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We're at a point now where the Russian military has all of the advantages. They have mastered drone warfare. And I bring that up because that's the way the fighting's done now. The day of, you know, mass tank attacks and all this is over. You put a thousand tanks online and move them towards a drone equipped enemy, and you'll have a thousand smoking hulks. You can't do mass infantry attacks. You have to break your teams up into smaller teams. You have to break the battlefield up into smaller chunks. There's nothing that can be done. Nothing can be done to stop this. The advantage is 100% Russia, and we're looking at the Ukrainians on the verge of total collapse. This is why you're seeing 10 kilometers in a day here. Unpressured because the Ukrainians have nothing to plug the hole.

Glenn (Speaker 0) argues that the idea Russia started the war merely for territory is nonsense and that NATO’s involvement is not genuinely helping Ukraine; he says “This is NATO’s war. Nothing we’re doing is actually helping Ukraine. They’re an instrument. They’re a tool.” He contends the conflict began as a failure to build a common European security architecture, and that Russian demands are high, making a peace settlement unlikely. He defines victory in a war of attrition as exhausting the adversary first, suggesting Russia would prefer a neutral Ukraine without NATO, and that if Ukraine remains in NATO orbit, Russia would rather take Odessa. He asserts that NATO expansion revived Cold War logic and that Ukraine’s neutrality was the original Russian objective. He argues that Ukraine’s current war losses and economic strain indicate Russia’s advantage, and claims NATO support has not truly helped Ukraine, noting that in his view NATO and Western actions have been a driver of the conflict, including claims about Istanbul, Minsk, and the 2014 coup. Jonathan (Speaker 1) pushes back on several points. He says the war is not solely about territory and disputes Glenn’s claim that NATO’s role is responsible for the conflict. He emphasizes that if this were simply about NATO, NATO could have destroyed Russia by arming Ukraine more aggressively, yet “they could have done it so much more, effectively,” implying NATO has not fully acted. He sees both sides as losing in a prolonged attritional battle and notes that neither side has achieved decisive victory due to limits on production, economies, and allied support. He argues the conflict is about more than territory and rejects the idea that NATO guarantees Ukraine’s security; he questions whether NATO would credibly defend an attacked ally in Europe. He says the Maidan movement in 2014 was organic and not fully orchestrated by the US, though he concedes US influence existed. He disputes Glenn’s claims about Western NGOs and American orchestration, and he highlights that many Ukrainians initially favored non-NATO paths, with polls showing limited appetite for NATO membership before 2014. He also contends that Ukraine’s future lies beyond mere territorial concessions, pointing to the EU’s role and the broader security order, and he warns that negotiations with a “mafia cabal” running Moscow are unlikely to yield lasting peace, arguing that Putin’s governance frames negotiations as instrumental and potentially destabilizing. Speaker 2 (moderator) asks for reactions to ongoing developments, including Trump and Kushner’s involvement, Putin’s aides’ statements about known positions and lack of progress, and questions about what Russia truly seeks: Donbas control or preventing Ukraine from joining NATO. The participants discuss definitions of “winning” in a war of attrition, the role and credibility of NATO guarantees, and the strategic importance of neutrality versus alliance membership. They debate whether Russia values a neutral Ukraine with security guarantees or insists on broader concessions, and whether Ukraine could ever be secure without a credible deterrent. Glenn asserts that there was never credible deterrence in Ukraine prior to 2014, while Jonathan argues that NATO’s efficacy and unity are questionable, with concerns about member states’ commitments and the real level of Western support. On NATO and security guarantees, Glenn maintains that true security for Ukraine would come from a non-NATO arrangement that prevents Ukraine from becoming a future proxy battleground, suggesting limited, carefully designed guarantees could be acceptable, but that any path toward NATO-like intrusion would be unacceptable. Jonathan says NATO is not delivering credible security and emphasizes that EU membership and security arrangements also factor into Russia’s calculations, with the European Union potentially offering security commitments if Ukraine joined, though that possibility remains contentious for Moscow. They discuss the costs of war, civilian impact, and the global economic ripple effects, including potential impacts on food prices and shipping routes if Russia responds to Ukrainian actions against its maritime traffic. Towards the end, they forecast no immediate peace and emphasize unpredictability due to Western political shifts, central bank asset issues, and external actors like China, North Korea, and Trump’s stance. Glenn predicts Ukraine’s military unraveling and a weakening economy, while Jonathan stresses that a peace deal remains unlikely under current leadership, with outcomes dependent on Western resolve and external support. The conversation closes with a sense that the next months will be dangerous and uncertain, with the broader international order potentially shifting as the conflict persists.

Stanislav Krapivnik and the host discuss the current phase of the war in Ukraine, focusing on the southern front around Zaporizhzhia and the broader strategic implications. - On the southern front, the Russians are advancing along the Zaporizhzhia axis, with the last defensible Ukrainian positions in the area being Arakha (Orakhivka) and Zaporizhzhia city. Gulyaipol has fallen after Russians breached a fortified eastern line by exploiting open terrain and flanking from the east; the Ukrainians’ straight-line northern assaults into Gulyaipol are described as unsustainable under heavy drone and open-ground fire. Russian forces have moved along the river edge and toward a 15-kilometer radius from Zaporizhzhia City, entering suburban zones and pressing east to overhang Arakha from the north. Zaporizhzhia City itself is an open terrain area with a major bridge over the Nieper; the speaker asserts it would be hard to hold under drone and air superiority, and predicts a ruinous but ultimately unsustainable defense there. - The Russians have established a corridor along the river edge, with continued advances toward the eastern outskirts and suburbia north of Zaporizhzhia City. From there, a potential northward push could flank from the south toward Krivyi Rih and Nikolaev, creating a threat toward Odessa if a bridgehead across Kherson is rebuilt and maintained. The argument is that taking Nikolaev is a prerequisite to threatening Odessa and that control of Kherson remains a strategic hinge. - Ukraine’s attempts to retake territory are described as costly and often ineffective PR moves, including “suicidal” assaults on Gulyaipol where fighters up on exposed ground are eliminated by drone and artillery fire. The Russians are said to have flanked Ukrainian positions with new lines north of fortified areas, rolling up fortifications and leaving Ukrainian defenders with few exits. - In the north and center, fighting around Konstantinovka continues, with a southwest push into the area and Ukraine concentrating reserves to stop it. Kosytivka is described as about 65% surrounded, Mirnograd and Pokrovsk are said to be effectively finished, though small pockets hold out. In Sumy and Kharkiv directions, new incursions are occurring but are relatively small; the border is being “flattened” or straightened as Ukraine’s reserves are used. - Weather and terrain play a critical role. Mud, freezing and thaw cycles, fog, rain, and wind hamper heavy mechanized movement and drone operations. Western equipment struggles in mud due to narrow tracks, while Russian equipment with wider tracks traverses better but still encounters problems. Drones do not fly well in fog or rain, and heavy winds impede operations; Russia is leveraging fog to move infantry in close combat. - The broader war and geopolitics are discussed. Ukraine’s energy infrastructure is a major target; European willingness to sustain support is framed as a bandage on a jugular wound, insufficient for a long-term victory. The host notes a perceived drift in European strategy, with French signals of compromise and American mediation and hints at how US priorities ( Greenland, Iceland, Iran, Cuba) could pull attention away from Ukraine. The Arashnik hypersonic system is described as capable of delivering a devastating plasma envelope and kinetic energy, with the potential to destroy bunkers and infrastructure anywhere in the world. - On the strategic horizon, there is skepticism about negotiations. The guest dismisses talk of a near-term deal and describes the last 10% of a push as the “bridge too far,” arguing that Russian gains in Donbas, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson are eroding Western leverage as they advance kilometer-by-kilometer. Zelensky is portrayed as a stationed beneficiary whose personal and backers’ financial interests may drive bargaining positions, with claims that he does not care about Ukrainians and is motivated by extraction from the conflict. - The guest contends that a gradual Russian advance, backed by logistics and local tactical wins, is more likely than a dramatic collapse, while insisting that a full-scale nuclear exchange between Russia and Europe remains unlikely unless the United States and NATO become deeply involved. The Arashnik discussion notes the potential for a limited exchange, but emphasizes Russia’s stated preference not to escalate, arguing Russia would not “want Europe” but would respond decisively if pushed. - The discussion also touches on global logistics and Western cohesion. A veteran anecdote about US military logistics in 2002 is used to illustrate how NATO’s naval and merchant fleets depend on non-Western partners for transport, underscoring European vulnerability in sustained conflict. Mercedes-Benz re-registering in Russia is noted as a sign of shifting economic realities, with wider implications for European-company strategy amid sanctions and isolation. - The program ends with a return to the practicalities of ongoing combat—daily casualties, the erosion of Ukrainian defensive lines, and the intensifying pressure on Ukrainian supply and morale—before signing off.

Stanislav Krapivnik, a former US army officer from Donbas, returns to discuss the escalation of NATO-Russia proxy warfare, the role of drones, and potential strategic escalations. The conversation centers on how Europe is contributing to deep strikes in Russia, especially against energy installations, and the resulting danger of a broader conflict. Key points and claims, as presented: - Drones and deep strikes: The EU, through its defense alignment, aims to overwhelm Russian air defenses and threaten strategic assets, including nuclear-capable targets, by using long-range drones. The objective is to degrade Russian defensive systems and the production rate of missiles, potentially opening the path to strikes on radars, early warning systems, strategic assets like bombers, and even nuclear submarines in port. - Nuclear war risk: The interviewee asserts that by mid-to-late summer there could be a zone of possible nuclear war if ground warfare arises or escalates due to Western actions. He notes that Russia’s anti-aircraft and early warning capabilities are limited to manageable scopes, with occasional corridors allowing strikes in, and that Europe’s current strategy could push the conflict toward a nuclear dimension. - Deterrence and first strikes: The discussion contrasts U.S. first-strike doctrine with other nations’ second-strike assurances. The speaker argues that in a blinded Russia, the logic for targeted first strikes becomes stronger for the other side, while lamenting that Europe’s leadership might be pushing toward a nuclear exchange. He cites studies suggesting that as few as 47 key targets could collapse the U.S. in a nuclear context, highlighting the fragility of a high-tech economy under nuclear disruption. - European psyche and policy: There is criticism of what the speaker describes as a mass psychosis in Europe, where warnings about striking Russia’s early radar or deterrent systems are dismissed in favor of defending Ukraine. The rhetoric suggests deep political and media reinforcement of pro-Ukraine narratives, with limited space for risk discussion about nuclear consequences. - Energy installations and economy: While drone strikes have targeted oil facilities, the speaker notes that most damage has been to storage facilities rather than critical infrastructure like pipelines or refineries. Refineries are large, and damage to some vessels can take longer to repair. Russia’s production has not been significantly reduced, but the attacks are accelerating a shift of energy facilities eastward toward Asia, while Europe faces higher oil prices on the spot market and potential disruptions to gas routes like TurkStream and Caspian Pipeline Authority, with broader economic impact on Southeastern Europe and Turkey. - Russia’s response and drone modernization: The Russian military has reorganized its drone capabilities, forming dedicated drone battalions and establishing new schools to standardize and professionalize drone operations. The move encompasses reconnaissance, kamikaze, bombing, and supply drones, with adjustments after initial disorganization. Ukrainians reportedly helped inspire and provide drone countermeasures, and Russia’s modernization integrates drones with air defenses. - Zelensky and Victory Day threat: The possibility of Zelensky threatening to strike Moscow’s Victory Day parade is discussed. The guest suggests Zelensky would want to be at the head of such a move, while acknowledging the uncertainty of who controls decisions in Kyiv and the level of Western involvement. The parade’s downscaled format is noted, but the broader question remains whether such a strike could occur. The guest asserts that Russian deterrence may have been eroded, and Western actors might not take credible deterrence seriously until an incident occurs. - Africa and Mali: Russia’s activities in Africa, especially Mali, are described as significant. Mali’s leadership under Asimi Goata is navigating between Western and Russian influence. Russian forces, including elements from the former Wagner group now under the Russian defense ministry, are described as rebuilding Mali’s military and supporting a campaign by jihadist groups. The situation includes rapid, mobile “flying columns” that can cause chaos but lack staying power against organized defenses. Russian drones and aviation (including ME-20 aircraft) are reportedly effective, and Mali is moving toward energy and resource development, including three nuclear power plants proposed by Russia to Elektrify the country. France’s position is framed as colonial, with Mali’s uranium, gold, and other resources creating strategic interest. Burkina Faso’s involvement and regional dynamics involving Niger are cited as part of a broader, expanding conflict network across Africa. - Global frontlines and war risk: The guest argues that multiple frontlines are forming—Ukraine, the Persian Gulf, and Western Africa—and that they could merge into a single broader conflict if not stopped. He asserts that the West is driving this escalation, and he characterizes Western public sentiment as often indifferent to Ukrainian casualties, focusing instead on political or financial gains from the conflict. - Frontline realities: On the ground, Ukraine has tactical successes but limited staying power due to heavy casualties and supply problems. Russian forces are reportedly stronger in Donbas, Kherson, and Sumy, while Ukrainian forces face difficult conditions, including open fields and heavy artillery advantages for the Russians. Drone warfare has prompted reorganized Russian drone corps, with improved training and standardized units. The discussion ends with a warning that the conflict has global implications, with fronts expanding and risks of a broader, possibly world-scale war if not curtailed. The interviewee emphasizes that the West’s actions are fueling escalation and that African theaters, particularly Mali, are becoming an integral part of the wider confrontation.

Colonel Douglas MacGregor discussed escalating conflicts involving Iran and Europe, arguing that renewed fighting is likely and that current ceasefire dynamics favor increased damage on both sides. He said the United States is “loaded to the gills” with air and naval munitions and aircraft and that there appears to be a similar amount of ammunition in reserve, which would allow an intense campaign to last “five to seven days” rather than a shorter, first-wave bombardment. He argued targeting would be an attempt to determine which air and naval target sets could compel Iran to collapse or surrender, while noting CIA-linked reporting that Iran emerged from the last round with “virtually 90%” intact, implying further Iranian readiness. MacGregor said both sides also appear to have added capabilities: claims included Russian additional radars and Chinese additional missiles, including a new cruise missile designed to sink ships at sea out to 300 kilometers, with some Russian and Chinese technicians allegedly operating systems on the ground. He stated he expected major damage this time, especially that Iran would “finish off the oil infrastructure on the West Side Of The Persian Gulf,” and that Iran might also attack desalination plants critical to Saudi Arabia, arguing that destroying the Al Shaba’il facility could force Riyadh to evacuate the capital due to lack of drinking water. He described the moment as one reflecting “a certain level of desperation” tied to Donald Trump and Benjamin Netanyahu, and said “every conceivable form of attack” would be used with far more intensity, short of a nuclear weapon. On reported differences between Trump and Netanyahu, MacGregor said he believes there is likely a split but also portrayed Trump as constrained with “no easy exit.” He compared Trump to “Hotel California,” asserting he wants to check out but cannot. He said Trump’s obligations to Israeli interests and donors, plus the lack of maneuver room, create pressure to restart war if pause outcomes don’t lead to a favorable path. He also outlined potential constraints on any prolonged campaign, including low strategic petroleum reserve levels by “the end of June, the beginning of July,” limits on crude exports needed to support U.S. refining, issues with exporting shale oil due to refinery mismatch, and broader financial stress if long-term bond yields rise toward “the 5% ceiling.” He argued gold replacing the dollar and “battle between bricks and The US dominated Western financial system” could undermine the ability to sustain war, framing this as a squeeze on Trump if the conflict continues. MacGregor then shifted to Ukraine and long-range drone strikes. He said flight paths and targeting for long-range Ukrainian drone strikes have been provided by American military capability and that U.S. surveillance aircraft and satellites have mapped refineries, oil derricks, airfields, and other strategic installations in Russia. He argued Russia has limited options besides “revenge strikes” because Ukrainians lack ground offensive capability and described Russian patience running out as public pressure grows to “crush this or declare war or both.” He tied Western escalation risk to European political and social dynamics, saying Europe’s policies have become economically and culturally destructive and that Germany is “on the edge of exploding,” which could drive a shift in European stance. He also argued the Baltic states facilitate or tolerate drone-strike operations and that European decisions aiding long-range drone construction are dangerous, with potential escalation if Russia believes it must strike directly. When asked whether the U.S. would come to the rescue if Article 5 were invoked, he said the United States would not use nuclear weapons and that missile inventories could be largely depleted, arguing attrition would likely favor Russia and China because they can produce more. In concluding, MacGregor returned to the Persian Gulf and U.S. posture, saying Americans are “finished in the Middle East” if the U.S. cannot break Iran’s grip on the Persian Gulf and force a return. He reiterated his long-held view that forward military presence is obsolete because bases are target arrays vulnerable to ballistic missiles and cruise missiles, and he argued defense is superior to offense under current conditions. He compared the danger of renewed conflict to needing to choose between Persian Gulf realities and financial-system pressures, ending with the question of “which one is gonna break first.”

- The conversation opens with a discussion of escalating dynamics in the Ukraine conflict as a new year begins, focusing on how the rules of war have shifted over the past four years, including the depth of NATO involvement and when actions cross into direct war. The speakers note that political leadership has largely been exempt from the war, but Russia has had opportunities to strike Ukrainian leaders that have been avoided, raising questions about future targets and the diplomatic path. - Speaker 1 argues that the political leadership has indeed been outside the war, and that voices inside Russia are growing more critical. They challenge the Western portrayal of Vladimir Putin as a dictator, suggesting Putin has restrained destruction that could hit the West, and asserting that the West and Zelenskyy have grown comfortable with exemptions. They warn that continued escalation could lead to a nuclear conflict with Europe at risk due to its geographic compactness, citing the potential fallout from attacks on American nuclear bases and the broader geopolitical consequences. - The discussion moves to the potential consequences of Western strikes on energy infrastructure and frontline energy targets, including refineries and civilian vessels. The speakers examine how Russia might respond if its assets are attacked at sea or in the Black Sea, and the possibility of Russia forcing Ukraine to lose access to the Black Sea through strategic military actions. The analysis includes a few provocative specifics: British and European actors allegedly orchestrating or enabling attacks, the role of third-country-flagged ships, and the idea that reflagging to Russian flags could be treated as an act of war by Russia. - The dialogue delves into the operational dynamics of the Mediterranean and Black Sea theatres, noting incidents such as sunflowers and other oil cargo damage, the Caspian transit company's facilities, and the implications for Turkish oil revenue and Western economies. The speakers argue that Western powers are drawing in broader international actors and that the war could expand beyond Ukraine, potentially dragging in NATO ships and submarines in a conflict at sea. They warn that if escalation continues, it could trigger a broader, more destructive war in Europe. - The conversation shifts to the likely trajectory of the battlefield, with Speaker 1 offering a grim assessment: the Donbas front and the Zaporozhye region are nearing collapse for Ukrainian forces, with Russian forces dominating missile and drone capabilities and outmaneuvering on three axes. The analysis suggests that within two to three months, upper-river-front areas, including the Zaporozhzhia and surrounding Donbas fronts, could be fully compromised, leaving only a few large urban pockets. The absence of civilian protection and the encirclement of cities would accelerate Ukrainian withdrawals and surrender, while Russia could enhance pressure on remaining fronts, including Donbas and Sumy, Kharkiv, and Dnieper regions, as weather and terrain favor Russian movements. - The speakers discuss the impact of collapsing command posts and morale, likening the abandonment of Gudai Poia to a sign of impending broader collapse, with open terrain making Ukrainian forces vulnerable to rapid Russian breakthroughs. They suggest that strategic fortifications will be overwhelmed as the front line collapses and supply lines are severed, with a predicted sequence of encirclements and city sieges. - The US role is analyzed as both a negotiator and strategist, with the assertion that the United States has long led the proxy dimension of the conflict and continues to influence targeting and weapons delivery. The discussion questions the coherence of US policy under Trump versus Biden, arguing the conflict remains a US-led enterprise despite attempts to reframe or outsources it. The speakers describe the US as hedging its bets through ongoing military support, budgets, and intelligence cooperation, while insisting that Ukraine remains a core objective of US hegemony. - A critical examination of European Union leadership follows, with strong claims that the EU is increasingly tyrannical and undemocratic, sanctioning dissidents andSuppressing speech. The dialogue condemns the deplatforming of individuals and argues that the EU’s leadership has undermined diplomacy and negotiated peace, instead pushing toward a broader confrontation with Russia. The speakers suggest that several European countries and elites are pursuing escalating policies to maintain power, even at the risk of deepening European instability and economic collapse. - The conversation ends with reflections on broader historical patterns, invoking Kennan’s warnings about NATO expansion and the risk of Russian backlash, and noting the potential for the EU to fracture under pressure. The participants acknowledge the risk of a wider conflict that could redefine global power and economic structures, while expressing concern about censorship, deplatforming, and the erosion of diplomacy as barriers to resolving the crisis. They conclude with a cautious note to prepare for worst-case scenarios and hope for, but not rely on, better circumstances in the near term.

Jiang Shuichin argues that rapid shifts in international power generally become highly disruptive and destabilizing, often coinciding with major world-order changes after major wars or state collapses. He says the Iran war could have wider ramifications beyond the Strait of Hormuz and the region, potentially dragging the broader world into escalating conflict. He explains that the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) has long been a major driver of the global economy by selling oil cheaply in US dollars and recycling revenue into the US economy. If GCC states were removed from the global economy, he says it would have “tremendous consequences.” He claims that within “a month or two” the world could run out of strategic fuel reserves, grounding airplanes. He also links the conflict to global food supply, stating that the Tigray War provides one third of the world’s fertilizer, and that during the global growing season widespread famine could occur within “five months” or “six months,” especially in Africa. On the Middle East’s reorientation, he argues that Iran can control the Strait of Hormuz de facto, collect tolls, and de facto use it to reconstruct its economy, industrialize, and build stronger trade relations with China and Russia. He says the US imposed a naval blockade to embargo Iranian oil exports to China, but that enforcement is difficult due to the Indian Ocean’s scale and US resource limitations. He asserts that the UAE is “most desperate for war” after losing control of trade through the region’s shipping and finance hub. He adds that Saudi Arabia faces long-term threat dynamics because Iranian influence and proxies affect both Hormuz/Straight security and the Red Sea. He claims Israel wants the war to continue to advance the “Greater Israel” project and warns it has discussed attacking Turkey and Egypt next. He frames the region as a “powder keg,” arguing it is hard for the status quo to persist and predicting possible future breakout regional hostilities, including possible US airstrikes against Tehran and possible Israeli false-flag escalation modeled on the Gulf of Tonkin incident. He suggests the status quo could last “the next three to five months,” arguing Trump would avoid being seen as a loser and might pursue a tentative agreement before shifting attention elsewhere. He presents Cuba as a potential “next global flash point,” arguing the US embargo blocks Cuba from accessing fuel, food, and water, and that Raúl Castro could be indicted, recalling a prior pattern involving Maduro and special forces. He says Russia is heavily invested in Cuba and that both Russia and China are trying to support it. He predicts the Middle East conflict could expand to other flashpoints worldwide, including the possibility of tensions involving North Korea and South Korea, and he claims the war in Europe will also escalate. In discussing Russia’s Ukraine war trajectory, he references an attack on a student dormitory in Luhansk that reportedly killed at least six students and says Putin promised swift retaliation, framing this as potential movement from a “special military operation” toward declaring war and switching to “total war.” He then argues that European elites are trapped in a self-reinforcing fantasy that Ukraine is winning, describing domestic and institutional dynamics that prevent acknowledgment of losses and sustain continued war support. Regarding China’s and Russia’s roles, he says Iranian Foreign Minister Araki visited both Russia and China and claims Putin told him Russia is supportive of the Iranian people and views the US and Israel as aggressors. He says if Iran faces difficulties, Russia would reinforce Iran through the Caspian Sea and describes Russia’s response to GCC complaints about Iran. He contrasts China’s approach as neutral and mediation-focused, arguing China seeks peace and ceasefire so the world can return to global trade and that China refuses a clear stance. He also claims China might sign an agreement with the US to buy more LNG to compensate for lost Middle East LNG, especially Qatar. He describes negotiations between the US and Iran as having “three sticking points.” The uranium issue, he says, could allow compromise through allowing international inspectors while keeping uranium. The Strait of Hormuz control, he says, is core to Iranian security and not something Iran would give up. The third sticking point is Lebanon and the requirement that any peace treaty with the US also applies to Lebanon, including Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon. He argues that Israel’s offensive in Lebanon makes lasting peace unlikely and suggests any settlement with Iran would be tentative and could resume within “at most six months.” He argues the US cannot retreat from the Iran war because US financing needs depend on the world continuing to buy US Treasuries and because continuous bombardment is limited by depleted munitions stocks after earlier sustained airstrikes. He states that to “fight this war effectively” the US would need ground troops, which he says would require a national draft and also a chain of events to justify the invasion, including a need for “justification” to rally Americans and create broader economic chaos that would make the invasion acceptable. On Israel’s “Greater Israel” project, he argues that Lebanon is part of the project and that even if the US and Iran reach tentative terms, Israel’s long-term objective would continue, preventing permanent peace. He also claims the Zionist lobby has significant political sway in the US and cites campaign spending aimed at defeating a Republican congressman to warn others. He further argues that conflict models in Europe and Asia are tied to a broader US grand strategy: shifting global conflict to sustain debt and delay economic constraints. He says the US would aim to retreat geographically while still financing and arming partners to prolong wars. For East Asia, he claims the US might allow Japan and South Korea to handle more while American forces and allied structures support containment dynamics. Finally, he argues that Taiwan’s status quo is not sustainable and points to a “grand bargain” after Trump’s China visit. He says Western reporting frames the visit as unproductive, while Chinese media and experts view it as a breakthrough that could end the trade war. He claims the bargain could involve US access to China’s financial market and China opposing Taiwan independence, with the US pausing or blocking a weapons shipment to Taiwan and considering onshoring semiconductors. He states he expects Taiwan to be a future flashpoint only near-term at minimum and argues the next major flashpoint could be North Korea rather than Taiwan. He closes by describing a Western “legitimacy crisis,” attributing it to demographic crisis, financialization, and moral decay, and arguing it will lead to a decline of Western society. He also argues immigration debates are framed as purely pro-immigrant versus racist, while culture and cultural cohesion are not addressed.

Glenn discusses growing fears that the Russia-Ukraine conflict is approaching a “third world war,” citing weekend attacks on Moscow, claims of Western assistance to Ukraine, and attacks “coming from NATO territory” without permission from Baltic states and Finland. He notes Europe mass-producing or intending to mass-produce long-range strike weapons to strike deep inside Russia, and asks Professor John Mearsheimer how events may develop, what options Russia has, and what futures lie ahead. Mearsheimer says Ukrainians are escalating against the Russian homeland. Earlier in the war they relied mainly on missiles under limits from Europeans and Americans; now they have turned to drones and developed a significant drone force capable of striking into Russia. He argues drone damage is not enough to affect the war’s outcome meaningfully, but warns the danger is continued escalation: drone attacks rising over time, and later missiles being added, resulting in combined missile-and-drone attacks on Russia. He says the key question is what Russia will do in response. He reports that Sergei Karaganov argues Russia should strike European targets to send a signal that actions are unacceptable, starting with conventional weapons and then—if necessary—nuclear weapons. Mearsheimer says Karaganov claims that while the idea was previously a minority view, now most Russians Mearsheimer speaks to agree, arguing Russia is “fed up” and that escalating attacks on the Russian homeland are unacceptable. Glenn suggests further escalation may occur beyond retaliation, including more brutal attacks on Ukraine and conventional attacks against countries such as Germany or Estonia, and raises discussions about Ukraine possibly “liberating Moldova” from Transnistria, where thousands of Russian troops are present, as another escalation pathway. Mearsheimer frames the conflicts as lacking bargaining space—comparing them to the Iran conflict between Iran and the United States/Israel. He says both sides see the other as an existential threat, leaving no room for negotiation, and that desperation drives risky behavior. Regarding diplomacy, Glenn questions how diplomacy can fail repeatedly. Mearsheimer says there is “zero bargaining space” because Russia sees Ukraine and European positions as existential threats, while Europe and Ukraine increasingly view Russia’s success in Ukraine as an existential threat. He adds that the United States does not view Russia as an existential threat, implying Trump is willing to bargain, but Europeans and Ukrainians do not want to negotiate the deal Trump proposes. He says Trump may have “washed his hands” of a diplomatic settlement and believes the war must be settled on the battlefield. Glenn then asks whether the United States would join if Russia struck Estonia. Mearsheimer says Karaganov’s framework involves attacking NATO countries with conventional weapons, which in the past would almost guarantee U.S. involvement. He says it is unclear what Trump would do, but emphasizes that once escalation begins, nuclear weapons are in the background. He describes the escalation ladder as being “felt in the dark,” where nuclear use is a rung that everyone wants to avoid, giving nuclear threats “huge deterrent value.” Glenn returns to deterrence and escalation dynamics, suggesting NATO is overly confident Russia is deterred, while Russia waits and then takes bigger steps. Mearsheimer says even limited conventional missile strikes into NATO countries—killing hardly anyone—would be a huge step because they would strike NATO members. He also argues Russia is winning the war and that drones have slowed Russian territory gains, making progress incremental. He concludes that slow battlefield progress, no bargaining space, and rising homeland attacks make serious escalation likely, and that Russia may only need a major conventional step to trigger a “gigantic leap forward.” He further argues narrative incentives increase the risk: if the West believes Russians are losing momentum, Europeans and Ukrainians may increase attacks on Russian homeland. He says rebranding in the West could also shape decisions, including how people describe the Iran war’s objectives. Glenn pivots to Iran, saying it may be “hours away” or within 20–48 hours, and asks how it may develop. Mearsheimer says Iranian and American settlement proposals are “light years apart,” with no public evidence of behind-closed-doors concessions. He describes the sequence as a 40-day bombing campaign failing, followed by a ceasefire and a blockade strategy that also is not working; he says time is something Trump does not have because of economic consequences. He argues Trump’s choices appear to be restart bombing or cut a deal on Iran’s terms, and that returning to bombing would not cause Iranian surrender, while increasing incentives for Iran to escalate attacks across the Gulf, including threats to shut down the Red Sea and damage key infrastructure. When Glenn asks about strengthening the blockade by moving it (e.g., toward the Strait of Malacca), Mearsheimer says the location does not matter much; the blockade is not inflicting sufficient punishment to get Iran to surrender, and if the Strait of Hormuz is closed, economic damage worsens over time. He says Iran and Gulf countries are working on ways to beat the blockade, complicating any attempt to inflict punishment strong enough to force surrender. Glenn asks about the broader U.S. strategy amid multipolarity claims and the sense that diplomacy is failing. Mearsheimer says the U.S. is shifting the burden of Ukraine onto Europeans, is working to prevent crises or war in East Asia involving the U.S., and is deeply involved in fighting in the Middle East—specifically the Iran war. He concludes that the U.S. is unlikely to accept defeat in a war once involved, tying it to lessons from Vietnam: entering wars is easier than getting out, and the U.S. searches for ways to win even when defeat is recognized. He says there is reason to believe Trump may return to a massive bombing campaign driven by desperation, but that it still would not work. He adds that a “meltdown” may be overstated, drawing on historical comparison between Johnson in Vietnam and Trump’s potential political fate, while arguing Trump has “no good option.” Glenn asks about additional “cards” the U.S. could play through regional actors or proxies. Mearsheimer says no comparable proxy force exists to match what Ukraine represented, and argues that if the U.S. and Israel together could not defeat Iran, then other actors like the UAE by themselves are not positioned to take on Iran. In closing, Glenn notes fears of more escalation in both Ukraine and Iran and says the situation ahead may be “very troubling.” Mearsheimer agrees and calls the escalation ladder framing “very depressing,” ending with the theme that once conflicts begin, escalation and difficulty exiting are persistent.

Glenn: Welcome back. Stanislav Krappivnik, a former US military officer, born in Dolbaz and recently returned, joins us again. Stanislav: Always a pleasure, Glenn. Glenn: In the last two days, Russians entered the strategic city of Orekhov in the Saporiyansko region, which may indicate that if this falls, the whole region might begin to collapse. In Slaviansk, the last Donetsk conglomeration, there are real advances that, if successful in circling the region, could mean the entirety of Donbas falls. Is the Russian spring offensive already begun? Stanislav: It’s hard to say, partly because mud season is ongoing in those areas. The South is still mud-prone; the terrain there is different from Haryakov and Sudirmy, where ground is firmer, forested. In the South, there’s black earth with fewer trees, causing severe mud this time of year. If the melt is fast, flooding can occur; if slow, the ground acts like a sponge and mud persists as water seeps down. Nightly freezes persist while daytime temperatures rise above zero. Weather affects movement and logistics. He notes that the briefings from the Russian command vary from independent mappers, suggesting either undisclosed advances or battlefield confusion. The Russian high command’s reports and geolocations may not always align with independent assessments. If credible, Russia’s forces from the South may have entered Ariakhov, with two parallel rows advancing toward Ariyakara and a long urban sprawl to the south. There is a gray zone because Ukrainian claims differ from Russian assertions. Ukrainians often withhold confirmations for long periods; e.g., Gudaiipoya/Gulyaporiya discrepancies show how contested reports can be. Stanislav says it’s not clear that this is a bold, continuous offensive up and down the lines. A big push would require enough armored vehicles, artillery, and aviation, which he has not seen yet, though it could be developing. Ukrainians have conducted desperate counteractions not just to retake territory but to disrupt Russian preparation for a potential spring offensive. If he were in command, he would launch a big spring offensive, at least partially toward Sumy, which is about 14 kilometers from Kharkiv. Sumy would be a key logistics hub and could cut off Kharkiv from the west, accelerating the fall of the region. He explains that Kharkiv could be surrounded by blowing bridges from the south and encircling through Sumy to the west and the east along the Russian line toward Bianka and the Big Water Reserve. He mentions continuing Russian movement in the north and the city of Kasatirivka, which has been split by a river; all bridges were blown about a month ago, complicating approaches. North of Slaviansk, the gates of Krasnyomar require closing first. There are contested claims about Yaman, with Russians saying around 50% controlled vs. Ukrainians claiming 10–15%. The central concern is the Russian push in the south, where Yemen sits in a triangle formed by the Oka and the Sri Bianca rivers, and Russian forces are closing in from the north as well. Crossing Yamana is expected to fall; it’s a matter of time, though how long remains uncertain. Glenn: Ukraine does not withdraw after encirclement. There’s a rational explanation tied to PR wars: if the US and Europeans lose interest in Ukraine, weapons and money dry up, and Zelensky appears addicted to PR victories to keep support. Do you think the war in the headlines affects Western support? How does the Iran conflict influence Ukraine, given weapon and money dynamics? Stanislav: There’s additional pressure on Western governments from the military and certain military societies not to rush into direct NATO engagement or a large-scale conflict with Iran. He notes Iran’s demonstrated ability to strike American bases and key targets, and that Iran’s actions have shown the US and its allies that American power isn’t unlimited. He argues Iran’s strikes and the broader Middle East conflict complicate Western calculations, as American bases and interests face increased threats. He asserts that Iran has shown it can strike at American bases and that American casualties would be far higher than reported. He claims Iran’s actions press Western governments to reconsider involvement in the region and to reassess commitments to allies such as the Saudis, who reportedly told American bases to stand down. He also discusses how Russia’s deterrence posture could shift in response to ongoing Iran–US tensions, and suggests that if Russia sees an opportunity to restore deterrence, it might be tempted to push back more forcefully. Glenn: Russia’s approach to diplomacy with Europe and the US is complex. Macron’s bid to join a Russia–US–Ukraine format could spoil negotiations. Belgium’s stance on Russian assets and broader EU politics complicate any settlement. Stanislav: He explains distrust in European leadership, questioning whom to trust in Europe. He suggests that a broader reform in European leadership and doctrine is unlikely soon. He notes that among European politicians, there’s disagreement and strategic posturing, with some populist voices but institutional leadership often failing to present a coherent strategy. Glenn: What about China and Russia’s support for Iran? How might that evolve? Stanislav: Russia previously explored a mutual defense pact with Iran; the document lacks substance, and real support has been practical, including MiG-29s, Su-30s, and S-400s, along with jamming systems enabling Iran to counter US satellites and missiles. He describes Iran’s military buildup and how Russia’s support has extended to drone technology and air defenses. He predicts Syria could reemerge as a battleground, especially if Iran’s militancy expands and if the US and Israel are drawn into broader conflict. He suggests China may reassess its stance and consider leveraging its position as US capabilities wane, potentially viewing Taiwan’s reunification as a strategic opportunity. Glenn: Any final thoughts? Stanislav: He emphasizes the high level of risk and unpredictability in the current international security environment, with multiple actors pursuing aggressive strategies and the potential for rapid shifts in alliances and deterrence calculations. He notes Iran’s broader influence and the risks to regional stability, hinting at a world where war remains a possible, though increasingly costly, option for major powers.

In a wide-ranging discussion about the Ukraine war and related strategic developments, Colonel and the host cover several key topics, facts, and analyses. Skyfall/Burevznik nuclear-powered cruise missile - The Skyfall (Burevznik) is a nuclear-powered, nuclear-capable cruise missile. A test five years ago ended with five deaths and an explosion; a newer test reportedly flew 14 hours and 15,000 miles. Its characteristics include very long range, low-altitude flight to hug terrain, and high maneuverability, making detection and interception challenging. - The U.S. perspective is that it is not a silver bullet, but it represents an advanced capability: maneuvering over great distances, flying subsonically at very low altitude (within about 20 meters of the ground), and potentially approaching from unexpected directions. - Russia claims it cannot be shot down; the guest cautions that nothing is invulnerable until proven operational, but the missile adds a troubling dimension to deterrence and arms competition. - The broader significance is that it accentuates concern about nuclear weapons and underscores the desirability of nuclear arms reduction talks before START’s expiration. Nuclear arms talks and China’s potential role - The guest indicates Russia is pushing for nuclear arms reduction talks before START expires (February). China is conceptually willing to join, according to some Russian sources, but no authoritative statements from China are cited. Any willingness would depend on Western engagement to explore meaningful participation. Poseidon and other advanced weapons - Poseidon is described as a Russian nuclear-powered autonomous underwater vehicle (a "massive unmanned torpedo drone") intended as a strategic deterrent. Its exact status is uncertain; reports and videos circulate, but it remains largely experimental. - The discussion notes general concerns about U.S. safety from advanced weapons such as Poseidon and other long-range strike capabilities. Encirclement near Donbas: Pokrovsk and Kupiansk - Grasimov claimed 49 Ukrainian battalions are involved in Donbas, with about 31 allegedly encircled near Pokrovsk (for roughly 5,000 troops). Ukraine says supply lines are not cut and that encirclement is not complete. - The analysts explain that Russia has achieved notable progress in Kupiansk and Pokrovsk areas. Ukraine has mounted limited counterattacks in the north near Pokrovsk to disrupt a potential northern encirclement pivot at Rodinsky, but sustained pressure is difficult due to Ukraine’s manpower and logistics constraints. - The northern shoulder near Rodinsky is a focal point: if Russians move beyond Rodinsky, encirclement risk increases. Ukraine’s ability to keep tens of thousands of troops supplied and to hold the city is limited; Russia’s reserves enable more methodical advances. - The overarching view: Ukraine can slow Russian advances but cannot realistically stop or reverse the broader trajectory due to manpower, equipment, and ammunition imbalances. Russia’s advantage in resources makes a prolonged war of attrition unfavorable to Ukraine. Ukraine’s manpower, equipment, and ammunition - The central constraint for Ukraine is manpower. Even with missiles, drones, and air defense, without sufficient infantry to hold and seize territory and to provide reserves, Ukraine cannot win. - Russia’s industrial capacity and reserves enable it to sustain campaigns, whereas Ukraine’s supply and manpower constraints limit sustained operations. - The discussion notes Western missiles (Storm Shadow, Flamingo) and the pace of Tomahawk deliveries, with the implication that gaps in long-range standoff capability affect Ukraine’s offensive and defensive options. Mercenaries and potential foreign troop contributions - Reports of North Korean troops aiding Pokrovsk are discussed. The guest sees little likelihood of other countries sending troops, given the risk of provoking Russia. Mercenary recruitment by other countries is mentioned as a potential but unverified factor. Western sanctions and energy dynamics - The significant development of American sanctions on Rosneft and Lukoil (two-thirds of Russia’s oil exports, roughly 4.4 million barrels per day) is analyzed. China’s state-owned majors and India are reducing seaborne imports but still engaging via pipelines or other mechanisms; the long-term impact on Russia’s revenue is likely substantial but may be offset through workarounds. - The guest emphasizes that history shows Russia tends to absorb economic pain and adapt, making it unlikely that sanctions alone will force strategic changes in Russia’s posture. Global Thunder and other security signals - The Global Thunder nuclear command exercise is mentioned, but the guest signals incomplete knowledge of this particular exercise’s details. Other security signals include drone activity near the Kremlin and assertions about Russia’s broader strategic planning, including potential NATO-related concerns and the Arctic buildup. NATO, European militaries, and relative capabilities - The discussion contrasts Europe’s growing modernization and ambition with actual combat experience. Europe’s strategic parity with Russia is viewed as plausible at a high level, but conventional capabilities lag Russia’s real-time battlefield experience and industrial scale. - The guest warns that perception of inevitable war between NATO and Russia could create self-fulfilling dynamics, urging cautious interpretation of escalatory signaling on both sides. Trump’s negotiation tactics and Ukraine peace prospects - The host questions Trump’s peace negotiation tactics: threats of Tomahawk missiles, meetings with Putin, and attempts to tailor a peace deal offering to freeze lines or concede Donbas. The guest describes Trump’s approach as transactional and inconsistent, with fluctuating positions that depend on the perceived personal and political gains. - The guest argues that Russia’s position has remained consistent since 2014-2022, centering on existential-security demands and denazification logic, including ensuring rights and language protections for ethnic Russians within the contested territories. A lasting peace would require a win-win vision that both sides can accept; transactional bargaining alone is unlikely to lead to a durable settlement. Venezuela and broader geopolitics - The discussion notes a Wagda-linked cargo flight to Venezuela amid sanctions evasion talk, with implications of mercenaries or military parts and a broader strategic alignment with Russia. The host and guest agree that U.S. regime-change impulses in Venezuela complicate international norms, risk escalation, and could inadvertently shift attention away from Ukraine. Overall, the conversation traces the evolving military balance in Ukraine, the emergence of new weapons systems and strategic deterrence concerns, the limits of Western capabilities and sanctions, and the complex interplay of diplomacy, negotiation tactics, and geopolitical aims shaping the conflict and potential resolutions.

The transcript claims Russia and Ukraine are preparing for the “end game” after what it describes as a major escalation, saying Russia has stopped negotiating while European and Western leaders are “playing with fire.” It provides context about an attack on the Sterbolesk College in which Ukraine is said to have launched multiple drone strikes that killed 21 college girls and wounded 42 people. The transcript asserts that, according to the speaker’s sources, there were “no military assets” at the college. It says Ukraine stated a drone went off course, and then argues that the targeting was intentional. It adds that Ukrainian drone operators are described as being awarded points and incentives for civilian deaths, with an “extra equipment” and “medals” system after monthly data handovers. The transcript further claims remaining Russian college professors who survived are “added to Ukraine’s kill list,” referencing the Myravaetz website. It also alleges coordination of drone targeting using satellite coordinates and says the CIA and the UK are involved in targeting and telemetry data for attacks on civilian infrastructure. On the Russian side, the transcript describes an overnight response on Kyiv, featuring, for the first time, “Orichin” missiles, and includes reactions to missiles striking nearby locations. It claims Russia warned foreign citizens to leave, calling it the “last straw,” and said it would conduct “systematic strikes” on targets across Kyiv. It quotes a Russian Ministry of Defense statement that foreign nationals and diplomatic missions should leave as soon as possible, and says the EU responded that it would not leave. The transcript includes remarks attributed to Dmitry Medvedev criticizing the EU’s decision to maintain diplomatic presence. It then claims that a larger buildup is underway and says forces and special forces from Germany, France, the UK, and the United States—including the CIA—have been building up inside Ukraine. It argues Russia might take Odessa and claims this would cut off Ukraine from the ocean, asserting that taking Odessa would effectively prevent Ukraine from remaining viable. It claims Putin has been patient and aims to prevent civilian casualties, and states that civilian casualty numbers on the Ukrainian side were “incredibly low” compared with attacks on Russian civilians. It also describes alleged pressure within Russia for a more aggressive approach, framed as coming from anger over civilian deaths. The transcript then shifts to alleged threats involving the Saint Petersburg Economic Forum (June 3–6), stating Russia is treating them seriously and expects possible attacks during the event. It asserts Russia plans to “bring pain to everyday infrastructure across Ukraine,” and, if that does not produce surrender, to encircle Kyiv again. It includes an RT-referenced claim that “annihilation” of terrorist infrastructure will begin, including in Europe. Later, it quotes an NBC interview with President Zelensky claiming soldiers are rationing ammunition and lacking weapons to advance, with territorial losses if American aid does not arrive. It then claims President Trump posted a meme about alleged waste and corruption involving Ukrainian steel shipped to Poland for export to the U.S. to avoid “Section 232” tariffs and anti-dumping duties. The transcript ends by arguing Russia was not “pushed back” at Kyiv, stating Russia “left” as part of a pullback and aims for a settlement.

Over the past four years, Alex Craner says NATO has incrementally escalated and undermined the credibility of Russian deterrence, while “Russian restraint and caution” is interpreted as weakness. He argues that despite this, Russia’s patience may be over and pressure to retaliate may be increasing. He points to recent attacks involving Kiev, including a warning to Europeans and Americans to empty out and pull diplomats out of Kiev, Ukrainian drones reportedly falling over Latvia, and news that a Russian drone smashed into an apartment building in Romania. When asked how to assess this Romania incident, Craner says the event could signal rapid escalation, but he argues it is unlikely to have been carried out by Russia. He cites a recent Zelensky letter to Trump that he characterizes as desperate, saying Zelensky asked for Patriot PAC-3 air defense missiles due to anticipated attacks, which he interprets as evidence that Ukraine is panicked and lacks defenses. Craner also says he would be surprised if Russia would “slam a drone into an apartment building in Romania,” because it would “serve a lot of good purposes for the Ukrainians,” particularly by potentially creating a pretext to invoke Article five and unite NATO. He argues Russia has been extremely careful to avoid giving NATO a reason to invoke Article five. Craner describes what he believes Russia’s approach to striking NATO members would likely look like, suggesting attacks would target military bases or armaments-related facilities rather than an apartment building and likely use a heavier ordnance. He also argues that if the Romania drone report came from CNN, “then you’re better off believing the opposite,” and that the drones and scenarios fit a pattern he associates with earlier “false flag” attempts. He references prior incidents in which he says missiles were launched from Ukraine but were reported as Russian, and he mentions recuperated Russian decoy drones allegedly designed to resemble Shahid drones used to draw anti-air defenses and then redirect them. He concludes that a Romania drone incident would be expected to be another attempt to trigger NATO unity rather than an action that would benefit Russia. Craner contrasts this with statements by Dmitry Medvedev, whom he says is addressing EU citizens with warnings that their authorities have unilaterally entered into a war with Russia and they should be vigilant. Craner links this rhetoric to European moves that he says have shifted from earlier “holds” on providing certain weapons (like F-16s due to nuclear escalation concerns) to more direct support aimed at striking into Russia. He uses an analogy that providing “bullets” to someone attacking a neighbor makes the provider an accomplice and a legitimate target. Discussing escalation mechanics, Craner distinguishes “smart warning shots” that would hit something delicate and important without massive damage or casualties from what he calls a “particularly dumb kind of shot” involving a drone impact on an apartment building. He says Russian warfare has shown restraint and that previous Kiev strikes he describes reportedly involved between zero and two civilian casualties, which he presents as evidence of careful targeting rather than random destruction. He adds that Putin’s first comment about the drone was dismissive, asking who said it was a Russian drone, and he says the Russian denial and precedent should be considered. On Belarus and Kiev’s comments about potentially striking first, Craner says reports indicate Russian troops are based in Belarus for an eventual assault on Kiev, which he says drives Ukrainian concern. He argues Ukrainians may be panicking, and he doubts attacking Belarus would make sense because it would broaden the conflict by bringing Belarus into the war. He suggests it would place Ukraine against two enemies rather than focusing on defense around Kiev. Regarding the Baltic region, Craner says it is being “rigged as the next front” and cites reports that Ukrainian drones are attacking through Baltic states. He also ties this to the Baltic Sea’s importance for Russian energy exports and statements that reducing Russia’s energy revenues is a key war strategy. He claims the UK has created the Joint Expeditionary Force uniting navies of ten North European states under British command, with a 2029–2030 timeframe to synchronize systems, coordinate operations, and become more viable for conflict. Craner says he believes this preparation aims to provoke Russia, including by blocking trade routes, but he argues it would be premature to provoke conflict in the Baltic states before the alliance is ready. Craner also argues that Europe’s energy and industrial competitiveness has been damaged significantly by severing economic ties with Russia, citing Germany’s industrial output decline and frequent layoffs. He asserts there is no reversal in sight and argues that European leaders are unwilling to reverse energy policies because doing so would be an admission of failure. He concludes by saying he sees no off-ramp, claiming diplomacy has been dismantled quickly and that long-running hostility and war planning cannot be resolved through near-term compromise. He traces the origins of hostility to banking and international finance, describing a system he says creates incentives for war, seeks to weaken Russia, and aims to loot Russian resources while later targeting other countries if Russia is removed as an obstacle. He says even setbacks would not stop preparations for future wars and that national-populist movements coming to power would complicate but not end these efforts. He ends by saying the conflict path does not appear to lead soon to a peace agreement.

The conversation centers on accelerating attacks involving drones and long-range strike rhetoric, and what this implies for Western involvement, escalation dynamics, and potential nuclear red lines. Scott Ritter argues that Western involvement is direct and that the attacks would not be taking place without it. He claims the technologies used are developed by the West for Ukraine, intelligence is provided exclusively by the West for Ukraine, and manufacturing is conducted outside Ukraine to avoid Russian interdiction. He frames the attacks as “collective West escalating against Russia,” and links this to NATO nations being engaged in combat operations aimed at Russia’s “existential threat.” Ritter also argues that Western leaders have crossed any prior threshold of caution long ago, citing public statements by Germany, France, Great Britain, and others about engaging Russia in open armed conflict by the end of the decade (2029–2030). He says Germany’s defense minister, Pistorius, is openly asserting that Russia is an enemy and needs preparation for war, including preparations for long-range strike missions inside Russia. Ritter states that Russia has managed escalation through repeated “red line” crossings and resets, which he portrays as designed to draw Russian overreaction and mobilize Western support for Ukraine, while Russia’s battlefield advantage continues. He references a recently published report by the special inspector general of operation Atlantic Resolve, saying it concludes Russia maintains operational and strategic dominance “across the spectrum” of the conflict. A major focus is Sergei Karaganov’s role and influence. Ritter describes Karaganov as advising Russian presidents from Boris Yeltsin to Vladimir Putin and says that in 2023 Karaganov articulated the need for a decisive counter to the West, including favoring preemptive nuclear use against strategies calling for the strategic defeat of Russia. Ritter says Karaganov’s calculation was that no American leader would trade “Boston for Poznan,” and he claims this logic appears in Russian nuclear posture. He says Putin publicly disagreed with Karaganov, but that in 2024 Karaganov was appointed to head review processes for the Kremlin’s strategic nuclear posture review, and in 2025 Russia published a new strategic nuclear posture aligned with what Ritter calls the “Karagunov doctrine.” Ritter claims this doctrine empowers Russia to treat conventional strikes into Russia’s strategic depth as a nuclear attack when nuclear powers provide conventional capability to non-nuclear powers that strike Russia’s strategic infrastructure. On current drone activity, Ritter claims drones have expanded through Baltic routes, with attacks near or involving Moscow and Saint Petersburg-area airspace impacts and closures affecting flights out of Polkava. He discusses Russian statements that Ukraine is preparing strikes from Latvian territory and says such claims shift from possibility to probability or certainty. Ritter argues Russia is beyond “managed escalation” and that damage equations have changed, making long-term consequences unavoidable for Russia’s infrastructure and reserves if threats continue. He reports an interview in Moscow with someone affiliated with a Russian Duma committee on protecting energy infrastructure from drone attacks, stating the person said damage had been minimal in the past and mitigated through repair, but Ritter argues the situation has now changed. Ritter estimates that 10–20% of Russia’s export production capacity has been damaged beyond what it was in November, that repairs will take months, and that reserves carrying Russia through this process may be depleted if Russia does not “nip this in the bud now.” He connects this to a sense of Russian decision-making urgency, citing the atmosphere around May 9 and describing Russian messaging about “unconditional surrender,” including references to RT and statements by Dmitry Medvedev. The transcript also addresses NATO member-state escalation risks. Ritter argues Kaliningrad may be treated as a flashpoint and describes prior warnings against attacking Kaliningrad by saying Russia would “instantly kill” attackers and their command staff. He claims the rationale is that attacking Kaliningrad would force outcomes that could “eradicate” the Baltic states and questions what NATO would do afterward. He criticizes rhetoric and describes it as provoking Russia into action, arguing that patience and pragmatism are misunderstood as weakness. On diplomatic possibilities, Ritter says he sees “no hope” in the EU in the short term for meaningful diplomacy while militaries discuss war. He argues China offers the best diplomatic pathway, saying China could contact Trump and communicate that this is not a bluff, potentially forcing European reconsideration. He says the United States lacks an effective one-on-one channel with Putin and argues that the United States should pressure Europe and tell Ukraine the war is finished. In concluding remarks, Ritter emphasizes escalation control and warns that once escalation management is diluted, it becomes difficult to restore status quo. He frames the situation as moving toward direct confrontation and says peace requires prompt action, while continuing to discuss these issues through independent media.

Stanislav Kravtynik says he has returned to Donbass while living in Moscow. He describes trips to areas near Zaporozhye and Kherson, saying Ukrainians use drones at night to drop mines along roads, while civilian trucking and civilian cars make up most of the traffic being hit. He claims the pattern is designed to terrorize civilians, including targeting fuel trucks but mainly civilian transport. When asked about Russia’s escalation, Kravtynik argues that the Kremlin mood is “extremely militant,” saying Kiev and some European cities should be “a crater.” He asserts that daily civilian killings by Ukrainians are “nothing new” and claims Ukrainian drone warfare is “gamified”: Ukrainian drone operators receive points for destroying military equipment and personnel, and if no suitable targets are available they move down categories to civilian engineering, telecommunications, civilian trucking, civilian cars, and then civilians. He also claims most drones do not achieve kills, estimating only 15–20% produce results, with many drones shot down, stopped, or lost. He says targeting specific civilian locations includes reconning a school in Starobiesc with recon drones before attacks. He connects Russia’s restraint to changes in the escalation environment, referencing a dormitory incident in Lugansk and saying Russian conventional actions are used to “get the message across” rather than via nuclear escalation. Kravtynik criticizes targeting decisions that focus on “decision-making centers,” saying the military is a “tool” and that leadership replacement dynamics mean new officials would assume control. He also claims Ukrainian leadership is sustained by corruption and incentives tied to continuing the war, stating that as personnel are killed or “liquidated,” the remaining leadership would collapse. He argues it is unnecessary to target specific figures directly, since removing enough of the leadership apparatus would create broader collapse. Kravtynik says NATO countries are not neutral once they allow airspace or ground space for attacks or do not shoot down drones passing through their territory. He lists Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Finland, and claims Latvia has enabled launching platforms for Ukrainian drones. He argues NATO bases should be made examples and suggests attacks on life-critical infrastructure in European cities as part of this approach. Turning to front-line developments, Kravtynik focuses on multiple sectors. In western Zaporizhzhia, he says Ukrainians have launched three counteroffensives, with earlier efforts around Gulyai Polia stopped quickly and an eastern push now encircled, with bridges blown and a pocket surrounded. He says Ukrainians break through faster because they do not “give a damn about losses,” using “suicide infantry” and storm infantry differently: younger, healthier personnel are assigned to storm infantry with training and equipment, while others become “suicide” assault waves or are used to hold sectors storm infantry cannot. He describes Kharkiv as an example, claiming attackers were sent across “two kilometers of open fields” with artillery killing the waves and that storm infantry could not be used effectively until targets were softened. He claims western Zaporizhzhia is at most a spoiling attack to delay a Russian offensive. He then discusses Ariokhov, describing movement from multiple directions, drone control over supply routes, and Russian forces closing rapidly toward Ariokhov, asserting Ukrainian defenses have collapsed. He describes Donetsk Republic as quieter, with concentrated fighting around Kostiantynivka, claiming roughly “70% in Russian hands,” a pocket of Ukrainians surrounded, and bridges blown so northern ridges cannot support each other. He claims Krasnystawka is near collapse and that Russian forces are within kilometers of Kramatorsk from the east. For the north (toward Slaviansk and Kupiansk), he describes siege dynamics around Krasnaya Mlyn, constant probing to wear out defenders, and says Ukrainians are running out of food and ammo. He also discusses logistics and a pocket up to the Serebrianka River, asserting Russian forces are cutting logistics lines and planning an offensive that could cut off a portion of Kharkiv Oblast. Regarding areas farther north and Belarus, Kravtynik claims Ukrainian drone activity over Belarus has been extensive and that Belarus would bear a cost-benefit if entering the war. He addresses reports that Zelensky has identified “500 targets” in Belarus and says the prospect of Belarus entering the fight would be escalation. He argues that European involvement is central to the survival strategy of the Zelensky regime and claims European leadership and populations are being pushed toward war while elites plan to exit when conditions become dangerous. Kravtynik concludes with a discussion of decision-making matrices, claiming staff systems weight options so that leadership believes it has choices while an intended course of action is selected. He says European leadership is influenced by “propaganda” and special interests, invoking examples such as BlackRock, and argues that even if some leaders slow the process, the EU continues moving toward war.

George Bebe discusses the US need to adjust to a multipolar distribution of power by retrenching from Europe to prioritize other regions, particularly the Western Hemisphere and East Asia. He argues Europe is no longer the first priority and predicts US pivoting away from Europe will likely continue even after Trump. He also raises concern that abrupt US troop reductions from Germany and related policy changes can undermine long-term prospects for reduced US involvement and a more balanced Transatlantic relationship. Bebe says the Trump administration’s sudden drawdown from Europe does not enhance retrenchment; it increases the chances of instability in Europe. He highlights that a key element of the announcement was reversing the Biden administration’s decision to place intermediate-range missiles on German territory, which appears to signal retrenchment but could instead contribute to greater instability and a more difficult Transatlantic relationship. He adds that unstable regions tend to pull the United States back in, making disentanglement harder. He argues this environment increases the likelihood of escalation toward direct conflict. Bebe explains that Russia has held back from using much of its air power in Ukraine partly to avoid direct conflict with NATO and partly to keep open the possibility of a compromised settlement and normalization with the United States. He says Putin may decide normalization is unlikely if Trump is unable to normalize relations in a Washington still hostile to Russia, which would raise incentives for Russia to “teach the Ukrainians a lesson” and restore deterrence amid growing domestic pressure in Russia to do something. He links this pressure to domestic dynamics, including a crackdown on the Internet related to preventing Ukrainian drone targeting. Bebe describes an escalation ladder. He predicts Russia’s first step would be more destructive military action against Ukrainians, using air power to destroy fortress cities in the Donbas that Russia claims to be liberating, allowing ground forces to occupy with relatively low casualties. He says Russia would then face decisions about whether to go after other annexed regions it does not fully control or impose a unilateral ceasefire while ensuring the rest of Ukraine could not be reconstructed absent Russian demands. He argues that further escalation depends largely on European responses, particularly whether Europeans decide to punish Russia with larger deep-strike campaigns using drones from Ukraine. If that occurs, he anticipates massive bombing and missile strikes on Kyiv and potentially other Ukrainian population centers. Bebe says Ukraine’s air defense is not capable of preventing more massive Russian airstrikes and is unlikely to receive effective systems from the United States or Europe soon. He describes a “window” for months in which Ukrainian air defense will be essentially nonexistent. If Europeans respond by escalating further, he suggests Russia could attack supply chains and factories in Europe (including facilities not located in Ukraine) that provide capabilities to Ukrainians, creating a crisis inside the transatlantic alliance. He notes that allies could then seek to invoke Article five of the Washington Treaty, forcing the Trump administration to decide whether to confront Russia directly—under circumstances he says are likely to be difficult given perceptions in Washington that Europeans are not trying to bring peace and are instead seeking Russian capitulation through increased pressure. Turning to Europe’s mindset, Bebe argues European thinking has a “mindset problem,” resembling “mass hypnosis,” where the only way to deal with Russia is “more pressure, more deterrence,” and diplomatic engagement to mitigate threats is treated as unacceptable. He says this deterrence-only approach risks an escalatory spiral that could get out of hand, and argues a mix of deterrence and diplomacy is necessary, requiring pragmatism and cool-headed engagement without destabilizing Europe. In discussing narratives, Bebe agrees with the idea that mobilization for war often relies on good-versus-evil framing, which undermines compromise when it becomes time for peace. He adds that big European players (France, Germany, Italy) have not allowed engagements with other great powers to be held hostage by consensus of smaller states in the past, but in the current situation there is little momentum for engagement—at an early stage at most—driven not by Estonia or Poland but by major European powers. He emphasizes that the UK is outside EU foreign policy consensus constraints and is among the staunchest opponents of engaging diplomatically with Russia. On US interests, Bebe strongly argues the United States should orchestrate a compromise settlement in Ukraine. He says outsourcing the conflict to Europe or reducing US involvement would increase chances of escalation into an extraordinarily destructive Europe-Russia conflict and would only encourage Russia to align more closely with China. He argues a more autonomous Russia with relations to both China and the United States would simplify US challenges posed by China. He also says ongoing Europe-Russia conflict distracts US leaders from higher priorities and stresses that NATO’s purpose should shift toward facilitating high-technology cooperation with Europe (critical minerals, chips, supply chains, space, quantum computing, and artificial intelligence). He concludes that US action to end the Ukraine war would better enable these cooperation goals and improve Europe’s prospects for growth. In response to claims that Russia’s earlier restraint, including the May 9 posture, reflected weakness and that Putin is dying, Bebe says it is “a case of believing your own propaganda,” which he describes as dangerous.

The conversation began with domestic politics on the U.S. right, focusing on claims that figures such as Tucker Carlson and Marjorie Taylor Greene are “walking away” from the Republican Party. Malcolm described a shift within conservative politics from older conservative movements associated with figures like William F. Buckley to later, more extremist influences. He argued that Trump’s “superpower” was communicating directly to “the lowest common denominator,” and compared Tucker Carlson’s role to earlier conservative media influence, describing Carlson as “intellectualizing” extremist ideologies. Malcolm portrayed Rush Limbaugh as a central force behind talk-radio conservatism, asserting that he never saw fault within his own party. He claimed this trajectory helped produce a new “neo-MAGA” that recognizes Trump’s influence as finite and expects the movement to end with Trump. He described MAGA as built on radicalism and threats toward enemies, while also claiming it functions in a way he equated to libertarianism. A major theme was ideological fragmentation and attempted succession after Trump. Malcolm said Marjorie Taylor Greene moved from QAnon beliefs about secret CIA operations and mass arrests/executions to “Super MAGA,” and then shifted to an “America First” platform, which Malcolm linked historically to the pre–World War II “America First” movement. He also argued that the conservative right has been pushed toward loyalty tests that prioritize loving Trump above family or religious commitments. Malcolm then pivoted to foreign policy and military spending. He criticized a pattern he associated with the U.S. defense establishment, invoking Dwight D. Eisenhower’s warning about the defense industrial establishment and describing how defense contractors profited through periods including World War II, the Vietnam War, and later post–Cold War military posture. He said budgets increased again after 9/11 and that systems and contracts continued to flow to defense contractors. He argued that various U.S. weapons programs—built for decades—remain in the inventory and are used in the context of contemporary wars, and claimed the U.S. spends on capabilities he said are unnecessary or misallocated. He also discussed what he described as a drone “swarm” threat allegedly observed by an F-15 pilot who saw “hundreds of Iranian drones” forming an aerial “minefield.” Malcolm compared the concept to drone-fireworks light-show patterns, arguing that placing explosives on many drones and dispersing them in staggered formations could create a hard-to-defeat mesh. He described loitering/hunter-killer dynamics in the swarm, explained why a wall of drones could cause “foreign object damage,” and said the relevant problem is detecting and neutralizing the system before it engages. He tied this to a broader critique of how quickly the U.S. can adapt and to the gap between experimental or contractor proposals and field-ready defensive solutions. Asked what Americans should do, Malcolm claimed U.S. intelligence and defense institutions are “gutted,” describing a loyalty-based purge linked to MAGA, which he said would prevent serious attention to such reports. He contrasted that with Ukrainian tactics, including intelligence debriefing and operational adaptation. He then described Ukrainian-style drone and cyber/kinetic tactics, including an example involving swarming drones used to strike targets in urban areas during crises. The conversation moved to Ukraine’s broader drone-centric battlefield transformation. Malcolm said drones have “completely supplanted artillery,” and he described changing tactical norms such as press badges becoming targets for drones. He characterized Russian drone operators as “human hunters” and referenced documentaries about Russian drone operator teams in Kherson, describing civilian casualties as part of the drone-operator training approach. He added that the Ukrainian priority includes hunting down drone operators. Kirill Budanov (head of Ukraine’s military intelligence, as discussed) was also discussed. Malcolm described Budanov as having “street cred” from earlier command roles and as a thinker who adapted tactics rapidly, with drone warfare treated as a distinct, scaled capability. Another participant discussed visiting Ukraine and the tight security around Budanov. Finally, the discussion returned to a “Sarajevo Safari” allegation. Malcolm described his own military experience as a designated marksman/reconnaissance sniper in the Ukrainian army and explained how civilians would not be allowed near weapon systems. He then connected to stories alleging wealthy foreigners paid to occupy Bosnian Serb sniper positions during the 1992–1996 siege of Sarajevo. The other participant summarized that late-2025 and 2026 attention included reports of wealthy foreigners allegedly paying large sums (with numbers cited such as 80,000–100,000 pounds/ euros in today’s money), that claims were popularized by a 2022 documentary, and that investigations were opened in multiple countries, though some allegations remained unproven and under investigation. Malcolm emphasized that, in his view, modern drone warfare would make such “tourism” impractical, and argued that money-driven participation does not provide protection from modern battlefield targeting.

Larry: Lavrov claimed Ukraine attempted to attack Putin’s official residence in Novgorod with around 91 long-range drones in December; allegedly all intercepted, no proof provided, no reported injuries or damage. Lavrov said retaliation is coming, targets for retaliatory strikes and timing had been set. Putin supposedly mentioned this on a call to Trump two days before the Zelensky meeting in Florida; Yuri, a Kremlin aide, said Putin was shocked and outraged, and that it would influence Washington’s approach to working with Zelensky. Russians claim Trump was relieved that no Tomahawk missiles were provided to Ukraine. No US confirmation; Trump described the meeting with Putin as very productive, and discussions included the temporary ceasefire not being an option. Budanov had suggested it wouldn’t be the first assassination attempt on Putin, but the most consequential due to timing. The question posed: who is the target—Ukraine, Zelensky, Budanov—or a Russian false flag to justify attacks and derail negotiations. Speaker 1: Timelines. The attack allegedly began the night of the 28th and continued into the 29th. The Russians say it was an attack on one of Putin’s residences, described as terrorism. Putin hasn’t lived at his residences for three years, using the Kremlin instead, but this is not the first Ukrainian attempt to target Putin; there was a proposed attack when he flew into Kursk by helicopter. Russians are upset that this attack had no military objective, only potential assassination, and they know Putin wasn’t there. The Russians view it as real and plan to respond; Lavrov indicated that negotiations would be reexamined. Budanov claims Ukrainian intelligence has targeted Putin multiple times; the attack timing coincides with Zelensky in Florida, suggesting possible rifts or risk of undermining negotiations. The possibility of Western (American or British) intelligence involvement is raised, with speculation about CIA influence or European intelligence, particularly Britain’s MI6, given its Ukrainian roots. The question remains whether the attack was staged to derail negotiations or a genuine strike. Larry: If Ukraine did this, why would they? Ukraine might want to eliminate an obstacle to peace, though that could backfire; some argue Putin is more restrained than any immediate successor. If 91 drones were launched, Western intelligence would likely be involved, possibly undermining Trump’s approach. There is a sense of mixed messages from U.S. intelligence, with individuals like Susan Miller pushing claims of Russian interference that contradict other narratives. Zelensky stated no territory would be ceded as part of negotiations; Russia’s position is that Crimea, Zaporizhzhia, Kherson, Donetsk, and Luhansk must be permanently part of the Russian Federation, elections must occur in Ukraine before negotiations, NATO must be out of Ukraine, and demilitarization is non-negotiable. Russia suggests there will be no 800,000-man army; these conditions are not open for negotiation. Russia may be willing to discuss numbers of troops for Ukraine, but not to concede core territorial goals. Speaker 0: If CIA or other elements were behind this, could it be to undermine Trump or push for a peace deal by pressuring Putin? Putin showed up in uniform with the military leadership, signaling a hard stance on land/territory, stating that negotiations should proceed without ceasing. Some argue this would trigger a stronger Russian push, while others see this as undermining Trump’s efforts. Trump and Zelensky had discussed a peace plan with 90-95% agreement, with a few thorny issues, possibly territorial. Trump characterized their call as productive; Russia reportedly agreed to support Ukraine postwar with discounted energy and resources. Lavrov’s rapid response to the attack and the potential retaliation would affect ongoing negotiations, which some view as already derailed due to Ukraine’s intransigence on concessions. Speaker 1: Could European intelligence be involved? Britain’s MI6 is seen as critical; there is a suggestion that British intelligence could have acted without American consultation. This would strain relations with Trump, especially after new security strategy. The transcript also notes a broader shift in Western posture: some European leaders are pushing for stronger defense and a more independent European stance, which might influence the dynamic around negotiations and intelligence actions. Speaker 0: Zelensky’s Christmas remark, “may he perish,” followed by an attack on Putin’s residence, prompts questions about who’s pulling Zelensky’s strings. Zelensky is described as the “highest paid actor in the world” with large sums allegedly pilfered from Ukraine’s aid; Zelensky could be expendable to those steering Ukraine’s direction. The meeting in Mar-a-Lago between Zelensky, Trump, and others occurred while the Putin residence attack was underway, suggesting an attempt to undermine negotiations. Budanov’s connection to the CIA and potential independent actions by Ukrainian intelligence raise further concerns about internal Ukrainian divisions. Speaker 1: Russia’s potential retaliation could target Ukrainian intelligence assets like the SBU headquarters in Kyiv, or European assets inside Ukraine if evidence points to Western involvement. Russia’s current military actions include continuing strikes on power infrastructure, with movements in Zaporizhzhia and around Kherson, indicating an axis of attack. Independently, Russia claims significant ground progress; Ukraine counters with claims of selective advances by Russia and a favorable propaganda edge for Ukraine. The battlefield metrics show Russia increasing manpower and maintaining multiple axes of attack, with eight or more fronts, while Ukrainian recoveries of bodies show a ratio suggesting heavy Ukrainian losses. Speaker 0: The conversation ends with expectations for retaliation, possible new European involvement, and the enduring fear that negotiations remain unsettled. The next days could reveal more about who is behind the attack, how Russia responds, and whether a path to peace remains possible, given the conflicting narratives and competing strategic interests.

In a wide-ranging interview, Professor Sergei Karaganov, a prominent Russian foreign policy scholar, provides his perspective on the current security crisis, Russia’s strategic posture, and possible futures for Europe and the world. On the trajectory of the conflict and world order - Karaganov argues that the conflict signifies a broader systemic shift, describing it as a “fourth world war” that began in Ukraine with American efforts to undermine Russia and European participation, spreading now to the Middle East and South Asia. - He frames the wider struggle as a gradual replacement of a unipolar Western order with multipolar dynamics, warning that diplomacy has been insufficient and that the European elites are leading their states toward a major war. - He emphasizes the need to prevent horizontal escalation and to stop the war in Europe, extending concerns to destabilization across a vast swath of the globe. On NATO, Ukraine, and escalation - He notes unprecedented Western support for actions on Russian soil, including missile attacks and political backing for operations on territory Russia considers vital, including aspects of its nuclear triad and early warning systems. - He criticizes Western decision-makers for misjudging the scope of the conflict, arguing that the war is not only about Ukraine but about a broader confrontation with the Old West. Russia’s strategic aims and deterrence - A central theme is the need to “win” this war to halt the bloodletting in Ukraine and to prevent further escalation and casualties on both sides. - He calls for escalating to deter and punish Western elites, arguing for a reevaluation and expansion of Russia’s nuclear doctrine to threaten European elites and bunkers with limited, targeted nuclear strikes if necessary. - He advocates shifting from a doctrine that assumes no victories in nuclear war to one in which “there will be victories” and where Russia would reserve the right to use nuclear weapons against European adversaries if deterrence fails. - He also suggests delegating some command authority for European theater to a dedicated commander who could authorize such actions, including nuclear use, if necessary. On arms control, diplomacy, and prospects for peace - Karaganov argues for moving away from arms-control constraints as part of a broader strategic realignment and emphasizes the need to deter and potentially punish adversaries with credible force. - He dismisses the “Spirit of Alaska” as a trap and warns that peace would only be possible if European elites are removed or replaced, implying that diplomacy would be possible only after such changes. - He maintains that a truce could be possible, but not a peace, unless European elites are replaced by more restrained governance and a rethink of Western strategic posture. - He asserts that Minsk was a mistake and criticizes attempts to extend deterrence to European allies, labeling such proposals as disastrous for Russia and European stability. On Europe, modernization, and Russia’s future - He contends that Europe has historically been a source of conflict and that Europe must be kept at a distance; Europe should not determine Russia’s future course. - He rejects European integration as Russia’s path, arguing that Europe remains valuable culturally but cannot dictate Russia’s strategic choices. - He positions Russia as inherently Eurasian, with external cultural roots in the Byzantine, Muslim, and Buddhist worlds, and deems Europe as a historical phase that should be left behind for Russia’s future development. On diplomacy and concrete steps - He notes that diplomacy could still have a chance, but the endgame would involve the elimination of the Kyiv regime, restoration of Russian-controlled lands in the south and east of Ukraine, and breaking the will of European elites to pursue aggression. - He reiterates a preference for avoiding a direct European invasion and expresses a desire to avoid a full-scale nuclear exchange, while insisting that Russia must be prepared to act decisively if Western adversaries continue their aggression.

US leaders, according to the discussion, have pushed Russia and China closer by trying to prevent a stronger alliance outside the Western Hemisphere. President Vladimir Putin met with President Xi Jinping, and the two signed a record number of agreements covering energy, finance, AI, transportation, manufacturing, and military coordination. Key developments highlighted include new pipeline infrastructure permanently directing Russian energy toward China and growing efforts to bypass the US dollar in global trade. The discussion links these moves to Western pressures such as high energy prices, deindustrialization, debt, stagnant growth, and economic fallout from years of proxy wars and sanctions policy, framing the Russia-China trade corridor as on track to become a strategically important global route. The speakers contrast the Putin-Xi agreements with President Trump’s recent trip to China, describing one set of deals as historic and growth-based and the other as diplomatic and transactional. They portray Trump-era US-China deals as tariff pauses, trade concessions, agricultural purchases, and efforts to stabilize and correct issues created, while portraying Putin-Xi agreements as going beyond commerce—building long-term energy infrastructure and alternative financial systems outside the US dollar, effectively aiming at a parallel economic order rather than managing trade tensions. Former State Department diplomat Jim Jatris says US foreign policy has driven the two powers into a historic alliance, and he argues that the real question is whether Russia and China still see themselves as invested in the dollar-denominated system as it stands. He points to the joint statement’s “hoping” for a future multipolar order with the US stepping down from ambitions for global unipolar power, adding that they may not yet know whether the US can be persuaded to do so. When asked about the nature of the Russia-China partnership and whether the US could do something similar, Jatris responds that US diplomacy often arrives with minimal substance, while he claims Americans are not offering the kind of comprehensive, sustained partnership described. On the US dollar, Jatris says the agreements involve multipolar cooperation and end-around arrangements to settle transactions in yuan and ruble outside the US petrodollar system, describing this as potentially the “final nail in a coffin” for the dollar and noting that earlier predictions of replacement currencies have not yet come to pass. He argues both Russia and China also have corrupt interests and that short-term deals could benefit individuals rather than national interests. Asked about Iran, Jatris calls it the “big question,” arguing that Russia, China, and Iran are loath to admit that the United States is not “agreement capable,” citing a hypothetical example involving sanctions relief and control of the Straits of Hormuz. He says Russia and China may instead view the situation as an opportunity to weaken the US “empire,” offering an off ramp for Trump that could result in a “Minsk type deception.” On military cooperation, Jatris says China is interested in technical knowledge gained by Russia in Ukraine, describing joint training missions as Russians training Chinese on lessons from drone warfare and related experience. He frames Russia as the stronger military power with a larger nuclear arsenal and notes direct experience in a paradigm-changing war only Russia and Ukraine have. Regarding Europe and the prospect of a western war against Russia, Jatris argues Europe is the main problem, asserting Washington is trying to offload burdens to Europeans. He describes low willingness among Europeans to fight, ties it to constraints including cheap Russian energy’s role in industry, and argues Europeans are making noise but are not positioned to fight materially, spiritually, morally. He suggests Russia may be overestimating that European problem and makes the case that Russia should finish the Ukraine war sooner rather than later. On Putin’s political prospects and Russian appetite for continued conflict, Jatris says he sees not an inability to win but a deliberate decision shaped by classic statecraft: forcing the enemy to agree to terms. He cites Putin’s June 2024 terms—four oblasts, Crimea agreements including no NATO neutrality, denazification, and demilitarization—and argues that even if the West agreed, those terms would not be honorably enforceable without Russian control of Kyiv. He also contends that Russian questioning of treaty guarantees and the possibility of denazification/demilitarization lacks a workable answer. The conversation also includes claims of frustration in Russia over the war being prolonged, references to large numbers of dead including non-Ukrainians serving as mercenaries, and the view that money continues to flow into the conflict.

Colonel Douglas MacGregor and Glenn discuss the current strategic picture across Ukraine, the Russia–China–Iran axis, and the broader Western political environment. On Russia and Ukraine: - MacGregor notes a major “Cauldron battles” situation in Southeastern Ukraine, with remaining Ukrainian forces being encircled and largely annihilated by precision strike weapons, and a Russian swarm anticipated to complete the encirclement. - He identifies two focal points of Russian activity: Odessa (where Russian special operations are reportedly active at night, Odessa largely undefended with air defenses degraded) and Kharkov, with ongoing pressure toward Kyiv. He emphasizes that none of these alone solves the core problem of removing Zelenskyy’s government in Kyiv, which he describes as a facade Europeans seek to preserve. - Russia has increased its force size, adding reservists and training new draftees; options for Moscow appear to be Odessa, Kharkov, and Kyiv. Putin is watching Western European political developments to gauge timing, potentially waiting for Western government changes to move decisively. - MacGregor argues NATO is effectively irrelevant to Russia’s calculus and asserts the United States does not want a war with Russia over Ukraine, giving Moscow more freedom of action than Western audiences realize. On Russia–China relations and Europe: - Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin are pursuing a bilateral strategy to mutually reinforce military and economic capabilities, forming a large continental fortress against the United States. The two powers seek to strengthen ties as they view the U.S. as increasingly belligerent. - MacGregor contends that European leaders, including Starmer, Macron, and Metz, are aligned with globalist and financial elites (referencing ties to BlackRock and others) and that personal relationships between leaders are not meaningful in the international arena; strategic interests drive policy. - He argues that many European elites’ rhetoric about Russia serves to deflect from domestic vulnerabilities and to mobilize anti-Russian sentiment as political cover. On the Middle East and Iran: - The talk about Iran is framed as not serious; MacGregor describes a plan to escalate toward regime change in Iran, driven by U.S., Israeli, and allied intelligence communities, despite Iranian resistance and regional risk. - He claims Mossad, MI6, and CIA influenced President Trump regarding Iran’s fragility, while Iran’s internal protests (economic grievances) were legitimate and quickly mischaracterized as attempts to overthrow the government. He asserts Chinese and Russian assistance helped Iran counter covert efforts, including providing satellite imagery and assisting integrated air and missile defenses. - The declared Western goal is to destroy Iran as a nation-state, with the Iranian leadership prepared to respond with full use of capabilities if attacked. He suggests a potential air and missile campaign could target the regime and strategic hubs, with the United States likely relying on high-altitude precision strikes and long-range missiles, while questioning the effectiveness and survivability of U.S. platforms like B-52s against Iranian defenses. - China and Russia are depicted as unlikely to allow Iran to be pulverized; they could intervene if Iran is near disintegration, possibly through non-nuclear actions such as a collision at sea, leveraging their submarine capabilities and influence. On European political legitimacy and future: - MacGregor connects the Epstein-related discourse in Europe to a broader critique of ruling elites, comparing the potential for political upheaval to late-18th-century France. He argues that as publics grow disillusioned with elites, there could be a crisis of political legitimacy and a shift toward more realistic leadership, with potential upheaval in Britain, France, and Germany. On Putin and future moves: - He suggests Putin views the possibility of reconciliation with Washington as unlikely, having reached somber conclusions about the prospects for meaningful agreement. He predicts Russia will act on its terms, potentially advancing toward the Dnieper River, Odessa, and perhaps Kyiv, while noting Russia does not intend to govern Western Ukraine long-term. He emphasizes that events will unfold on Russian terms, with European irrelevance in the decision-making process fading as Moscow executes its plans.

Speaker 0 and Speaker 1 discuss a cascade of developments around Ukraine, Russia, and Western policy. - Speaker 0 notes that Trump reportedly changed his stance on Tomahawk missiles, mentions a meeting with Zelensky where Zelensky supposedly urged acceptance of a Putin deal, and recalls that the Trump-Putin meeting was canceled. Speaker 1 responds that Russia has 100% made clear there will be no freeze and that for the war to end, Ukraine must leave all Russian territory. He says Tomahawk missiles were never on the table, that this was a pressure ploy by Trump to push Russia, and that it could have led to a thermonuclear war, which Putin reminded the US about in their conversations. - According to Speaker 1, Ukrainians will die, Russians will advance, Ukrainian economy will be destroyed, and Ukrainian energy infrastructure will be annihilated, leading to the collapse of Ukraine as a nation. Speaker 0 sketches a timeline: initial plans for a Putin-Trump-Zelensky sequence, Putin’s call after Trump hinted at Tomahawks, then a Zelensky meeting where Zelensky allegedly pressed Trump to accept a Putin deal, after which Tomahawks were no longer on the table and the Trump-Putin meeting was canceled. - Speaker 1 repeats: Tomahawks were never on the table; this was a pressure tactic. He explains the Russia-US exchange as frank, with Russia laying down the law; he asserts that the US would have faced a major escalation if Tomahawks had been supplied, because Tomahawks are nuclear-capable. He claims Ukraine would have been made a party to the conflict through US involvement. He adds that Russia will not accept a freeze because, constitutionally, Ukraine must leave all Russian territory, including Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, Donetsk, and Lugansk. - Speaker 0 asks why Tomahawks would matter, and Speaker 1 reiterates that Storm Shadow and Scout missiles are not nuclear capable, while Tomahawks would be, and contrasts this with Ukraine’s Flamingo drone, dismissing Flamingo as a propaganda tool. He describes Flamingo as a wooden drone designed to mimic a flock of birds and says it will be shot down and is not a serious threat; Ukraine’s drone capability is strong, with Ukrainians as the second-best fighters and drones in the world, while Russians are first in drone capability. - They discuss the trajectory of the war: Speaker 1 emphasizes that Russia’s advance is strategic, with drone warfare transforming the battlefield into piecemeal advances. He asserts Russia’s kill ratio of 36 Ukrainians to 1 Russian, and argues the West’s narrative of Russia suffering more is fantasy. He notes the West’s support for Ukraine drains Ukraine’s resources while Russia’s defense industry booms, and that Russia’s economy, energy, and sanctions resistance show resilience. - On economics, Speaker 1 claims the Russian economy is thriving; gas is cheap in Russia, Novosibirsk and Ekaterinburg are booming, and sanctions have not toppled Russia. He argues Europe’s sanctions are not beating Russia and that Russia’s ruble remains strong; he contrasts this with Western expectations of Russia’s collapse. - They discuss casualty figures and manpower. Speaker 0 asks for a definite casualty number; Speaker 1 cites Ukrainians dying daily (tens of thousands over time) and asserts Russians suffer hundreds daily on their worst day, noting Ukraine’s manpower shortages and Russia’s mobilization efforts: Russia conducted a one-time 300,000-mobilization; Ukraine has mobilized seven or eight times and relies on volunteers and external manpower, including Western units in some cases. He contends Russia’s total forces expanded to 1.5 million due to NATO expansion and ongoing operations. - On battlefield tactics, Speaker 1 explains Russia’s algorithm: three-man assault teams using drone support to seize bunkers held by larger Ukrainian forces, followed by reinforcement, all while drone warfare dominates. He asserts Ukraine’s drone capacity is strong, but Russia counters with its own drones and targeting of Ukrainian drone operators. - They debate why Russia would not freeze lines even if Ukraine yielded Donbas, Lugansk, and Donetsk. Speaker 1 insists those regions are Russian territory per referendum and constitutional absorption in September 2022, and argues that Ukraine cannot give up Donbas, which is Russia’s, and that a freeze would not be acceptable to Russia. He asserts that Moscow will not abandon these territories and that any idea of a freeze is a Western fantasy. - The discussion touches on the Minsk accords, the Istanbul talks, and the argument that Ukraine’s leadership initially pursued peace but later prepared for renewed conflict with NATO backing. Speaker 1 contends that Minsk was a sham agreed to buy time, and that Russia’s goal was to compel Ukraine to honor commitments to protect Russian speakers; Ukraine’s leadership is accused of pursuing war rather than peace after early negotiations. - They discuss Wagner and Prigozin’s role: Wagner provided a vehicle to surge capabilities into Lugansk and Donetsk; after September 2022 these troops were to be absorbed into the Russian military, but Prigozin continued operations in Bachmuth, recruited prisoners, and pressured for offensive allocations; this culminated in a confrontation with Shoigu and Gerasimov, and Wagner eventually faced disbandment pressure and a mobilization response. - In closing, Speaker 0 notes recent sanctions and Putin’s response condemning them as attempts to pressure Russia, while Speaker 1 reiterates that Russia seeks to end the war and rebuild relations with the US, but not under ongoing Ukraine conflict. He emphasizes that India and China will stand with Russia, citing strategic partnerships and the desire to maintain sovereign energy decisions, and predictsRussia will endure sanctions while seeking new buyers and alliances. - The exchange ends with Putin signaling that new sanctions will have costs for the EU, while Speaker 1 reiterates that Russia will adapt and maintain its strategic position, with China and India aligned with Russia rather than yielding to Western pressure.

Mario: Let's start with Venezuela. Do you think this is a strategy by Trump? Larry: I saw something similar back in 1988. The CIA was involved with trying to provoke Manuel Noriega into taking some sort of action. They could say, oh, well, we gotta go respond to this to set the stage for our military invasion, which I believe that in 2018, Donald Trump signed a finding authorizing a covert action by the CIA to get rid of Maduro. That attempt failed. And now the objective, get control of the oil. That's the number one priority. And I think it's being done with an eye looking forward, recognizing the potential risk. If conflict is renewed with Iran, prospect of the shutdown of Persian Gulf— Mario: Ukraine defeated Russia. Larry: Yeah. That was the plan. Russia's military is now around 1,500,000. Mario: Let’s talk Venezuela. What’s your initial reaction? When John Kuriaki suggested the best indicator is naval movements, and the buildup off Venezuela is significant. I’ve heard they have 14, twelve warships, including the Gerald Ford. Do you think they are bluffing? Is this Trump strategy? Larry: It could be a bluff. I saw something similar in 1988. I was in the CIA’s Central America branch. They tried to provoke Noriega into action to justify invasion, which happened in December 1988. What’s different now is the base infrastructure. In Panama, Quarry Heights was full; Southern Command was there. Southern Command has moved to Miami. The weaponization of the idea of a “supported vs. supporting” commander is reversed here: Southern Command would be subordinate to Special Operations Command. SOCOM cannot fight a conventional war; they’re light infantry, raids, hostage rescue. So the question is: what will the ships actually do? Shells into Venezuela won’t defeat Venezuela. Ground forces would require mass, and Venezuela is three times the size of Vietnam with rugged terrain that favors ambushes. If US troops ashore, you’d stack body bags far beyond Iraq and Afghanistan. Mario: Do Venezuelans have the will to fight Maduro? Larry: Yes. It will rally insurgents from Brazil and Colombia. If we decapitate Maduro, there are loyalists with weapons; an insurgency could follow, and the US would be hard-pressed to pacify it. The State Department’s INL/INSCR reports on narcotics note Venezuela as a transit point for marijuana and some cocaine, with fentanyl less central than claimed by Trump. The 2018 emphasis on Trendy Aragua looked CIA-driven. Trump reportedly signed a covert action finding in 2018 to remove Maduro, leading to the Guaidó fiasco; that covert action included some public diplomacy via USAID. The objective now, as you asked, is oil control and curtailing Russia, China, and Iran’s influence, with an eye toward BRICS. Mario: Could there be a decapitation strike on Maduro, and would someone like Maria take over? Larry: A decapitation strike could spark insurgency; the US would not be able to pacify it. The broader agenda seems to include a strategy to seize oil and reduce regional influence by Russia and China. Venezuela’s role as a transit point and possible BRICS alignment complicates any straightforward regime-change scenario. Mario: Moving to general foreign policy under Trump. The national security strategy (NSS) for 2025 signals a shift, but you question how binding NSS papers are. What did you make of it, and how does it relate to Ukraine? You’ve noted Trump isn’t serious about peace in Ukraine on some occasions. Larry: The NSS is a set of guidelines, not a blueprint. Europe is being asked to step up, the US distancing itself from Europe, and the strategic relationship with Europe is damaged by the perception of long-term reliability and sanctions. The document highlights China as an economic rival rather than an enemy; it criticizes Europe’s defense spending and censorship, and it frames Russia as less of a direct threat than before, though the reality is nuanced. The US-EU relationship is strained, and the US wants Europe to shoulder more of the burden in Ukraine while maintaining strategic pressure. Mario: What about Ukraine? Zelensky’s negotiation posture, security guarantees, and the Moscow terms? Larry: Putin spoke on 06/14/2024 with five Russian demands: Crimea, Zaporizhzhia, Kherson, Donetsk, and Luhansk are permanently part of Russia; Ukraine must withdraw its forces from those republics; there must be an election in Ukraine with a legitimately elected president (the Russians argue Zelensky is illegitimate for not holding elections); they suggest a successor to Zelensky and elections within 90 days. Freezing lines in Donbas is not accepted by Russia; the Russians claim further territory may be annexed with referenda. If peace talks fail, Russia is likely to push to occupy Kharkiv, Sumy, Mykolaiv, and Odessa, potentially Kyiv. Western support is insufficient to alter that trajectory, given Russia’s large artillery and drone production. The US and Europe cannot match Russia’s drone and shell output; even if they supply Tomahawks, escalation risks, including nuclear considerations, grow. Russia’s economy and war capacity remain robust, and the BRICS poles are strengthening as Western leverage wanes. Mario: What about sanctions strategy and Russia’s oil revenues? Larry: Oil remains a significant but not decisive portion of Russia’s GDP. The West’s sanctions are not enough to force collapse; Russia has endured the 1990s and remains resilient. BRICS cooperation and the shift to the Global South are changing the global order, with Russia and China deepening ties and reducing Western influence. The war in Ukraine has not produced a decisive Western victory, and the global south is moving away from Western-led sanctions, reshaping geopolitical alignments. Mario, it’s been a pleasure.

Dmitry Sims junior hosts lieutenant general Abty Alaudinov, hero of Russia, hero of the Chechen Republic, hero of the Donetsk People’s Republic, commander of the Akhmet Special Forces, and deputy head of the main military political directorate of the Russian Ministry of Defense. The conversation centers on the current phase of the conflict, Russia’s strategy, the role of Western support, and comparisons with Israeli actions in Gaza and other theaters. Key points and claims: - Russia’s combat capability and strategy - Alaudinov states that “overall, all troops of the Russian Federation’s Ministry of Defense are engaged in active offensive operations across all sectors where we’re positioned,” with the most intense fighting around Pokrovsk, seen as the key point to break through to operational space. He notes progress in sectors where the Ahmad (Akhmet) special forces operate and emphasizes a broader offensive plan while maintaining an “active defense” to engage the entire front line and stretch the enemy’s resources. - He asserts that “only Russia is advancing” along the 1,000-kilometer line of contact and attributes slower offensive tempo to preserving personnel and avoiding a sharp breakthrough that could trigger NATO involvement. He argues the primary damage comes from unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) on both sides, and contends a rapid thrust would yield enormous losses. - Perceived signs of enemy strain - The speaker describes Ukraine as gradually crumbling under pressure, with Pokrovsk, Kupiansk, and the surrounding agglomeration “gradually falling apart.” He claims Russia liberates one or two settlements daily and that NATO support—drones and equipment—has not changed the overall dynamics; Ukraine cannot hold the front despite the influx of foreign weapons. - Western/NATO support - Alaudinov asserts that NATO testing is ongoing on Ukraine with drones, weapons, electronic warfare, etc., and that Trump’s shifting rhetoric does not reduce the flow of weapons or support. He contends that American support persists even as political statements change, and he notes deep American-NATO involvement via think tanks, satellites, and arms supplies that reach the front. - Drones and the changing nature of war - He emphasizes drones as the central element of modern warfare, while not negating the continued relevance of artillery and tanks. He argues: “a tank worth millions of dollars can be destroyed by a drone that costs $500,” and stresses the need to compete economically in war, deploying cheaper, effective unmanned systems to exhaust the enemy’s resources. - He claims Russia has a layered drone system for deep reconnaissance and strike with various warhead levels, ranges, and maneuverability, enabling operations from closest to farthest sectors and allowing “all targets” to be hit today. He asserts Russia is ahead of NATO in unmanned aviation. - Mobilization and tactics - Refuting Western depictions of “meat assaults,” he notes Russia conducted only one mobilization (300,000) and has continued advancing, while Ukraine has mobilized for years and still struggles. He attributes Ukraine’s resilience to nationalist formations behind mobilized troops, and he suggests that without NATO support, Ukraine would not sustain the front for many days. - Mercenaries and comparisons to Israeli actions - He characterizes Western mercenaries as having arrived with false expectations and being killed off in large numbers; Ukrainians are described as having strong spirit, but NATO soldiers lack endurance in the same way. Israeli mercenaries are described as capable in some contexts but not decisive against Russia. - On Gaza and the Israeli army, Alaudinov accuses Israel of “a fascist state” with tactics that spare no one, arguing Russia fights only those who fight with weapons and does not target women, children, or elders. He contrasts this with alleged Israeli actions in Gaza, saying Israel has no tactics and destroys civilians. - Nuclear considerations and doctrine - He asserts Russia is a nuclear power with substantial combat experience and advances in missiles like Zircon that could sink carriers, arguing NATO did not account for Russia’s capabilities when initiating the conflict. He presents a broader critique of Western policy and the so-called “deep state,” alleging far-reaching political dynamics involving Israel, Epstein, and compromise among Western leadership. - Closing perspective - The discussion closes with the host thanking Alaudinov for the detailed analysis of the operation and broader geopolitical commentary, including views on Israel, Gaza, Iran, and U.S. roles.

Mario and the Colonel discuss the latest developments in the Ukraine-Russia conflict and their implications for peace negotiations and the battlefield. - The hosts walk through conflicting claims about an alleged Ukrainian drone attack on Putin’s residence, timed with Zelenskyy’s meeting with Trump. Ukraine denied the claims; Russia asserted the opposite; a CIA report then said the drones targeted a Russian military base in the region and that this wasn’t the first time such a base had been targeted. The Colonel notes that all sides may be using disinformation, and no one can say with authority what happened. He emphasizes that what matters is how each side uses the information to bolster its position and public support, including Lavrov’s stated threat of retaliation. He argues the military reality on the ground continues to be unfavorable for Ukraine, and that Russia will use any incident to justify gains or concessions on its terms. - On negotiations, the 90–95% of an agreement reportedly already accepted is contrasted with two sticking points: security guarantees and territory. Zelenskyy is said to be nearing some form of security guarantee solution, but Donbas territorial concessions remain unresolved. The Colonel suggests evaluating who benefits from the alleged incident; if true, it could be used to sabotage peace talks. He notes competing narratives: Ukraine seeks to portray Russia as untrustworthy, while Russia portrays Ukraine as the aggressor and untrustworthy, both using the incident to justify their positions. He questions whether any side actually benefits, proposing that Russia might use the event domestically to rally support and push negotiations toward its terms. - The discussion moves to strategic weapons and timing. They note the Arashnik missiles in Belarus, described as nuclear-capable, with high speed and multiple warheads. The Colonel says Russia has signaled willingness to escalate but would likely reserve Arashniks for decisive moments or major escalations, possibly a clash with NATO, rather than using them routinely. He cites Putin’s statements about negotiating or taking actions by force and explains that Russia’s leadership appears to have reached a point where battlefield gains could be prioritized if diplomacy stalls. - On Ukraine’s ability to advance, the Colonel argues that Russia prioritizes territorial gains but is not constrained by time, with large manpower advantages and sustained firepower. He asserts Russia’s advance has accelerated over 2024–2025 and could continue, potentially enabling breakthroughs even if the Donbas remains a long-term objective. He contrasts this with potential Ukrainian vulnerabilities, including troop losses, desertions, and mobilization limits, suggesting Ukraine could face a collapse in the front line by spring or summer, though there is uncertainty about exact outcomes. - Regarding Ukraine’s effort to disrupt Russia’s economy by targeting the Black Sea fleet and shipping, the Colonel is skeptical that such actions would decisively affect Russia, given Russia’s diversification away from sea-based revenues and Ukraine’s parallel economic strains, including power shortages and refineries. He emphasizes that neither side’s economic measures have produced a decisive effect, and that Russia has prepared countermeasures. - Trump’s post claiming that “Putin’s attack bluster” shows Russia stands in the way of peace is discussed. The Colonel says Trump is echoing Western lines and that such rhetoric will not by itself alter the course of negotiations; an eventual settlement requires both sides to agree on terms, not slogans. - On possible Russian retaliation, the Colonel suggests targeted responses within Kyiv’s power sector or leadership and possibly infrastructure, but he cautions against predicting escalation, noting Russia’s risk-averse tendencies and potential to strike second- and third-tier Ukrainian leaders or critical infrastructure if deemed necessary for domestic purposes. - Looking ahead twelve months, the Colonel predicts continued war, potential major battlefield moves with accelerating territorial changes, and the possibility of a breakthrough or a sharp escalation. He warns that a purely defensive posture will not win and that the pace of Russian advances could lead to significant shifts by late 2026, with Donbas negotiations remaining unsettled. He concludes that the conflict is likely to continue, with hybrid warfare and broader Western responses shaping developments.