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The conversation centers on Iran, its 47-year regime, and how to think about protest, reform, and potential change from the perspective of an Iranian-American who has lived in the United States most of his life. The speakers discuss the severity of the regime, the nature of the opposition, and the calculus involved in any push for change. - Freedom and the cost of change: Freedom is described as nasty and the regime as “nasty.” The speakers assert that the regime, including the IRGC, is not likely to give up Iran in a peaceful way. They emphasize that protests and resistance have been ongoing, and that the regime has a track record of destroying opposition. They use the imagery of public executions and a ruthless approach to suppression, comparing the regime’s behavior to a brutal, game-of-thrones-like motto. - Personal history and perspective: The guest notes his life trajectory—born during the 1978 revolution, living through the Shah’s era briefly, and then the Khomeini years—giving him a long historical frame for evaluating leadership and revolution. He remarks that he has no moral authority to tell Iranians how to protest or whether to risk their families, acknowledging the severe personal stakes for those on the ground. He stresses the bravery and resilience of the Iranian people and explains the immense pressures that drive ordinary citizens to protest. - The strategic challenge of regime change: The guest asserts that the regime wants to stretch negotiations and extend days to avoid losing resources, implying a protracted endurance tactic. He insists that replacing or reforming the regime would be extremely difficult, given the depth of the regime’s networks and its long tenure. - Reza Pahlavi and leadership dynamics: The discussion revisits Reza Pahlavi, the former shah’s son, noting his recent high-profile activity, meetings in Washington, and televised statements. The guest acknowledges both praise and criticism of Reza Pahlavi, arguing that leadership in Iran would require clear, tough decisions and that those who criticize him must provide constructive counterarguments rather than ad hominem attacks. He discusses the complexity of leadership in exile and the challenges of returning to Iran to lead, including loyalty issues within the military and the risk of betrayal. - The US and foreign policy angle: The hosts debate what role the United States should play, including the consideration of strikes or sanctions. The guest uses a parable about a local offense (a killer in Miami) to illustrate how a country should commit to eliminating a threat without broad interference in other regions’ problems. He argues for public support of a targeted objective but cautions against broad, nation-building wars that could trigger larger conflicts. He also notes the influence of other actors, including Israel, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Russia, China, and European nations, on the Iran situation, suggesting a multi-layered and opaque calculus in any action. - The question of strikes and objectives: The speakers discuss whether strikes should aim to completely destroy the regime or merely pressure it, emphasizing that the intention behind any military action matters more than the action itself. They consider the risk of a dangerous power vacuum, comparing potential outcomes to Libya or Iraq, and discuss the possibility of negotiating with a different leadership that could concede to protesters’ demands while minimizing harm to the broader population. They acknowledge the difficulty of achieving a favorable outcome without risking unintended consequences. - The role of sanctions and diplomacy: The sanctions are described as byproducts of the regime’s leadership and its lack of diplomacy, with the argument that sanctions affect the Iranian people more than the ruling elite. The dialogue touches on questions of accountability for the regime’s behavior and the broader regional dynamics, including public sentiment in Iran and international responses. - Mossad and external involvement: The guest asserts that Mossad and Israel are heavily involved in Iran’s internal dynamics and protests, given the existential stakes and the perception of threats against Iranian leadership. He contends that foreign intelligence communities are active in shaping events and information, including potential misdirection and propaganda. - The broader takeaway: The discussion ends by underscoring the need for multiple options and credible leadership in Iran, the difficulty of changing a deeply entrenched regime, and the reality that any transition would be complex, potentially dangerous, and require careful, strategic consideration of long-term impacts rather than quick, sweeping actions. The host reflects on the remarkable intensity and busyness of US politics and foreign policy under a dynamic administration, noting that such a convergence of domestic and international pressures makes this period historically singular.

The speaker states that the United States is conducting an operation with a clear goal: to eliminate the threat posed by Iran’s short-range ballistic missiles and by Iran’s navy to naval assets. The speaker says the operation is focused on this objective and is progressing “quite successfully,” with the details of tactics and progress to be discussed by the Pentagon and the Department of War. Two reasons are given for acting now. First, the speaker asserts that if Iran came under attack by the United States, Israel, or another party, Iran would respond against the United States. According to the speaker, orders had been delegated down to field commanders, and within an hour of the initial attack on Iran’s leadership compound, the Iranian missile forces in the south and in the north were activated to launch. The speaker notes that those forces were “prepositioned.” Second, the speaker explains that the assessment was that if the United States stood and waited for Iran’s attack to come first, American casualties would be much higher. Therefore, the president made the decision to act preemptively. The speaker emphasizes that they knew there would be an Israeli action, and that action would precipitate an attack against American forces. The implication is that delaying a preemptive strike would result in greater casualties, potentially billions of dollars in losses, and more American lives at risk. The overarching message is that the preemptive operation aims to neutralize Iran’s short-range ballistic missiles and navy threats before they are used in consolidation with anticipated Israeli actions and any Iranian counterattacks against U.S. forces. The speaker frames the decision as prudent and anticipatory, intended to prevent higher casualties and to maintain safety for American personnel and assets. The speaker stops short of detailing specific tactical methods, pointing listeners to the Pentagon and the Department of War for a deeper discussion of tactics and progress.

Speaker 0 and Speaker 1 discuss the unfolding conflict with Iran, focusing on miscalculations, strategy, and potential trajectories. - Speaker 1 says the war is a major miscalculation, identifiable before it began. Signs were evident: movement of military equipment, force postures, and statements suggested that absent an eleventh-hour change by Trump, the plan was to use prepositioned forces and enablers for sustained combat. He notes this pattern matches previous experiences in which the U.S. saw a buildup as a precursor to war, citing Russia’s 2022 invasion and his own observations of earlier prepositioning, logistics, air support, refueling, and large-scale aviation assets (C-17s, C-5s, fighter jets, aircraft carriers). - He argues Iran’s leadership intended to pursue war rather than negotiation, pointing to what he calls a central missed opportunity: the Oman foreign minister’s Friday-night submissions to the Iranian negotiator offering zero reprocessing, stockpile reductions, and at least preliminary talks on long-range missiles and proxies. He asserts that if the Trump administration had accepted those terms, a ceasefire or settlement might have been possible; instead, he claims the next morning’s attack signaled that negotiations were never the aim. - Regarding U.S. objectives, Speaker 1 says the stated aims from Trump were unattainable given Iran’s resolve and the regime’s calculations that fighting a war with the U.S. is less risky than submitting to U.S. demands. He cites a New York Times report indicating Iran believed war with the U.S. was a viable risk, yet he notes Iran’s leadership now appears to be consolidating support at home and regionally after the Ayatollah’s assassination and the subsequent martyrdom of Qasem Soleimani’s successor in Iran’s internal narrative. - On battlefield dynamics, he emphasizes that Iran’s force deployment is not merely pressure but designed for use, with extensive underground facilities capable of withstanding sustained pressure. He forecasts continued high-intensity operations for a period, but warns the U.S. faces a tightening window: if the Iranian side holds firm and the U.S. cannot sustain supplies and missiles, the U.S. could reach a crisis point. - He discusses possible ceasefire dynamics and political reaction: Trump’s suggestion of a ceasefire could be “complete BS” if the Ayatollah’s position remains solid; the martyrdom and regional protests strengthen Iran’s stance. He expects continued escalation and a hardening of Iran’s demands, including sanctions relief or designation changes, should the conflict drag on. - On regional response, Speaker 1 notes that Iran has drawn regional actors into the conflict, with protests supporting Iran across Iraq, Pakistan, Bahrain, Oman, Kuwait, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Israel. He says many Iranians—though opposed to the regime—are unlikely to embrace Israel or the United States as a path out of the crisis, given decades of antagonism and past betrayals by Western powers. - Regarding U.S. vulnerabilities, he says there are reports of U.S. casualties (three killed, five seriously wounded, others lightly wounded) though some figures are disputed; the public reporting may lag behind direct sources. He mentions possible gaps in air defense and the risk of shortages in interceptors as drones and missiles proliferate, warning that Iran could escalate if U.S. stocks are depleted. - Looking ahead, Speaker 1 argues the conflict is a battle of wills and a war of attrition. The U.S. attempted a “cheap” approach with naval and air power but no ground forces; Iran appears ready to continue long enough to force concessions. He warns the Iranian threat could extend to oil infrastructure and the broader economy if the United States or its regional partners target Iran’s energy sector, potentially broadening the conflict. - In sum, he characterizes Iran’s strategy as all-in, aiming to impose pain to compel a negotiated settlement unfavorable to the U.S., while the U.S. faces a narrowing margin to sustain supply chains, missiles, and air defenses as the conflict potentially drags on for weeks to months. He cautions that the escalation ladder remains with higher rungs available, including strikes on energy infrastructure, if the conflict widens.

John Mersheimer argues that the war against Iran is not proceeding as the United States hoped and that there is no plausible off-ramp or decisive pathway to victory. He contends that Washington cannot narrate a decisive end to the conflict the way it could have against Nazi Germany or Imperial Japan, because the war has not produced a decisive Iranian collapse. Instead, Iran has an incentive to convert the fight into a protracted war of attrition and possesses the means to do so, including a broad set of missiles and drones and the ability to retaliate across the region. The result, he says, is a stalemate in which Iran would drive a hard bargain to secure sanctions relief or other concessions, and escalation by the U.S. and Israel will simply provoke Iran to escalate further. On why Iran will not settle on American terms, Mersheimer emphasizes that Iran has a strong hand and time on its side. He notes that the more time passes, the more desperate the U.S. will be to settle, which strengthens Iran’s position. He argues that even heavy bombardment would not compel Iran to quit; rather, Iran could strike back against Gulf states, Israel, and American assets with significant effect. The Gulf States are particularly vulnerable due to a small number of petroleum sites, short-range missiles, drones, and, crucially, desalination plants that provide most of their fresh water. He cites Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Oman as heavily dependent on desalination, implying that destroying such infrastructure would have catastrophic humanitarian and economic consequences. Iran could also target energy infrastructure, and even if the Strait of Hormuz remains open, widespread damage to Gulf energy infrastructure would devastate the regional and global economy. He warns that Israel could suffer increasing Iranian pressure as time goes on, especially as interceptors become depleted. Regarding energy and the Strait of Hormuz, Mersheimer stresses that 20% of the world’s oil and gas passes through the Persian Gulf, making the energy dimension the war’s most consequential aspect. He argues that opening the Strait of Hormuz would be exceedingly difficult, and destroying desalination and petroleum infrastructure in the Gulf States would negate any advantage of keeping the straits open. He suggests that escalation without a viable endgame will have grave economic repercussions for the world, pushing the U.S. toward a coerced end that would not be a victory. Mersheimer contends that strategic bombing or air power alone cannot win such wars. He contrasts World War II and Korea/Vietnam with the present, where there are no boots on the ground and no clear path to victory via air power alone. He notes that the deterrent value of air power is limited, and a regime change strategy is notoriously difficult without ground forces. He argues that the decapitation strategy and ongoing escalations are unlikely to produce a decisive American/Israeli victory, and could instead lead to a stalemate or American concession under economic strain. On leadership and credibility, Mersheimer critiques U.S. leadership, particularly President Trump, for ignoring warning from generals and the National Intelligence Council that regime change was unlikely to succeed. He cites General James Mattis-era warnings that there was no viable military option and notes the pre-war intelligence that suggested limited prospects for quick regime change. He points to Trump’s sometimes contradictory and inaccurate statements about Iranian capabilities, including claims that Iran possessed Tomahawk missiles and that U.S. strikes had erased Iran’s nuclear capability. He argues that such statements undermine U.S. credibility, though he distinguishes between outright lies and genuine mistaken beliefs by leaders. The discussion also covers Russia’s involvement, with Russia believed to be providing intelligence to Iran and possibly supplying matériel and oil if needed. Mersheimer asserts that the war benefits Russia strategically: it diverts U.S. resources from Europe and Ukraine, potentially worsens Ukraine’s trajectory, and could raise global energy prices that benefit Russian revenue. He suggests that Russia, and possibly China, have strong incentives to aid Iran to counter American power. Europe’s role is analyzed as largely symbolic or marginal in determining the war’s outcome. Mersheimer argues that European elites are aligned with the U.S., prioritizing NATO continuity and the maintenance of American military presence, despite the damaging consequences for Europe. He suggests a radical approach for Europe: adopt a hardball stance toward the U.S., diversify its economic and strategic relations (including with China, Russia, and India), and resist being economically manipulated or coerced by Washington. He emphasizes that Europe’s interests would be better served by reducing overreliance on the United States and pursuing a more balanced set of strategic partners. Towards the end, the hosts revisit the idea that leaders lie and that liberal democracies tend to rely more on public persuasion and propaganda, with Trump’s statements illustrating the complexities of truth in international politics. The conversation ends with a reflection on whether Europe should recalibrate its posture toward the United States and broaden its strategic hedges to protect its own interests, rather than assuming continued U.S. leadership in a costly and protracted confrontation with Iran.

The statements contend that the actions were carried out with no congressional authorization, placing them in direct violation of the Constitution, specifically Articles I and II, and that they breach international law and American law, with no concerns raised about these issues. The speaker suggests that this pattern represents a new perimeter being established by Donald Trump, portraying the current situation as lawless and characterized by an authoritarian figure in the person of Trump. It is argued that there are no remaining guardrails to constrain him, and the only limitations he follows are self-imposed, based on what might provoke a backlash or retaliation. In other words, he would only undertake operations that do not invite a response or “kickback.” According to the account, some operations have already been undertaken that did not carry potential pushback, but the Iran scenario is singled out as one of the larger cases. The contention is that, unlike previous actions, there is a solid chance that Iran could retaliate in ways the United States would prefer to avoid. There is further concern that if Iran does retaliate, the United States could be harmed back in ways that are undesirable or difficult to manage. This potential for meaningful retaliation is presented as a key reason why Trump may not have ordered certain operations up to this point. Overall, the speaker implies a shift toward more aggressive or expansive actions without the usual checks and balances, highlighting the absence of congressional authorization and the potential for significant consequences if opposing parties decide to respond forcefully. The Iran situation is emphasized as a critical turning point because of the greater likelihood of retaliation compared to previous actions, influencing Trump’s restraint or hesitation in approving further operations.

Mario: Do you think The US should attack Iran? Joel: He could do a large but limited strike designed to punish the Iranian regime, but not explicitly try to topple it. Clint (Glenn): Now it's in the national interest of Iran to acquire nuclear weapons as a deterrent. You think that Iran the authority enemy. Of Not America being responsible for killing thousands of Iranians. It's very strange that we don't recognize the security competition here. You're unbelievable. No legitimate security concerns for Iran. None of your rules. Mario: Gentlemen. Astonishing. Joel: Does Iran need to be an enemy of The US? Clint: I see that’s very dishonest. This idea that The United States and Israel are worried about the Iranian civilians. I think this is ludicrous. If anything, they're doing everything they can to fuel the violence. If we stop threatening them, perhaps we can get something in return. They stop the threat. No. Mario: Never tried we've never gone down this path at all. Joel: You’re just completely ignoring tens of billions of Iranian dollars that go funneling into terrorist organizations that kill Americans, kill our Arab allies, kill our Israeli allies. It doesn't seem to bother you. Mario: Joel, I’m gonna start with you. A pretty broad question. Do you think The US should attack Iran, and do you think they will? Joel: The president has set his own terms. He has three choices: do nothing and frame that as diplomacy; do a large but limited strike designed to punish the regime but not topple it; or go all in toward regime change. He hasn’t made regime change his explicit objective yet. I think he’ll pick option two, a large but limited strike, because negotiations aren’t designed to lead somewhere. The Iranians are not serious, in his view. Mario: Do you think Trump should go with option two, or seek regime change? Joel: He should go with number two. Regime change is something I would love to see, but it’s too big an objective with air power. If the regime is toppled by force, the risks are immense. Damaging the regime—ballistic missiles, some nuclear components—could be enough to protect citizens and allies, even if it doesn’t topple the regime. If a coup follows, that’s a risk. Mario: Glenn, you argued against regime change but acknowledged concerns about the regime’s brutality. Please respond to Joel and the broader points. Glenn: I don’t think Trump should attack. It’s very likely he will, and the objective will probably be a limited bloody nose attack that is going bombed for two or three days or, like last time, twelve, and then pull away, with an implicit understanding that if Iran retaliates, it could be a big war. There is no diplomatic solution because the Iranians reject multi-issue deals; they want nuclear issues to be separate. The Iran regime is existentially threatened, so they’ll respond. The aim should be to recognize key security concerns and pursue a broader security understanding, not just use force. Mario: Joel, respond to Glenn’s point about whether Iran must be considered an enemy and about potential diplomacy. Joel: Does Iran need to be an enemy of The US? No. But this regime is an enemy. The people of Iran do not have to be enemies. The supreme leader believes the United States and Israel are enemies, and for forty-seven years they say, death to America, death to Israel. The Iranian regime has decided they’re the enemy. The Iranian people largely despise the regime. Mario: If Iran agrees to stop the nuclear program, should The US accept such a deal? Is that enough? Joel: The nuclear program is almost 100% destroyed; you wouldn’t negotiate solely on that. If diplomacy exists, it would be to address threats beyond the nuclear issue—ballistic missiles, regional alliances, human rights, etc. The Iranians were willing to accept transparency around their nuclear program in JCPOA-era diplomacy, but the Americans pulled out. If a nuclear deal is possible, it would require mutual concessions; insisting on broader concessions risks collapse. Glenn: The problem is that Iran has legitimate security concerns too. The strategy after the Cold War linking security to global hegemony is problematic. There should be recognition of Iran’s legitimate security needs, not a complete defanging. We should explore a grand bargain—recognize a Palestinian state, get out of Syria, and pursue a path with Iran that reduces the threat without destroying Iran. Mario: There’s a debate about whether the Gulf states see Israel as a bigger threat than Iran now. Joel, what’s your take? Joel: Two countries—Qatar and Turkey—see Israel as an enemy. Turkey’s Erdogan has threatened Jerusalem; Qatar hosts anti-American and anti-Israel propaganda via Al Jazeera and has hosted Hamas leaders. Israel has the right to defend itself and has pursued peace deals with several Arab states, but the region remains dangerous. Israel should avoid destabilizing moves and pursue peace where possible, while recognizing the security challenges it faces. Glenn: Israel’s internal politics and policy flaws exist, but law in Israel provides equal rights to Arab citizens; policy can be improved, but not all claims of apartheid reflect law. Arabs have political rights, though issues with funding and policy remain. The West Bank is a flashpoint; Gaza is controlled by Hamas, complicating Palestinian governance. There’s a broader discussion about whether regime change in Iran is desirable given potential fragmentation and regional instability. Mario: Final question: where is Iran by year’s end? Glenn: If Trump attacks, Iran will perceive an existential threat and may strike back hard, possibly shutting the Strait of Hormuz. Russia and China may intervene to prevent complete destruction of Iran. Joel: I hope Glenn’s scenario doesn’t come true. Iran might pursue nuclear weapons as a deterrent. If the regime is weakened, the region’s stability could be jeopardized. The options remain: negotiate, strike, or regime-change—prefer a large but limited strike to deter further advancement without taking ownership of an unknown future. Mario: Thank you both. This was a vigorous, wide-ranging exchange. End of time.

Lindsey Graham stated he told allies that if Hezbollah attacks Israel, the U.S. and Israel should target Iran by destroying their refineries to put them "out of the oil business." Speaker 0 claims Graham hasn't considered the consequences of war with Iran, and that Graham and many of his colleagues are reckless. Speaker 0 also mentions Dan Crenshaw's call for a "war to end all wars," which speaker 0 dismisses as impossible, stating that wars beget more war and citing World War I as an example.

The speaker reports aggressive military actions and ongoing negotiations with Iran. They state that they have “destroyed a lot of additional targets today” and that “the navy's gone” and “the air force is gone,” while noting that “we know that” and that they “destroyed many, many targets today” in what was “a big day.” Negotiations are described as both direct and indirect, with emissaries involved as well as direct dealings. On the diplomatic side, the speaker says Iran “agreed to send eight votes two days ago, and then they added another two, so it was 10 votes,” and that “today, they gave us as a tribute I don't know. Can't define it exactly, but they gave us, I think out of a sign of respect, 20 boats of oil.” These vessels would be moving “through the Hormoz Strait” and would begin “starting tomorrow morning over the next couple of days.” The speaker claims to be “doing extremely well in that negotiation,” while acknowledging uncertainty in dealings with Iran: “you never know with Iran because we negotiate with them and then we always have to blow them up.” Historical references are cited to explain current posture: the “b two bombers” and the termination of the “Iran nuclear deal done by Barack Hussein Obama, probably the worst deal we've ever done as a country, of the dumbest deals we've ever done.” The speaker asserts that the deal was terminated, otherwise “right now, they'd have a nuclear weapon,” and that an attack with the B-2 bombers was used to stop them from having nuclear capability. The speaker suggests a possible future deal with Iran but notes it is not certain: “I think we'll make a deal with them. Pretty sure. But it's possible we won't.” Regarding regime change, the speaker asserts that “we've had regime change, if you look already, because the one regime was decimated, destroyed. They're all dead.” The “next regime is mostly dead,” and the “third regime” involves “a whole different group of people” than any before. The speaker contends that this constitutes regime change and characterizes the first regime as “really bad, really evil,” which is claimed to be “done.” The second regime is described as “appointed, and they're gone.” The third group is described as “much more reasonable,” leading the speaker to say that regime change appears to be achieved and may be automatic.

Initiating a crisis to go to war with Iran is challenging. If compromise fails, starting a war through covert means may be best for US interests. Historical examples show wars began after specific incidents, not just sanctions. Increasing pressure on Iran, like mysterious submarine incidents, could be an option. Using covert actions against Iran could escalate if needed.

The speaker argues that pushing for war with Iran is a dangerous delusion. They claim: “That’s all you gotta do is just push a button, give an order, and bam. Iran will be blown up.” They challenge the audience to understand how combat power works and to see that many war advocates are “singing from the same sheet of music.” The speaker names several individuals as examples of this chorus: Rebecca Hendrix, Victoria Coates, Rebecca Grant, Mike Pompeo, General Jack Keane, and Senator Lindsey Graham, indicating that all of these figures promote a similar line of thinking about provoking a war with Iran. The central claim is that these hawkish voices believe one can “do this massive armada” and that Iran cannot respond effectively. The speaker insists that such views are incorrect, stating that Iran can and would “make life incredibly difficult and kill many Israelis.” They note the explicit claims by Iran that they would attack and kill targets and people in Israel, and attack Americans and kill Americans through bases throughout the region. The speaker emphasizes that if the advocacy for war succeeds in provoking Iran, “you’re gonna get a lot of Israelis killed and a lot of Americans killed.” The speaker also acknowledges uncertainty about Iran’s precise calculations, noting that Iran’s claims about what they would do may be posturing or may reflect a real intent to respond, but that the speaker cannot predict which. They argue that Iran may choose not to act if it believes retaliation would be excessive or counterproductive, but if Iran does move as it has said it would, the consequences would be severe for Israelis and Americans. In summary, the speaker condemns the assumption that a war with Iran can be conducted unilaterally or without severe retaliatory consequences, warning that the consequences could include significant loss of life among Israelis and Americans if Iran follows through on its stated intentions. The dialogue frames the issue as a critique of a pervasive pro-war chorus and underscores the potential human cost of such policy.

Speaker 0 questions the rationale for the war, noting that “the intelligence did not suggest that an attack was imminent from Iran,” and asking, “What is left? Why are we at war with Iran?” He also remarks that “the nuclear program isn’t the reason” and that he never expected to hear Ted Cruz talking about nukes. Speaker 1 suggests the simplest explanation given, which has been backtracked, is that “Israel made us do it, that Bibi decided on this timeline, Netanyahu decided he wanted to attack, and he convinced Trump to join him by scaring Trump into believing that US assets in the region would be at risk, and so Trump was better off just joining Netanyahu.” He adds that this may not be the full explanation, but it’s a plausible one. He notes that “the nuclear program is not part of their targeting campaign,” and that “harder line leadership is taking hold,” with the Strait of Hormuz “still being shut down even as we get their navy.” He asks what remains as the explanation, suggesting it might be that Israel forced the United States’ hand and questions, “How weak does that make The United States look? How weak are we if our allies can force us into wars of choice that are bad for US national security interests?”

The speaker believes President Trump gets to define "America First" because he was elected and leads the movement. The President is focused on the core American national interest: ensuring Iran does not have a nuclear weapon. When asked how long diplomacy should be given before military action, the speaker says the President will pursue diplomacy until he believes there is no opportunity left. Once diplomacy has run its course, the President will do what he needs to end Iranian enrichment and the nuclear program. The speaker advises the President to trust his instincts, which he believes are the best of any president or political leader he's ever seen. The speaker thinks the President knows when diplomacy has run its course and when to employ the military to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. The President will continue working the process and allow diplomacy to unfold, while retaining the option to do whatever is necessary to keep Americans safe.

In this video, the speaker claims that all wars in the US have been fake, referring to the manipulation and strategizing that leads to war. He highlights the Washington Institute For Near East Policy, a think tank with influential members like Henry Kissinger and Condoleezza Rice, who have served in various presidential administrations. The speaker emphasizes that American interests in the Middle East, rather than spreading democracy or freedom, drive these wars. He discusses historical examples of false flag events that led to wars, such as Pearl Harbor and the Gulf of Tonkin incident. The speaker concludes that if Iran doesn't compromise, someone else should initiate the war, following the pattern of previous conflicts.

The speaker opens by citing James Madison, who wrote to Thomas Jefferson in 1789 that “the constitution supposes what the history of all governments demonstrates, that the executive branch of power is the most interested in war and most prone to it,” and notes that the constitution itself vests in the legislature the question of war (Article I, Section 8, Clause 11) while giving the president operational powers of war (Article II, Section 2, Clause 1). Even if one claimed the 1973 War Powers Resolution supersedes the constitutional language, the speaker argues the president has not met its conditions: the president may only introduce U.S. armed forces into hostilities under three circumstances—declaration of war, specific statutory authorization, or a national emergency created by an attack on the United States—none of which exist today because Iran has not attacked the United States, Congress has not declared war, and Congress has not granted specific statutory authorization. Beyond this constitutional framing, the speaker asks why the United States would go to war with Iran and emphasizes that servicemembers deserve a clear mission. He questions how such a war would help American families with groceries, housing, or safety in schools and neighborhoods. He cautions against past interventions in the Middle East, arguing they have produced a debt of at least $8 trillion from wars in Iraq, Libya, Syria, and Afghanistan, and contends a sustained war with Iran will not stabilize the region but will radicalize new generations of terrorists and generate more refugees to Europe and the United States. The speaker argues Iran is not Venezuela, and that Ayatollah Khomeini was not a president but a religious leader in a region notorious for radical Islamists; he asserts that the United States and Israel turned him into a martyr, contributing to broader conflict and casualties, including six American families who have lost loved ones. He claims the administration cannot provide a straight answer for why the preemptive war was launched, noting contradictory statements about imminent Iranian strikes and the rationale of stopping a nuclear program. A candid answer, he says, came from the Secretary of State, who said Israel forced the United States to act, implying that Congress must decide war. If American lives are to be risked, that decision must be debated and voted on by representatives, and the debate should be arduous with a hard vote. He offers a theory that colleagues do not want to go on record due to a poor track record of meddling in the Middle East and a desire to avoid their names being associated with an unfavorable outcome. The speaker asserts Congress is not here to declare war today; the vote on the War Powers Resolution is to reassert that Congress must decide questions of war. Some say war is authorized by paying for it through the budget, but the speaker asserts that defining the mission for the troops is not included in the budget and has not been done. He thanks the men and women engaged in combat, prays for their safety, and states that the resolution is written for them—to ensure they know when they achieve their mission and can come home.

The transcript centers on a loud, multi-voiced discussion about the prospect of war with Iran, U.S. policy dynamics, and the influence of allied actors—especially Israel—on Washington’s decisions. - The opening segment features sharp, provocative claims about President Trump’s stance toward Iran. One speaker asserts that Trump gave Iran seven days to comply or “we will unleash hell on that country,” including strikes on desalinization plants and energy infrastructure. This is framed as part of a broader, catastrophic escalation in Iran under heavy pressure on Trump to commit U.S. forces to Israel’s war. - Joe Kent, a former director of the National Counterterrorism Center who resigned from the administration, presents the central prognosis. He warns that Trump will face immense pressure to commit ground troops in Iran, calling such a move a “catastrophic escalation” that would increase bloodshed. Kent urges the public to contact the White House and members of Congress to oppose boots on the ground in Iran, advocating for peaceful resolution and public pressure for peace. - The discussion shifts to Israeli involvement. The panel notes that Israeli media report Israel will not commit ground troops if the U.S. invades Iran, and some assert Israel has never, in any conflict, committed troops to support the U.S. The conversation questions this claim, noting counterpoints from analyst Brandon Weichert that Israel has undermined American forces in certain areas. - The debate then returns to Trump’s diplomacy and strategy. The host asks whether Trump’s stated approach toward Iran—potentially including a peace plan—is credible or “fake news.” Kent responds that Iran will not take diplomacy seriously unless U.S. actions demonstrate credibility, such as restraining Israel. He suggests that a more restrained Israeli posture would signal to Iran that the U.S. is serious about negotiations. - The program examines whether the MAGA movement has shifted on the issue. There is testimony that figures like Mark Levin have advocated for some form of ground action, though Levin reportedly denies calls for large-scale deployment. Kent explains that while he believes certain special operations capabilities exist—units trained to seize enriched uranium—the broader question is whether boots on the ground are necessary or wise. He emphasizes that a successful, limited operation could paradoxically encourage further action by Israel if it appears easy, potentially dragging the U.S. deeper into conflict. - A recurring theme is the perceived dominance of the Israeli lobby over U.S. foreign policy. Several participants contend that Israeli influence drives the war timeline, with Israeli action sometimes undermining U.S. diplomacy. They argue that despite public differences, the United States has not meaningfully restrained Israel, and that Israeli strategic goals could be pushing Washington toward conflict. - The conversation also covers domestic political dynamics and civil liberties. Kent argues that the intelligence community’s influence—infused with foreign policy aims—risks eroding civil liberties, including discussions around domestic terrorism and surveillance. The group notes pushback within the administration and among some members of the intelligence community about surveillance proposals tied to Palantir and broader counterterrorism practices. - Kent addresses questions about the internal decision-making process that led to the Iran policy shift, denying he was offered a central role in any pre-crime or AI-driven surveillance agenda. He acknowledges pushback within the administration against aggressive domestic surveillance measures while noting that the debate over civil liberties remains contentious. - The program touches on broader conspiracy-like theories and questions about whether individuals such as Kent are “controlled opposition” or pawns in a larger plan involving tech elites like Peter Thiel and Palantir. Kent insists his campaign funding was modest and transparent, and he stresses the need for accountability and oversight to prevent misuse of powerful tools. - In closing, the speakers converge on a common refrain: no U.S. boots on the ground in Iran. They stress that the priority should be preventing another ground war, avoiding American casualties, and pressing for diplomacy rather than expansion of hostilities. The show highlights public involvement—urging viewers to contact representatives, stay vigilant about foreign influence, and oppose a march toward war. - Across the exchange, the underlying tension is clear: competing visions of American sovereignty, the balance between counterterrorism and civil liberties, and the extent to which foreign actors (notably Israel) shape U.S. policy toward Iran. The participants repeatedly return to the need for accountability, restraint, and a peaceful path forward, even as they recognize the high stakes and the intense political pressure surrounding any potential intervention.

We seem to be heading to war with Iran, with little pushback from Republicans. War with Iran could mean Armageddon, with no appreciation for the implications for the US, Europe, and the Middle East. Twenty percent of the world's oil passes through the Straits of Hormuz, and Iran has missiles that can reach 1,200 miles with precision. If we bomb Iran, our bases in Iraq and Syria will be targeted. Hezbollah has a large operation in Mexico, and their agents could cause trouble here at home. If we attack Iran, Russia will not sit by quietly. Sanctions haven't stopped Iran's military development. Our military is at a weak point. If the US enters this conflict, it will be difficult for Russia and Turkey not to also come into this fight against us.

Speaker 0 and Speaker 1 discuss the possibility of striking Iran to eliminate its nuclear program and the broader implications of regime change. - Speaker 0 acknowledges arguments that Israel has wanted to dismantle Iran’s nuclear program, and that American involvement with B-52s and large bombs might be needed to finish the job. He notes the idea of a strike that proceeds quickly with minimal American casualties, under a Trump-era frame that Iran will not get a nuclear bomb. - He observes a shift among Washington’s neoconservative and Republican circles from opposing Iran’s nuclear capability to opposing Ayatollah rule itself, suggesting a subtle change in objectives while maintaining the theme of intervention. He concedes cautious support if Trump executes it prudently, but warns of a “switcheroo” toward regime change rather than purely disabling the nuclear program. - Speaker 0 criticizes the record of neocons on foreign policy (Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Syria, the Arab Spring) and argues that the entire Middle East bears their failures. He emphasizes a potential regime-change drive and questions what would come after removing the Ayatollah, including possible US troop deployments and financial support for a new regime. - He highlights the size of Iran (about 92,000,000 people, two and a half times the size of Texas) and warns that regime change could trigger a bloody civil war and a large refugee crisis, possibly drawing tens or hundreds of thousands of deaths and destabilizing Europe. - Speaker 1 presents a more vocal stance: he would like to see the regime fall and leaves to the president the timing and method, insisting that if the nuclear program isn’t eliminated now, “we’ll all regret it” and urging to “be all in” to help Israel finish the job. - In cuts 3:43, Speaker 1 argues that removing the Ayatollah’s regime would be beneficial because staying in power would continue to threaten Israel, foment terrorism, and pursue a bomb; he characterizes the regime as aiming to destroy Jews and Sunni Islam, calling them “fanatical religious Nazis.” - Speaker 0 responds that such a forceful call for regime change is immature, shallow, and reckless, warning that certainty about outcomes in foreign interventions is impossible. He asserts that the first rule of foreign policy is humility, noting that prior interventions led to prolonged conflict and mass displacement. He cautions against beating the drums for regime change in another Middle Eastern country, especially the largest, and reiterates that the issue is not simply removing the nuclear program but opposing Western-led regime change. - The discussion frames a tension between supporting efforts to deny Iran a nuclear weapon and resisting Western-led regime change, with a strong emphasis on potential humanitarian and geopolitical consequences. The speakers reference public opinion (citing 86% of Americans not wanting Iran to have a bomb) and critique interventions as historically destabilizing.

Mario and the Professor discuss the scale and spread of the current oil and energy shock and its broad economic and geopolitical ripple effects. - Severity and scope: The Professor calls the crisis “pretty catastrophic,” possibly the biggest oil crisis experienced, potentially surpassing the 1970s shocks. He notes a gap between Washington rhetoric and underlying economic reality and emphasizes the war’s effects beyond oil, including fertilizer and helium, all of which pass through the Strait of Hormuz or related chokepoints. - U.S. economic backdrop (before the war): The Professor provides a pre-war table: - U.S. GDP growth in 2024 was 2.3%, 2025 about the same after a dip in 2024 to 2.2%. - Jobs: 2024 added 2.2 million; 2025 added 185,000, with tariffs contributing to a manufacturing job loss of 108,000. - Productivity declined from 3% to 2.1% in 2025. - He argues the U.S. economy was already slowing and that the war exacerbates existing weaknesses rather than creating a boom. - Immediate physical and downstream effects: - The closure of the Strait of Hormuz affects more than oil: up to 20% of world oil, a third of fertilizer, and helium used in chip manufacturing (notably in Taiwan) pass through the strait. - The closure’s ripple effects include fertilizer shortages and higher prices (fertilizer up about 50%), and broader supply chain dislocations as related infrastructure and inventories (oil, fertilizers, helium) become depleted and must be rebuilt. - Relative impact by region: The U.S. is more insulated from physical shocks than many others, but financial markets (stocks and bonds) are hit, with higher interest rates and a rising 10- and 30-year bond yield. Europe and Asia face larger direct physical disruptions; India, Taiwan, and others bear notable hits due to fertilizer and helium supply constraints. - Global energy and political dynamics: - The U.S. remains a net importer of oil, though it is a net exporter of petroleum products; fertilizer reliance and pricing reflect broader global constraints. - The professor highlights the political costs: protectionism (tariffs), militarism (increased defense spending and involvement), and interventionism (policy actions). He notes polling is negative on these directions, suggesting policy headwinds for the administration. - The escalation and motivations for war: - A theory discussed is that the war was driven by a belief in decapitating Iran’s leadership to force regime change, a strategy the professor says many experts have warned against. He cites New York Times reporting that Mossad and Netanyahu supported decapitation, but that former Mossad leadership and U.S. intelligence warned it would not work; the escalation suggests a divergence between theory and outcome. - He acknowledges another view that controlling Hormuz could economically benefit the U.S., but ranks it as a lesser driver than regime-change objectives. - Possible outcomes and scenarios: - If the Houthis control the Red Sea and the Strait of Hormuz remains closed, and the Beber/Mendeb is blocked, the consequences would intensify; the professor describes a “freeway turned into a toll road” scenario in Hormuz and greater disruption in the Gulf, including potential attacks on desalination plants. - The economic signaling would likely worsen: downward revisions to growth, higher import prices, and increased financial market strain; a prolonged closure would intensify these effects. - The escalation ladder and endgame: - The professor warns that escalating with boots on the ground would favor Iran and could trigger widespread disruption of Gulf infrastructure, desalination, and regional stability. He suggests Russia would be a clear beneficiary in such a scenario. - He concludes with a stark warning: if Hormuz and the Beber/Mendeb remain closed, and desalination and critical infrastructure are attacked, the situation could resemble or exceed the scale of the 2008 financial crisis—“look like a birthday party” compared with what could unfold. - Overall takeaway: The crisis is multi-faceted, with immediate physical shortages (oil, fertilizer, helium) and cascading financial and political costs. The duration and depth depend on how long chokepoints stay closed and whether escalation occurs, with the potential for severe global economic and geopolitical consequences.

The speaker explains that America's interests can be either distinct or overlapping at different times. They emphasize that a primary concern is not going to war with Iran. The rationale given is that war would be a huge distraction of resources and would be massively expensive to the country.

Attacking a nation like Iran would quickly teach them to acquire nuclear weapons to prevent future attacks. Israel, North Korea, France, the United States, and Russia all obtained nuclear weapons for this reason. The speaker references the United States killing 250,000,000 people in two days in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, stating that it was not a high moral moment for America. The speaker suggests that attacking Iran could push them to develop nuclear weapons.

- Trump has been presenting optimistic updates about negotiations with Iran, despite Iran denying them, and there is a belief that Monday morning actions are an attempt to manipulate markets, keep oil prices low, and keep the stock market high. - If a weekend land invasion of Iran occurs, many military experts suspect US troops would have to land or parachute in, which would change gold demand and pricing dynamics. - Speaker 1 explains that a true war outcome would require ground troops to take control of territory, not just air strikes or bombs. He notes Trump promised no troops on the ground, but argues that regime change would be impossible without occupying the country, leading to higher American casualties and families affected. - He warns that sending troops would mean they would have to stay in Iran, creating a prolonged conflict akin to Iraq or Afghanistan, with no clear exit strategy and ongoing political and strategic problems. - He suggests that Trump could alternatively declare victory and withdraw, claiming the destruction of Iran’s military capabilities (no navy, no air force, no nuclear program) as a complete victory and greatest military achievement. - The discussion then notes that the Strait of Hormuz was open before the war, implying strategic stakes and continued vulnerability. - Speaker 0 points out that Iran has pledged not to allow US occupation and would fight back, describing Iran as a country of 90 million with rugged terrain and highly motivated, religiously committed people who could be willing to die for their country. - They acknowledge the assumption that Iranians are uniformly supportive of a US liberation, labeling that notion as crazy. - They conclude that there could be even greater anti-American sentiment in Iran now than a month ago, recognizing that the population’s reaction to war may be hostile despite US actions.

Crisis initiation is tough, and it's hard to see how the U.S. president can get the U.S. to war with Iran. If compromise isn't coming, the traditional way America gets to war would be best for U.S. interests. To go to war, the U.S. has historically waited for an attack, such as Pearl Harbor, the Lusitania, the Gulf of Tonkin, the Maine, or Fort Sumter. If the Iranians aren't going to compromise, it would be best if somebody else started the war. One can combine other means of pressure with sanctions, such as increasing pressure after the explosion on August 17. Iranian submarines periodically go down, and someday one of them might not come up. The U.S. is already using covert means against the Iranians and could get nastier.

It is difficult for the United States to initiate a crisis and go to war with Iran. If compromise is not possible, the traditional way for America to go to war would be in the best interest of the country. Historical examples show that events like Pearl Harbor, the Lusitania episode, the Gulf of Tonkin incident, the explosion of the USS Maine, and the attack on Fort Sumter led to the US entering wars. Therefore, if Iran does not compromise, it would be preferable for someone else to start the war.

"Here's something you're never taught in school. Here in the good old US Of A, all of your wars have been fake." The video centers on the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, an American think tank established in 1985, whose mission is "to advance a balanced and realistic understanding of American interests in The Middle East and to promote the policies that secure them." Its board includes Henry Kissinger, Richard Pearl, Condoleezza Rice, George Shultz, James Woolsey. The speaker notes: "crisis initiation is really tough, and it's very hard for me to see how The United States, president can get us to war with Iran." He adds: "The traditional way that America gets to war is what's best for US interests." He cites alleged false flags: "False flag." Pearl Harbor, Lusitania, Gulf Of Tonkin, Maine, Fort Sumter. "If the Iranians aren't gonna compromise, it would be best if somebody else started the war." "This is how America goes to war." "One can combine other means of pressure with sanctions." "We could step up the pressure." "They're in the game of doing that to everybody." "We are in the game of using covert means against the Iranians." "We could get nastier with that." "you don't know when World War three is gonna break out, but when it does, you'll know why."

"The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. This is an American think tank out of Washington DC. It was established in 1985, and it says the mission statement of the institute, quote, is to advance a balanced and realistic understanding of American interests in The Middle East and to promote the policies that secure them. Not about what's right and wrong over there. It's just whatever secures the American interests over in The Middle East, and we all know what those interests are. You've got Henry Kissinger, Richard Pearl, Condoleezza Rice, George Shultz, James Woolsey. It's a fun crowd. And it doesn't matter which president you think you're voting for. It's gonna change everything. People that have been part of this particular think tank have served senior positions in the administrations of every president this country has had since George h w Bush. Some of you may have seen this video, but again, considering the things that are going on right now, it's very it's more relevant now than it's ever been. So we're gonna go ahead and watch this, and I just wanna say upfront, you're gonna wanna have to make yourself resist the urge to punch your screen because you're gonna wanna punch this guy." "crisis initiation is really tough, and it's very hard for me to see how The United States, president can get us to war with Iran." "He just said that. You aren't hearing things he literally said. Crisis initiation's tough, and how's The United States president gonna get to war with Iran? Because wars don't just happen. They make the war." "The traditional way that America goes to war is what's best for the interests." "Some people might think that mister Roosevelt wanted to get us into World War two, as David mentioned. You may recall we had to wait for Pearl Harbor. False flag." "Some people might think that mister Wilson wanted to get us into World War one. You may recall he had to wait for the Lusitania episode. False flag." "Some people might think that mister Johnson wanted to send troops to Vietnam. You may recall he had to wait for the Gulf Of Tonkin episode. Total false flag." "We didn't go to war with Spain until the USS until the Maine exploded. Probably also a false flag." "May I point out that mister Lincoln did not feel he could call out the federal army until Fort Sumter was attacked, which is why he ordered the commander of Fort Sumter to do exactly that thing which the South Carolinians had said would cause an attack. Also a false flag." "Do you see a pattern here?" "So if in fact the Iranians aren't gonna compromise, it would be best if somebody else started the war." "Period." "If the Iranians don't compromise, it would be best if someone started this war because that is how America goes to war." "One can combine other means of pressure with sanctions. I mentioned that explosion on August 17. We could step up the pressure." "We are in the game of using covert means against the Iranians. We we could get nastier with that." "This is how America goes to war. You don't know when World War three is gonna break out, but when it does, you'll know why."