitical and economic shift away from the existing global order toward a more transactional, hemisphere-centered American strategy, with mining and critical minerals playing a key role in national security and economic policy.

The speaker stated, “How about we’re buying oil from Venezuela? When I left, Venezuela was ready to collapse. We would have taken it over. We would have gotten all that oil. It would have been right next door.” The claim centers on the idea that external action could have enabled acquiring Venezuelan oil by seizing control as the country was described as near collapse.

Brandon Weikert begins by referencing a quote attributed to Donald Trump: “We attacked Carg Island last night. I said, don’t touch the oil because maybe we’ll take over Carg Island.” Weikert questions whether Trump is misunderstanding the feasibility of military action against “Carg Island” and suggests the comment may reflect verbal excess. Karen Katowski says she did not see the quote, but argues Trump has long been fixated on “Carg Island” dating back to the late 1980s and that the military is right: taking the island would be extremely difficult and impossible to hold. She adds that Trump is prone to repeated verbal errors and that his decision-making capability is diminished because he processes everything personally; she contrasts this with how leadership requires respecting and motivating people rather than creating fear. The conversation then turns to how Trump communicates about Iran and diplomacy. Weikert and Katowski discuss Trump calling the Iranian leadership “scum,” framing it as an unusual and disruptive diplomatic tactic. Katowski says Trump takes personally the large international attendance at Iran-related ceremonies following an assassination and compares Trump’s tendency to center himself in every event. They further discuss internal U.S. assessments, suggesting military capacity to fight “a distant war” may diminish over time, making immediate action seem like a “last gasp,” while noting the U.S. has systems that cost too much, too few assets, and delays in adapting to modern warfare such as drones. Katowski references the November national security strategy, saying it seemed easy to understand and included an intention to pull back from the Middle East. She argues that even if the strategy points toward withdrawal, the problem is that no effective “something else” is put in its place, and she says the Pentagon is poorly balanced and cannot sustain expeditionary wars or defend the United States effectively. She claims that simply adding large sums (1.5 trillion) to the same system would waste money without paradigm change. Weikert asks about Pete Hegseth and whether Pentagon personnel respect him, given his earlier comments about hypersonic weapons and acquisition reform. Katowski says many within the system hold contempt for him and that the military-industrial complex and Pentagon bureaucracy are structured with networks and plans that outlast any single Secretary of Defense. She illustrates this with a story from her Pentagon time involving an elderly civil servant employee who was allowed to remain despite not producing work, emphasizing that entrenched systems can resist change. They then discuss Section 219 (and related legislation) and claim it functions as a cover rather than a practical procurement merger, suggesting Israel’s interest may be access to intelligence and data. Katowski describes a broader pattern of influence inside U.S. institutions and says that if such legislation moves forward, Israel would likely learn who reacts negatively and potentially target compromises within the system. Weikert shifts to ongoing war dynamics, asking about a plan to arm Iraqi Kurds as a front against Iran. Katowski says she lacks inside information beyond Trump’s statements on social media, where he said the U.S. gave arms to the Kurds north of Iran that they took. She argues the Kurds do not trust the United States due to repeated “shafting,” including during Trump’s prior term. They debate where Iraqi oil revenue flows and connect it to an executive-order framework from 2003 associated with moving Iraqi oil sales to be tied to the dollar and routed through institutions in New York, with the claim that this arrangement affects sovereignty and political outcomes. Katowski argues the system has effectively persisted since 2003 and that it reduces Iraqi control over oil revenues. The conversation expands into Syria and Lebanon, discussing HTS/Jolani and whether HTS elements could be deployed in southern Lebanon against Hezbollah. Katowski says she does not have special contacts confirming this, but calls it dangerous and notes concerns about Jolani’s history and brutality. They also discuss shifting alliances and the idea that NATO leadership and some Middle East partners are strategically ineffective. Weikert asks specifically about Israeli Defense Force struggles against Hezbollah and Katowski answers by saying the IDF is struggling in Gaza and highlights what she portrays as poor training and leadership, pointing to a former retired special forces officer’s critiques. Katowski argues Israel’s mandatory service system can resemble a “camp,” contributing to dysfunction across multiple fronts (Gaza, Hezbollah, Yemen/Houthis, and Iran), along with high suicide and alcohol abuse rates and harsh treatment of others upon return. In closing, Weikert asks whether the direction of events with Iran points toward de-escalation. Katowski says she doubts the U.S. has staying power, implying low remaining weapon stocks, worn-out personnel, and shipyard delays affecting readiness. She suggests Trump may be seeking a diversion and that Israel may be more willing to escalate. She ends by saying she expects some sort of MOU or ceasefire arrangement, while expressing concern that Israel would prefer chaos, which she says Israel can exploit.

The speakers portray the United States as having shifted from an empire to a pirate state, with a transformation into what they call the petro gas dollar or LNG dollar. They claim the US has quietly carried out an armed robbery of the world’s oil and gas supply, hitting Russian tankers and refineries, crippling China’s oil supply, capturing major oil fields, and kidnapping or assassinating leaders, all while expanding its domination over global energy and finance. The analysis emphasizes that the US, now the world’s top producer and exporter of oil, gas, and LNG, operates with self-sufficiency but seeks to kill competition to maintain a monopoly. The claim is that the US used the Ukraine war as cover to eliminate rivals and then used the Iran war to finish off Qatar’s LNG position, forcing Europe to buy American LNG at ten times the price and turning Europe into a US energy client. As a result, European energy prices rise, euros lose value relative to the dollar, and BRICS and dedollarization efforts falter. A central strategic thread is the destruction of competing energy suppliers to create captive markets. The speakers allege that the US destroyed Nord Stream II and blew up pipelines, which not only hurt Russia but forced Europe to rely on American LNG. They argue that the US then redirected gas flows to the Gulf and Levant, sealing a role for Chevron and other US energy giants in these transactions. The Board of Peace is described as a front for a legal cover of Washington’s colonial plan, enabling energy seizures in Gaza, the Levantine Basin, and elsewhere, with Chevron’s activities framed as orchestrated groundwork for energy deals in the Levantine Basin, as well as in Venezuela and Lebanon. The narrative then claims the US intends to dominate China by cutting off its vital fuel sources, forcing China to buy American oil and gas, thereby preserving the dollar and hobbling BRICS and multipolarity. It details how the US targeted Venezuela’s oil, kidnapping Maduro and seizing oil, which previously supplied 80% of Venezuela’s oil exports to China, and how the US expanded its reach by threatening Cuba’s energy grid after Maduro’s removal. It asserts the US orchestrated a global oil blockade, with attacks on Russian energy hubs, ships, and refineries, to cripple Russia and China’s energy security, including attacks in the Caribbean, North Atlantic, Mediterranean, Black Sea, and Baltic Sea. The speakers describe Iran as being cut off from Hormuz and subjected to an escalating cycle of strikes that disrupt its toll system and port infrastructure, while Russia’s exports are disrupted by attacks on export hubs and ships, creating a 40% reduction in Russia’s seaborne oil export capacity. They claim the US is using this chaos to drive up LNG and oil prices, forcing Europe and Asia to bid on US gas while shipping dominance remains with Washington. The financial logic is that dedollarization efforts fail because the US can force energy trade to be settled in dollars, while the US economy benefits from wartime pricing and export profits. The “maritime extortion network” is described as a system where the US can move LNG on ships, changing routes as needed, and a “protection racket” via the US Navy is proposed as a price for safe passage. The monroe doctrine is reframed as moving the planet’s energy corridor into the Western Hemisphere, with the Gulf of Mexico and Washington as the key nodes, rather than the Middle East. Finally, the speakers assert that Iran’s drones, missiles, and air defenses have degraded the US air force’s bases and radar arrays, while the USS Gerald R. Ford was compelled to relocate, reinforcing the claim that Iran’s actions are challenging US military dominance and undermining the myth of invincibility. The overarching claim is that the US empire is consolidating global energy control through piracy, sanctions, and strategic energy realignments, with Chevron playing a pivotal role in every facet of this strategy.

Speaker 0 explains that once goals are achieved, Americans understand that “we’re real partners.” Speaker 1 reinforces: “Real partners.” Speaker 0 contends that what has to be done is to have alternative routes instead of going through the choke points of the Hormuz Straits and the Bab El Mandeb Straits in order to have the flow. Speaker 1 prompts: “Wait for it.” Speaker 0 continues: “Just have oil pipelines going west to through the Arabian Peninsula To where? Right up to Israel, right up to our Mediterranean. There” Speaker 1 interjects: “you have it.” Speaker 0 asserts that the real objective of all of this was to intentionally—“they knew that starting a war with Iran would cause a shutdown of both the Bab El Mamdab Straits, which is what the Houthis can affect in the Red Sea, and then the Strait Of Hormuz, which Iran has effectively shut down.” He states that they knew that would happen because their long-term goal has always been to force the Muslim countries in the Arab states, the Gulf Arab states, to route all of their oil exports through Israel. Speaker 1 adds: “Therefore, Israel can now control up to 40% of the world's petroleum. And that amount of control would absolutely make them a superpower, and that's exactly what they want.” Speaker 0 goes on to say that if Iran falls, it’s not going to be Turkey next; it’s going to be Egypt because they have to take back the Suez Canal. He notes that Egypt had control during the Arab-Israeli war for a brief time, but the UN forced them to give it back to Egypt. He emphasizes that they have always wanted that back. Speaker 1 contributes: “Because if they can control the Suez Canal and take that away from Egypt and they can force all the Gulf states to run all their oil through Israel. Israel controls the world, and that's their ultimate objective. That's the objective of this war.”

The United States invaded Iraq in 2003 because Iraq started trading oil in euros instead of US dollars. After 9/11, the US claimed Iraq had weapons of mass destruction and harbored terrorists, leading to the invasion. Currently, the US is facing potential conflicts with Russia and China for trading oil in currencies other than the dollar. The speaker warns of a possible future war in Ukraine orchestrated by the military-industrial complex, urging people to be wary of lies told to justify sending troops overseas. The speaker emphasizes the need to question media narratives and highlights the shift in US military focus from the Middle East to Eastern Europe.

Yannis Varoufakis (founder of DiEM25 and former finance minister of Greece) and Glenn discuss the implications of a signed U.S.-Iran memorandum of understanding (MOU) framed as a “Versailles Treaty.” Varoufakis argues the name reflects a dialectical inversion: the U.S., which presents itself as the winner, is putting up up to $300 billion to reconstruct its victims. He says Congress would face obstacles in approving it and that the MOU is not a done deal; he describes it as light years away from Iranian bank accounts receiving dollars. Still, he says signing the MOU is symbolically crucial—an “unequivocal victory” for Iran at the diplomatic level and a temporary surrender by the Trump administration. Varoufakis links the agreement to broader Middle East shifts. He claims the Abraham Accords’ original design is “dead in the water” because the Gulf Council states are effectively left on their own. He also says Europeans have been “spectacularly” left out and that the MOU may produce a rupture within U.S.-Israel relations: Netanyahu could wreck the deal, while Netanyahu’s actions are also creating a split between the Israeli establishment and the Republican Party. He maintains these developments are significant regardless of whether the MOU evolves into a treaty. On U.S. motivations, Glenn suggests the Americans may be buying time to get oil back to markets, noting Trump’s comments about only having four weeks of oil left. Varoufakis replies that “theater” should not be underestimated, describing how the language used by J.D. Vance signals that an Israeli-skeptic faction within MAGA has the upper hand following the Trump administration’s MOU with Iran. He connects this to internal U.S. political pressures affecting Trump’s constituency and to Vance’s stance against Israel-driven policy in Washington. When asked which of the MOU’s points is least likely to be implemented, Varoufakis identifies transferring monies to Iranian bank accounts as the hardest due to Congress’s control and opposition from Democrats and pro-Israeli Republicans. He argues the key obstacle is granting Iran access to frozen Iranian dollars. He says this would be difficult for Trump, predicting political backlash framed as Trump going back on his word and doing worse than what Trump accused Obama of doing in 2015. He says other items may be harder or easier, but the money transfer is the least likely. Varoufakis adds that Lebanon is tied to a ceasefire and Israel ending its blockade involving south Lebanon and removal of Israeli troops from south Lebanon. He calls this part of the MOU a major diplomatic victory for Iran and Hezbollah, supported by an origin story that he attributes to Israel’s 1982 invasion of South Lebanon. He argues Congress cannot take away the Lebanon ceasefire component, though the money transfer could be delayed. Discussing how the Gulf states might respond, Varoufakis describes the MOU as relief mixed with existential dread. He says the Gulf states recognize their strategic error in putting “all their eggs” in the U.S. security umbrella. He argues Iran can threaten Hormuz closure and is enabled to charge fees through “insurance cost” mechanisms, citing that about 30 vessels crossed the Strait of Hormuz and were charged. He also claims Iranian cheap drones and missiles can be produced in large numbers, while Israeli/U.S. defenses are expensive and limited in scale. Varoufakis distinguishes among Gulf states. He says Qatar and Oman lean toward de-escalation with Iran, while the UAE has a confrontational stance and is closely allied with Israel. He argues Saudi Arabia moved toward accommodation with Iran after 2019 attacks on Saudi petroleum facilities by Iran and its Houthi allies, using China as a go-between to establish a detente. He claims Saudi purchasing of American weaponry has waned recently, with deals being pursued with France and Canada, suggesting Gulf states may seek alternative arms sources. On the “petrodollar” system, Varoufakis argues U.S. hegemony relies on recycling Gulf surpluses into the United States, and he claims the Gulf states function like vassals within a dollar empire. He says Washington signaled anxiety about reduced petrodollar recycling through U.S. Treasury swap lines to the Gulf states, interpreting this as a move to prop up U.S. money markets rather than a bailout for Gulf liquidity. He cites agreements he says totaled $3.5 trillion to $3.7 trillion flowing from the Gulf to the U.S. within 18 months, with parts directed to AI investments and weapons purchases, and he says this flow dried up when the Iran war began. Varoufakis also argues Europe has been irrelevant during the Iran war and suggests U.S. military posture toward Europe may change following a review of U.S. military commitment to Europe by Pete Hegseth. He says the U.S. would relocate military spending from Europe toward West Asia or the Far East while using legally grounded bilateral basing agreements. He argues Europe lacks energy planning and a coherent energy union, and he frames Europe as dependent on expensive U.S. fossil fuels rather than Russia’s gas, while lacking discussion about decarbonization and electrification. When asked about Ukraine, Varoufakis says he does not predict outcomes but rejects the idea that the U.S. can subcontract the war to Europeans. He argues Europeans cannot supply the intelligence and data he says the U.S. provides and cannot afford the cost. He claims European budgets are under strain and cites repayment burdens for the NextGenerationEU recovery fund and constraints on further borrowing for Ukraine. His “hunch” is that after Iran, Trump may propose a Russia-Ukraine peace deal “take it or leave it,” and if rejected he would switch off briefings and data sharing. Finally, Glenn asks why France and Germany still oppose ending the Ukraine war despite the Iran defeat. Varoufakis gives two reasons: he says they lack a growth model (with the Green Deal spending failing to materialize and German Greens declining) and weaponry becomes the remaining growth channel; and he says a peace plan would be immediately vetoed by Baltic states and Finland (and possibly Poland and others), because they have learned to maintain tension between NATO and Russia and would humiliate any proposal. He concludes by saying he sees no learning from history within the German establishment.

Professor Zhang argues that geopolitics is a game where players maximize their self-interest, with predictions built on game theory rather than ideology. For 2026, the central event is Trump’s state visit to China in April, and the US–China relationship is identified as the key uncertain variable, while Russia–Ukraine is considered settled and Europe–NATO–Russia largely forecastable. Zhang outlines the grand strategy behind current tensions: Trump supposedly aims to force a grand bargain with China by leveraging the destabilization of the Middle East and Western Hemisphere to push China into continuing to buy US dollars. He contends that since Nixon’s 1971 decision to float the dollar, the US has relied on two pillars—the petrodollar system and opening China to American technology and markets. As the US then ran deficits and engaged in Middle East wars, China sought to internationalize the yuan and reduce dependence on the dollar via instruments like the Shanghai gold exchange. This, in his view, destabilizes the dollar, prompting Trump to push China to maintain dollar demand by destabilizing oil supply routes and minerals for China’s EV, AI, and other sectors. By invading Venezuela and potentially destabilizing Iran, Trump allegedly aims to force China to rely more on Western Hemisphere oil, silver, gold, lithium, copper, etc., and thus buy more US Treasuries to support the dollar. The discussion then shifts to possible bifurcations: if the United States truly wants China to use the dollar, it would create trust and a predictable, rules-based order; yet current actions—such as cutting China off from semiconductors or “crushing its tech industry”—could push China away, making it more independent and less dependent on the dollar. The Venezuelan case is cited as evidence that the aim is to obstruct China rather than claim oil directly; it would rather block rival powers than simply seize resources. The two powers are described as codependent: China imports about three-quarters of its oil, with roughly 50% from the Middle East and 20% from Russia; China would face a long and costly transition to replace Russian oil entirely, including pipelines. China also has tools to push back, such as triggering instability in silver markets (where China dominates) or other commodities used for manufacturing, a dynamic described as mutually assured economic destruction if either side overplays. When asked how the US could simultaneously pursue trust and coercion, Zhang asserts it cannot have both; the US is described as a global hegemon that should treat China as an equal, but instead presses to subordinate China. This creates a “ladder over an abyss” metaphor: both sides must climb together, or both fall; overt coercion could push China toward a different strategic alignment, possibly toward Russia or a diversified energy portfolio. Zhang emphasizes the role of hubris and racism in US policy, rather than pure ideology, and says the US dollar’s strength is also its vulnerability. Looking at US domestic dynamics, Zhang predicts a potential US economic crisis could magnify political instability. He identifies three US fragilities: (1) AI-driven GDP components that may not generate enduring profits, as data centers consume vast resources and job loss looms; (2) over-financialization, including a speculative silver market and leverage in commodities; and (3) cryptocurrency de-coupled from real utility, with quantum easing allowing continued money printing. He argues these weaknesses could precipitate a fiscal crisis and civil conflict if not contained, potentially catalyzing a broader crisis of state legitimacy. In Europe, Zhang foresees militarization and a misguided pro-war stance despite domestic discontent, predicting irrational policies and a possible collapse of NATO’s existing framework. He forecasts intensified Europe–Russia tensions, including a possible endgame around Odessa, with NATO likely to be overwhelmed militarily, leading to civil unrest and a “slow death” for European cohesion over five to ten years. He contends Europe’s strategic autonomy is eroding under multiculturalist policies and internal polarization, undermining willingness to fight. Regarding the United States’ global posture, Zhang argues Washington is moving toward transactional empire-building—exploiting its vassals when advantageous and abandoning them when not—while projecting power from the Western Hemisphere as a core strategy. He argues that this approach will erode Europe’s relevance and provoke global backlash. Finally, Zhang returns to Iran: Trump’s push for regime change there is linked to leveraging support from Israel and influential backers, such as Adelson and Elon Musk, with the likely aim of a ground invasion. Yet the plausibility of a successful invasion is questionable, given Iran’s size and power, and Trump’s emphasis on optics over sustained policy. The main unknown is China’s response; factions within China differ on dependence on Russia versus diversified oil sources, and the April meeting will shape whether a grand bargain reduces conflict or merely preserves the empire’s decline. To conclude, the April China meeting is pivotal, with four scheduled meetings in 2026; a China–US deal could stabilize some tensions, but the underlying imperial collapse is expected to persist, fueling wars and confrontations worldwide regardless of occasional bargains.

The Iraq war was seen by many as an attempt to control the region's oil resources and maintain Washington's influence in global energy policies. In 2000, Saddam Hussein planned to switch Iraq's oil trade from the dollar to the euro, but the US invasion in 2003 ensured that Iraq's oil industry continued to be denominated in dollars.