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The British people deserve an explanation for a significant failure that was not merely accidental or due to global trends. This failure was intentional, stemming from deliberate policy reforms aimed at liberalizing immigration. Brexit was leveraged to transform Britain into an experiment in open borders, under the guise of "Global Britain." This approach lacked public support, yet it was pursued while downplaying its existence.

When the Soviet Union ended, the U.S. believed it could do as it wanted, leading to wars in the Middle East, Serbia, and Africa. Europe, lacking a foreign policy, has shown only American loyalty. It's time for European officials to lead with a European foreign policy. The war in Ukraine is ending. Putin's intention was to negotiate neutrality. Ukraine walked away from a near agreement because the U.S. told them to. I advised Ukraine to be neutral, echoing Kissinger's warning: "To be an enemy of the United States is dangerous, but to be a friend is fatal." The U.S. viewed NATO enlargement as its right, ignoring Russian concerns. This project, dating back to the 90s, aimed to neutralize Russia. Trump and Putin will likely agree to end the war, regardless of Europe's warmongering.

The Ukraine war didn't begin with Putin's invasion; it's rooted in broken promises. In 1990, the US assured Gorbachev NATO wouldn't expand eastward, a pledge violated starting in 1994. NATO expansion, coupled with US actions like the 1999 bombing of Serbia and the 2002 withdrawal from the ABM treaty, fueled Russian insecurity. The US involvement in Ukrainian politics, including the 2014 coup, further escalated tensions. Putin's 2021 security proposal, seeking to prevent NATO expansion, was rejected. The US's "open door" policy for NATO enlargement, and its support for Ukraine's continued fight, directly contradicts the assurances made to Gorbachev, leading to the current conflict. This is not a simple case of Russian aggression, but a culmination of decades of broken promises and escalating tensions.

As European economies decline, young people can't afford homes, and energy costs are much higher, leading to a declining standard of living and low birth rates, which is a sign of civilizational collapse. There's a lot of rage in Europe, and the Russia-Ukraine war serves as a relief valve for European leaders to blame Putin. The UK's response to fighting a new war against Russia is sad because Russia could easily defeat the UK. Turning the population's rage towards Russia distracts from domestic issues. Intelligence sources believe Ukrainians were behind the Nord Stream pipeline attack.

- Democrats' spending caused inflation, and Biden's administration ignited global unrest after a peaceful period under Trump. Biden's Afghanistan withdrawal was botched, and NATO expansion talks provoked Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Opportunities for peace were rejected, leading to a prolonged war with mass casualties and depleted US stockpiles. - The US has a history of military interventions, including the bombing of Belgrade, and illegal wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria, as well as involvement in the 2014 coup in Kyiv. The US government cannot be trusted. - NATO expansion was promised not to move "one inch eastward" but Clinton signed off on plans to expand NATO to Ukraine. The US unilaterally withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 2002, leading to missile systems in Eastern Europe that Russia views as a threat. - Putin sought to force Ukraine to negotiate neutrality, aiming to keep NATO off Russia's border. The US rejected negotiations, and a draft Russia-US security agreement proposing no NATO enlargement. - Germany has aligned with the US, supporting NATO expansion, but previously had an independent foreign policy. Merkel knew NATO expansion was a bad idea but gave in to US pressure. - The US is in a hot war with Russia, with US personnel on the ground in Ukraine. Russia could disable critical American infrastructure. - The war in Ukraine is a US-Russia conflict provoked by the US with the aim of NATO enlargement. The American people have been told the opposite. - The war started in 2014 with US involvement in the overthrow of Ukraine's government. The US rejected off-ramps and continues to fund the war, resulting in Ukrainian deaths and territorial losses. - The US should negotiate with Russia, acknowledging mutual security concerns and halting NATO enlargement. - The US is trying to destroy Russia through CIA operations in Ukraine. Russia is defending its right to survive. - Globalists aim to exploit Ukraine's resources and destroy Russia. The BRICS nations are moving towards a gold-backed currency. - The US has invested billions in Ukraine since 1991 to support a democratic government. Zelenskyy's team is adding fuel to the fire. - The US blew up the Nord Stream pipeline, as promised by Biden. - The US is turning Ukraine into a de facto member of NATO.

"And frankly, the there's a massive incentive on the left to import voters." "So if they can't convince their nation to vote for them, they're going to import people from other nations to vote for them." "This is a massive factor." "And frankly, it's a strategy that will succeed if it is not stopped." "It's really a voter importation thing." "That is 100% what is happening." "I mean, BBC is complicit in the destruction of Britain." "The '97 is a failure if we don't pay for it." "You're forced to pay for your own destruction." "We pay for it." "Yes."

The British people deserve an explanation for the significant failures in immigration policy. This situation isn't merely a result of bad luck or global trends; it was a deliberate choice. Policies were intentionally reformed to liberalize immigration, using Brexit as a means to create an open borders experiment in the UK. The concept of "Global Britain" reflects this agenda, which lacked public support and was downplayed by those in power.

Checklist for summary approach: - Identify and preserve the core causation chain from 1990 to the present. - Retain all direct claims about NATO expansion, treaties, regime changes, and key US actions. - Highlight unique or surprising elements (intercepted calls, personal connections, blunt quotes). - Exclude repetition, filler, and off-topic discussions. - Do not judge the claims; present them as stated, without added qualifiers. - Translate any non-English nuances into concise English where needed. - Aim for 395–494 words. According to the speaker, the Ukraine war is not a Putin-initiated attack as framed by common narratives, but a long sequence beginning in 1990. James Baker (Secretary of State) told Mikhail Gorbachev that NATO would not move eastward if Germany unified; Gorbachev agreed. The speaker asserts the US then “cheated” with a 1994 Clinton plan to expand NATO to Ukraine, arguing that neoconservatives took power and NATO enlargement began in 1999 with Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. Russia initially cared little, seeing no direct border threat beyond Kaliningrad, and NATO’s bombing of Belgrade in 1999 aggravated Moscow. Putin’s leadership is described as initially pro-European; he even considered joining NATO when a mutually respectful relationship existed. After 9/11, Russia supported the US in counterterrorism, but two decisive later actions altered it. In 2002 the United States unilaterally withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, which the speaker says triggered US missile deployments in Eastern Europe—Aegis systems—prompting Russia to fear a decapitation strike from missiles near Moscow. He claims the US then invaded Iraq in 2003 on phony pretenses. In 2004–2005 a “soft regime change operation” in Ukraine (the first color revolution) installed leaders connected to US interests; the speaker recalls advising Ukraine’s government in the early 1990s and knows Yushchenko personally. Yanukovych won Ukraine’s 2009 election and pursued neutrality; the US pressed NATO expansion despite Ukrainian public preference for neutrality amid ethnic divides. On 22 February 2014, the US actively participated in overthrowing Yanukovych, with a leaked call between Victoria Nuland and Jeffrey Pyatt discussing a preferred next government (names like Yatsenyuk/Yats, and influence from Biden) and vowing Western support; the speaker asserts the Americans told Yanukovych to fight on, promising “we’ve got your back” but “we don’t have your front,” pushing Ukraine into front lines and contributing to a high death toll—“six hundred thousand deaths now of Ukrainians since Boris Johnson flew to Kyiv to tell them to be brave.” The speaker contends the war is misrepresented as a madman invading Europe and criticizes it as “bogus, fake history” and a PR narrative by the US government; he claims NYT suppressed his commentary and argues the US ignores prudence in favor of open-ended enlargement. He cautions against pursuing China and Taiwan, warning about nuclear risk if a power challenges the US. He notes Putin’s 2021 security proposal to bar NATO enlargement, the White House’s rejection of negotiations, and NATO’s “open door” stance, which he decries as unstable. The narrative concludes with a focus on preventing further escalation and avoiding a nuclear confrontation.

Trump was elected partly on the promise to end costly wars like the one in Ukraine. Ending the war has been a topic since before it began. The Minsk agreements aimed to resolve the conflict in Eastern Ukraine, but Ukraine didn't implement key provisions, like constitutional changes for Russian-speaking people. In 2021, Zelensky signed a law to reclaim temporarily occupied areas, including Crimea, a red line for Russia. Crimea has historically been Russian, with a majority Russian population. A plebiscite showed Crimeans favored joining Russia. We could have avoided war by saying NATO would never accept Ukraine. Johnson shut down negotiations in Istanbul. This has been a failure on our military leadership.

NATO was warned that expanding would lead to a Ukrainian invasion, but they proceeded anyway. In 2021, President Putin sent a treaty to NATO, asking them to promise no more enlargement to avoid invading Ukraine. NATO didn't sign, and the opposite occurred. The ongoing war in Ukraine has resulted in a significant number of casualties, yet the media fails to mention that NATO acknowledged the warning and still expanded. The advantage of NATO expansion is not addressed.

The term "unprovoked" used by journalists regarding Russia's actions is misleading. This war has numerous provocations, stemming from U.S. actions like NATO expansion plans since the 1990s, the 2002 withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, and the 1999 bombing of Belgrade. The overthrow of Viktor Yanukovych in 2014, supported by U.S. officials, and the failure to uphold the Minsk II agreements also contributed to the conflict. By the end of 2021, after nine years of tension, a major war could have been avoided if the U.S. had engaged in negotiations over Russia's proposal for Ukraine's neutrality and NATO non-expansion. I urged the White House to pursue diplomacy to prevent war.

My son fought in Ukraine because he saw Putin as a bully. This war is about Russia's security, not territory. Since 1992, they've opposed NATO in Ukraine due to historical invasions. They feel threatened because NATO has expanded eastward despite promises otherwise. We overthrew Ukraine's government in 2014, prompting Russian response. A peace treaty was negotiated but then disregarded. Boris Johnson stopped Zelensky from finalizing another agreement with Putin, leading to many deaths. We wanted the war, spending money that could be used at home. Trump, a dealmaker, aims to resolve this. Putin feared Ukraine attacking Russia, which Zelensky seemingly confirmed. The Afghan withdrawal was a calamity due to political timelines. We should have withdrawn troops responsibly.

The speaker expresses deep sadness about the current situation with Russia, noting extensive time spent in Russia in the 1980s and 1990s and connections with people who ran the government then. He argues that a fundamental error by the United States in the mid to late 1980s and early 1990s was the expansion of NATO. He emphasizes that after the Cold War was won, there was debate about NATO’s future, and the idea of expanding it arose despite it being a bureaucracy that “works.” The speaker recounts a key episode from the reunification negotiations with Germany. He says that during those talks, Gorbachev and Jim Baker discussed the treaty, which stated that there would be no NATO troops in East Germany, and Baker told Gorbachev that if Germany were reunified and NATO expanded beyond that, NATO would not expand “one inch further east.” The speaker states that Gorbachev told him and others that Baker had promised this interpretation, and that Gorbachev also told Coal (likely a reference to other Russian officials) the same thing, which he says was new information. He asserts that the first Bush administration kept this promise, or at least appeared to honor it, pursuing a partnership for peace that Russians somewhat liked. With the Clinton administration, the speaker asserts, the first thing done in his first term was to expand NATO. He questions the rationale, referencing Strobe Talbot’s Foreign Affairs article on why NATO was expanded, and implies the reasons were insufficient. In conversations with Russians who ran for president in 1996 and 2000, he recalls a question from the Urals about why the Americans were expanding NATO, noting that although NATO is a military alliance, Russians might not understand puts and calls but do understand tanks. He quotes a Russian politician who says, “Russians might not be able to understand puts and calls, but they certainly understand tanks.” The speaker uses a banking analogy: a friend or supporter goes bankrupt, and you call to offer encouragement; instead, the United States “kicked them when they were down” by expanding NATO. He contends that this expansion created the justification for authoritarianism’s return in Russia and characterizes it as a blunder of monumental proportions. He reflects that at Oxford he studied Cold War origins and believes the Russians were responsible for much of it, describing the expansion as born of bureaucratic inertia within NATO, or, in the worst case, a self-fulfilling prophecy among certain Clinton-era officials who believed Russia would forever be the enemy. Looking forward, the speaker suggests a missed opportunity for a strategic partnership built on common long-term threats and cooperation, noting that Russia would have been a significant partner given its oil and regional influence. He concludes with a sense of profound sadness, arguing that the United States created a problem that could have been avoided and lost an important long-term partner, especially on today’s most threatening issues.

Speaker 0: It is an indictment of your own leadership. And in countries across Europe, the leaders feel that way. Russia is an embarrassment to them because it is, relatively speaking, thriving. And so they all, as one, backed the Biden administration's plan to have a war with Russia. And let's stop lying. This was not an unprovoked invasion. Putin just randomly went over the line into Eastern Ukraine and stole these oblast. He stole this land that belonged to another people. That's a total lie, and it's not a defense of Putin to call it out as a lie because it is, and everybody knows it now. The truth is that in 2001, Putin, same guy, same leader, asked the Bush administration in person directly to George W. Bush, I would like to join NATO. I would like to join the defensive alliance that exists to keep me from moving west into Western Europe. In other words, you won. I'm joining your team. And due in part to his own limitations as a leader and due in part to the counsel that he received from Condoleezza Rice at the time, George w Bush turned down that offer and prevented Russia from joining NATO. And the guest we're gonna speak to in a moment, if you're wondering if he has a good track record of calling future events, said at the time, this decision to turn down Vladimir Putin's it's twenty five years ago, Vladimir Putin's request to join NATO, to join the West, to all be in it together, to work together, this decision made by the Bush administration guarantees a collision with the West. We are now on a collision course. And, of course, he was absolutely right because NATO didn't want Russia because NATO wanted a war with Russia, and boy, they got it. And so from 2001 all the way to 2022, twenty one years, NATO moved inexorably east surrounding Russia. And many times, again, this is not a defense of Russia. It's just a fact. Many times, the Russian government under Putin said, woah. Woah. Woah. Woah. Woah. Are threatening our core national interest, which is not to have other people's missiles on our borders back off. And then in 2014, the Obama administration overthrew the government of Ukraine to put an American puppet in there, thereby sealing the fate of nations. When that happened, and Sergei Karganov said it at the time, you have just guaranteed a war in Ukraine that will destroy Ukraine.

The UK is seen as irresponsible, echoing the attitudes of the 19th-century British Empire and causing global tensions. Recent comments by President Macron are also viewed as reckless. Zelensky is perceived as a threat because he seems to be pushing for a full-scale war between NATO and Russia. The belief is that if the conflict remains between Ukraine and Russia, Ukraine will ultimately lose. Zelensky's actions appear aimed at drawing NATO into a broader conflict.

Richard Sakwa, a professor of politics at the University of Kent, discusses the Ukraine war, diplomacy, and the deeper roots of the conflict across four to five interlinked levels, emphasizing how shifting narratives and power dynamics shape the path to peace. - Current phase and diplomacy: Sakwa notes that Europe is shifting from a war-framed narrative (unprovoked invasion, good-versus-evil) toward recognizing mutual security concerns and engaging in diplomacy. He cites the evolving European appetite for diplomacy, referencing past proposals (Kirill Dmitriev–Steve Witkoff peace framework) and recent 20-point peace plan, which Moscow finds unacceptable in full. He highlights that Washington and European capitals are now planning to engage Moscow more substantively, with the battlefield still central for months, before durable diplomacy can take hold. He frames this as a liminal moment where deeper root causes must be addressed if negotiations are to succeed. - Four to five layers of roots: Sakwa articulates a multi-layered framework to understand the war’s origins. 1) Internal Ukrainian layer: He contrasts two visions of Ukrainian statehood since 1991. The monist vision posits a primordial Ukrainian nationalism that can shed Russian (and Polish-Lithuanian) colonial legacies to reveal an inherent Ukrainian state. The alternative “Russo-Ukrainian” vision (the book and concept he has developed) portrays Ukraine as pluralistic, tolerant, multilingual, and multi-confessional. Moscow’s demand for denazification and protection of linguistic and cultural rights sits within this frame, illustrating a core domestic-divide issue in Ukraine. 2) Russo-Ukrainian interstate/intercultural layer: Sakwa emphasizes a mimetic dynamic (citing Rene Girard) where proximity and shared space between Russia and Ukraine fuel intense conflict, rooted in their shared East Slavic, Orthodox-leaning civilizational space and long entwined history. This layer explains why hostility persisted for decades and why nationalist tendencies in Ukraine resist rapprochement with Russia. 3) Intra-European layer: He argues we must go back to 1945 and beyond to understand postwar arrangements. The post-1990s “Atlanticist” settlement—NATO and EU leadership shaping Europe—marginalized Russia, fueling security dilemmas and NATO enlargement. He suggests that the Cold War’s end did not produce a pan-European continental unity; instead, European powers reinforced a Western-centered security order that contributed to the current conflict. 4) United States–Russia superpower layer: He describes a deteriorating US-led framework where attempts to manage Europe and Russia were compromised by changing US policies and leadership (including Trump’s unpredictable positioning). The envisaged peace by “above” (grand bargains among great powers) has faltered, revealing a weakened Western-led order and fragile strategic coherence. 5) Civilizational and new security architecture layer (potential fifth): He mentions a broader civilizational struggle narrative (Russia versus Western liberal order) and the possibility of shifting toward a post-Western Russia that remains European in identity. He also notes discussions about building parallel institutions (BRICS, SCO) as alternatives to Bretton Woods and a more plural security order, including the idea of a pan-European, post-American European security framework. - Civilizational and identity dynamics: The dialogue highlights decolonial tendencies in Ukraine, cautioning that portraying Russia as an imperial relic risks domestic and international instability (purging culture, language, media, and political parties). Solzhenitsyn’s observation about Russians and Ukrainians being both brotherly and destabilizing is invoked to illustrate the double-edged sword of deep cultural ties. Sakwa argues for a nation-building Ukraine that is distinct from Russia while not being anti-Russian, to avoid inflaming internal and regional security tensions. - European strategic trajectory and a post-American Europe: The conversation critiques ongoing European war-centering and NATO expansion, warning that a divided Europe risks becoming dependent on the US and vulnerable to external powers, including China. Sakwa advocates a pan-continental vision—potentially a North Eurasian confederation—rooted in UN Charter norms and multilateral cooperation, rather than renewed bloc confrontation. He fears the United Nations system itself is deteriorating under great-power politics, as seen in US withdrawals and the politicization of international bodies. - Outlook and optimism: Both speakers acknowledge a subdued optimism about small openings for diplomacy but remain broadly pessimistic about rapid resolution. Sakwa emphasizes the need for new ideas and a reimagined security architecture, warning that the current trajectory risks prolonging conflict and deepening divisions. In closing, Sakwa stresses that diplomacy is on the agenda but remains uncertain in its effectiveness, with a wary prognosis for a quick end to the war. The discussion underscores that resolving Ukraine’s crisis requires addressing deep-rooted structural issues across Ukrainian internal politics, Russo-Ukrainian relations, European security order, US–Russia dynamics, and broader civilizational narratives, while pursuing a cooperative, rules-based international framework.

Putin initially tried to prevent the war and sought a diplomatic solution. He negotiated with Ukraine, focusing on Crimea. However, his main concern was NATO expansion into Ukraine. If Ukraine had remained neutral, the war might have been avoided. But the US and UK intervened, pressuring Ukraine to abandon negotiations. In 2022, it seemed possible for Ukraine and the West to win, but 2023 has been disastrous for Ukraine, and now it appears Russia will emerge victorious.

The Ukraine conflict didn't begin with Putin's 2022 invasion; it's rooted in broken promises dating back to 1990. The US, despite assurances to Gorbachev that NATO wouldn't expand eastward, violated this agreement, starting with NATO expansion in 1999. This was followed by NATO bombing of Serbia in 1999 and the placement of missile systems in Eastern Europe, viewed by Russia as a direct threat. Further US involvement included the 2004 and 2014 Ukrainian regime changes. Despite Putin's initial pro-Western stance and his 2021 proposal for a security agreement barring NATO expansion, the West's continued support for Ukraine escalated the conflict. The narrative of Putin as a madman is a misrepresentation; this is a complex geopolitical game with potentially devastating consequences.

I predicted missiles would hit Poland near the defense pact area. Though the missiles were blown up before detonating, telemetry showed it wasn't Russia, despite Zelensky's insistence. The Nord Stream pipeline was also blamed on Russia, despite a lack of motive, and Biden's prior threat. They're now attacking nuclear power plants, including Chernobyl, risking a meltdown to blame on Russia. Zelensky, a puppet with a Napoleon complex, demands Trump seek his permission before speaking with Putin and wants nukes. The US funds most of Ukraine's operations, but Trump wants to cut off the money and leave Russia alone. Europe's defense ministers plan for a 20-30 year war with Russia for global control. Trump is dismantling the bureaucracy while the establishment panics.

I called Zelenskyy a welfare queen because he's constantly asking for money with arrogance, despite billions already unaccounted for. We're working to protect his borders while ours are ignored. His wife shops in Paris, and Ukrainian oligarchs buy yachts. I've had no respect for him since day one. Trump's approach was refreshing, considering how much Zelenskyy has taken from America without respect. He wears military fatigues, acting downtrodden, but he's been on magazine covers and wanted to attend the Oscars. I believe all politicians lie, so I analyzed speeches and transcripts. Putin stated NATO's eastward expansion violated prior assurances when the Berlin Wall fell. We're the aggressors, not him, pushing NATO expansion. Zelenskyy has suspended elections, locked down churches and nuns. I don't like him at all.

The British people deserve an explanation for a significant failure that was not due to chance or oversight. This situation arose from deliberate policy changes aimed at liberalizing immigration. Brexit was leveraged to transform Britain into an experiment in open borders, encapsulated by the slogan "Global Britain." This approach lacked public support, yet it was pursued while downplaying its existence.

I predicted yesterday's events accurately. I don't believe Russia would ever allow Ukraine to join NATO, regardless of who is in power. I believe the war began because Biden stated Ukraine could join NATO, which he shouldn't have done. I knew then that war was inevitable, and I was right. This war is Biden's fault, not Putin's. Biden is incompetent, and saying Ukraine could join NATO was foolish. His comment about a "minor incursion" being acceptable was also a mistake.

I met Prime Minister Orban 36 years ago and saw in him vision, energy, and foresight. The Ukraine war resulted from the US's idea to expand NATO eastward, ignoring promises made to Russia. Yesterday was historic; Trump and Putin spoke, and the defense secretary admitted Ukraine won't join NATO, forming a basis for peace. For 30 years, America played a "game of risk," seeking world hegemony, but Rubio now acknowledges a multipolar world. Europe is befuddled as the US reverses course. I told European leaders this project wouldn't work; Russia sees it as life or death. ExpressVPN shields your online activity. We need rational conversations in foreign policy, not attacks based on motive. The problem is the arrogance of power.

Glenn: Welcome back. We are joined today by Professor John Mersheimer to understand what is happening in the world with this new great power rivalry and how the outcome of the Ukraine war will impact this new Cold War. Have we entered a new Cold War? Who are the players, competing interests, and the rules? Mersheimer: I think we have entered a new Cold War. We're in a multipolar system, and the United States, China, and Russia are the three great powers. The United States is certainly in a cold war with China. China is powerful and threatens to dominate East Asia, and the United States will almost certainly go to great lengths to prevent that from happening, which axiomatically creates an intense security competition in China. An intense security competition is a cold war, and the name of the game is to make sure that security competition does not turn into a hot war. We are in a cold war with the Chinese, or the Chinese are in a cold war with us. The hot war is avoided. Regarding Russia, since we moved into multipolarity, the Russians and the Chinese have been close allies against the United States. This is largely a result of the Ukraine war, which has pushed the Russians into the arms of the Chinese and caused closer Sino-Russian cooperation. The United States, through the Biden administration, was involved in a cold war with both Russia and China. Trump tried to change that, seeking good relations with Russia to form a Russia-plus-US alliance against China, but he has been unable to make that happen. The result is that the United States is basically still in a cold war with both Russia and China. The war in Ukraine has made me worry greatly that the Cold War in Europe could turn into a hot war, even as the U.S.-China relationship remains cooler so far. Glenn: European leaders hoped the United States and Europe would unite in this new Cold War, with liberal hegemony fading and a return to unity against Russia. But Ukraine has instead divided Europe. How do you explain this? Is it the US not seeing Russia as the same threat as Europeans, or a concern about pushing Russia toward China, or Europe’s costs of the partnership? Is this uniquely a Trump-era approach? Mersheimer: From an American point of view, good relations with Russia make sense. China is the peer competitor, and the United States wants to pivot to East Asia to prevent China’s dominance. Russia is the weakest of the three great powers and not a major threat to Europe. The Americans believe Europe can deal with Russia, freeing them to focus on China. Europe, by contrast, is threatened by Russia’s proximity and thus prioritizes Russia. NATO expansion into Ukraine is seen by many Europeans as a disaster, poisoning Russia–Europe relations, making Europe deeply committed to using Ukraine to weaken Russia. The transatlantic alliance becomes strained, especially with Trump raising the possibility of leaving NATO. Europeans fear losing the American pacifier that keeps centrifugal forces in check, which would complicate European coordination with Russia. Glenn: If the United States signals a departure, won’t Europe face greater challenges in managing Russia? And is Russia truly an empire-building threat, or is this a post-2014 narrative that intensified after February 2022? Mersheimer: Bringing Ukraine into NATO was destined to cause trouble. The crisis began in 2014, and the 2022 war is ongoing. The Ukrainians and Europeans want a security guarantee for Ukraine, essentially NATO membership, while Russia demands territory and rejects a security guarantee that would enshrine NATO’s presence near its borders. The Europeans see NATO expansion as threatening, while the Americans view Russia as the weaker power and the need to pivot to China. The controversy over responsibility for this disaster arises from competing interpretations of NATO expansion and Russian aggression. Glenn: Do you see Russia changing course soon? There has been escalation—Odessa blockades, port attacks, and targeting infrastructure. Could this signal a new stage of the war? Mersheimer: The Russians believe Ukraine is on the ropes and expect to win on the battlefield in 2026, possibly expanding fronts in Kharkiv and Sumy. They may consider increasing conventional force and possibly using nuclear weapons if the war drags on. They view the conflict as existential and fear losing, which could push them toward drastic measures to end the war. The Russians could escalate if they think they cannot win conventionally. Glenn: What are the non-nuclear options to win quickly? Could the Russians deliver a decisive conventional victory? Mersheimer: It’s a war of attrition. If Ukraine’s army is weakened, Russia could surround large Ukrainian formations, disrupt logistics, and open larger fronts. They may build up forces in the rear, potentially for a breakthrough or to deter Western escalation. The battlefield outcome may determine the next steps, including whether nuclear options are considered. Glenn: How will Ukraine end? Is it a military defeat, economic collapse, or political fragmentation? Mersheimer: Ukraine is likely to be defeated on the battlefield. Its economy is in desperate shape, and losing Odessa or more territory would worsen it. Politically, Ukraine will face internal divisions once the war ends. Europe will face a broken Russia–Ukraine relationship, with some European states viewing the conflict differently. Ukraine’s demographic decline compounds its bleak outlook, and the country may become a problematic rump state. The war should have been settled earlier; the negotiators in Istanbul in 2022 could have sought a different path. Zelensky’s choice to align with Western powers and walk away from Istanbul negotiations deepened Ukraine’s predicament. Glenn: Any final reflections? Mersheimer: The war’s outcome will reshape Western unity and European security. Historians may view this as a major mistake in weakening the West. The blame for the disaster will likely be attributed in the West to Russia’s imperialism, but the expansion of NATO is also central. Europe’s economic and political landscape will be altered, and Ukraine’s future will be deeply challenging.