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Colombia initially refused to take back criminals, but I insisted they would. These individuals, including murderers and drug lords, pose a significant threat. Imagine being a pilot with dangerous criminals on board—it's not safe. Colombia quickly apologized and even considered sending their presidential plane to retrieve these criminals to avoid inconvenience. I appreciate the Colombian people and their representatives for their swift action. Despite tough talk from other countries, they will ultimately comply and take back their criminals. They will accept this situation, and I believe they will appreciate it in the end.

- The discussion frames Iranian capabilities as the current biggest threat to the US Navy, noting that Iran’s position is now stronger, with significant new efforts in the last six months supported by China and Russia. The guest emphasizes that Iranian capabilities today are far more lethal than in 2020 and that Iran has benefited from Chinese and Russian involvement, including help with integrated air defenses. - On the protests in Iran, the guest contends that Mossad, with CIA and MI6, joined the efforts to provoke the regime into a brutal crackdown, aiming to trigger a stronger US response. He argues the protests were legitimate at their core (economic grievances and reformist aims) and that the attempt to exploit them for regime change failed. He explains that, after discovering 40,000 starlight terminals used to orchestrate regime-change efforts, the intelligence community judged the operation a failure, and President Trump was advised that a broader, more forceful campaign would be required, potentially including more firepower and assets. - Regarding Russia and China’s responses to potential regime collapse in Iran, the guest asserts that Russia would intervene only if the regime seemed in danger of collapsing, and China would respond similarly, considering strategic and financial consequences. - In the Maduro Venezuela operation, the guest recounts paying off many actors to enable the abduction of Maduro and his wife, noting air defenses largely stood down due to bribes, with one battery reportedly firing and damaging a helicopter. He suggests the operation accomplished regime alteration but not a change in leadership style, since the new president reportedly will not take instructions from Washington. He speculates that continued oil income from the captured Venezuelan oil could influence outcomes, and he notes skepticism about the profitability of Venezuelan drilling for major oil corporations, who may turn to private or mercenary groups. - The “secret weapon” comment (the discombobulator) is described as an exaggeration; the guest hints at undisclosed capabilities but declines further public discussion, citing high clearance and Pentagon confidentiality. - On Iran’s protests and possible US strikes, the guest reiterates that the initial protests were economically driven and that the Mossad-CIA-MI6 effort to provoke a harsher regime response stalled, leading to the decision for a larger potential strike. He outlines a plan for a prolonged air campaign with multiple carriers and a heavy emphasis on air power over naval action, suggesting a Kosovo-like approach with extensive air sorties to degrade Iran’s air and missile defenses, using surface ships as needed but relying on air power for sustained damage. He notes that the air campaign would require time and additional assets, possibly two to three more carrier groups, and would hinge on the ability to degrade defenses to enable broader bombing operations. - When discussing Iranian capabilities against the US Navy, the guest says Iran’s current capabilities are more dangerous, with Iran receiving about 500 missiles from China and improved Russian integrated air defenses. He notes concern about long-range missiles capable of reaching US bases and questions whether Iran’s Orion missiles could reach Diego Garcia. He asserts that Russian help could be more for deterrence or limited military support rather than supplying exotic missiles like Reshnik, and that the Chinese missiles could threaten ships at sea. - On the US mobilization (Lincoln, submarines, aircraft, drones, HIMARS, Patriot/THAAD), the guest says the response is a time-buying effort to pressure negotiations, with more assets likely and ongoing dialogue with Iran. He suggests the US may pursue enriched uranium settlements, acknowledging Netanyahu’s and Trump’s positions, while noting Iran’s insistence that missile development is not negotiable and that JCPOA prospects are unlikely. - About Iran’s possible escalation strategies, the guest analyzes several options: drone swarms could threaten bases; sea mines in the Strait of Hormuz would be a last resort but remain a hazard; a swarm of boats and diesel submarines pose challenges but are not existential threats to carriers; and long-range missiles (including those supplied by China) could target US bases or ships. He emphasizes that the navy can defend against many of these threats but highlights the difficulty of countering missiles and the threat submarines pose in shallow gulf waters. - On Russia and China’s potential responses if the regime falls: Russia would likely intervene militarily or economically to prevent regime disintegration, while China could leverage financial power (including debt leverage) and maintain strategic flexibility. The Turkish role is described as a wild card; Turkey could be motivated to counter Israeli hegemony in the region, potentially drawing NATO into conflict, despite NATO’s current limited capacity. - Finally, the guest touches on broader geopolitical implications: he suggests Europe is drifting towards greater autonomy from the US, NATO’s effectiveness is questionable, and the regime’s fall could trigger wider regional instability. He argues Taiwan is a separate, less feasible target for conflict, given distance and economic stakes, and calls for more cautious rhetoric regarding Taiwan. He closes by noting that Ukraine’s fate and Europe’s stance will influence how the US and its allies manage any Iran escalation.

Fox News alert: B-52 bombers are flying off the coast of Venezuela. Trump is not bluffing. More than 10,000 US soldiers are built up in the Caribbean on ships in Puerto Rico, locked and loaded. Special operations helicopters were seen 90 miles from Venezuela’s coast, used by Delta Force, Navy SEALs, and the Green Berets. The Black Ops were spotted off the coast of Trinidad. Also spotted are little birds—smaller but faster, designed for quick insertion of special operators behind enemy lines. The Ghost was confirmed in the Caribbean. The Ghost is the nickname for MV Ocean Trader, the kind of ship that doesn’t want to be found, designed for black ops and special missions because it’s dark and blends with cargo. There’s more: 10% of the US naval power is now in the region, including subs, several destroyers, and F-35 fighters in Puerto Rico, on top of “coke boats” being smoked to pieces by the week as kilos of cocaine wash ashore. Dozens of bad hombres are being shark bait. Maduro’s attention is piqued; he’s described as the dictator of the narco state, a very bad hombre, and the US has doubled the bounty on his head to 50 million dollars. According to the New York Times, Maduro offered the US a dominant stake in Venezuela’s oil, gold, and mineral wealth, and promised to cut ties with Russia and China. Trump and Rubio said no. That suggests the gunboat diplomacy is going to end up with no Maduro and a Venezuela aligned with the US, not Putin or China. American action in Latin America hasn’t always ended well; Bay of Pigs is referenced as a comparison. Other times, it’s been a piece of cake. It’s the backyard, and Trump is reestablishing the Monroe Doctrine, aka the Dunro Doctrine. The piece hopes a Venezuelan general does the right thing and collects the $50,000,000 bounty. No one wants a messy conflict in South America. Maduro controls drug traffickers who are pretty strapped and have military-grade weapons, and Biden let hundreds of thousands of Venezuelans into the country, who could be activated. If Trump can pull this off and kick China and Russia out of Venezuela after what he did with the Iranians, it’ll give him power to deter Russia and Ukraine and China and Taiwan.

- Speaker 0 asks for the first reaction to the news and whether it was clearly a special operations effort to capture Maduro or a larger military operation. Speaker 1 says it quickly became obvious it was a special operations mission, citing the ships and platforms ideal for this, and the ability to fly helicopters into Venezuela as supporting evidence. - On how the operation penetrated Caracas and Maduro’s defenses: Speaker 1 says cyber operations were used to turn off power and to blind the air defense by making tracking and identification difficult, in addition to traditional jamming and excellent on-the-ground intelligence built up over weeks. He also suggests internal help within the Venezuelan regime was likely. - On the possibility of an inside asset and the defensive protections: Speaker 0 notes Cuban intelligence and Venezuelan National Guard protection for Maduro and asks how insiders could have enabled the operation. Speaker 1 says insiders could have assisted, and acknowledges the intelligence on Maduro’s whereabouts was very strong. He cautions the president’s administration should not publicly reveal inside help, as that could cause paranoia within the command structure. - On the operation’s execution and its comparison to past regime-change operations: Speaker 1 emphasizes training and technology, noting the unit would include special operations aviation, Delta, and other components; argues this is a joint operation involving army, navy, air force, marines, cyber, and space-based platforms, requiring extensive rehearsals over weeks. He references Noriega’s capture as a point of comparison, but notes Maduro is on a different level. - On the electricity outage in Caracas: Speaker 0 asks if it was a cyber disruption or a kinetic strike. Speaker 1 responds that a cyber disruption to power is more likely than a kinetic strike, given the context. - On Venezuela’s air defense systems (S-300s, BUKs) and the $6 billion investment: Speaker 0 questions whether it’s fair to criticize these systems given the operation. Speaker 1 acknowledges they are sophisticated and capable but not sure of their maintenance and training levels. He notes the United States had telegraphed expectations for weeks and suggests negligence or incompetence in air-defense command and control if surprised. - On possible inside help and seniority of the asset: Speaker 0 asks who within the regime might have cooperated with the CIA. Speaker 1 is reluctant to speculate beyond confirming there was very good intelligence on Maduro’s whereabouts. He finds it unlikely that the vice president would have been an internal asset, though he concedes nothing is impossible, given a mix of factions in the regime and third-party interference. - On geopolitical repercussions and messaging to China, Iran, and Russia: Speaker 0 points to the timing with a Chinese delegation in Caracas and asks what message this sends to China and whether the date had symbolic resonance with other events. Speaker 1 says the date was probably driven by weather and other operations rather than a deliberate China signal; he suggests China would reassess oil dependencies and potential leverage now that Maduro is captured. He predicts the next target could be Cuba and discusses logistical challenges, such as Cuba’s island geography and Guantanamo Bay. - On US strategy in the Western Hemisphere and potential targets: Speaker 1 opines that Cuba is a plausible next target and explains why, including electoral considerations in Florida. He notes that a Cuba operation would be more difficult than Venezuela due to geography but could be motivated by domestic political calculation and the Monroe Doctrine as a signal. - On China, Russia, and Iran in the wake of Maduro’s capture: Speaker 1 argues the US demonstrates strong capabilities, and China would need to reassess oil supply and leverage; Russia’s and Iran’s interests could be pressured as the US asserts influence in the region. He mentions that the US might not directly engage in large-scale intervention in Iran but warns against overreach due to domestic political constraints. - On the broader pattern and future: Speaker 1 cautions about the risk of hubris and notes domestic political constraints and upcoming congressional pressures that could shape how far the administration pursues this strategy beyond Venezuela. He stresses the importance of not overestimating the ability to sustain similar moves without a plan for the post-Maduro environment.

Robert O’Neill and the interviewer discuss the Maduro operation in Venezuela and the Bin Laden raid, comparing the two missions, the forces involved, and the broader implications for U.S. military capabilities and geopolitics. - The Maduro operation differed sharply from the Bin Laden raid in scope and risk. The Maduro mission involved an army base in Venezuela (their Pentagon) and a target in a house with a safe room. Chinese and Russian involvement and the presence of advanced air defenses complicated planning. The operation used a “gorilla package” with about 150 aircraft, whereas the Bin Laden raid used fewer assets and was characterized by a tighter ground package. The Maduro operation allowed for no-kill options and contingencies, but still entailed high risk; the Bin Laden raid was described as a one-way mission with a different risk profile. - The Maduro mission emphasized rapid execution, with the aim of capturing the president, his wife, and returning them to the United States within about 24 hours. The discussion highlights a distinction between kill options under the Venezuela operation and capture-focused goals for Maduro. - In contrast, the Bin Laden mission involved a ground assault with SEAL Team Six and an intense, fast breach. The initial breach attempts faced a crash of a helicopter, forcing adjustments, but the team proceeded to clear the house, enter the target, and locate Bin Laden. O’Neill described the movement through the compound as methodical: “If the guy in front of me went left, I went right,” continuing until Bin Laden was found and killed. - On the day of Bin Laden’s death, there were no casualties among U.S. operators on the ground; the operation produced an extensive recovery of material, including external hard drives, computers, disks, opium, and other items. The raid revealed Bin Laden was “running the whole thing from Pakistan,” raising questions about ISI knowledge and cross-border links. - The two tier-one units, Delta Force and SEAL Team Six, are both elite but have different primary focuses and traditions. Delta Force is described as older, largely Army-based, with emphasis on hostage rescue on land or in aircraft, and a selection that allows entry for those who prove themselves. SEAL Team Six is portrayed as capable across domains but with primary strength on maritime operations (e.g., the Captain Phillips raid). The discussion notes that both units share high standards for counterterrorism and special operations, and both have strong track records. - Operational differences in training and approach are highlighted. Delta’s emphasis on close-quarters battle and air operations is compared with SEAL Team Six’s maritime emphasis, yet both units are said to perform similar work in practice. Admiral William McRaven is credited with supporting and enabling SEAL Team Six and Delta to operate successfully during the Bin Laden and Maduro operations. The guest emphasizes that both teams perform with high effectiveness, noting the pilots as “unsung heroes” for their precise timing and reliability (plus or minus seconds). - The interview touches on the conditions and contingencies of planning: compartmentalization is discussed, with a preference for sharing enough information with operators on target to perform effectively, while preserving sensitive intelligence to prevent leaks. The Maduro operation allegedly involved strong inside information from Venezuelan sources, with a broader strategy that included leveraging internal actors who might seek power. - Leaks and doxxing are a recurring theme. The hosts discuss the ethics and consequences of releasing names or details about operators involved in these missions. Seth Harp’s reporting on the Maduro raid and the doxxing debate is discussed; the guest argues that doxxing can endanger families and operational security, while also acknowledging the journalist’s desire to be first. - The role of the helicopters and the risk of enemy fire are addressed. A Chinook helicopter was hit during Maduro, but did not crash; the squad subsequently extracted, illustrating the danger and resilience of mission planning. The Bin Laden raid included a helicopter crash incident that required a quick, adaptive response from the team. - The interviewee comments on geopolitical ramifications and future targets. The possibility of Iran being next is discussed; the guest argues that operations against Iran could be possible but would require careful political and strategic consideration and public messaging. The discussion also touches on perceptions of Russia and China, containment strategies, and the importance of democratic governance versus autocratic models in global affairs. - Final reflections include the evolution of the next generation of operators. The guest expresses optimism about the Gen Z cohorts in special operations, emphasizing merit-based selection, resilience, and morale. He concludes with gratitude for the teams involved and notes the personal impact of these operations on his life and career.

In this conversation, the speakers discuss a high-profile operation centered on Maduro’s kidnapping, its implications, and broader geopolitical consequences. - The operation to capture Maduro is described as not a regime change but an action intended to “hold off Maduro, get US control of the oil, and get China and Russia and Iran out.” A senior Venezuelan security official is identified as a full cooperator with the United States, allowing US forces to enter “the front door” with minimal resistance and no return fire. The plan reportedly involved a coordinated assault with Venezuelan forces, and while several air defenses were destroyed or not activated, most were not deployed due to a stand-down order. The operation did not replace the Venezuelan government; Maduro remained in power, at least for the moment. - For context on the execution, Speaker 1, who has experience scripting Delta Force and SEAL Team Six exercises, notes the mission took place in full moonlight (unusual for planned clandestine night operations). He claims the Venezuelan air defenses were substantial but largely avoided activation because of the stand-down order, enabling a seamless entry for US forces. He compares this to a counterterrorism exercise in the US years earlier—staged surveillance and pre-positioned access that eliminated obstacles in advance. - Casualties and aftermath are uncertain. There are conflicting reports on casualties among Cubans and Venezuelans, with no clear names or numbers yet confirmed. The operation involved collaboration with Venezuelan forces and did not topple the Maduro regime. - On the motive and internal dynamics, Speaker 1 suggests multiple potential actors within Maduro’s circle could have incentives to cooperate with the US, possibly including financial or visa-based incentives. The possibility of infiltrators within intelligence, military, or police is raised. The role of a specific senior official who allegedly ordered a stand-down is mentioned, though not named. - Questions about the rocket attack on a US chopper are raised, with speculation that it might have been a lone actor or a malfunction rather than a deliberate act by a large organized force. - The discussion turns to the interim president Delcy Rodríguez. While theories exist that she cooperated with the US, Speaker 1 says that the theory of her involvement is likely a cover story designed to divert attention from those actually involved. - The broader geopolitical frame emphasizes that this is not about regime change in Venezuela, but about oil access and limiting adversaries. The conversation suggests a recurring US strategy: remove Maduro, gain oil leverage, and push rivals like China, Russia, and Iran out of influence. The hypothesis includes using economic and political pressure and, if necessary, military options, while acknowledging the risk of drawing wider regional opposition and potential escalation. - The discussion then broadens to the US role in the multipolar order. The speakers debate whether the world is tilting toward a multipolar system or a reinforced US unipolar order. They agree that the reality is mixed: Russia and China are building a new international order with India and Brazil, while US actions—such as threats against Venezuela, arms packages to Taiwan, and support for Ukraine—signal both erosion of hegemony and attempts to sustain influence. - The Monroe Doctrine is critiqued. The speakers contend that the so-called Dunro Doctrine (a term they use to describe perceived US interference) misreads the historical framework. They argue that the Monroe Doctrine was never a proclamation of exclusive US dominance in the Western Hemisphere; instead, the US has historically faced resistance as other powers gain influence. - Iran and the Middle East are discussed at length. The twelve-day war (in reference to Iran’s confrontation with Israel) is described as not severely weakening Iran militarily, though it has economic and political strains. Iran’s allies (Russia, China) have become more engaged since sanctions relief began in September, and Iran has pursued stronger economic ties with both Russia and China, including a potential North–South Corridor. Iran reportedly rejected a mutual defense treaty with Russia initially but later pursued stronger cooperation after the conflict. Iran’s leadership is described as consolidating power and preparing for potential future conflicts, while the protests inside Iran are depicted as largely manufactured or at least amplified by Western intelligence networks, though there is genuine internal discontent over currency and economic conditions. - The panelists debate whether the US could or would attempt another targeted strike on Iranian leadership. They argue that the US would face greater risk and likely casualties if attempting a similar operation without a compatible insider network, making a repeat Maduro-like capture unlikely. - Final reflections acknowledge that the US’s global influence is eroding, but the US remains deeply involved in global affairs. The discussion ends with a cautionary stance toward US hegemonic assumptions and recognition of a rising multipolar framework in which China, Russia, and allied states exert greater influence in Latin America, the Middle East, and beyond.

Two years ago today on 10/17/2023, I was sentenced to sixty days in prison for trespassing outside the capital on J sixth. The judge during my sentencing said that I misused my platform as a candidate for elected office. If you don't know, my name is Ryan Kelly. I was the leading gubernatorial candidate in the state of Michigan in 2022 when the FBI raided my house on 06/09/2022, and they arrested me on misdemeanor charges, nonviolent, never even went inside the Capitol Building, was the leading gubernatorial candidate, election interference. I was the best poised to beat Whitmer. But, anyway, that's the point of all of this right now. The judge said that I had a lot of folks that followed me. I had a lot of folks that supported me. And with that comes the responsibility of not peddling lies and falsehoods. And he was talking about the twenty twenty election because I said it was a fraudulent stolen election. He was talking about January 6 because I said that the January 6 that there was FBI agents there that were setting the whole thing up and involved in the crowd. And what did we find out here recently? Oh, I was right, but I was sentenced to sixty days in prison for that. One of the biggest things the judge brought up that he had a huge problem with the Facebook posts that I had. Right? Freedom of speech. Poof. Gone. Kings do that kind of stuff. They don't let their people talk freely. Is that right? And then on top of that, you know, lying and misleading all of my supporters when we come to now find out there was 274 agents that were in the crowd that day on January 6. You know, it's obvious that the Democrats are the tyrants, the kings, if you will. Right? I mean, look at what they did with Kamala in the primary. Right? I don't need to explain it to y'all. But, you know, here we are. The Trump administration is removing illegal immigrants from our country and doing good things for America. It was the Biden administration, the Democrats that targeted American citizens. Red, white, and blue. Let's go USA.

Airbridge is a term that is common in law enforcement for how drug traffickers move their drugs from multiple countries, Venezuela, Honduras, Guatemala, Mexico, to our country. It's called an airbridge. And they pay off government officials. They pay people off. They pay off law enforcement officers in their countries to ignore that and to let them fly undetected. We're looking at all that. We're looking at that in multiple countries. We are not done yet. At president Trump's direction, we will continue to fight until every single cartel boss is behind bars and on American soil and in American prisons for the rest of their lives. Thank you.

Ian and Mario discuss the Venezuelan operation and its wider implications. - Maduro’s regime and Venezuela’s situation are contrasted with Chavez. Maduro is not as popular or charismatic, the economy is in shambles, and Venezuela possesses billions in Russian air defenses that failed to down US helicopters, highlighting a discrepancy between defense systems and battlefield outcomes. - The Washington assessment is that the operation to capture Maduro involved substantial internal support from Maduro’s circles, potentially including CIA-assisted tips and insider cooperation, enabling real-time intelligence on Maduro’s movements. This inside help is seen as a critical factor alongside the United States’ capabilities. - The operation was planned for months, with the White House reportedly approving strikes in advance as long as a window existed. The goal was to capture Maduro and bring him to the United States, not simply to eliminate him; the plan also involved a minimal American casualty count (one helicopter injury, no American deaths). - The vice president, Delsy Rodríguez, is discussed as a possible insider who might have privately engaged with the United States, though it’s not clear she knew the exact timing of the strike. Cuban intelligence was described as protecting Maduro, and Maduro’s inner circle would have had reasons to avoid leaks. - There was emphasis that the operation was not framed as democracy promotion or regime change, but rather about removing Maduro and establishing a transition that could reshape Venezuela’s leadership and oil/drug policy, with the oil sector and sanctions regime central to the US strategy. The leaders around Maduro, not Maduro alone, shape the outcome. - The Venezuelan air defense systems, largely Russian, were targeted and neutralized in advance of the Delta Strike Force. The attack demonstrated US surgical strike capabilities, but also underscored the risk of Venezuelan retaliation and the complexity of operating in a heavily defended airspace. - The discussion shifts to the political implications for allied and regional actors. The operation raises questions for Mexico, Colombia, Brazil, and Denmark (in terms of leverage and responses to US unilateral actions). Colombia, under Petro, faces considerable pressure as US leverage increases, while Brazil’s stance is tempered by prior sanctions and subsequent negotiations. Denmark and other partners are noted for their responses to geopolitical shifts. - China’s role is addressed: China had a delegation in Caracas at the time, with public shock at the US move. The US did not appear to have given heads-up to China. This underscores the multipolar dynamic where the US can project military power, but economic and technological power remains more distributed. - The broader geopolitical context includes Russia’s strategic vulnerabilities. The Venezuela operation signals American military capability and willingness to act unilaterally, yet Africa, the Middle East, and Ukraine illustrate ongoing limits and risks. Moscow’s alliances with Venezuela and Iran are highlighted, but the operation did not rely on formal mutual defense commitments; Russia’s global influence is depicted as waning in the face of US operational decisiveness. - The discussion covers potential long-term effects on global order. The US displays “extraordinary military capability” but faces political constraints as a democracy with checks and balances. The speaker warns of a possible “law of the jungle” trajectory if the US continues to rely on coercive power, potentially diminishing international legitimacy and provoking responses from China and others who possess economic leverage. - The possible phase two is referenced as a strategic instrument; if the new Venezuelan leadership does not align with US aims, offshore oil facilities could be targeted to compel compliance, signaling ongoing leverage without ground troop deployments. - Regarding Iran, there is no current plan for a Maduro-like operation. Israel’s potential pushes against Iran are discussed, but the US position remains cautious: strikes would be contingent on broader strategic considerations, with the US wary of deepening conflicts if not coordinated with partners. - Ian offers forecasts: Iran is likely to face increased pressure domestically and internationally, while Venezuela could see a transitional government for 12–18 months amid power-sharing negotiations, with ongoing instability possible as opposition figures push for more influence. The expectations emphasize ongoing US leverage, limited appetite for full regime change, and the risk that military weakness and political maneuvering will shape outcomes in the near term.

Mario and Max discuss the January 3 operation in Venezuela, its potential objectives, and the wider geopolitical implications. - The operation raised early fears of a full amphibious invasion or a new war, with rapid questions about how Maduro could be kidnapped with so little resistance and whether a single downed helicopter could have produced a catastrophe for Donald Trump. Max notes that 16 guards of Nicolas Maduro were killed, including his personal bodyguard who had guarded Hugo Chavez, and suggests this could indicate the operation was choreographed or left open to a deal through Maduro. - Max says he had woken late and watched the event unfold, and he entertained theories about a negotiated exit for Maduro that would leave the Pesuv (Chavista) structure in place, enabling a transition to a figure like Delsy Rodriguez (the vice president) who would work within Chavismo to exploit Venezuelan resources for Trump’s cronies. He states he predicted that Trump would claim Maria Carina Machado did not have enough support to rule and would not be returned to power, a point he supported with sources and his reading of Trump’s behavior, including Trump’s condemnation of Machado’s Nobel Prize and disregard for Juan Guaido. - Max describes a theory of a deal and questions whether the Venezuelan military stood down. He notes that the US military is dominant but that losing a single helicopter could have become a political disaster for Trump. He mentions Joaquin Padrino Lopez (defense minister) and Diosdado Cabello as other power centers, suggesting that even if Maduro was abducted, a power vacuum could destabilize Venezuela. He cites Cabello signaling resistance by appearing on the street with military figures and the Second Republic flag. - The conversation covers whether Delsy Rodriguez has broad support in Venezuela. Max recalls Rodriguez’s 2021 interview and her role during the COVID response, portraying her as stabilizing economically and presiding over ministries, which aided an economic revival supported by China and others. Max suggests her potential as a US-friendly figure but notes she lacks the military backing to consolidate power against other Pesuv factions. - Mario asks about Maduro’s leadership, and Max rejects the idea that Maduro is purely incompetent, noting corruption under the Bolivarian regime and Maduro’s own background as a student of Simon Bolivar, a former bus driver who rose through the ranks. He argues Maduro was not a stupid leader and contrasts his profile with Trump’s. He warns that achieving regime change would not be simple, given Venezuela’s polarization and the military’s importance. - The discussion turns to the economic situation in Venezuela. Mario references statistics: economy shrinking by around 80% since 2013, 95% in poverty, oil production down, living standards collapsed, and out-migration. Max acknowledges some statistics may be flawed but agrees that Delsy Rodriguez had presided over an economic revival and that China played a central role, purchasing a large share of Venezuelan oil and helping with oil infrastructure, while Iran and Russia also provided support. He notes the impact of US sanctions and the broader “financial terrorism” narrative, arguing that sanctions and IMF-style measures contributed to economic decline and the diaspora’s views. - They debate who bears responsibility for the crisis. Max emphasizes longstanding US sanctions and political interference as primary factors, arguing that the US sought to undermine Venezuela’s sovereignty and to plunder its resources, with Maduro’s government framed by Western outlets as corrupt; he cites evidence of corruption and suggests a pattern of coercive measures against Venezuela. - The conversation covers the purpose behind capturing Maduro. Max suggests the aim might be to replace Maduro with a more pliable figure who would cooperate with US oil interests and allow greater control over Venezuela’s PDVSA structure. He discusses the possibility of grooming a candidate from within Pesuv or returning Machado, though he notes Marco Rubio’s public stance that elections could be delayed to avoid destabilizing Venezuela. - The role of China and the broader multipolar dynamic is addressed. The Chinese envoy’s meeting with Maduro hours before the strikes is seen as signaling China’s interest and as part of a broader message to China, Russia, and Iran about US reach. Max believes the operation sends a wider message of US willingness to act in the hemisphere and to police resource access. - The interview ends with a comparison to the Panama regime change (Manuel Noriega) and a reminder that Maduro will be tried in the Southern District of New York. Max notes that Machado’s supporters and US associates are calculating future power arrangements, while Maduro remains central to ongoing debates about Venezuela’s political and economic future.

In a wide-ranging discussion about the January 3 operation in Venezuela, the speakers explore initial reactions, possible motives, and the broader geopolitical implications. - Initial reaction and early concerns: The exchange begins with the worry that the events marked the start of a full amphibious assault or a new war. Speaker 1 recalls staying up late and being shocked by the “sheer gangsterism” of Maduro’s kidnapping, noting that Maduro was flown out of the country with little resistance. He models several theories around how such an operation could occur with minimal opposition and suggests the possibility of a negotiated exit that would keep the Chavista structure in place through a successor like Delsy Rodriguez. - The “deal” theory and who might be involved: Speaker 1 explains a theory that Donald Trump and Marco Rubio wanted a negotiated exit for Maduro that would allow the Pesuv (Chavista) structure to remain and enable the installation of a figure like Delsy Rodriguez to work within Chavismo to secure resource contracts for Trump’s allies. He cites sources close to negotiations and references coverage in the New York Times supporting elements of this narrative. He also notes Trump’s public dismissal of Maria Carina Machado as lacking support to rule, a point he says he predicted on a livestream. - The military stand-down hypothesis: The conversation delves into why no strikes targeted the helicopters, positing a stand-down order. Speaker 0 asks who would authorize such a stand-down and cites Ian Bremmer’s assessment as a possibility but unlikely due to the risk. Speaker 1 acknowledges the plausibility of many theories, including the idea that a stand-down could spare the country from greater U.S. violence, reminiscent of past operations in Baghdad or Raqqa, and emphasizes that the question of who issued any stand-down order remains unresolved. He mentions Delsy Rodriguez’s potential self-protection concerns and notes Diosdado Cabello’s visible signaling alongside military figures after Maduro’s abduction. - Delsy Rodriguez and potential motivations: The interlocutors discuss Rodriguez’s political stature, her management of Venezuela’s COVID response, and the perception she could pose a more direct challenge to U.S. interests due to her economic stabilization efforts and heavy ties to China. Speaker 1 underscores that Rodriguez stabilized the economy and was central to a revival that included substantial China-driven oil exports, a point supported by a New York Times profile. He clarifies that he did not speculate Rodriguez was the U.S. mole but stresses she would be asked by interviewers about such questions. - Maduro’s leadership and the economic crisis: The participants debate Maduro’s competence, acknowledging corruption and structural issues within a petro-state framework but arguing that the decline in living standards and oil production has deep roots, including U.S. sanctions and geopolitical pressure. Speaker 1 contends that while Maduro was not a “stupid” leader, Chavez-era and post-Chavez mismanagement, together with U.S. financial sanctions and regime-change tactics, contributed to Venezuela’s economic collapse. He insists the regime’s persistence does not hinge on one leader and cautions against simplistic characterizations of Maduro or Chavez as solely responsible for ruin. - Economic dynamics and sanctions: The discussion emphasizes that Venezuela’s economic trajectory has been shaped by sanctions and counter-sanctions, with Speaker 1 asserting that U.S. maximum-pressure campaigns and the theft of assets (including Sitco and gold reserves) severely impacted the economy. He argues the sanctions constitute financial terrorism and compares U.S. policy to broader imperial dynamics centered on dollar dominance and oil leverage. - Regime change prospects and future leadership: The speakers speculate about possible future leadership within the Pesuv or an alternative power structure, including the potential grooming of a candidate from within the regime or the return of Maria Carina Machado if conditions align. They note that a political shift would require military backing, and they discuss whether an eventual election could be staged or delayed to a more favorable time for U.S. interests. They emphasize that, absent military support, it would be difficult for any non-Maduro leadership to emerge. - China, Russia, and global signaling: The conversation covers the Chinese envoy’s presence in Caracas before the operation and the broader implications for China’s role in Venezuela. Speaker 1 argues the operation sent a global message to rivals (China, Russia, Iran) that the U.S. can seize leadership and resources, while also suggesting that China could be leveraged to avoid deeper conflict by permitting continued oil exports. The dialogue also touches on potential retaliatory moves by Russia or China and the broader geopolitical chessboard, including implications for Greenland and other strategic theaters. - Legal proceedings and comparisons to other regime changes: Maduro’s indictment in the Southern District of New York is discussed, with reflections on its weaknesses and how it compares to similar prosecutions (e.g., Juan Orlando Hernandez). The discussion concludes with a sense that Venezuela will likely face a prolonged, complex confrontation, with lingering questions about who will govern next and under what terms.

Fox News alert: B-52 bombers are flying off the coast of Venezuela. Trump says he’s not bluffing. Right now, more than 10,000 US soldiers are built up in the Caribbean on ships in Puerto Rico, locked and loaded. Special operations helicopters were seen 90 miles from Venezuela’s coast. The chopper units are used by Delta Force, Navy SEALs, and the Green Berets. The Black Ops were spotted off the coast of Trinidad. Also seen were little birds—smaller but faster aircraft designed for quick insertion of special operators behind enemy lines. The Ghost was also confirmed to be in the Caribbean. That’s the nickname for MV Ocean Trader, a ship designed for black ops and special missions because it’s dark and blends in with cargo. There’s more. 10% of US naval power is now in the region. It’s a major shift with submarines, several destroyers, and F-35 fighters in Puerto Rico, on top of the cocaine boats being smoked to pieces by the week. Kilos of cocaine are washing ashore. Don’t tell Hunter. Dozens of bad hombres are being described as shark bait. Maduro’s attention is captured. He’s the dictator of the narco state, and the US has doubled the bounty on his head to 50 million dollars. According to the New York Times, Maduro offered the United States a dominant stake in Venezuela’s oil, gold, and mineral wealth and promised to cut ties with Russia and China. Trump and Rubio said no. That suggests the gunboat diplomacy could end with Maduro removed and Venezuela aligned with the US, not Putin or China. American action in Latin America hasn’t always ended well; the Bay of Pigs is cited as a historical reference. It’s the US backyard, and Trump is reestablishing the Monroe Doctrine, referred to here as the Dunro Doctrine. Hopefully, a Venezuelan general does the right thing and collects the 50-million-dollar bounty. No one wants a messy conflict in South America. Maduro controls drug traffickers who are well-armed, and Biden allowed hundreds of thousands of Venezuelans into the United States, who could be activated. If Trump can pull this off and push China and Russia out of Venezuela after what he did with the Iranians, it will give him significant power to deter Russia and Ukraine and China and Taiwan.

The transcript reports that the United States used directed energy weapons on Venezuelan soldiers during the kidnapping raid to capture Nicolas Maduro. Redacted independently confirmed this news from multiple sources, and it is claimed that this technology isn’t new and has been used on multiple previous occasions that have gone unreported. Regarding the events of last week, the broadcaster emphasizes the central question of what the United States deployed in Caracas on 01/03/2026, and how it operated. The operation is described as “operation absolute resolve,” part of a larger Caribbean campaign. It is stated that roughly 150 aircraft were used in strikes around Caracas before Delta Force and CIA operatives captured Maduro and Celia Flores and flew them out. Reuters is cited as framing the action as a strategic message, particularly to China and Russia, which allegedly supplied air defenses that were quickly disabled in the opening moments offline. A circulating transcript from a Venezuelan security guard loyal to Maduro is highlighted as particularly noteworthy. The transcript is described as aligning with what modern electronic warfare and directed energy weapons can do, and it is noted that White House press spokesman Carolyn Leavitt retweeted the transcript, which contributed to wider coverage and credibility. The account suggests that this admission spooked many people. The report also emphasizes that the technology used is decades old, contrasting it with the current, described as mind-blowing, capabilities of today’s directed energy weapons. Overall, the summary asserts that the incident involved directed energy weapons used during a high-profile operation to seize Maduro, with multiple confirmations and surrounding coverage pointing to a broader history of such technology being deployed, albeit previously unreported.

The transcript centers on claims that the United States used directed energy weapons during the kidnapping raid in Caracas to capture Nicolás Maduro on January 3, 2026, with Redacted independently confirming the news from multiple sources. The host asserts that this technology is not new and that the U.S. has used it on previous, unreported occasions. The operation, termed “Absolute Resolve” and part of a broader Caribbean campaign, allegedly involved roughly 150 aircraft conducting strikes around Caracas before Delta Force and CIA operatives seized Maduro and Celia Flores and flew them out. Reuters is cited as framing the raid as a strategic message to China and Russia, noting that air defenses supplied by those countries were reportedly disabled in the opening moments. A circulating Venezuelan security guard’s transcript, which is also retweeted by White House press spokesperson Carolyn Leavitt, is highlighted as aligning with what modern electronic warfare and directed energy weapons can do. The guard describes a scenario where all radar systems shut down without explanation, followed by a large drone presence over positions. He recounts a moment when something was launched that produced “a very intense sound wave,” after which his unit experienced severe physiological effects: people bleeding from the nose, vomiting blood, and an inability to move or stand. He describes eyes going blind first and bodies collapsing, with the head feeling like it would explode. The host clarifies what is meant by directed energy, distinguishing electronic warfare (attacking the spectrum, jamming, spoofing, overload, or cutting networks) from kinetic actions. The Economic Times is cited as describing something called the “Wraith” as an electronic warfare umbrella used in the Maduro capture to create a digital blackout that paralyzed security infrastructure. There is some confusion around the name because CX2 markets a product called Wraith as an autonomous airborne EW platform that locates high-value emitters such as jammers and radars, with a promotional video illustrating its jamming capabilities. A third component discussed is sonic or acoustic weapons. The listener is shown a concept of active denial technology described by the Pentagon as a focused beam of radio frequency millimeter waves that penetrate only about one sixty-fourth of an inch into the skin, causing an intolerable heating sensation that compels movement; stepping out of the beam ends the sensation. The host references a Fox News segment in which Peter Ducey tested the system, illustrating crowd-control and perimetry uses. The conversation then elaborates that directed energy weapons are a real arms category used by major powers for years, with China and Russia possessing their own systems. The host mentions that initial testing of these weapons reportedly occurred in Afghanistan, with subsequent use in Syria during the Obama era, and asserts that the U.S. has employed such weapons for years, including during the Maduro operation. The discussion includes warnings against overestimating unilateral U.S. dominance in this arena, noting that both China and Russia have developed and deployed directed energy capabilities and that the technologies are broader and older than some public narratives suggest. The segment also touches on ongoing geopolitical dynamics involving Iran and global security concerns related to these weapons.

A security guard who protected Maduro has spoken, and the report is being translated from Spanish. The speaker describes the impact of American military capabilities observed in Venezuela, noting that the Americans had technology superior to anything they've seen before. According to the guard, everything used for radar and related systems was taken offline. He claims the Americans had drones that were "taking out bases and taking out things faster," and that their opponents had no technology to compete with drones. The guard states that only eight helicopters and twenty men were sent in, yet those twenty killed hundreds of the enemy and left none of their own soldiers injured. He says it felt like the enemy was firing 300 rounds a minute, describing it as unmatched by anything they've seen. He also mentions a sonic shock boom used by the Americans, which caused everyone to bleed profusely from the nose. People reportedly could not gather themselves after the attack, and they vomited blood from their mouths and noses, becoming incapacitated immediately. The guard emphasizes that he never wants to fear or fight the Americans again. He is sending warnings to others, asserting that if you think you can fight the Americans, you do not understand their weaponry or capabilities. He asserts that twenty men defeated hundreds, and suggests this claim is spreading across Latin America. The broader political context referenced includes Trump’s statements that Mexico would be on a list of targets, which the speaker frames as changing the overall climate in Latin America. The narrative connects firsthand accounts from people who were there to the perception that the region’s geopolitical dynamics have shifted due to the Venezuela incident, including the implication that the United States possesses overwhelming military technology and capabilities.

The discussion covers Iran, its regional threats, and potential US actions, along with broader geopolitical implications. - Iranian capabilities and external support: The on-hand capabilities are said to be far more lethal and the Iranian position stronger, with enormous recent investment by Iran, notably with Chinese and Russian involvement over the last six months. Russia is aiding integrated air defenses and China has reportedly provided missiles; the exact mix and ranges are not fully disclosed. The panelists expect Iranian air and missile defenses to work much better with Russian and Chinese assistance this time. - Protests in Iran and US strike calculations: The protests were described as legitimate initially, driven by economic distress, with two groups present: reform-minded and more conservative elements. The Mossad, with CIA and MI6, allegedly joined to provoke brutality by the regime, aiming to push it toward a brutal crackdown and to exploit the protests as a regime-change opportunity. It was claimed that 40,000 starlight terminals were smuggled in to orchestrate protests but were discovered and eliminated, marking the operation as a failure. Consequently, strikes were deemed impractical unless more firepower and longer duration were available, leading to a predicted extended air campaign rather than a quick strike. - Maduro kidnapping and Venezuela: The operation involved paying off those in the way and exploiting air defenses; one air-defense battery fired, hitting a helicopter but not bringing it down. The new president in Venezuela reportedly refuses to take instructions from Washington, raising questions about regime-change outcomes. There is speculation about continued income from oil captured and sold illegally, and about who will protect Venezuelan oil interests as drilling resumes, including potential mercenaries and maverick oil groups. The oil leadership reportedly lacks interest in going down there unless it is highly profitable. - Secret weapon discussions: The “discombobulator” and other secret weapons mentioned by Trump are described as exaggerated; the speaker notes there are weapons kept secret for dire circumstances but declines to elaborate beyond public knowledge, given high-level clearance. - Iran-focused air campaign planning: The US would rely on a prolonged air campaign, potentially comparable to the Kosovo campaign in 1999, avoiding nuclear weapons and using extensive air power with support from bases in Europe and the region. The Navy would be complemented by the Air Force with a long campaign, while the Navy would need replenishment and time to rearm. - Missile and weapon capabilities: Iran’s capabilities have evolved, aided by Chinese missiles (allegedly hundreds) and Russian support. The range of missiles questions whether they can reach Diego Garcia, with concerns about more capable missiles hitting US bases in the region. Russia’s supply of Reshnik missiles (hypersonic, multiple warheads) is viewed as unlikely; the focus is on Iranian missiles that can threaten ships and bases in the Middle East. - US force posture and diplomacy: The force buildup (aircraft, submarines, drones, THAAD, Patriot) signals a “play for time” strategy while pursuing negotiations, including enriched uranium discussions. There is debate about what agreement might be possible on enriched uranium and JCPOA-related issues; Iran reportedly rejects several Netanyahu/Trump demand points, including missile constraints as a non-starter. - Russia, China, and Turkey as wild cards: Russia would likely intervene militarily only if Iran’s regime faces collapse; China would likely use economic means and some political leverage. Turkey is seen as a wild card; it could join a regional confrontation and potentially align against Israel or the US, with NATO’s response viewed as uncertain and largely lacking a unified, decisive stance. - Nuclear arms and START: The May suspension of START is mentioned; Russia claims willingness to extend, while the US has not responded, raising concerns about unconstrained Russian nuclear activity if treaties lapse. - Ukraine and Taiwan implications: European nerves and NATO dynamics are evolving; the Europeans are portrayed as vacillating between opposing and challenging Trump-era policies, with NATO potentially facing existential questions. A strike on Iran could shift focus away from Ukraine and Taiwan, empowering adversaries, or strengthen deterrence depending on actions and diplomacy. The speaker suggests that, pragmatically, Taiwan poses a far more difficult strategic challenge and that escalation there would be highly unrewarding, potentially increasing China’s incentives to avoid direct conflict.

Venezuela is turned into a narco terrorist state that continues to work with the FARC, continues to work with ELN from Colombia to send record amounts of cocaine from Venezuela, from Colombia into the Mexican cartels that continue to come into The United States at record amounts. "We have seized more cocaine this year than past years." "The amount of methamphetamine coming into this country continues to be on the uptick, and we still see record amounts of fentanyl coming into our country." "But the Venezuelan corruption, the Venezuelan dictatorship, he is a narco terrorist." "They continue to send this poison to The United States killing hundreds of thousands of Americans, not to mention the TDA members that they send to our country to destroy the beautiful streets of The United States."

- "massive amounts of drugs coming into our country to kill a lot of people, and, everybody fully understands that." - "We have tapes of them speaking." - "they were hit." - "they won't be doing it again." - "Venezuela has been a very bad actor." - "They've been sending millions of people into our country." - "They emptied out you don't know this, but they emptied out their prisons in Venezuela, and they emptied them out into The United States Of America." - "We're getting them out we're getting them out rapidly, but it's caused a tremendous problem." - "And Pete and all of the people that are working very hard to rectify the stupidity of the Biden administration, allowing these people to pour into our country with open borders." - "We are paying a big price as a country for the incompetence of the Biden administration."

The Venezuelan government has dispatched Trende Aragua, this gang, to come into The United States and commit mayhem. And one of the things that was leaked from someone in the intel community was that didn't happen. There is no official link between the Venezuelan government and Trendy Aragua. Therefore, it's not an incursion. It's not an invasion. The FBI very clearly is the intelligence element that is responsible for domestic security. The Maduro, Venezuelan government is supporting Trendy Aragua and their criminal activities here enabled by president Biden's four years of open borders where they very freely came in and out of our country and were able to to begin to control territory here in The United States.

Speaker 0 announced that the FBI has arrested one of the key participants behind the Benghazi attack. Zubar Albakash landed at Andrews Air Air Force Base at 3AM this morning. He is in our custody. He was greeted by director Patel and US attorney Jeanine Pirro. Hillary Clinton famously once said about Benghazi, what difference at this point does it make? Well, it makes a difference to Donald Trump. It makes a difference to those families. And fourteen years later, it makes a difference to law enforcement who made the difference in this case. Thank you, president Trump, for supporting all of our agencies around the country and around the world. Abakush will now face American justice on American soil. We will prosecute this alleged terrorist to the fullest extent of the law. He'll face charges related to murder, terrorism, arson, among others. Let this case serve as a reminder. If you commit a crime against the American people anywhere in this world, president Trump's justice department will find you.

We know you have a crime and terrorism problem and we are eager to help. We turned the murder capital of the world into the safest country in the Western Hemisphere. We liberated millions. To liberate 350,000,000 people, you have to imprison some. You cannot just free the criminals and think crime's gonna go down magically. You have to imprison them so you can liberate 350,000,000 Americans that are asking for the end of crime and the end of terrorism. It's clear that with the numbers at the border, even in Democrat run cities, they get help from the work you're doing. I'm really happy to be here, honored, and eager to help.

Speaker 0: Have you considered talking to the president of Colombia who you called a drop leader? Speaker 1: No. I haven't really thought too much about him. He's been fairly hostile to The United States, and I haven't given him a lot of thought. He's he's gonna have himself some big problems if he doesn't wise up. Speaker 2: Did you say Colombia is producing a lot of drugs. Have cocaine factories that they make cocaine, as you know, and they sell it right into The United States. So he better wise up or he'll be next. He'll be next too. I hope he's listening. Speaker 0: So was this operation a message that you're sending to Mexico, to Claudia Scheinbaum, president there? Speaker 2: Well, it wasn't meant to be. We're very friendly with her. She's a good woman, but the cartels are running Mexico. She's not running Mexico. The cartels are running Mexico. We could be politically correct and be nice and say, oh, yes. Is no. No. She's very, you know, she's very frightened of the cartels that are running Mexico. And I've asked her numerous times, would you like us to take out the cartels? No. No. No, mister president. No. No, no, please. So we have to do something because we lost the real number is 300,000 people, in my opinion. You know, they like to say a 100,000. A 100,000 is a lot of people, but the real number is 300,000 people. And we lost it to drugs, and they come in through the southern border, mostly the southern border. A lot plenty come in through Canada too, by the way, in case you don't know. But but they come in through the southern border, and something's gonna have to be done with Mexico. Cuban government, the Trump administration's next target, mister secretary, very quickly. Speaker 3: Well, the Cuban government is a is a huge problem. Yeah. The the the the Cuban government is a huge problem for Speaker 2: some So is that a yes? Speaker 3: Cuba. But I don't think people fully appreciate. I think they're in a lot of trouble. Yes. I'm not gonna talk talk to you about what our future steps are gonna be and our policies are gonna be right now in this regard, but I don't think it's any mystery that we are not big fans of the Cuban regime, who, by the way, are the ones that were propping up Maduro. His entire, like, internal security force, his internal security opera apparatus is entirely controlled by Cubans. One of the untold stories here is how, in essence, you talk about colonization because I think you said Dulce Rodriguez mentioned that, the ones who have sort of colonized, at least inside the regime, are Cubans. It was Cubans that guarded Maduro. He was not guarded by Venezuelan bodyguards. He had Cuban bodyguards. In terms of their internal intelligence, who spies on who inside to make sure there are no traitors, those are all Cubans. Speaker 0: He felt very strongly. We we needed for nationals. We need Greenland for national security, not for minerals. We had some we have so many sites for minerals and oil and everything. We have more oil than any other country in the world. We need Greenland for national security.

President Trump is commended for acting decisively. The military strike was meticulously and precisely carried out. Servicemen and women traveled far, deposited 14 bunker buster bombs, destroyed targets, and returned home safely without any casualties. The mission was flawless.

The discussion centers on the Venezuelan operation that resulted in the capture of Maduro and the broader implications for global power dynamics. Larry asserts that many aspects of Maduro’s kidnapping were “odd,” noting that Caracas possessed significant air defense systems, most of which were not activated, and that one security service leader was a full cooperator with the United States, facilitating U.S. entry and avoiding return fire. He describes the operation as not replacing the Maduro government but “hold off Maduro, get US control of the oil, and get China and Russia and Iran out.” The plan, he states, was not regime change; the regime remained in power, but Maduro was removed temporarily to pursue strategic objectives. In recounting the operation, Larry explains that Delta Force operators from Task Force 160 carried out the mission in full moonlight, which he says reduced the usual advantage of nighttime execution. He compares the Caracas action to a pre-planned, staged exercise at Otis Air Force Base decades earlier, suggesting the Caracas operation was similarly staged, with the United States not facing ground fire. He notes conflicting casualty reports—“32 Cubans were killed” versus “80 Venezuelans”—and emphasizes the cooperation with Venezuelan forces, with no replacement of the government. A key point concerns a potential stand-down order. Larry indicates that the anti-air defenses bought from Russia—S-300s and Buk missiles—were not disabled; rather, they were not activated due to a stand-down order. He proposes that an insider within Maduro’s security apparatus cooperated with the U.S., and he names the possibility of a particular senior commander but declines to identify him publicly. He also discusses a theory that interim president Delcy Rodríguez might have been involved in providing intelligence or cooperation, but he regards such claims as a diversion from the real participants. The discussion then turns to the political and strategic objectives behind capturing Maduro. Mario asks about why capture was pursued if regime change was not intended, and Larry responds that the plan was to “get US control of the oil” and to push out rivals like China, Russia, and Iran from influence in Venezuela. They discuss potential future actions if Rodríguez or other internal leaders do not cooperate, including the possibility of escalating through force or covert operations that could provoke U.S. casualties and thus justify greater U.S. troop involvement. They compare this to the Iraq 2003 invasion planning, noting a lack of long-term stabilization plans. The Monroe Doctrine is invoked and contrasted with a Dunno/“Dunrold” framing. Larry argues that the Monroe Doctrine was misinterpreted as a unilateral U.S. claim to the Western Hemisphere, calling current U.S. actions a blend of Polk and Teddy Roosevelt’s doctrine rather than a strict, modern application of Monroe. He asserts that Russia and China are building a new international order with India and Brazil, and that Trump’s rhetoric may accelerate multipolar alignment, particularly with BRICS members like Brazil. They discuss how U.S. actions could push countries toward cooperating with China and Russia, potentially eroding U.S. hegemony. Turning to Iran, the analysts discuss protests and foreign involvement. They contend that Iranian protests are largely manufactured or supported by Western intelligence, including Mossad and the CIA, highlighting sources like the NCIR/Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK) as part of Western intelligence influence. They note that Iran has strengthened ties with Russia and China since September, reducing sanctions pressure and improving economic options. They contend that Iran’s leadership—Pozheskin’s regime—has shown signs of adapting to internal pressures, including firing an economic minister, while maintaining a posture of resilience against Western demands. They discuss the twelve-day war with Israel, arguing Iran recovered quickly and maintained a strong stance, with deep hypersonic capabilities and robust air defense. The speakers conclude by debating whether the U.S. could replicate Maduro’s capture in Iran or whether a regime change attempt there is feasible. They contend there are no existing U.S. networks in Iran comparable to those in Venezuela, making a similar operation unlikely. They reflect on U.S. leverage, the role of foreign backing for Iran, and the potential for Iran to leverage its growing ties with Russia and China to resist Western pressure. The conversation ends with mutual appreciation and a New Year closing note.