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The speaker states that the United States is conducting an operation with a clear goal: to eliminate the threat posed by Iran’s short-range ballistic missiles and by Iran’s navy to naval assets. The speaker says the operation is focused on this objective and is progressing “quite successfully,” with the details of tactics and progress to be discussed by the Pentagon and the Department of War. Two reasons are given for acting now. First, the speaker asserts that if Iran came under attack by the United States, Israel, or another party, Iran would respond against the United States. According to the speaker, orders had been delegated down to field commanders, and within an hour of the initial attack on Iran’s leadership compound, the Iranian missile forces in the south and in the north were activated to launch. The speaker notes that those forces were “prepositioned.” Second, the speaker explains that the assessment was that if the United States stood and waited for Iran’s attack to come first, American casualties would be much higher. Therefore, the president made the decision to act preemptively. The speaker emphasizes that they knew there would be an Israeli action, and that action would precipitate an attack against American forces. The implication is that delaying a preemptive strike would result in greater casualties, potentially billions of dollars in losses, and more American lives at risk. The overarching message is that the preemptive operation aims to neutralize Iran’s short-range ballistic missiles and navy threats before they are used in consolidation with anticipated Israeli actions and any Iranian counterattacks against U.S. forces. The speaker frames the decision as prudent and anticipatory, intended to prevent higher casualties and to maintain safety for American personnel and assets. The speaker stops short of detailing specific tactical methods, pointing listeners to the Pentagon and the Department of War for a deeper discussion of tactics and progress.

John Mersheimer argues that the war against Iran is not proceeding as the United States hoped and that there is no plausible off-ramp or decisive pathway to victory. He contends that Washington cannot narrate a decisive end to the conflict the way it could have against Nazi Germany or Imperial Japan, because the war has not produced a decisive Iranian collapse. Instead, Iran has an incentive to convert the fight into a protracted war of attrition and possesses the means to do so, including a broad set of missiles and drones and the ability to retaliate across the region. The result, he says, is a stalemate in which Iran would drive a hard bargain to secure sanctions relief or other concessions, and escalation by the U.S. and Israel will simply provoke Iran to escalate further. On why Iran will not settle on American terms, Mersheimer emphasizes that Iran has a strong hand and time on its side. He notes that the more time passes, the more desperate the U.S. will be to settle, which strengthens Iran’s position. He argues that even heavy bombardment would not compel Iran to quit; rather, Iran could strike back against Gulf states, Israel, and American assets with significant effect. The Gulf States are particularly vulnerable due to a small number of petroleum sites, short-range missiles, drones, and, crucially, desalination plants that provide most of their fresh water. He cites Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Oman as heavily dependent on desalination, implying that destroying such infrastructure would have catastrophic humanitarian and economic consequences. Iran could also target energy infrastructure, and even if the Strait of Hormuz remains open, widespread damage to Gulf energy infrastructure would devastate the regional and global economy. He warns that Israel could suffer increasing Iranian pressure as time goes on, especially as interceptors become depleted. Regarding energy and the Strait of Hormuz, Mersheimer stresses that 20% of the world’s oil and gas passes through the Persian Gulf, making the energy dimension the war’s most consequential aspect. He argues that opening the Strait of Hormuz would be exceedingly difficult, and destroying desalination and petroleum infrastructure in the Gulf States would negate any advantage of keeping the straits open. He suggests that escalation without a viable endgame will have grave economic repercussions for the world, pushing the U.S. toward a coerced end that would not be a victory. Mersheimer contends that strategic bombing or air power alone cannot win such wars. He contrasts World War II and Korea/Vietnam with the present, where there are no boots on the ground and no clear path to victory via air power alone. He notes that the deterrent value of air power is limited, and a regime change strategy is notoriously difficult without ground forces. He argues that the decapitation strategy and ongoing escalations are unlikely to produce a decisive American/Israeli victory, and could instead lead to a stalemate or American concession under economic strain. On leadership and credibility, Mersheimer critiques U.S. leadership, particularly President Trump, for ignoring warning from generals and the National Intelligence Council that regime change was unlikely to succeed. He cites General James Mattis-era warnings that there was no viable military option and notes the pre-war intelligence that suggested limited prospects for quick regime change. He points to Trump’s sometimes contradictory and inaccurate statements about Iranian capabilities, including claims that Iran possessed Tomahawk missiles and that U.S. strikes had erased Iran’s nuclear capability. He argues that such statements undermine U.S. credibility, though he distinguishes between outright lies and genuine mistaken beliefs by leaders. The discussion also covers Russia’s involvement, with Russia believed to be providing intelligence to Iran and possibly supplying matériel and oil if needed. Mersheimer asserts that the war benefits Russia strategically: it diverts U.S. resources from Europe and Ukraine, potentially worsens Ukraine’s trajectory, and could raise global energy prices that benefit Russian revenue. He suggests that Russia, and possibly China, have strong incentives to aid Iran to counter American power. Europe’s role is analyzed as largely symbolic or marginal in determining the war’s outcome. Mersheimer argues that European elites are aligned with the U.S., prioritizing NATO continuity and the maintenance of American military presence, despite the damaging consequences for Europe. He suggests a radical approach for Europe: adopt a hardball stance toward the U.S., diversify its economic and strategic relations (including with China, Russia, and India), and resist being economically manipulated or coerced by Washington. He emphasizes that Europe’s interests would be better served by reducing overreliance on the United States and pursuing a more balanced set of strategic partners. Towards the end, the hosts revisit the idea that leaders lie and that liberal democracies tend to rely more on public persuasion and propaganda, with Trump’s statements illustrating the complexities of truth in international politics. The conversation ends with a reflection on whether Europe should recalibrate its posture toward the United States and broaden its strategic hedges to protect its own interests, rather than assuming continued U.S. leadership in a costly and protracted confrontation with Iran.

The statements contend that the actions were carried out with no congressional authorization, placing them in direct violation of the Constitution, specifically Articles I and II, and that they breach international law and American law, with no concerns raised about these issues. The speaker suggests that this pattern represents a new perimeter being established by Donald Trump, portraying the current situation as lawless and characterized by an authoritarian figure in the person of Trump. It is argued that there are no remaining guardrails to constrain him, and the only limitations he follows are self-imposed, based on what might provoke a backlash or retaliation. In other words, he would only undertake operations that do not invite a response or “kickback.” According to the account, some operations have already been undertaken that did not carry potential pushback, but the Iran scenario is singled out as one of the larger cases. The contention is that, unlike previous actions, there is a solid chance that Iran could retaliate in ways the United States would prefer to avoid. There is further concern that if Iran does retaliate, the United States could be harmed back in ways that are undesirable or difficult to manage. This potential for meaningful retaliation is presented as a key reason why Trump may not have ordered certain operations up to this point. Overall, the speaker implies a shift toward more aggressive or expansive actions without the usual checks and balances, highlighting the absence of congressional authorization and the potential for significant consequences if opposing parties decide to respond forcefully. The Iran situation is emphasized as a critical turning point because of the greater likelihood of retaliation compared to previous actions, influencing Trump’s restraint or hesitation in approving further operations.

Mario: Do you think The US should attack Iran? Joel: He could do a large but limited strike designed to punish the Iranian regime, but not explicitly try to topple it. Clint (Glenn): Now it's in the national interest of Iran to acquire nuclear weapons as a deterrent. You think that Iran the authority enemy. Of Not America being responsible for killing thousands of Iranians. It's very strange that we don't recognize the security competition here. You're unbelievable. No legitimate security concerns for Iran. None of your rules. Mario: Gentlemen. Astonishing. Joel: Does Iran need to be an enemy of The US? Clint: I see that’s very dishonest. This idea that The United States and Israel are worried about the Iranian civilians. I think this is ludicrous. If anything, they're doing everything they can to fuel the violence. If we stop threatening them, perhaps we can get something in return. They stop the threat. No. Mario: Never tried we've never gone down this path at all. Joel: You’re just completely ignoring tens of billions of Iranian dollars that go funneling into terrorist organizations that kill Americans, kill our Arab allies, kill our Israeli allies. It doesn't seem to bother you. Mario: Joel, I’m gonna start with you. A pretty broad question. Do you think The US should attack Iran, and do you think they will? Joel: The president has set his own terms. He has three choices: do nothing and frame that as diplomacy; do a large but limited strike designed to punish the regime but not topple it; or go all in toward regime change. He hasn’t made regime change his explicit objective yet. I think he’ll pick option two, a large but limited strike, because negotiations aren’t designed to lead somewhere. The Iranians are not serious, in his view. Mario: Do you think Trump should go with option two, or seek regime change? Joel: He should go with number two. Regime change is something I would love to see, but it’s too big an objective with air power. If the regime is toppled by force, the risks are immense. Damaging the regime—ballistic missiles, some nuclear components—could be enough to protect citizens and allies, even if it doesn’t topple the regime. If a coup follows, that’s a risk. Mario: Glenn, you argued against regime change but acknowledged concerns about the regime’s brutality. Please respond to Joel and the broader points. Glenn: I don’t think Trump should attack. It’s very likely he will, and the objective will probably be a limited bloody nose attack that is going bombed for two or three days or, like last time, twelve, and then pull away, with an implicit understanding that if Iran retaliates, it could be a big war. There is no diplomatic solution because the Iranians reject multi-issue deals; they want nuclear issues to be separate. The Iran regime is existentially threatened, so they’ll respond. The aim should be to recognize key security concerns and pursue a broader security understanding, not just use force. Mario: Joel, respond to Glenn’s point about whether Iran must be considered an enemy and about potential diplomacy. Joel: Does Iran need to be an enemy of The US? No. But this regime is an enemy. The people of Iran do not have to be enemies. The supreme leader believes the United States and Israel are enemies, and for forty-seven years they say, death to America, death to Israel. The Iranian regime has decided they’re the enemy. The Iranian people largely despise the regime. Mario: If Iran agrees to stop the nuclear program, should The US accept such a deal? Is that enough? Joel: The nuclear program is almost 100% destroyed; you wouldn’t negotiate solely on that. If diplomacy exists, it would be to address threats beyond the nuclear issue—ballistic missiles, regional alliances, human rights, etc. The Iranians were willing to accept transparency around their nuclear program in JCPOA-era diplomacy, but the Americans pulled out. If a nuclear deal is possible, it would require mutual concessions; insisting on broader concessions risks collapse. Glenn: The problem is that Iran has legitimate security concerns too. The strategy after the Cold War linking security to global hegemony is problematic. There should be recognition of Iran’s legitimate security needs, not a complete defanging. We should explore a grand bargain—recognize a Palestinian state, get out of Syria, and pursue a path with Iran that reduces the threat without destroying Iran. Mario: There’s a debate about whether the Gulf states see Israel as a bigger threat than Iran now. Joel, what’s your take? Joel: Two countries—Qatar and Turkey—see Israel as an enemy. Turkey’s Erdogan has threatened Jerusalem; Qatar hosts anti-American and anti-Israel propaganda via Al Jazeera and has hosted Hamas leaders. Israel has the right to defend itself and has pursued peace deals with several Arab states, but the region remains dangerous. Israel should avoid destabilizing moves and pursue peace where possible, while recognizing the security challenges it faces. Glenn: Israel’s internal politics and policy flaws exist, but law in Israel provides equal rights to Arab citizens; policy can be improved, but not all claims of apartheid reflect law. Arabs have political rights, though issues with funding and policy remain. The West Bank is a flashpoint; Gaza is controlled by Hamas, complicating Palestinian governance. There’s a broader discussion about whether regime change in Iran is desirable given potential fragmentation and regional instability. Mario: Final question: where is Iran by year’s end? Glenn: If Trump attacks, Iran will perceive an existential threat and may strike back hard, possibly shutting the Strait of Hormuz. Russia and China may intervene to prevent complete destruction of Iran. Joel: I hope Glenn’s scenario doesn’t come true. Iran might pursue nuclear weapons as a deterrent. If the regime is weakened, the region’s stability could be jeopardized. The options remain: negotiate, strike, or regime-change—prefer a large but limited strike to deter further advancement without taking ownership of an unknown future. Mario: Thank you both. This was a vigorous, wide-ranging exchange. End of time.

Lindsey Graham stated he told allies that if Hezbollah attacks Israel, the U.S. and Israel should target Iran by destroying their refineries to put them "out of the oil business." Speaker 0 claims Graham hasn't considered the consequences of war with Iran, and that Graham and many of his colleagues are reckless. Speaker 0 also mentions Dan Crenshaw's call for a "war to end all wars," which speaker 0 dismisses as impossible, stating that wars beget more war and citing World War I as an example.

Initiating a crisis to go to war with Iran is challenging. If compromise fails, starting a war through covert means may be best for US interests. Historical examples show wars began after specific incidents, not just sanctions. Increasing pressure on Iran, like mysterious submarine incidents, could be an option. Using covert actions against Iran could escalate if needed.

Speaker 0 questions the rationale for the war, noting that “the intelligence did not suggest that an attack was imminent from Iran,” and asking, “What is left? Why are we at war with Iran?” He also remarks that “the nuclear program isn’t the reason” and that he never expected to hear Ted Cruz talking about nukes. Speaker 1 suggests the simplest explanation given, which has been backtracked, is that “Israel made us do it, that Bibi decided on this timeline, Netanyahu decided he wanted to attack, and he convinced Trump to join him by scaring Trump into believing that US assets in the region would be at risk, and so Trump was better off just joining Netanyahu.” He adds that this may not be the full explanation, but it’s a plausible one. He notes that “the nuclear program is not part of their targeting campaign,” and that “harder line leadership is taking hold,” with the Strait of Hormuz “still being shut down even as we get their navy.” He asks what remains as the explanation, suggesting it might be that Israel forced the United States’ hand and questions, “How weak does that make The United States look? How weak are we if our allies can force us into wars of choice that are bad for US national security interests?”

The speaker believes President Trump gets to define "America First" because he was elected and leads the movement. The President is focused on the core American national interest: ensuring Iran does not have a nuclear weapon. When asked how long diplomacy should be given before military action, the speaker says the President will pursue diplomacy until he believes there is no opportunity left. Once diplomacy has run its course, the President will do what he needs to end Iranian enrichment and the nuclear program. The speaker advises the President to trust his instincts, which he believes are the best of any president or political leader he's ever seen. The speaker thinks the President knows when diplomacy has run its course and when to employ the military to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. The President will continue working the process and allow diplomacy to unfold, while retaining the option to do whatever is necessary to keep Americans safe.

Trump has announced Project Freedom, an effort to escort ships out of the Persian Gulf through the Strait of Hormuz, beginning today. It would involve tanker vessels and about 100 aircraft, though the number of ships is unclear. The speaker views this as an attempt to provoke a response from Iran to justify a renewed, larger war against it, effectively daring Iran to attack as ships are escorted through the Strait. There is debate over whether the Strait is international waters. The speaker notes that maritime law grants 12 miles of territorial waters to each country, and the Strait is so narrow that Iran’s 12 miles and Oman’s 12 miles together cover the entire strait, leaving no international-water segment. The northern portion is claimed to be within Iran’s territorial waters, while the southern portion is believed to have been mined, potentially forcing ships to use the northern portion and come within Iran’s range of drones or missiles. Questions are raised about which ships would be used to escort the tankers. The operation is labeled humanitarian, but the speaker recalls Trump’s past statements about targeting civilians, bombing infrastructure in Iran, and supporting actions in Gaza, arguing that such rhetoric and actions have been condemned as war crimes. The speaker notes a pattern of deceit by the U.S. military, suggesting a possibility that humanitarian rhetoric could mask an attack plan, potentially using civilian tankers as shields or enabling U.S. naval vessels to enter the Persian Gulf for an attack. The central question is Iran’s likely response. Iran has said that no ships will pass without its permission and has the capability to harass or attack vessels. Iran has previously attacked and destroyed commercial ships attempting to transit without permission. Possible Iranian responses include attacking commercial vessels, attacking U.S. naval vessels, doing nothing, or deploying more mines and waiting for ships to hit them. The speaker argues that Trump and the Pentagon are desperate, having failed to force Iran to surrender control of the Strait through financial pressure, mass bombing, sanctions, or fomenting domestic uprisings. Iran reportedly still holds leverage over the Strait, and the United States is attempting to reshape public perception and present itself as a humanitarian actor, despite history and geography suggesting otherwise. The takeaway is that the plan could be an attempt to provoke Iran into a military response that would allow another round of war, possibly under a War Powers Act extension, with U.S. sailors potentially used as bait—an outcome described as horrific and unethical. In the broader context, the ongoing oil shortages and potential global impacts are highlighted, with warnings that delays in opening the strait could worsen shortages of oil, gas, and fertilizer, raising fears of famine in the coming years. The speaker calls for peace and for negotiation with Iran, noting that compromise seems unlikely under the current administration. The closing sentiment emphasizes staying informed and seeking peaceful resolutions.

The speaker opens by citing James Madison, who wrote to Thomas Jefferson in 1789 that “the constitution supposes what the history of all governments demonstrates, that the executive branch of power is the most interested in war and most prone to it,” and notes that the constitution itself vests in the legislature the question of war (Article I, Section 8, Clause 11) while giving the president operational powers of war (Article II, Section 2, Clause 1). Even if one claimed the 1973 War Powers Resolution supersedes the constitutional language, the speaker argues the president has not met its conditions: the president may only introduce U.S. armed forces into hostilities under three circumstances—declaration of war, specific statutory authorization, or a national emergency created by an attack on the United States—none of which exist today because Iran has not attacked the United States, Congress has not declared war, and Congress has not granted specific statutory authorization. Beyond this constitutional framing, the speaker asks why the United States would go to war with Iran and emphasizes that servicemembers deserve a clear mission. He questions how such a war would help American families with groceries, housing, or safety in schools and neighborhoods. He cautions against past interventions in the Middle East, arguing they have produced a debt of at least $8 trillion from wars in Iraq, Libya, Syria, and Afghanistan, and contends a sustained war with Iran will not stabilize the region but will radicalize new generations of terrorists and generate more refugees to Europe and the United States. The speaker argues Iran is not Venezuela, and that Ayatollah Khomeini was not a president but a religious leader in a region notorious for radical Islamists; he asserts that the United States and Israel turned him into a martyr, contributing to broader conflict and casualties, including six American families who have lost loved ones. He claims the administration cannot provide a straight answer for why the preemptive war was launched, noting contradictory statements about imminent Iranian strikes and the rationale of stopping a nuclear program. A candid answer, he says, came from the Secretary of State, who said Israel forced the United States to act, implying that Congress must decide war. If American lives are to be risked, that decision must be debated and voted on by representatives, and the debate should be arduous with a hard vote. He offers a theory that colleagues do not want to go on record due to a poor track record of meddling in the Middle East and a desire to avoid their names being associated with an unfavorable outcome. The speaker asserts Congress is not here to declare war today; the vote on the War Powers Resolution is to reassert that Congress must decide questions of war. Some say war is authorized by paying for it through the budget, but the speaker asserts that defining the mission for the troops is not included in the budget and has not been done. He thanks the men and women engaged in combat, prays for their safety, and states that the resolution is written for them—to ensure they know when they achieve their mission and can come home.

The transcript centers on a loud, multi-voiced discussion about the prospect of war with Iran, U.S. policy dynamics, and the influence of allied actors—especially Israel—on Washington’s decisions. - The opening segment features sharp, provocative claims about President Trump’s stance toward Iran. One speaker asserts that Trump gave Iran seven days to comply or “we will unleash hell on that country,” including strikes on desalinization plants and energy infrastructure. This is framed as part of a broader, catastrophic escalation in Iran under heavy pressure on Trump to commit U.S. forces to Israel’s war. - Joe Kent, a former director of the National Counterterrorism Center who resigned from the administration, presents the central prognosis. He warns that Trump will face immense pressure to commit ground troops in Iran, calling such a move a “catastrophic escalation” that would increase bloodshed. Kent urges the public to contact the White House and members of Congress to oppose boots on the ground in Iran, advocating for peaceful resolution and public pressure for peace. - The discussion shifts to Israeli involvement. The panel notes that Israeli media report Israel will not commit ground troops if the U.S. invades Iran, and some assert Israel has never, in any conflict, committed troops to support the U.S. The conversation questions this claim, noting counterpoints from analyst Brandon Weichert that Israel has undermined American forces in certain areas. - The debate then returns to Trump’s diplomacy and strategy. The host asks whether Trump’s stated approach toward Iran—potentially including a peace plan—is credible or “fake news.” Kent responds that Iran will not take diplomacy seriously unless U.S. actions demonstrate credibility, such as restraining Israel. He suggests that a more restrained Israeli posture would signal to Iran that the U.S. is serious about negotiations. - The program examines whether the MAGA movement has shifted on the issue. There is testimony that figures like Mark Levin have advocated for some form of ground action, though Levin reportedly denies calls for large-scale deployment. Kent explains that while he believes certain special operations capabilities exist—units trained to seize enriched uranium—the broader question is whether boots on the ground are necessary or wise. He emphasizes that a successful, limited operation could paradoxically encourage further action by Israel if it appears easy, potentially dragging the U.S. deeper into conflict. - A recurring theme is the perceived dominance of the Israeli lobby over U.S. foreign policy. Several participants contend that Israeli influence drives the war timeline, with Israeli action sometimes undermining U.S. diplomacy. They argue that despite public differences, the United States has not meaningfully restrained Israel, and that Israeli strategic goals could be pushing Washington toward conflict. - The conversation also covers domestic political dynamics and civil liberties. Kent argues that the intelligence community’s influence—infused with foreign policy aims—risks eroding civil liberties, including discussions around domestic terrorism and surveillance. The group notes pushback within the administration and among some members of the intelligence community about surveillance proposals tied to Palantir and broader counterterrorism practices. - Kent addresses questions about the internal decision-making process that led to the Iran policy shift, denying he was offered a central role in any pre-crime or AI-driven surveillance agenda. He acknowledges pushback within the administration against aggressive domestic surveillance measures while noting that the debate over civil liberties remains contentious. - The program touches on broader conspiracy-like theories and questions about whether individuals such as Kent are “controlled opposition” or pawns in a larger plan involving tech elites like Peter Thiel and Palantir. Kent insists his campaign funding was modest and transparent, and he stresses the need for accountability and oversight to prevent misuse of powerful tools. - In closing, the speakers converge on a common refrain: no U.S. boots on the ground in Iran. They stress that the priority should be preventing another ground war, avoiding American casualties, and pressing for diplomacy rather than expansion of hostilities. The show highlights public involvement—urging viewers to contact representatives, stay vigilant about foreign influence, and oppose a march toward war. - Across the exchange, the underlying tension is clear: competing visions of American sovereignty, the balance between counterterrorism and civil liberties, and the extent to which foreign actors (notably Israel) shape U.S. policy toward Iran. The participants repeatedly return to the need for accountability, restraint, and a peaceful path forward, even as they recognize the high stakes and the intense political pressure surrounding any potential intervention.

In this discussion with Glenn, Professor John Mearsheimer analyzes the U.S. handling of the Iran war under Trump, the role of Israel and the lobby, and the broader implications for the international system as power shifts from unipolar to multipolar. Key points on U.S. strategy and diplomacy - Trump’s approach is a unique form of diplomacy: he pursued a ceasefire grounded in Iran’s 10-point plan as a starting point for negotiations, then moved to a blockade of Iranian ports and allowed escalation elsewhere. The aim, according to the speakers, was to gain breathing space to rearm and regroup, and to press Iran into concessions. - The absence of a viable military option: there is no credible American military path to victory in the Iran war. Escalation would be Iranian-dominant, and further escalation would damage the world economy, creating political and economic consequences domestically and internationally. - The administration’s diplomacy is hampered by incompetence, notably in Ukraine-Russia diplomacy, which erodes confidence in negotiating with Iran as well. The Israeli lobby adds pressure to avoid a peace that acknowledges Iran’s gains. - Four goals in the war, from an Israeli perspective, are regime change, eliminating Iran’s nuclear enrichment, destroying long-range missiles, and stopping Iranian support for Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis. Israel and its lobby view the situation as existential and push for continued pressure unless Iran is decisively defeated. From the U.S. perspective, this means consensus among allies is fragile and often subordinated to domestic and lobby pressures. The strategic logic of the blockade and escalation - The blockade is not a war-winning instrument. The naval option is constrained by ship counts, wear on assets, potential Chinese escorts, and reciprocal Iranian actions (Iran already captured ships in retaliation). Iran’s tolerance for pain is high, and the blockade is not a reliable lever to force compliance. - Air power failed to defeat Iran, confirming that the war cannot be won through bombing alone. Ground invasion is unlikely due to limited American combat troops, political will, and public tolerance for casualties. Consequently, the U.S. has turned to naval coercion via the Strait of Hormuz and global oil interdictions, but this too is unlikely to compel a definitive Iranian capitulation. - A ceasefire is seen as essential to halt the fighting and begin negotiations; however, the ceasefire has not achieved meaningful negotiations because the blockade remains in place, and Iran has demanded its end as a condition to return to talks. Possible Iranian responses and risk dynamics - If the United States were to resume massive bombing, Iran could launch a “Goderdammerung” response—shutting down the Persian Gulf and Red Sea, attacking energy infrastructure and desalination plants, and wrecking the world economy. This would imply a broader regional and global calamity, with Iran threatening to pull down others with it. - The Iranians are expected to leverage the Strait of Hormuz and toll revenues, and to press for sanctions relief and ongoing control of the Strait as bargaining chips. The blockade may inflict pain, but Iran has shown a high capacity to tolerate it, making the naval option unlikely to deliver victory. Europe, diplomacy, and the evolving alliance system - Elbridge Colby’s remarks suggest Europe should take primary responsibility for conventional and Ukraine support, reflecting U.S. weapon stock depletion and a shift toward East Asia as the priority theater. This signals a “buck-passing” of security obligations and a withdrawal of the United States from Europe at the conventional level. - The Colby framework implies the U.S. is reorienting away from Europe and toward East Asia, potentially weakening NATO cohesion as American weapons support diminishes. This could push Europe to diversify security arrangements and rely less on U.S. guarantees. - There is a broader pattern of “divorcing” from allies: as the Gulf, Europe, and Ukraine face continued pressures, the alliance system frays. The U.S. may seek to offload security burdens, while Russia and China adapt by intensifying their own strategic ties and exploiting the rifts within Western alliances. The multipolar world and regional flashpoints - The discussion emphasizes that the world has moved from a post–Cold War unipolar moment to a multipolar system, with East Asia (China) as the primary U.S. strategic focus, but with persistent, volatile conflicts in Europe (Russia-Ukraine) and the Middle East (Israel-Iran, and allied networks like Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Houthis). - The speakers stress the interconnections among conflicts: resolving Israel-Iran involves Hezbollah and Hamas; resolving Ukraine involves European commitments and American supplies; and the evolving alliance structures—where the U.S. may reduce its conventional footprint in Europe—could heighten tensions or provoke Russian reactions. Final reflections - The conversation closes by acknowledging the plastic, uncertain moment in world politics: many possible futures depend on diplomacy, leadership choices, and how quickly new equilibria are formed among emerging great powers. The two speakers stress that avoiding a major conflagration will require careful diplomacy, recognition of interlinked flashpoints, and a willingness to rethink traditional alliance structures in a multipolar world.

We seem to be heading to war with Iran, with little pushback from Republicans. War with Iran could mean Armageddon, with no appreciation for the implications for the US, Europe, and the Middle East. Twenty percent of the world's oil passes through the Straits of Hormuz, and Iran has missiles that can reach 1,200 miles with precision. If we bomb Iran, our bases in Iraq and Syria will be targeted. Hezbollah has a large operation in Mexico, and their agents could cause trouble here at home. If we attack Iran, Russia will not sit by quietly. Sanctions haven't stopped Iran's military development. Our military is at a weak point. If the US enters this conflict, it will be difficult for Russia and Turkey not to also come into this fight against us.

Speaker 0 and Speaker 1 discuss the possibility of striking Iran to eliminate its nuclear program and the broader implications of regime change. - Speaker 0 acknowledges arguments that Israel has wanted to dismantle Iran’s nuclear program, and that American involvement with B-52s and large bombs might be needed to finish the job. He notes the idea of a strike that proceeds quickly with minimal American casualties, under a Trump-era frame that Iran will not get a nuclear bomb. - He observes a shift among Washington’s neoconservative and Republican circles from opposing Iran’s nuclear capability to opposing Ayatollah rule itself, suggesting a subtle change in objectives while maintaining the theme of intervention. He concedes cautious support if Trump executes it prudently, but warns of a “switcheroo” toward regime change rather than purely disabling the nuclear program. - Speaker 0 criticizes the record of neocons on foreign policy (Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Syria, the Arab Spring) and argues that the entire Middle East bears their failures. He emphasizes a potential regime-change drive and questions what would come after removing the Ayatollah, including possible US troop deployments and financial support for a new regime. - He highlights the size of Iran (about 92,000,000 people, two and a half times the size of Texas) and warns that regime change could trigger a bloody civil war and a large refugee crisis, possibly drawing tens or hundreds of thousands of deaths and destabilizing Europe. - Speaker 1 presents a more vocal stance: he would like to see the regime fall and leaves to the president the timing and method, insisting that if the nuclear program isn’t eliminated now, “we’ll all regret it” and urging to “be all in” to help Israel finish the job. - In cuts 3:43, Speaker 1 argues that removing the Ayatollah’s regime would be beneficial because staying in power would continue to threaten Israel, foment terrorism, and pursue a bomb; he characterizes the regime as aiming to destroy Jews and Sunni Islam, calling them “fanatical religious Nazis.” - Speaker 0 responds that such a forceful call for regime change is immature, shallow, and reckless, warning that certainty about outcomes in foreign interventions is impossible. He asserts that the first rule of foreign policy is humility, noting that prior interventions led to prolonged conflict and mass displacement. He cautions against beating the drums for regime change in another Middle Eastern country, especially the largest, and reiterates that the issue is not simply removing the nuclear program but opposing Western-led regime change. - The discussion frames a tension between supporting efforts to deny Iran a nuclear weapon and resisting Western-led regime change, with a strong emphasis on potential humanitarian and geopolitical consequences. The speakers reference public opinion (citing 86% of Americans not wanting Iran to have a bomb) and critique interventions as historically destabilizing.

The speaker explains that America's interests can be either distinct or overlapping at different times. They emphasize that a primary concern is not going to war with Iran. The rationale given is that war would be a huge distraction of resources and would be massively expensive to the country.

Zhang Shueqin is discussed as a predictor known for predicting Trump’s reelection, Vance as VP pick, and a US–Iran war. The conversation centers on why he predicted a US attack on Iran and how it might unfold. Key reasoning about Iran war - The strongest evidence, according to Zhang, is the January 2020 US assassination of Qasem Soleimani, who led Iranian proxies. He argues that killing an Iranian envoy to the region amounted to a declaration of war, and that if Trump had won reelection in 2020, he would have most certainly declared war on Iran. - In the war’s first month, the US focus was decapitation of Iranian leadership, aiming to force surrender and regime change. Iran proved resilient and creative, leading the US to shift to a phase of attrition, attempting to cripple Iran’s war-financing capacity and oil exports to China, and to control Hormuz. This included a naval blockade of the Strait of Hormuz. - The war is expected to be slow and world-news-muted, with efforts to pressure Iran economically and diplomatically to force a settlement. There is no off-ramp seen for the US because consequences are vast for regional players. Actors and interests in the region - Regional players: UAE, Saudi Arabia, and possibly Kuwait, viewed as wanting Iran defeated and the war prolonged. Iran’s leadership wants relief from sanctions and to retain Hormuz as leverage. - The United States: aims to sustain the petrodollar system; fears that if Gulf states decouple from the dollar or shift currencies, the American economy could suffer. The US would prefer to press sanctions and blockade to compel cooperation and debt-financing from global actors. - Israel: sees the conflict as an opportunity for its Greater Israel project, hoping regional chaos would redraw borders after the conflict. - China: wants an end to the conflict to protect global trade and its energy interests, and to preserve balance in its relations with Iran, the GCC, and other players. China’s leverage includes pressure on Iran and economic guarantees that encourage a ceasefire, while seeking to minimize direct conflict with GCC states. - Russia and others: Russia is discussed as arming and supporting Iran in a broader economic/military contest with the US; geopolitics involve maritime skirmishes and energy strikes in a wider economic war. World War III framework and economic warfare - Zhang argues we are already in World War III, but the war is economic and strategic rather than traditional kinetic warfare. The main combatants are the US and Russia in the maritime and energy sphere, with China central to US debt-financing and global trade stability. - Economic warfare includes targeting oil refineries, shipping lanes, and export capabilities; the purpose is to force political settlements and shift global economic order. - The US strategy is described as creating global chaos while maintaining North American focus, exporting conflict to Europe and East Asia to defend empire interests, and using debt and weapons sales to manage global markets. China, the US, and future diplomacy - A Trump visit to Beijing is framed as potentially signaling a rapprochement, followed by cooperation in three areas: trade (China buying more Western Hemisphere LNG and resources), Taiwan status (reaffirming one China policy), and AI collaboration. The larger aim is described as turning China into an economic vassal to the US empire. - Europe is described as already largely vassalized by US policy, with the war in Ukraine illustrating this subordination; popular discontent is rising (e.g., in Germany with the AfD), but European leadership remains aligned with Washington’s agenda. Iranian and European responses - Iran, facing economic pressures and geopolitical isolation, initially led the war, but China’s mediation and pressure contributed to a ceasefire. There is a rift between Iran’s political leadership and its military leadership over how to proceed with the war. - Europeans could escalate involvement in a broader conflict, but the US strategy appears to rely on Europe fighting longer against Russia while the US profits through arms sales and financial mechanisms. European leadership, according to the discussion, remains cautious and influenced by external powers. Israel’s position and the broader arc - Israel is depicted as pursuing a death-cult, eschatological strategy that could unify Jews globally but increase regional instability. The greater aim is for Israel to benefit from regional chaos, while risking broader conflict. Future trajectories and civilizational decline - The discussion suggests that, in the short term, the US may appear to win economically, especially through debt-financed global demand for US energy and weapons, but in the mid- to long-term, imperial decline could lead to civil conflict within the US, driven by factional struggles between Wall Street financiers and tech oligarchs backing AI surveillance/state power. - The potential for a third Trump term is linked to deeper internal conflicts and the acceleration of violence or civil unrest, with religion offered by some as a potential stabilizing force in American society. - Three symptoms of imperial decline are privatization, financialization, and individualization; yet the speaker believes a Christian-nationalist revival could renew the republic. Closing stance - Across the discussion, the US empire is portrayed as pursuing an expansive, conflict-driven strategy to sustain power, while global players seek various economic and strategic outcomes. The overall forecast emphasizes ongoing, multi-front tensions with no easy peace, and a complex interplay among US, European, Middle Eastern, Russian, and Chinese interests.

The conversation highlights that, beyond the nuclear enrichment issue, there are numerous unresolved questions that must be addressed to reach a meaningful agreement. Key topics include who controls the Strait, the future of US military bases in the region, what security architecture would reassure Iran that it won’t be attacked again, and how to handle reparations and sanctions. The participants note interconnected problems involving Hezbollah, Hamas, the Houthis, and Iran’s relations with them. Speaker 1 points out that the president has described force as the greatest cudgel, using bombs and the threat of bombs to compel a unified proposal and bring adversaries to the table, but Speaker 1 questions how viable this approach is given current fractures. Speaker 0 agrees it’s a repeated pattern of insisting on force, and emphasizes the irony of proponents claiming that bombing will produce a unified outcome when negotiations seem unlikely. Speaker 0 reinforces that the war was started and heavily bombed for a long period without achieving goals, arguing that the result so far is a loss of the war. They criticize President Trump’s belief that resuming bombing would yield the desired outcomes not achieved earlier, calling that line of reasoning foolish. Speaker 0 emphasizes there is no military option that will succeed and warns that escalation could benefit Iran. Speaker 0 further argues from an Iranian strategic perspective, suggesting that if they were playing Iran’s hand, they would not go to Islamabad soon but instead would urge the United States to escalate and see how the international economy would be affected—likening it to a Titanic approaching an iceberg—thereby increasing Iran’s leverage for a better deal than presently available. Speaker 1 notes that Israelis do not want the war ended and prefer continued escalation, implying a disconnect between U.S. strategy and Israeli preferences. They reiterate that Trump seems to be holding a weak hand, unable to secure a war-winning outcome, while the broader situation remains fragmented and complex with multiple regional actors and strategic considerations to resolve.

Attacking a nation like Iran would quickly teach them to acquire nuclear weapons to prevent future attacks. Israel, North Korea, France, the United States, and Russia all obtained nuclear weapons for this reason. The speaker references the United States killing 250,000,000 people in two days in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, stating that it was not a high moral moment for America. The speaker suggests that attacking Iran could push them to develop nuclear weapons.

- Trump has been presenting optimistic updates about negotiations with Iran, despite Iran denying them, and there is a belief that Monday morning actions are an attempt to manipulate markets, keep oil prices low, and keep the stock market high. - If a weekend land invasion of Iran occurs, many military experts suspect US troops would have to land or parachute in, which would change gold demand and pricing dynamics. - Speaker 1 explains that a true war outcome would require ground troops to take control of territory, not just air strikes or bombs. He notes Trump promised no troops on the ground, but argues that regime change would be impossible without occupying the country, leading to higher American casualties and families affected. - He warns that sending troops would mean they would have to stay in Iran, creating a prolonged conflict akin to Iraq or Afghanistan, with no clear exit strategy and ongoing political and strategic problems. - He suggests that Trump could alternatively declare victory and withdraw, claiming the destruction of Iran’s military capabilities (no navy, no air force, no nuclear program) as a complete victory and greatest military achievement. - The discussion then notes that the Strait of Hormuz was open before the war, implying strategic stakes and continued vulnerability. - Speaker 0 points out that Iran has pledged not to allow US occupation and would fight back, describing Iran as a country of 90 million with rugged terrain and highly motivated, religiously committed people who could be willing to die for their country. - They acknowledge the assumption that Iranians are uniformly supportive of a US liberation, labeling that notion as crazy. - They conclude that there could be even greater anti-American sentiment in Iran now than a month ago, recognizing that the population’s reaction to war may be hostile despite US actions.

The United States cannot win this war against Iran. The speaker says Iran has geographic, geopolitical, and strategic dominance, and can shut down the Strait of Hormuz whenever they want, so the United States cannot win “short of something crazy like nukes.” Because of this, the speaker argues the United States should tell Israel to win the war by telling Israel to keep doing what it is doing in Lebanon, while the United States would cut off funding if Israel does not comply—“you will never see a dime from the United States.” The speaker presents this as the only way the United States could achieve the war objective against Iran and rejects the idea that the suggestion is “crazy.” The speaker then states that in the real world, Trump is not going to cut off Israel, saying he will not do so due to “all the strings attached” to him and who he is beholden to in the United States.

Crisis initiation is tough, and it's hard to see how the U.S. president can get the U.S. to war with Iran. If compromise isn't coming, the traditional way America gets to war would be best for U.S. interests. To go to war, the U.S. has historically waited for an attack, such as Pearl Harbor, the Lusitania, the Gulf of Tonkin, the Maine, or Fort Sumter. If the Iranians aren't going to compromise, it would be best if somebody else started the war. One can combine other means of pressure with sanctions, such as increasing pressure after the explosion on August 17. Iranian submarines periodically go down, and someday one of them might not come up. The U.S. is already using covert means against the Iranians and could get nastier.

The discussion centers on Iran’s response to the latest US peace terms and the broader trajectory of the conflict. Iran publicly rejected the terms, calling them “completely unrealistic” and signaling that they would not open the Strait of Hormuz. At the same time, the claim is made that the rumblings from US outlets and the president’s rhetoric suggested closeness to a deal, but those impressions are challenged as inconsistent with Iran’s stance. Project Freedom is said to have been shelved after Saudi Arabia reportedly refused to allow US forces to use its airspace and a key regional airbase, making the Trump administration’s stated option to advance that plan unworkable. The host asks where things stand on the escalation ladder. Professor Robert Pape, director of the Chicago Project on Security and Threats, describes the situation as a trap. He argues that the fundamental issues in play have not changed since the bombs began falling about seventy days ago. He praises the US military’s tactical performance—air, naval, and leadership-target strikes—but criticizes the strategy as fundamentally flawed. According to Pape, tactical successes do not yield meaningful strategic results, and Iran’s power is growing due to geography and cheap technologies like drones and mines. He notes that even after sinking Iran’s navy, the impact was negligible because Iran’s power persists and expands, especially given a Gulf-wide vulnerability to Hormuz. A critical development discussed is Iran’s action near the UAE, striking a pipeline that bypassed Hormuz and moved nearly 2,000,000 barrels of oil per day. This demonstrated Iran’s capacity to inflict damage despite a naval blockade, contributing to Gulf states’ reluctance to participate in or support US actions. The implication is that US punitive measures—hitting energy infrastructure or power grids—are unlikely to force Iran to kneel and may instead provoke greater retaliation. Pape warns that the escalation could drag on for months, with consequences such as rising gasoline prices in the US, potentially reaching about $6 in May or higher in some places like Chicago. The conversation turns to more immediate developments: fresh drone attacks around Kishem Island with Iran claiming air defenses intercepted the assaults; Iranian officials reportedly require compensation for damages and the withdrawal of all US forces from the Gulf as preconditions for ending the war. Pape reframes these attacks as part of Iran’s effort to keep the United States off balance and off leadership leverage, suggesting that Trump’s approach—driven by civilian leadership and charisma—misses the realities of great-power politics. He discusses the broader risk of increased Gulf infrastructure targeting if the US escalates, including the potential for higher gas prices and substantial infrastructure repair costs. The interview ends with reflections on the limits of punishment as a strategy, the enduring influence of Iran’s geopolitical position, and the likelihood that even if further force is used, it may not yield the desired strategic outcome. The speakers acknowledge the difficulty of predicting exact moves but emphasize the persistence of the escalation trap and the real-world consequences for energy markets and regional stability.

It is difficult for the United States to initiate a crisis and go to war with Iran. If compromise is not possible, the traditional way for America to go to war would be in the best interest of the country. Historical examples show that events like Pearl Harbor, the Lusitania episode, the Gulf of Tonkin incident, the explosion of the USS Maine, and the attack on Fort Sumter led to the US entering wars. Therefore, if Iran does not compromise, it would be preferable for someone else to start the war.

"Here's something you're never taught in school. Here in the good old US Of A, all of your wars have been fake." The video centers on the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, an American think tank established in 1985, whose mission is "to advance a balanced and realistic understanding of American interests in The Middle East and to promote the policies that secure them." Its board includes Henry Kissinger, Richard Pearl, Condoleezza Rice, George Shultz, James Woolsey. The speaker notes: "crisis initiation is really tough, and it's very hard for me to see how The United States, president can get us to war with Iran." He adds: "The traditional way that America gets to war is what's best for US interests." He cites alleged false flags: "False flag." Pearl Harbor, Lusitania, Gulf Of Tonkin, Maine, Fort Sumter. "If the Iranians aren't gonna compromise, it would be best if somebody else started the war." "This is how America goes to war." "One can combine other means of pressure with sanctions." "We could step up the pressure." "They're in the game of doing that to everybody." "We are in the game of using covert means against the Iranians." "We could get nastier with that." "you don't know when World War three is gonna break out, but when it does, you'll know why."

"The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. This is an American think tank out of Washington DC. It was established in 1985, and it says the mission statement of the institute, quote, is to advance a balanced and realistic understanding of American interests in The Middle East and to promote the policies that secure them. Not about what's right and wrong over there. It's just whatever secures the American interests over in The Middle East, and we all know what those interests are. You've got Henry Kissinger, Richard Pearl, Condoleezza Rice, George Shultz, James Woolsey. It's a fun crowd. And it doesn't matter which president you think you're voting for. It's gonna change everything. People that have been part of this particular think tank have served senior positions in the administrations of every president this country has had since George h w Bush. Some of you may have seen this video, but again, considering the things that are going on right now, it's very it's more relevant now than it's ever been. So we're gonna go ahead and watch this, and I just wanna say upfront, you're gonna wanna have to make yourself resist the urge to punch your screen because you're gonna wanna punch this guy." "crisis initiation is really tough, and it's very hard for me to see how The United States, president can get us to war with Iran." "He just said that. You aren't hearing things he literally said. Crisis initiation's tough, and how's The United States president gonna get to war with Iran? Because wars don't just happen. They make the war." "The traditional way that America goes to war is what's best for the interests." "Some people might think that mister Roosevelt wanted to get us into World War two, as David mentioned. You may recall we had to wait for Pearl Harbor. False flag." "Some people might think that mister Wilson wanted to get us into World War one. You may recall he had to wait for the Lusitania episode. False flag." "Some people might think that mister Johnson wanted to send troops to Vietnam. You may recall he had to wait for the Gulf Of Tonkin episode. Total false flag." "We didn't go to war with Spain until the USS until the Maine exploded. Probably also a false flag." "May I point out that mister Lincoln did not feel he could call out the federal army until Fort Sumter was attacked, which is why he ordered the commander of Fort Sumter to do exactly that thing which the South Carolinians had said would cause an attack. Also a false flag." "Do you see a pattern here?" "So if in fact the Iranians aren't gonna compromise, it would be best if somebody else started the war." "Period." "If the Iranians don't compromise, it would be best if someone started this war because that is how America goes to war." "One can combine other means of pressure with sanctions. I mentioned that explosion on August 17. We could step up the pressure." "We are in the game of using covert means against the Iranians. We we could get nastier with that." "This is how America goes to war. You don't know when World War three is gonna break out, but when it does, you'll know why."