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When the Soviet Union ended, the U.S. believed it could do as it wanted, leading to wars in the Middle East, Serbia, and Africa. Europe, lacking a foreign policy, has shown only American loyalty. It's time for European officials to lead with a European foreign policy. The war in Ukraine is ending. Putin's intention was to negotiate neutrality. Ukraine walked away from a near agreement because the U.S. told them to. I advised Ukraine to be neutral, echoing Kissinger's warning: "To be an enemy of the United States is dangerous, but to be a friend is fatal." The U.S. viewed NATO enlargement as its right, ignoring Russian concerns. This project, dating back to the 90s, aimed to neutralize Russia. Trump and Putin will likely agree to end the war, regardless of Europe's warmongering.

The discussion questions what NATO will contribute, especially in terms of deploying French soldiers to Ukraine, and then pivots to the broader military capacity of Europe. The speaker asserts that only a handful of militaries today can fight large-scale ground combat, and in Europe that group consists of the United States, Russia, and Ukraine. There is no European army today capable of large-scale ground combat. The speaker notes that Germany claims it will build the largest ground army in Europe, but cites a recent poll showing that only 16% of German men would be willing to fight and die for their country if Germany were invaded, and speculates about the willingness to fight if Germany were to take the fight abroad to invade somebody else. Regarding Britain, the speaker describes the entire British military as something that could be placed in a large soccer stadium, with 30,000 unsold seats, implying a perceived weakness or limited capability. The overarching point is that Europe is “a lot of huffing and puffing, but they can't blow the house down.”

Nikolay Petro and Gwen were discussing the Munich Security Conference and the broader shift in global order. The core theme is the destruction or breakdown of the post–Cold War order as the world moves toward multipolarity, with the United States and Europe following diverging paths. - The transition to multipolarity is described as chaos and a vacuum of strategic thinking. From a European perspective, this is an unwanted transition into something unfamiliar, while the US debates a more pragmatic approach that may bypass traditional institutions to position itself favorably. The multipolar world would be more democratic, with more voices in actual discussion of each nation’s needs and contributions, in contrast to the hegemonic, rules-based order. - The concept of multipolarity presumes multiple poles of interest. Nations at the top of the old order feel uncomfortable; they had a lead dog (the United States) and knew where they were going. Now the lead dog may be wandering, and the rest are lost. There’s a push to engage voices from the global South, or the global majority, though the term “global South” is viewed as imprecise. - At Munich, Kaia Kallas and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz (Mertz) urged order to avoid chaos. Kallas favored restoring or preserving the structures of the past, arguing the European Union should reconnect with the US and dominate collectively as the political West. Mertz used aggressive language, saying Germany’s army must be the most powerful in Europe and that the war in Ukraine will end only when Russia is exhausted economically and militarily; he argued Europe imposed unheard-of losses on Russia. - In response, the US role in Munich was anticipated to feature Marco Rubio as the delegation head, signaling a security-focused agenda rather than deep internal European discourse. The discussion suggested the US may push a strategy of returning to or reshaping a hegemonic order, pressuring Europe to align with American priorities, and highlighting that the old order is over. - There is a perception of internal German political dynamics: the rise of the anti-establishment party (IFD) could challenge the current SPD/CSU coalition, potentially altering the German stance on Russia and Europe’s strategy toward Moscow. The possibility exists that internal German shifts could counter aggressive German policy toward Russia. - In Europe, there is a tension between those who want to sacrifice more national autonomy to please the US and those who advocate diversifying ties to avoid total dependence on Washington. In practice, EU policy has often mirrored US priorities, thereby delaying a truly autonomous European strategy. - The EU’s foreign policy structure remains weak due to political diversity among member states, the need for cooperation with national governments, and resistance to surrendering power to Brussels. There is no cohesive grand strategy within the EU, making it hard to present a unified vision in a multipolar world. The EU’s reliance on crisis-driven centralization contrasts with those internal contradictions. - Ukraine’s war exposed tensions in Europe’s cohesion. Initially, there was a rallying effect and unified front against Russia, aided by US support, aiming for a rapid Russian defeat. Now the EU’s rhetoric shifts toward seeking a ceasefire and preserving what remains of Ukraine, labeling victory in terms of saving Ukraine rather than expelling Russia. EU funding for Ukraine—about €90 billion over two years—may be insufficient, with Ukraine claiming higher needs. - The discussion suggested that European leadership’s view of Russia and Putin is unstable: some European circles believe Russia could collapse economically, while others see Russia’s leadership as capable of countermeasures. Reports of France reestablishing high-level political contacts with Russia were noted as part of this flux. - The conversation contrasted backward-looking US/EU visions with a forward-looking multipolar vision promoted by BRICS, especially Russia, which could be more promising due to its forward outlook. The EU, dominated by internal divisions, struggles to articulate an autonomous multipolar path, while the United States appears intent on reviving its dominant position and reshaping the international order, sometimes in ways that delay the shift to multipolarity. - Overall, the speakers highlighted a shared but backward-looking orientation between the EU and the US, versus a forward-looking, multipolar alternative; they also underscored the strategic vacuum, internal European divisions, and the continuing tug-of-war between attempting to restore past structures and embracing a new global arrangement.

John Mersheimer argues that the war against Iran is not proceeding as the United States hoped and that there is no plausible off-ramp or decisive pathway to victory. He contends that Washington cannot narrate a decisive end to the conflict the way it could have against Nazi Germany or Imperial Japan, because the war has not produced a decisive Iranian collapse. Instead, Iran has an incentive to convert the fight into a protracted war of attrition and possesses the means to do so, including a broad set of missiles and drones and the ability to retaliate across the region. The result, he says, is a stalemate in which Iran would drive a hard bargain to secure sanctions relief or other concessions, and escalation by the U.S. and Israel will simply provoke Iran to escalate further. On why Iran will not settle on American terms, Mersheimer emphasizes that Iran has a strong hand and time on its side. He notes that the more time passes, the more desperate the U.S. will be to settle, which strengthens Iran’s position. He argues that even heavy bombardment would not compel Iran to quit; rather, Iran could strike back against Gulf states, Israel, and American assets with significant effect. The Gulf States are particularly vulnerable due to a small number of petroleum sites, short-range missiles, drones, and, crucially, desalination plants that provide most of their fresh water. He cites Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Oman as heavily dependent on desalination, implying that destroying such infrastructure would have catastrophic humanitarian and economic consequences. Iran could also target energy infrastructure, and even if the Strait of Hormuz remains open, widespread damage to Gulf energy infrastructure would devastate the regional and global economy. He warns that Israel could suffer increasing Iranian pressure as time goes on, especially as interceptors become depleted. Regarding energy and the Strait of Hormuz, Mersheimer stresses that 20% of the world’s oil and gas passes through the Persian Gulf, making the energy dimension the war’s most consequential aspect. He argues that opening the Strait of Hormuz would be exceedingly difficult, and destroying desalination and petroleum infrastructure in the Gulf States would negate any advantage of keeping the straits open. He suggests that escalation without a viable endgame will have grave economic repercussions for the world, pushing the U.S. toward a coerced end that would not be a victory. Mersheimer contends that strategic bombing or air power alone cannot win such wars. He contrasts World War II and Korea/Vietnam with the present, where there are no boots on the ground and no clear path to victory via air power alone. He notes that the deterrent value of air power is limited, and a regime change strategy is notoriously difficult without ground forces. He argues that the decapitation strategy and ongoing escalations are unlikely to produce a decisive American/Israeli victory, and could instead lead to a stalemate or American concession under economic strain. On leadership and credibility, Mersheimer critiques U.S. leadership, particularly President Trump, for ignoring warning from generals and the National Intelligence Council that regime change was unlikely to succeed. He cites General James Mattis-era warnings that there was no viable military option and notes the pre-war intelligence that suggested limited prospects for quick regime change. He points to Trump’s sometimes contradictory and inaccurate statements about Iranian capabilities, including claims that Iran possessed Tomahawk missiles and that U.S. strikes had erased Iran’s nuclear capability. He argues that such statements undermine U.S. credibility, though he distinguishes between outright lies and genuine mistaken beliefs by leaders. The discussion also covers Russia’s involvement, with Russia believed to be providing intelligence to Iran and possibly supplying matériel and oil if needed. Mersheimer asserts that the war benefits Russia strategically: it diverts U.S. resources from Europe and Ukraine, potentially worsens Ukraine’s trajectory, and could raise global energy prices that benefit Russian revenue. He suggests that Russia, and possibly China, have strong incentives to aid Iran to counter American power. Europe’s role is analyzed as largely symbolic or marginal in determining the war’s outcome. Mersheimer argues that European elites are aligned with the U.S., prioritizing NATO continuity and the maintenance of American military presence, despite the damaging consequences for Europe. He suggests a radical approach for Europe: adopt a hardball stance toward the U.S., diversify its economic and strategic relations (including with China, Russia, and India), and resist being economically manipulated or coerced by Washington. He emphasizes that Europe’s interests would be better served by reducing overreliance on the United States and pursuing a more balanced set of strategic partners. Towards the end, the hosts revisit the idea that leaders lie and that liberal democracies tend to rely more on public persuasion and propaganda, with Trump’s statements illustrating the complexities of truth in international politics. The conversation ends with a reflection on whether Europe should recalibrate its posture toward the United States and broaden its strategic hedges to protect its own interests, rather than assuming continued U.S. leadership in a costly and protracted confrontation with Iran.

I love Europe, but Europeans don't respect Americans, and a relationship without mutual respect can't last. We're not obligated to protect Ukraine, especially when we have our own problems at home, like fentanyl deaths and veterans needing help. We've been bailing out Europe for 80 years, and it's time for them to handle their own security. Americans across the political spectrum don't want to be in a nuclear war with Russia or continue the Ukraine war. The entitlement we're seeing from European leaders and Zelensky suggests the relationship is over. We'll still trade and visit, but the dynamic needs to change. Americans are tired of paying for Europe's security while receiving disrespect in return. It's time for the relationship to evolve.

The discussion centers on the economic component of what the guests describe as a proxy war between NATO and Russia, with Professor Richard Wolff arguing that Western efforts to collapse Russia’s economy through unprecedented sanctions have not achieved their intended effects. The host notes claims that Russia is “a gas station masquerading as a country,” yet Russia has adapted, diversified, and grown even as European counterparts face serious economic trouble. Wolff frames the issue through class analysis rather than only inter-state chess maneuvers, asking why great powers do what they do and how domestic constraints and social pressures shape government strategy. He argues that Europe—not only Russia—has been a central driver, rooted in Europe’s history of capitalism and imperial expansion. He describes European colonial capitalism as sustaining capitalist growth until, by 1914, European powers had run out of territory, exemplified by the 1884 Berlin Conference carving up Africa. He then characterizes the period leading to World War I and the mutual destruction of colonizing empires (except the United States) as the outcome of this exhaustion. According to Wolff, the United States emerged as hegemon after World War II, not through colonial control like the Europeans, but by creating economic chains tied to political and military arrangements. He describes a division of labor in which Europe was told to focus on domestic repression of communist and socialist movements while the U.S. provided a defense umbrella, allowing Europeans to spend on social welfare. Wolff says this arrangement later became a crisis for Europe when the U.S. reduced the umbrella, forcing Europeans to pay for defense at the expense of welfare or by borrowing, deepening subordinate dependence. He further argues that Europe “never recovered” from the loss of empires and became tied to the U.S. to manage internal political and external risks. Wolff claims that Europe’s main hope to restore its historical position is an outcome resembling Zbigniew Brzezinski’s concept from the 1990s: a grand strategy to “destroy Russia” and dismember it into smaller states. In Wolff’s portrayal, this is not about communism’s presence but about dismantling Russia to enable an imperial-like recapture that Europe believes it cannot pursue otherwise against the U.S. or China. Wolff describes European escalation as “desperate,” tied to leaders’ need to sustain domestic support after perceived U.S. disrespect. He claims demonization of Russia and escalation function as a strategy to keep capitalists supported and to preserve a new imperial project. The host agrees that Europe has incentives to make itself relevant to the U.S., citing NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte’s claims about military “Keynesianism,” arms procurement benefits, and buying U.S. energy to demonstrate loyalty. Wolff extends the argument by emphasizing Europe’s economic vulnerability: he says Europe lacks the domestic economic foundation and industrial capacity to compete technologically and militarily with the U.S. and China. He points to layoffs and industrial restructuring, including Volkswagen layoffs, and argues that deindustrialization is underway. He adds examples from European daily life (such as BYD taxis in Paris) to illustrate how competitors’ products displace traditional European manufacturing. On military feasibility, Wolff states that before Russia’s invasion there was a major Ukrainian military buildup, but he argues it was insufficient against Russia. He claims China’s manufacturing base and Iran’s ability to obtain capabilities via routes involving Russia and China increase the challenge of any attempt by Europe to reverse the balance. He also cites spending asymmetries, stating that Europe cannot match U.S. military budgets (including the projected rise in the U.S. budget to $1.5 trillion by 2027), and that even borrowing would not close the gap. Regarding Russian economic resilience, Wolff argues Russia has accepted it will be a junior partner of China, describing the Chinese economy as four to five times larger. He claims Russia and China will work toward developing and “colonizing” Russian Asia to access resources, cities, forests, and land, emphasizing that Russia has the geographic “horizontal” expansion unlike the constraints of places like New York. He contrasts this with Europe’s perceived inability to recover and suggests Russia’s partnership structure supports growth under sanctions. The exchange concludes with the host asking whether Europe’s attempts to become relevant to a declining U.S. indicate an unfavorable future, and Wolff responding that he fears European “hysteria” reflects a lack of alternatives and an unwillingness to change society to adapt to a multipolar reality. He argues the absence of an inclusive security architecture and the maintenance of sovereign inequality keep Europe locked into escalation rather than compromise. In closing, Wolff adds a Marxist question about enterprise organization, arguing that capitalism’s profit-maximizing structure benefits a small number while democratic alternatives would prioritize wages and salaries. He presents this as potentially offering a way out of an economic and political dead end.

Glenn opens by noting a year has passed since Jeffrey Sachs urged Europe to adopt a realistic foreign policy that understands Russia, Europe, and the United States, and to avoid being invaded by the U.S.—even suggesting Trump could land troops in Greenland. Glenn asks how to read the current situation, including Davos and Europe’s anger at U.S. hostility, and the revived emphasis on international law. Jeffrey Sachs responds with a version of the “ride on the back of a tiger” metaphor from Kennedy, arguing Europeans forgot that the United States is an imperial power that has acted brazenly and brutally for about twenty years. He lists U.S. actions: invasions, regime changes, and reckless interference in Ukraine, and U.S. complicity in Israel’s wars across Africa and the Middle East, along with involvement in overthrowing Ukraine’s Yanukovych and other interventions. He claims Europeans were silent or complicit as the United States bombed Iran, kidnapped its president, and pursued Greenland, calling the Greenland push a grotesque power grab by Trump. He asserts New York Times recognition of U.S. imperial tendencies and says Europe’s naivete and hypocrisy are evident. He states: “The United States is thuggish, imperialistic, reckless, and that The U. S. Has left a large swath of the world in misery. Europe has been mostly compliant or complicit.” He urges Europeans to understand what the United States is about, to stop Russophobia, and to keep lines of communication with Russia open; he argues Europe’s Russophobia made it boxed in with little diplomacy with Russia or the U.S. Glenn adds that Europe’s stance mirrors a Cold War-like unity against Russia, but that the current reality differs: the U.S. does not view Russia as its main adversary, and Russophobia deepens Europe’s dependence on the U.S. Glenn notes mixed reactions at Davos, including Canada’s Prime Minister Mark Carney signaling a shift away from a rules-based order that privileges the West, and Macron’s private message to Trump seeking a cooperative stance on Syria, Iran, and Greenland. He remarks that NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg praised NATO while Trump hinted that the real enemy is within NATO, highlighting the chaos. He asks if this signals a decline of the U.S. empire or NATO. Sachs discusses Carney's stance as significant: Carney’s trip to China and a dialogue with Beijing indicating diversification with China, including a Canadian-Chinese investment plan. He credits Carney with being a rare straightforward statesman and notes instability ahead. Trump’s Davos retreat from threats (notably Greenland) may have been influenced by stock-market declines, according to Sachs’ theory. He mentions a possible European concession about U.S. sovereignty over parts of Greenland, though he doubts any negotiation has been meaningful. He cites Scott Bessent’s Fox Business interview as revealing: sanctions on Iran are a form of economic statecraft designed to crush the Iranian economy, with Iran’s currency collapse and bank failures cited as evidence; Sachs condemns this as a violation of international law and UN Charter, and calls Bessent’s pride in wielding currency-destabilization as alarming. He points to sanctions against Cuba and a broader pattern of “thuggish gangster behavior” by the U.S., noting Europeans’ silence on Iran and other regimes until it backfires on them. Sachs argues Europe’s Russophobia is self-destructive, and he emphasizes that diplomacy remains possible if Germany, France, and Italy adopt a rational approach. He criticizes Germany for duplicity in NATO enlargement and Minsk II, blaming Merkel for dropped commitments, and notes that Italy shows less Russophobia and could shift toward diplomacy. He believes Central Europe and some leaders (e.g., Orban, Czech and Slovak figures) favor diplomacy, but German leadership has been weak. He stresses that Europe must avoid dismemberment and choose diplomacy with Russia, warning that continued war policy will leave Europe isolated. He closes with optimism that there remains a path forward if key European powers act differently. Glenn thanks Sachs for the discussion and ends.

There is a powerful case for India and the European Union to forge deeper ties, as we have entered an era of multipolarity and strategic autonomy.

As a representative of Europe, a continent of great explorers, inventors and industrial revolutions, I want it to be great again. Currently, the continent is in decline and we owe it to our heritage and children to repair it. Europe's GDP was once larger than the United States', but is now 50% smaller. Industrial production in Germany has fallen, while Poland's has increased. Europe stands at a crossroads and cannot be the weaker partner of the United States. To rise again, we must abandon the outdated EU development model, as the Franco-German engine has stalled and Brussels cannot replace the real economy. Climate and migration policies have created chaos. If we fail to change course, Europe risks becoming a museum or a colony of Asian powers.

Larry: Lavrov claimed Ukraine attempted to attack Putin’s official residence in Novgorod with around 91 long-range drones in December; allegedly all intercepted, no proof provided, no reported injuries or damage. Lavrov said retaliation is coming, targets for retaliatory strikes and timing had been set. Putin supposedly mentioned this on a call to Trump two days before the Zelensky meeting in Florida; Yuri, a Kremlin aide, said Putin was shocked and outraged, and that it would influence Washington’s approach to working with Zelensky. Russians claim Trump was relieved that no Tomahawk missiles were provided to Ukraine. No US confirmation; Trump described the meeting with Putin as very productive, and discussions included the temporary ceasefire not being an option. Budanov had suggested it wouldn’t be the first assassination attempt on Putin, but the most consequential due to timing. The question posed: who is the target—Ukraine, Zelensky, Budanov—or a Russian false flag to justify attacks and derail negotiations. Speaker 1: Timelines. The attack allegedly began the night of the 28th and continued into the 29th. The Russians say it was an attack on one of Putin’s residences, described as terrorism. Putin hasn’t lived at his residences for three years, using the Kremlin instead, but this is not the first Ukrainian attempt to target Putin; there was a proposed attack when he flew into Kursk by helicopter. Russians are upset that this attack had no military objective, only potential assassination, and they know Putin wasn’t there. The Russians view it as real and plan to respond; Lavrov indicated that negotiations would be reexamined. Budanov claims Ukrainian intelligence has targeted Putin multiple times; the attack timing coincides with Zelensky in Florida, suggesting possible rifts or risk of undermining negotiations. The possibility of Western (American or British) intelligence involvement is raised, with speculation about CIA influence or European intelligence, particularly Britain’s MI6, given its Ukrainian roots. The question remains whether the attack was staged to derail negotiations or a genuine strike. Larry: If Ukraine did this, why would they? Ukraine might want to eliminate an obstacle to peace, though that could backfire; some argue Putin is more restrained than any immediate successor. If 91 drones were launched, Western intelligence would likely be involved, possibly undermining Trump’s approach. There is a sense of mixed messages from U.S. intelligence, with individuals like Susan Miller pushing claims of Russian interference that contradict other narratives. Zelensky stated no territory would be ceded as part of negotiations; Russia’s position is that Crimea, Zaporizhzhia, Kherson, Donetsk, and Luhansk must be permanently part of the Russian Federation, elections must occur in Ukraine before negotiations, NATO must be out of Ukraine, and demilitarization is non-negotiable. Russia suggests there will be no 800,000-man army; these conditions are not open for negotiation. Russia may be willing to discuss numbers of troops for Ukraine, but not to concede core territorial goals. Speaker 0: If CIA or other elements were behind this, could it be to undermine Trump or push for a peace deal by pressuring Putin? Putin showed up in uniform with the military leadership, signaling a hard stance on land/territory, stating that negotiations should proceed without ceasing. Some argue this would trigger a stronger Russian push, while others see this as undermining Trump’s efforts. Trump and Zelensky had discussed a peace plan with 90-95% agreement, with a few thorny issues, possibly territorial. Trump characterized their call as productive; Russia reportedly agreed to support Ukraine postwar with discounted energy and resources. Lavrov’s rapid response to the attack and the potential retaliation would affect ongoing negotiations, which some view as already derailed due to Ukraine’s intransigence on concessions. Speaker 1: Could European intelligence be involved? Britain’s MI6 is seen as critical; there is a suggestion that British intelligence could have acted without American consultation. This would strain relations with Trump, especially after new security strategy. The transcript also notes a broader shift in Western posture: some European leaders are pushing for stronger defense and a more independent European stance, which might influence the dynamic around negotiations and intelligence actions. Speaker 0: Zelensky’s Christmas remark, “may he perish,” followed by an attack on Putin’s residence, prompts questions about who’s pulling Zelensky’s strings. Zelensky is described as the “highest paid actor in the world” with large sums allegedly pilfered from Ukraine’s aid; Zelensky could be expendable to those steering Ukraine’s direction. The meeting in Mar-a-Lago between Zelensky, Trump, and others occurred while the Putin residence attack was underway, suggesting an attempt to undermine negotiations. Budanov’s connection to the CIA and potential independent actions by Ukrainian intelligence raise further concerns about internal Ukrainian divisions. Speaker 1: Russia’s potential retaliation could target Ukrainian intelligence assets like the SBU headquarters in Kyiv, or European assets inside Ukraine if evidence points to Western involvement. Russia’s current military actions include continuing strikes on power infrastructure, with movements in Zaporizhzhia and around Kherson, indicating an axis of attack. Independently, Russia claims significant ground progress; Ukraine counters with claims of selective advances by Russia and a favorable propaganda edge for Ukraine. The battlefield metrics show Russia increasing manpower and maintaining multiple axes of attack, with eight or more fronts, while Ukrainian recoveries of bodies show a ratio suggesting heavy Ukrainian losses. Speaker 0: The conversation ends with expectations for retaliation, possible new European involvement, and the enduring fear that negotiations remain unsettled. The next days could reveal more about who is behind the attack, how Russia responds, and whether a path to peace remains possible, given the conflicting narratives and competing strategic interests.

George Beebe discusses how NATO expansion and Western narratives changed from the 1990s to the present, focusing on concerns within the U.S. and Europe about how enlargement would affect relations with Russia. He explains that after the Cold War ended—after the Berlin Wall fell, the Warsaw Pact broke up, and the Soviet Union dissolved—the West faced the question of what foreign policy should be. He says Western judgment was that the Western community was successful and should be extended: transforming former Warsaw Pact members, Russia, and even the Middle East through liberalization and “globaliz[ing] the Western system.” He argues this involved “social engineering” that the West was “really not capable of” and that it failed to account for Russia’s reactions. Beebe says NATO enlargement was built on the idea that extending the NATO and EU “security umbrella” would foster Westernization and liberalization, while Russia viewed this as offering subordinate status rather than co-equal partnership. He describes Russian concerns as including the placement of NATO forces on Russia’s borders. He adds that many Russia experts in Washington and Europe—especially those with deep expertise from the Cold War—believed expansion would trigger increasingly intense reactions as NATO moved closer to Russian borders. He says that in the mid-1990s it was widely considered “crazy” to expand NATO, and that it was “unthinkable” to go beyond Warsaw Pact states and bring core elements of the former Soviet Union—specifically Ukraine—into NATO. In his view, what is now treated as conventional wisdom—that Ukraine can choose its military allies and host forces—is “almost a sacred principle” that is central to the root of the current conflict. Beebe emphasizes that understanding these dynamics is critical to finding an exit from the war, stating that arguing the conflict was “completely unprovoked” ignores history and shaping dynamics. He also addresses how initial disagreement became a narrative that NATO enlargement had “nothing whatsoever to do with this” even after warnings. He mentions William Burns’ “Nyet Means Nyet” cable and its argument that no matter Russia’s political spectrum, Ukrainian NATO membership would be intolerable and would provoke reaction. Beebe says that after enlargement decisions were made, some opponents accepted the “new situation on the ground,” in part because power brokers in Washington would not publicly admit they were wrong and because a “new generation of Russia experts” emerged who were trained during a period expecting transformation of Russia into liberal democracies through internal-system-focused reasoning, with geography and balance of power treated as less important. He argues the European Union’s post-Cold War evolution left it unable to act coherently as a geopolitical actor because it became a regulatory superpower focused on transmitting values and expanding a Western community. He says Russian objections force Europeans into an “existential question” about Europe’s purpose, which he links to difficulties settling the war. Beebe then outlines how he believes Russia interpreted events in Ukraine as not starting in 2014 but rooting back to early NATO enlargement steps, especially the Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary joining. He recounts Russia’s concern that NATO claimed to be defensive while intervening in Serbia without UN Security Council authorization, and how this led Russia to conclude that deterrence depended less on NATO’s stated nature than on Russia’s own ability to deter. He connects this to the 2008 Bucharest summit signaling Ukraine and Georgia could join NATO, describing Russia’s view that Ukraine was becoming “NATO-ized” through deepening military links. He says Russia believed a window was closing: Ukraine’s enmeshment would eventually remove Russia’s military option except war with NATO. He characterizes Putin’s action as “preemptive and illegally,” while also maintaining that there were causes beyond “Putin’s own imperialist desires.” In discussing current escalation, Beebe describes NATO involvement as something Ukrainians would like to see directly, believing it mitigates Russia’s advantages. He says Russia understands it is being baited into an overreaction, but that provocations have intensified, including attacks he references on Russian territory and nuclear-relevant capabilities. He says Russia’s messaging aims to pressure Washington and Europe to restrain Ukrainians, including Foreign Intelligence Service warnings about Latvian involvement in drone strikes and threats against Latvian facilities. He portrays a scenario where Article 5 could trigger a painful U.S. choice between fighting Russia—potentially nuclear—or hollowing out NATO, arguing that U.S. interest lies in diplomacy to avoid that decision. He also warns that Western fear of nuclear war has diminished, which he calls dangerous because nuclear deterrence relies on fear to bring sobriety. He cites Sergei Karganov’s view that fear of nuclear war must be restored and says restoring it could create a catastrophic escalatory spiral. On the “narrative war,” Beebe calls claims that Ukraine is winning “propaganda,” describing it as designed to buy time and allow opponents of settlement to avoid compromise. He argues the “stay the course” line seeks to avoid any need to compromise and that it is a fantasy, asserting that a compromise would require Russia giving up important things and the West and Ukraine also doing so. He compares the logic to the war on Iran analogy raised by the host: Western unwillingness to accept Russia’s existential threat perception prevents understanding why Moscow cannot accept capitulation terms. He closes by saying his optimism about compromise has fluctuated, becoming more hopeful after developments in the Israel-U.S.-Iran conflict that he connects to renewed prospects for negotiations in Ukraine. He adds that making Zelensky accept a settlement and getting Europeans to think about “the world as it is, not how they wish it was” would be complicated. He frames the struggle as between the Trump administration and a “deep state,” including links in Europe, and says the next weeks will show whether resistance can be overcome.

I truly believe the time has come for Europe to have its own military. The Armed Forces of Europe must be created. This isn't harder than standing firm against Russian attacks, which we've already done. It's not just about increasing defense spending as a GDP ratio. Money is needed, of course. But money alone won't stop an enemy assault. People and weapons don't come free, but it's not just about budgets. It's about people realizing they need to defend their own home.

The conversation centers on the idea that Europe’s leadership has deteriorated and that powerful voices from the past warned this would happen. Colin Powell, according to Speaker 1, told Speaker 0 in 1989 that Europe would end up with “horrible leaders,” and that those who replace them would be people “who have no conscience, people who have no sense of reality, people who have not been seasoned by warfare… who think they control their lives but don't.” Powell’s view, developed from his experience as a military and strategic analyst, was that once the pressure of the Cold War abated, there would be little rationale for NATO, and Europe would drift without a coherent security structure. Speaker 1 elaborates that Powell’s instincts led him to anticipate a dissolution of the postwar security order. Powell argued that NATO’s justification would erode, and a political debacle would accompany the military one as Europe’s leaders lacked direct experience of war. He advised creating a European security identity (ESI) consisting of a 3,000-person brigade, with its own equipment, training, and industrial base, divorced from NATO. The idea was that, over time (perhaps a 20–25 year period), the ESI could grow into a division, then a corps, with its own air power and arms industry, eventually allowing NATO to fade away while Europe managed its own security. Speaker 1 notes that Powell’s position was controversial with U.S. defense and defense contractors, who viewed him as dangerous for proposing such an independent European security framework. The discussion parallels George Kennan’s 1987 warning that if the Soviet Union collapsed, American society would face a shock because so much of its domestic and alliance structures depended on the external threat. The speakers discuss Clinton-era shifts, including Bill Perry’s attempts to revive cooperation with Russia, and the way Clinton’s policies altered the trajectory away from Powell’s envisioned framework. They mention a shift away from a fixed European security reliance on a NATO-centric model toward broader strategic engagement, but also criticize the departure from a legally grounded approach to world affairs. The conversation then turns to current tensions, including Europe’s involvement in Ukraine. The participants reflect on Powell’s broader aim of integrating security arrangements with law, noting that international law should guide actions, even if law alone cannot ensure outcomes. They discuss the possibility that the war in Ukraine could reflect the consequences of earlier decisions to preserve U.S. footprints in Europe and the Cold War security architecture, which in their view helped maintain stability but also embedded Europe within a security framework that relied on American leadership. The dialogue references the Balkans as an example of policy divergence: Powell warned that stabilizing the Balkans would require extensive forces, but President Bush was reluctant. Clinton eventually conducted a prolonged bombing campaign against Serbia, altering the dynamic with Russia and highlighting the tensions between ambitious security vision and political practicality. The speakers emphasize the importance of law and national security structures, the desire to rethink post–Cold War decisions, and the ongoing question of how Europe should secure its own stability while balancing relations with Russia and the United States.

The speaker argues that the European Union, the United Nations, and the World Health Organization should be abolished. They claim there are numerous European “x” accounts aiming to provoke Western Europeans to go to war with Russia because Western funding for Ukraine is dwindling, and they say these actors want to attack Russia regardless of US backing. A self-proclaimed “Gunther” is featured as a controversial figure who says he’s part of NATO, but the speaker notes that NATO publicly denies knowing him and that Gunther formed his own NGOs without funding. The speaker highlights Gunther’s post: Europeans will never be slaves. In response, the speaker asks why Gunther would arrest people for telling the truth online and trying to enslave them in a digital prison; they claim Gunther is misrepresenting online repression and compare digital punishment to real torture. The speaker cites a German police investigation of a Gab user who called a female politician fat, emphasizing the use of the term fat as quoted in the post. They challenge Gunther by asking if the photo shows a Victoria’s Secret model, implying a discrepancy between appearances and claims, and label Gunther as aligning with “the EU’s bitches” and lacking sovereignty. They accuse Hungary of being fined a million dollars a day for not accepting “undesirables,” asserting EU law requires such intake and that white Europeans are urged to fight against Russia while others (described in demeaning terms) contribute less. The speaker argues that Western Europe is dependent on the United States, stating that the US is the biggest financier of NATO and possesses the most powerful military, and that Europeans would be abandoned without US support. They remark that Gunther’s post demonstrates this dependence, noting Gunther’s post about Trump wanting to win and withdraw the US Navy from European seas, which would leave Europe exposed to Russia and Iran. The speaker mocks Gunther’s attempt to lead a European naval force and requests continued US Navy presence for a decade to help. Overall, the speaker frames a narrative of European subservience to the United States, critiques of EU sovereignty, and hostility toward Western multinational institutions, while repeatedly referencing Gunther as a focal figure in these exchanges.

Colonel Lawrence Wilkerson and Glenn discuss the trajectory of U.S. policy under Trump and the broader implications for the international order. Wilkerson argues that the postwar world order, built after World War II, is unraveling intentionally, driven by what he calls a disastrous blend of decision making and strategic aims. He faults Steve Miller’s comments on bases in Greenland and contends that the United States already had, historically, bases in Greenland and that current rhetoric reflects a Hobbesian view of a world governed by force rather than law. He attributes the drift to “the brains of some truly stupid people,” and notes that the guide for decision making is Trump’s morality, which Wilkerson asserts is deficient, shaping both domestic and international actions. On domestic policy and its international spillovers, Wilkerson cites the Minnesota situation as an example of how Trump’s approach translates into draconian, forceful actions at home. He contends that the “morality” guiding decisions in both spheres leads to a reckless use of force and an undermining of the rule of law. He emphasizes that the law disappears in the international sphere and domestic governance declines when empire comes home, suggesting that the United States is acting in ways that weaken rather than strengthen the rule of law globally. Turning to foreign policy, Wilkerson argues that America’s military posture is misposed and maldeployed. He questions why the United States maintains a large presence in the Caribbean and Gulf regions at a time when potential adversaries like China and Russia require attention elsewhere. He contends that the United States has a depleted carrier fleet and is not fulfilling presence missions or developing coherent war plans, raising concerns about the feasibility of any significant action against Iran. The discussion notes that an attack on Iran could be logistically problematic given the current force distribution, and Wilkerson fears the United States risks humiliation and strategic setback if it pursues major military action without a credible, well-deployed plan. The conversation shifts to the broader effects of U.S. strategy on global alignments. Wilkerson argues that Europe’s leaders have changed dramatically since the end of the Cold War, predicting that NATO may eventually fade as Europe develops its own security identity, a concept Powell explored historically. He cites Powell’s vision of a European security identity (ESI) separate from NATO, consisting of a modest European brigade that could grow into a fuller defense structure, potentially reducing Europe’s reliance on NATO and even integrating Russia gradually. He suggests Clinton’s era disrupted these ideas, with Serbia bombing and a shift toward a more aggressive line that drew Russia back into the geopolitical frame, complicating efforts to maintain a balanced, law-based security architecture. Powell’s long-term predictions about Europe’s leadership and the likelihood that Europe would be governed by leaders without the experience of warfare are discussed as prescient, though not realized. Wilkerson notes Powell’s belief that the center could not hold as NATO’s purpose evolved and leadership changed, leading to the potential dissolution of the NATO framework and the emergence of a European security identity. The conversation emphasizes that this shift would require a carefully calibrated approach to arms control, law, and alliance structures, rather than casting law aside in favor of a unilateral, morality-based approach to security. Regarding China and the future global order, Wilkerson aligns with Mearsheimer in predicting potential conflict with China, arguing that the combination of the U.S. unilateral approach, strategic competition, and the push toward a lawless, orderless world heightens the risk of a major confrontation. He asserts that China, studying U.S. behavior, would rather avoid a nuclear or conventional war and would seek to avoid destabilizing actions that could provoke a broader conflict. The discussion closes with reflections on U.S. regional influence, the BRICS movement, and the dollar’s reserve status. Wilkerson contends that the BRICS’ move toward dedollarization faced obstacles due to U.S. threats, and he notes China’s official stance against wanting to be the world’s reserve currency, warning that clinging to exclusive dominance harms global stability. He praises an earlier postwar framework grounded in law and international norms and laments its abandonment under current leadership, describing the present era as a disaster for both the United States and the wider world.

George Bibi and Vlad discuss the United States’ evolving grand strategy in a multipolar world and the key choices facing Washington, Europe, Russia, and China. - The shift from the post–Cold War hegemonic peace is framed as undeniable: a new international distribution of power requires the U.S. to adjust its approach, since balancing all great powers is impractical and potentially unfavorable. - The U.S. previously pursued a hegemonic peace with ambitions beyond capabilities, aiming to transform other countries toward liberal governance and internal reengineering. This was described as beyond America’s reach and not essential to global order or U.S. security, leading to strategic insolvency: objectives outpaced capabilities. - The Trump-era National Security Strategy signals a reorientation: U.S. priorities must begin with the United States itself—its security, prosperity, and ability to preserve republican governance. Foreign policy should flow from that, implying consolidation or retrenchment and a focus on near-term priorities. - Geography becomes central: what happens in the U.S. Western Hemisphere is most important, followed by China, then Europe, and then other regions. The United States is returning to a traditional view that immediate neighborhood concerns matter most, in a world that is now more polycentric. - In a multipolar order, there must be a balance of power and reasonable bargains with other great powers to protect U.S. interests without provoking direct conflict. Managing the transition will be messy and require careful calibration of goals and capabilities. - Europe’s adjustment is seen as lagging. Absent Trump’s forcing mechanism, Europe would maintain reliance on U.S. security while pursuing deeper integration and outward values. The U.S. cannot afford to be Europe’s security benefactor in a multipolar order and needs partners who amplify rather than diminish U.S. power. - Europe is criticized as a liability in diplomacy and defense due to insufficient military investment and weak capability to engage with Russia. European self-doubt and fear of Russia hinder compromising where necessary. Strengthening Europe’s political health and military capabilities is viewed as essential for effective diplomacy and counterbalancing China and Russia. - The Ukraine conflict is tied to broader strategic paradigms: Europe’s framing of the war around World War II and unconditional surrender undermines possible compromises. A compromise that protects Ukraine’s vital interests while acknowledging Russia’s security concerns could prevent disaster and benefit Europe’s future security and prosperity. - U.S.–Europe tensions extend beyond Ukraine to governance ideals, trade, internet freedom, and speech regulation. These issues require ongoing dialogue to manage differences while maintaining credible alliances. - The potential for U.S.–Russia normalization is discussed: the Cold War-style ideological confrontation is largely over, with strategic incentives to prevent Russia and China from forming a closer alliance. Normalizing relations would give Russia more autonomy and reduce dependence on China, though distrust remains deep and domestic U.S. institutions would need to buy in. - China’s role is addressed within a framework of competition, deterrence, and diplomacy. The United States aims to reduce vulnerability to Chinese pressure in strategic minerals, supply chains, and space/sea lines, while engaging China to establish mutually acceptable rules and prevent spirals into direct confrontation. - A “grand bargain” or durable order is proposed: a mix of competition, diplomacy, and restraint that avoids domination or coercion, seeking an equilibrium that both the United States and China can live with.

Yanis Orofakis and Glenn critique the trajectory of Europe and the European Union, arguing that Europe is on a path of long-term decline and stagnation financially, ecologically, and morally. They contend that the roots of current problems go back to the 2008 crisis, describing the response as a coup that bailed out banks and shifted losses onto weak taxpayers, with austerity imposed on the majority and “socialism for the bankers” justified in the name of European solidarity. Orofakis recounts his experience negotiating with the European Commission during Greece’s debt crisis, noting that the Commission was sidelined by a bureaucracy led by figures like Thomas Wieser, and that decisions were driven by a cabal aligned with Berlin to protect the taxpayers, especially in weaker economies. He asserts that this approach caused a collapse of aggregate demand, a lack of private investment, and a rapid rise in asset prices while wages and pensions fell, contributing to deindustrialization, including in Germany. He identifies the 2008 episode as an inflection point that began a broader European decline, with the ECB’s trillions not translating into productive investment. Instead, funds were used by corporations to buy back shares, while real investment stagnated. This dynamic, he argues, has fragmented the eurozone and undermined its viability, with Germany’s deindustrialization and a political class unable to articulate a coherent strategy for the Eurozone’s future. He points to energy and industrial policy shortcomings, and stresses that Germany’s pursuit of a higher value-added economy is undermined by a lack of demand for such products in Europe, leading to production shifts into arms manufacturing (e.g., Rheinmetall) as a stopgap for deindustrialization. On Germany specifically, Orofakis argues that German leaders realized austerity would wound their own economy, yet persisted, revealing a self-inflicted wound that could empower far-right currents. He cites Volkswagen’s production shifts and the use of Leopard tanks as evidence of a war-driven economic distortion, and he contends that ongoing war in Ukraine is leveraged to justify rearmament and a stalled industrial policy with no robust European plan for peace or diplomacy. Regarding Europe’s cohesion, he distinguishes between popular support for a common European space (freedom of movement, Erasmus) and the EU’s actual creation as a cartel of big business under U.S. influence. He argues the EU’s DNA is tied to NATO and U.S. strategic interests, with the Bretton Woods era and the dollar’s dominance providing macroeconomic stability that Europe increasingly lacks as a consequence of the dollar-based system’s erosion. The post-2008 decoupling from the U.S. is highlighted, with Trump’s tariffs framed as evidence that Europe can no longer rely on a seamless U.S. security and economic framework. Orofakis contends that the EU’s governance is characterized by clueless leadership and a lack of a credible industrial or strategic plan. He cites the absence of a banking union with a common deposit insurance, and the failure to implement a central fiscal mechanism like a European Investment Bank-supported growth program using ECB-backed bonds. He emphasizes the need for a peace-and-security agenda with Russia and Ukraine, criticizing those who demonize Russia and call for endless war without proposing a path to peace. In conclusion, while optimism is cautious, they argue that collective rational action could avert a century of humiliation. They advocate overthrowing current leadership to pursue a rational, united European strategy that prioritizes peace, sovereign economic policy, and a viable security architecture, rather than allegiance to a failed status quo.

Professor Jeffrey Sachs discusses the precarious state of the global economy amid geopolitical conflict and strategic realignments. He notes that the US–China trade and investment relationship “is never going to be what it was ten years ago,” with the period of dynamic, mutually investing ties effectively over. Europe–Russia linkages are damaged “perhaps to the point of no return in our generation,” making Europe the big loser in this breakup. Sachs identifies a trend toward regionalization, with trade and investment within Asia strengthening, and within Africa likely strengthening, while Europe becomes economically adrift after severing ties with its main natural resource provider, Russia. He emphasizes that the world economy still hangs in the balance in the short term. If the United States resumes war with Iran, Sachs puts the probability at about 50 percent or higher, warning that the results would be devastating under any circumstance. He characterizes the United States as having “deinstitutionalized” governance and describes Israel as an “out of control” state pursuing continued war. A simmering conflict, if reignited, would magnify short-term economic impacts dramatically. He argues that the US’s attempt to maintain preeminence through regime change and war operations is contributing to the breakup of the previously integrated world economy, and that the digital economy’s dependence on bytes reinforces a US-centred security order that will increasingly separate from China. He predicts Asia will become increasingly integrated, with the United States’ dominance waning as a result. In discussing Europe’s prospects, Sachs argues that Europe should have recognized that the United States worked to keep Europe and Russia apart, and that Europe’s embrace of expansion into Central and Eastern Europe and the idea of a “new wall” against Russia was misguided. He asserts that Europe’s leadership has pursued a failed economic and geopolitical strategy, leading to economic decline, with industry shuttering and no clear bright spots. He critiques the current European leadership, suggesting that new political entrepreneurship is needed for Europe to regain prosperity, relevance, and security. Sachs critiques the notion that the war in Ukraine should be ended by arming Europe to take on Russia, contrasting with his view of open, mutually beneficial trade historically. He argues that economics, once framed as win–win and beneficial for global development, has been reframed in Washington as a tool for preserving American dominance. He recounts a shift from open trade as a beneficial system to an emphasis on military and geopolitical objectives, citing Eldridge Colby and Jake Sullivan as proponents of organizing economics for power rather than prosperity. He contends that globalization did not fail; rather, the US share of world output declined as China rose, and the misallocation of economics toward power has harmed both the American public and global economic well-being. Regarding naval blockades and economic warfare, Sachs notes the shift toward piracy-like practices, with talk of seizing ships and blockading nations such as Iran, Cuba, and Venezuela. He predicts that, while the United States may struggle to sustain broad blockades or confrontations, the farther one moves toward Asia, the less effective US power becomes. He foresees that Europe, if it continues to challenge Russia directly, risks war and devastation, while Asia’s rise will diminish US sway. He concludes that the United States is the most dangerous country in the world when it pursues global dominance at the expense of national well-being, and that Europe must reassess geography and power realities to avoid further decline.

Glenn (Speaker 0) and John Mersheimer (Speaker 1) discuss the Iran war and its trajectory. Mersheimer asserts the war is not going well for the United States and that President Trump cannot find an off ramp because there is no plausible endgame or decisive victory against Iran. He notes that if Iran can turn the conflict into a protracted war of attrition, it has incentives and means to do so, including a strong bargaining position to demand sanctions relief or reparations. He argues the United States and Israel are not the sole drivers; Iran has a say, and there is no credible story about ending the war on American terms. Mersheimer cautions that even heavy bombardment or “today being the day of the heaviest bombardment” would not necessarily compel Iran to quit. He suggests Tehran will respond by escalating, potentially striking Gulf States and Israel with missiles and drones, given Iran’s capability with accurate drones and ballistic missiles in a target-rich environment. He emphasizes Iran’s incentive to avoid a settlement that yields no gains for Tehran while seeking concessions or relief from sanctions as time passes, increasing American pressure to settle. He warns that if international economic effects worsen, the United States may push for an end to the war, but that would constitute conceding to the Iranians rather than achieving victory. Glenn asks about escalation dominance, noting Iran’s potential vulnerability of Gulf desalination and energy infrastructure. Mersheimer confirms Gulf desalination plants are a critical vulnerability (Riyadh’s desalination plant servicing 90% of Riyadh’s water; Kuwait 90%; Oman 76%; Saudi water about 70%; desalination is essential). He reiterates that Iran can target desalination alongside petroleum infrastructure to cripple Gulf States and that such actions would also affect Israel and the wider economy. He asserts Iran has the option to damage the Gulf States and thus impact the world economy, making escalation unlikely to yield a favorable US-Israeli outcome. The energy dimension is central: 20% of the world’s oil and gas comes from the Persian Gulf. The Straits of Hormuz are unlikely to be opened easily, and destroying Gulf States’ infrastructure would make that moot anyway. He explains that even if Hormuz were open, damaged Gulf States would not export oil, and American naval escorting would be impractical due to vulnerability. He observes that the Iranians’ options threaten the international economy, and the United States’ off ramp is not readily available. Mersheimer provides a historical perspective on air power: strategic bombing cannot win wars alone, as seen in World War II and later conflicts. He notes that the present campaign lacks boots on the ground, relying on air power, but history shows air power alone is insufficient to achieve regime change or decisive victory against formidable adversaries like Iran. He argues that the decapitation strategy, followed by escalation, is unlikely to succeed and that the literature on air wars and sanctions supports this. They discuss previous warnings within the administration: General James Mattis (General Keane) and the National Intelligence Council warned before the war that regime change and quick victory were unlikely. Mersheimer highlights that only 20% of Americans supported the war initially, with 80% skeptical or opposed. He attributes some of the current predicament to Trump and Netanyahu's insistence on a quick victory, arguing that Netanyahu has pushed for a regime-change approach that failed. The conversation turns to Russia and China. Mersheimer contends that Russia benefits from the war by diverting US resources and relations away from Europe and Ukraine, strengthening Russia’s own strategic position. He suggests Russia may be aiding Iran with intelligence and possibly with weapons or energy, as well as improving its image in Iran. He asserts that this war distracts the US from Ukraine, harming Ukrainian efforts and potentially strengthening Russia economically by boosting demand for Russian oil and gas if Gulf supply is constrained. Europe’s position is examined. Mersheimer claims the European Union’s support is largely rhetorical; Europe’s elites fear a US departure from Europe and want to preserve NATO. He argues Europe’s interests will be largely ignored in a US-dominated conflict, with Macron’s stance portrayed as exaggerated power. He suggests Europe is hurt by the war and that their leverage over the United States is limited unless they diversify away from exclusive dependence on the US. In closing, Glenn and John reflect on leadership and propaganda. Mersheimer reiterates that leaders lie in international politics, with democracies more prone to lying to their publics than autocracies, and notes that Trump’s statements—such as Iran possessing Tomahawk missiles or the nuclear capability being erased—are examples of implausible or untruthful claims. He emphasizes the rational strategic thinking of Iranian and Russian leaders, but critiques the American leadership’s strategic understanding. The discussion concludes with reflections on Europe’s potential hardball approach toward the United States, and the need for diversification in European strategy to counter American leverage. The interview ends with appreciation for the exchange and a shared wish that the subject were less depressing.

They wanted to build Ukraine like the West, but Putin didn't want that. He wanted to control Ukraine.

Professor Jeffrey Sachs argues that the current moment represents dramatic and dangerous upheaval, with the war against Iran in its second week and a “regime change operation” not going as planned. He says there is tremendous confusion about war aims and the ground situation, describing Washington as “fogged” and characterizing Donald Trump’s public messaging as “ravings” from a “madman.” He contends that escalation control is illusory and that the world is sliding toward a broader and more dangerous conflict. Sachs asserts that the war is not limited to Iran: Iran has claimed to strike U.S. bases in several countries while denying attacks on Saudi Arabia, Azerbaijan, and Turkey. He suggests the U.S. and Israel are pulling in proxies, including Kurdish fighters, and that Russia may be supplying Iran with intelligence while the U.S. supplies Ukraine. He contends that after decapitation strikes on Iran, Moscow faces pressure to deter NATO attacks, while Europe contemplates increasing nuclear weapons. He views the conflict as part of a wider global struggle, with fighting across the world and potential linkages to energy markets, indicating that an energy crisis is likely to be severe and poorly priced in by markets. He argues that if China and Russia support Iran, it underscores a broader strategic dynamic, given China’s oil interests and the U.S.’s efforts to cut off oil supplies to China from Venezuela, Russia, and Iran. On international law, Sachs reiterates his argument that the U.S.-Israel attack on Iran is also an attack on the United Nations. He asserts that the U.S. under Trump “despises the UN” and seeks to kill it “through a thousand cuts and through a devastating blow,” pointing to the U.S. withdrawal from UN agencies and rejection of key treaties. He emphasizes that Europe is complicit, with European leaders and ambassadors at the UN Security Council focusing critiques on Iran rather than on the U.S.-Israel strike. He invokes Article 2(4) of the UN Charter as the essence of the UN’s purpose to stop the use of force, contrasting this with the belief that the U.S. “rules the world” and uses violence to impose demands, including the call for “unconditional surrender” in Iran. Sachs describes the U.S. foreign policy machinery as dominated by the CIA and a network of “off the books militaries” that pursue regime change and hegemony. He recalls historical episodes: the 1953 coup in Iran, the Kennedy and Eisenhower era, and the long-standing pattern of U.S. interference in other countries’ leadership. He asserts that performance of checks and balances is deteriorating, with democracy weakening under threat and dissent punished, both in the U.S. and in Europe. He likens Trump’s rhetoric to a hyperbolic assertion that he would determine Iran’s next leader, calling this symptomatic of a broader U.S. imperial project. In discussing European responses, Sachs criticizes Germany for showing subservience to the U.S. stance, with European leaders at times prioritizing confrontation with Iran over engagement with Russia or seeking peace. He laments the decline of European strategic autonomy and the EU as a whole, noting the Danish ambassador’s focus on Iran while ignoring U.S.-Israeli actions. He argues that Europe’s leadership has failed to act in the spirit of postwar peace, contrasting current leadership with figures like de Gaulle, Mitterrand, Kohl, or Schroeder. Toward multipolarity, Sachs traces the idea back to Roosevelt’s vision for a United Nations-centered postwar order and contrasts it with the post-1990s U.S. unilateralism. He argues that the United States, Britain, Russia, and China would need to cooperate to avert catastrophe, and that the current trajectory—led by an obsession with global dominance—risks war, economic crisis, and widespread destabilization. He suggests that China and Russia are the most likely to push back against U.S. hegemony, with India possibly playing a role, though its alignment remains ambivalent. Sachs closes by noting that a move toward peaceful multipolar cooperation would require different leadership and a rejection of the Leviathan-style dominance mindset.

Marco Rubio traveled to Germany for the Munich Security Conference and delivered what the program calls the most important American speech in the last thirty years, calling on Europe to join Trump's new world order or face the consequences. He told NATO allies that playtime is over and that a new world order is being written by the United States; Europe is asked to join, or face being left behind. Rubio framed NATO as a transaction between countries and said it is only worth defending if you are worth defending, accusing European leaders of managing Europe’s decline and warning that if Europe continues on a liberal, destructive path, the United States will be done with them. He criticized a liberal globalist agenda of a borderless world and mass immigration, and argued for reform of the existing international order rather than dismantling it. Rubio asserted that the old rules of the world are dead and that the West must adapt to a new era of geopolitics. He indicated that these are conversations he has been having with allies and other world leaders behind closed doors, and that these talks are accelerating. The speech conveyed a clear ultimatum: the US wants Europe with us, but is prepared to rebuild the global order alone if necessary. Rubio stated that the US would prefer to act with Europe, but would do so independently if Europe does not align. The discussion then ties these geopolitics to currency and economics. The US dollar’s role as the reserve currency and its strength are central to the old world order. The Trump administration is signaling that the strong dollar religion is over, with the dollar weakened in Trump’s second term to make US exports cheaper. Reuters is cited as reporting that China’s treasury holdings have dropped to their lowest level since 2008 as banks are urged to curb exposure to US treasuries, suggesting China is stepping back from funding America and that the burden may shift to US funding via domestic sources. The narrative contrasts this with China’s push for a stronger yuan and global reserve status, including potential expansion of currency use in trade, while Europe sits in the middle, invited to join the US-led shift or be sidelined. There is mention of a possible April Beijing trip by Trump to meet Xi Jinping. The segment also notes internal GOP dynamics, describing Rubio as a neocon favorite and predicting a contest between Rubio’s hawkish approach and JD Vance, who reportedly does not want broad war expansions. The speaker frames Rubio’s speech as a signal flare indicating a real-time reorganization of the West, with the dollar at the blast radius. The sponsor segment follows, tying the topics to critical minerals and a program named Project Vault, a $12 billion strategic reserve for precious minerals to protect the private sector from supply shocks. At a Critical Minerals Ministerial, JD Vance and Marco Rubio delivered a message to China about preventing market flooding from killing domestic projects. The sponsor promotes North American Niobium, a company exploring for niobium and two rare earths (neodymium and praseodymium), describing niobium as critical for aerospace and defense applications, with no domestic US production and 90% global supply controlled by Brazil. The company’s base includes Quebec, Canada, and it highlights leadership from Joseph Carrabas of Rio Tinto and Cliffs Natural Resources fame, and Carrie Lynn Findlay, a former Canadian cabinet minister. The ticker symbol NIOMF is provided, with notes that shares are tradable on major US brokerages, and a reminder for due diligence.

Glenn: Welcome back. We are joined today by Professor John Mersheimer to understand what is happening in the world with this new great power rivalry and how the outcome of the Ukraine war will impact this new Cold War. Have we entered a new Cold War? Who are the players, competing interests, and the rules? Mersheimer: I think we have entered a new Cold War. We're in a multipolar system, and the United States, China, and Russia are the three great powers. The United States is certainly in a cold war with China. China is powerful and threatens to dominate East Asia, and the United States will almost certainly go to great lengths to prevent that from happening, which axiomatically creates an intense security competition in China. An intense security competition is a cold war, and the name of the game is to make sure that security competition does not turn into a hot war. We are in a cold war with the Chinese, or the Chinese are in a cold war with us. The hot war is avoided. Regarding Russia, since we moved into multipolarity, the Russians and the Chinese have been close allies against the United States. This is largely a result of the Ukraine war, which has pushed the Russians into the arms of the Chinese and caused closer Sino-Russian cooperation. The United States, through the Biden administration, was involved in a cold war with both Russia and China. Trump tried to change that, seeking good relations with Russia to form a Russia-plus-US alliance against China, but he has been unable to make that happen. The result is that the United States is basically still in a cold war with both Russia and China. The war in Ukraine has made me worry greatly that the Cold War in Europe could turn into a hot war, even as the U.S.-China relationship remains cooler so far. Glenn: European leaders hoped the United States and Europe would unite in this new Cold War, with liberal hegemony fading and a return to unity against Russia. But Ukraine has instead divided Europe. How do you explain this? Is it the US not seeing Russia as the same threat as Europeans, or a concern about pushing Russia toward China, or Europe’s costs of the partnership? Is this uniquely a Trump-era approach? Mersheimer: From an American point of view, good relations with Russia make sense. China is the peer competitor, and the United States wants to pivot to East Asia to prevent China’s dominance. Russia is the weakest of the three great powers and not a major threat to Europe. The Americans believe Europe can deal with Russia, freeing them to focus on China. Europe, by contrast, is threatened by Russia’s proximity and thus prioritizes Russia. NATO expansion into Ukraine is seen by many Europeans as a disaster, poisoning Russia–Europe relations, making Europe deeply committed to using Ukraine to weaken Russia. The transatlantic alliance becomes strained, especially with Trump raising the possibility of leaving NATO. Europeans fear losing the American pacifier that keeps centrifugal forces in check, which would complicate European coordination with Russia. Glenn: If the United States signals a departure, won’t Europe face greater challenges in managing Russia? And is Russia truly an empire-building threat, or is this a post-2014 narrative that intensified after February 2022? Mersheimer: Bringing Ukraine into NATO was destined to cause trouble. The crisis began in 2014, and the 2022 war is ongoing. The Ukrainians and Europeans want a security guarantee for Ukraine, essentially NATO membership, while Russia demands territory and rejects a security guarantee that would enshrine NATO’s presence near its borders. The Europeans see NATO expansion as threatening, while the Americans view Russia as the weaker power and the need to pivot to China. The controversy over responsibility for this disaster arises from competing interpretations of NATO expansion and Russian aggression. Glenn: Do you see Russia changing course soon? There has been escalation—Odessa blockades, port attacks, and targeting infrastructure. Could this signal a new stage of the war? Mersheimer: The Russians believe Ukraine is on the ropes and expect to win on the battlefield in 2026, possibly expanding fronts in Kharkiv and Sumy. They may consider increasing conventional force and possibly using nuclear weapons if the war drags on. They view the conflict as existential and fear losing, which could push them toward drastic measures to end the war. The Russians could escalate if they think they cannot win conventionally. Glenn: What are the non-nuclear options to win quickly? Could the Russians deliver a decisive conventional victory? Mersheimer: It’s a war of attrition. If Ukraine’s army is weakened, Russia could surround large Ukrainian formations, disrupt logistics, and open larger fronts. They may build up forces in the rear, potentially for a breakthrough or to deter Western escalation. The battlefield outcome may determine the next steps, including whether nuclear options are considered. Glenn: How will Ukraine end? Is it a military defeat, economic collapse, or political fragmentation? Mersheimer: Ukraine is likely to be defeated on the battlefield. Its economy is in desperate shape, and losing Odessa or more territory would worsen it. Politically, Ukraine will face internal divisions once the war ends. Europe will face a broken Russia–Ukraine relationship, with some European states viewing the conflict differently. Ukraine’s demographic decline compounds its bleak outlook, and the country may become a problematic rump state. The war should have been settled earlier; the negotiators in Istanbul in 2022 could have sought a different path. Zelensky’s choice to align with Western powers and walk away from Istanbul negotiations deepened Ukraine’s predicament. Glenn: Any final reflections? Mersheimer: The war’s outcome will reshape Western unity and European security. Historians may view this as a major mistake in weakening the West. The blame for the disaster will likely be attributed in the West to Russia’s imperialism, but the expansion of NATO is also central. Europe’s economic and political landscape will be altered, and Ukraine’s future will be deeply challenging.

The speaker criticizes the European Commission for being excessively influenced by American networks. They argue that all European commissioners, from various countries, must be approved by the Americans, making them all pro-American. The speaker acknowledges the partnership with the United States but emphasizes the need for Europe to maintain its independence and not become servants to American interests.