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Glenn: Welcome back. We’re joined by professor Syed Mohammed Marandi, from Tehran University and former adviser to Iran’s nuclear negotiation team. Thank you for coming back. Marandi: Hi, Glenn. Thank you. It shows how much I like your show because I went through a lot of trouble to get online. Glenn: I appreciate it. Regarding the riots in Iran, Tehran included, it seems every time there’s a buildup to regime change or invasion, the script follows a pattern: first destabilize with sanctions and an information war, then build on public grievances and instigate violent protests. You announce the intention to help locals in their aspirations for freedom, with rhetoric reduced to a binary: either you don’t care about the protesters or you support sanctions or intervention. After a coup or invasion, the US and its allies have a zero-sum geopolitical interest and power interest, not altruism. The result, from the Arab Spring onward, is that the country to be liberated is destroyed. Iranian protests are an internal issue, but once international, geopolitics intrudes. How do you assess the situation on the ground in Tehran, domestic grievances, and the geopolitical component? Marandi: Western media and think tanks periodically declare Iran on the verge of collapse, but the state has popular support and a strong constitutional adherence. Currency suddenly fell—perhaps 30–50% in a brief period—and was managed from abroad, with pressure from the US and Western allies on currency-exchange places. Peaceful protests in Tehran and other cities followed mainly by business people whose shops were threatened by rising prices; if the currency isn’t stabilized, they’d go out of business. Protests continued into day two, with larger crowds in some cities. Then infiltration occurred: small, well-disciplined groups began to riot. Over the past days, over 100 officers were murdered, some beheaded or burned alive, some police faces smashed. A nurse in a clinic was burned alive in the top floor; ambulances and fire engines were burned; a Red Crescent worker was killed. Western media claims “protesters” and ignores footage. Across the country today, demonstrations in support of the Islamic Republic and the constitution were large—city by city like Isfahan, Tabriz, Ahvaz, Mashhad, Tehran. The crowd in Tehran was among the largest ever. Despite rioters, millions showed up in demonstrations across the country. The Iranian state’s media is outspent by a global Persian-language media empire in the West, with billions spent on online campaigns, bot armies, and networks. Yet millions demonstrated in support of the state. People can see the footage themselves. The internet was shut down to coordinate rioters across groups including ISIS-related elements, monarchists, and Kurdish groups. The rioters’ coordination collapsed when the internet went down. The regime’s supporters remain, and demonstrations in Tehran and across Iran show broad, diverse perspectives, all affirming support for the constitution and the state. Glenn: I’ve seen pro-government marches here as well; they’re huge, though not always covered in Europe. Marandi: There’s a narrative control to label the government illegitimate to topple it. The rhetoric claims Iranians are freedom-loving, yet those who claim to support them have bombs and blood. Pompeo’s tweet suggesting Mossad agents among protesters, and Mossad’s Persian-language statements, indicate foreign interference. The internet blackout aimed to prevent coordination among rioters; footage shows violent acts—two men burned in a mosque, a nurse burned in a clinic, ambulances and public buses destroyed. The “millions on the streets” claim is contradicted by the actuality of coordination via foreign paymasters. Glenn: Trump claimed Iran had fallen and would negotiate; is this about a new nuclear deal, stalled or about missiles and Iran’s regional support? What are Washington’s aims? Marandi: No one contacted him; his claim about the second-largest city falling is baseless. His ignorance shows inchoate knowledge of ground realities. Trump’s past statements about surrendering Iran suggest aims aligned with the Israeli regime’s goals: a broken West Asia and North Africa, fragmentation of states, and meddling across the region. Erdogan’s miscalculation—allying with Israel and Qatar—empowered Israeli policy at the expense of Turkey, Syria, Egypt, and Iran. The “woman, life, freedom” protests were initially fueled by Western narratives; BBC Persian and other outlets spread misinformation about Massa Amini, which was later corrected, but the cycle repeats. The West uses propaganda to push riots; Iran’s endurance of sanctions and propaganda demonstrates broad legitimacy for the Islamic Republic even amid external pressure. The demonstrations today show support for the state, the constitution, and Iran’s policies while denouncing the US, the Israeli regime, and their supporters. AOC’s stance and Trump’s stance reflect a uniparty tendency toward empire preservation. Glenn: Regarding potential war, Lindsey Graham floated strikes; how likely is war? Marandi: The currency manipulation aimed to justify instability for war. The CIA, Mossad, and others would seek to justify strikes, but Iran is prepared for war. If the US attacks, Iran may strike back; the population that stood with the state could unite in the face of aggression. Iran’s capabilities include underground drone and missile bases, short- to medium-range missiles, more easily moved than long-range missiles. Iran could devastate US installations if attacked. If war occurs, Iran could retaliate in the Persian Gulf and beyond, potentially impacting global economies. If the US begins, Iran could respond decisively, targeting American interests abroad and in the region. The Zionists allegedly favor war for their regional aims, regardless of Western consequences. Glenn: Professor Malandy, thank you for traveling and for the discussion. Marandi: Always a pleasure, Glenn.

As European economies decline, young people can't afford homes, and energy costs are much higher, leading to a declining standard of living and low birth rates, which is a sign of civilizational collapse. There's a lot of rage in Europe, and the Russia-Ukraine war serves as a relief valve for European leaders to blame Putin. The UK's response to fighting a new war against Russia is sad because Russia could easily defeat the UK. Turning the population's rage towards Russia distracts from domestic issues. Intelligence sources believe Ukrainians were behind the Nord Stream pipeline attack.

In this conversation, Brian Berletic discusses the current collision between the United States’ global strategy and a rising multipolar world, arguing that U.S. policy is driven by corporate-financier interests and a desire to preserve unipolar primacy, regardless of the costs to others. - Structural dynamics and multipolar resistance - The host notes a shift from optimism about Trump’s “America First” rhetoric toward an assessment that U.S. strategy aims to restore hegemony and broad, repeated wars, even as a multipolar world emerges. - Berletic agrees that the crisis is structural: the U.S. system is driven by large corporate-financier interests prioritizing expansion of profit and power. He cites Brookings Institution’s 2009 policy papers, particularly The Path to Persia, as documenting a long-running plan to manage Iran via a sequence of options designed to be used in synergy to topple Iran, with Syria serving as a staging ground for broader conflict. - He argues the policy framework has guided decisions across administrations, turning policy papers into bills and war plans, with corporate media selling these as American interests. This, he says, leaves little room for genuine opposition because political power is financed by corporate interests. - Iran, Syria, and the Middle East as a springboard to a global confrontation - Berletic traces the current Iran crisis to the 2009 Brookings paper’s emphasis on air corridors and using Israel to provoke a war, placing blame on Israel as a proxy mechanism while the U.S. cleanses the region of access points for striking Iran directly. - He asserts the Arab Spring (2011) was designed to encircle Iran and move toward Moscow and Beijing, with Iran as the final target. The U.S. and its allies allegedly used policy papers to push tactical steps—weakening Russia via Ukraine, exploiting Syria, and leveraging Iran as a fulcrum for broader restraint against Eurasian powers. - The aim, he argues, is to prevent a rising China by destabilizing Iran and, simultaneously, strangling energy exports that feed China’s growth. He claims the United States has imposed a global maritime oil blockade on China through coordinated strikes and pressure on oil-rich states, while China pursues energy independence via Belt and Road, coal-to-liquids, and growing imports from Russia. - The role of diplomacy, escalation, and Netanyahu’s proxy - On diplomacy, Berletic says the U.S. has no genuine interest in peace; diplomacy is used to pretext war, creating appearances of reasonable engagement while advancing the continuity of a warlike agenda. He references the Witch Path to Persia as describing diplomacy as a pretext for regime change. - He emphasizes that Russia and China are not credibly negotiating with the U.S., viewing Western diplomacy as theater designed to degrade multipolar powers. Iran, he adds, may be buying time but also reacting to U.S. pressure, while Arab states and Israel are portrayed as proxies with limited autonomy. - The discussion also covers how Israel serves as a disposable proxy to advance U.S. goals, including potential use of nuclear weapons, with Trump allegedly signaling a post-facto defense of Israel in any such scenario. - The Iran conflict, its dynamics, and potential trajectory - The war in Iran is described as a phased aggression, beginning with the consulate attack and escalating into economic and missile-strike campaigns. Berletic notes Iran’s resilient command-and-control and ongoing missile launches, suggesting the U.S. and its allies are attempting to bankrupt Iran while degrading its military capabilities. - He highlights the strain on U.S. munitions inventories, particularly anti-missile interceptors and long-range weapons, due to simultaneous operations in Ukraine, the Middle East, and potential confrontations with China. He warns that the war’s logistics are being stretched to the breaking point, risking a broader blowback. - The discussion points to potential escalation vectors: shutting Hormuz, targeting civilian infrastructure, and possibly using proxies (including within the Gulf states and Yemen) to choke off energy flows. Berletic cautions that the U.S. could resort to more drastic steps, including leveraging Israel for off-world actions, while maintaining that multipolar actors (Russia, China, Iran) would resist. - Capabilities, resources, and the potential duration - The host notes China’s energy-mobility strategies and the Western dependency on rare earth minerals (e.g., gallium) mostly produced in China, emphasizing how U.S. war aims rely on leveraging allies and global supply chains that are not easily sustained. - Berletic argues the U.S. does not plan for permanent victory but for control, and that multipolar powers are growing faster than the United States can destroy them. He suggests an inflection point will come when multipolarism outruns U.S. capacity, though the outcome remains precarious due to nuclear risk and global economic shocks. - Outlook and final reflections - The interlocutors reiterate that the war is part of a broader structural battle between unipolar U.S. dominance and a rising multipolar order anchored by Eurasian powers. They stress the need to awaken broader publics to the reality of multipolarism and to pursue a more balanced world order, warning that the current trajectory risks global economic harm and dangerous escalation.

Speaker 0 describes Zelensky as an American hero and contrasts his public image with the underlying narrative. He explains Zelensky was totally apolitical, an outsider with no government experience, a comedian, and the star of a planned TV show called Servant of the People. In the show, the main character creates a YouTube video that calls out oligarchs and corruption, becomes popular, and is drafted as a protest candidate who eventually becomes president. In real life, the TV show is supported by oligarch Kolomoisky, who owned the channel and did a large, nonstop promotional push to make it the number one show, including primetime slots, ads, and crossovers with the news. In 2018, a year before the show ended, Zelensky formed a political party named Servant of the People, the same title as the show, and secretly produced another season of the show. In April 2019, he announced his candidacy on Instagram, with no campaign, no rallies, no real platform, and he skipped presidential debates; his few early press conferences were poor. Kolomoisky’s channel provided Zelensky with endless airtime and favorable polls while attacking his enemies. Speaker 0 continues that US intelligence agencies, CIA and NSA, helped by funding democracy campaigns in Ukraine—reportedly around $5 billion—funneled through NGOs, with USAID embedding advisers in Zelensky’s organization to assist the campaign. On election day, Zelensky wins with 73% of the vote. Afterward, the war with Russia occurs, he declares martial law, and elections are ended. An election in 2024 is anticipated as the result of democracy money. He asserts Zelensky is an actor in a carefully designed television show—“a construct,” akin to Epstein—an created entity that works, and asks what Americans think about his popularity. Speaker 1 responds that Americans are disappointed by the ongoing war and deaths, noting that the war’s human cost is a major failure of promises from the Trump administration, who claimed he would resolve it in 24 hours. He adds that conscripting 60-year-old men and Americans and others going to fight are part of the situation. He states that the Ukraine narrative, and wars in general, are not organic: wars like this are driven by demands for primacy, control, and wealth, rather than being spontaneous. He reflects that Putin didn’t suddenly decide to invade; similarly, the broader pattern of power is not organic. He notes the Russian soldiers were told they would be welcomed and that they had dress uniforms, and compares to expectations in Iraq, where it was promised that Iraqis would welcome forces. He asks what the Ukraine situation is really about, and comments that human war reduces to a few centers of power like NATO, China, the Soviet bloc, and oil-producing countries, ultimately converging to two leaders in a room who must kill each other, as part of the decay of empire, with the U.S. maintaining about 760 overseas military bases.

Glenn: Welcome back. Stanislav Krappivnik, a former US military officer, born in Dolbaz and recently returned, joins us again. Stanislav: Always a pleasure, Glenn. Glenn: In the last two days, Russians entered the strategic city of Orekhov in the Saporiyansko region, which may indicate that if this falls, the whole region might begin to collapse. In Slaviansk, the last Donetsk conglomeration, there are real advances that, if successful in circling the region, could mean the entirety of Donbas falls. Is the Russian spring offensive already begun? Stanislav: It’s hard to say, partly because mud season is ongoing in those areas. The South is still mud-prone; the terrain there is different from Haryakov and Sudirmy, where ground is firmer, forested. In the South, there’s black earth with fewer trees, causing severe mud this time of year. If the melt is fast, flooding can occur; if slow, the ground acts like a sponge and mud persists as water seeps down. Nightly freezes persist while daytime temperatures rise above zero. Weather affects movement and logistics. He notes that the briefings from the Russian command vary from independent mappers, suggesting either undisclosed advances or battlefield confusion. The Russian high command’s reports and geolocations may not always align with independent assessments. If credible, Russia’s forces from the South may have entered Ariakhov, with two parallel rows advancing toward Ariyakara and a long urban sprawl to the south. There is a gray zone because Ukrainian claims differ from Russian assertions. Ukrainians often withhold confirmations for long periods; e.g., Gudaiipoya/Gulyaporiya discrepancies show how contested reports can be. Stanislav says it’s not clear that this is a bold, continuous offensive up and down the lines. A big push would require enough armored vehicles, artillery, and aviation, which he has not seen yet, though it could be developing. Ukrainians have conducted desperate counteractions not just to retake territory but to disrupt Russian preparation for a potential spring offensive. If he were in command, he would launch a big spring offensive, at least partially toward Sumy, which is about 14 kilometers from Kharkiv. Sumy would be a key logistics hub and could cut off Kharkiv from the west, accelerating the fall of the region. He explains that Kharkiv could be surrounded by blowing bridges from the south and encircling through Sumy to the west and the east along the Russian line toward Bianka and the Big Water Reserve. He mentions continuing Russian movement in the north and the city of Kasatirivka, which has been split by a river; all bridges were blown about a month ago, complicating approaches. North of Slaviansk, the gates of Krasnyomar require closing first. There are contested claims about Yaman, with Russians saying around 50% controlled vs. Ukrainians claiming 10–15%. The central concern is the Russian push in the south, where Yemen sits in a triangle formed by the Oka and the Sri Bianca rivers, and Russian forces are closing in from the north as well. Crossing Yamana is expected to fall; it’s a matter of time, though how long remains uncertain. Glenn: Ukraine does not withdraw after encirclement. There’s a rational explanation tied to PR wars: if the US and Europeans lose interest in Ukraine, weapons and money dry up, and Zelensky appears addicted to PR victories to keep support. Do you think the war in the headlines affects Western support? How does the Iran conflict influence Ukraine, given weapon and money dynamics? Stanislav: There’s additional pressure on Western governments from the military and certain military societies not to rush into direct NATO engagement or a large-scale conflict with Iran. He notes Iran’s demonstrated ability to strike American bases and key targets, and that Iran’s actions have shown the US and its allies that American power isn’t unlimited. He argues Iran’s strikes and the broader Middle East conflict complicate Western calculations, as American bases and interests face increased threats. He asserts that Iran has shown it can strike at American bases and that American casualties would be far higher than reported. He claims Iran’s actions press Western governments to reconsider involvement in the region and to reassess commitments to allies such as the Saudis, who reportedly told American bases to stand down. He also discusses how Russia’s deterrence posture could shift in response to ongoing Iran–US tensions, and suggests that if Russia sees an opportunity to restore deterrence, it might be tempted to push back more forcefully. Glenn: Russia’s approach to diplomacy with Europe and the US is complex. Macron’s bid to join a Russia–US–Ukraine format could spoil negotiations. Belgium’s stance on Russian assets and broader EU politics complicate any settlement. Stanislav: He explains distrust in European leadership, questioning whom to trust in Europe. He suggests that a broader reform in European leadership and doctrine is unlikely soon. He notes that among European politicians, there’s disagreement and strategic posturing, with some populist voices but institutional leadership often failing to present a coherent strategy. Glenn: What about China and Russia’s support for Iran? How might that evolve? Stanislav: Russia previously explored a mutual defense pact with Iran; the document lacks substance, and real support has been practical, including MiG-29s, Su-30s, and S-400s, along with jamming systems enabling Iran to counter US satellites and missiles. He describes Iran’s military buildup and how Russia’s support has extended to drone technology and air defenses. He predicts Syria could reemerge as a battleground, especially if Iran’s militancy expands and if the US and Israel are drawn into broader conflict. He suggests China may reassess its stance and consider leveraging its position as US capabilities wane, potentially viewing Taiwan’s reunification as a strategic opportunity. Glenn: Any final thoughts? Stanislav: He emphasizes the high level of risk and unpredictability in the current international security environment, with multiple actors pursuing aggressive strategies and the potential for rapid shifts in alliances and deterrence calculations. He notes Iran’s broader influence and the risks to regional stability, hinting at a world where war remains a possible, though increasingly costly, option for major powers.

The discussion frames the current global confrontation as driven less by ideology or democracy and more by an economic battle centered on financial control. The speakers argue that the British establishment is panicking not about territory or missiles, but because a Quietly released Washington document signals the end of London’s ability to siphon money from the American economy. This document, the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) 2025 annual report, is said to prioritize economic stability and household income over protecting the financial system that underpins “the casino,” and it is described as revolutionary in shifting policy away from saving “financial parasites” toward supporting the real economy. Key points include: - The premise that London fears a shift in U.S. policy that places people and economic growth first, not globalist or imperial financial interests. The two documents released within a week—the FSOC 2025 report and the administration’s national security strategy—are said to reassert that American principles will govern, not imperial ones. - Susan Kokinda argues that this shift exposes a strategic clash: London’s fear is the end of its economic model’s dominance, not a conventional military threat. - The war in Ukraine is recast as a theater where Trump’s administration is pushing a new economic and geopolitical strategy. Trump’s team is said to be telling Zelensky to negotiate on territory or risk losing security guarantees, signaling a move away from a rigid transatlantic alliance toward recognizing Russia’s interests and seeking peace. - Britain, according to the analysis, is openly pushing for continued conflict. A Sky News interview with a British general is cited as evidence that the UK is preparing its population for war rather than advocating peace. - Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service is presented as corroborating that the UK is undermining Trump’s peace efforts and pressuring the EU to seize Russian assets to fund Ukraine and derail a U.S.-led settlement. - The FSOC reform is tied to a broader reshaping of the U.S. economy, with the participation of influential figures such as Lord Peter Mandelson and Larry Summers in shaping post-2008 financial policy (Dodd-Frank) and its alleged pivot toward protecting American households rather than financial centers. - The administration’s domestic focus targets four alleged cartels that are viewed as pillars of the imperial financialized system: beef cartels, big pharma and insurance, housing, and narco trafficking. The claim is that these sectors drain resources from the public and fuel the financial system’s dominance. - Beef, pharma, housing, and drugs are presented as extraction and control mechanisms of the British system, with reforms aimed at breaking these up described as both economic and strategic blows to the empire. - The narrator contends that stopping these economic mechanisms can prevent wars sustained by financial interests, and that Trump’s policies are reviving American manufacturing, builders, and producers. Supporting details highlight instances where political figures frame policy as protecting working Americans—food security, healthcare affordability, and housing stability—while linking these goals to a broader strategy against international financial power structures. The overarching claim is that the real war behind the shooting war is economic, and the British system cannot survive a successful American pivot toward prioritizing people and real economy over financial elites. The update closes by urging readers to understand the economic war behind geopolitical conflict and to engage with Promethean Action for more analysis.

The conversation centers on a view that the United States has failed in its proxy conflicts with Russia and Iran and that power is shifting to a multipolar world led by non-Western states. Stanislav Krapivnik argues that Russia’s pivot away from the West undercuts Western unity and that Europe is increasingly exposed as the West’s policies erode, with Russia becoming a leading anti-Western force for years to come. He frames the shift as not just multipolar but anti-Western in direction, noting that Russia’s stance has turned against the West and that the West’s “genocidal” actions and moral claims have damaged its legitimacy. He also asserts that the West’s actions have helped bring to power leadership in both Russia and Iran who are less amenable to Western influence. He highlights Trump’s regime-change actions as reflecting realignments away from West-facing regimes and notes the long-running Iranian threat as a consequence of Western policy. Key points covered include: - The shift from a Western-centered world order to a multipolar order led by non-Western powers, with Russia and Iran resisting U.S. and European influence. - Russia’s movement away from Western integration toward an anti-Western bloc, and the idea that the West’s moral posture has deteriorated, with calls that Europe’s rulers have failed to uphold moral standards while supporting aggressive actions. - Iran’s history of being pro-Western but ultimately rejecting Western dominance after regime-change attempts and pro-West leadership were removed; the discussion notes that Iran has demonstrated resilience by countering Western pressure and has weakened American influence in the region by striking American targets and allied interests. - Ukraine as a proxy conflict, with NATO involvement, and the view that Western leaders are pushing Ukraine into escalating confrontations with Russia. The speaker cites evidence that NATO and U.S. forces are deeply involved, including drone and missile strikes attributed to American planning or directive, and suggests that Europe’s leadership is moving toward broader war, despite public appeals for limited engagement. - The role of Turkey and the Baltic states: Turkey’s shifting position and its anger over Ukrainian actions; the Baltic states’ treatment of Russian minorities and the geopolitical risk of escalation if Estonia’s airspace is used for drone strikes against Russia, seen as potentially triggering a larger European conflict. - The argument that Europe’s security architecture is collapsing under its own hubris and dependence on the United States, with accusations that European populations are being molded toward war, militarization, and possibly even mobilization and conscription in several states (Germany, Poland, etc.). - The claim that deterrence must be reasserted; the speaker argues for making an example of Estonia as a warning to deter further cross-border aggression and to prevent a larger war, asserting that Europe’s leaders are too eager to escalate, risking a broader confrontation with Russia. - The broader cultural and historical analysis of Europe’s relation to Russia, including Peter the Great’s attempts to connect with Western Europe and Russia’s long-standing pendulum between East and West, with the speaker asserting that today Russia views itself as separate from Europe, forming a distinct civilization and political orientation. - The potential for a larger war in the near term if European leadership does not adopt a more prudent approach; the speaker warns that Orban’s political fate could accelerate conflict, and emphasizes that Europe must acknowledge deterrence realities or face nuclear risks. - The closing remarks echo Easter greetings, with the speaker returning to the grim prognosis of European demographic and political trajectories, highlighting a view that Western policy has empowered elites while threatening mass casualties and societal upheaval in Europe.

- The discussion centers on whether European actions against Russia amount to a NATO-wide escalation and could lead to direct confrontation with Russia outside Ukraine, given recent attacks on Russian energy infrastructure and civilian ships in the Black Sea, including a Russian oil tanker in the Mediterranean with reports of drones launched from Greece. Putin reportedly vowed retaliation, and the guests consider how European and U.S./NATO support for Ukraine factors into this dynamic. - Daniel Davis argues that a segment of the Western alliance wants a conflict with Russia, framing it as peace on their terms from a position of weakness. He says there is little consideration for Russia’s security requirements or a mutually acceptable peace, and that ignoring Russia’s security concerns has driven the current cycle of escalation. He notes that Western actions since 2021–2022 have ignored the Russian side and pursued war aims on Western terms, contributing to a deteriorating situation and increasing casualties on the Ukrainian side. - Davis contends that Russia has been reticent to respond to many provocations with significant actions outside Ukraine, implying that Moscow has avoided a full-scale escalation that could threaten NATO. He predicts that Putin will respond to Western strikes on Russian targets, possibly increasing pressure on Odessa and other civilian infrastructure in Ukraine, with a tit-for-tat pattern as Russia leverages its greater capacity to hit Western shipping and infrastructure. - He asserts that since 2023, the West’s approach has not reversed the battlefield dynamics; sanctions, intelligence inputs, and heavy weapon transfers have not pushed Russia out of Ukraine and have allowed NATO and European stockpiles to deplete while Russia continues to build up in key categories (missiles, air defense, logistics). He claims Europe’s commitment of large sums to Ukraine will further strain their economies and shorten their stockpiles, potentially weakening Western readiness for a wider conflict. - The guest stresses that Russia’s strategy appears to be “go slow” in Ukraine to maintain pressure without triggering a broader European or NATO intervention, while building up stockpiles to prepare for a possible expansion of war if needed. He notes that Russia has generated a stockpile advantage in missiles (including Oreshniks) and air defense that could be decisive in a broader conventional war. - The discussion covers Oreshnik missiles, with Davis explaining Russia’s aim to maximize production and use if needed, not merely deter. He argues that Western air defenses would be ineffective against such systems and that Russia’s broader stockpiling and production could outpace Western depletion. He suggests Russia’s buildup is intended to enable a decisive move if NATO or Western forces escalate, and that the West’s capacity to sustain prolonged high-tempo combat is limited. - Both speakers discuss Odessa as a likely target if Russia deems it necessary to retaliate against Western support for Ukraine, noting that recent strikes on bridges, trains, and energy facilities in the region indicate growing Russian intent to disrupt Ukraine’s rear and logistics in the event of a front-line escalation. They consider whether Russia could seize Odessa if Western concessions are not forthcoming, and whether European leaders would respond decisively if Russia moves against Ukrainian ports. - The hosts warn that Western rhetoric about a “just and lasting peace” may be misaligned with Russia’s goals and that the risk of a broader conflict—potentially involving nuclear considerations—exists if provocations continue. They caution that if the conflict widens, all sides—Russia, Ukraine, Europe, and the United States—could suffer heavy losses, and express concern about the potential for miscalculation as new weapons systems and security arrangements come into play before the year ends.

In a wide-ranging interview, Professor Sergei Karaganov, a prominent Russian foreign policy scholar, provides his perspective on the current security crisis, Russia’s strategic posture, and possible futures for Europe and the world. On the trajectory of the conflict and world order - Karaganov argues that the conflict signifies a broader systemic shift, describing it as a “fourth world war” that began in Ukraine with American efforts to undermine Russia and European participation, spreading now to the Middle East and South Asia. - He frames the wider struggle as a gradual replacement of a unipolar Western order with multipolar dynamics, warning that diplomacy has been insufficient and that the European elites are leading their states toward a major war. - He emphasizes the need to prevent horizontal escalation and to stop the war in Europe, extending concerns to destabilization across a vast swath of the globe. On NATO, Ukraine, and escalation - He notes unprecedented Western support for actions on Russian soil, including missile attacks and political backing for operations on territory Russia considers vital, including aspects of its nuclear triad and early warning systems. - He criticizes Western decision-makers for misjudging the scope of the conflict, arguing that the war is not only about Ukraine but about a broader confrontation with the Old West. Russia’s strategic aims and deterrence - A central theme is the need to “win” this war to halt the bloodletting in Ukraine and to prevent further escalation and casualties on both sides. - He calls for escalating to deter and punish Western elites, arguing for a reevaluation and expansion of Russia’s nuclear doctrine to threaten European elites and bunkers with limited, targeted nuclear strikes if necessary. - He advocates shifting from a doctrine that assumes no victories in nuclear war to one in which “there will be victories” and where Russia would reserve the right to use nuclear weapons against European adversaries if deterrence fails. - He also suggests delegating some command authority for European theater to a dedicated commander who could authorize such actions, including nuclear use, if necessary. On arms control, diplomacy, and prospects for peace - Karaganov argues for moving away from arms-control constraints as part of a broader strategic realignment and emphasizes the need to deter and potentially punish adversaries with credible force. - He dismisses the “Spirit of Alaska” as a trap and warns that peace would only be possible if European elites are removed or replaced, implying that diplomacy would be possible only after such changes. - He maintains that a truce could be possible, but not a peace, unless European elites are replaced by more restrained governance and a rethink of Western strategic posture. - He asserts that Minsk was a mistake and criticizes attempts to extend deterrence to European allies, labeling such proposals as disastrous for Russia and European stability. On Europe, modernization, and Russia’s future - He contends that Europe has historically been a source of conflict and that Europe must be kept at a distance; Europe should not determine Russia’s future course. - He rejects European integration as Russia’s path, arguing that Europe remains valuable culturally but cannot dictate Russia’s strategic choices. - He positions Russia as inherently Eurasian, with external cultural roots in the Byzantine, Muslim, and Buddhist worlds, and deems Europe as a historical phase that should be left behind for Russia’s future development. On diplomacy and concrete steps - He notes that diplomacy could still have a chance, but the endgame would involve the elimination of the Kyiv regime, restoration of Russian-controlled lands in the south and east of Ukraine, and breaking the will of European elites to pursue aggression. - He reiterates a preference for avoiding a direct European invasion and expresses a desire to avoid a full-scale nuclear exchange, while insisting that Russia must be prepared to act decisively if Western adversaries continue their aggression.

Mario asked Pepe Escobar for his take on the state of affairs, focusing on Venezuela and Iran, in the wake of dramatic developments including the alleged attack on Maduro-era Venezuela and broader upheavals in Iran, Russia, and beyond. Pepe frames Venezuela as a desperate move connected to the demise of the petrodollar, with multiple overlapping headlines and actors maneuvering for advantage in a test of national security and regional influence. He says the United States has claimed Venezuela as “my backyard,” and questions whether Washington is prepared to back a fifth-column government in Venezuela or to overhaul the Venezuelan oil industry to serve American interests. He argues that reconstituting Venezuela’s energy sector to produce about 3 million barrels per day would require five years and roughly $183 billion in investment, and notes that American CEOs are not willing to spend that much without total investment guarantees. He suggests the White House lacked a coherent, forward-looking strategy for reorganizing Venezuela’s oil industry and that the ego of neoconservatism drove actions that lacked feasibility. On the leadership dynamics, Pepe notes that Delcy Rodríguez, a seasoned Chavista negotiator and daughter of a revolutionary killed by the CIA, leads a government that prioritizes Venezuela’s interests over U.S. interests. He mentions that Maduro’s security head, previously said to be linked to the operation, was demoted rather than arrested, indicating an intelligence and political calculus aimed at explaining the leadership in a way domestic audiences can accept. He emphasizes that the regime remains, with Padrino López and other core figures still in place, and that the “regime change” dream from Trump’s team did not materialize as hoped. He suggests the regime change narrative was limited to a “mini Netflix special with full of special effects.” Pepe shifts to the broader regional and global context, noting that Venezuela’s crisis intersects with Brazil’s Lula, BRICS dynamics, and US foreign policy. He asserts that Delcy Rodríguez’s negotiating skills could help Venezuela if the sanctions were lifted, and stresses the importance of popular support for her—reportedly over 90% of Venezuelans backing her. He argues that Latin American sentiment strongly rejects external interference, pointing to regional uproar over U.S. actions in Venezuela. He also discusses how Brazil’s stance within BRICS and Lula’s position affect Venezuela’s prospects for integration into BRICS, including Lula’s veto in BRICS discussions that blocked Venezuela from becoming a BRICS member. Turning to the broader geopolitics, Pepe argues that the strategic landscape is dominated by three major players: Iran, Russia, and China. He explains that, unlike the United States, Russia and China respond to actions with measured, long-term strategies and emphasize concrete acts over rhetoric. He points to NATO attacks on Russia’s nuclear triad site and the Novgorod residence as pivotal events, arguing that Russia’s response is framed by a long-term calculus rather than immediate negotiations. He notes that China seeks to move global trade toward the yuan rather than the dollar, framing this as a de facto removal of dollar dominance rather than a formal currency replacement. He emphasizes that Iran is maneuvering under severe sanctions, with protests driven largely by economic grievances but potentially hijacked by foreign actors as seen in color-revolution playbooks, and that Iran’s leadership stresses long-term resilience and partnerships with Russia and China. Pepe cautions that the Iran and Venezuela situations show a broader pattern: sanctions and mismanagement combine to create fragility, while external actors press their own strategic agendas. He warns that the instability in Iran and the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war create a dangerous, volatile environment, with the potential for a prolonged European and global conflict if escalation continues. He concludes with a bleak assessment for the near term, suggesting that the war in Ukraine could extend for years and that Europe faces mounting economic strain as it bears the costs of ongoing conflict. In sum, Pepe Escobar portrays Venezuela as a case where sanctions, strategic miscalculations, and competing powers intersect, while Iran, Russia, and China pursue longer-term, multilayered strategies that complicate Western-led attempts at regime change or coercive diplomacy.

Speaker 0 says Western European populations support what he calls a “suicidal war on Russia through Ukraine” because elites in Zelensky’s Ukraine use corruption to maintain control over their population, rather than protecting countries from Russia or the Soviet Union. He adds that the elites aim to protect societies from becoming democratic. Speaker 1 agrees and frames the pattern as one where leaders who prioritize national interest are eliminated. He cites Libya as an example, saying Muammar Gaddafi cared about Libyans and Africans, but was assassinated for defying the central banking system and relying on gold with his own oil. He then says Venezuela today follows a similar pattern, where becoming nationalist and enriching one’s people leads to being killed or overthrown. Speaker 1 describes the mechanism as “Gladio networks” and intelligence agencies deploying operations against leaders. He recounts the Congo in the early 1960s after independence from Belgium, when Patrice Lumumba was elected prime minister. He says Lumumba approached the United States with a proposal to give the uranium that had been allocated to Belgium, but to use the portion going to Belgium to enrich Congolese people. He states that President Dwight D. Eisenhower would not meet with Lumumba and that Vice President Richard Nixon would not meet with him; Lumumba instead met with the secretary of state, who told him that he could not cut out Belgium and that Congo would receive the same arrangement as before, providing essentially nothing for building schools and hospitals. Speaker 1 says Lumumba then refused the deal, and that the Soviet Union would have been interested in uranium. Speaker 1 concludes that Lumumba was murdered by Operation Gladio elements controlled by Otto Skorzeny, described as Nazi, under Reinhard Gehlen’s German intelligence, the BND. He ends by saying that any prime minister or president who “stands up for their country” is targeted by an “international syndicate” seeking to control the world’s resources.

Alex Kraner and Glenn discuss the idea that democracy in the West is largely a façade with real power exercised by an unaccountable oligarchy, a phenomenon they compare to historical patterns from Rome and other periods. - Kraner argues that while democracies are presented as rule-by-the-people, in reality Western nations exhibit a shallow democracy on the surface, with an oligarchy actually governing the system. This, he says, leads to crises, repression, censorship, declining living standards, deteriorating infrastructure, and endless wars, despite repeated mandates for prosperity and security from voters. - He cites empirical evidence and references a video analysis to support the claim that democracies deliver outcomes unlike their professed ideals. The same syndrome, he notes, has repeated itself across different eras, from ancient Rome to Lombard banking in Italy, suggesting a persistent pattern of oligarchic control under democratic veneers. - A key contrast is drawn with Russia under Vladimir Putin. Kraner asserts Putin did not exterminate oligarchs but “rounded them up and laid down the rules”: pay taxes, treat employees fairly, stay out of politics. Oligarchs were allowed to keep wealth but were constrained to a sandbox where the state runs the country and politics remain within established channels. According to him, this check on oligarchy contributed to Russia’s economic revival and resilience even amid severe sanctions. - He contends that in the West, oligarchs and elected leaders are effectively intertwined, with leaders subordinate to oligarchic interests. He points to policy directions—such as rapid social changes (LGBT agendas), perpetual warfare, financial crises, and energy policies— as examples of decisions that appear not to reflect the democratic will of the people. - The “expert class” is described as a mechanism through which elites impose policies (e.g., net zero, carbon capture) by claiming scientific consensus and complexity that ordinary citizens cannot grasp, thereby narrowing democratic control. - Tocqueville’s concept of democratic despotism is revisited: democracies can be vulnerable to oligarchies because of trust in representatives, expansion of the administrative state, and manufactured consensus. The danger is a paternalistic state that treats citizens as infants, while wealthier interests consolidate influence over institutions. - They discuss the perception problem: many people feel they cannot critique the system without seeming fringe or conspiracy-minded, though awareness is growing—polls, journalism, and academic work increasingly recognize that voting has limited impact on policy, illustrating the oligarchic influence. - The conversation covers the political consequences: populist and anti-establishment candidates gain traction (e.g., Trump in the U.S., nationalist movements in Europe) as mainstream options become less credible. Courts are used as tools to disqualify or sideline challengers, a phenomenon described as lawfare. - On the trajectory ahead, they contemplate whether Western society is heading toward pre-revolutionary conditions. Guardian signals include declining trust in politicians and media, the failure of the old narrative to enforce obedience, and growing calls to reform rather than escalate with new wars. - Strategically, they propose broadening anti-oligarchic reform by engaging soldiers, police, and other institutions to prevent a collapse into civil conflict, stressing that reform is essential to avert violence and preserve stability. - In closing, they acknowledge the paradox of liberal democracy: it holds strong ideals, yet its vulnerability to oligarchic capture necessitates clear understanding and reform to prevent cycles of debt, imperialism, and conflict. They express cautious optimism that, despite resistance, a shift toward reform is possible if more people recognize the systemic dynamics at play. Throughout, the speakers emphasize the need to reexamine Tocqueville’s warnings, understand the role of the expert class, and confront the entrenched power of oligarchies to preserve democratic legitimacy and avert future upheavals.

Alistair Crook and Alistair Crook discuss two linked crises: Iran and the US/Israel framework for a ceasefire, and a Europe-coordinated escalation against Russia after a major strike on Moscow. Crook begins with Iran, referencing a memorandum of understanding that has allegedly already been signed but remains shrouded in secrecy. He asks whether the Americans will uphold it, how it will reshape the region, and how it affects US-Israeli dynamics. Crook notes that Netanyahu appears weaker and raises the possibility that his replacement could be more hawkish, questioning whether Arab-party support for Netanyahu has shifted. He suggests that regardless of whether the framework is implemented, it will have a major impact across the US, Israel, and the wider region. Alistair Crook responds that the arrangement is a “framework” rather than a treaty or ceasefire: it is the “easiest part,” while the hardest element is constructing a protective zone and managing disruption. He describes visible elements already approaching within this “framework.” He then breaks down three areas Crook raised. First, he says the agreement is controversial in the United States and also controversial in Iran. He describes tension rooted in Iran’s experience with the JCPOA not being upheld and Iran remaining constrained. He cites a statement by Iran’s Supreme Leader, saying the Supreme Leader opposed the framework but was persuaded by Tazashian and Kaleva that there would be no backsliding on the framework terms or Iranian interests, which predominantly center on Hormuz. He frames Hormuz as a pivot for Iran’s potential shift into a new geopolitical context. He adds that the Supreme Leader is putting on notice both Iran’s reformist wing and a skeptical public that Iran will not allow precedents that expand the meaning of the framework until it is emptied of its purpose. Second, he highlights Lebanon as crucial. He says Iran has changed its position because it previously did not intervene directly against Israel in the axis-of-resistance way until the last period. He describes this as the first time Iran threatened heavy missile strikes on northern Israel if Israel flattened Beirut’s Dahir, arguing that this threatened the border-to-Galilee “path.” He says Trump then intervened and the attacks were stopped, but now the “thing” is being tested again. He links this to a breach question: he says Iran refuses to attend negotiating sessions and that Lebanon would be seen as a breach of the ceasefire from Iran’s perspective. Third, he turns to Israel and US politics. He claims Israeli press coverage reflects “real turmoil,” portraying the situation as a huge defeat for the “victory narrative” involving American support to destroy Iran, destroy Hezbollah, and annex parts of Lebanon with proxy permission. He describes an incident near Bofor Castle where Hezbollah attacked with an anti-tank missile, resulting in four soldiers dead, including the commander of the 82nd Brigade. He says figures and polling pressure are intensifying for Netanyahu, arguing that if Netanyahu does nothing militarily in Lebanon, his election will be lost and that there is “wall-to-wall consensus” for action. He adds that Trump’s language is shocking to Israelis: he reports Trump criticized Israel’s handling in Beirut and implied that an ex-ISIS leader could manage Lebanon more “sophisticatedly,” describing it as an unparalleled slap. He says Israelis interpret this as a Middle East that has changed: they believe there is no way to destroy Iran without the United States, and therefore that regime change is not achievable. He characterizes the result as a psychological defeat for the “Gratial Israel” concept and an acceptance that the US may impose penalties on Israel if it retaliates or breaches the framework, particularly in ways that could undermine Trump’s achievement of opening Hormuz. He argues that the framework triggered a US shift, driven by Hormuz and an “economic cliff,” saying Trump said the US was “four weeks away from running out of oil,” with figures describing US strategic reserve levels down to about 20 million barrels. He describes the ensuing US domestic battle between pro-Israel Zionist groups and Trump supporters insisting on “America first.” He counters a simple prediction of Republican losses by suggesting the midterms are rotational, with about 20 Republican seats in contention, and that loyalty to Trump’s personality could reduce defection. He also suggests that if Netanyahu attacks Lebanon, the shift could frame it as “slapping America in the face,” potentially rebounding politically for Trump among some voters. Crook then shifts topics to Russia, focusing on what he presents as an unprecedented Western escalation: a massive strike on Moscow, with NATO footprints being “advertised almost.” He asks how such escalation could be controlled and prevent nuclear escalation. He also complains that Western participation is now openly visible despite earlier efforts to conceal or downplay it. Alistair Crook says the strike involved many drones and missiles into a refinery area in Moscow and was intended to put Russians “on edge.” He links it to coordination around EU and allied meetings, stating that Macron and Merz met in London beforehand and brought Zelensky to stage European ultimatums. He says the point was to change the narrative, with Europe trying to present that Ukraine is not on the back foot and to push for more defense resources. He describes Europe’s aim as a ceasefire framework and UK/France and other participation in peacekeeping, with Ukraine eventually aligned with Europe, and bringing America back into the process via stage-managed messaging. He argues that Europe is escalating toward a war with Russia but lacks practical clarity on what such a war would look like, questioning whether it would be conventional, asymmetrical, air, or nuclear. He recounts arguments by Russian figures at the St. Petersburg Conference about stopping the “ratchet” of escalation and says the debate is growing over more procurement, missiles, drones, and co-production—reassembling shipped systems in Ukraine for use against Russia. He says Europe’s assumption that Russia would capitulate is a misunderstanding of Russia’s consciousness and history with Europe, similar to what he earlier described as a misunderstanding of Iran. He concludes that the strategy is dangerous because there is no clear escalation control if Russia perceives the threat, and he links this to Russia’s history of restraint before retaliation. The discussion ends with Crook urging readers to consult Alistair Crook’s Substack, and Crook thanking him for his insights.

Alexander McCurse and the host discuss the Iran showdown as shifting from regime-change aims to an energy-focused attrition war. McCurse notes that in the last few days Iran has faced extreme attacks—from the South Pars field to the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant—and asks how to assess Iran’s retaliation. McCurse argues the Western campaign reflected “extreme frustration and bewilderment in Washington and in Israel,” with initial hopes that Iran’s leadership would fall quickly and a power vacuum would force concessions. Instead, Iran has sustained resistance, complicating Western aims and driving a broader energy-war dynamic that Western powers cannot win, since they “rely, depend on energy,” while Iran, Russia, and potentially China are better positioned to endure. McCurse explains that the Bushehr attack is significant and consequential: the reactor is largely Russian-built with Russian technicians nearby, and the strike served as a signal to Russia to reduce support and push Iran toward negotiations. He emphasizes that Iran’s response was to strike back, revealing a miscalculation by the West similar to earlier expectations at the war’s start. The result has produced an energy-focused attrition war that, in McCurse’s view, Western powers cannot prevail in. The host references public figures who downplayed Iran’s threats, including Trump and coverage in outlets like the Wall Street Journal, and asks why Western leaders failed to predict Iran’s capable retaliation. McCurse responds that a trend of overestimating Western willpower and underestimating adversaries’ capabilities has persisted, noting a broader pattern: a belief in near-unlimited Western power, with insufficient attention to adversaries’ true industrial and strategic capacities. He cites examples of North Korea-style simplifications and generalizations about Russia and Iran, and argues that the West has often overlooked Iran’s stable institutions and its willingness to endure in pursuit of its core interests. They discuss the broader security environment, including how Ukraine’s war mirrors this dynamic. McCurse argues that dialogue and mutual address of security concerns have eroded due to a narrative that frames opponents as fundamentally brittle or ideologically driven. He stresses the importance of acknowledging that Iran can defend itself and that progress toward negotiations requires recognizing the root causes as legitimate concerns, not simply dismissing them as irrational. Reflecting on Europe, McCurse suggests that the war in Iran is connected to the proxy war with Russia and to Europe’s energy and security policies. He notes sanctions’ potential to unravel as energy dependencies shift, with countries like Indonesia and South Korea seeking Russian energy, and Taiwan needing helium from the Persian Gulf, implying broader economic entanglements that complicate sanctions strategies. He argues that the West’s insistence on a punitive, unilateral approach—while ignoring the need to address root causes—undermines long-term security. He lauds the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action as a model that balanced preventing nuclear escalation with Gulf stability, and laments that Western governments reversed post–Cold War understandings, including NATO’s eastward expansion. The discussion turns to China’s role. McCurse explains that China, the Eurasian colossus, will “buy Russian oil,” provide chips, and support Iran “under the surface” without overtly challenging Western interests, maintaining a cautious but significant involvement. He argues China will avoid a full-on confrontation that escalates US tensions, balancing its interests across Russia, Iran, and the West to preserve security and economic continuity. Towards the end, they address public sentiment in Europe and the potential fragmentation of pro-war coalitions. McCurse cautions that hardliners still control the narrative, making durable peace unlikely in the near term, though a paradigm shift toward dialogue could emerge if confronted with economic and political reality. He concludes by reiterating that the Iranians view the conflict as forced upon them, while the West has undertaken a war of choice, and that both sides’ calculus will shape the duration and outcome of the crisis.

Colonel Douglas MacGregor and Glenn discuss the current strategic picture across Ukraine, the Russia–China–Iran axis, and the broader Western political environment. On Russia and Ukraine: - MacGregor notes a major “Cauldron battles” situation in Southeastern Ukraine, with remaining Ukrainian forces being encircled and largely annihilated by precision strike weapons, and a Russian swarm anticipated to complete the encirclement. - He identifies two focal points of Russian activity: Odessa (where Russian special operations are reportedly active at night, Odessa largely undefended with air defenses degraded) and Kharkov, with ongoing pressure toward Kyiv. He emphasizes that none of these alone solves the core problem of removing Zelenskyy’s government in Kyiv, which he describes as a facade Europeans seek to preserve. - Russia has increased its force size, adding reservists and training new draftees; options for Moscow appear to be Odessa, Kharkov, and Kyiv. Putin is watching Western European political developments to gauge timing, potentially waiting for Western government changes to move decisively. - MacGregor argues NATO is effectively irrelevant to Russia’s calculus and asserts the United States does not want a war with Russia over Ukraine, giving Moscow more freedom of action than Western audiences realize. On Russia–China relations and Europe: - Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin are pursuing a bilateral strategy to mutually reinforce military and economic capabilities, forming a large continental fortress against the United States. The two powers seek to strengthen ties as they view the U.S. as increasingly belligerent. - MacGregor contends that European leaders, including Starmer, Macron, and Metz, are aligned with globalist and financial elites (referencing ties to BlackRock and others) and that personal relationships between leaders are not meaningful in the international arena; strategic interests drive policy. - He argues that many European elites’ rhetoric about Russia serves to deflect from domestic vulnerabilities and to mobilize anti-Russian sentiment as political cover. On the Middle East and Iran: - The talk about Iran is framed as not serious; MacGregor describes a plan to escalate toward regime change in Iran, driven by U.S., Israeli, and allied intelligence communities, despite Iranian resistance and regional risk. - He claims Mossad, MI6, and CIA influenced President Trump regarding Iran’s fragility, while Iran’s internal protests (economic grievances) were legitimate and quickly mischaracterized as attempts to overthrow the government. He asserts Chinese and Russian assistance helped Iran counter covert efforts, including providing satellite imagery and assisting integrated air and missile defenses. - The declared Western goal is to destroy Iran as a nation-state, with the Iranian leadership prepared to respond with full use of capabilities if attacked. He suggests a potential air and missile campaign could target the regime and strategic hubs, with the United States likely relying on high-altitude precision strikes and long-range missiles, while questioning the effectiveness and survivability of U.S. platforms like B-52s against Iranian defenses. - China and Russia are depicted as unlikely to allow Iran to be pulverized; they could intervene if Iran is near disintegration, possibly through non-nuclear actions such as a collision at sea, leveraging their submarine capabilities and influence. On European political legitimacy and future: - MacGregor connects the Epstein-related discourse in Europe to a broader critique of ruling elites, comparing the potential for political upheaval to late-18th-century France. He argues that as publics grow disillusioned with elites, there could be a crisis of political legitimacy and a shift toward more realistic leadership, with potential upheaval in Britain, France, and Germany. On Putin and future moves: - He suggests Putin views the possibility of reconciliation with Washington as unlikely, having reached somber conclusions about the prospects for meaningful agreement. He predicts Russia will act on its terms, potentially advancing toward the Dnieper River, Odessa, and perhaps Kyiv, while noting Russia does not intend to govern Western Ukraine long-term. He emphasizes that events will unfold on Russian terms, with European irrelevance in the decision-making process fading as Moscow executes its plans.

Glenn and Stanislav Krapivnik discuss a string of escalating security and geopolitical crises with a focus on drone incidents, NATO-Russia tensions, and the broader international energy and security implications. - Baltic drone incidents: Glenn asks about an attack on a key Russian port in the Baltic Sea, noting drones entered from NATO territory through the Baltic States and may have circumvented Belarus. Stanislav explains that two drones hit targets in the Baltics—one at an Estonian power-plant chimney and another at a separate object in Latvia—and suggests dozens of drones may have flown through airspace, possibly from Ukraine via Poland and the Baltics or launched from the pre-Baltics. He argues this is not a one-off event and raises two possibilities: either NATO member states have incompetent security, or they are directly engaged, with the more likely conclusion that the pre-Baltic states are direct participants in the war. - Deterrence and red lines: The conversation notes that NATO has aimed to pressure Russia economically (targeting energy, shipping, and oil). Glenn asks how these actions affect sentiment and Kremlin incentives. Stanislav counters that Tallinn and other Baltic leadership have crossed red lines, citing past incidents (Estonia drone attack on Skowabur Air Base) and suggesting Estonian actions are part of a broader pattern of Russophobia. He argues that Estonia’s leadership and policies threaten deterrence calculations and calls for accountability, positing that deterrence must be reset against Estonia given the perceived egregious escalations. - Interconnected conflicts and the Iran-Russia axis: The speakers discuss Sergei Lavrov’s remarks about a potential third world war linked to Iran and Russia. Stanislav asserts that conflicts are becoming highly interconnected, with the West having fomented them through proxies and direct actions. He asserts that Western leaders, whom he characterizes as pursuing broad war aims, are willing to sacrifice lives for geopolitical objectives, and he highlights ongoing cross-border terrorism and sanctions on supply chains. He emphasizes that Russia has long been involved in Iran’s military upgrades and drones, noting that Russian components power Iranian drones. He also points to the potential for China to align with expanding conflict dynamics, suggesting that Russia has already embedded itself in supporting Iran and that a fall of Iran would threaten Russia’s regional borders, especially along the Kazakhstani frontier. - Energy, fertilizer, and economic shocks: Stanislav draws on his supply-chain experience to describe the cascading effects of war on energy and fertilizer. He explains the logistical challenges of large-scale industrial repair after missile strikes, including the long lead times for steel, valves, and large refinery components, and argues that Europe’s gas and steel supply are constrained. He notes Russia’s restriction on diesel exports and Qatar’s role in fertilizer, highlighting how Europe has become dependent on Russian and Qatari supplies and is now left vulnerable by policy choices. He foresees a multi-year disruption of energy, fertilizer, and food supplies, warning of price spikes and potential starvation in parts of Europe and beyond as planting seasons approach. He highlights that fertilizer production relies on natural gas and that gas-rich regions are facing supply limitations, which would prolong and intensify food insecurity and economic disruption. - Gulf energy states and strategic calculations: The discussion turns to the Gulf, describing Gulf states as corporate-like entities run by wealthy families. Stanislav speculates on the strategic calculations of states like Qatar and the UAE, including the possibility that political and economic incentives could shape decisions about involvement in broader regional conflict, arms supplies, or island and maritime control. He argues that damage to energy infrastructure, maritime chokepoints, and desalination plants could have devastating regional consequences, potentially forcing costly rebuilding campaigns over several years. - Military capability and future risks: Stanislav critiques U.S. military capability for large-scale ground campaigns, arguing that the U.S. is not a traditional land-power and that a sustained invasion of Iran would face enormous logistical and manpower challenges. He emphasizes the scale and difficulty of mobilizing, training, and sustaining a large force in conflict terrain, particularly in Iran’s mountainous, fortified landscape. He also discusses the domestic constraints of U.S. recruitment, obesity rates, and the challenges of sustaining a 21st-century volunteer force in a major war. - Final reflections on leadership and narrative: The conversation closes with a discussion of Trump-era war briefs, characterizing them as short, sensational videos focused on explosions rather than reality, and a broader critique of political leadership and messaging in wartime decision-making. Glenn and Stanislav note the risk that political leaders may oversell battlefield successes and struggle to withdraw from costly, escalating commitments. In sum, the discussion centers on cross-border drone activity and its implications for NATO-Russia dynamics, the widening economic and energy-security consequences of contemporary conflicts, the deepening Iran-Russia alignment, and the daunting logistical and strategic challenges of any potential military escalation in the Middle East, including Iran.

In this discussion, Colonel Douglas MacGregor argues that the Islamabad peace talks were likely a fabrication and that Iran showed no real interest in negotiating. He asserts there was no evidence of Iranian intent to negotiate in the last talks, and notes that Vice President Harris’s momentary outside call during a meeting suggested to him that Netanyahu, not Trump, was effectively in charge of decisions affecting the conflict. He claims the White House comments about a possible ceasefire or talks are “nonsense” or designed to calm markets, and predicts the Iranian ceasefire deadline (3 AM Iranian time) would not yield a negotiated halt to hostilities. He says Iran is preparing for renewed attacks and for the possibility of a quicker American strike. MacGregor frames the conflict in strategic terms, contrasting American offensive power with Iran’s defense-focused posture. He describes the United States as a power that “banks on the offense, the ability to attack beyond its normal limits,” while Iran operates from within its borders with substantial underground storage and a defense-oriented program. He emphasizes Iran’s capability to wage a long-range, dispersed defense and to strike from 500 to 1,000 miles beyond its borders, complicating sustained air and naval operations. He believes the opening phase of any renewed U.S. campaign will be “far more intense”—more sorties, missiles, and bombings aimed at targets that could influence the outcome, focusing on infrastructure to degrade the Iranian state rather than merely military targets. Regarding resources, MacGregor estimates the Iranians have substantial unmanned systems (perhaps 45–50,000) and missiles (15–20,000, possibly more) with ongoing underground production capacity, aided by external resupply from China and Russia. He suggests the United States may have replenished some missile stocks, including air-to-surface missiles and anti-missile stocks, but questions the current readiness of destroyed radars and other critical C4ISR assets. He anticipates greater use of carpet bombing and destruction of critical infrastructure (bridges, power plants, desalination and oil infrastructure), describing this as an effort to destroy the state. On ground forces, he notes reports that President Trump has been reluctant to use them and expresses skepticism about their usefulness in the Gulf, given supply and medical evacuation challenges. He mentions potential but limited appetite for ground operations by Special Operations forces and the Army/Marines. MacGregor discusses global repercussions, warning that Iranian destruction could trigger famine due to Gulf-region fertilizer supply chains, rising fuel prices, and energy insecurity worldwide. He claims Europe is already facing energy crises and political upheaval, predicting governments will be overthrown as they confront shortages and the realities of energy dependency, and asserts the petrodollar system is dead or in decline, with China potentially stepping in as a financial hub. He argues that the multipolar shift will constrain U.S. power and that Europe should re-engage with Moscow, possibly under a new arrangement akin to a Manchurian-style convention to manage straits and regional influence. In the European and Asian context, he says NATO is finished and warns that Western media have misrepresented Russia’s intentions, instead blaming Western leaders for the escalation. He criticizes Western support for Ukraine, arguing that Ukrainian actions have been complicit in wider war costs, and he contends the broader goal of Israel’s regional plans has driven U.S. policy toward Iran. He predicts open revolutions or political turnover in Western Europe, calls for Europe to move away from wind/solar dependence in favor of more traditional energy sources, and urges a diplomatic resolution to end the war with Iran through mediation rather than continued conflict. Toward the end, MacGregor casts Trump as trapped by a Washington status quo and the Israel lobby, expresses pessimism about congressional restraint, and reiterates his view that the current approach is unsustainable. He closes by reiterating the need to end the hostilities and find a different path forward, arguing that Iran should logically oversee a new, negotiated framework for the region.

The transcript is a sprawling, high‑tension discussion in which the speakers elaborate a globalist–style scenario of escalating crisis, famine, and war, with frequent references to geopolitics, historical precedent, and provocatively conspiratorial interpretations. Key points and claims: - Catastrophic deaths and cascading conflict: The speakers repeatedly state that billions could die at the current pace, with the rate likely to be “the big time,” not merely tens of millions. They describe a trajectory toward full‑scale war and famine that could intensify over years. - Nuclear war and false flags: They suggest some actors “actually want to have a nuclear war,” and discuss the possibility that a false flag in the United States could trigger broader conflict. They claim globalist actors are manoeuvring toward such outcomes. - Global famine and migration as a driver of conflict: The conversation centers on famines as the trigger for massive migration pressures. They describe famine as creating “human osmotic pressure” that drives migration through routes like the Darien Gap, potentially to the United States, with ships possibly coming up the Mississippi and other routes to drop off tens of thousands of migrants. They warn Americans will be killed if authorities don’t stop this. - Military escalation and re‑armament at home: They predict the United States will see a military draft “as they’re gonna Ukraine it,” with native populations replaced by migrants who crossed through places like the Darien Gap. They describe the creation of new foreign armies or “Ukrainian” style armies within the U.S. and even in places like Ireland and Hispaniola. - Special forces and foreign armies: The discussion invokes Green Berets and OSS history to claim special forces are used to raise up foreign armies or internal resistances, including examples from Iraq and Afghanistan. They argue this is a normal pattern repeated worldwide, with implications for how futures might unfold. - Strategic chokepoints and “closing” maneuvers: They discuss the closing of major maritime chokepoints—Strait of Malacca, Hormuz, Turkish Straits, and potentially the Danish Straits or Kra Isthmus Canal—as mechanisms to pressure China and other powers into famine or surrender. The claim is that closing these routes would dramatically affect global trade and food supplies, accelerating collapse. - Iran–Israel–U.S. dynamics and a broader war: They describe a confrontation involving Iran, Iran’s missiles, and attacks near Dubai/UAE, with references to Trump’s shifting stance from “we’re done” to “total war.” They assert that the war could involve the Strait of Hormuz and broader campaigns against multiple nations, including threats to reset the entire geopolitical order. - attribution of responsibility and power dynamics: They argue Zionist actors are using the United States and other nations to fight China and Russia or to push for famine and disruption. They claim “the Zionists are using The United States against China and Russia” and that Israel is pursuing “Greater Israel” ambitions, with fluctuating opinions within Israel about the approach. - Argentina, Brazil, and South American pivot: They predict expansion of influence or conflict into South America (Argentina, Brazil), with implications for Chile, Paraguay, and the Drake Passage. They suggest Argentina could become a new focal point for Zionist–Chinese strategies and that Israel may seek relocation of power through places like Argentina or Ukraine in the event of a broader collapse. - Economic and fertilizer considerations: They note fertilizer shortages impacting the global economy, stressing that 30% of global fertilizer production is affected, contributing to the risk of widespread food insecurity and social unrest. - Historical and anthropological framing: The speakers frequently frame current events as a continuation of “manifest destiny” and globally systemic strategies to divide, conquer, and reallocate resources. They discuss “anthropological warfare” as a technique historically used to acquired land or resources, and they reference archival sources (e.g., Smithsonian ethnographies, War Department reports) to illustrate how populations have been managed or manipulated in past expansions. - U.S. domestic and cultural factors: They claim the United States faces domestic upheaval including potential draft scenarios, civil unrest, and demographic shifts tied to migration and military restructuring. They describe the American political and military establishment as being targeted by a broader plan to destabilize and collapse state structures. - Trump, Netanyahu, and political leverage: The conversation frames Trump and Netanyahu as central players whose actions are instrumental in the ongoing strategic dynamic, including alleged manipulation by Netanyahu to shape U.S. policy. They argue the broader crisis is designed to “kill the recovery” and enable a “great reset.” - Media, narratives, and stagecraft: There is repeated skepticism about staged events or what they regard as propaganda—examples include discussions of a controversial event at the White House and the portrayal of security and intelligence actions as orchestrated theater. They assert that real action is at the strategic level of infrastructure destruction, famine, and war rather than political theatre. - Personal and historical anecdotes: Michael Yon is introduced as a guest with a long background as a Green Beret and combat photographer; he and the hosts discuss historical episodes (e.g., the OSS, U.S. expansion, and the role of “Scots‑Irish” in American history) to illustrate patterns of colonization, military strategy, and “the globalist Thunderdome” that have shaped past and present dynamics. - Call to action and media strategy: The speakers urge listeners to support their network and products as a practical means to sustain reporting and analysis. They frame listeners as “the brains, the guts, the eyes, the blood” of a resistance movement and emphasize rapid sharing of content and recruitment to counter narratives they label as globalist control. - Closing tone: The speakers insist that the crisis is already underway, with famines and wars advancing, and they insist there is little chance of peaceful resolution unless drastic changes occur. They emphasize preparedness, historical awareness, and continued dissemination of information as essential. Overall, the dialogue presents a densely interwoven view of imminent famine, geopolitical manipulation, and multipolar conflict, punctuated by strong, conspiratorial framing of Zionist influence, the role of Israel, and the use of historical patterns of conquest and “anthropological warfare” to justify a foreseen, protracted crisis with major implications for global order.

In this conversation, Brian Berletic, a former US Marine and political analyst, discusses how the United States pursues a pattern of strategic sequencing that targets rivals one by one, often using negotiation or peace as delaying tactics or outsourcing parts of conflict to allies. He connects this to a broader framework outlined in a 2019 Rand Corporation paper and to a speech by Elbridge Colby, the US undersecretary of war for policy, arguing that the US aims to keep Ukraine’s war ongoing by shifting more responsibility and escalation to Europe, thereby pressuring Russia while also targeting Iran and, ultimately, China. Berletic frames Pete Hegseth’s early-2025 pivot as Europe taking over a proxy war against Russia and Ukraine, with Europe increasing defense spending and doubling down on Ukraine support. He says this demonstrates a natural progression where Europe becomes the frontline in the proxy conflict, while the US maintains involvement through its command in Germany and intelligence and reconnaissance capabilities. He asserts that the US is fighting Russia through Ukraine and Europe, and that there was never an intention to defeat Russia outright in this phase; instead, the aim was to create multiple dilemmas for Russia, Iran, and China as described in the Rand paper. He notes that the US sought to destroy Russia’s energy exports to Europe and replace them with LNG from the US, turning peacetime relationships into wartime dependencies. The host pushes back on the idea that evidence is ignored, highlighting how public discourse often promotes the Ukraine war as beneficial for the US, while the real dynamic is a shift toward European engagement and energy decoupling from Russia. Berletic reiterates that Europe’s energy dependence on the US mirrors how Europe was cut off from Russia through war, paralleling Asia’s potential energy realignment. He points to the Nord Stream destruction as part of a long-running strategy to subordinate Europe to US interests and to enable a broader energy strategy that pressures Asia similarly. He claims that US corporate and political influence in Europe, including the EU’s governance and non-democratic manipulation of information spaces, results in a system where national sovereignty is eroded in favor of a US-led foreign policy. They discuss elite capture, where a handful of individuals in European Union leadership and other allied governments operate for US interests, often through think tanks and institutions like the New York Times’ reporting on CIA involvement in Ukraine’s internal security apparatus. Berletic argues this results in client regimes and a lack of true national sovereignty, making European and East Asian leadership more pliant to US strategic aims. He notes that the EU’s approach—treating opposition as a temporary obstacle to be overcome—has facilitated centralized power and an ever-tightening foreign policy framework that undermines independent decision-making. On China, Berletic argues that US actions against Iran are also aimed at Asia, cutting energy flows and pressuring regional states to depend on US energy. He points to LNG projects prepared in advance of conflict with Russia, designed to be economically viable only if energy flows can be constrained, and he describes a broader energy-dominance framework aimed at surrounding China with US-backed energy dependencies. He asserts there is a coordinated plan to surround China with hostile proxies and to leverage energy as strategic leverage, transforming countries like Vietnam, Japan, and South Korea into instruments of US policy. The discussion then touches on what happens if allies resist this burden-sharing, suggesting that truly independent leadership in Europe or East Asia would reject the arrangement as unsustainable. Berletic argues that diplomacy is not dead, but multipolarism—led by Russia, China, and Iran—offers a path away from US-led hegemony, albeit with ongoing conflict and upheaval. He closes by emphasizing the importance of alternatives to Western media narratives and the need for multipolarism to reduce war and promote a more equitable global order.

Alex Kraner and Glenn discuss the Iran ceasefire and the market's reaction, along with broader geopolitical dynamics and historical patterns around war and finance. - On the ceasefire and markets: Alex argues that reading optimism from markets is unreliable, noting that markets can remain irrational for longer than a person can stay solvent. He was surprised by the ceasefire and authored a newsletter piece suggesting the peace was unlikely to hold and that the probability of lasting peace was near zero. He observed the ceasefire narrative already fraying as he finished his article. He emphasizes that the ultimate incentive for war is the conquest of collateral: Iran’s vast natural-resource wealth (estimated at about $35 trillion) could become collateral for Western banking interests. He contends that war is driven by a desire to secure new money-like collateral to prevent systemic collapse caused by fiat money expansion and liquidity injections. - Narrative and hypocrisy in war discourse: Glenn notes how narratives about values, feminism, or democracy are used to sell wars. Alex adds that wars are often sold by demonizing the other side, citing examples from past interventions (Syria, Gaddafi, Saddam Hussein, Milosevic, Allende, Ortega, Chavez, Maduro, Castro) to illustrate a recurring pattern of manufactured villains and “slaying dragons” to justify action. He also cites Afghanistan as an example where Western intervention harmed women’s rights and long-term outcomes (mass malnutrition and stunting among children) despite rhetoric about protecting women. - Lebanon and the ceasefire framework: They discuss whether Lebanon was included in the ceasefire framework as communicated by the Pakistani prime minister and why Israel then attacked Lebanon. Alex argues the U.S. may be posturing to present the ceasefire as a U.S.-led result, while Iran shaped the negotiation terms. He also suggests the U.S. was already preparing for broader action, including ground invasion plans and troop movements. - U.S. strategic posture and global ambitions: They consider whether Trump’s administration genuinely sought to retreat from global policing or if transition plans were undermined by the Iran decision. Alex recalls a shift in 2019 where Trump reportedly resisted war against Iran, then changed course on 28 February, risking severe consequences. He argues Europe may bear more hardship from the conflict, with the U.S. potentially cushioning its own impact, while Europe could face stagflation, currency pressures, and social unrest. - European exposure and dollar dynamics: Glenn notes hedge funds betting against European stocks and asks how Europe will fare if the ceasefire holds but the damage persists. Alex describes Europe as cornered: cutting off Russian energy while maintaining vulnerability due to limited alternative supplies (Qatar/US), and the potential fragility of dollar liquidity for European banks. He warns that swap lines could be withdrawn, threatening the euro and triggering inflationary crises. He cites Eurostat data showing high living-cost pressures and suggests social revolts or civil unrest could emerge across Europe. He forecasts a possible major war against Russia as a political stabilization tactic. - Global realignment and multipolarity: They foresee massive fracturing in the Middle East and Europe, leading to a multipolar global order. The United States could retreat to its own hemisphere and rethink its monetary system, with the banking oligarchy remaining a central lever of power. They discuss Gulf states’ vulnerability to Western policy and consider whether Saudi Arabia, among others, will fare better or worse depending on access to U.S. dollars and geopolitical alignments. Alex argues that the broader strategy aims to reconfigure Eurasia by weakening or fragmenting Iran, Russia, and China in sequence, using proxy wars, regime-change efforts, and economic coercion. - Long-run structural shift: The conversation concludes with the assertion that the current dynamics reflect a persistent pattern: Western powers leveraging financial and military instruments to secure strategic advantages, while portraying their actions as defending democracy and rights. They reiterate that the overarching driver remains financial hegemony and control of collateral, with the war system persistently extending into Eurasia through interconnected corridors, ports, and infrastructure projects. The dialogue ends with the claim that wars are driven by banking and financial interests rather than purely ideological aims.

Brian Berletic discusses connections between the US “economic war against China” and wars/proxy conflicts involving Russia and Iran, arguing that the US seeks primacy rather than balance of power and uses diplomacy to build pretexts for additional war and to shape geopolitics. He says US policymakers do not expect China to pressure Iran or to pressure Russia, because China has reasons to avoid helping isolate itself, and he frames US actions as deliberate attempts to keep adversaries from becoming independent centers of power. He argues the US aims to weaken Russia, Iran, and China by creating wedges and subordination through client regimes and proxies. He claims Europe, Israel, Persian Gulf states, Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines are treated as extensions of US foreign policy rather than independent balancing powers. He also contrasts what he describes as US strategic framing—portraying America as reasonable while treating opponents as “evil”—with the claimed reality of proxy war, including in Europe and Iran. When asked about the goal of restoring primacy, Berletic says the US tries to pursue multiple forms of dominance—military, financial, trade-route control, and technological dominance—while acknowledging it is becoming less realistic as China surpasses the US plus its proxies. He says US strategy, as he describes it, shifts to wrecking multiple theaters and trade systems rather than direct head-to-head conflict, including efforts to disrupt energy exports and contested waterways. He cites US-created crises in the Middle East and describes US pressure on Indonesia near the Strait of Malacca, attempts to gain military access to that chokepoint, and blockading tactics affecting Russian energy exports and other routes. He claims the US has reorganized the Marine Corps into an anti-shipping force “specifically” for interdicting shipping, with preparation starting before the Trump administration. He argues that these actions aim to increase leverage over Asian states through energy dependence on US LNG exports, and to coerce regional countries away from balancing China. He compares this to how he says the US subordinated Europe via energy dependence, including by disrupting Russia–Europe energy flows over years. Addressing the US strategy’s “double blockade” concept and chokepoints, Berletic argues it is not about shutting everything down instantly. He claims the US does not need to seize every ship; he says ships often turn back and/or are disabled or seized, and he points to examples of US warplanes disabling ships. He argues this creates deterrence and manages economic damage rather than causing total collapse at once, with the goal of controlled destabilization and increased dependency that can be used to disrupt what China is doing in the region. On the Russia–China dynamic, he says Russia is a large energy producer and shares a direct border with China, leaving fewer “middle countries” through which disruption can be mediated compared with routes like Russia–Europe gas via Ukraine. He argues that because Russia and China together can attract other states into a broader gravitational pull, the US strategy carries risks but fits a longstanding pattern of maritime corridor control and chokepoint strategies. Berletic expands on what he describes as long-running pressure against Belt and Road corridors: he claims US-backed militants attack Belt and Road infrastructure in Myanmar and that the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor is attacked by US-backed terrorists. He also describes attacks in Afghanistan against the Afghan government and Chinese investments, framing this as a long-term “global dirty war” against China and its partners. When discussing Iran and Russia, he says Iran and Russia could strike deals with the US but are instead aiming to prevent a return to the prior status quo of sanctions/perpetual threats and NATO’s incremental expansion. He frames their posture as insisting adversaries must be included in the security architecture. He then compares the current era to a “new great game,” arguing it extends beyond Eurasia and now involves technology and rapid integration of advanced capabilities into deterrence for states such as Iran. He characterizes US behavior as either dividing adversaries or weakening them to prevent coordination. He says the US does not want friends among Iran or Russia because it wants them to be subordinated or weakened; otherwise, he claims they would work together with China. Finally, regarding Taiwan, he says the US “keeps” the one-China policy rhetorically but undermines it in practice through laws, troop presence, and military cooperation with Taiwan alongside regional partners, framing US support as preventing any meaningful back-off. He says US diplomacy functions as cover, including in relation to Russia/Ukraine and Iran, and describes US strategy as a multi-domain approach that already functions as economic and proxy war against China while escalating across Russia, Iran, the Middle East, and Asia-Pacific military integration. He concludes by warning that US policy will likely continue escalating and that China’s ability to build faster than the US can disrupt and destroy is central to whether open conflict can be deterred.

Pepe and Mario discuss a broad set of geopolitical developments, focusing on Venezuela, Iran, and broader U.S.-led actions, with insights on Russia, China, and other regional players. - Venezuela developments and U.S. involvement - Venezuela is described as a “desperate move related to the demise of the petrodollar,” with multiple overlapping headlines about backers maneuvering for profit and power in Latin America, and about the U.S. declaring “this is my backyard.” Delcy Rodríguez, the daughter of a slain revolutionary killed by the CIA, leads a new government, described as old-school Chavista with strong negotiation skills, who prioritizes Venezuela’s interests over U.S. interests. - The operation is criticized as having no clear strategy or forward planning for reorganizing the Venezuelan oil industry to serve U.S. interests. Estimates from Chinese experts suggest it would take five years to recondition Venezuela’s energy ecosystem for American needs and sixteen years to reach around 3 million barrels per day, requiring approximately $183 billion in investment—investment that U.S. CEOs are reportedly unwilling to provide without total guarantees. - There is debate about the extent of U.S. influence within Maduro’s circle. Some Venezuelan sources note that the head of security for the president, previously aligned with the regime, was demoted (not arrested), and there is discussion of possible U.S. ties with individuals around Maduro’s inner circle, though the regime remains headed by Maduro with key loyalists like the defense minister (Padrino) and the interior minister (Cabello) still in place. - The narrative around regime change is viewed as a two-edged story: the U.S. sought to replace Maduro with a pliant leadership, yet the regime remains and regional power structures (including BRICS dynamics) persist. Delcy Rodríguez is portrayed as capable of negotiating with the U.S., including conversations with Marco Rubio before the coup and ongoing discussions with U.S. actors, while maintaining Venezuela’s sovereignty and memory of the revolution. - The broader regional reaction to U.S. actions in Venezuela has included criticism from neighboring countries like Colombia and Mexico, with a sense in Latin America that the U.S. should not intrude in sovereign affairs. Brazil (a major BRICS member) is highlighted as a key actor whose stance can influence Venezuela’s BRICS prospects; Lula’s position is described as cautious, with Brazil’s foreign ministry reportedly vetoing Venezuela’s BRICS membership despite Lula’s personal views. - The sanctions regime is cited as a principal reason for Venezuela’s economic stagnation, with the suggestion that lifting sanctions would be a prerequisite for meaningful economic recovery. Delcy Rodríguez is characterized as a skilled negotiator who could potentially improve Venezuela’s standing if sanctions are removed. - Public opinion in Venezuela is described as broadly supportive of the regime, with the U.S. action provoking anti-American sentiment across the hemisphere. The discussion notes that a large majority of Venezuelans (over 90%) reportedly view Delcy Rodríguez favorably, and that the perception of U.S. intervention as a violation of sovereignty influences regional attitudes. - Iran: protests, economy, and foreign influence - Iran is facing significant protests that are described as the most severe since 2022, driven largely by economic issues, inflation, and the cost of living under four decades of sanctions. Real inflation is suggested to be 35–40%, with currency and purchasing power severely eroded. - Foreign influence is discussed as a factor hijacking domestic protests in Iran, described as a “color revolution” playbook echoed by past experiences in Hong Kong and other theaters. Iranian authorities reportedly remain skeptical of Western actors, while acknowledging the regime’s vulnerability to sanctions and mismanagement. - Iranians emphasize the long-term, multi-faceted nature of their political system, including the Shiite theology underpinning governance, and the resilience of movements like Hezbollah and Yemeni factions. Iran’s leadership stresses long-term strategic ties with Russia and China, as well as BRICS engagement, with practical cooperation including repair of the Iranian electrical grid in the wake of Israeli attacks during the twelve-day war and port infrastructure developments linked to an international transportation corridor, including Indian and Chinese involvement. - The discussion notes that while sanctions have damaged Iran economically, Iranians maintain a strong domestic intellectual and grassroots culture, including debates in universities and cafes, and are not easily toppled. The regime’s ability to survive is framed in terms of internal legitimacy, external alliances (Russia, China), and the capacity to negotiate under external pressure. - Russia, China, and the U.S. strategic landscape - The conversation contrasts the apparent U.S. “bordello circus” with the more sophisticated military-diplomatic practices of Iran, Russia, and China. Russia emphasizes actions over rhetoric, citing NATO attacks on its nuclear triad and the Novgorod residence attack as evidence of deterrence concerns. China pursues long-term plans (five-year plans through 2035) and aims to elevate trade with a yuan-centric global south, seeking to reduce dollar reliance without emitting a formal de-dollarization policy. - The discussion frames U.S. policy as volatile and unpredictable (the Nixon “madman theory” analog), while Russia, China, and Iran respond with measured, long-term strategies. The potential for a prolonged Ukraine conflict is acknowledged if European leaders pursue extended confrontation, with economic strains anticipated across Europe. - In Venezuela, Iran, and broader geopolitics, the panel emphasizes the complexity of regime stability, the role of sanctions, BRICS dynamics, and the long game of global power shifts that may redefine alliances and economic arrangements over the coming years.